P E N 1 N S U LAR W A R.






FROM 1808 TO 1813. ,~;:~~
S.·.··( I /.'. ~··.~.l. ~ ~ ~. .~r./
?,' .' • ':::"/;

! \... .... ~~ ..... ;I¡~QUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.c.;~ij~a, .





VOL. n.

,- ~. :,,- ,-.,",~.:
-.'- .



1829. ./

.'. ''¡' .















Battle of Busaco--The British army retires upon Torres
Ved ras, slowly followed by the French-Description of the
lines-General review of the campaign, and condition of the
two armies-Lord ,,y ellingtoll receives reillforcements Page 1


~Iassena halts before the lines, which are illdustriously streng-
thened by the British troops-Lord 'VelIillgton, alarmed fol'
Abrantes, sellds a corps across the Tagus to secure it-For-
tifies a new positioll on the south side of the harbour-The
enemy construct boats on the river-Retire to Salltarem, alld
take up a position - The alIies follow, and go illto cantoll.-


ments 1Il front of them - Various movements of uetachcd
bodies, and many rumours touching the future 32


State of affairs on the southern frontier-Advance of Soult
against Badajoz-Capture of Olivenfa, and Ínvestment of Ba-
dajoz-General Mendizabal defeated, and Badajoz taken-
Campo Mayor reduced-Massena breaks up from Saníarem,
and retreats into Spain-Marshal Beresford marches towards
Badajoz-;-Attack of a French convoy at Campo Mayor-
The British corps passes the Guadiana, reduces Olivenfa,
and invests Badajoz-Lord Wellington visits this corps, and
gives directions for the siege-Is recaIled to the north, where
the army remains in position round Fuentes de Honor . 71


Battle of Fuentes de Honor-Re-investment of Almeida-
The French garrison blo~ up the place, and escape-Massena's
army retires into Spain, and Lord Wellington's Ínto canton-
ments-Siege of Badajoz by Marshal Beresford-Is raised
in consequence of the advance of Soult-Lord Wellington
sends off reinforcements to Marshal Beresford, and sets out
to join him-The Marshal's corps assemble in position at
V~Vff& 100


Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz-Battle of
Albuera-Retreat of Soult, and renewal of the siege-It is
pressed with vigour, and a breach in Fort St. Christoval pro-


nounced practicable - Movements of the enemy to ,relieve
the place-Brilliant cavalry affair at Usagre 128


Siege ofBadajoz-Fort Sto Christoval twice stormed without
cffect-Movements of tite enemy to relieve tite town-Lord
Wellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Por-
tugal-Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversion, and
retires to Cadiz-The Britislt army takes post behind the
Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas-Intercepted letter from
Marmont to Berthier-The allies go into cantonments. 155


Amnsements of the officers in quarters-Lord Wellington
suddenly moves towards Rodrigo, and invests the place-Dis-
position of the army in its new alignment-Description of the
country round Ciudad Rodrigo-Reports of the preparations
made' by the enellly to raise the sieg'e of that city, and ar-
rangements entered into in consequence 181


Delay on the part of the enemy to connuence 0l'erations-
They advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; throw in a con-
voy, and pass the Agueda-Skirmishes along the front of thc
British line, which falls back upon Fuente Guinaido-Dis-
play of French troops thcre-Lord 1YeJlington retires to Al.
fayates- Partial actiolls during the lllovement-Thc enemy
withdraw, and the British troops retire into cantonuwnts be-

viii CON'fENTS.

hind the Coa-Ciudad Rodrigo observed by flying parties-
:Exploits of Don Julian 20 ....


Increasing jealousies amollg the 8paniards, and nllmert>us
disasters in the south, produce gloom in the British arrny-
It continues in its quarters, and rnakes preparations to he-
siege Ciudad Rodrigo-The French armies suddenly withdraw
towards the south and east of 8pain-Lord Wellington moves
to the front, and invests Rodrigo-Progress of the siege-
Storming and capture of the place 231

Appendix 271





Battle of Busaco-The British army retires upon Torres Ve-
dras, slowly foIlowed by the French-Description of the
lines-General review of the campaign, and condition of the
two armies-Lo1"d Wellington receives reinforcements.

h has been stated in the former volume, that the
whole of the troops which composed the French
arrny of Portugal, advanced, in pursuit of us,by
columns of corps, between the Mondego and the
Douro. Instead, however. of continuing their
maTch, as we had anticipated, by these distinct
routes, they soon struck into a single line, and
proceeded, in one immensebody. along the Vizeu
road, on the right bank of the MondegQ. It 1S
worthy of remark, that the road thus selected IS



one of the worst in Portugal, and that it presented
at this time so many natural difficulties to the
transport of guns and wheeled carriages, as to be
by us esteemed quite impassable. Yet by that
road were the French troops pushed forward, and
though they were followed. by an enormous train
of carriages, of artillery, ammunition-waggons,
and other materiel, they nevertheless contrived to
make way with considerable rapidity and order.

As soon as the first intelligence of these move-
ments reached us, we retired from Celerico, and
took up fresh ground in the viciníty of Gouvea.
This was done under a persuasion that the enemy
would make his principal attack upon our right;
but it was no sooner ascertained that the road
by which we had fallen back remained unoc-
cupied, than Lord Wellington directed his columns
upon the point threatened, and in a very masterIy'
style of manreuvre, threw the whole of his army
across the Mondego, between the 25th and 26th.
At the same time, the corps of Generals Hill and
Leith were moved, the one from Largedas, the
other from, Thomar, by the Espinhel road; and
they both arrived on the latter day at the river.
Lord Wellington's corps crossed at the Bavia de
Pina Cova, and a1: the fords in the neighbourhood
of Ponte de Marcella. The light division, with
the cavalry,· were then pushed forward to meet
the enemy's advance as far as Santa Comba Dao;


the first division was placed at Mealhada, on the
great road w hich leads froro Coimbra to O porto;
the fourth occupied the left of the position of Bu-
saco, which it was now arranged to take up;
whilst the third, leaving sufficient room for the
first to form betweeo, in case the attack should
be made exclusively 00 the heights, unsupported
by anyattempt to turn our Hank, took post in con-
tinuation ofthe line thus marked out. Such were
the general arrangements entered into on the
25th; it remains now to describe the nature of
the ground on which it was pr-Oposed to risk an

. aetion.
The position of Busaco consists of one huge

mountain, which extends from the edge of the
Mondego to the great Oporto road, and supports
upon its summit the convent of Busaco, inhabited
by Plonks of the order of La Trappe. It measures
nearly sixtéen miles in width from the right, where
it eases itself off by gradual falls towards the Mon-
dego to the left, where it ends in a variety of
tongues of land, each as lofty, craggy, and rugged
as itself. It is covered in front by gorges of inde-
scribable depth, and defiles barely passable for
sheep. The principal inconvenience attending it
as fighting ground for our army, arose out of its
extent; for it was manifestly too capacious to be
occupied aright by sixty thousand men; whereas,
it is essential to the consitution of a military post, AfI'.~~

\¡~- '
'"'~"" .,:,


that it be as easy of egress as it is difficult of ac-
cess, and that its flanks as well as its centre be
well secured. But where ground is too extensive
for the troops destined to hold it, the latter object
can never be perfectly attained; and in the pre-
sent instance we could not but feel that any seri-
pus endeavour to tum our left by the Mealhada
road, must in the end be attended with success.
Strange to say, however, Marshal Massena,-an
officer whose reputation carne second to that of no
marshal in the French service, -made no effort of
the kind. On the contrary, he led his columns
through the passes aboye described, and up the
face of heights approximating very nearly to the
perpendicular, and thus devoted them to destruc-
tion, froID the hands of men, posted, as has been
already mentioned, on their summits. Had he
acted by the advice of Lord Wellington,· 1 think
he could not have adopted a course better calcu-
lated to insurE~ a defeat, and that too with a 10ss to
the conquerors trifling, even in proportion to what
usually attends upon success.
- On the 25th, th~ enemy's advanced-guard took
possession of Santa Comba Dao, and pushed on to
Martigao, were Crawford had strongly posted his
corps. As it was· Lord Wellington's wish that no
affair of advanced-guards should take place, in-
structions had been issued for the light division to
retire, on the first alarm, to the mountain of Busa-


co; and the movement was executed in admirable
order, and in the pre8ence of the enemy. Our
troops could not, however, fall back so rapidly as
to avoid; entirely, coming into .occasional contact
with their pursuers, and a good de al of firing, with
a tolerab1y smart cannonade, was the consequence.
But the 10ss on either side was trifling; although
1 had to regret the IOS8 of a fine young manmy
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Hoey, who was killed
by a cannon-shot atmy side. The light division
now threw itself upon some high and commanding
ground just aboye the great road to Vizeu, so as to

. communicate with the fourth division on it8 left,
and with the first upon its right. For the latter
division had been moved up from its station at
Mealhada, and now took post upon the hejghts~
where room had been allotted t6 it; ·and Hill and
Leith . being in full march over the Mondego, the
line was in excellent progress towards formation.
At length the arrangements were complete, and
on the 27th, at day-break, the army was an drawn
up in the following order.

On the right of the whole stood the second
division, commanded by General Hill, guarding
thedeclivities towards the Mondego, and flanked
by tbe stream. N ext to it came General Leitb's
corps, then General Picton's third division, tben
General Spencer's first division, then General
Crawford's light division; and last of an, upon


the extreme left, stood the fourth division, under
the eommand of General Coleo The eavalry were
sent to the plains in front of Mealhada, where
there was room for them to act; and the artillery
was distributed at different points, aceording as
convenienee of ground, or the prospect of an ad-
vantageous range direeted.

1 have said that the light division drew up
upon some high and· broken ground aboye the
great road to Vizeu. The road in question, which
conducts from Coimbra to the town just named,
winds round the right of a projeeting tongue· of
land, and passing through the village of Mortea,
skirts the convent wall; from which, to the sum-
mit of the mountain, there is the spaee of barely
half a mile. ' On the 26th the enemy showed a
'strong force in this direction, as welI as in front of
that part of our position which was oceupied by
General Picton. Though they did nothing more
than show themselves, it became very evident that
Massena was really making ready to attaek our
formidable position, and we heartily congratulated
one another on a prospect so satisfactory: for it is
impossible to conceive a pie ce of ground more de-
fensible from aH attempts in its front. The glacis
of a fortress is not more bare nor open to the fire
of its defenders; whilst the abruptness of the as-
eent was of itself suffieient to render powerJess, at
least for a time, the heavily-Ioaded troops which


might accomplish it. N o great while elapsed ere
our wishes received their full accomplishment; for
on the. following morning, soon after our line had
been formed, the enemy advanced to the attack.

At six o'clock in the m'orning two heavy
columns were seen to approach, the one along the
road, so as to fall in with the light division, the
other through a defile, in the direction of General
Picton's post. Both attacks were made with
great spirit and determination; but the latter was
evidently that upon which Massena mainly relied,
and to insure the success of which he had taken
every imaginable precaution. lt was intrusted to
an élite corps, appointed expressly for the service;
and it was headed by three of the most distin-
guished regiments in the French army; the 32nd,
36th, and 70th. These were placed under the
command of General Merle, an officer who had
acquired a high reputation from his behaviour at
Austerlitz; and they certainly gave proof that
neither they nor their leader had won a name
which they were not worthy to wear. They
pressed forward with a gallantry whieh drew
forth the hearty plaudits, not of their friends only,
but of their enemies; and in spite of as heavy a
shower of grape, round shot, and musketry, as it
is easy to imagine, they actually gained the summit.
They gained it too in good order, that is to say,
they were formed in an instant after the aseent


was won; and had they been supported, they
would have doubtless stood their ground for sorne
time; but there was no support in their rear;
and the 45th British,. with the 8th Portuguese,
met them with a bravery not inferior to their own,
or that of any other corps in· either army. The
contest was warm, but it was ¡lOt of long continu-
ance; for the 88th arriving to the assistance of
their cornrades, instantly charged, and the enemy
wete borne over the cliffs and crags with fearful
rapidity, many of them being lite rally picked out
of the holes in the rocks by the bayonets of our
soldiel's. The troops ernployed in this attack CQfi-
sisted oftwodivisions ofthe corps of Regnier, one
of which, under Merle, suffered the fate just
described,whilst the other remained in reserve at
the defile.

Whilst these things were going on in front of
Picton's post, twodivisions of the corps of Marshal
Ney, oue commanded by Loisón, and the other
by Mermot~ bore down· in like manner upon
General Crawford. Both of these divisions took
part in the assault, a third being left. in reserve;
and they advanced with great intrepidity over
half the ascent, exposed only to a trifling fire
frOID a few pieces· of cannon. The 43rd, 52nd,
and 95th, were in line there, and they permitted
the enemy to approach till less than one hundred
yards divided thern; and then one volley from


fight to left, coolly and deliberately given, thinned
the ranks of the assailants; after which our troops,
giving a loud and simultaneous cheer, rushed
forward with the bayonet. N ever was rout more
complete than that which followed the movement.
The enemy, unable to retreat and afraid to resist,
were roUed down the steep Iike a torrent of hail·
stones driven before a powerful wind; and not
the bayonets only, but the very hands of some of
our brave fellows; became in an instant red with
the bIood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more
decÍsive charges than those executed this day by
the two divisions which bore the brunt of the
action, were never perhaps witnessed; nor could
anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of
our rilen throughout, except, perhaps, the hardi-
hood which had ventured upon so desperate an

The 10ss of the French in these encounters was
estimated at somewhere between five and six
thousand men; Qurs fell considerably short of one
thousand; but as one of their corps, that of J unot,
had not yet been engaged, we naturally expected
a repetition of the battle on the following morning.
In this, however, we were deceived. Massena
had :already erred sufficiently in risking one at-
tempt to force our heights; and he had learned a
lesson which it was not probable that he would
speedily forget. Instead, therefore, of again di-


recting his troops against our impregnable rocks,
he was observed, soon after daylight on the 28th,
to be drawing off from the late points of attack,
and it was found that he was moving, with his
entire force, upon the Mealhada road, with the
evident intention of turning uso It was a move-
ment for which we were not only prepared, but
for which we had aH along looked, as a measure
of common prudence on the part of the enemy;
and as we never calculated upon being able to re-
tain Busaco after it should be executed, we now
made· ready to abandon the high grounds, and
continue our retreat. As soon, therefore, as the
dusk of the evening set in, we defiled to our left,
throwing Hill's division once more across the
river; and the rest of the corps marching during
the 29th, on Decentecio, Botao, Eiros, and Meal-
hada, the line of the Mondego was, on the 30th,

As it was not Lord Wellington's design to make
any stand, or risk a second batde on the Mondego,
the army was put in motion again on the 1st of
October; and the head-quarters, having halted at
Redenha that night, carne in on the 2nd to Leira.
During these marches, the divisions of the army
were kept as near aS'possible to one another: the
right retiring by the main road, pushed directly
upon Leira; the left, passing the river somewhat

·lower in it8 course, came in, under the guidance


of General Spencer, to the same tine of march
near Pombal; by which arrangement one wing
was throughout at hand to support the other, had
circumstances occurred to require it. But the
enemy showed no disposition to harass uso Though
they entered Coimbra almost at the moment of
our quitting it, they suffered our rear-guard to
march on without molestation; and they even
halted during the remainder of that day, and the
whole of the next, in the place. On the 3rd,
however, they pushed forward strong patrols into
Condeixa, towards Leira. Here, part of our
magazine, containing corn and provisions, fell into
their hands; but the magazine was captured, not
because we were unable, but because we were
unwilling to defend it. The faet is, that Lord
Wellington had strictly prohibited the rear-guard
from engaging in any affair which could, without
compromising its own safety, be avoided; and the
!'ltores in question were abandoned, rather than
that a loss of life, however trifling, should be ex-
perienced in their defence.

The army rested in Leira till the morning of the
5th, when Lord Wellington, having ascertained
that the enemy were coming on in force, gave
orders that the retreat should be resumed. This
was done along the two great roads which lead to
Lisbon, by Rio Major and Alcoba~a, and on the
same evening head-quarters were established in


the last-mentioned place; but though no skir-
mishing occurred, nor any seriolishardships feH
to our lot, it was altogether one of the most dis-
tressing journeys which any individual in the army
was evercalled upon to perform. The proclama-
tions which had been issued, requiring the inha-
bitants to abandon their homes as wefeU hack,
were very . generaHy attended to, and spectac1es
more affiicting than this prompt obedience on the
part of the Portuguese presented, it were a hard
matter even to imagine. Crowds of men, women,
and childrell; of the sick, the aged, and the in-
firm,as well as of the robust and the yonng, co-
vered the roads and the fields in every direction.
Mothers might be seen with infants at their
breasts, hurrying towards the capital, and weep-
illg as they went; old men; scarcely able to totter
along, made way chiefly by the aid of their sons
and daughters; whilst the whole way-side soon
became strewed with bedding, blankets, and other
species of household furniture, which the weary
fugitives were unable to carry further. During
the retreat of Sir John Moore's army, numerous
heart-rending scenes were brought before us;. for
then, as now, the people-particularly in Galicia
-fled at our approach; but they aH returned,
sooner or later, to theirhomes, nor ever dreamed
of accumulating upon ourline of marchó or follow-
ing our fortunes. The case was different here.


Those who forsook their dwellings, forsook them
under the persm¡.sion that they should never be-
hold them again; and the agony which such an
apprehension appeared to excite among the majo-
ritf, exceeds any attempt at' description. N or
was it on aceount of the immediate suffering of the
eountry people alone that we were disposed. on
the present occasion, to view the measure with
regret. 1t could not but occur to us, that, though
the devastating system must inevitably bear hard
upon the French, the most serious evils would~ in
aH probability, arise out ofit, both to ourselvesand
our allies, from the famine and general distress
which it threatened to bring upon a crowd so
dense, shut up within the walls of a single city.
There cán be no question now,that this very mea-
sure, more perhaps than any other, preserved Por-
tugal from subjugation, and England from defeat;
but, at the moment, there were few,
who seemed not disposed to view it with reproba-
tion; because, whilst they condemned its appa-
rent violation oí. every feeling of humanity and
justiee, they doubted the soundness of the poliey
in whieh it originated.

Whilstwe were thuscondueting ourselves, march-
ing with deliberation, and sweeping before us all
the reSOurces of the country, the enemy had ad-
vanced as far as Leira, and. seemed disposed, to
foHow us up with the fuH vigour of the sehool in


whieh their leader had learned his tacties. Their
videttes entered Leira about a eouple of hours
after our rear-guard quitted it, and they had, in
consequence, before them a choice of two roads to
Lisbon, one by the Tagus, the other bX the Sála.
But on both we were equally well prepared to re-
ceive them, as the following description of the new
arrangement of our forces will show.

It has been stated aboye, that in continuation of
the retreat from Leira upon the lines, the head-
quarters of our army were established, on the
evening of the 5th, at Alcoba~a. From Aleoba~a
a further falling baek was made upon Torres Ve-
dras and Rio Major; and from the lattei' of these
pIaees the troops began, on the 10th, to move into
the position. On that day General Hill's corps,
whieh had returned from the Ponte de Mareel1a
upon Thomar, arrived at"Villa Franca; and on the
followillg morning every division occupied the
ground marked out for it, and aU were in readiness,
at a momenfs notice, to assume the posts which
they might be required to defend.

Though 1 have already laid before the reader
something of a rude outline of tbe position of
Torres Yedras, 1 am tempted at the present stage.
of my narrative, that he may he the better able to
understand the plan of operations upon whieh it
was proposed to aet, to go rather more at length
into its localities and general disposition. 1 am


willing to believe, likewise, that ihe repetitions
which may be necessary, will be perused, even by
the unmilitary reader, without disgust; because it
is to the wise occupation of that position, and to
the judicious method pursued in maintaining it,
that the ultimate success of the Peninsular war is
to be attributed ; and because it will long continue,
even in its rude outlines, to present to future gene-
rations an enduring testimonial to the sagacity and
unconquerable firmness of our leader. With this
preface, 1 proceed now to describe, in as accurate
terms as 1 am able to employ, both the arrange-
ment of the troops, and the nature of the champ
de bataille, upon which the fate, not of Lisbon
onIy, but of Europe itself was to be decided.

Along the neck of the Peninsulaat the extre ..
mity of whichLisbon is bui!t, there extend severa!
ranges of high and rugged hills, intersected ~ere
and there by narrow passes, and covered, for the
most part, by deep ravines and defiles, in the
usual acceptation of the term, impassable. Along
these, at the distance of perhaps 25 English miles
from, the city, Lord Wellington had selected two
lines, one considerably in advance ofthe other, but
both of tremendous strength; and he had bestowed
upon their fortification so much of care, and dili.;.
gence, 'and science, as to place them almost equally
beyond the reach ofinsult from any assailing force,
however numerous and well supplied. Jfhe sys-


tem pursued onthis occasion was quite novel, and
the works erected were altogether such as were
not to be met with under similar circumstances in
any part ofthe world. It will not be necessary to
enter at muchlength into the merits of the second
line, because its strength was never tried; but of
the first or more advanced force, the following will
be found to contain a tolerably correct sketch.

This line rested its right upon the acclivities of
Alhandra, on the summit of which several for-
midable redoubts were erected, and was flanked
by the fire of adozen gun-boats, at anchor in the
Tagus. The faces of these hilIs were all carefuIly
scarped; the road which led through them. was
destroyed; and it was with' perfect justice con-
cluded, that here, at least, our position might be
pronounced impregnable. On the left of these
heights laya ravine or gully, called the pass of
Maltao, the gorge of which was effectually blOcked
up by .two formidableredoubts; whilst it was
completely comrnanded, on one hand by the hilIs
of Alhándra, and o~ the other by those of Armeda.
Thelatter, like the forrner, were. scarped, and
otherwise rendered inaccessible; and they com-
municated with the centre of the position, which
was a huge mountain, crowned bya redoubt more
extensive than any other in the lineo As this
mountain overhung the village of Sobral, its castle
kept cornpletely at command the great road which

l'ENJNSFLA J{ "'A H. 17

conducts from thenoe to Lisbon, and rendered it
utterly hopeless for any body of men so much as
to attempt a passage in that direction. On the
left of this redoubt, again, some high and broken
ground looked down upon Zebreira, and stretched
in formidable shape towards Pataneira. J ust
behind that village there is a deep glen, succeeded
by other hills, which cover the roads from Ribal-
deira to Exara de los Cavalleiros and Lisbon;
whilst on the left of the whole was a lofty moun-
tain, which crowded up all the space between
these roads and Torres Vedras. Such is a brief
detail of the leading features in this position; than
which it wiU be seen that, independently of all
that art had done for it, few can be imagined more
formidable; but when it is further undel'stood
that the ascents were all steep, rugged, and rocky ;
that -strong vineyards and deep ground everywhere
covered the front; and that, wherever natural ob-
stacles chanced to be fewer in numbel', or Iess in-
superable in kind than couId have been desired,
labour had not failed to suppIy them; and when
these things are taken into consideration, an army
once brought thither must either be faIse to itself,
or it might defy aH the force of the French em-
pire seriousIy to molest it. 1t remains now to
state in what order, and with what design. tIte
troops were arranged for its defence.

On the right of the whole was posted General
VOL. n. B


Hill's corps, the British troops occupying the vil-
lage of Alhandra, where they were kept ready to
be moved to any point which seemed most to be
threatened ; whilst the Pórtuguese stood prepared
to throw thernselves into the redoubts, and to
defend thern to the last extremity. Next to Hill's
carne Crawford's division, having the heights of
Arruda, and the works attached to thern, pecu-
liarly intrusted to its careo Then carne General
Pack's Portuguese brigade; the whole of which
were stationed in the great redoubt of which 1
have aIread y spoken. as crowning the hill aboye
Sobral; whilst Sir Brent Spencer's division garri-
soned the high ground aboye Zebreira, as far as
the village of Pataneira. General Picton's right
joined itself to Spencer's left, in rear of the last-
named place, at the ravine which there broke in ;
and Cole's division, connecting itself with Picton's,
carried on the line across the hills, as far as the
road to Exara de Cavalleiros and Lisbon. Last
of aH came General Campbell's corps, which occu-
pying the mountain between the· road and Torres
Yedras, formed the extreme left of our arrny.

1 have spoken of redoubts and other works, as
giving additional s.trength to this stupendous posi-
tion; it is right that 1 should refer to thero in
terrns sornewhat more explicito The reader is
not, perhaps, ignorant, that in fortifying a line,
su eh as that of Torres Yedras, for the· support of a


large army in the field, the ordinary practice is to
construct batteries and other points d'appui,
which shall present as imposing a front as may be
to . the attacking force, but shall be open and

-utterly defenceless from the rearo In the present
instance, however, the redoubts thrown up were
not so much field-works as regular castles, many
of which were capable of containing several hun-
dreds, whilst one required no fewer than three
thousand men to form its garrison. These were
built as if each had -been intended to stand a

. siege of s~x weeks, at the most moderate computa-
tion; they were placed in situations which ren-
dered them quite as defensible froro one side as
from another; and they were aH, to a certain ex-
tent at least, independent of those near them, and
well sheItered from their fire, should they fall into
the-hands of the enemy. It wasLord Wellington's
design to garrison these posts chiefiy with the
militia and least disciplined regiments; whilst he
kept the whole of the British troops, and the élite
of the Portuguese, free and unencumbered, to be
employed as circumstances might require. By
this arrangement he secured to himself the double
advantage of a moveable army and a fortified
place. Supposing the position to be forced, the
forts were still there to interrupt the enemy's com-
munications, and cut off their supplies ; whilst the
columns need only to be marched a few miles to


the rear, in order to assume ground even more
defensible than that which they abandoned. 1 am
not willing to detain the reader by any remarks of
my own, at a period of the narrative so replete
with interesting oecurrences: but 1 cannot pro-
ceed further, without desiring to draw the atten-
tion of my brother soldiers in a particular manner
not only to the subject of which 1 am now speak-
ing, but to the whole plan of this campaign; be-
cause 1 am sme that a British army never took
part in one better adapted to. instruct it in the art
of manreuvring 'on a great scale, nor consequenUy
so well calculated to make efficient officers of those
who shared in it, or are disposed to take the trou-
ble of studying it as it deserves.

In the course of this narrative 1 have, in general,
eonfined myself so much to the movements of the
troops placed immediately under the orders of
Lord Wellington, that the reader, were he not
instructedfrom different sourees, might remain
ignorant that there were other corps of greater 01'
less efficiency employed at different points in our
favour, during the entire summer. These were, a
body of mili tia under Colonel Trant, which moved
hither and thither as eircrimstances seemed to re-
quire; General Silveira's army, consisting of sorne
eight thousand irregulars; a portion of the Lusi-
tanian Legion, under Colonel Wilson; besides
bandsof guerillas in all directions. It is deserving


of record, that Lord Wellington kept the whole of
these irregular troops among the mountains and
fastnesses, in points of perfeet seeurity, till the
ópportunity arrived for bringing them into play.
At what moment this oeeurred, and to what uses
they were eventual1y turned, will best be under-
stood by glaneing back through the whole of the
eampaign, from its opening' up to the present hour.

The faH of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida, instead of disclosing at once the plan
upon whieh Massena was preparing to aet, left us
for some time as mueh in the dark as ever; inas-
much as Regnier's eorps remained on the left of
the Tagus, and seemed still to threaten the division
of General HiB. The eonseqllence was, that an
opinion generaIly prevailed in our army-and 1
have reason to believe that it was embraced by the
Commander-in-ehief-that he would make his
main push upon our right flank, and amusing us in
front, follow up our movements with one corps
onIy. The defences of the Zezere were, under
these eircumstanees, naturally looked to by us as
of paramount importance; and it was chiefly to
secure them, that General Leith's eorps was formed
at Thomar, and kept in reserve. Contrary to all
expectation, however, and in direet defiance of
every ordínary rule ofmilitary manreuvre, Massena
left our right unmolested; and thoughhe was


compelled to move upon a much larger portion of
the circumference of the circle than we were f he
threw his whole army~ in masterIy style, to the
north bank of the Mondego. He was quite aware
that, did we perceive this movement, Hill could be
brought into junction with us within a shorter
space of time than would be requisite to connect
Regnier with himself; and he knew also that the
movement could hardly be made witbout our
knowledge.· Massena, therefore, adopted his plans
up~m principIes more deep and more ~ubtile than
usualIy guide men in theirundertakings. By the
less observing, it was affirmed that he had chosen
the only road which was impassable for artillery;
and that he moved his arrny in·· one line, merely
that a reasonable excuse D1ight be made for the
delay on which he had already determined. There
is not, however, justice in these notions. Massena
took a road by which, and by which alone, he was
enabled to avoid the whole of the defences of the
Zezere, the strong positions of Sarsedas and Ponte
de Marcella, and, 1 may add, thevery rock upon
which he chose to make temporary· shipwreck of
his prospects, the line of Bnsaco; for had he per-
si$ted in his prudent course, and followed at once
the path by the Sierra de Caramala, he might have
arrived at the point where he now stood, within
a few leagues of Lisbon. N ow let attention be


paid to the plan of operations, by which Lord
Wellington contri ved to render aH the ta lent and
prudence of his skilful adversary ofno avail.

The first measure which our .chief adopted was
this: he caused an excellent road to be made on
the 80uth side of the Mondego, which extended an
the way from Celerico to Ponte de Marcella, and
beyond it to Coimbra. His next step was to pro-
vide against the delays and confusion to which the
enemy, who moved in a single continuous column,
were subject. FoI' this purpose, as he had deter-
mined, on many accounts, not to risk an action on
the fI'ontier, he took the precaution to throw his
divisions and brigades along the great gorge, ex-
tending from Celerico to the Alva; and he so ar-
ranged them, as that when the army began to
move, the troops followed one another by stages,
in tbe utmost regularity, and without any of that
bustle which a march en masse unavoidably occa-
síons. Possessed of these advantages, Lord Wel-
lington saw, clearly enough, that it was in his
power, ~n the event of Massena's advance by any
single road, to cross the Mondego with his whole
force, and to throw himself, whenever he chose,
between the enemy and Coimbra. As soon, there-
fore, as Massena's designs were satisfactorily as-
certained, he fixed, with a master's eye, upon the
banks of the Dao and the Criz, as the proper spots
at which to cast impediments in the way ofthe


French; whilst he should perform the arduous
and enterprising operation, of throwing the entire
of his infantry, artillery, and stores, by wretched
fords, and still more wretched bridges, across a
river of no ordinary dimensions or difficulties.

AH was .accomplished in the very order and
manner which he had in his own mind chalked
out. The bridges on the Dao. and the Criz were
then destroyed with astonishing celerity. Craw-
ford and Pack, with the advanced-guard, were
thrown across at Santa Comba Dao, and the rest
of the army accomplished a very brilliant ~a­
nreuvre with the utmost accuracy and perfection;
fuI' not a gun got out of its place during the con~
tinuance of the march, and when the moment of
inquiry arrived, everything was found in the exact
spot which it had be en intended to occupy. But
the most extraordinary feature of all remains yet
10 be noticed. From the instant when he fixed
upon the position of Busaco, Lord Wellington ex-
pressed his firm conviction that he would be at-
tacked there; and he adhered to that opinion, in
opposition to the sentiments of every fUllctiollary
by whom he was surrounded. There was a de-
gree of prescience in this for which it is impossible
accurately to account"; for there cannot be a ques-
tion as to the course which the enemy ought to
have adopted, alld which it was their wisdom to
adopto Instead of dashing themselves madly


against US, they ought to have continued to take
ground to their right, and so gone round a stu-
pendous mountain, which the slightest exercise
of milital'y penetration might. have shown that
they need not hope to pass. It is true that at
this time Colonel Trant, with his corps, ought to
have taken post at Sardao: he had received orders
to proceed thither, with a view of strengthening
our left; and it may be that the enemy had been
]ed to think of him as actually in that situation.
But had the case been so, it requires no depth of
discernment to discover that aH the resistance
which it was in his power to offer, would have
availed nothing against three French corps; more
especially when it is considered that there are
numerous· passes from Mortagao, by the Vouga,
into the Oporto road, which Trant possessed
neither force nor means adequate to watch. It
were absurd, therefore, to speak of this notion, as
at the time it was not unusual to speak of it, as in
any degree inHuencing Massena in the comse
which he pursued; for it requires only a glance
over the map to convince any one that all effort to
stop the enemy in the Hat country between the
Busaco and the sea, must have be en fruitless.
Had they chosen to bring their united force into
that arena, we could have done nothing to arrest
their progress; and hence it is, that 1 speak of
Lord WeUington's prescience as something quite


out of the ordinary course of events, inasmuch as
Busaco was a position simply and solely because
the enemy thoughtfit by attacking to give to it
that character.

That the success which crowned our efforts at
Busaco was productive of the most beneficial con-
sequences, and that the manreuvres which pre-
ceded the- battle were all admirable in their kind,
admits not of a doubt. By means of these _the
enemy's arrival at Coimbra was delayed, and time
given for the removal of the inhabitants; an advan-
tage which became the more vital, as we had been
disappointed in our expectation of an attack upon
the position of Ponte de Marcella. Far be it from
me, therefore, to throw out so much as an insinua-
tion that everything was not conducted with con-
summate ability and admirable foresight. Yet is
it as clear as the sun at noon-day, not only that
Massena might have passed us by without fight-
ing, but that, when we abandoned the ground of
our victory at Busaco, we did so, not because
Trant had failed in reaching his allotted station,
but because the ground was in itself indef~nsible.
The truth ¡s, that Massena, in this campaign, by
no means supported the reputation whichhis
previous services had obtained for him, or carne up
to the opinion which we had formed of him, as a
master of the military arto Throughout our
retreat, he scarcely ever followed us up with the


vigour which gene rally attends the movements of
a pursuing army, and all his operations were
marked by a languor and supineness which sur-
prised not less than they gratified uso It seemed
as ifthe Fren~h soldiers had already learned to
stand in fear of us, or that they had ceased to be
the men before whom the nations of the north
one after another gave way. Had we been at all
pushed, hampered as we were with the whole
population of the country, it would have been
impracticable, at more than one place, to hinder
stores and even stragglers from falling into the
enemy's hands; but from .the hour of our first
movement, up to the moment of our arrival in
the lines, not an effort was made so to harass
uso It is time, however, that 1 should cease from
this somewhat technical dissertation, and resume,'-
where 1 permitted it to slip, the thread of my

During the last week of our retrogression the
rain fell in uninterrupted torrents; flooding all the
plains, cutting up the roads, and swelling every
mountain-stream to a roaring cataract .. In spite.
however, of the difficulties thence arising,· and
nothing daunted by the numerous privations
which threatened to befall his army in· an ex-
hausted country, Massena continued his march;
driving us back upon our strength; our re~ources,


our magazines, and our provisions, whilst his own
were suffering continual diminution, and his com-
munications with therear becoming daily more and
more msecure. The truth is, that both parties
were now committed to a desperate game. On
our side the chances of success were, doubtless,
infinitely greater than on the side of the enemy,
inasmuch as our position was excellent, our
troops were fresh and in high spirits, our supplies
were abundant, and the capital in our rear was
tranquil ;but we could not conceal from our-
selves that the game was still desperate, as well
with us as with them. Were we, by any fatality,
to suffer a defeat; were the French to force our
lines, and make themselves masters of our intrench-
ments, through the imbecility 01' treachery of their
defenders, or through any other of those accidents
to which war is ever liable, the chances were,
that neither army nor ships would ever escape
from the Tagus .. We were thetefore in the situa-
tion of men about to make their last throw, and to
stake upon it, not temporary prosperity, but actual
existence. The French, on the other hand, whilst
they advanced against us, plunged into a district
where means of subsistence must soon be wanting
to them, and left their rear to be acted upon by
clouds of irregulars, whom Lord Wellington now
surnmoned from their fastnesses for the purpose.


The bodies to which I anude were, five thousand
men under Trant, which were hurrying along the
road [rom Oporto to Coimbra; a similar force of
militia under Wilson, which had already arrived
at Busaco, and had taken sorne prisoners; two
distinct corps, the one estimated at fifteen thou-
sand men, under Silveira, the other at eight or
ten thousand men, under Bacillar, which were
advancing from the north; besides numerous
straggling bands, aH animated by the same feeling
of deadly hatred towards the French. Now these

. corps, .though very inferior to regular ttoops, were
still capable of creating constant alarm; inasmuch
as they were ever at hand to cut off convoys, to
destroy stragglers, to surprise magazines, al1d to
harass the rear-guard ; whilst in front the prospect
of a resistance was held out, which Massena could
notcontemplate without the most serious appre-
hensiol1. That the enerny considered their situa-
tion one of extreme peril and hazard, Wás dis-
tinctly proved by the state of inactivity into which
they saan fell; as if they felt their inability to
perform that which their wishes prompted, and
yet were unwilling to resign all hope without at
least ane effort to rea1ise it.

In the mean while Lord Wellington, whose
exertions were unintermitting, and whose activity
of body al1d mind surpassed all that could have


been expected even from him, was receiving every
hour fresh encouragements to persevere in the
judicious system which he had adopted. For
sorne time back he had been very urgent with his
own government, to send such reinforcements as
his circumstances required; and he was about
this time gratified by the arrival in camp of six
battalions from England, and four from Cadiz;
amounting, in aH, to between seven and eight
thousand men. By this happy addition, the effec-
tive strength of the British army was increased to
thirty-three thousand soldiers; whilst th~ SUill
total of its strength upon paper fell not short of
forty-one thousand. Nor was this the only addi-:,
tion which he received to his force at a moment
so critical. He prevailed upon Romana, whose
continuance on the southern frontier was proved
to be productive of no serious advantage, to join
him with as large a portion of his corps as he
could venture to remove; and fhere came in, in
consequence, about three thousand Spaniards, the
élite of the Spanish army, under that officer. The
corps in question marched from Badajoz and
Campo Major, and reaching the Tagus at Aldea
Gallega, was brought over from thence, and took
post at Exara de los· Cavalleiros, as a support to
our centre. Thus, with thirty-three thousand
British, thirty thousand Portuguese, and three


thousand Spaniards, the allied arrny could muster
nearly seventy thousand men; of which the com-
parative inefficiency of sorne of its parts was more
than cornpensated by the nature of the ground
which it occupied.



Massena halts before the lines, which are industriously strength-
ened by the British troops-Lord WeIlington, alarmed ror
Abrantes, sends a corps across the Tagus to secure it-For-
tifies a new position on the south side of the harbour-The
enemy construct hoats on the river-Retire to 8antarem, and
take up a position-The allies follow, and go into canton-
ments in front of them-V arious movements of detached
hodies, and many rumours touching the future.

LITTLE occurred in our irnmediate presence par-
ticularly deserving of notice, for some time aftel'
we finally took up the position of the Zebreira. A t
first, indeed, a few affail's· of cavalry took place,
most of which ended in oul' favour; but latterly
this force was removed to the real', as well be-
cause their services were not needed, as beca use
they could there be hetter supplied with forage,
than among the rugged defiles in front. There
\Vere also two partial rencontres of infantry; one
in which sorne Portuguese regiments, attached to


General Cole's division, behaved well whilst re~
tiring from Ribaldusa towards Guaxara; and ano-
ther, which gave to the 71st regiment, assisted
by a company of the 95th and ~ few Germans, a
brilliant opportunity of distinguishing themselves.
On the 14th, a strong body of French troops at·
tacked a redoubt at Sobral, which the 71st were
appointed to hold. That gallant regiment not
only repulsed the assailants, but following them
beyond the lines, drove them, in their turn, from a
work which they had begun to construct on a
height opposite, and kept possession of the gronnd
which they had gained. These, however, were
the only instances in which large bodies of men
carne into contacto The pickets, particularly oa
our right, would, from time to time, engage, and a
good deal of desultory firing was the conseq uence ;
but such skirmishes produced no memorable re-
sults, and were, in general, productive of few ca-
sualties. The only person of note, indeed, that
feH on either side, was the French General St.
Croix, who was killed by a cannon-shot from one
of our gun-boats, as he was reconnoitring. . He
was an ófficer of distinguished gallantry and higb
character-one of the best in the cavalry servÍce
-Of the Emperor; and 1 Qwn that we sincerely
lamented the sorry manner in which a brave so}, ..
dier, who came with honour and safety through

VOL. 11. e


the perils of Austerlitz, Esli~g, and Wagram, lost
his Jife.

But though all remained quiet in our camp,
and in that of the enemy, the latter were begin-
ning every day to experience more and more se-
verely the difficulties of the undertaking in which
they had embarked. Their communications be-
carne hourly less and less open; sickness began
to spread itself through their ranks; the stock of
provisions whch, in spite of our exertions to pre-
vent it, they had, on their first arrival, contrived
to discover, was rapidly wasting; and desertions
were exceedingly frequent. Their regular tr90PS in
the rear, were, moreover, singularly active; and
their enterprises proved to be, for the most part,
not more spirited than successful. A corps of
Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant and Ge-
neral Miller, entered Coimbra on the 7th, where
they captured a considerable depot of stores, as
well as four thousand sick and wounded, who had
been lodged there in hospital. This done, they
made ready the bridge over the Mondego for de-
struction; and then pushing their cavalry towards
Condeixa, harassed Massena's rear with continual
skirmishes. In entering upon the latter under-
taking, they felt theÍnselves perfectly secure; for
it was in their power, at any moment, to retire, if
attacked by superior force, across the river, and


breaking down the bridge in their rear, to set all the
enemy's efforts to molest them at defiance. The
consequence was, that their attacks were both bold
and well managed; and the enemy lost not a few,
as well of those who met the assailants face to face,
as from the stragglers and plundering parties, which,
in spite of all risks, persisted in straying from their

A delay so continued, and so little expected
from the French Marshal, not unnaturally led to
a variety of conjectures, on our parts, as to its
originating causes and probable results. The
whole of Massena's operations,considered merely
in a military point of view, appeared to be so ¡n-
explicable, that we found ourselves under the ne-
eessity of regarding' them in a different light, and
referring them to political considerations entirely.
Hehad acted, from his first assumption 'Of the
eommand, as if he were embarked in an under-
taking, of the ultimate success of which he was
far from being sanguine; and in which he ha-
zarded his reputation on no other aceount, than
because he knew ~t to be a business, in the prose-
cution of which the Emperor was deeply in-
terested. There feH into our hands, during this
interval, several letters; sorne of instruction to
Massena from N apoleon; others, on private busi-
ness between Massena and his brother marshals.
Many of these were curious and interesting docu-


ments; and those of the former class showed
that the sources of information open to the enemy
were more ample and more correct than could
have beensupposed. The Emperor's directions
to Massena, which had reference to the opening
of the campaign, required him to enter Portugal
without delay, and to bring the English to battle
wherever he should find them. It was stated
that there were but sixteen thousand British
troops under Lord Wellington iil person, and only
four thousand under Hill; that the whole united,
inclusive of the Portuguese, could not exceed
thirty thousand men; that the Portuguese were
little better than brigands; and that there could
be nothing capable of arresting the progre ss of a
French force, which counted sixty thousand in-
fantry and twelve thousand cavalry, between
Ciudad Rodrigo and the capital. The probability
that four thousand men would shortly be brought
from Cadiz, was, moreover, urged as a reason why
Massena should sufrer no delays on his march;
whilst it was added that the spies in London
wrote strongly of the intentions of the English to
embark as soon as they should be hard pressed,
and abandon the country. Now it is worthy of
notice, that the nmnbers specified aboye, corres-
ponded exactly with the effective state of our,
army during the ear]y summer; and there is no
doubt that, at the moment when Buonaparte


wrote, serious thoughts were entertained, if not in
Portugal, certainly in London, of relinquishing the
contest as profitIess, and beyond the means of
England to support.

From the tenor of this communication we were
Ied to believe that Massena had, as 1 have already
hinted, embarked in a series of operations which
his j udgment condemned; and that he now found
himself reduced to the mortifying alternative of
either risking all upon the chances of a battle, or
of remaining where he was, in spite of the nume~
rous privations to which he was subject, till fresh
instructions should reach him from Paris. Had he
confined his views, if not previously to his defeat
at Busaeo, at all events after that event oeeurred,
to the north of Portugal, taking up the line of the
Mondego for the winter, and detaehing a corps to
occupy Oporto, he would have made himself mas-
ter of a portion of the country; and making the
most of his successes at Ciudad Rodrigo and AI-
meida, would have optained credit for having ac-
complished a tolerably brilliant campaign. But
that opportunity was gone by. He had be en re-
pulsed at Busaco; he had passed the Mondego,
with a perfeet knowledge all the while, that his
communications would beco me at every step more
uncertain; he saw the whole militia of Portugal
rising in his rear, and yet leít his sick at Coimbra,
without a sufficient garrison to proteet them. He


had done all this, not that he might follow us with
vigour, for the pursuit was so delibera te, that all
our stiagglers and almost aH our baggage escaped
uninjured; and now he lay perfectly inactive in
our front. lt was quite impossible to imagine that
an officer of Massena's character could have acted
thus, had he not acted under the influence of com-
pulsion. To that, therefore, we unhesitatingly
attributed the proceedings of our opponent. We
had reason to believe that he had despatched mes-
sengers to demand, either that strong reinforce-
nlents should be sent to him, or that fresh instnic-
tions, suitable to the turn which affairs had taken,
might be granted; and we accordingly looked
forward to a continuance of the procrastinating
system for sorne time to come; for reinforce-
ments, supposing the plan of reinforcing to be
adopted, could not arrive in a day. It is true that
the French corps in Galicia, augmented by every-
thing in Castile, would prove formidable; and
that the space between Galicia and Massena's en-
campmen1, might be traversed with perfect ease
in a fortnight. But the garrisons could not be
·withdrawn from Galicia and Castile ti11 others
arrived to replace them; and of the movement of
any force adequate to that purpose we knew no-
thing. Our minister at Lisbon, Sir Charles Stuart,
spoke indeed of fun forty thousand men as on their
way through Spain; but the only corps of which


our intelligence took notice, consisted of no more
than nine battalions of infantry, and two thousand
cavalry, on its march from Vittoria, towards the
Portuguese frontier. There WélS, no doubt, a pos-
sibility that the blockade of Cadiz might be inter-
mitted; in which case the arrny hitherto employed
there, uniting itself to Mortier's corps, might enter
Alentejo full twenty-five thousand strong,; and if
to this twenty thousand more could be added, on
the route from Galicia to Oporto, then indeed we
might expect sorne severe service belore long.
But however judicious all these measures might be
in themselves, there was nothing before us calcu-
lated to excite an apprehension, that they were
really in process of completion. On the con-
trary, we were led, from a variety of oc curren ces,
to guess that Massena's views leaned more to a
retreat than to an advance; and that he delayed
the former movement only till the sanctioll of his
master should be obtained, and his own credit
should be thereby saved.

The advanced parties of the Portuguese being
pushed on as far as Leira, and the garrison of
Abrantes seriously incommoding the French, the
latter moved in forceupon Salvatierra, where they
succeeded in establishing a bridge across the Ta-
gus, and so laid open to themselves the province
of Alentejo. This might be for the purpose of
securing those supplies which were no longer to

~_ .. ~~.-:--If~": ~ ~ ,l",· "


be had from the north; but taken ill connexioll
with a rumour which prevailed of an intended at-
tack upon Abrantes, it appeared to us that Massena
was anxious to keep the Alentejo open as a line
by which his escape wouldbe secured. Abrantes,
however, was so well supplied and garrisoned, as
to leave us little ground to apprehend any misfor-
tune there, unless, indeed, it were attacked by a
force greater than the enemy could well spare from
our front; and hence we reflected, that if he
should retreat l?y the Alentejo, he must march by
a single toad, and that the means were still in our
hands of intercepting him, should we fee1 ourselves
sufficiently strong; or at least of harassing him
dreadfulIy, should that course appear "more advisa-
ble. To s-peak with candour, however, it must be
confessed that Massena's designs were as mysterious
to us as they were probably vague and undefined
even to himself; and we accordingly remained to
watch the result, not in id lenes!'!, hut in security,
upan our line ofimpregnable hilIs and fortifications.

There arose, at this time, 80mething like a
question amongst us, whether a movement on the
offensive, entered upon at this critical j uncture y
ll1ight not bringabout the most favourable results.
By su eh as argued in favour of the movement, it
was urged that the French were diminished in
numbers, broken in spirit, and devoid of confidence;
that the soldiers distrusted their leaders, and the


leaders distrusted the soldiers; and that a spirited
attack made at such a moment, would not only
not be resisted, but that it would probably end in

- a victory more complete than had been obtained
during the war. Fortunately for the cause of
which he was the main support, our chief saw
matters in a very different light. We estimated
the losses of the French army at the highest, when
we put down the amount, by deaths, sickness, de~
sertion, and the casualties of battle, at fifteen thou~
sand meno Now, as they moved into the country
with fuIl sixty-two thousand, this would still leave
tbem forty-seven thousand with which to meet us;
and as we could not pretend to bring more than
fifty thousand beyond the lines, our numerical
superiority would be an advantage hardly worth
calcuJating upon. To counterbalance it entirely,
again, it was to be considered that the enemy
were aIl veteran troops; whilst of ours, the larger
proportion were raw levies of Portuguese and
Spaniards, in many instances wretchedly officered,
and in aIl, but little accustomed to fleld movements~
i~' ThePortuguese had, indeed, behaved gallantly at

Busaco; and we were disposed to place in them
as much confidence as could be re po sed in any
soldiers as yet so imperfectly instructed in their
duty; but we should have hardly looked to them
for that regularity of manrellvre over a broken and
varied traet of eountry, which we should be sure


to find in the well~ained troops to whom they
would be opposed. Besides, our attack, if made
at aH, must be made without cannon; for we had
so completely destroyed the roads, and scarped the
faces of the heights, that artillery could not be
advanced, either by the one or the othel', as long
as an enemy lay befóre us to impede its progress.
The enemy, therefore, ifbeaten at all-which was
surely, under such circumstances, problematical-
could not be beaten without a heavy 10ss on our
side; and that 10ss would, as a matter of course,
faH upon the best men; because sueh only would

. be found at their posts. N ow ir, again, the defeat
were not perfeet, if it amounted to anything less
than a total rout and dissolution ofthe al'my, where
would be the benefit arising from it? Massena
would retire upon sorne strong positions, disputing
with us every inch of the country, and finally
make his escape to the reinforeements in his real' ;
whilst we should have exhausted ours, and erip-
pled our whole resources; fol' the attainment of
only a momentary advantage. N ay, it was far
from being impossible, that whilst we wel'e follow-
ing up the eorps opposed to us, othel's might ad-
vanee upon the lines, of neeessity feebly manned ;
and should these be carried, not even the total de-
struction of Massena and his army would compen-
sate for the misfortune. On all these aceounts,
and wi th the firm conviction on his mind, that


things were working as advantageouslyas he could
desire, Lord Wellington determined to adhere to
his defensive system; and the event proved, that
as his reasoning had not proceeded upon mistaken
grounds, so the results to which it led were not

N either the time of our soldiers nor that of
their chief was, however, wasted in idleness. The
former were busily employed in the construction
of new works, wherever their erection appeared at
all desirable, and in giving additional solidity to
those already thrown up; till the lines became as
perfect aspecimen of a fortified position as it was
possible for nature and art to produce. The latter
was indefatigable in his exertions to bring his
army into a condition of general efficiency, and
his exertions were too judiciously applied not to
be erowned with success. The Portuguese being
now thoroughly amalgamated with the British
troops, learned from them aH those lessons which
in after campaigns they turned to an excellent
account; and Beresford, to whom the entire merit
of their first trainingis due, was in consequence re-
lieved from all further responsibility in field opera-
tions. Every day brought in its improvements
among them; and the General was soon rewarded
for all his trouble by the conviction that he might
rely upon them almost as perfectly as upon his
countrymen. N or was Lord Wellington inattentive


to the comforts, and even luxuries of his followers.
Provisions were abundant; there was no want of
wine; and sports and amusements went on as· if
we had be en, not at the seat of war, but in Eng-
land. Officers of all ranks, and in every depart-
ment, from the Commander-in-chief down to the
regimental subaltern, occasionally enjoyed the
field-sports of hunting, shooting, and fishing. The
men, too, had their pastimes when not employed
on duty; in a word, seldom has an army, occupy-
ing ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so
many hours of relaxation, or contrived to uniteso
completely the pIe asures of country life with the
serious business of war. It is probably needless
to add, that so great a show of security in their
leader had the best possible effect upon the tem-
per of the troops; or that the morale of the army
was sustained, not more by a contemplation of
things as they really were, than by a conviction
that they must be going on prosperously, other-
wise so much relaxation could not abound.

1 have said that, in this interval of quiet, a
variety of intercepted letters, as \vell private as
official, feH into our hands. Among others, we
were fortunate enough to become possessed of
Massena's account of the battle of Busaco, given
in a demi-official communication addressed to
Berthier. It was rather a curious despatch, but
contained, upon the whole, more of truth and can-


did admissions than were usually to be found in
French reports of actions. He acknow1edged
that he had been repulsed in both attempts upon
our position, with the 10ss of fO\lr thousaryd men,
besides a large proportion of his best officers,
whom he requested Berthier to rep]ace without
delay; and he stated the force with which he had
attacked, almost exactIy as it had been repre-
sented by Lord Wellington. Where alone he fell
into error, was in representing Regnier's corps as
having been opposed by a "colonne serrée" of
twenty thousand rnen under Hill; whereas it is
weH known to every militar y man in our army,
that the colonne serrée was á mode of forrnation of
which Lord Wellington constan tI y disapproved.
He had succeeded in overthrowing it at Virniera,
Ta]avera, and in this very affair of Busaco, and
was -not, therefore, 1ikely to have adopted it on
either occasion himself. But it was then so much
in favour with the French generals, that they put
no faith in any other method of fighting; and pro-
bably when Massena wrote his detail, he believed
all that he was writing.

So passed the time, from the beginning of Oc-
tober, when we took up our ground at Torres
Ved ras, to the rniddle of November, when we
were called upon to quit it. Rumours in abun-
dance poured in upon us during this interval, sorne
of them exhilarating enough, others sufficiently


gloomy; but as we seldom paid to such more at-
tention than was their due, ~e rarely permitted
them to exert any permanent influence over our
feelings andexpectations. The circumstance which
served most decidedly to impress us with a belief
that the enemy were far from being at their ease,
was, that desertions from their army occurred
daily; indeed, we received as many as 200 and
250 deserters in one week. Latterly, however,
these became less frequent, and strange to say,
several instances of the kind occurred amongst
ourselves. We had, moreover, abundant sourCes
of private gratification, in the many little fétes and
galas which from time to time occurred; more es-
pecially after the arrival of a king's messenger with
crosses and medals for the army. But the gayest
by far which took place at this time was held at
Mafra, on the 7th of November, on which occasion
Marshal Beresford was formally invested with the
order of the Bath. The thing was conducted with
great state and singular decorum, and gave univer-
sal satisfaction, both to the British officers and to
the Portuguese inhabitants. At length, however,
we were roused from this state of pleasurable in-
activity, by a piece of intelligence which we were
hardly prepared to receive, and which, in conse-
quence, carne upon us with a degree of surprise,
of which 1 confess. myself inadequate to convey
any just idea.


On the 13th of November advices reached us,
that a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand
men wason its way to join the army of Massena ;
that it had already passed the frontier; and that
the advance had arrived that day in Sabugal. At
the same time we were perfectly aware that the
enemy had for some time back been busily em-
ployed in the construction of a multitude of boats
at Santarem; 'and that these, with manyalready
built, which had fallen into their hands, were
mounted upon wheels, and put in a condition to
be transported overland to any point where they
úlight be needed. Whilst we were wavering
between the belief that Massena meditated a re-
treat, and the notion that very possibly he might
be disposed to make an attempt upon ,the fort of
Lisbon from the opposite bank of the Tagus, intel-
ligellce carne in, that not aman was to be seen,
either .at the outposts, or along the position which
the French arrny had lately occupied. They broke
up, it appeared, on the night of the 14th, and were
departed; but whether in fuH flight with a view to
abandon Portugal, or merely for the purpose of
taking up a winter's line, no one appeared to
know. The movernent was altogether as sudden
and as unlooked-for as frequently occurs in war;
and it threw us, for a time, into a state of amaze-
ment, which instantly set all our speculating pro-
pensities into full play.


One idea, and not entirely a visionary one, was,
that Massena despairing of su cee ss, at least during
the present season, had determined to faH back
upon Spain ; that his wheeled boats were destined
to supply the place of bridges over the Zezere, or,
in case of need, over the Tagus; and that in the
mean while he was retrograding by Thomar and
Estrada-nova, for the purpose of meeting and car-
rying along WiLh him the corps which had arrived
at Sabugal. 1t was objected, however, to this,
that nothing short of the most pressing necessity
could justify a measure, which, besides the imme-
diate abandonment of Portugal, must produce the
very worst effects upon the French interests in
Spain; and the objection, to say the least of it,
was not more wanting in force, than the supposi-
tion which it was· brought forward to combato
True, the army might have exhausted, and they
probably had exhausted, the supplies which their
confined situation furnished; and hence it became
necessary to shift their ground, for the purpose of
meeting the force now on its march, and the stores
it was supposed to convey; but a flight into Spain
was, upon more mature deliberation, pronounced
improbable; and hence other and no less feasible
theories were started to supply the place of that
rejected as soon as proposed.

1t was supposed, first, that Massena, guessing
that we might be informed ofhis coming reinforce-


ment, had become apprehensive of a disposition,
on our part, to attack him before it arrived; and
that he deemed it a wise measure to fall hack
upon stronger ground, there to- await its junction.
Secondly, and this was the most general opinion of
the whole, it was surmised that he intended to at-
tempt the reduction of Abrantes by bombci.rdment
andassault, the fall of which would supply him
with numerous means of every sort for the future
prosecution oí a scheme, upon which, at present,
he was manifestly too weak to think of embarking.
_ It was therefore believed that the French army
designed tB place itself in position behind the
Zezere ; from whence it might oppose aformida,ble
barrier to any efforts on our part, for the relief of
a fortress, the possession of which would be of
incalculable advantage to them, whenever they
should find themselves sufficientIy strong to -ad-
vanee again upon the capital.

Abrantes had long been put in an excellent state
ofdefence, and it was garrisoned by no fewer than
two regiments of the line and three of militia ;
had it been left, therefore, entirely to its own re-
sources, there was every prospect of its holding
out vigorously. This, however, was not the first
occasion on which we had been alarmed for its
safety; and measures had in consequence been
adopted, which placed it further beyond the risk,
noí only of cápture, but ofinsult. General Fane,



with a brigade of Portug-uese cavalry, accompanied
. by several guns and a howitzer, had been passed

Qver the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march
along the southern bank of the river, and to des-
troy, if p'ossible, any boats which he might observe
in progress of preparation at Santarem or else-
where. He had obeyed these orders, and kept up
a long and warm cannonade on the enemy's inei-
pient flo~~lla; but his howitzer having been disabled.
his round-shot proved of little utility; and as no at-
~empt was madewith the Congreve rockets, whieh
now, for the first time, might llave been brought
into play, the enemy suceeeded in completing the
task which they had begun, and in furnishing
themselves. with ample means to cross the rivers
at their pleasure. This was certainly unfortunate,

. seeing that all the bridges had been carefulIy des-
troyed in their rear; and they were, to a certain
degree, hemmed in b~tween unfordable streams on
one hand, and our impassable lines on the other;
but there was no help foc it; and Fane, finding
his exertions profitless, went into cantonments.
He was thus circumstanced in quarters opposite
10 Santarem, when the retreat of the French be-
gan, and aecordingly"in a situation to render to the
garrison of Abrantes, in case of an attack, the most
powerful and opportune assistance.

The enemy's movement commenced from the
right of the line from Ribaldeira, Sobra1, and Villa


Franca; consequently the first alarm was given
by General Campbell's division upon our left.
Lord Wellington instantly wrote to Admiral Berke-
ley, to request that he would send up the launches
and boats of his fleet, in order tbat means migbt
be at hand to pass over General Hill's or any otber
corps wbich might be selected, to the left bank of
the Tagus. At the same time, General Crawford's
divisibn was ordered to advance from the Arruda
heights to Alenquer; and General Hill's, from
Alhandra to Villa Franca, with directions to feel
their way futther to the front, but to act with
caution. On the 15th, it was discovered that the
enemy were moving the whole oí their force on the
great road by the Tagús, a sniall detachment on]y
being left to protect the path which leads by Al ..
cantara and Rio Major to Santarem. As soon as
this' was known, General Spencer's division pushed
into Sobral and Alenquer; whilst Crawford, press-
ing forward from the latter place to Villa Nova
and Azembaja, discovered the enerny's rear-guard
in position between it and Cartaxo. These last-
mentioned movements occurred on the J 6th; on
which day likewise the head-quarters were trans-
ferred to Alenquer; but as it was of essential
importance" that we should be fully informed re-
pecting the enemy's probable designs, before we
committed ourselves too far by any more rapid
pursuit, a halt was ordered to take place on the


17th, in order that time might be granted for
the arrival of a report froIl). General Fane, whose
situation gave him excellent opportunities of
watching with etfect the" movement of Massena's

The report in question arrived in due thne, and
it led us to believe that the enemy were conti-
nuing their retreat from S antarem , and that no-
thing more than a. strong rear-guard remained be-
hind for the purpose of covering the movement.
It may be advisable to state bere tbat tbe position
of Santarem is exceedingly formidable, and tha1" it
cannot he turned eXGept by a very large army,
andat tbe exp~nse of mueh time and fatigue in
making a lengthened detour. We were, therefore,
far" froIl). experiencing regret, that Massena had
not deemed it advisable to offer us battIe on tbat
line, more éspecially as his abandonment of the
strong groun~ left us at liherty to look to tbe pro-
tection of Abrantes, and to throw such a force
there as might act witp eff'ect upon the enemy's
flank, under cover of the pace. ) L nder these cir-
cumstances, Lord Wellington determined to" esta-
blish his head-quarters at Santarem, to push on
Crawford further in fr:ont, and to hring up the
whole of.his army in" tbe same" direction, except
Hill's corps only, which, crossing the river at Vee-
lada in boats, and returning again by the bridge
below Abrantes, would be ahle to harass and im.,


pede the enerny's communicatíons" and render
great assistance to us in our projected operations.
This was the more to be reekoned upon, because
Massena possessed but a single bridge across the
Zezere; and as he must move his entire army in
one column, it was not probable that he could do
so with su eh rapidity as to insure its passage un-
molested from either quarter.

The troops being put in motion for these several
purposes, it was soon discovered that General
Fane's first report respecting the enemy's designs
was not likely to be realised, and that they had
assurned the positíon from whieh we thought they
would have retired. The advance, under Craw-
foro, found Sahtarem occupied by what appeared
at first to be a strong rear-guard,but which
proved in the end to be the second corps which
had there taken up its cantonments. Upon this
the head-quarters, attended by Spencer's division,
were established at Cartaxo; General Cotton's
cavalry were sent forward to join the lightdivi-
sion; General Anson's brigade took the road to
Aleventre and Río Major ; and the fourth and fifth
divisions fixed themselves at Alenquer and Sobral ;
whilst the sixth remained stationary at Ribaldeira,
and the third at Torres Yedras.

Our army had not long taken up its new align-
ment, when it was satisfactorily ascertained that
the enemy were strengthening and disposingthem~


selves in a very judicious mannery for the double
purposes, as it appeared, of securing cornfortable
winter-quarters, andprotecting, from the side of
Abrantes, all such supplies and reinforcements as
might be on the way to join them. Whilst the
second corps garrisoned Santarem, the eighth
took possession of a line of cantonments on the
right, extending by Torres N ovas all the way to
Thomar. Here part of the sixth corps was es-
tablished; and about four thousand infantry, with
three hundred cavalry, passed the Zezere, for t~e
purpose of establishing a téte-de-pont; for the
bridge; it appeared, w'as already ·aH but complete.
though boats· continued to be constructed in San~
tarem, and were hourly in movement towards the
river. With re8pectz again, to the reinforcements,
their advance was reported to be at Pinhel,
whither they had arrived after sustaining 'a sharp
action with the corps of General Silveira. The
latter having come upon them at Valvarde some-
what by surprise, succeeded i~ killing three hun-
dred, and taking many prisoners; but as the
enemy were reported to amount to fifteen thou-
sand meny Silveira could not venture to follow up
thesuccess which he. obtained. On the contrary,
he very prudently retired behind the Douro, as
800n as he had struck his blow; and theFrench,
leaving a detachment to watch him, pushed on
with the main body in the direction of Massena's


army. From all these particulars, we were led
tQ the conclusion, that Massena. entertained no
design of evacuating Portugal; but that he would
remain where he was, till the. junction of fresh
troops, and the arrival of a more favourable sea-
son, should enable hirn once more to act upon the

Affairs continued in this state without the oc-
currence of any event calculated to interrupt our
tranquillity, up to a late date in Decernber. For
sorne time the weather was so boisterous, and the
rain feU in such constant torrents, as effectually
to hinder any military operations from being un-
dertaken; and when these obstac1es ceased to
exist, the policy both of the English and French
general s equally restrained theru. frorn entering
upon a winter's campaign. Inforrnation, in the
mean while, continued daily to accumulate upon
us, and much of it was from a source which left
no reason to doubt of its authenticity; whilst the
burden of the whole tended to strengthen our
conviction, that another struggle for the preserva-
tion' of Portugal must take place in the spring.
Of the various rumours which reached us, it will
be necessary to repeat only such as most deeply
interested us at the moment; and these 1 'proceed
to give in the order in which they carne in.

We learned that the head of the enemy's rein-
forcement, which Silveira had encountered by the


way, was now in communication with Massena's
line, and that it had c10sed in somewhere between
the extreme right at Leira, and the extreme left
at Santaremó Of the numbers which composed
the entire force, a variety of accounts were in cir-
culation, sorne rating it as high as lifteen or twenty
thousand men, others taking it considerably below
that estimate; but whatever its aggregate strength
might be, no more than five tho.usand men had as
yet arrived; nor were the remainder, as far as we
could learn, ascertained to be near at hand. The
reinforcement in question had, it appeared, been
obtained by a forward movement of the ninth
corps under Drouet ;which, taking possession of
the posts and cahtonments on the frontier, hitherto
occupied by detachments from Massena's army,
enabled these detachments to proceed to their
several corps. We had no reason to believe that
any part of Drouet's corps was actually employed.
in Portugal; by maoy, indeed, it was imagined,
that being under the orders of Joseph, it could not
be moved out of Spain unless by express directions
frorn Paris; bl\t one of its divisions' had certainly
marched :to the very extremity of its province;
and thus the whole of Massena's three corps were
rendered effective. At the same time other corps,
which had been scattered through Castile, were
represented as having fallen back upon Madrid;
and the province, thus relieved from the presence


of the enemy, was again in a state of rebellion.
Don J ulian, the gallant partisan, whose services at
Ciudad Rodrigo obtained for him so much well-
merited renown, was once more in· arms. He was
preparing to attack Zamora, where a very feeble
garrison had been left; and the probabilities were,
that unless fresh forces speedily carne up to take
the stations which Drouet had abandoned, that
part of Spain would become as hostile as ever.

With respect to Portugal, we heard that Sil-
veira's affair had occurred with a detached corps,
which had been thrown across the Coa to protect
the march· of the main body hither, by way of
Sabugal, CasteUo BÍ'anco, and Cardijos. The
Portuguese general, though deeming it prudent to
retire, stilI held Francola wÍth his outposts; and
the enemy continued to maintain a small bodyof
troops' on the other side of the Coa, on purpose to
watch him. J n the mean while, Trant was at
Coimbta, where all remainedperfectly quiet;
thóugh his advance, under Wilson, had lately
fallen back to Espinhel; whilst General Hill's
movernent on the left bank of the Tagus had been
arrested at Chamuca. The necessity for his
entrance into Abrantes no longer existing, Lord
Wellington did not consider it prudentto push
him on thither, as long as theenemy abstained
fmm making sorne decided demonstration of their
design to attack the place; and all their late ope-


rations seemed to imply that they meditated
nothing more than defensive operations during
the winter. It was very evident, likewise, that
General HilFs march had seriously alarmed them
for the safety of theÍr expected reinforcements;
and that they looked to Abrantes with apprehen-
sion, ratber tban with any hope of being able to
make themselves masters of it; for they broke up
the roads willeh lead from thence to Punhete, and
otherwise strove to interrupt aH communication
between the Zezere and the town.

1 have spoken hitherto of the dispositions ofthe
French general in terms more vague perhaps than
their nature, and the re.sults to which they promised
to lead, seem,J;e demando • The line which Mas- -present occupied was one of great extent
-insomuch that it might, at almost any point, be
pierced, and the position of Santarem. and the
troops cantoned there, eompletely isolated; yet
wasit one, taking into consideration certain disád-
vantages under which we laboured, demonstrative
of judgment in the individual who selectedit.
Were we disposed to try its strength,we must ad·
vanee to the attack over a country low· and flat,
and at present everywhere under water, leaving,
at the same time, IÍumerous openings by which a
spirited enemy might, in the mean while, pene ...
trate into our lines in the rearo Now, in spirit and
enterprise, no one can accuse French soldiers of


heing deficient, and as they w~re aware of our
difficulties, little doubt could be entertained that
they would greedily take advantage of them. On
the other hand, Massena had possessed himself of
a district rich in corn; he possessed ample stóres
of cattle; and he enjoyed the prospect of living
at least as well as he could do in any part of Spain.
Bis communications with his rear were now more
secured by meansof the troops whom he had lately
brought up j his flanks were equally safe, notwith-
standing the proximity of Abrantes; and as most
oC the country people whom we had swept aw;;ty
with us had litde by little returned to their homes,
there appeared to be no difficulty whatever in bis
establishing himself where he was during the win..,
ter. But if ~uch were really his design, why con-
tinue to crowd forward so many masses, which,
weré it intended to pass any length of time in a
state of quiet, had much better be dispersed in
cantonments more- remote from one another? His
present mode of proceeding must lead to a con-
sumption of his means more rapid by far than was
accordant with sound policy j-could it be that
Massena entertained serious thoughts of resuming
the offensive at once? This was a grave question
at the moment; and it involved many other con-
siderations, not less important and weighty than

It was not to be expected that the enerny would


a second time make their attempt upon Lisbon by
one side of the Tagus only, leaving to us the undis-
puted command of that river, and of both of its
banks". " They had already suffered so much froro
thelr neglect on this head, that nothing short of
infatuation could lead them into it again. On the
contrary, it required but a moderate degree of
foresight to discover, that let the attempt be made
when it would, a strong corps would be pushed
along the left of the river, and the most strenuous
exertions set on foot to molest the harbour, and aU
that came out and io, (rom the point of Almada. It
accordingly became a matter of serious importance
to us, thatapo"Sition should be marked out and
strongly fortified on the one ban k as well as on the
other. This was the more necessary. as, although
AdmiralBerkeley, when first consulted, had given
it as his decided :apinion, that the lines of Torres
Yedras with the inoer circle óf works about Fort
Sto Julien would; at any moment and under any
eircumstances, secure,incase ofneed, the safe em-
barkation ofthe troops,.the late alarm induced him
to come to a different persuasion; and he now
conceived, that unless something were done to
fortify the left as well as the right side of the har-
bOllr, the shipping,. Íncase ofa reverse at our lines,
would be exposedtó danger. Guided in part by
this consideration, and in part by the conviction,
that such a chain of posts would enable him to


employ Hill's or any other corps with perfeet se-
eurity on the opposite bank, Lord Wellington de-
termined to construct t here an intrenched position,
similar to that whieh he had constl'ucted at Torres
Vedras; and earIy in the winter the engineers,
with as many troops and artificers as eould be
spared fol' the purpose, were emploJ ed in its for-

The new line of redoubts extended across that
neck of land whieh is formed by a bed of the river
on one side, and by an inHexion ofthe seaon the
other; and it was of a formidable nature. In ad-
dition 10 this, great eare was bestowed in strength-
ening the inner circle of Fort Sto J uIien, and at
both points the heaviest ordnance at our command,
chiefly twenty-four pounders, were mouoted. By
this means oul' capabilities of defence were brought
to a state of perfection, as high as was compatible
with the end ptoposed, and the difficulties to be
ovel'come. But after a1l, the great question was,
whether, in case of an extl'emity, any works wouId
. suffice to covel' the escape of an army so numerOU8
as that now under Lord Wellington's command.
Thel'e could be no doubt thatboth banks of the
-river were well guarded-that ls to say, the new
lines around Almada effectually covered the 80uth-
ern side; whilst the fortifications about Sto J uIien
protected the bay and place of embarkation in all
directions; but the question still remained to be ~'.""'.
.J~ ,~\ té: -

. ti


answered~-was it possible for a force of forty
thousand men to escape in the face of such an
army, as should be capable of drívíng it fromthe
double line of Torres Ved ras, back to the sea? 1 t
was quite evident that nothing short of an over-
whelming superiority in numbers eould ever force
our first lines of defence. That superiority,how-
ever, were it su eh as to obtain this advantage,
would likewise be competent to bear down an
oppositíon whieh -might afterwards be offered;
and therefore our surest hope, 1 say not of ultimate
triumph, but even of safety, lay in our succes's in
the field. Of success, however, we must be doubt-
fuI, unlesssupport should be given to us with the
same unsparing liberality with whieh it was af-
forded to the enemy; and henee aH felt, even now
when the tide seemed to haveturned slightly in
ourfavour, that at no period since the commence-
ment of the struggle did we stand in greater need
of fresh troops of all arms and descríptions from
England. Thereeould be líttle doubt that N apo-
leon would, at length, be roused from the appa-'
rent apathy with whieh he had hitherto regarded
the affairs of Portugal. The probability was, that
the return of spring at the latest would bring to
Massena such an addítion of strength as we, with
our present numbers, could not hope successfully
to oppose in the field; and then we should be
compelled to retire once more within our lines,


and the war would become one, not of personal
contests, but of resources. Now, though we had
heretofore sustained this species of warfare suc-
cessfully, it was not to be expected that we could
continue to do so for ever; and hence our most
fervent wishes were, either that Massena might
find ·himself under the necessity of abandoning
Portugal before his supplies could reach him~ or
that we rnight receive such an addition to our
means, as would enable us to bring matters to the
issue of a battle, with something like a faÍr pros-
pect of victory.

Whilst we were thus speculating, and whilst
part of our people were employed in giving addi-
tiona1 strength to the works in our rear, few events
took place calculated to exert any degree of in-
fluence over the final issue of the war. 1 have
rnentioned the arrival of five thousand men at
Massena's cantonments, and spoken of them as
forming part of a considerable divisioll, which the
advance' of Drouet's corps, and its occupation of
the posts upon the frolltier, set at liberty to rnove
towards the front. The remainder followed theÍr
leading brigades, but after reaching the Zezere,
retreated again, with the 10ss of many hundred
men, through the operation of parties of guerillas
upon their rear and flanks. For sorne days they
were not heard of; but at length a report came in,
that a corps had made its appearance on the Coa, .


and that having crossed that stream, itwas in full-
march towards the front. Whether this were the
same body which, after re'aching the Zezere, had
fallen back without so rnuch as opening a commu-
nication with Massena, we found it impossible ac·
curátely at this time to ascertain; indeed, our
information went no further than to establish the
faet, that it eonsisted of about sixteen thousand
men, and that its march was conducted with· great
deliberation, as if to protect a convoy.But the
impressionmade upon us was, that the corps in
question either consisted solely of the same troops
who had formerly made an attempt to join, or that
they and part of'Drouet's corps had united to
rnake the 'number; arid the information whic'h we
afterwards received went to satisfy. U8 that the
latter instructions had been correcto Though ha-
rassed as the rest had been, they succeeded in
. reaching their destination; and they made up the
wholé of the additional force which Massena re-
ceived during the winter.

In the mean while, the Freneh Marshal was
waiting anxiously for advices from Paris, whither
he had despatched General Foy, sorne weeks pre-
viously, with a stateÍnent of the 'situation and
prospects of his ariny. [

1 1 have noticed this.mission, chiefly because it furnishcs me
• with an opportunity of saying a few words touching statemeuts


The position which he had taken up at Santa-
rem, however, he carefully and industriously im-
proved, by covering the face of the hill with three
lines of abbatis, or otherwise intrenching the corps

. to which its defence was intrusted. It ought to
be observed here, that though Santarem lay consi-
derably in ad vance of the rest of h is line, and was,
as 1 have already hinted, to a certain degree, iso-
lated and detached, it was not on that account the
less favourable tohis general defence. On the
contrary, though other points might be easily
pierced, no advantage could be taken of the suc-
cess obtained, whilst this projecting post remained
in the hands of the enemy; whilst its natural and
artificial strength were both such, as to render any
attempt upon it, with our present means, in the
highest degree hazardous and uncertain. -Thus

which have appeared in a History of the Peninsular 'Var by
General Foy, and which has of late attracted sorne attention
aroong his countrymen. The General, on his arrival at Paris,
publishéd in the MOlliteur a variety of accounts, relative to the
conduct of his fellow-soldiers, and the dispositions of the English
arroyo In these 1 can by no means concur. For example :
He assured the ,French public, that whilst multitudes daily
carne over froro our carop, the crime of deseltion was hardly
known in tIte French army; whereas the returns in my posses-
sion distinctly prove that,we took in no fewer than 733 deser-
ters in the course of three months. But 1 feeI delicacy in
pressing, as an ad verse roilitary writer, our differences of opinion

VOL. 11.


were we kept at bay by a line, abundantly acces-
sible in every, direction save one; because from
that one our own flanks and rear were in danger,
should we venture to try the fortune of an action
in any other q uarter.

There is but one other circumstance to which 1
consider it necessary to allude before closing this
chapter, and with it the history of the eampaign
of 1810. December was far advaneed, when an
offieer attached to the staft' of Massena's army,
who was proceeding towards Ciudad Rodrigo in
the disguise of a peusant, fell into the hands· of
sorne of our flying pa~ties, and was brought in to
head -q uarters. Frorn him we learned that the
Marshal had received no eornmunieations from
Franee since be first entered Portugal, and that he
was now labouring llnder the greatest anxiety for
the arrival both of intelligenee and instructions.
Our prisoner had been sent, it appeared, to meet
whatever corps or messengers might be upon the
way for the purpose of hurrying them on with as
few delays as possible; and though he was evi-
dently a man in whom no confidence had been
reposed, he spoke with so great an appearance of
eandour and openness, that we felt little disposed
to doubt the truth of his assertions. He informed
us that Massena had resolv~d not to attack our
lines, unless he shouldbe reinforced by a eorps of
twenty-five or thirty thousand men; and tbat in


case these faiIed in arriving, he had determined
tofall back, for the winter, by Castello Branco
and Alcantara, into Spain'. The advantages which
he proposed to obtain by this movement were, a
concentration with the armies operating in that
portion of the Peninsula, and the redriction of the
city of Badajoz, which would enable him, on the
return of spring, to debouch once more into Por-
tugal, with two large armies, one in the Alentejo,
and the other on the right bank of the Tagus.
Our informant further assured us, that instead of
having corn and supplies in abundance at their
. command, the French were suffering grievously
for everything. Their ammunition, their medicines,
their shoes, theirclothing, and provisions, were
an at the lowest ebb; whilst their linen, an article
upon which the welfare of an army depends in
no ordinary degree, was almost entirely exhausted.
Finally, he said that Massena was on bad terms
with all his generals, Loison and Freire being the
only individuals among them with whom he kept
up any great intimacy; that there were full ten
thousandsick in the hospitals; and that the entire
force of infantry and cavalry which they were
capable of hringing under arms, did not exceed
forty thousand meno

The only fact in aU this information which we
felt disposed to question, was, the reported design
of Massena to abandon Portugal. . There ap-


peared to be no necessity for this measure, and
many good reasons against it; and, therefore, we
stiU inclined to the opinion, that whether he with-
drew behind the Mondego or not, he would not
withdraw further, but endeavour, keeping his
communications open all the while with his
real', to obtain possession oCas large a portion of
the country as might be practicable. This, how-
ever, he would do, only provided he were left to
the guidance of his own judgment; for, should
a peremptory order to advance arrive from Paris,
advancE' he must and would at all hazards.ln
the latter case, we were aware, from othersources,
that he was prepared to sacrifice twenty thousand
men in the attempt to possess himself of our lines;
and that the attempt would be made both with
judgment and vigour, we c1early foresaw. But
of the result of any such endeavour, no one could
for a moment doubt; and hence no one looked
forward to the probability of its occurrence with
the slightest alarm, or even anxiety.

Such was our state, and such our prospects and
expectations, during the winter of 1810. On the
side of Abrantes aH was safe; the French having
resolved, and wisely resolved, not to besiege it;
whilst Silveira, wh6 on the approach of the rein-
forcements had retired across the Coa, was again
in readiness to act, as soon as an opening should
be given on the rear of the enemy. In the mean


while, Trant and Bucellar were on the alert at
Coimbra; and Wilson, retreating frorn EspinheI,
threw himself with his corps on the other side of
the Mondego. The latter rnovernent, was, indeed,
on one account, a subject of regret to us, inas-
much as it deprived us of our readiest and surest
source of intelligence, which could henceforth be
obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was
made under the impression that a further conti-
nuance in Espinhel would be hazardous, and
could not be risked. With respect to the French,
again, they, like ourselves, rested quieto Their
position was, as 1 have already stated, a good one,
and it was now greatly improved by their obtain-
ing permanent possession of one bank of the Mon-
dego; bywhich not only their flank, but all their
marches from the rear were, to a certain degree,
secured. But there were a variety of causes at
work competent, in due time, to disturb this state
of apparent tranquillity; and the spring can hardly
be said to have set in, ere they carne powerfully
into operation.

Before closing this chapter, which terminates
the carnpaign of 1810, it would be injustice not to
record the extraordinary zeal, ability, and activity,
which were displayed in two departments of our
army; 1 mean, the commi8sariat under Sir R.
Kennedy, and the medica1 department under Dr.
Frank. It i8 not my province to eulogise; but as


the existence and life ofthe soldier depended upon
the direction of the latter with his valuable assist·
ants, and the comfort and sustenance upon the
former, it is impossible that 1 shouJd refrain, as
adjutant·general of the army, from adding my mite
of gratitude to these two very meritorious public
officers. And 1 must say that, when Dr. Frank
afterwardR from illness left the arrny, it occasioned
one general sentiment of deep public regret.



8tate of affairs on the southernfrontier-Advance of 80u1t
against Badajoz-Capture ofOliven~a, and inve~tment ofBa-
dajoz-General Mendizabaldefeated, and Badajoz taken-
Campo Mayor reduced-Massena breaks up from Santarem,
and retreats into Spain-Marshal .Beresford marches towards
Badajoz-Attack of a French convoy at Campo Mayor-
The British corps passes the Guadiana, reduces Olivens:a,
and invests Badajoz-Lord 'Vellington "isits this corps, and
gives directions for the siege----Is recal1ed to the north, where
the army remains in position round Fuentes de Honor.

BEFORE pursuing further the fortunes of Massena,
• and the movements of the divisions immediately

opposed to him, it will be necessary, in as few
words as possible, to make the reader acquainted
with certain transactions which ;had been going on
elsewhere ..

Whilst the whole of the allied army was col-
lected in the lines of Torres Yedras, and its atten-
tion turned almost exclusively to the defence of
Lisbon, Soult, having assembled about thirteen or


fourteen thousand men in the south of Spain, ad-
vanced on Badajoz, for the purpose of effecting
adiversion on the side of Alentejo, and opening
a communication across the Tagus with Massena.
Generals Ballasteros and Mendizabal, who, on the
departure of Romana, commanded in that quarter,
found themselves unable to oppose him. The
former accordingly moved to his right upon Salva-
tierra and the lower parts of the Guadiana; whilst
the latter, leaving seven battalions with a brigade
of field artillery in Oliven~a, retreated across the
river. Oliven~a was not a place of extraordinary
strength; and had the reverse been the case, the
neglect of Mendizabal to supply it with a compe-
tent store of provisions would have rendered the
strength of its fortífications profitless: it was
blockaded on the 11th of January, and on the
22nd famine compelled the garrison to surrender.

Having taken measures for rendering Oliven~a
a place of arms in support of his future operations,
Soult detached Mortier's corps on the 26th to in- ,
vest Badajoz; and the· investment was at once
completed on the left of the Guadiana by the in-
fantry; whilst the cavalry, under General Latour
Maubourg, patroled round the right. N o great
while elapsed ere the investment was converted
into a siege. Ground was broken on the 28th, and
an attack directed against the Pardaleras outwork,
which was battered from the Sierra del Viento,


and enfiladed from a paralleI at two hundred and
fifty yards distant; and a breach being effected on
the 11th of February, the Pardaleras was, on the
same night, stormed, and carried with very little

As soon as the movement of Marshal Soult was
known at Cartaxo, Lord Wellington despatched
his Spanish corps into the Alentejo, that it might
co-operate with Mendizabal for the protection of
that frontier; and he pointed out a position to the
north of Badajoz, having its right protected by
Fort St. Christoval, and its front covered by the
Gevora, as the best which the Spanish army could
take up, for the purpose of keeping open a com-
munication with the town in case it should be at-
tacked. Unfortunately, the brave Romana, who,
more than all the rest of the Spanish generals put
together, had obtained and merited our confidence
and respect, was unable to accompany his corps.
He was now labouring under asevere malady,
which, on the 27th of January, terminated his ex-
istence. But the division made good its position;
the post recommended was assumed on the 9th of
February; and it proved a constant source of
anxiety to the besiegers, and of confidence to the
besieged, by covering the introduction of numerous
supplies ¡nto the place. The enemy saw its im-
portan ce, and determined, at all hazards, to carry
it; and the improvidence of the Spanish General


was not long in furnishing them with the oppor·
tunity which they so much desired.

It happened that a h,owitzer or two, from the
opposite bank of the river, were enabled to throw
a few shells into the ground of the Spanish en-
campment, which, without doing much real mis-
chief, harassed and annoyed the meno Mendizabal,
very unwisely, paid to the matter a degree of at-
tention which it did not merit; and to get rid of
the nuisance, moved the whole of his army to its
left, completely out of the protection of Fort St.
Christoval. The enerny perceived his error, and
lost not a rnoment in availing thernselves of it.
Mortier established a flying bridge _ tlpon the
Guadiana aboye the town, and crossed over iil the
night of the 18th; whilst six thousand men from
the besieging army forded the Gevora, and at-
tacked the Spaniards at daylight. The resistance
made was as trifling as might have been expected
from bad troops, deprived of all the advantages of
position; and out of nine thousand infantry, and
a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, of which Mendi:'
zabal's corps had consisted, only three thousand
five hundred made their escape. - Three thousand
fled-to Badajoz, where they were shut up with
the rest of the garrison; whilst five húndred re-
tired upon Elvas, under the cornrnand of Don
Carlos de España.

The siege was now carried on with renewed

vigour,-and the Governor being killed, the command
devolved upon General Imaz, an officer who felt
no disposition to emulate the renown of Palafox
and Alvarez. A breach, exceedingly imperfect in
kind, was no sooner effected, than Imaz proposed
a capitulation; and on . the 11 th of March, at a
moment when he knew, froID telegraphic de-
spatches, that Massena was in fuIl retreat, and
that forces were on their way to relieve the place,
he marched out nine thousand troops into the
ditch, who layed down their arms to a similar
number of French infantry, with sorne six or eight
hundred cavalry, the total amount of the besieging
army. Had the slightest resolution existed in the
breast of that man, Badajoz might have been pre-
served; and all the blood which was aíterwards
spilled in retaking it, might, as a necessary conse-
quence, have been saved.

Mortier's next business was to invest Campo
Mayor, with a corps of five thousand infantry, and
six hundred cavalry. Campo Mayor is a large
frontier town, supplied originally with tolerable
fortifications; but which had oí late be en sadly
neglected, and were oí course íalling to decay.
Five thousand men is the smallest number which
would be required to garrison it; but at present
it was held by no more than two hundred militia,
undei the command oí Major Tallaia, of the Por-
tuguese engineers. That officer's means in cannon


and stores were as feeble as his force in men;
there were but five pieces of artillery mounted on
the ramparts; yet he compelled the enemy to
proceed against him with all the order of a siege;
nor was it till a practicable breach had been
formed in the body of the place, that he would
listen to any proposal of surrender. At last, how-
ever, seeing his defences ruined, and the enemy
prepared to storm, he stipulated for a delay of
twenty-four hours, in the hope that relief might
arrive; and none appearing, he very reluctantly
gave up the townon the 23rd of March.

In the mean while affairs were drawing rapidly
to a crisis on'the north side of the Tagus. Though
their change of situation conduced, for a short
time, very considerably to the cornforts of lVIas-
sena and his army, it was quite impossible that a
country already exhausted could longsupport the
burden which the presence of some fifty or sixty
thousand men, besides horses and other animals,
laid upon it; and this the French General began,
by degrees, to feel very sensibly. His troops be-
carne every day more and more sickly; provisions
became every day scarcer, and forage was not to
be procured by any exertions. The reinforce-
ments, too, for which he had waited so long and
so patiently, carne not up, by any means, to his
wants or his wishes; indeed, the fresh regiments
marched into his line were not sufficiently nume-


rous to fill Up the gaps which the casualties of
war had already occasioned there. Massena felt
that the moment for offensive operations had
passed away. Whether he regretted that he had
not hazarded an attaek upon our lines, at a mo-
ment when their yet imperfect state held out sorne
ehances of success, 1 know not; but eertain it is,
that he soon began, after his assumption of the
position at Santarem, to prepare for a retreat.
Parties were eontinuallyemployed upon the Ze-
zere, eonstrueting bridges, and throwing up works
for their defence ; his siek and wounded were gra-
dually, quietly, and cautiously, transferred to the
rear; and at the beginning of March 1811, there
remained in his eamp, besides sorne heavy artillery
of little value, only the men and horses fit for
duty, with as many stores, guns, aml11unition~
waggons, and tumbrils, as appeared necessary for
their use. Everything, however, was done with
so much address, that exeept of the faet that two
bridge s instead of one were now upon the Zezere,
we were kept in profound ignoranee as to his pro-
eeedings, and we eontinued to the last to cast an-
xious g]ances towards Abrantes, for the safety of
which we conceived that there were still good
grounds of apprehension.

1 have stated that, on the breaking up of the
French army from before the lines of Torres Ve-
dras, General Hill's division was sent across the


Tagus, for the purpose of giving additional security
to the garrison of Abrantes, and of embarrassing
Massena's movements, should he either attempt to
retire by the Alentejo, or take the route of Pun-
heteo As soon as the operations of Soult's army
became known, Marshal Beresford's corps was
likewise thrown across the river, with a view of
raising the siege of Badajoz, and giving relief to
the Spanish corps, already hard-pressed upon the
frontier. Beresford had not yet begun his march
southward, when ceftain indications of a move-
ment on the part of Massena, induced Lord Wel-
lington to delay his progress. Instead of march-
ing towards Badajoz, he was directed to advance
upon A brantes, and, repassing the Tagus there, to
threaten the enemy's posts at Punhete ; and a por-
tion of his corps, under Major-general the Honour-
able William Stewart, had actually obeyed these
instructions, . when the enemis designs became
suddenly developed. On the night of the 5th of
March, Massena decamped frorr.. his position at
Santarem, and concentrating the whole of his
army about Pombal, made demonstrations there,
as if he were not only willing, but anxious, to rest
the fate of the campaign upon the issue of a gene-
ral action.

On the 6th of March the head-quarters of the
allied army were established at Santarem, and
dispositions were made for pursuing the enemy


along the road which his main body had taken,
and disIodging him from the several posts which
he retained in other quarters. General Stewart's
brigacle passed the Zezere, and advanced, together
with the 4th, the 6th, and part oí the 1st divisions,
towards Thomar, where the French seemed at first
disposed to collect in force; whilst the light divi-
sion, supported by the 1st German huzzars and
royal dragoons, proceeded at a quick pace to-
wards Pombal. At Thomar no encounter took
place, the enemy retreating, on the appearance of
our people, towards the Mondego; but at Pombal
there was some fighting, and hopes were at one
moment entertained, that there would be a good
deal more. Our leading brigade came up with
the fugitives on the 9th, and succeeded, after a
brief but smart skirmish, in capturing about two
hundred prisoners; and on the 11 th dispositions
were made for bringing the enerny to action, by
the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light divisions,
assembled for the purpose. But Massena, instead
of waiting to be ass'ailed, broke up during the
night, and feH back, covered by the whole of
Montbrun's cavalry, by the 6th corps of infantry,
and by part of the 8th, in the directioll of Re-
denha. On the I2t~, a strong rear-guard was
se en posted at the end of a defile, in front of the
vilIage. It was immediately attacked by three
divisions of il1fantry, by General Pack's Portu-


guese brigade, and the cavalry; and after an ob-
stinate resistance, was driven through the defile
to the plain beyond. It next retreated to some
high and broken ground, where it again showed a
front; but from this position also it was compelled
to retire with some loss; and finally it withdrew
to Condeixa, where the main body had established
itself. .

The enemy's force assembled here consisted of
the 6th, 8th, and 9th corps; of the whole of Mas-
sena's army in short, except the 2nd corps, which
continued still at Espinhel. The ground which
they occupied was singularly commanding; and
as it could not be attempted in front, without a
sacrifice of Jives mueh greater than either his feel-
ings or policy induced Lord Wellington to risk,
arrangements were made for turning it. The
third division, under General Picton, made a long
and tedious detour to the right; but it succeeded
in throwing itself upon the left of the enemy's
line, which instantly broke into column of march,
and fell back. Similar movements were effected
with similar results during several successive
days; and the enemy, diverted from his original
intention of passing part of his force over the Mon-
dego at Coimbra, cOlüinued his retreat, in a single
continuous column, along the road which winds
between the river and the Sierra de Estrella.
The consequence was, that he passed over little


else than a succession of admirable positions; ánd
as he took care to cover his marches with the best
of his cavalry, with a force of infantry which never
feH short of ten thousand rnén, a,nd with only one
brigade of guns admirably horsed, his retrogres-
sion was conducted in good order, and with as
little 10ss as could well befall an army whilst ex-
ecuting a rnanmuvre of the kind. On one occa-
sion onl y were the French in danger of being
dragged into a general action, at manifest disad-
vantage to themselves. Whilst crossing the
Coera, the alIies pressed so closely upon them,
that to save his main body, Massena was content
to sacrifice a considerable portion of his rear-
guard, which, halting to be attacked, was cut to
pieces; whilst the columns escaped, with the loss
of sorne artillery and a great deal of baggage. It
¡s, however, extremely probable that all Mas-
sena's precautions would have failed to preserve
hirn, had it been possible to transport stores and
provisions as rapidly as our troops were capable of
rnarching; but on the 19th, it was found that the
columns had outstripped their supplies, and a halt
of sorne days was necessary, to give the latter
time to overtake them.

As it was not my good fortune to be an eye-
witness of this memorable retreat, having be en
obliged to leave the army froID severe illness for
three IDonths, 1 shall not pretend to enter IDl-

VOL. n. F


nutely into details of which 1 could speak only
upon the reports of others. It is sufficient to ob-
serve that Massena finally escaped to a position
on the Spanish side of the Agueda, after having
exhibited nurnerous proofs of capacity to direct the
rnovements of a retreating force, and leaving be-
hind him sorne sad memoriaIs of the absence of
an humane feelings frorn arnong his soldiery. The
line of the enemy's march could, indeed, be every-
where traced by the smoke of cottages, hamlets,
and towns, which they reduced to ashes; and
even those which escaped the ravages of the Hames,
were left in a state of total dilapidation and abso-
lute destitution. Of the acts of personal violence
which they committed, 1 would rather not from
hearsay give a relation; but this much may be
said, that the Portuguese must cease to feeI as
men cornmonly feel, if they ever forget the con-
duct of an army, which entered their country
with the warmest protestationsof friendship, and
in whose promises of protection too many were
tempted to place reliance. Even the towns which
had given shelter to the head-quarters of the French
generals were not spared. Torres Novas, Thomar,
and Pernes, were all of them sacked on the eve-
ning previous to their evacuation; the convent of
Alcoba~a was burned to the ground; the Bishop's
palace, and the whole town of Leiria, shared the
same fate ;-in a word, it seemed as if these men


had resolved to make a desert ofthe country which
they had failed to conquer; and that the war,
which they professed at first to wage only with
the Englísh and their armed partisans, had been
lurned against its peaceable inhabitants.

The last stand which the enemy made on the
present occasion, took place near Sabugal, and
proved hig-hly honourable to the British arms. On
the 3rd of April, the second corps was seen in po-
sition, with its rightimmediately aboye the bridge
and town of Sabugal; and its left extended along
the road to Alfayates, so as to command all the
approaches from the fords of the Coa towards the
upper part of the town. Lord Wellington made
his dispositions to attack it in front, flank, and
rear, at the same moment; and but foro the unfor-
tunate occurrence of a sudden shower of rain, it
would have been, in all probability, annihilated.
But though it escared being surrounded, it made
not good its retreat till after it had suffered asevere
los s in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and an
opportunity had be en given to one brigade of the
light division, which, single-handed, maintained the
uneq ual contest for sorne time, of increasing the
welI-earned reputation which that pecllliarly-
distinguished division had already acquired. After
this, Massena withdrew entirely into Spain; AI-
meida was blockaded; and Lord Wellington,
leaving Sir Brent Spencer- to conduct that service,


as well as to provide against emergencies in front ,
hurried away towards Badajoz, where his presence
began about tbis time to be seriously needed.

It has been stated tbat Marshal Beresford was
already moving to raise the siege of Badajoz, and
arrest the ptagress of Soult in that quarter, when
the unexpected concentration of Massena'g fOf(~es
at Pombal, induced Lord Wellington to recall him
to his assistance. On the 17th, however, when
all hope of fighting a general battle was laid aside,
the Marshal prepared to resume his original under-
taking; andputting himself at the head of the
2nd and 4th British, and General Hamilton's
Portuguese division, with the 13th 1ight dragoons,
sorne heavy cavalry, and two brigades of artillery,
he crossed the Tagus at Tancos. Marshal Beres-
ford proceeded by way of Ponte de Lor, Oralo, and
Portalegre, to Campo Mayor, where he an'ived on
the 25tb. The euemy bad just evacuated tlle
town; and a considerab1e convoy of artillery, am-
munition-waggons, and strings of loaded mules,
was seen travelling under tbe escort of three bat-
talions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, to-
wards Badajoz. An immediate pursuit was ordered,
and the allied cavalry was not long in overtaking
the convoy. which' made ready to receive them.
General Latour Maubourg, who eommallded on the
occasioll, formed his infantry into two solid squares,
which he supported by placing his cavalry on the


right; but a brilliant charge fmm two squadrons
oí the 13th, in which a similar force of Portuguese
took part, overthrew the French cavalry, and gave
to the allies momentary possession of the entire
convoy. The ardour of pursuit, however, canied
the conqueror8 too faro They followed the flying
cavalry under the guns of Badajoz, and suffered, in
consequence, sorne los8; whilst they gave to the
squares an opportunity of retiring in good order,
against which theycould not, in their scattered
state, make any impression. The consequence
was, that before any portion of the British infan-
try was enabled to come up, the whole of the con-
voy escaped within the gates, leaving Qnly a single
howitzer, with one or two ammunition-waggons,
in the handS' of our dragoons.

The enemy having thus withdrawn entirely
from -the right bank of the Guadiana, it became an
object of consideration how that river was to be
passed, in order that Badajoz might be put in a
state of blockade before it shouldbe provisioned,
or the damage caused in the late siege repaired.
There were but two bridges, one at Merida, the
other at Badajoz; and both were in possession of
the French; whilst the only practicable ford,--
and that too~ during the present season of the
year, practicable for cavalry alone,-lay under the
guns of Fort J uramenha. U pon it, however, no
reliance could be placed, as the sole channel· of


communication between different portions of our
army; for the first fIood would close up the pas-
sage entirely, by rendering the ford for a time
quite impervious. A bridge upon tresseIs was
accordingly directed to be formed, and put down
at a convenient point; whilst five Spanish boats,
with four pontoons, then in store at Elvas, were
converted into rafts, to be used, when circum-
stances should require, as fIying bridges.

It is not necessary to enter at much length into
the various obstacles which the army was com-
pelled to surmount, before it succeeded in efféct-
ing its passage across the Guadiana. Having
carried in its train no pontoons or other materials
for bridge-making, it was reduced to the necessity
of depending upon such supplies as the country
round, and the inefficient magazine at Elvas, were
enabled to furnish; and these proved so inade-
quate, that several heavy showers causing the
waters to rise on the very inorning after the
tressel-bridge had been completed, the whole was
swept away, and the labour of several anxious
days annihilated. It was at length determined
not to wait any Jonger, but to pass the troops at
once upon the rafts; and after they should have
taken up their graund of investment, to erect
another bridge at their leisure. The resolution
was promptly carried into effect. During the
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, the troops were ferried


across in detachrnents as nurnerous as were at all
consistent with their personal safety; and on the
latter day, Marshal Beresford established his
head-quarters at a srnall village on the left bank
of the river. He had hardly done so, when an
attack was made upon the village, which so far
succeeded, that the cavalry picket stationed there
was surprised and destroyed; but a company of
infantry, which were in reserve to support thern,
carne up, and theenerny were finally driven out
with sorne loss.

Before these arrangernents could be accorn-
plished, the enerny were enabled to fill in their
trenches, to rebuild the breaches, and to throw
considerable stores of provisions and arnrnunition
into Badajoz. This done, Mortier returned
towards Seville; but he endeavoured to cast an
additional irnpediment in the way of our projected
siege, by placing a garrison of four hundred rnen
in Oliven!(a. The nurnbers thus shut up, thougb,
neither adequate to rnake a proper defence, nor
very formidable when considered as a post upon
our flank, were not altogether to be neglected;
and Marshal Beresford accordingly resolved to
comrnence his opemtions, by making hirñself
mast{lr of OIiven~a.

The care of conducting this attack was in-
trusted to General Cole, who sat down before the
place on the 11th. On the 15th, the batteries


beiug in readiness to open, the Governor was sum-
moned, and honourable terms offered, in case· he
should be' disposed to capitulate; but as these
were rejected, the firing began, and before noon
a practicable breach was effected. The Governor
now, in his turn, proposed terms of capitulation,
but was refused. The firing was resumed, and in
half an hour the place surrendered at discretion.
General Cole then has tened to join Marshal Beres-
ford, who, having established a bridge of casks
over the ford at J uramenha, and secured it by a
téte-de-pont, capable of containing fifteen hundred
men, was now in position at Sto Martha. Rere the
corps established itself; and from this point the
different objects were attended to, of our com~
pleting the investment of Badajoz; of alarming
General Latour Maubourg into a further retrogres-
sion; and of watching the motions of SouIt, who
was using his best endeavours to open a comrnu-
nication with the city.

Things were in this state, when, on the 20th of
April, Lord Wellington arrived from the north,
and gave directions for the immediate cornmence-
ment of active operations against Badajoz. The
great difficulty, however, was to fall upon sorne
such plan of attack, as might hold out a promise
uf speedy success, and at the same time should not
require the employmentof great means in its exe,..
cution. Jt was a matter ofthe first consequence t~


reduce Badajoz quickly; because, if a greater
space of time were allowed than sixteen days of
open tren eh es, besides the period requisite in pre-
paring materials, our informatio.n assured us that
Soult would be able to collect a suffieient force to
relieve it. On the other hand, seldom has a siege
been undertaken, in modero times, with resourees
less adequate to the design, either in intrenching
tools, ammunition, or guns. Lord Wellington had,
it is true, ordered an ampIe suppIy of everything
requisite to be forwarded from Lisbon; and an
ample supply of everything requisite was actually
prepared; but when the stores began to be put in
motion, it was found that means of transport were
wanting; and hence not one-tenth part ofthe ma-
teriel promised ever reaehed the ca;mp of the
besieging army. N otwithstanding these disad,.
vantages, our engineers set steadily to the ope-
ration of reducing the place; and the preliminary
steps to the breaking of ground before the Parda-
leras, the Castle, and Fort Christoval, were taken
so early as the 22nd df April.

Before, however, any use could be made of these
preparatory arrangements, a despatch from Sir
Brent Spencer summoned Lord Wellington to his
original station on the northern frontier. Having
drawn out directions for the future conduct of the
besieging force, and recommended to Marshal
Beresford, in case of any ~ttempt on the part of


Marshal Soult, to risk an action, Lord Wellington
departed from the Guadiana, and arrived at the
position in the vicinity of Almeida, just in time to
meet the danger with which his troops were there
menaced. Jt will be necessary here to describe
somewhat at large the situation in which our army
at this time stood, on the banks of the Agueda;
and as 1 happen to be enabled, from personal ob-
servation, to enter upon my task, 1 do so with
greater readiness than if, as in the earlier pages of
the present chapter, 1 were obliged to write from
the statements and observations of others.

Between the Duas Casas and Touron rivers,
there extends a range of heights, which formed,
on the present occasion, the main feature in our
position. Our right, though placed directly upon
Nava d'Avel, might be said, in strictness, to rest
upon the Coa; for the country between the Coa
and the village being extremely impracticable,
little danger was to be apprehended from any at-
tempt made in that quarter. Our centre extended
along the heig"hts just alluded to, between the vil-
lages of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa;
whilst our left, which embraced Fort Conception
and Valdelamula, circled round by Almeida, so as
tocomplete the blockade of that important place,
at the same time that it appuyed upon ground
extremely favourable. With respect to the ar-
rangement of the troops, a few words will suffice.


On the extreme right of the line, General Hou-
stoun, with the seventh division, took post; the
cavalry being formed next to him, though some-
what in .advance. After the seyenth carne the first
division, thrown considerably forward, and upon
very advantageous ground, and communicating on
its left with the third, which again heldcon-
nexion with the light, as it did with the sixth and
fifth. The fifth division, under Sir William Ers-
kine, formed the extreme left of the line; whilst
the blockade of Almeida was, in an especial man-
ner, committed to the sixth division, under Gene-
ral Campbell. Every division and brigade was,
however, in a situation to move at a- moment's
warning, and by short and direct paths, to any
post in the entire line which might be threatened;
and hence, though to external appearance our
flanks were far removed from one -another, the
space of three hours would have brought the most
distant battalions in position to the same ground,
at any given point. Such was the local state of
our army, from the day when Massena retreated
across the frontier, up to the end of April; and such
it continued to be, when Lord We1lington, after
having examined the condition of affairs in the
south, returned to direct the series of operations
which were impending.

When Massena finally withdrew from the Por-
tuguese territory, it was confidently anticipated


that he would scarcely be in a condition to re-
sume offensive operations for severaI months to
come. Rumours of his excessive unpopularity
began aIso to make their way within our campo
We were told a variety of tales touching a quarrel
which had occurred between the Prince of Esling
and MarshaI N ey, into which, it was added, that
the whole army had entered, with a decided lean-
ing towards the latter officer; and it was repea-
tedly rumoured that Massena was on the eve of
his recall, and that some new chief would shortly
appear upon the stage to supply his place. Whe-
ther these reports were we11 or ill founded, we
hardly cared to inquire; but wecontinued to pre.,.
serve an attitude of extreme watchfulness towards
the front, at the same time that the blockade of
Almeida was kept up with a11 the diligence and
vigoQr of which we were capable. With respect,
again, to the enemy's position, we were not so well
informed. We were aware that they occupied Ciu-
dad Rodrigoand the country round in force, whilst
their outposts extended along the Agueda, and
their patrols occasionally passed it; but whether
they had sent any of their divisions to the towns
in therear, as some of our communications asserted,
we possessed nó means of accurately ascertaining.
The first days ofMay, however, brought in a tole-
rahly explicit declaration of the enemy's designs ;
and _we found that any noticins which we might


have be en led to form, as to the disorganisation and
consequent inefficiency of Massena's army, were
quite as groundless as many other reports which
daiJy poured in upon uso

1 have said that the centre of our line extended
at this time along the heights between the villa-
ges of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa; a
few words more respecting the localities of the
former ofthese villages may not be amiss.

Fuentes de Honor was not, strictly speaking,
embraced in our position, and though occupied by
the light troops of the 1st and 3rd divisÍons s.up-
ported by the 7th regiment, it was he Id merely
as an advanced post. Yet, in spite of its advanced
situation, it possessed so many defensible features,
as to form, in point of fact, one of the main bul-
warks of our ground; and its strength came fairly
into trial on two separate occasions, at the period
to which 1 now refer. On both was the judgment
which directed its selection distinctly shown; and
therefore 1 will endeavour to detail its particular
features and bearings.

Fuentes de Honor stands at the bottom of a
valley, and on the bank of a small rivulet or brook.
On either side are rising grounds; and through it
passes the main road to Caseja, Gallegos, and from
thence to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the Ciudad Ro-
drigo side, an extensive morass is bounded at sorne
distance by a thick wood; and though the ground


certainly rises there, as it does in rear of the vil~
lage, still the troops which advance in a hostile
attitude froro that quarter, must pass over a con~
siderable tract, where they will be exposed to a
heávy and destructive fire from almost every point.
The village itself is crossed in various directions
by walls, which afforded excellent cover for infan-
try, and were not altogether profitless against
artillery; whilst in its rear arise sorne rocky heights,
which at once covered the troops whilst in posses~
sion of the place, and afforded them a safe place
of retreat, in case they should be driven out. Above
these rocky heights was our main line arrayed ;
from whence., in case of need, reinforcements could
be continually sent to the troops in the village;
whilst, in the event ofthe village itself being car-
ried, the conquerors would find that their Iabours,
so far from being completed, were only beginning.
To sum up all in few words ;-it would be ex-
tremely difficult to conceive a post so well adapted
to give to its defenders a superiority quite unusual
over any force which might attack them; so easy
of defence from its local situation; so secure, in
point ofretreat; and withal so extremely impor-
tant to the line which it was designed to cover;
as furnishing an arena of con test quite distinct
from the main position, and totally independent
of it. This post, as 1 have aIread y stated, was
held by the light troops of the third and first divi.,.


sions; and it became, as soon as. Massena found
himself 5n a condition to renew hostilities, the
theatre of operations, hardly less sanguinary, or
less gIorious, than the hills of Busaco, or-the plains
of Talavera.

Before 1 proceed, however, to give any account
of the operations which may be said to have marked
the opening of another campaign, it may not per-
haps be amiss if 1 offer a few remarks, in addition
to those already recorded, touching the present
prospects of Lord Wellington's army, as compared
with those which were before it at the correspond-

. ing period in 1810.
In the month of February, 1810, Lord Welling.,.

ton formed himself in position, on almos! the same
ground which he occupied now. His was then
the only thing in the shape of an army throughout
the Peninsula; for the Spanish corps had been
aH, one after another, overthrown; and there re-
mained no force capable of keeping the field,
except about twenty-seven thousandBritish, and
an equal number of Portuguese troops. lt unfor-
tunately happened, al so, that both the British and
Portuguese were suffering dreadfully from sick-
ness; whilst the latter, as is well known, ne-
ver havingas yet found an opportunity of prov-
ing themselves, could not, even if efficient in
other respects, be perfectly relied upon. The ene-
my had just made themselves masters of Andalu-


sia, without being under the necessity of striking
a blow ;-Cadiz was in a state of blockade ;-and
Regnier and Mortier, threatening Portugal through
the Alentejo, were but feebly opposed by a mi-
serable levy under Romana. Massena,likewise,
was around Ciudad Rodrigo with upwards of
seventy thousand veterans; and from the fortress,
garrisoned only by Spaniards, and superintended
by a Spanish governor, no very obstínate resist-
ance was expected.

1t is not, perhll:ps, going too far to affirm that
few men, situated as Lord Wellington then was,
would have regarded bis case as otber tban despe-
rateo He was opposed, with less than fifty thou-
sand effectives, to the undivided strength of the
French empire; for there was no diversion going
on in the nortb of Europe, nor any prospect of
such diversion being speed·ily effected. It is true
that the lines were in his rear, fortified as care-
fully and skilfully as time and circumstances would
allow, and that his retreat thither could never be
prevented; but formidable as the lines were, no
one ventured to pronounce them impregnable, es;'
pecially if assailed by the. whole of the French
corps then in the Peninsula. The truth, indeed,
is, that among the' heads of departments, and
throughout the army at large, there were at this
time few, who did not look forward with some-
thing like anxiety to a speedy re-embarkation.


Portugal has no gates, it was said, by closing which
thirty thousand British soldiers can pretend to
shut out the French army; and to talk of defend-
ing it, now that Spain has been subdued, is as
idIe as it could be, to talk of defending the solitary
province of Galicia, Andalusia, or Arragon. Em-
bark we must, before long ;-and happy shall we
be, if our embarkation be not impeded or pre-
vented. Such, however, were not the senti-
ments of our chief; and it must be so interesting
to posterity to record what passed in his mind at
the period 1 allude to, that 1 hesitate not to give
his opinions, in nearly his own words,as commu-
nicated to myself:

" There is no doubt that the task which 1 have
uridertaken is Herculean, particularlynow, that
the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that
there is nothing in the shape of an army in the
field but ourselves. 1 think 1 am, however, in
such a situation, that 1 can retire and embark
whenever 1 please; and if that be the case, the
longer 1 stay, the better for the cause, and the
more honourable to the country. Whether 1 shall
be able to hold my ground at last, must of course
depend upon the numbers and the means by
which 1 sh:!l be attacked; and adverting to the
difficulties ofsubsistence even for small numbers
in this country, 1 hope that 1 shall not be at-
tacked by more than 1 shan be able to manage.

VOL. n. G


The necessity of keeping my real' open to the
Tagus is· a difficulty; and 1 should be able to
effect my object with gl'eater ease, if 1 was not
\lnder the necessity of effecting everything, not
only without 10ss, but without risk 01' even the
appearance of risk, in order to please the good
people of EngIand."

These are memorable sentiments, contrasted
with those which, it must be admitted, were gene-
rally felt by the army. - How well and how accu-
rately all our commander's calculatíons had been
formed, the turn which events took speedily de-
monstrated. The enemy advanced-they over-
carne the obstacles opposed to them-and we re-
tired, as it had been previously arranged, to Torres
Ved ras. Here then, at the very extremity of the
Peninsula, Lord Wellington took his stand; and
here he remained till the results of his own pro-

. found combinations compelled the enemy to fall
back into Spain.

How different wasour situation now! Instead
of acting solely on the defensive, we were engaged
in two offensive operations at once, both of them
ofthe very fil'st importance. We had even ven-
tured to divide our strength in the faces of those
very corps which but ayear ago th-reatened us .
with annihilation; and we were carrying· on two
sieges, and covering the divisions which conducted
them, at the mouths of the two gl'eat roads which


touch upon the Portuguese frontier. Thus by the
unbending firmness of one man, aided by the admi-
rable discipline and courage of his troops, had
the course of a war, of late so alarming, been
arrested; and the French, instead of overrunning
Portugal, and bringing under their yoke the last
portionof the continent of Europe, were held in
check in a country where their superiority ex-
tended no further than over the spots of ground
.covered by their several bivouacs.



Battle of Fuentes de Honor-Re-investment of Almeida-The
French garrison blow up the place, and escape-Massena's
army retires into Spain, and Lord Wellington's into canton-
ments-Siege of Badajoz by Marshal Beresford-Is raised
in consequence of the advance of Soult-Lord Wellington
,sends off reinforcements to Marshal Beresford, and sets out
to join him-The Marshal's corps assemble in position at

ON the 1st and 2nd of May, several large bodies
of French troops were observed to pass the
Agueda and the Azava, and to make a movement,
as if with the design of threatening our communi-
cations, and, if possible, effecting the relief of the
fortress of Almeida. Towards the evening of the
3rd, the sixth corps showed itself in. three lines on
the ridge which overhangs Fuentes de Honor, in
a direction parallel to that occupied by us; and
they shortly afterwards opened a heavy can-
nonade, which they followed up by a desperate


assault upon the village. Lieutenant-colonél
Williams, who commanded a battalion of light
companies, gallantly sustained the attack for sorne
time; but it was found necessary, at last, to sup-
port him with tbe 7 J st, under Colonel Cadogan,
as it again was supported in succession by the
79th and 24th regiments. The battle had not
lasted long, when Colonel Williams teceived a
wound, which compelled him to quit the field,
and things were in s()me disorder; but at tbis
moment Colonel Cadogan pressed forward with
the 71st, and driving the enemy with the bayonet
from all the ground which they had won, restored
the fortune ofthe day. It is scarcely necessary
to add, tbat tbe 7lst were ably supported by tbe
79th and 24th; upon tbe senior officer among
whom, Colonel Cameron of the former corps, tbe
command of the whole devolved.

Though checked in their first advance, the
enemy repeatedly renewed their attack, bringing
up, on each occasion, fresh troops; and on every
occasion were they driven back with a heroism
which has never been surpassed, and but rarely
equalJed. They fought, however, with great gal-
lantry, and more than once stood to be bayoneted
by our soldiers in the main street of the village;
but their success, whenever obtained, lasted but a
moment, and they were instandy swept away by
adesperate charge from the men whom they be-


lieved that they had DverCDme. The 71st, which
had repeatedly attacked and DverthrDwn cDlumns
.of French trDDps Dn the rDad, were tempted, tD-
wards dusk, by the appearance Df what they CDn-
ceived tD be a gun .on the Dpp.osite acc1ivity, tD
I'ush acrDSS the rivulet? and becDme the assailants
in their turno N.othing c.ouldbe m.ore impetu.ous,
and yet mDre DrderIy, than this charge. They
lite rally b.ore d.own everything befDre them, till
they reached the .object Df their search; when, tD
their m.ortificati.on, they discDvered that it was
nDt a gun, but .only a tumbril .of ammunitiDn. ·Of
that, hDwever, they made themselves masters ;
and thDUgh· severely galled Dn their return by a
murderDUS fire .of musketry and grape, they re-
gained Fuentes de HDn.or with their trDphy. and
spent the night there in quieto

As may readily be imagined, the dawn Df the
4th had n.o! yet appeared, when the whDle Df Dur
line gDt under arms, and waited in. anxiDus expec-
tatiDn fDr a renewal Df the cDmbat. Day broke,
hDwever, without disclDsing any disp.osition, .on
the part Df the enemy, t.o resume the .offensive;
and as h.our after h.our stole Dn, a belief naturally
ar.ose, that n.othing wDuld be attempted, at least
fol' the presento . Inthis persuasi.on we were
str.ongly c.onfirmed by the rep.ort .of several de-
serters, wh.o this day carne in t.o us, and we leárned that Massena, Dverawed by the


obstinacy of yesterday's resistance, had resolved
to attempt nothing further, till he should be re-
inforced by a body of the imperial guard, which
was understood to be 011 its march to join him.
That the statements of the deserters were not to
be disregarded, a variety of circumstances led us
to believe. In the first place, clouds of mounted
and staff officers might be seen, riding, from time
to time, along the opposite ridge, and examining,
with apparent care and minuteness, into our dis-
positions. In the next place, as evening ap-
proached, we observed no inconsiderable addition
to"the enemy's cavalry, particularly to their hus-
sars and lancers, arrive. The reader need scaréely
be reminded that our force was greatly weakened,
more especially in cavalry, in consequence of the
formation of the separate corps, which was now
acting under Marshal Beresford. Of the latter
description of troops we could not muster, at
present, more than fifteen or sixteen hundred in
the field; and the total amount of our effectives,
including Portuguese of all arms, fell short of
twenty-nine thousand. On the side of the enemy,
again, the cavalry were computed to exceed four
thousand; whilst the sum of the effectives fell
not 8hort of forty-five thou8and. These were
fearful odds, especiaIly when it is considered that
we were fighting for the attainment of one specific
object, and that we were not only calIed upon to


resist with effect this tremendous superiority, but
tó continue, at the same time, the blockade of
Almeida. Yet had the men confidence in their
leader, as their leader had confidenee in them; and
that feeling, aided by the judicious choice of
ground, and the able manreuvres which our divi~
sions severally exeeuted, carried us safely and
gloriously through all our difficulties.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 5th, our
advanced parties sent in to state that the enemy's
columns were in motion; and before six they had
commenced a desperate attaek, as well upon the
vi.llage of Fuentes de Honor as upon the 7th
division, which oceupied a wood and sorne broken
ground on the right of our lineo In Fuentes tha
assailants were met with the same spirit of deter-
mined resistance which had frustrated all their
efforts on the 3rd; and if for a moment they
seemed to have made an impression, they were
almost immediately. afterwards driven with 10ss
from the ground which they had won. 011 the
right, affairs went on with rather more of apparent
peril; though even there the danger was never
very imminent. It was here that they deemed it
expedíent to employ the mass of their cavalry,
which carne on, stróngly supported both by in-
fantry and guns; and asevere loss was on our
part experienced, before a final check was given
to the progress of men who fought like troops


habituated to victory, and as yet unaccustomed to

The first attack fell upon· General Sontag's
brigade, which had been especiaUy directed to
defend the wood, but which, overwhelmed by
numbers,retired, after a gallant and obstínate re-

. sistance. Our cavalry seeing this, and anxious to
cover the retreat of their comrades, q uitted a very
commandingand yet open posítion on which they
had been drawn up, and descended, with two or
three pieees ofhorse-artillery, into the low ground.
It was an unfortunate movement, and opened·to
the enemy the only prospect ofpermanent suecess
which they enjoyed during the whole of the day ;
for they immediately occupíed in force the heights
wbich had been abandoned, and pressed our peo~
pIe so vigorously, that it was found necessary to
give to this partor our line a new direction. The
light division, which had advanced to support
tbe cavalry, finding the post aIread y evacuated,
~. wheeled to the right, and made arrangements to
. protect a fresh movement of General Houston's

division, which they ~xecuted in masterly style.
rrhey drew up in squares of battalions, received
:aud repulsed repeated charges of the French caval-
:ry, and then marching through our own sq uadrons,
susÚlined a cannonade as galling as has frequentIy
fallen to the share of troops in that dense order.
1n tbe mean while~ no formidable force of Blitish


dragoons could be brought together, for our infe-
riority in that arm was too decisive to warrant
any granddisplay; but a few squadrons charged
from time to time through the intervals of the
squares with. greater 9r less benefit, according as
opportunities offered. In the end, however, this
species of manreuvre threatened to be productive
of more harm than good. Our troopers, in re-
tiring, got among our owri squares, and threw
them into confusion, from which, but for the judi-
cious conduet of the ehasseurs Britanniques, mueh

. misehief might have aeerued. These, however, by
a well-directed Ranking fire, hindered the enemy
from taking advantage of the opening made, and
henee our retrogression was effeeted with but little
10ss on our part, and a heavy sIaughter among the

The right was now appuyed by a strong hiIl, on
the summit oí whieh stood an old tower; and the
enemy finding that the newalignment had be en
taken up without the slightest disorder, paused
before they ventured to assail it. Their successes
he re amounted to nothing more than the oecu-
pation of some ground, whieh, at the eornmenee-
ment oí the action, had been held by us; they had
in no respect broken our ranks, and they were as
far from turning them as ever; whilst in the direc-
tion of Fuentes de Honor, upon whieh a variety of
attempts had been made, they were beaten baek


at all points. They had attacked it in front, and
on both flanks, with infantry, artillery, and caval-
ry; but the steady valour of the 71st and 79th
regiments, supported by the 24th, set all their
efforts at defiance; and now, after several hours of
severe fighting, not the slightest impression was
made. Massena seemed to feel that our troops
were made of more obstinate stuff than even he
had anticipated, and towards evening he relaxed
in his exertions. His columns on our right halted;
those which had been employed in the assault of
Fuentes drew off; and the whole army prepared .
to bivouac, in the order in which it stood at the
close ofthe action. Similar arrangements were
entered into on ·our side .. The pickets were sta-
tioned along the front of the position; and large
fires were lighted across the ridge; and both
parties lay down to rest with a confident assu-
rance on their minds that the battle was inter-
mitted ónly till the return of daylight.

We were, as usual, under arms long before
dawn appeared; but it brought about no such re-
sults as we had anticipated. The enemy were
before us, indeed, in the same force as ever, and
in the same attitude which they had assumed on
the preceding evening; but they exhibited no dis-
position to renew the struggle; whilst we were
content to retain our attitude of watchfulness, and
to act as we had hitherto done, entirely on the de-


fensive. In this manner the whole of the 6th
passed away, no movernent of any importance
being made on either side; and night again closed
in, bringing with it an increased persuasion, that
the morrow must, at all events, lead to sorne more
decisive issues. But those amongst us who anti-
cipated another battle, found, on the return of day,
that they had rniscalculated the enemy's courage
'or resources. The dawn of the 8th showed their
columns in full retreat; and towards noon it was
satisfactorily ascertained that they had taken the
road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Massena; with his who]e
arrny, reinforced by every battalion aÍld squadron
wbich he had be en enabled to bring up from Cas-
tiJe and Galicia, was thus foiled by three divisions
of our divided force; he was compelled to retreat
before men over whom he had calculated on ob-
,taining an easy and brilliant victory ; and Almeida,
for the relief of which he had shown hirnself
deeply interested, was left to its fate. It may be
worth while to inquire into sorne of those circurn-
stances which tended to produce a failure so re-
markable, and to place fresh laurels on the brows
of one, to whose renown all Europe was already
beginning to bear witness.

There can be no doubt that the general arrange-
ment and disposition of the aUied troops was
marked by aH that judgment and military saga-
city, which so eminently cháracterise the tactics


of the Duke of Wellington. Every species of
force, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, was
posted where it could act to the best purpose and
with greatest effect; whilst due advantage was
taken of all the natural inequalities which pre- '
sented themselves, to shelter our people, as far as
might be, from the enemy's fire. Yet our line was
in many places unavoidably exposed, and open to
the attacks both of cavalry and artillery; whilst
the thick woods in our front afforded to Massena
the most convenient plateau which he could have
desired, for the distribution of his columns unseen,
and therefore disregarded. Had be rightly availed
himself of tbis advantage, be might bave poured
the mass of his force upon any single point, and
perbaps made an impression befare we could bave
bad time to support it. There were, besides this,
otber and equally obvious modes of proceeding, to
which be bad no recourse. Massena's superiority
to us, both in cavalry and artillery, was very great.
Had be commenced his attack witb a violent can-
nonade, jt must bave produced sorne bavoc, and
probably considerable confusion in our lineo He
might tben have moved forward bis cavalry en
masse, supporting it by strong columns of infantry;
and had eitber tbe one or the otber succeeded in
piercing tbrough, our situation would bave been
by no means an enviable one. It is, indeed,
higbly probable that his 'Cbarges would have been


repulsed; but in this case, a third resource was
left to him, of which he might al so have availed
himself. Had he thrown his cavalry round our
right flank,-a movement which we should have
found it no easy matter to prevent,-crossed the
Coa, advanced upon our lines of communication,
and stopped our supplies, at the moment when,
with his infantry, he threatened to turn us; then
pushed upon Sabugal and the places near, he
might have compelled us to pass the Coa with all
our artillery at the most disadvantageous,
and cut us off from our best and safest retteat.
There was, indeed, a time during the continuance
of the affairof thé 5th,·.when his design of acting
in this manner was )eriously apprehended; and
Lord Wellington was, in consequence, reduced to
the necessity of deciding whether he should relin-
quish the Sabugal road, or raise the blockade of
Almeida. But Lord Wellington's presence of
mind never for a moment forsook him. He felt no
distrust in his troops; to retain his hold over a
secure and accessible }ine of retreat was, ~there­
fore, to him, a éonsideration of less moment than
to continue an operation of which the ultimate
success could be now neither doubtful nor remote;
and he at once determined to expose Sabugal,
rather than throw open a communication with
Almeida. It was a bold measure, but it was not
adopted without due consideration ; and it received


an ample reward in the successful termination of
this hard-fought battle.

The 10ss experienced by our army during the
operations of these two days was very conside-
rabie; for the actions, a1though partial, were
maintained with signal obstinacy on both sides.
It fen chiefly upon the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions
of infantry, and upon the cavalry, and amounted
. in aH to nearIy sixteen hundred meno That of the
enemy was much greater, and carne not short, on
the most rnoderate computation, of three thousand.
They left four hundred dead in the village of
Fuentes de Honor alone, and a large proportion of
prisoners fell into our hands. N otwithstanding all
this, however, they retrograded soslowly, that on
the 9th it was stil1 doubtful whether some fresh
efforts might not be made. They had taken, as 1
have -stated, the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and ap-
peared about noon on the preceding day to be in
full retreat; but their retreat was conducted with
the utmost leisure, w.hieh the peeuliarity of our
circumstanees WQuld not permit us to interrupto
On the contrary, we applied ourselves sedulously
to the double task ofstrengtheningour own ground
by means of intrenchments, and resuming the
striet blockade of Almeida, in which late events
had compel1ed us to relax; and on the 10th we
were relieved from a11 further uneasiness respect-
ing Massena, by the diseovery that he had leftno


more tban a few cavalry pickets on the banks of
tbe Azava. Thus was an end put to a variety of
conjectures, o which some had begun to hazard,
touching the probabilities of another action in this
quarter; and Lord Wellington was left at liberty
to pursue such plans as he should consider best
adapted to the situation of the country, and most
suitable to his own means and resources.

In addition to giving security to _his position
aboye Fuentes de Honor, by directing certain
field-works to be thrown up here and there for its
defence .. Lord Wellington issued orders that °the
blockade of Almeida should be resumed. On first
arriving in this province, the British general caused
Almeida to be reconnoitred, with the view, ir pos-
sible, of carrying it by a coup-de-main. As, how-
ever, it was found too formidable for any such
attempt, and as the arrny was not possessed of a
battering train, or other materials necessary for the
conduct of a regular siege, he was, per force,
obliged to content himself with its investment;
and confident hopes were entertained, that famine
would, before long, do the work of war. It had
now been blockaded sorne time, and its stock of
provisions, originally scan'ty, was drawing, we
were well aware, rapidly to an end; it was there-
fore of the utmost importance. not only to prevent
fresh supplies from being thrown in, but to hinder
the garrison from effecting its escape; a measure


which the governor was known to have in contem-
plation. On this aecount, Massena's eQlumns had
no sooner abandoned their ground, than the sixt,h
division, on whom the duties of the blockade de-
volved, were commanded to resuQ}.e their labours ;
and they marched for the purpose, uÍlder the ord~rs
of General Campbell, back upon their canton-

Gener;:JJCampbell, a zealous and enterprising offi-
cer, was exceedingly desirolls that the arrangement
of the blockade should be intrusted entirely to
himself; and being ambitious, as it was but natu~
fal that he should, of the honour of reducing this
important place through hi~ own.~kill, he requested
and ()b\ained permis$iQn 10 condllct all details-
withoqt any interference. Whether it was; th,at
GeQeral Campbell felt too confident, or, wheth~l'
any other circumst_ances bad weigilt with him, 1
know ·Ilqt; but tl!e Qven,t proved that, in making
his dispoliitions, he adopted a system of incau\ion,
which led to resul~ IIWftifying to 4ims,elf, ~~ f,LU·
noying to the wllOle al'my. Instead of coverÍI)g
with troops t4e l~ft fa,ce of Almeida, th~ h,anks Qf
the ¡\gl,lep,a, ~I;ld the bridge ~t ll~rba <lel Puerc,o,
the~e . ppint¡; rePlain~ un,guard,ed; an,d he p~~t~
a Qrig~dE} .a.t·Jun~a a11dMalp~rteda, thr(};w l>a.qk
General P~ck tQ Ci¡;¡co V ~IJI~s,l,\nd watc~~d; with
a degre,e ~f atteijt~(;m, $,e right, faqe qf the. tO,,"11,
frOID whi~h 110 mOyet;nellt was likely to be made.



with a probability of success. Of Barba del
Puerco in particular, it behoved him, in the opinion
of aH, to be excessively jealous, because, through
it ran the most direct and shortest road towards the
enemy's outposts; indeed, so conscious were all
parties of this, that on the 11th the 4th regiment,
from Sir William Erskine's division, was, in spite 01'
the late agreement, ordered up to take possession
of the heights aboye that place. But the ar~ange­
ment came too late, for matters were already in a
train for an attempt, the success of which, whilst it
speaks nothing· in favour of our prudence, must
ever redound to the honour of General Brennier,
the brave man who condllcted it.

A little before midnight on the 11th, animmense
explosion was heard in the vicinity of the fortress ;
though our head-quarters weretoo far removed to
be aware of thé circumstance. Soon afterwards
General Pack, who chanced to be at Malparteda
with the pickets of his brigade, spread an alarm
that the place was blown up, and that the Frel1ch
garrison was marching in good order towards
Barba del Puerco. General Pack's pickets of-
fered as much resistance as they were capable of
offering; but the enemy soon broke through, and
passing along the flank of the reserve, our people
were unable to arrest their progress, even for a
momento General Pack sent immediately to sum-
mon General Campbell, who, on the first noise,


had hurried frorn his quarters; but the latter has-
tened to the front, not leaving, as it was said, posi-
tive orders behind him, and carne up whilst his
own troops were yet dispersed. and in disorder.
Great delay occurred in consequence, in bringing
thern to the point threatened; whilst the 4th regi-
ment failed in its attempts to head the flying gar-
rison; by which rneans Brennier was enabled tB
lead his troops in a close and compact column from
Almeida as far as the Agueda, without having ex-
perienced any serious rnolestation by the way.
General Pack, indeed, by great exertions, con-
trived to hang with a few of his men upon the
enerny's rear. and pointed out, by the flashes of
hisrnusketry, the exactpath which they had taken;
but Brennier conducted all things in a manner so
cool and soldier-like, that not the slightest symp-
tom of confusion was manifested throughout tbe
night. He had given positive directions to his
soldiers, from the instant oftheir quitting the town.
to continue their march in profound silence; how-
ever heavy might be the fire of the besiegers, they
were not to return a shot; "and when daylight
arrived, in case they should find themselves sur-
rounded, they were to make an opening wherever
they best could, with the bayonet. N o commands
could have beenmore punctually obeyed. The
sound of a voice was not heard among them; and
they never once returned the desultory tiraillade


with which General Pack's men endeavoured tó

Having reached the Agueda, they made a halt,
in order that sorne stragglers who had lagged be-
hind, might regain the column. This measure af~
forded an opportunity to the 36th, 2nd, and 4th
regiments, to close upon them; and as the French,
when they resumed their march, mistook their
way by diverging a little too much to the left,
these regiments were enabled to reach the bank of
the river just as the fugitives were crossing the
bridge at Barba del Puerco. A destructive tire
was immediately thrown in, by which between
one and two hundred men weremQwed down;
whilst two squadrons of the royals having fianked
them, succeeded, in conjunotion with Pack's Por-
tuguese, in seeuring ten officers and two hundred
men as prisoners. Thus about oIíe-third of the
garrison of Almeida was cut off. But the remain-
ing two-thirdseffected their escape, not less, in
all probability, to the astonishment of Marshal
Massena, than to tha regret of Lord Welliogton
and his followers. It seemed as if, by t11,i8 unto-
ward event, all the advantages obtained by tbe
battle of Fuentes ele Hónor were tbrown away.
N ot that we very deepJy regretted tbe escape of
the individuals: they were brave men, had made
a bold venture, and deserved that it should be
~rowned with suceess; but it was mortifying to


reflect that now Massena might, with sorne show
of reason, speak of his late operations as a victory,
and not as a defeat. He might, in a specious man·
ner, inform Europe that he had manreuvred merely
for the purpose of bringing off the garrison of AI-
meida; and as the garrison had actually escaped,
how could we contradict him? It is not wórth
while to dwell longer on this affair; but 1 will
venture to affirm that no one who witnessed the
effect this disappointment produced upon our army,
will ever be able to forget it.

General Brennier left Almeida in a state of sad
diJapidation. On examining it next day, we found
that three out of the five bastions of which it was
composed, had been blown to atoms; the crests
were thrown down into theditch; and the stenes
ofwhich they had principally bean composed, were
burlad, by the violence of the explosion, in all di-
rections, and to great distances. Whether the
foundations were materially shaken, we had not
the means of immediately ascertaining; but the
revetments and ravelines were equally untouched2
and the main outline of the rampart and ditch
remained entire. The other two bastions had not
beeninjured, the mines having by mere accident
faiied to expIode. Yet was the whole a complete
ruin; and though we jurlged that it might be so
far restored, for a moderate expense, as to be ren·
dered secure against a coup-de-main, we saw


plainly cnough, that to put it again in a state of
defence, and render it capable of withstanding a
siege, would require much time, much labour,
and much money. In this country the expenses
oí mason work are very hea vy, and Almeida was
entirely constructed of masonry; whilst the Iapse
of six or eight months-the smallest space of time
that its re-erection would require-would, in all
probability, produce events calcuIated, either in
one way or another, to render its existence or non-
existence a question of very littIe importance.
On these accounts, Lord Wellington determined
not to interfere respecting it, but to Ieave it to the
Portuguese 'government to determiue whether it
shouId be rebuilt or not; and ir it were, in what
form, and after what plan, the repairs shouId be

, The sensation produced by the escape of the
garrison, and the destruction of Almeida, having
subsided, we began again to give our undivided
attention to the reports w hich arrived from various
quarters, relative to the French, as weIl as to
speculations and surmises touc1ting ourselves. Of
the French, it was confidently asserted that they
had 'retired upon Salamanca, Zamora, and Toro;
that Massena had 'received his recall from Paris ;
and that Marmont, of whose junction we had pre-
viously received accounts, was now in the chief
command. Their generals, moreover, were said


to agree in opinion that nothing could be under-
taken' against Portugal or the English, till the
army should be completely reorganised, and
strengthened by large supplies, both of men and
means. ,AH likewise, combined, it was said, in an
outcry against Massena, whose conduct towards
Ney had been warmly condemned, not only by
the corps of N ey himself, but by the oftic'ers of
the army in general, and whose measures were
characterised as having been, from the first,. with-
out object, and destitute of judgment.. A strong
sense of discontent was thus said to be general
throughout their ranks, and discipline was stated
to have become, in consequence, grievously re'-
laxed. As to ourselves, though our credit might
not, perhaps, stand on ground quite sO'elevated as
that which it occupied previous to the late failtire
at Almeida, yet it must be admitted by an that
the British army had established for itself a repu-
tation such as it had not, at any other period of
the war, obtained; and there were few who
looked . forward without a sanguine and welI-
grounded expectation, that future events would
only add to the glories of the troops and their
illustrious leader. We had now be en fairly pitted
against the warriors and chiefs before whom the
powers of Europe gave way; and we had come
forth from the struggle in a manner which could
hardly fail to satisfy all that we were at least not


inferior to them in any qualification befitting sol~
diers. Everyindividual in the army felt this, and
every one felt to whom the praise was due. The
consequencé was, that Lord Wellingtonwas looked
up to with a degree ofenthusiastic devotion, which
'it may not, perhaps; be easy for a common reader
to understand; whilst aU his proceedings showed
that in hisanny, in itsvalour and patienee, disci-
pline and coolness, he reposed a eonfidence of
which the soldiers knew themselves to be worthy,
and which .it 'Was their principal boast, that they
had in no instance ahused 01' betrayed.

As BOOIl as Almeida feU, and it became satis-
factorily ascertained. tbat nothing of sny impor-
tance W<nHd. be attempted on this side oí Portugal,
Lord W~lingtol1 began to direet a large share of
bis attention to the eampaign in the south, and
made ready lo assist Marshal Beresford, not only
with strong reinforcements, but with his own coun-
sel and presen'Ce. For this putpose, he pol hvo
divisiOllS~ the 3rd and the 7tb, under GeneraIs
Picton and Houston, in march towards the Gua-
diana, directing thero to move by Campo Mayor.
The rest ofthe army was then ordered into can-
ton'menti!!; the sixth division at Mealhada, Jueda,
and Frenada; tire' nfth at Fuentes de Honor,
Ponte Vilhe, and· Nave d'Avel; the first at Aldea
de Ponte and Albergaria; the ligbt at Gallegos~
and along the banks of the Agueda; and the ca-


valry at Cesmeo and the villages near. Along
this line, by the extraordinary exertions of Mr:
Kennedy and the comm:issariat department, the
troops were, upon the whole, well supplied; and
though forage was rather searee, still the cavalry
contrived not only to keep up the condition in
which they previously stood, but even to improve
upon it. Sir Brent Spencer, likewise, on whom,
in the event of Lord Wellington's absence, the
eommand of the whole devolved, was unremitting
in his exertions to provide for the wants of the sol.
diera, and to guard them against surprise. But
on the latter head no great risk was apprehended ;
and therefore Lord Wellington; as soon: as he had
seen his arrangements in a train towardstheir
eompletion, set oft: accompanied by the heads of
departments, for Badajoz.

It may be necessary here to advert to circum.~
stances which, during the last fortnight, had be..:
fallen Marshal Beresford and his corps.

On the 22nd of April, in consequenee of diree-
tiOO8 given by Lord WeHington himself, measures
were taken for completing the investment of Ba ~
dajoz, and for preparing fascines, gabions, and
other implements neeessary for the conduct of the
siege. These were somewhat interrupted by thé
sudden rise of the river on the 24th; which sweep~
ing away the bridge of casks, which had been
thrown across, cut off all cornmunication between


the investing army and Portugal. On the 29th,
however, the communications were restored by
means of flying bridges; and on the 1st of May,
the bridge of casks was replaced more firmly and
more conveniently than ever.

On the 4th, General William Stewart invested
Badajoz on the left bank of the river; having
marched from Talavera la Real with five thousand
men at midnight, and taken up his ground without
any loss at nine in the morning. By some mis-
take, however, and the occurrence of several
disasters,' the investment on the southern side was
not effected till the 8th, and then only after a good
deal of skirmishing, and with considerable difli-
culty. But a flying bridge was, in the interim,
established on the Guadiana, immediately below
the mouth of the Caya; roads of communication
were formed round the place; and the guns and
stores were moved froro Oliven!;a according to
orders; and as those intended to act against Fort
Sto Christoval were brought up on the same day
which saw the investment completed, prepara-
tions were made to break ground, and commence
the siege with vigour, that evening.

Without going into a regular journal of this
siege, it may be' proper to advert here to the
amount of the rneans with which a handful of
British troops endeavoured to reduce one of the
strongest and IDOst regularly fortified places in


the south of Spain. For the attack upon Fort
Christoval-to the results of which they looked
for success in the undertaking at large-there
were provided five hundred intr~nching tools, two
thousand sand-bags, a few planks, and about two
hundred gabions. The artillery consisted of three
brass twenty-four pounders, provided with three
hundred rounds per gun, and two eight-inch
howitzers, supplied each with two hundred rounds.
The besieging corps was made up of Qne British
brigade, two battalions of Portuguese of the line,
and a battalion of militia, mustering in all about
four thousand men; one hundred men of the line
were appointed to act as overseers; forty-eight
carpenters, and thirty-six miners, were attached
to the engineers; and there were present twenty-
seven rank and file of the corps of royal military
artificers. • .

The soil upon whieh the working parties began
their operations proved so rocky and unyielding,
tbat though· ground was broken on tbe Digbt of
the 8th, and four hundred men were employed in
breaking it, ten men only were enabled to work
under cover, when daylight appeared; and the
progress made was in consequence both slowand

~ 8ee an extremely interesting work by Colonel Jones, of
the Engineer~, called "A Journal of the 8ie~es ill the

124 1\1 A RItA TIVE OF THE

unsatisfactory, On the 10th the garrison madea
sortie, which was at first attended with success-
the troops employed making their way, in spite
of the covering parties, into one of our advanced
works; but the guard of the trenches soon reco-
vered the ground which was lost, and drove the
enemy back with considerable slaughter within
the walls. On this occasion the indiscreet valour
of sorne of our officers tempted them to lead their
men up to the very glacis of the fort; and they
sustained, for no purpose, a 10ss, which might
have been well avoided, of nearly four hundred in
killed and wounded. On the 11th the breaching
battery being completed, and the guns and
howitzers prepared for service, our artillery opened
the attack, attempting, with the howitzers, to
keep under the fire. of the place; whilst with the
three twenty-four pounders, they strove to batter
in breach thé smalIer flank of Fort Sto Christoval.
But our gunnel's were Portuguese recruits, who
knew little of their duty, and exhibited abad
specimen of practice; whereas the fire from the
fort was both well directed and warmly kept up.
The consequence was, that long before evening
our batteries were silenced; and the three guns,
and one of the howitzers, were rendered unser-

N othing intimidatedby these reverses, Marshal


Beresford prepared to renew his efforts with aH
the means which he was able to bring together.
Other guns were moved round to Fort Christoval,
and a new battery constructed and armed; but
before a fair trial could be made of its efficiency,
reports reached the General, which caused him to
suspend, for the present, the whole of bis under-
taking. He learned that Soult, having collected
an army .of fifteen or sixteen thousand, men, in
communication with General Latour Maubourg at
the head of six thousand more, was in full march
for the relief of the place; and as the corps with
wbich be covered the siege was by no means com~
petent to oppose that force, it becáme indispensa-
ble to relinquish every other object, for tbe sake
of effectually meeting the danger which threat.;
ened. On the night between the 12th and 13th,
therefore, when a fresh parallel bad just beeo
Qpened, and upwards of fourteen hundred men
were paraded, for the purpose of briskly carrying
on the work, an order arrived that the under-
taking should be relinquished, and that tbe troops
should march, without delay, to the position at
Valverde. The orders were promptly obeyed.
On the night of the 13th, all the batteries were
distilounted; and on the ] 4th, such materíals as it
was found impossible to remove, were bumed, or
otherwise destroyed. On the. night of the 15th,
the lastcorps which had halted to complete these


operations, tóok their departure; and the first
siege ofBadajoz was formalIy raised.

Such was the substance of the information
which reached us; part of it whilst we were yet
at Villa Formosa, and part whilst wewere prose-
cuting our journey towards the Guadiana. That
Marshal Beresford's situation was one of extreme
difficulty and delicacy, any one who reflects must
percelve. There was submitted to him no other
alternative than either to fight with the Guadiana
in his rear,over which his communications were
precarious and indifferent, or by a retreat, to abán-
don Badajoz entirely, and permit the enemy, by
taking possession of the course of the river, to
strengthen and consolidate himself in Estremadura
and the south of Spain. He knew, indeed, that
Lord Wellington was hurrying to his assistance,
and he was aware that two divisions had begun
their march for the purpose of supporting him:
had it been practicable, therefore, to protract mat-
ters, and to avoid an action till the reinforcements
should arrive, it would have been his policy to do
so. But the enemy pressed forward ",ith so much
rapidity, and manifested so decided an intention
of overwhelming him at once, that in point of fact
he can hardly be said to have possessed a choice.
He accordingly concentrated his troops, as has
been aboye related, at Valverde, whither likewise
the Spanish generals~ Blake and Castaños, with


twelve thousand men, hastened· to join him; and
the three chiefs having concerted their plans, and
made every disposition to receive the enemy,
awaited that battle which appeared to be inevi-



Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz-Battle of AI-
buera-Retreat of 80ult, and renewal of the siege-It is
pressed with vigour, and a breach in Fort 8t. Christoval pro-
nouneed prácticable-Movements of díe enemy to relieve
the plaee-Brilliant cavalry affair at Usagre.

lw consequence of the advices which he received
from the south, Lord Wellington, as soon as he
saw matters in a proper train upon the Agueda,
set off to join Marshal Beresford, and to superin-
tend in person the operations which that officer
was conducting. We quitted Vil1a Formosa on
the 15th, and travelling at the rate of sixty miles
a day, without baggage or impediments of any
description, arrived in Elvas before dark on the
19th. Whilst performing this arduous journey,
a variety of rumours relative to late transactions
met us at every stage. At one place it was stated
that the enemy were coming on in force, and that


a battle might hourIy be expected; at anothel",
that Marshal Beresford had resolved upon a re-
treat, not feeling himself equal' to oppose the
French; and, at a third, that a great action had
been fought, and that it had ended in favour of
the allies. It will readily be imagined that the last
rurnour, though it entered in no respect into parti-
culars, tended, in no sligbt degree, to elevate our
spirits, and quicken our pace. On reaching Elvas,
however, more accurate details were given; for
Colonel Arbuthnot, from the Marshal's head-
quarters, met us here, and from him we received
an official account of one of the most obstinate, as
well as sanguinary actions, in which British troops
were ever engaged.

The most advantageous position which it is pos-
sible for an arrny to assume, which desires to check
the advance of a hostile force froll1 Seville to
Badajoz, is beside the village of Albuera, among
sorne undulating heights which stretch towards the
rear, and are covered by two small streams run-
ning in parallel directions upon the flanks of the
plateau. On this ground Marshal Beresford de-
termined to take post, and fOl" that purpose ad-
vanced his troops towards Albuera on the 14th
and 15th; but Soult, having hurried from Seville
by forced marches of not less than six leagues a
day, was beforehand with him; and the cavalry,
which had been sent on as far as Almendralejo to

VOL. ll. 1


reconnoitre, was driven back in disorder. It was
accordingly found, on arriving at the village, that
an extensive wood, of which it had been Marshal
Beresford's intention to avail himself, was in pos·
session of the French; and hence, that whatever
dispositions he might deern it advisable to make,
must be entirely restricted to the country on the
western bank of the Albuera.

The position selected for the army was accor·
dingly behind the litt1e river Albuera, where
the road from Seville to Badajoz and OIiven~a,
after passing the stream by a bridge close to the
village, separates into two branches. Here the
ground rises from the river in gentle undulations,
which, extending to the right, afford no single point
d'appui more favourable than another, but tempt
him, who has already arranged his line along their
summits, to draw it out from hill to hill, and emi-
nence to eminence. It was here that the allied
armies were posted on the evening of the 15th;
their left resting upon Albuera, and covered by the
stream, the steep banks of which, together with
sorne walls and buildings, afforded to it a good
deal of shelter; whilst their right, extending to a
considerable distance, found no commanding fea-
ture on which to lean.

Marshal Beresford had on this occasion under
his orders !L corps of Spaniards, whom he stationed
in a double line upon his extreme right, between


two hillocks, one somewhat in advance of the
other; next to them carne the second British di-
vision, which, under General Stewart, composed
the centre; and on the left of aU were the Portu-
guese of General Hamilton's division, supported by
General Alten's brigade of light Germans. The
fourth division, under General Cole, which did not
reach its ground till after the battle began, formed,
as a reserve, in rear of the second; whilst the
main body of the cavalry took post upon the right,
so as to cover the Spaniards, and hinder them from
being turned. With respect to the exact numbers
of this army, it is not very easy to form a correct
judgment, bécause the Spaniards are proverbial
for the great inaccuracy of their returns; but
taking these at 12,000, the Portuguese at 8000,
and the British at 7 flOO, the total amount will
reach about 27,000. That it could not exceed
this is certain, however much it tnight fall short of
it. In cavalry, Marshal Beresford's corps was ex-
tremely -weak, and his artillery amounted to no
more than thirty pieces.

The force with which Soult prepared to raise
the siege of Badajoz was, in point of number, in-
ferior to that of the allies; but in cavalry, artillery,
and the general character of the troops, it was
greatly superior. Twenty thousand French in-
fantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty pie ces of
cannon, bivouacked, on the night of the 15th, in


the wood; and the whole advanced next day in
the finest order to the attack.

It might be about nine o'clock in the morning
of the 16th, when a heavy force of cavalry, sup-
ported by t~o large columns of infantry, were
seen moving towards the bridge, with a view, as
it was supposed, of piercing the allied line in that
quarter, and making themselves masters of AI-
buera. AH eyes were instantly turned to the
point threatened, and the most effective prepara-
tions were made to meet and repel the attack;
but before the excellence of these could inany
degree be put to the test, a new source of alarm
disclosed itself in another direction. The enerny,
instead of corning on as had been expected, ra.,
pidly changed their plan, and under cover of their
cavalry, and favoured by a thick fog, filed off
towards our right. Rere they pressed forward
with an impetuosity which the Spaniards, who
were stationed there, could not withstand ;and in
a few minutes they were in possession of the
most cornmanding heights, upon which our right
Rank depended for support. The Spaniards be-
haved, on this occasion, with considerable gal-
lantry. They gave way, it is true, and fell back ;
but their retreat was conducted without confu-
sion, and though repulsed, they were far from
being defeated. But their retrogression threw
open to the enemy, not only the key of Marshal


Beresford's position, but the only good road by
which, in case of a disaster, he could retire; for
it laid bare his line of communication with Val-
verde, and exposed him to the risk of being
hemmed in between the river and the enemy's
eolumns. It became, therefore, an objeet of the
first importanee to reeover the heights which had
been lost; and it was in striving to attain thatend,
that the chief portion of the loss occurred.

Marshal Beresford endeavoured at first to bring
back tIte Spanish troops to the eharge; but find-
ing them extremely unwieldy, and little eapable
of executing a nice manreuvre, he passed the
whole of General Stewart's division through them,
towards the right. This done, General Stewart
immediately deployed his first brigade, consisting
of the buffs, the 66th, the 2nd battalion 48th, and
the 31st, into line, and pushed them, under Co-
lonel Colbourn, up the hill, against the enemy's
columns. Their advance was spirited, and their
tire admirably directed; but before they could
approach within charging distance, the enemy's
cavalry broke in upon their right. One wing of
the buffs was now directed to be thrown back;
but the regiment, confused, in part by the ap-
proach of the cavalry, and not rightIy Ullderstand-
ing the orders given, fell in upon the second bri-
gade, which, under General Houghton, was ad-
vancing in eolumn to support its comrades. The


movement unavoidably threw that brigade like-
wise into confusion, as it happened at the moment
to be in the act of deploying into line; and henee
it could afford no adequate assistance, for sorne
time, to the leading regiments, which were now
engaged under the most fearful disadvantages.
The consequence was, that the first brigade suf-
fered terribly, as well by a tremendous fire of
grape whieh was poured upon them from the
height, as from the cavalry whieh rode through
and cut them up at their leisure. The buffs, 66th,
and 48th, were, indeed, annihilated, and the 31st
escaped a similar fate, only because, being on the
left, it had time to form, and was thus enabled to
sbow a regular front to the enemy.

In the mean while General Houghton's brigade
had completed its formation, and advanced gal-
lantly to the charge, the General himself animat-
ing his troops forward, and setting them an exam-
pIe of the most devoted bravery. He was thus
employed, cheering them on, and waving his hat
in front of the line, when three balls pierced his
body, and he fell. The brigade, however, was not
daunted by his fall; it still pressed forward, and
the regiments of which it was composed, namely
the 57th, 1st battaIion 48th, and 29th, vied with
one another in deeds of heroism. The 57th and
29th in particular, the former under Colonel ln-
glis, the latter under Major W ay, performed pro-


digies of valour ; but notwithstanding their utmost
exertions, nobly seconded by those of the 28th,
34th, and 39tb, under Colonel Abercrombie, the
enemy succeeded in maintaining their post. At
tbis moment we had lost a whole brigade of artil-
lery, a large number of prisoners. and eight stand
of colours, belonging to the buffs, the 66th, the
48th, and 57th regiments; and affairs began to
wear an unpromising appearance. But Marshal
Beresford determined to make one effort more for
victory, and happily it was not made in vain.

General Cole's division had not yet been en-
gaged; it reached the ground after the battle
began; and having rested for a space in rear of
the centre, was moved towards the right, where it
formed en potence. Jt was now ordered down
into the valIey, for the purpose of carrying this
formidable height. N othing could exceed the
gallantry of the fusileer brigade, to which the
arduous task was mainly iÍltrusted. Though de-
prived, at an early stage of the action, of their lea-
der, Sir William Myers, the fusileers pressed on
without a moment's pause, or even hesitation, and,
amidst terrible slaughter, drove the enerny from
the ridge which he had so long and so obstinately
defended. They were, however, ably seconded
by Colonel Abercrombie's brigade, as well as by a
brigade of Portuguese under Colone] Hervey,
which repeatedly resisted ana repelled attacks


froro the enerny's cava1ry; and they retook the
whole of the captured guns, with the exception of
a single howítzer, and three out of the eight stand
of colours which had been lost. In this grand
assault General Cole, with almost every individual
attached to his staff, was wounded; General
Stewart received two contusions; and few of the
senior officers, either of regiments or brigades,
escaped unhurt; but its success was decisive of
the fortune of the day, which now declared in our
favour. The enemy made no fresh eflorts to
regain his post, but retiring in good order across
the rivulet, took up for the n1ght the ground from
which he had advanced in the morning.

Whilst this trernendous conflict was going on
upon the right, several attempts were made to pene-
trate into the village, and to break through our left
in the direction of the bridge. The latter were
bravely met by the Portuguese troops, who con-
stantly droye back the colurnns asrast as they carne
on; whilst General Alten's light Gerrnans, lining
the walls about the village, hindered the assailants
from making any irnpression there. Sorne cavalry,
which showed thernselves here, were watched by
the 13th light dragoons, and by a Portuguese
brigade, under Colon.el Otway; but the rnass of
the enerny's horse, independentlyof those squa-
drons which committed so much havoc arnong the
infantry, was extended beyond üur right, and


threatened to take us in rearo It was judiciously
opposed by General Luroley's heavy brigade.
which, moving as the eneroy moved, and con ti-
nually presenting to them a front of resistance,
hindered thero froro effecting 'a design which
must have be en productive to us of the most se-
rious consequences. Our artillery, likewise, was
admirably served: its fire was very destructive,
and the men stood to their guns till many of them
were sabred; indeed, there was not an officer or
soldier in any department of the army who failed
this day in doing more than his duty. 1 have al-
ready spoken of the daring intrepidity of the fu-
sileers and it deserves to be held up to remem-
brance; but the bravery of the 57th and 31st feH
in no degree short of that of their comrades. These
regiments having ascended the height, stood their
grOl;md nobly against all the efforts of a column of
French grenadiers. The enemy's fire thinned their
ranks, but never once broke them; for at the
close of the action, the dead and wounded were
found in two distinct lines, upon the very spots
which they had occupied whilst alive and fighting.
They fought, too, in every imaginable order which
infantry can be called upon to assume. They re-
sisted cavalry in square, deployed again ¡nto line,
received and returned repeated volleys, whilst a
few yards only divided them from their oppo-
nents; and at last carried everything before them,


by a charge with the bayonet. AH this could
not, of course, be done without a prodigious
slaughter on both sides; indeed, thekilled and
wounded lay in masses so compact~ that full
seven thousand bodies occupied the· space of a
fewhundred feet; and our artillery, when ad-
vancing towards the close of the day, were com-
pelled to pass over them, deaf to their cries, and
averting their gaze from the brave fellows thus
laid prostrate in the dust.

The victory was a highly important one, but it
was purchased at arate dearer than had been re-
quired to secure any other victory in the Penin-
sula. Out of 7500 British troops engaged, 4158
were placed hors de combat, the Portuguese lost
389, and the Spaniards nearly 2000; so that
there fell of the allies this day no fewer than
6577. Of the enemy's 108S we were necessarily
unable to form a calculation equally exact, but it
was estimated to amount to full 8000, among
whom were three generals killed, and many supe-
rior officers wounded. The latter fact we learned
from our prisoners, who asserted that the casual-
tíes among their leaders had been such as to leave
the troops in many· instances at a loss from whom
to receive orders, and that this circumstance, more
than ally other, led to the retreat from the height,
and the abandonment of further operations.

During the batUeof Albuera, a number of little


events occurred, some of them honourabJe in the
highest degree to individuaJs, and others, not dis-
graceful, but somewhat ludicrous. It is not ne-
cessary for me to add my tribute of respect to the
memory of the brave youth, Ensign Thomas, of
the Buffs, who refused to resign the standard of
his regiment except with life, and whose Jife paid
the forfeit of his devoted gallantry. Though young
in years, and holding but an inferor rank in his
profession, his name will be recorded in the list of
those ofwhom England has just cause to be proud;
and his example will doubtless be followed by
others, as often as the chances of war may leave
them only a choice between d~ath and dishonour.
But there were one or two circumstances besides
this, of which little notice has elsewhere been
taken, and which appear to me to be deserving of
some passing record.

During the hottest of the action, Marshal Beres-
ford exposed himself with a degree of intrepidity,
which could hardly fail of spreadirig an example
of heroism around. He repeatedly dragged the
Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them
to lead their men forward, and show them the
way; and when individually charged by a Polish
lancer, he grappled his adversary by the throat,
and threw him from his saddle. A very different
fate attended the personal exertions úf the Portu-
guese staff. They too were charged by a single


lancer, who knocked down one with the butt of
his pike, overset another man and horse, and gave
ample employment to the entire head-quarters
before he was finally despatched. These heroes
declared that the man seemed possessed by an
evil spirit; and that when he fell at last, he lite-
rally bit the ground. The lancers, as is well
known, were peculiarly daring in their attacks, and
mereiless in their operations. They seldom paused
to offer quarter, but speared our men without
merey, whether offering resistanee, or giving proofs
of submission.

Sueh is the substanee of an official report, whieh
was communicated to us at Elvas on the 19th;
and it must be eonfessed that a 'diselosure of the
los s sustained too k away, in sorne degree, from the
satisfaction which would have otherwise accom-
panied the announcement ofa fresh vietory. 'Vhen
the amount of casualties suffered at Albuera carne
to be added to those experienced before Badajoz,
and in the affair of Fuentes de Honor, it appeared
that, unless powerful reinforcements should arrive
speedily from England, the plans for the rest of
the campaign must receive serious interruption
from the absence of adequate means to carry them
into effect. We had, it in contemplation, be it
remembered, at this time to reduce the two for-
tresses of Badajoz and Rodrigo, and to keep the
army of Portugal oceupicd in thc north; whilst


80ult should be threatened in the south, and
an effort made to raise the blockade of Cadiz;
and to effect these different ends, we possessed onIy
the force which had followed Massena from Torres
Yedras, diminished by fuIl nine thousand men,
who were hors de combat in the late encounters.
It was impossible to think of this without expe-
riencing the liveliest anxiety, or to cast our re-
gal'ds homewards without an ardent hope that a
proper spirit might animate the counciIs of those
in whom the power of right1y carrying on the war
was vested. That we were commi tted in the
eyes, not of the Peninsular nations only, but of
Europe at large, couId no longer be questioned ;
all now 100ked to us and to our fortunes as the
criterion by which to try the wisdom of their own
resistance or continued submission to the French
yoke; and hence, if we should either reIinquish
the contest, 01' conduct it with languor and indif-
ference, the prospect of a secure peace was felt to
be as remote, as when arms were first assumed
against the aggressions of Buonaparte. 1t was our
business, however, not to speculate upon proba-
bilities, or to waste time in idly wishing for an
increase of means, but to turn those already at our
disposal to the best account; and Lord Wellington
was not aman to permit present opportunities to
be negIected, merely hecause the future happened
to be not quite sobright as he either desired,


or had reason ,to believe that it ought to have

On the retreat of the enemy after the battle of
Albuera, Marshal Beresford sent back General
Hamilton's Portuguese division, with orders to ob-
serve Badajoz upon ¡ts southern side, whilst he
himself ad vanced with the rest of his corps, and
too k post at Almendralejo. The troops were thus
distributed when Lord Wellington arrived; and as
it was essential that SouIt's columns, which were
understood to have concentrated at Fuente del
Maestre, should be narrowly watched, he did not
interfere with the material parts of this arrange-
mento But the reduction of Badajoz being the
object in which he felt most deeply interested, he
applied to it all the resources and numerical force
at his disposaI, and earnestly urged forward every
measure which promised in any way to accelerate
the undertaking. No great while elapsed befo re
the siege was regularly renewed; . and ifthe means
applied were still very inferior to what they ought
to have been, they were at least more respectable
than any which it had been practicable to apply
during the late investment; and not less respect-
able than the circumstances of the army, and the
general resources of the country, were adequate to

As soon as the two divisions carne up, of whose
march from the position of the Agueda notice has


already been taken, Lord Wellington proceeded to
invest the place anew, upon both banks of the
river. For this purpose, the seventh division, under
General Houston, drove in on ,the 25th an the
enemy's posts upon the right bank, and established
its pickets within a short distance of Fort Christo-
val, at the same time that a fiying bridge was
thrown across the Guadiana as at the last attack,
and the stores and materials forwarded from Elvas
to the depots before the place. On the left bank,
again, the Portuguese corps was aIread y at its
post; but it was strengthened, on the 27th, by the
arrival of, the third division, which, marching from
Campo Mayor, crossed the Guadiana at the ford
aboye the town. The garrison was thus shut com-
pletely within its works, and the business of the
siege began.

1, have said that the total amount of men and
means employed in this service, though certainly
greater than had been employed before, was not
such as to raise any very lively expectations, in
the breast of an ordinary observer, ofa speedyand
successful termination to our labours. There sat
down before the place a besieging army offourteen
or fifteen thousand men, including three thousand
Spaniards, and two thousand Portuguese militia;
and the artillery to be employed amounted to forty
pieces, among which are to be numbered four ten-
inch and six eight-inch howitzers. Of mortarswe


possessed none; eight, therefore, 01,lt of the ten
howitzers, were directed to be used as such; and
our guns, of which two were twenty-four poun-
ders, and four sixteen pounders, were all brass,
and oí Portuguese manufacture. The engineers'
stores col1ected on the occasion comprised 3500
intrenchiilg tools, 60,000 sand-bags, 600 gabions,
a very few fascines, and an extremely inadequate
quantity of splint~r-proof timber and planks;
whilst, independently oí the officers, there were
attached to the department, 169 men of the line,
to act as overseers, 48 carpenters, 48 miners, and
25 rank and file, of the corps of royal artificers.
The chief engineer and principal director of the
operations was Lieutenant-colonelFletcher. Major
Dixon, oí the Portuguese artillery, was at the
head of that department; and Captains Ross and
M'Leod were put in chargeof two depots, which
were established on each side of the river.

To oppose this force, there was understood to be
in Badajoz and in its outworks, a garrison of three
thousand men, amply provided with food and other
stores for two months' consumption. Their artil-
lery, too, was oí a very excellent description. It
numbered flin 150 pieces; from which a fire might,
at almost any point; be thrown out, infinitely su-
perior to that which we could bring against it ;
and though, at first, we were led to believe that
the stock of ammunition was scanty in the place,


a short experience of its uses served to convince
us that in that rumour there was no foundation.
In spite, however, of these disadvantages, our
engineers appeared sanguine as' to the results.
They determined to make two attacks upon two
sides at the same time, directing one against Fort
ChristovaI, and the other against the old castle.
That the reader may the better understand the ob-
ject of these, it will be necessary to inform him,
somewhat more minutely than has yet been done,
how Badajoz, Fort Christoval, and the Castle,
were respectively s~tuated.

The large and fortified town of Badajoz stands
upon the left bank of the Guadiana, having one-
fourth of its enceinte washed by the river, which
variesfrom about three hundred to five hundred
yards in width, and secures aH the spaee whieh it
embráces froin insulL Towards the land side its
defences consist of eight regularly construeted
fronts, connected by a good eovered way and
glacis. The ravelines are, however, unfinished;
but the fronts possess whole revetments, .and the
escarpe of the bastions Ís thirty feet in height,
though that of the curtains is considerably lower.
In advance ofthese fronts are two detached works,
namely, the Pardaleras, a crown work, about tWQ
hundred yards distant, and the Pecurina, a strong
redoubt, four hundred yards removed from the
glacis. On the north-east side, again, where an


angle is formed by the junction of the river Revel-
las with the Guadiana, there is a hill, measuring,
perhaps, 120 feet in height, the summit of which
is crowned by an old castle; and the walls of that
castle, naked, weak, and only partialIy flanked,
form part of the enceinte of the place. The castle
itself embraces an area ofvery considerable extent,
and might, if proper care were bestowed upon it,
be rendered exceedingly formidable; but its de-
fences have, by sorne accident, been most unac-
countably neglected, and, at the period of which 1
am now speaking, it was defici~nt even in an ordi-
nary parapet to shelter its guns.· It was against
this point that oUr engineers determined to conduct
one of their attacks, and it was he re . that they
seemed to possess the best, if not the only chance,
of ultimately succeeding.

On the opposite bank of the Guadiana, and in a
direct Une with this ancient building, stand the
heights of St. Christoval, which measure in alti-
tude little less than the hill of the castIe itself, and
may. from the peculiar shape and bearing of the
latter eminence, be said completely to command
it. The castle hill, it will be observed, forms a sort
of inclined plain, which eases itself off towards the
edge of the water; and hence a spectator from the
summit of the heights of St. Christoval is enabled
to see, with perfect accuracy, anything which may
harren to be going cm withín the walls of the


castle. To hinder an enemy from availing himself
of this advantage, a square fort, of aboye three
hundred feet per face, has been constructed. It is
strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp
twenty feet in height; and it i8 capable, from the
rocky nature of the ground on which it stands, to
offer a stout resistance, even when methodically
besieged. Between it and the town, however, the
communication is far from being good; inasmuch
as it is carried on entirely by mean s of a long
bridge, subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more
precarious and insecure instrumentality of boats.
Against this fort was the second attack directed ;
and the obstacles to be encountered soon proved to
be as serious as from the general appearance of
the place might have been expected.

Every preliminary measure having been duly
adopted, large working parties were ordered out
on the night of the 31 st, and ground \Vas broken
both before the Castle and Fort Sto Christoval.
The former operation went on wholly unobserved
by the enemy, till daylight disclosed our people,
already well covered by their embankment; but
in the latter we \Vere immediately detected, and
an incessant fire of grape and round shot kept up
in the direction of the noise. In spite, however, of
this interruption, the men toiled on; and four dis~
tinet batteries, at different rlistanccs from the place,

148 NARRA'flV1I: OF 'l'HE

were marked out, and in part completed. From
that moment reliefs reguIarIy succeeded one ano-
ther by day as well as by night; and though the
enemy, by shifting two or three of their guns, con-
trived to throw shot into our very trenches, still all
the batteries, including one against the angle of
the castle, were completed and armed by the 2nd
of June. On the 3rd they opened; and a heavy
fire was kept up on both sides, during several days
and nights, without the smallest intermission.

It was now that the inefficient nature of Portu-
guese artillery, as well as the inferiority of Portu-
guese ammunition, became conspicuous. Our
guns, one after another, became disab~ed by their
own fue; whilst our breaching batteries. though
they caused the masonry both of Fort Christoval
and the Castle to peel off, were far from producing
that effect which had been anticipated from them;
On the side of the castle all that couId be said
was, that at the end of several days of open bat-
teries, the waU and rampart appeared to be a little
shaken; but of a practicable breach the com-
niencement had not yet been made ;. llor could it
be surmised how far it was ever likely to be ef.
fected. On the ~ide of Fort Christoval, however,
our progress, though not what it was expected to
have been, seemed more certain. Two bastions at
Iength fell, apparently filling up the ditch with


their ruins, and on the 6th, the breach being re~
connoitred, it was conceived that an assault might
safely be hazarded.

There were a variety of reasons'which combined
to produce an inclination in Lord Wellington,
rather to risk an attack before the place should
have been laid perfectly bare, tban lose even
anotber day in distant cannonading. We heard
from a11 quarters that the enemy were moving. in
great force, for the relief of the place. So early,
indeed, as the 25th, the very day on which the
re-investment took place, cireumstances occurred
to produce a suspicion of the kind, and every hour
gave to it greater force, and an increased degree
of credibility. On that day an affair took place in
front of our covering corps, which, though credit-
able in the highest degree to the troops engaged,
could- not be regarded by us, at head-quarters,
without uneasiness, since it clearly indicated a
disposition, on the part of Marshal Soult, to re-
sume the offensive, and led to the conclusion,
either that reinforcements had already arrived, or
that they were close at hand, and therefore to "be
securely counted on.

The advanced station of our cavalry was, at this
time, in Usagre, a small town, distant about two
leagues from Almendralejo. Rere General Lum-
ley, who commanded the allied squadrons, took
up his quarters; and here an opportunitywas af-


forded him of distinguishing himself. . On . the ~
25th, about nve hundred of the enemy's cavalry
crossed a líttle stream which runs before the vil-
lage, and filing through the street, which our
peopIe, on their approach, had evacuated, de-
bouched at its extremity, and formed with a wall
in their rearo General Lumley seized this favour-
able opportunity, by ordering out the 3rd dragoon
guards, and 4th dragoons, to charge. They exe-
cuted the movement in good style, and overthrow-
ing the French in a moment, cut down about one
hundred, and made many prisoners. The rest
fled in every direction; whilst their comrades, in
large numbers, stood upon the opposite bank of
the rivulet, to witness a defeat which they could
not interfere to prevent. The affair naturally pro-
duced the best effect upon the spirits of our troop- .
ers, who had ~almost beglln to consider themselves
inferior to the French; and it hadan effect diame-
trically the reverse upon the enemy. The latter
came not on again whilst our squadrons retained
their attitude of defiance; but as it was not
intended that we should keep this place by dint
of hard fighting, that attitude was gradually laid
aside.' Our men f~ll back upon Los Santos, Vil1a
Franca, . and Puebla; and the enemy too k quiet
possession of Usagre. . .

Had the report of this rencontre come alone, it
would have been treated byus as an indication of


nothing more than a desire on the part of the
French Marshal to feel how we wer~ disposed, and
whether it might not be practicable to alarm us
into an abandonment of our present undertaking;
but it did not come alone. We soon learned that
Drouet had actual1y set out from Salamanca for
the south, with seventeen battalions and several
squadrons; and that a large proportion, if not the
whole of Marmont's army, was expected to foHow.
Lord Wellington instantly despatched orders for
General Howard's brigade of the first division, as
well as for a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to
hasten from the Agueda, in order to reinforce liS at
Badajoz; and instructions were, at the same
time, conveyed to other divisions, that they should
hold themselves in readiness to undertake a simj-
lar journey. By and by a rumour carne in that
Drouet was near at hand, and that his arrival at
Cordova was confidentIy expected on the 9th of
June at furtbest. Nowas Soult was at this time
at Llerena, Villa Garcia, and the villages near,
there could be little doubt as to bis being able to
eolleet a force upon the Albuera by the 12th; and
then the question arose, whether it would be pos-
sible for us to continue our operations against Ba..:
dajoz beyond the 10th. lt wás quite evident that
the covering army, even after it should have been
strengthened by the troops called in from the
north, would not be competent to oppose Soult,


. thus inereased to fuU thirty thousand men ; where-
as, should Marmont himself appear upon the stage
in this quarter,' to risk a battle with the covering
and even besieging corps combined, would have
been most injudieious. On all these aceounts
Lord Wellington determined to try the effeet of an
assault on the very first opportunity whieh should
hold out the slightest prospect of success; and
hence the breaeh in Fort Sto Christoval was no
sooner pronounced practicable, than preparations
were made to storm it.


In the mean while a few changes occurred . in
the distribution both of the men and officers em-
ployed in this part oftbe country. The Portuguese
government had become, of late, so little attentive
to the eondition of ¡ts arroy, that the troops, desti-
tute of pay, and miserably supplied with necessa-
ries, were sinking fast into tha state of inefficiency
from which they had been so lately delivered.
The men, after enduring privations more severe
than eouldhave been borne by the natives of
almost any otlter country, began at last, sorne of
them to desert their colours, and the rest to lay
aside allthat esprit de corps, with which Marshal
'Beresford had taken so much pains to inspire
them; and the offic"ers, as many at least as were
not Englishmen, or thoroughly imbued with the
English system, hardly endeavoured to restrain
them in their proceedings. U nder these circum-


stances, it became indispensable to relieve Marshal
Beresford from his command of the covering corps ;
because it was felt that, if he could not restore
something like alacrity an.d discipline to tp.e Por-
tuguese legions, no other officer in either service
need attempt it. Marshal Beresford was accord-
ingly called in, and General Hill proceeded to
take upon himself the charge thus rendered vacant.
At the same time, General Howard's brigade was
incorporated into the second division; whilst the
remains of the brigade lately commanded by Ge-
neral Houghton, as well as of the buffs, the 31st,
and the 66th, being formed into a single battalion
of detachments, and placed in the brigade of Ge-
neral Lumley, were attached to the same divi-
sion. The brigade of Portuguese, likewise, which
marched from the Agueda at the same time with
General Howard's regiments, took its station in
the second division. Thus, whilst the third and
seventh divisions, with one corps of Portuguese,
and another of Spaniards, under the immediate
orders of Lord Wellington, pressed the blockade,
and carried on the siege of Badajoz, the second
and·fourth divisions, with the light brigade of the
King's German Legion, supported by General Cot-
ton with the cavalry from the north, as well as by
the cavalry of the south under General Erskine,
covered their operations; the infantry holding the


poslhon of Albuera, as being the most advanta-
geous in this neighbourhood, and the cavalry
keeping watch at Almendralejo, Los Santos, Villa
Franca, and the country round.



Siege ()f Badajoz-Fort Sto Christoval twice stormed without
effect-Movemcnts of the enemy to relieve the town-Lord
lVellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Por-
tugal-Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversi()o, aod
retires to Cadiz-The British army takes post behiod tlle
Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas-Intercepted letter
from Marmoot to nerthier-The aIlies go into cantonments.

THE breach in Sto Christoval having been ex a-
mined by Lieutenant Foster of the engineers, and
pronounced practicable, orders were issued that
an assault should take place on the night between
the 6th and 7th of June; and the forlorn hope,
consisting of twenty-five men, advanced about
midnight under the guidance of that officer, and
directed their operations against the part which
'appeared most assailable, namely, the right salient
angle of the fort. By the fire of our batteries the
palisades had all been destroyed; and as the
counterscarp was here little more than four feet in
depth, it proved no obstacle to the assailants : they


sprang into the ditch, and marched straight to the
foot of the breach. But here asad reverse awaited
them. 'The enemy, labouring incessantly between
dusk and the hour of attack. had removed the rub-
bish, and the escarpe was found to stand c1ear
nearly seven feet from the bottom of the ditch.
Our men, though totally unprepared for such an
occurrence, made· repeated effort$ to surmount the
obstac1e; but all were unavailing. They accord-
ingiy,det~min~ to relinquish the attempt, and
they might have retired with a very IOS8,
had they not been met by the main bod y of the
storming party, amounting to 155 meno These
having brought with them a few ladders, insisted
~pon trying the effect of an escalade; and they
unhappily planted their instruments against a point,
the '. summit of which overtopped the longest of
them by full five feet. The consequence was, that
the enemy, roused to a sense of their danger,
hurled down into the ditch a shower of shells,
grenades, atones, and other missiles, which taking
effect among men unavoidably crowded together.
produced considerable slaughter aúd great con-
fusiono The partyat length retired. leaving behind
them twelve dead. artd carrying away upwards of
'ninety wouúded.

From this' period up to the 9th, our people
sedulously employed constructing
ne.W batteries, and making better preparations for


a fresh assault. There arrived upon the 8th
seven iron guns, which having been transported
from Lisbon to Elvas, were from the latter place
forwarded to our camp; and these, with the whole
of our serviceable artillery, amounting to no more
than seven cannons and two howitzers, played in-
cessantly upon the breach, and the batteries which
commanded and defended it. But the practice
was far from being accurate, and the walls seemed
to be made of materials more than ordinarily du-
rabIe; for after expending a considerable portion
of ammunition, it was found that the breach could
not be made by many degrees more promising
than it was before .. Still, as a good deal of rub ..
bish lay under its gorge, so as to form, in our view ...
a sort of rude path up the face, it was again de-
termined to try the fortune of an assault, andthe
determination was formed on grounds not Yery
dissimilar from those which guided our Tesolutitms
on the previous occasion.

We heard, upon authority.which left us<. no room
to doubt the truth of the raport, that Drouet fiad
actually reached Cordova on the 7th and 8th;;1\Illd
that his divisioR ofeight thousand menWll8:¡·in
communication with the corps of Marskal Soalt¡
The latter, too, hOO, as it appeared, refused·'his
left, and was manreuvring that he might com~i by
Medellin, into connexion, either with a part;:.«
with the whole ofMarmont's army; farol·the


movement of the latter towards this quarter of
Spain we were now c.redibly informed, andwe
saw at once that the main effort of the enemy
would be directed to the preservation of Badajoz.
N or, in truth, was this at all to be wondered ato
Situated as their forces now were, Badajoz was to
the French a point of paramount importance, in-
asmuch as it formed the key of all their intended
operations in the Alentejo, and a connecting link
with Seville and their divisions before Cadiz. Jt
was but natural, therefore, that they should use
every effort to preserve it; and that such was their
intention, a despatch received on the 8th from
General Spencer, together with other information
collected elsewhere, sufficientIy assured uso The
following is an outline of the details contained in
that despatch, in which, as the reader will éasily
believe, we felt ourselves deeply interested.

The enemy, it appeared, entered Ciudad Ro-
drigo on the evening ofthe 5th, with 2,500 cava1ry,
14 rieces of artillery, and 16,000 infantry ~ and
our light division retiring, on the 6th, as far as
Nave d'Avel, the French pursued their march in
h~o columns, composed chiefiy of cavalry, along
the roads which lea,d to Gallegos and Carpeo.
The rnass which moved by the latter road seemed
to be the stronger of the two, and it was accom-
panied by six pieces of cannon. Our cavalry, ob-
servingthcm aH the while, feH back to thc high


grounds, and formed a line between Espeja and
Gallegos; upon which the enemy pushed through
the wood, in two bodies, with great impetuosity,
and made a daring attempt to cut off a large pro-
portion, if not the whole, of the force opposed to
them. The cavalry, however, saw through the
manceuvre, and skilfully defeated it. By inclining
to their right, they avoided the left and front at-
tacks directed against them, and coming down
with great gallantry upon the column on the Es-
peja road, overthrew and repulsed it with 10ss.
On this occasion the royals particuIarly distin-
guished themselves. Our people then retrograded
to Sabugal, whilst the French having merely en-
tered Fuentes de Honor, and patroned as far as
Almeida and the Coa, withdrew their troops, and
ended their recognisance.

Whilst the preceding operation was going for-
ward, another and more important movement,
which this was intended to cover, received its ac-
complishment, though not unnoticed by uso De-
spatches from Colone] Grant, who occupied posts
about the Puerto de Banos, informed us that two
divisions of Marmont's infantry with 500 cavalry
had passed along the real' of the reconnoitring co-
]umns, and arrived on the 6th-the very day on
which the recognisance was made-at Los Santos
and Fuentes .. They were commanded by Regnier,
and continued their march upon Banos, at which


place their leader 81ept on the night of the 9th.
But it was not from the reports of our own officers
alone, that we obtained, at this time, a pretty ac-
curateinsight into the enemy's designs and opera-
tions. Froro intercepted letters which feH into
our hands, we leamed that Marmont fully in-
tended to co-operate in raising the siege of Bada-
joz-though whether with the whole or onlya part
of his force, we had no opportunity of accurate-
Iy determining. AH our speculations, however,
tended to excite a belief that, if he moved at aU,
he would move with his army en tire ; and we
were the further confirmed in this opinion by va-
fious hints,which, though in their more direct
allusions inexplicable, were yet sufficiently clear
to put us generally upon our guardo It was stated
in these letters that as soon as Badajoz should be
relieved, the two Marshals would proceed to aet
upon the plan originally formed; and henee, though
of the object of that plan we necessarily remained
in the dark, we were not slow in discovering that
it required for its aceomplishment a perfeet union
of force. U pon these grounds we came to the
conclusion that Badajoz must either be reduced
at once, or not at aH;. because we eould hardly
pretend to continue the siege in presence of Mar-
mont's and Soult's armies combined; and as littIe
could we hope to fight them to advantage on the
south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city in a


state of blockade. That we might not, however;
be exposed to greater hazard than was necessary,
General Spencer received directions to move by
Penamacor to Castello Branco~. which place he
was commanded to reach on the 12th, and to hold
himself in readiness to form a junction with our
corps at the shortest notice.

Such ''las the general state of our affairs, when
the breach in Fort Sto Christoval was .pronounced,
for the second time, practicable; and it may not
be amiss, before proceedingto narrate the par-
ticulars of the assault, if 1 give a brief review of
the relative strength and prospects of the cont~nd-
. .

mg armles.
There were now, on the south and no1'th fron-

tiers of Portugal, two large and effective French
armies,-that of Marshal Soult in the province of
Estremadura, that of Marshal Marmont in La
Mancha. The former, by dint of extraordinary
exertions, was enabled, when reinforced by Dr6uet's
and Sebastiani's divisions, and by two or three
batt~lions, which he did not scruple to withdraw
from· before Cadiz, to muster full thirty thousand
men; of which not fewer than four thousand were
cavalry; the latter having reorganised the army of
Portugal, and arranged it into'Sixdivisions, posses:-
sed thir.ty thousand infantry, besides cavalry and
artillery. Allowing, therefore, for casualties on the
march, and for those little' niis-statementswhieh



are unavoidable in making up all returns, the gross
amount of the two corps, whenunited, would not
faH short of sixty thousand meno N ow, on our
parts, aIthough our force upon paper showed nearly
fifty tbousand British troops, we were quite un-
able, from sickness (and there were at this time
12,500 upon the list) and other necessary deduc-
tions, to bring more than thirty thousand men into
the fieId. The Portuguese, again, having become,
in every respect, far Iess efficient than they were
wont to be, could not be calculated at more tban
twenty-five thousand ;whilst the Spaniards, who
spoke of themselves as twelve thousand strong,
might muster perhaps eight or nine thousand.
Thus, in point of gross numbers, the opposing
genera1& were almost on a footing of equality. But it
ought to be remembered that, whilst the French pos-
sessed ample means of reeruiting their losses, and
were enabled, after every reverse, to make head
again with almost undiminished strength, our rein-
forcements eame in slowly, and by small detaeh-
ments at a time. '1'0 pursue the siege of Badajoz,
therefore, leisurely, and with a striet attention to
rule, would be to lay ourselves out for a general
and decisive aetion, in which. we must fight in an
open ~ountry,with .our Hanks exposed, and the
Guadiana closing. us in upon the rearo It is true
that, at the present season, the waters of the river
were low ; that it might be forded in various points,.


and could not, therefore, cut off our retreat, sup-
posing us to be worsted; but the question was,
whether it were worth while to cast all upon the
hazard of one throw; more e~pecially when the
stake on the side of the enemy was not, and could
not be made, equal1y desperate with our own. To
act thus had never yet been Lord Wellington's
policy; and he saw nothing in present circum-
stances to bring about a change in his plans. On
the contrary, he resolved to make oue effort more
to possess himself of the beleaguered city; and in
case that should faíl, either to prosecute the un-
dertaking, provided he were left to do so at his
leisure,or to retire from before the place, and take
up a convenient position somewhere on the north
side of the Guadiana.

Actuated by these motives, and anxious to avail
himself of the opportunity still within his reach,
Lord Wellington gave orders that Fort St. Chris-
toval should again be stormed, on the night of the
9th of J une. On this occasion, the storming party
consisted of two hundred men, twenty-five of
whom, as formerly,formed an advanced-guard, or
forlorn hope, under Lieutenant Hunt, orthe royal
engineers. They marched from the trenches at
the signal given, and pushed for the ditch; but
the eIiemy were far better prepared to receive
them no"," than they had been before, and opened
a heavy tire upon· them as soon as they arrived

164 S A RRA.1'IYE OF 'rHB

within range of musketry. U nfortunately. Lieu~
tenant Hunt was killed upon the glacis; and
though the troops leaped into the ditch with their
accustomed gallantry, and pressed ·forward as
they imagined towards the breach, they had no
longer a leader capable of guiding them, and in
consequence 10st their way. They went forward,
provided with two ladders fmm twenty-five to
thirty feet in length; but they applied them, not to
the breach, but to the face of a bastion which was
not in ruins, though considerably injured by stray
shot. The consequences were such as might be
anticipated. After persisting in their efforts to
escalad e with the most daring bravery during a
full hour, they were finally compelled to retreat,
with the 10ss of forty men killed, and no fewer
than one hundred wounded. Thus ended the se-
cond attempt on Badajoz; for on our parts nothing
further was tried at thistime. During. the 10th,
a truce was agreed upon, for thepurpose of carry-
ing off the wounded, and burying the .<lead; and
in the evening our guns and stores began to be
removed. On the 11th, all that could be done,
without attractíng notice, towards the attainment
of the same end, was effected; and on the 12th,
the siege was finally raised, after it had cost the
allies 9 officers and 109 men killed, with 25 officers
and 342 men wounded and taken prisoners.

But though the stores and materíe} were thus


removed from before Badajoz, it was not esteemed
prudent to withdraw the covering army fromits
position on the Albuera, till the enemy, by sorne
movement more deeisive than they had yet made,
should throw further light upon their future inten-
tions. In spite of the extreme probability of the
rumours whieh had reaehed us, it wouId have
been something more than prudent, had we
ehanged our whole line of operations upon their
authority alone; and henee the eorps of whieh
Marshal Beresford had originally been in com-
mand, but whieh was now under the orders of

. General Hill. kept its ground, and retained its at-
ti tu de of watehfulness, up to the 16th. Upon
that day, however, we reeeived offieial information
that Regnier, with the advanee of Marmont's
corps, was at Truxillo; and that the main body
was in the act of passing the Tagus at Alcantara;
whilst Soult's army was observed to be feeling its
'Yay, with the eavalry and light troops, from
Llerena towards Medellin and Merida. It was
. therefore impossible any longer to doubt that the
object of the enemy was a combined operation for
the relief of Badajoz; andas they refused their
left, and· marched strongly towards their right,
our left became of eourse the probable point of
attack. Under these circumstances, the position
of the Albuera was pronouneed wholly untenable ;
nor was there any other on the left of the Guadiaria

166 NAItItATlVE OF 'fIlE

which offered the slightest advantages, or held
out to us the smallest inducement to take it up.

It would have been quite unnaturaI, had Lord
WeHington; thus situated, felt otherwise than
mortified and gl'ieved to a great degree. In spite
of aH the exertions which he had marle, and the
numerous successes which he had obtained, he
saw himself, at the present juncture, in a situation
at least not more enviable than that which he
filled on the opening of the campaign; for the re-
sources of the enemy,instead of diminishing, ap-
peared to increase, whilst his own were becoming
daily more and more enfeebled. 1 have said
that the Portuguese army -\vas "not now in the
state of efficiency in which it appear~d to be
twelve months before. On the contrary, without
pay, without provisions, without sufficient means
of transport, the troops seemed to be rapidly fall-
ing back into their original disorganisation; whilst
"the commanders were involvedin continual di&-
putes and quarrels, as well with one another, as
with the Regency and the court of Brazil. With
respect, again, to the Spaniards, nothing could be
more disgusting than the apathy with which they
regarded passing events, unless, indeed, it was
their excessive and "mistaken jealousy of English
interference. Though we had drawn upon our-
selves last year aH the French armies ofthe north,
neither Castile, nor Galicia. nor Biscay, nor Na-


varre, nor· the Asturias, nor Lean, made the
faintest effort to take advantage of the diversion ;
andnow, when the armies of the south and of the
centre were collected in our front, both the in-
terior . and northern provinces of S pain remained
perfectIy quieto Madrid, which was at this time
freed from the presence of French soldiers, was
actually guarded by the citizens in the name of
Joseph, and with arms and ammunition given to
them by the French; whilst the Cortes and the
Regency had become objects of contempt, as
general and as complete as ever was heaped upon
the government of this or any other country. In
every department cabal and party spirit were at
work. Each cornmander of an army had his own
pIans and his own adherents, both in the Regency
and in the Cortes; whilst among themselves there
existéd but one point of union, and that was to
be found in a universal distrust of their alIies.
From Spain, therefore, little was now to be ex-
pected; indeed, it was confidently given out
that Joseph had retired from the Peninsula, and
that Ferdinand was about to return with Marshal
Berthier* for the purpose of allaying all misgivings,
and reconciling the nation at large to the wishes
of N apolean. N or were OUT prospects by many
degrees more bright, when we looked only tb the
defence of Portuga1. By the capture of Badajoz
in the south, and the destruction of Almeidain the


nOFth, the two great roads ¡nto the heart of the
Mímtry were laid open; for the government hav-
ing refused to advance money for ¡ts repair, AI-
meida was blown up; and hence it was in the
power of Buonaparte, whenever he shouldthink
tit strongly to reinforce his armies here, to march
upon Lisbon by the route which to himself should
appear most advantageous. . lt is true that OUI'
works about the capital were capable of a long ..
and obstinate defence, and that if EngIand chose
to turn her undivided strength to that point, she
might unquestionably preserve it; but it admitted
of serious douht whether the preservation of Lis-
hon would repay the cost of defending it, espe-
cially when it must be defended by suhjecting the
richest provinces in the kingdom to devastation ..
These were gloomy and somewhat dispiriting COh-
siderations. Whether they occurred to Lord Wel-
lington or not, 1 take it not upon me to determine;
but before the rest of the army they rose in full
force; there were few who looked far into the
future without serious misgivings.

Lord Wellington having maturely weighed all
the reasons for and against his proposed proceed-
ing, at last sent for Castaños and Blake at AI-
buera, and opened to. thero the views which he
entertained, and the determination to which he
had come. He díd so, prefacing his declaration
by a statement, that nothing which they cOllld do.


or say would induce him to depart from his own-
pIans; leaving it~ at the same time, to themselves
to choose whether they wouId foUow us in om;
movements, or act independently; and when they
adopted the latter alterna ti ve, . he explained to
them his own sentiments as to the best course
which they had it in theirpower to pursue. This
done, he dismissed them, and immediately issued
orders for the breaking up of the army from Al-
buera and Badajoz. The movement took prace
on the 18th; and all the stores and baggage being
safely conveyed to the rear, the columns moved
without impediment or confusion upon their new
ground. On the 20thof June the following was
the disposition oí the allied British and Portu-
guese arIl,lies.

At Torre del Mouro, on the line of the river
Caya, an extensive encampment was formed, which
rested its right flank upon Elvas, and had its left
covered by Campo Mayor. It was occupied, 1st,
by the cavalry under Sir Stapleton eoUon ; 2ndly,
by the second and fourth divisions, by Major-ge-
neral Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry,
by Major-general Alten's light brigade, and by
two brigades of nine pounders. These troops were
all under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-ge-
neral Hill, and held the right wing 01' Elvas moiety
of the encampment .. The third and seventh divi.,.
sions again, which moved from the trenches, di-:-


rected tbeir steps towatds Campo Mayor; wbere
on the ·left of tbe camp tbey reported to General·
Picton, as tl~e/genior officer. In the mean wbile
General 'Spencer's corps; which, in obedience to
directions previous1y given, had advanced to Por-
talegre, formed a separate encampment for itself.
It was kept there, because Portalegre con8tituted
a convenient centre froID whence it might either
be brougbt, in case of need, into tbe camp at
Torre del Mouro, or thrown back across the Tagus,
should Marmont demonstrate in that quarter;
whi1st tbe communication between the two, which
happened to be neitber remote nor intricate, was
sufficiently preserved by patrols and flying parties.

It is to beobserved tbat the object of tbi~ new
alignment was pure1y one of defence. It was as-
sumed under tbe persuasion tbat tbe enemy, wbo
had collected in strength, would not content them-
selves with the relief of Badajoz, but press forward
with a view to besiege E1vas, and probably make
an ilTUption into Alentejo. N ow, as the 108s of
Elvas would have been productive to us of conse-
quences the most disastrous, inasmuch as it wou1d
nave supp1ied tbe French with an additiona1 pivot
on wbich to turn, and comp1eted tbe exposure of
too fichest and most fertile districts in Portugal,
Lord Wellington made up bis mind to risk every-
thing for its preservation; and with this view he
disposed his army in such order, as that it might


selze the first favourable opportunity of striking a
blow. Should Marmont, previously to sitting
down before the place, choose to risk a great battle
by attacking us in our position~ the nature of the
ground which we occupied would give to us ad-
vantages the most decided; should he, on the
other hand, commence his operations before the
town, leaving us to observe or molest him as best
sllited our own convenience, we might wait with
patience till the fitting moment had arrived, and
then become ourselves the assailants. Thus were
we provided against either extremities, supposing
the notion formed touching the enemy's designs to
be wen~founded; whereas, if no forward move-
ment were made on their parts, then might we
either remain q llietly where we were, till general
events should take a turn more favourable, or
resume the offensive as soon as our own circum-
stances,and the distribution of the enemy's force,
might appear to authorise the measure. That
Lord Wellington himself anticipated a general
action is, 1 believe, true; he spoke of its probable
occurrence, and took all the precautions to insure
a vlctory, which his genius pointed out; and as
he possessed sources of information to which no
other individual had access, there can be little
doubt that he carne to that conclusion on grounds
perfectly reasonable. As to myself, 1 own that 1
considered the enemy had gained a great deal by

172 N ARRATIVE 01< 'filE

the successful resistance of Badajoz; more, per-
haps, than in the present state of the campaign
they had any right to expect; and as their troops
stood at least as much in need of repose and re-or-
ganisation as ours~ it appeared somewhat impro-
bable that they would, for the sake of harassing
us, deny to themselves that of which they strongly
experienced the want.

But whilst Lord Wellington thus distributed his
own forces, he was neither unmindful of the ad-
vantages to be derived from a diversion, nor care-
less of the condition of the strong-holds which he
had fallen back to protecL

To effect the former of these objects, General
Blake was directed to put his corps in motion,
and, marching down the right bank of the Gua-
diana upon the Conde q.e Unebla, to cross at Mer-
tola, so as to threaten, at once, Seville, the camp
befare Cadiz, and the rear of the French arroyo
For the purpose of prosecuting the latter, nume-
rous working parties were employed every day,
not only at Elvas-where, in truth, their exer-
tions were múch needed-but likewise at Campo
Mayor,· and the fortress of Juramenha. 1 have
said that the exertions of our artificers were in a
peculiar manner needed at Elvas, and 1 said tru]y.
By the negligence of the Portuguese government,'
that city-the most important by far upon the
southern frontier-had fallen ¡nto a state of mise-

PENINsur.AIl WAR. 173

rabIe dilapidation. The walls were in mány pIaees
broken down; the ditches filled up; and the few
pieces of artillery mounted upon the ramparts
were all of the worst deseription; whiIst, to add
to its general disabilities, it was heId at this time
by a garrison composed entireIy of Portuguese
troops; and the Governor, though one of the best
of his class, was still onIy a Portuguese officer.
On these several accounts it became sufficientIy
manifest, that if the place were intended to offer a
moderate resistance, great eare must be taken to
remedy so me, at least, of its defects; and since it

. suited not the poliey of the times to change the
garrison, or displace the' Governor, Lord Welling-
ton determined that the excuse of ruineddefences
should not be at hand to sanction a tooready sub ...
rnlSSlon. . Its works were carefully and scienti-
.ficaUy repaired, and rendered capable, under
proper management, of holding out for a very con-
siderable length of time. Besides these opera-
tions, however, which, thoughdoubtless very lIseful,
were .certainly not very interesting, nothing was
attempted on our part; and as the enemy, with a
few trifling exceptions, continued as peaceably dis-
posed as ourselves, we were left, somewhat to oU\,
surprise,and not a little to our mortificabon, to
spend the bestof the summer months in idleness.

From the 20th of June to the 21st of Ju]y, our
army remailled in its double encampmellt, at Por-


talegre and Torre del Mouro. Few incidents
occurred, during the whole of that time, calculated,
in a military point of view, to arrest our attention,
or rouse us from our lethargy; and of these few,
it unhappily occurred that almost aH proved of
an unsatisfactory nature. The enemy, instead of
following us up, as had been anticipated, confined
their operations entirely to the southern side oí
the Guadiana, never venturing upon anything 00
our bank ofthe river, except an occasional recog-
nisance; and these recognisances, being conducted
generally by cavalry, were generally successful,
as far as success was desired. On one occasion,
in particular, they contrivcd to make prisoners oí
nearly one hundred and twenty men, belonging to,
the 11th light dragoons, and twenty hussars oí the
German legion; and as this was tbe most serious
affair which took place during an entire month,
it may not be amiss if I give a particular account
of it.

It has been stated that, in forming our present
encampment, the line of the Caya was taken up:
it may be necessary to remind the reader, that in
making use of this expression, no more is meant
than that, our troops were posted in the rear oí
that river, and in' a direction parallel with its
general course. The Caya is a shallow and wind-
ing s.tream, which runs in one of its branches,
nearly north and south from the mountains near


Campo Mayor, to t-he Guadiana. Its banks are
in general low and open, though on our side there
was a range of commanding heights, not vel'y fal'
removed frorn the stl'eam. It ~o happened that
our cavalry pickets, instead of being posted upon
this rising ground, were l'anged along the margin
of the river, sorne of them in the very angles
formed by its detours, and in spots where no vigi-
lance could enable the videttes to observe an
enemy till he was close at hand. In one of these
most inappropriate spots was a considerable party;
of the 11 tQ. stationed, on a morning, when the
French thought fit to push a large force acl'Oss the
river, for the purpose of ascertaining how we were
employed. Our cavalry behaved with their accus-
torned gallantry, charging the Ieading squadron oí
the force irnrnediately opposed to them, and
driving it back with precipitation upon its support;
but they were ignorant all the while that other
squadrons had turned them, and that overwhelming
numbers were already formed jn their real'. The
consequence was, that the whole partywas su1'-
ro'unded, and with the exception of a few indivi-
duals, who contrived to cut their way through, all
were taken. It is scarcely necessary to add, that
the disaster gave rise to a variety of reports, and
to much condemnation; but 1 consider it not
worth while to repeat it.
. In addition to such occurrences as this, the only


sources of public interest which we possessed,
arose from the various reports which, from time to
time, carne in, of the movements both of the
French armies and of the Spanishcorps. We
learned, for example, that Soult had retllrned to
Seville with the whole of his force, and that he
had detached a division to oppose Blake, who had
crossed the Guadiana, according to the precon~
certed plan, at Mertola. Instead, however, of
pushing for Seville, Blake contented himself with
making a night attack upon the castles of Puebla
and Unebla, in which, as a matterof course, he
failed; and now, on receiving intelligence of the
march of Soul1's detachment against him, he with-
drew to Ayamonte, and emharked for Cadiz.
Marmont, in the mean while, was stated to remain
stationary at Merida and its vicinity; from whence
his cavalry were sent to the front for the purpose
of foraging, as often as necessity'req uired. Large
reinforcements of stores and artillery were, at the

. sametime, thrown into Badajoz; its works were
thoroughly repaired, and its garrison was increased
to the amount of five thousand mello But the
most satisfactory piece of iutelligence which carne
to us, was conveyed in a letter from Marmout him-'
self; which, though addressed to Marshal Ber-
thier, fell, by great good fortune, ¡nto our hauds.
The General had intrusted it to one of his aides-
de.-camp, whom he despatched, as a most coufi-


dential person, to París; and who, being inter-
cepted, as well as his communication, by a wan-
dering band of Spaniards, was sent in person to
our campo As the letter was really a curious one,
and as it served to convey a very correct idea of
the state of the French army, as well as an ex-
tremely favourable notion of the judgment and
good sense of its commander, it may not be amiss
to repeat here a brief outline of its contents.

Tbe letter in question was dated from Merida,
at a period posterior to the relief of Badajoz, and
the consequent retrogression of our divisions. It
began by informing his Excellency the Prince of
N eufchatel, that having succeeded, in conjunction
with the Duke of Dalmatia, in raising the siege of
Badajoz, the writer had since directed his undi~
vided attention to the re-organisation and re-esta-
blishment of discipline in the army of Portugal.
The system of requisitions, and the irregularity of
supply, had been carried, it was continued, to so
great a height, that the army was become liUJe
better than a rabble of banditti; nor could any
thing be attempted with the slightest prospect of
success, tiU the method should be entirely
changed, and the troops provided and paid in such
a manner, as to render them both contented and
manageable. To, accomplish this, the Marshal
was thEm devising plans ; and he earnestIy pressed
for instructions and assistance froID the Emperor,

VOL. Ir. l\f


in carrying them into execution. In the mean
time, however, he meditated a removal to the right
bank of the Tagus; whilst Soult, who had heard
of succours being sent from Cadiz to Tarragona,
and considered his presence in the south as indis-
pensable, was preparing to march thither without
delay. With him the Marshal would leave the
fifth corps of infantry as well as several battalions
of cavalry, these being more immediately destined
for the defence of Estremadura; but he added an
earnest request, that they might thenceforth be
attached to the army of Portugal, as an arrange-
ment not only natural, but necessary.

The letter went on to state, that with his own
corps, amounting to thirty-twothousand infantry,
and from three to four thoúsand cavalry, the writer
intended to place himself in sorne convenient camp
between the Teitar and the Tagus, where he should
be able more narrowly to watch the conduct of
his troops, and improve their discipline. The only
obstacle to this arrangement arose from the diffi.-
cultyof providing adequate supplies of food and
forage; but though doubtless very great, Marmont
expressed sanguine hopes that he should be able
to surmount it. In tbis case, and supposing that two
or three months' "repose were obtained, and that
the remounts of horses, and re-equipments of va-
rious kinds promised should arrive, he entertained
no doubt that the fine arrny of Portugal would


again become tres redoutable, and capable of exe-
cuting any service in which the Emperor might be
pleased to employ it. He next proceeded to spe-
cify the position and supposed. strength of our
army. He reported the departure of Blake's corps,
and its embarkation for Cadiz, subsequent to the
failure of its attack upon the casUe of Puebla,
and entered into a variety of other particulars,
which abundaritly testified that the channels of
information possessed by the French, were at least
as perfect and as open as those possessed by our-
selves. But of his own plans, Marmont said no-
thing more, ínasmuch as it was his design to re-
main wholly upon the defensive, till specific or-
ders shotild reach him from Paris. In- addition to
this despatch from Marmont, a letter from General
Tresion, chief of the staff, was likewise inter-
cepted ;but it contained little calculated to in-
terest, except an explicit dec1aration that the
French troops were unable to cope with the Eng-
lish, and that their best chance of success lay in

1 have reason to believe that the communica-
tions made in Marshal Marmont's despatch, com-
bined with other circumstances of less moment,
determinedLord Wellington to forego, for the
present, an offensive operations against the enemy
in Spain. It was c1ear that against odds so tre-
mendous he could not, with his present strength,


hope to accompliah any object of importance, since
Marmont's corpa alone was capable of offering to
him a stout resistan ce ; and should it fall back
upon that of Soult, its superiority would become at
once overwhelming. He accordingly made up his
mind to place his troops in temporary cantoll-
ments; and the divisions began, on the 21st, to
break up from theiÍ" respective stations for that
purpose. Two of these, the third and the sixth,
were arde red to cross the Tagus, and to occupy
CastelIo Branco, and the villages near; the se-
venth was directed to move upon Niza; the light
to Campo Mayor; the first and fifth to Portalegre,
whither the head-quarters likewlse removed; and
the second and fourth to Evora and its adjacents.
Thus was a very strong corps of infantry, sup-
ported by the whole of the cavalry, kept in Alen-
tejo; whilst the remainder of the army taking post
in the vicinity of the Tagus, beame disposable
towards any point which nlÍght chance to be

r¡.; N I N S U LA It W J\ R. 181


Amusements ofthe officers in quarters-Lord Wellington sud·
denly moves towards _Rodrigo, and invests the place-Dispo--
sition of the' army in its new alignment-Description of the
country round Ciudad Rodrigo-Reports oi' the preparations
made by th!:' enemy to raise the siege of that city, and ar-
rangements entered into in consequence.

IN the·preceding pages, rny narrative has been so
completely confined to a detail of the great ope-
rations of the army, and of the results arising out
of them, that 1 have as yet found no opportunity
of making the reader acquainted with the general
mode and style of living adopted at this time
among the staff and other officers. 1 t may be
sufficient to state here, that no set of persons could
more industriously strive to unite mirth with hard-
ships, and relaxation with severe d~ty. For sorne

. time, we contented ourselves with keeping pointers
and greyhounds, and indulging, as often as oppor·


tunities offered, in the sports of shooting, coursing,
and fishing; but now ataste for hunting began to
prevail amongst us, and fox-hounds and harriers,
more or less numerous and good, were established
in the different divisions of the army. At head-
quarters we were fortunate enough to become pos-
sessed of an excellent pack, which afforded us
much amusement, and occupied time which would
have otherwise htmg heavily on our hands; and it
is worthy of remark, that in such minor under-
takings, no man entered more heartily than our
leader. It was during this summer that he -first
instituted the custom, which he never afterwards
laid aside, of throwing off at settled points on
established days in every week, whilst the army
was not in the field, and the incidents, replete with
mirth, to which these meetings gave rise, are far
too numerous to be recorded, though they will be
long remembered. Then, in our quarters, we lived
gaily and well. A spirit of good-fellowship and
hospitality everywhere prevailed; and in the midst
of war,-balls, private theatricals, and agreeable
parties, were things of continual occurrence. It is
lmnecessary to add that this system, whilst it de-
tracted in no de~ree from the discipline and effi-
ciency of the troops, spread abroad arnong those
who carne under its influence the very best dispo-
sitio n and ternper; and aH men realIy learned to
love their occupation, even at its most trying mo"'


ments, from a recollection of the many enjoyments
of which it became the source.

It has been stated that on the 21st of July the
army broke up from its camps, (or the purpose of
taking possession of a line of temporary canton-
ments on each side ofthe Tagus. AH was duly
executed by the 23rd; and on that daythe whole
of the divisions,' with the exception of the fifth
aJone, which still kept the fieId at about a league's

. distance from Portalegre, were comfortably housed
at their respective destinations. The movement
was hardly made, when we were joined by four
regimentsof infantry and oue of cavalry, from En-
gland-. namely, by the 26th, 32nd, 68th,and 77th
infantry, and the 12th light dragoons; aH of them
strong in numbers, and extremely effective; whilst
the arrival of General Graham at Lisbon, who
carne as second in command from Cadiz, was offi-
cially announced to uso The latter piece of in-
telligence was received with much satisfaction;
for. General Graham had seen a great deal of ser-
vice, and wherever employed, had proved himself
always to be an officer of enterprise and talent;
and his late success at Barossa, however much it
may be supposed to have depended upon the
valour of the troops engaged, certainly took not
away from the reputation which their leader had
previously acquired.

We were scarcely settled in



when a variety of rumours began to cireulate, most
of them ealeulated to inspire apprehension, and
very few of a eontrary tendeney. In the first
place, a report was conveyed to us through certain
Spanish offieers at head-quarters, that two sepa-
rate columns, consisting of thirty thousand men
each, were on their mareh to reinforce the French
armies in Spain; one froro the side of Dalmatia,
and the other from an opposite direction. Nor
could the numerous detaiJs with which we were
favoured, of the formation of bands of guerillas,
and of their daring enterprises, in any effectual
degree lessen the impression which it had pro-
dueed. Much has been said of these guerillas, as
well by the Spaniards themselves as by the histo-
rians of other countries, who have aerived their
information chiefiy from S panish sources; but all
who served in the Peninsula ean attest that a less
efficient and more mischievous body of marauders
never infested any country. It is not denied
that they cut off, froro time to time, a small convoy,
or an isolated detachment; but unfortunately
they did not confine their operations to attacks
upon the enemy. Whoever feH in their way, be
he friendor foe, rarely escaped unplundered ; and
the inhabitants of the smaller villages everywhere
dreaded their appearance as much as that of the
French. Yet were these the onIy portions of the
population of Srain which could be said to be in


arms. In the country places, it is true that the
people were generally disposed to favour the cause
of independence; and that from the llttle ham\ets
and solitary cottages, by far the larger proportion
of recruits for the Spanish army was procured;
but in the towns, one wish, and one alone, seemed
to prevail-namely, that the repose of the inhabi.:
tants might not be interrupted by the approach of
any troops, whether French or British. Tran-
quillity at all hazards, and at any cost, was the
boon for which the mass of the population of
Spain now pined, till it became too apparent, that
were we to withdraw from the Peninsula, the war
would come to an end before the close of a single
summer. Nor, in truth, was the existence ofthat
feeling very greatly to be wondered ato The
Spaniards possessed no force competent, at any
point, to make head against ,the invaders; almost
an their strong pIaces were in the hands of the
French ; whilst discord the most atrocious and the.
most palpable reigned in those very assemblies
which ought to have guided the energies of the
people, and directed their exertions. We heard,
indeed, about this time, of the re-capture of
Figueras, and it was one of the few rumours
which served to keep alive anything like a hope
that Spain might yet do something worthy of her
ancient renown, and of the cause in which she
was embarked; but neither this, nor a few trifling


successes near Astorga, nor even the triumphs of
Don Julian, who was intercepting convoys, and
making prisoners about Salamanca, was sufficient
to inspire us with any great degree of confidence
in the exertions of our allies. On the contrary,
we felt that the British army was, and must con-
tinue" to be, the principal in this war of Peninsular
independence; and hence it was not very easy
even for the most sanguine amongst us to believe
that, should Russia and the northern states persist
in their pacific policy, Great Britain could possibly
retíre from a contest so unequal, in triumph, and
with honour.

When the army first took up its liríe of can-
tonments, an opinion generally prevailed, that
nothing further would be attempted, on our parts,
till the sultry season should have passed away.
With respect to the enemy, every thing appeared
to indicate that, whatever might be done in other
parts of the Peninsula, Portugal would be left
undisturbed, till the arrival of the promised rein-
forcements from France, and other favourable cir-
cumstances, should authorise a fresh invasion.
Marmont, it was ascertained, having withdrawn
his troops into the vale of Plasencia, with the
exception of one division only under General Foy,
which was appointed to watch the left bank of the
Tagus, had established his own head-quarters at
Talavera de la Reyna. Soult was gone to the


south, with the intention, as was believed, of
laying siege to Carthagena; and Suchet, to whom
Tarragona had lately submitted, was preparing to
push his conquests in Alicant and Catalonia. In
the mean time, Bessieres was assembling oue
considerable corps at Valladolid, aud Bonnet
another at Leon aud Benavente; whilst Joseph,
who had lately returned to Madrid, was amusing
himself and his subjects with proclamations, as
absurd in their language as they were nugatory in
their effects. He was assuring them at once, of
the increased love of the Emperor towards the
Spaniards, and oí the march of sixty thousand
fl'esh troops from France into Spain; and whilst
he threatened the severest vengeance agaiust the
bauds of plunderers by whom the. roads and
passes were everywhere infested, he held out the
brightest hopes to all sueh guerilla chiefs as chose
to aecept rank in the imperial service. N ot a
word, however, was said, either by him or his
generals, of further attempts against Portugal or-
the English; and henee there were few amongst
us who antieipated any other result, than that the
line whieh we had now assumed would be main-
tained, at all events, throughout the dog-days, if
not till the return of spring. .

Whilst the rest of the army were thus indulging
in dreams of q uiet . and repose, the ever-aetive
mind of their leader was meditating an enterprise,


hazardous, no doubt, and at the best beset with
diffieulties, but in the highest degree influential
upon the general issue of the war. The possession
of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz on one side of
Spain, and of three out of the four principal for-
tresses on the other, gave to the enemy a faeility
of movement, of whieh it was of the utmost con-
sequence to deprive them; and Lord Wellington's
principal views had, in consequenee, been, for
sorne time back, directed to the recovery of pIaces
of the importanee of which every day brought
proofsmore and more decided. How he failed ih
his attempt upon one of these, the reader has al-
ready been informed, as well as of the eircum-
stanees whieh would have rendered a fresh effort,
in the same q uarter, even more hopeless than the
effort already made. But with respect to Ciudad
Rodrigo, the case was somewhat different. Should
Soult really embark in the siege of Carthagena, or in
any other expedition calculated togive to his army
fuIl oecupation, Ciudad Rodrigo must necessarily
be left, in a great degree, to the protection of its
own garrison; and with the garrison of Ciudad
Rodrigo, even though it should be supported by
the single eorps of Marmont, Lord Wellington be-
lieved himself fully adequate to cope. With the
hope, therefore, sorne such occurrence might
fall out, stores and guns were quietly, but indus-
tl'iously, transported from Lisbon to Oporto, and


from Oporto to Lamego; and at the moment
when, to all external appearance, "his undivided
attentíon was bestowed upon recruiting the health
of his troops, he was looking to their employment
in a species of operations, for which, to confess
the truth, the British army was, at this period,
less prepared than any other army in Europe.

1 have said that, at the period to which my pre-
sent narrative refers, the British army was, among
all the armies of Europe, the least prepared to
undertake the duties of a siege,-and for this ob-
vious reason, that it was, and long continued to be,
deficient in those establishments, without which it
is utterly impossible either to defend 01' attack forti-
fied places to advantage. In expressing myselfthus,
it is very far froID my intention to cast the slightest
stigma upon the corps of engineers. Our engineer
officers were then, as they are now, equal1y able
and scientific; but besides that, in the Península
at least, they were few in number, the absence of _
all adequate support in the other departments of the
army, rendered them quite incapable of applying
the science to its legitimate ends, or causing it to
produce its legitimate effects. Ours was, perhaps,
the only army in Europe which possessed no corps
of sappers and miners, nor any body of men pecu-
liarly trained to carry on the more intricate de-

" tails of a siege. We had~ it is true, what was
termed the regiment of royal military artificers ;


that lS to say, a battalion of carpenters, black-
smiths, stonemasons, and other handicraftsmen;
but not one of these had ever seen a mine; and as
to a sap, they were probably incapable of under-
standing the very meaning of the word. In the
regiments of the line again, there were hut few,
even among the officers, who had ever bestowed
much attention upon these important matters;
whilst the men may be pronounced. without reser-
vation, to have been universally ignorant of them.
N ow. when with such materials our engineers be-
gan the labours of a siege, how was it possible
that they could carry them on either with rapidity
{Ir success ? . These officers could not be present
in a variety of pIaces at the same moment; and
wherever they were not present, the probability
was, that nothing was done as it ought to have
be en done. Then, again, in all the materials
requisite for sieges, we were greatly deficient.
We had no pontoons norpontooneers; our b!"each,.
ing artillery, chiefly of Portuguese manufacture,
was both meagre and badIy supplied; and our in-
trenching tooIs consisted simply of the most com-
mon description of spades, bill-hooks, and pick-
axes. The truth is, that the British government,
never having contemplated the possibility of its
armies being engaged in a serious c,ontinental war,
and feeling secure against invasion from the de-
cided superiority of its fleets, had never bestowed


attention upon the organisation of means, withoñt
which the bravest troops in the world will be liable
to disaster, as often as they find themselves op-
posed by ramparts and ditches; and hence the
British army, in no single instance from the
commencernent to the close of the Peninsular
struggle, sat down before a fortified place but
under disadvantages. Both the General and his
followers were conscious that they possessed nei-
ther the physical nor moral elements for such en-
terprises, and they never entered upon themex-
cept when an irresistible necessity compelled.

But though the case was so~ and though now,
more perhaps than at subsequent periods, we felt
our own inferiority in these respects, Lord Wel-
lington was not, on that account, disposed to per-
mit what appeared to be a favourable opportunity
for the re-capture of Ciudad Rodrigo to pass un-
heeded. The divisions had taken up their canton-
ments but a few days, when an intercepted return
of the provisions in that place fell ¡nto our hands,
from which it appeared that the existing stock was
scanty, and that the prospects of securing a fresh
suppIy were both remote and contingento It
instantly occurred to him, that were it practicable
to invest Rodrigo previous to the arrival of a con-
voy, famine might be made to do the work of a
siege, whilst, at all events, a knowledge that the
fortress was in danger,. couId not but dishearten


Marmont, even if it should fail in alarming Soult
in the midst of his southernoperations. The plan
was no sooner conceived than carried ¡nto execu-
tion. Whilst the second British, and General
Hamilton's Portuguese division of infantry, sup-
ported by two brigades of cavalry, received orders
to remain at Estreroos and Portalegre, under Ge-
neral Hill, for the protection of Alentejo, the re-
roainder of the army, consisting of the dragoons,
the light, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions,
was suddenly called into the field, and on the
sixth day after it had taken up its cantonments,
found itself in full march towards the north.

On the 1St of August head-quarters reached
Castello Branco, where a haIt of a single day oc-
curred. On the 8th, they were transferred to
Sabugal; and on the 10th, Lord Wellington fixed
his residence in the town of Fuente Guenaldo.
A loose and extensive line was then taken up,
froro Villa Vicosa on the right, to Gallegos on the
left, along which the several divisions and brigades
were distributed, the 1st occupying Penamacor,
the 4th Pedrogao, the 5th Payo, near the pass of
Perales, the 6th Gallegos, the 7th Alfayates and
Villa Mayor, and the light Mortegao, on the op-
posite side- of the Agueda. With respect to the
3rd division, it remained, with the bulk of the ar-
tillery, at Fuente Guenaldo; whilst the cavalry
was scattered here and there in squadrons and


srnall parties, according as the nature of the ground
rendered their presence desirable, or facility of ac-
cornmodation invited.

Before 1 proceed to give any account of the
operations to which these arrangements proved a
prelude, it wiU be necessary to make the reader
somewhat better acquainted with the real state
aud local situation of the fortre8s, towards which
our attention was now turned.

Ciudad situated upon one of tluee
hills, or rather eminences, which stand upon the
right bank of the Agueda, and rise abruptly out of
an extensive plain, in a state of high cultivation,
and at this time covered with an abundant crop of
corno The plain in question is bo;rdered on the
north and west by a range of rugged mountains ;
and on the south-east, by a similar range, still rugged and impervious. The formerof these
ranges consists of cliffs and ·crags, separated from
one another here and there by wide passes,
through which several excellent roads conduct to
Salamanca and into Castile; the latter can boast
only of the pass of Perales, a defile so precipitous,
as to be perfectly useless in a military point of
view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at
th~ distance of man y miles from the walls, and
hence both are equally unamiling for the purposes
of a blockading force; whilst neither offers a posi-



tion at all favourable or commodious to an army
intended to cover the progress of a siege.

It is rather singular, in a country like Spaio,
that the whole flat should be deficient in springs
and pools, and that the only source from which
water can be procured by the inhabitants, is
the Agueda. 1 need scarcely add that this
circumstance alone, independently of all other
considerations, gave to the projected siege no very
favourable aspect, since it was manifest that, should
it be undertaken, the mass of our troops must
establish themselves at a distance from the river,
and suffer serious inconvenience in a matter, not
less important than any by which they were liable '
to be effected. But the difficulty which would thus
be experienced in supplying the men with one of
the most essential necessaries of life, was not the
only, nor, perhaps, the greatest obstac1e, which
stood in the way of our design on the present oc-
casion. Should we fairly embark in the siege,
we must do so with the fuIl determination either
of abandoning our whole train, or staking every-
thing upon the fate of a battle, in case the enemy
should approach in force to the relief of the garri-
son; because the condition of the country in our
rear was such, as to preclude all hope that heavy
guns and stores, once brought up, could ever be
removed hastily, and in the presence of a superior


force. In the first place, the roads in this part of
the country are rarely suchas deserve to be termed
good; during the dry season, they may, indeed, he
traversed by carriages of aoy description; but
after rain they are impervious to all except the
lightest and best constructed. In the next place,
the rivers which separate Rodrigo from Portugal,
particularly the Agueda and the Coa, are not only
difficult on account of the steep and rugged nature
of their banks, but they are liable to sudden
rises oí many feet, which will, in the course of a
few hours, sweep away bridges, and render fords
impassable. Supposing, therefore, that we should
bring up our guns and stores unmolested, open our
trenches, and establish our magazines, it would be·
vain to speculate upon any other issue than suc-
cess; for retreat we could not, even if defeated,
without abandoning all these to the enemy. There
was not, either, as 1 have already hinted, a1'1y
ground upon which a covering army could draw
up to advantage. Were we to take possession oí
the north-western ridges, our troops would be
separated into numberless little bands, no two of
which could co-operate well together, inasmuch as
the heights are all a great deal too rugged in their
faces to permit of easy communication from the
one to the other; whilst we should be exposed to
the risk of being forced at· sorne one point, and
having the enemy in our rear, before we were


properly aware of their approach. To post our-
selves in the plain,. again, could be done only at
the expense of prodigious labour and much time,
since the plain'ought to be fortified before it could
offer a position; and even then it would be ex-
posed to the hazard of turning, or being drawn out
ti11 it became feeble from its very extent. In the
outward appearances of nature, therefore, we saw
nothing calculated to inspire us with confidence
as to the issue of the intended operation; and no
man can say our chief examined the ground super-
ficially. He spent an en tire week, from three
o'clock in the morning till six in the evening of
every day, onhorseback.

If the nature of the country was not such as very
strongly to encourage us in our designs, the infor-
mation which we received from a variety of quar-
ters, both as to thc state of the fortress, and the
probabilities of its being relieved, were equally at
variance with our wishes and expectations. It
was soon discovered that the scarcity of provisions
under which the garrison was reported to labour,
had long ago been removed. A convoy of stores
of every description had entered the place just
before our arrival, and it was now victualled and
provided for at least two months to come. Evi-
dence, likewise, was not wanting, that the French
marshals were determined to hazard aH, rather
than permit a post of so much importance to be


wrested from them; and hence, that our siege
must be cornmenced, under the moral certainty of
being attacked by all the disposable force in the
country long before it could be brought to a con-
clusion. The following is a brief summary of the
rumours which now prevailed, relative to the dis-
position and numbers of the enemy's troops; and
by which, in the event of our embarking in the
affair, we should, in aU"probability, be assailed.

The corps of "Marshal Marmont, distributed
through the vale of Plasencia, mustered in all
thirty-five thousand men; there were at Bena-
vente, Toro, Valladolid, &c. about fifteen thousand
more; whilst ten thousand fresh troops, from the
reinforcements lately introduced into the country,
were understood to be within a few marches of
Salamanca. It was not difficult to foresee that,
whenever Marmont should deem it expedient to
take the field, he would do so at the head of these
corps combined; or, in other words, with a force of
not less than sixty thousand meno N ow, it unfor-
tunately happened that the allied army was suf-
fering at this moment more severely from sickness
than it had done at almost any previous periodo
There were in hospital, or unfit for duty, no fewer
tban thirteen tbousand British, and five tbousand
Portuguese-a fun tbousand of whom had broken
down during the late march; and hence the ut-
most amount upon which it was possible forus to


calculate, e.xceeded not forty-two or forty-three
thousand meno The matter to be decided accord-
ingly was~ whether, with such mean s, we should
be justified in laying siege to a strong place, well
supplied, well garrisoned, and covered by an army
which, in point of numbers, surpassed our own by
nearly one-third; more especially after our late
failure at Badajoz, the impression of which had
not yet departed from men's minds. There could
be but one opinion as to the prudence or impru-
dence of the undertaking, and that opinion Lord
Wellington immediately embraced. He found
himself mistaken in the estímate which had been
formed of tbe . defensibility of the place, and he
now wisely abstained from a vain attempt to ac-
complish that for which his means were manifestly
incompetent. Having placed Rodrigo in a state
of blockade by drawing around it a chain of posts,
he determined to await the result in the position
which he had assumed; and he found comfort
under a temporary derangement of his plan s, frOIn
the conviction that his movement would at least
operate as a powerful diversion in favour of othe.
provinces and eities of Spain.

Matters continued in this state, from day to
day, and from week to week, without giving birth
to any events worthy of record. The blockade
was maintained with so much diligence, that tbe.
garrison began at last to experience something like


distress, and the preparations for converting it into
a siege, though not absolutely laid aside, went on
slowly and with languor. Occasionally, too, an
affair of posts would occur, in which, 1 regret to
say, the enemy were not always unsuccessful;
whilst rumours, as usual, came in to supply with
subjects of speculation those who had little in their
own immediate occupations or prospects to excite
interest. One day brought intelligence of the for-
midable attitude assumed by the Spaniards in Ga-
licia; thenext furnished a detail of their overthrow
and dispersion. Now we heard of Blake's arrival
in Cadiz, and of the great deeds which he ex-
pected to perform in Andalusia; again, of the ra-
pidity with which Suchet and Sebastiani were
completing the subjugation of the southern pro-
vinces; and the probability that Grenada and
Carthagena would shortly be redueed: But it
was not till towards the end of August, that eer-
tain indications of a movement on tbe part of
Marmont, gave to our own situation its ordinary
character of ¡nterest; and September was far ad-
vanced before we ]earned to believe that impor-
tant operations were realIy at hand.

The first expectation of hostilities about to re-
commence, was excited by a report that Marmont
had broken up from his cantonments, and that his
columns were in march towards Castile. This
carne in about the 24th óf August, and as it was


supposed tu rest upon tolerably good evidence.
Lord Wellington made instant preparations to
meet the threatened danger. The divisions which
had hitherto occupied cantonments between Fu-
ente Guinaldo and the Tagus, closed up; the first
and fourthpassing the Coa, and stationing them-
selves -at Nave d'Avel, Fuentes de Honor, Villa
Formosa, ~nd ValdelamuIa; whilst the remainder
took post on the heights of Pastores, at El Boden,
at Montiago, Albergaria, and the places near.
By this arrangement, the several brigade's of the
allied army were so distributed, as that they couIJ,
at a moment's notice, concentrate between the
Agueda and the Coa; whilst all the principal de-
files of the mountains beyond being watched, the
possibility of throwing a corps unobserved either
into Rodrigo, 01' upon any link in our communica-
tions, was prevented. A point d'appui, likewise,
for those in front, was eonstituted at Fuente Gui-
naIdo, where a position was marked out, and
strengthened by respeetable' intrenehments; in a
word, every precaution was taken which the eir-
cumstanees of the case appeared to demand, and
whieh would enable Lord Wellington either to
fight to advantage, should it be his poliey to risk
a battle, 01', having kept out his advaneed eorps
to the last moment, to fall back upon his re-

We werc thus situated, the expeetations of aH


being excited to a high degree. when there fell
into our hands letters and other documents, which
threw a good deal of light, as well upon the
amount of the enemy's means, as. upon the plan s
which he had be en lately devising, and the man-
ner in which he proposed to carry them into exe-
cution. Of the letters, one, and not the least in-
teresting, was addressed by General Foy, from his
head-quarters at Almaraz, to General' Gerard,
commandant of the 5th corps at Zafra. It bore
date so long ago as the period of our first arrival
in our present line, and informed the writer's cor-
respondent of the march of the British arrny to-
wards Ciudad Rodrigo; of Lord Wellington's
designs upon that place; and of the measures
which the. French were abóut to adopt, for the
purpose of defeating them. General Foy, it ap-
peared, was under orders to join Marrnont at
Plasencia, whilst Gerard was to move upon
Almaraz and Truxillo; eight tbousand men were
on their march from the anny of the centre; and
their arrival at the Tagus might daily be expected;
As soon as these should come up, Marmont was to
push, with the whole of his army, through the
pass of Baños, and to advance upon Ciudad Ro-
drigo frorn the side of Alba; whilst General D'Or-
senne, with as many troops as he might be able to
collect, was to threaten the blockading force from
Salamanca. Such was a general olltlinc of the


enemy's plan, as far at least as it couId be col-
leeted from the statements of General Foy j with
respeet to the amount of resourees at his disposal,
we possessed other and not less aeeurate means of
information. Of the strength of Mannont's eorps,
after it should have be en reinforeed by the pro-
mised divisions, little doubt could exist; we set it
down, allowing for casualties and sickness, at
forty-five thousand effectives; D'Orsenne's we
were disposed to calculate at twenty-five or thirty
thousand; and there were incIuded in it fifteen
thousand infantry, and five hundred cavaIry orihe
imperial guarda The latter faet we learned from a
perusal of certain oflicial returns, whieh, together
with the intereepted letters aboye alluded to,
came into our possession; and we were the more
inclined to place reliance on their accuracy, from
private aceounts representing the division of guards
as littIe short of thirty thousand. One of D'Or-
senne's generals, for example,in a private com-
munication full of the most extravagant bombast,
informed the Governor of Rodrigo, that they were
coming with twenty-five thousand guards; and
then, added he, H Nous verrons si ces illustres
Anglois nous attendront, ou si, comme a l'ordinaire,
¡ls se retireront." This statement was, of course,
treated as a gros s exaggeration; yet the amount of
force known to be at Marmont's disposal was su eh
as we could scarcely hope to fight to advantage¡


and a~ Lord Wellington saw nothing in the exist-
ing state of affairs, which demanded that his pru-
dent counsels should be abandoned, he resolved
not to hazard a general action at aH. On the con-
trary. it was his intention to retire leisurely across
the Agueda, or even further, in case he should be
hard pressed; and, from sorne other and better
ground, to act offensively or otherwise, according
as circumstances might direct.

1 should try the patience of the reader beyond
endurance, were 1 to repeat, in regular order. aH
the demonstrations and trifling movements on the
part both of the enerny and ourselves, which, up
to the middle of September, served to keep alive
the interest under which we now began again to
labour. At one time, a corps of French cavalry
was known to have threaded the pass of Baños,
and aH were, in consequence, on the alert, as at
the cornmencement of great undertakings. At
another, the cavalry were stated to have with-
drawn; and a rumour prevailed, that Marroont
was once more falling back upon Plasencia; and
that the design of relieving Rodrigo was aban-
doneel. For this, a variety of causes were as-
signed. Soult had fought asevere action with
Blake, and had suffered a defeat: he had returned
to Llerena, and part of Marmont's troops were on
their way to reinforce him. The Spaniards in the
north, too, were acquiring fresh resolution, and


great things' might yet be expected from them.
Thus were we amused, day after day, by state-
ments which at the best could be very imperfectIy
relied upon, and which were not unfrequently
devoid of all . foundation; till men cea sed in the
end to turn their eyes, with the smallest interest,
to any other part of the stage besides that imme-
diately before them. But matters were drawing
gradual1y to a crisis; and proofs began by degrees
to develope themselves, touching the real predica-
ment in which the belligerent parties stood; and
the fate which, as a matter of course, might be ex-
pected to attend ourselves. .



Delay on the part of the enemy to commence operations-They
advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; throw in a con-
voy, and pass the Agueda-Skirmishes along the front of the
British line, which faUs back upon Fuente Guinaldo-
Display of French troops there-Lord Wellington retires to
Alfayates-Partial actions during the movement-The
enemy withdraw, and the British troops retire into canton-
ments behind the Coa-Ciudad Rodrigo observed by flying
parties-Exploits of Don Julian.

lT was now the middle of September, and the
enerny's grand movement for the relief of Ciudad
Rodrigo -was still deferrec1, though each successive
day brought additional proofs that no great while
would elapse ere it would receive its accomplish-
mento We lÍeard from various quarters that Mar-
mont's columns were in march towarc1s Tomames
and Val de Fuentes, and that the imperial guards,
with other troops to the number of twenty 01'
twenty-five thousand men, were collected in and


about Salamanca. N ext carne intercepted cont·
munications, which stated that a convoy would
arrive near the place on the 20th or 21st at the
Jatest; and that the force with which it was pro-
posed to cover its introduction, would render aH
idea on our part of an attempt at molesting it, in-
admissible. Upwards of sixty thousand infantry.
cavalry, and artillery, it was said, were prepared
to raise the blockade; it was even hinted that a
fresh irruption into Portugal was at hand, and
that a campaign as active as had yet been per-
formed, and pregnant with results the most im-
portant, might be expected. Such reports and
.surmises, from whatsoever quarter conveyed,or by
whomsoever stated, were received with the liveliest
interest by the army at large. The sun never
rose without an expectation that great deeds
would be accomplished, 01' at least begun, before
his setting; and never set without producing a
conviction, that when he rose again, it would be
upon a scene of carnage and strife. AH, however,
were prepared to bid that morning welcome, let it
come when it might. The best dispositions which
his circumstances would allow had already been
made by Lord Wellington, and the best spirit pre-
vailed among the men; so that, if one feeling ap-
peared more conspicuous than another, it was of
impatience that the game, so long anticipated,
should be so tardy in its commencement.


In the former chapter a general outline has be~n
given of the order in which· the allied troops, from
time to time, arranged themselves; it may not be
amiss to give here in detail, the llature of the
ground which theyoccupied at this criticaljuncture.
There were two divisions, the fifth and the light,
on the right bank of the Agueda; the one occupy-
ing Payo, the other Martiago. The latter com-
municated by its left, through Pastores, with the
third division of El Boden; which, again, exten-
ding along the river Azava as far as Gallegos,
united with the sixth, and thus leaned the left of
the whole Jine upon the Agueda at Cesmiro. At
the same time, Fuente Guinaldo, Nave d'Avel,
and the posts in that direction, were held by the
fourth and first divisions; whilst the cavalry were
at Ituero, Espeja, Carpio, and along the plain
which skirts the left of the high ground that runs
parallel with the Agueda from Fuente Guinaldo to
El Boden and Pastores, where it terminates in an
abrupt fall towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The two
lines of operations, again, which it was probable
that the enemy would select, were either by Gal-
legos and Almeida, passing the Azava and Duos
Casas rivers; or along the great road which leads
to Fuente Guinaldo, turning the Azava, and
making direct for Sabugal. . Now, as the country
on the latter of these was in every point of view
more defensible than that upon the former, Lord


Wellington earIy determined on making it the line
of his retreat; and the divisions upon the more
advanced chain accordingly received orders, in
case of an attack, to retire, after having well dis-
puted their ground, towards Fuente Guinaldo.
Here it was expected that a more ~esolute stand
would be made, under cover of the redoubts and
other works which had of late becn thrown up j
whilst, in the event of further falling back, every-
thing was so settled, that themovement could be
executed at any moment, and with comparative

Such was the order oftheallied army, when, on
the 24th of Septernber,a considerable body of the
enemy showed themselves in the plain before
Ciudad Rodrigo. They carne from the Salamanca
and Tomames roads, and were accompanied by a
countless number of waggons, cars, aneI loaded
mules. Their progress was sIow, and apparently
cautious; but towards evening the convoy began
to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen
squadrons of cavalry. which passed the Agueda,
and a Iarge column of infantry, which h~lted upon
the plain. Still no syrnptoms were manifested of
a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt
anything further than the object which was thus
attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at
dusk, and a11 bivouacked that night near the town.
In the morning, ho\vever, as soon asobjects becam~


discernible, on~ corps of cavalry, amounting to at
least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a
whole division of infantry, appeared in motion
along the great road, whieh, leading from Ciudad
Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Boden on the left ;
whilst another, less numerous perhaps, but, like
the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched
direet upon. Espeja. They both moved with ad-
mirable steadiness and great reguIarity; and as
the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear
and beautiful, their appearanee was altogether very
warlike, and extremely imposing.

As it was not for sorne time ascertained whether
strong reconnoissances only, or the advarice of the
whole French army, were intended; and as Lord
Wellington felt great reIuctance to abandon the
heights of El Boden and Pastores, unless threat-
ened by numbers whieh it would have been use-
less to oppose, our troops neither shifted their
ground, nor rnarle at first any general disposition
to cover the points threatened by concentration.
The enemy's columns, on the contrary, pushed on
-not disregarded certainly, but as eertainly with-
out drawing us into any premature disclosure of
our intentions; till the larger mass, which was
rnoving towards Guinaldo, reached the base of
sorne rising ground, which was heId by a portion
of the third division. These troops instantly
forrned; and though they consisted of no more

VOL. JI. o


than one British brigade under General CoIvllle,
and one Portuguese regiment of infantry-the
ninth-some pieces of Portuguese artillery, and
four squadrons of General Alten's cavalry, they
contri ved to arrest, for a considerable space of
time, the further advance of the assal1ants. Ii
was my good fortune to be particularly mixed with
this affair, and as one more brilliant has notoften
been accomplished by a handful of British troops,
l shall take the liberty of giving here a somewhat
detailed account of it.

1 have said that the enemy's column was per-
mitted to approach. almost to the base of the
heights, before any disposition., was made, on our
part, to harass or impede its progress. The guns,
indeed, opened upon. his leading sq uadrons as soon
as they arrived within range, and it wasconsola-
tory to observe that their fire was well directed;
but the infantry continued in close columns of
battalions behind the ridge, and the cavalry stood
in similar order, each man with the bridle of his
horse slung across his armo As soon, however, as
it became distinctly manifest that an attack was
in serious contemplation,. our troops prepared to
meet it with their accustomed gallantry and cool-
ness. The infantry wheeled into line; the cával-
ry mounted, and made ready to move wherever
their presence might be .required; whilst the ar-
tillery, redoubling their exertions, poured forth a


shower of grape and case shot, which exceedi~gly
galled and irritated the enemy. These arrange-
ments were not lost upon the French; they too
gave to their front a greater extent, as speedily as
the nature of the ground would permit, and ad-
vanced forward.

The attack was begun by a column of cavalry,
which charged up the heights in gaHant style;
cheering in the usual manner of the French, and
making directly for the guns. Our artillery men
stood their ground resoJutely, giving their fire to
the last; but there being nothing immediately at
hand to support them, they were at length com-
pelled to retire, and the guns fen, for a moment,
into the hands of the assailants. But it was only
for a moment; for the 5th regiment was ordet'ed
instantIy to recover them. They marched up in
line, and firing with great coolness; when at the
distance of only a few paces from theiradversa-
saries, they brought their bayonets to the charging
position, and rushed forward. 1 believe this is
the first instance on record of a charge witIrthe
bayonet being made upon cavalry by an infantry
battalion in line; nor, perhaps, would it be pru-
dent to introduce the practice into general use;·
but never was charge more successful. Posses;.,
sing the advantage of grotind, and keeping in close
and compact array, the 5th literaUypushed their
adversaries down the hill; they thenretook th·e~


guns, and limbering them to the horses which had
followed their advance, drew them off in safety.
Whilst this was going on in one part of the field,
repeated and impetuous attacks were made in ano-
ther upon the handful of cavalry, which, under
General Alten's orders, manfully stood itsground.
Columns of the enemy's squadrons pushed again
and again upon the heights at different points, and
under different leaders; but they were overthrown
as regularly as tbey carne on, by sbort eharges
fromour resolute troopers, who drove them down
the deseent witb great slaughter, and still greater
confusioll. It is worthy of remark that, onaU
such occasions. the assailants outnumbered the
defend-ersby at least four to -ene; and that, em'"
boldened perhaps by their recent successes at the
outposts, they carne on with tbe recklessbravery
wbicb is exhibited only by men aecustomed to
conquer; but nothing could exceed the steadiness
of our cavalry; and tbeir excellenee became only
the more apparent, on aceount of the great odds
10 which they were opposed. There were present
in this rencontre two squadrons of tbe 1st hussars
of tbe King's German Legion, with a similar num-
Qer of the 11th ligbt dragoons; between whom it
was impossible to' determine wbich performed
feats of tbe greater gallantry; indeed 1 can per-
sonally attest tbat. the single souree of anxiety
experieneed by the officers in. eommand. arose


from an apprehension lest these brave fellows
should follow the broken multitudes down the cliffs
and preci¡Jices into which they drove them. To
hinder this were the efforts of. others and myself
mainly directed; and it was not without conside~
rabIe exertions that we succeeded.

The action had continued in this state ror sorne
time, the enemy continually assaulting our front
and left, and we as continually repulsing them,
when Captain Dashwood, an active officer of tbe
Adjutant-general's department, suddenly disco~
vered a heavy column moving towards the rear of
our right, round which it had penetrated unob·
served, and therefore unresisted. N ot a minute
was to be lost, for even a rnoment's indecision
would have enabled the French to accomplish their
object of surrounding uso A retreat was accordw
ingly ordered, and the heights were abandoned.
It is scarcely necessary to add, that the peculiarity
of our situation compelled us to look rather to the
celerity with which this manreuvre could be exe-
cuted, than to anything besides, and that the re-
treat of the cavalry was, in consequence, more
precipitate than orderly; but the brigade of in-
fantry, which consisted of the 77th, 83rd, and 5th,
covered ¡t, and found fresh opportunities of exhiw
biting their steadiness and high state of discipline.
They formed into squares \n the plain in rear of the
hussars, and when the French cavalry came oli in

214 NAltRATIVE 01<' TIfE

overwbelming numbers, and at full speed, opened
upon them a fire so destructive, tbat it completely
checked them. This was the last effort oneither
side. The enemy, overawed by the commanding
attitude assumed by our infantry, drew back; and
our troops continued their march upon Fuente
Guinaldo, where they ar~ived, in due time, with-
out further molestation.

Whilst the right of our line was thus employed,
Jarge masses of the enemy's cavalry and infantry
bore Jikewise upon our left, and drove back the
advanced post s from .carpio, and the stations near.
They were opposed chiefly by the 14th and 16th
dragoons, which .charged with great gallantry as
often as o:pportunities offered; but as it was highly
improbable that demonstrations thus made in force
llpon both flanks would not, sooner or later, end in
anendeavour to bring on a general action, Lord
Wellington early began to make his dispositions for
the evento Fo!' this putpose, the light divisÍon was
commanded to cross the -river, and hold the right
of _ the line at Fuente Guinaldo; the thírd- and
fourth divisions, with GeneralPack's brigade, took
théir ground so as to be flaÍlked by the redoubts ;
the seventh, which had hitherto been in reserve at
Albergaría, :cIosed up; ·whilst the fifth remaíned
still on the right bank of the Agueda, with a view
of giving additional security to that flan k of the
position. The cava1fy, again, were an moved into


the centre, and took post in front of the town. At
the same time the sixth division defiled from Gal·
legos and Espeja towardsits right; whilst Gen-eral
Graham, who comínanded the ,force on the left of
Ituero, and was, with the first division, at Nave
d'A vel, received 'iHstructio~s, in case the right
should be sorely pressed, to march at the shortest
notice to ¡ts support. Every movement was made,
and every object accomplished, on the night ofthe
25th, without the slightest confusion or risk; in-
deed the only circumstances which befell during
the progress of operations, at all deserving of
record, occurred at Pastores, where the 74th and
a battalion of the 60th regiments were posted.
By sorne mistake or another, the orders for the
retreat of these regiments did not arrive till all
support had been withdrawn, and the enemy were
seen in their rear; upon which Colonel Trench of
the 74th, the senior and a very distinguished offi-
-cer, with great ju'dgment passed tbe Agueda, and
made good his retreat by tbe right bank. He feH
in, during his perilous journey, ~ith a party of
.French cavalry, most of whom he succeeded in
.making prisoners; and having re-crossed theriver,
.overtook hisdivision about midníght, with the twó
battalions unbroken and uninjured.

The nigbt .of the 25th was spent by us as it is
,customary f.or soldiers to spend á night upon
which tbey have reason to expect that a day of


battle will rise; that is to say, tbe superior officers
lay down in their cloaks upon the fioors of the
houses, whilst the men slept on their arms, round
large· fires~ which blazed along the range of the

Long before dawn,. however, all were astir and
in their places; and the different regiments looked
anxiously for the moment which should behold the
commencement of a game as desperate as any
which they had been yet called upon to play.
But, instead of indulgingour troops as they'ex-
pected, Marmont contented himself with making
an exhibition of his force, and causing it to execute
a variety oí manreuvres in our presence; and it .
must be c~nfessed that a spectacle more striking.
has rarely been seen. The large body of cavalry
which followed lis to our position, and had bivou-·
acked during the nigbt in the woods adjoining,
were first drawn up in compact array, as if waiting
for the signal to push on. By and by, nine batta-
lions of infantry,· attended by a proportionate
quantity of artillery ~ made their appearance, and
formed into columns, lines, echelons, and squares.
Towards noon, twelve battalions of the imperial
guard carne upon. the ground in one solid mass ;
and as each soldier was decked out with feathers
and shoulder-knots of a bloody hue, their appear-
ance was certainly imposing in no ordinary degree.
The ~olid column, however, soon deployed into


columns of battalions-a movement which was
executed with a degree of quickness and accuracy
quite admirable; and then, after having performed
several other evolutions with ~qual precision, the
guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac.
Next carne another division of infantry in real' of
theguards, and then a fresh column of cavalry,
till it was computed that the enemy hadcollected
on thissingle point a force of not less than 25,000
meno N or did the muster cease to go on, as long
as daylight lasted. To the very latest moment,
\re could observe men, horses, guns, carriages.
tumbriIs, and ammunition-waggons, Hocking into
the encampment; as if it were the design of the
French general to bring his whole disposable
force to bear against the position of Fuente

The position of Fuente Guinaldo was held at
this time by three divisons only of the allied army,
not one of which could bring into the field. so
manyas 5000 bayonets. Our numerical inferiority
was, therefore, very great; and as there was
nothing in the nature of the ground calculated to
mak~ up for a superiority in numbers so decided,
Lord Wellington at once determined to abandon
his works, and retire. In accordance witb this
resolution, we began our retreat immediately after
daI'k on the 26th; the right wing taking the two
roads which lead, Olle by Castelhas dos Flores


and Furealhos, the other by Albergaria and Aldea
de Ponte to Nave d'Avel, whilst the left feH baek
upon Bismula, and behind the Villa-major river;
andthe troops went ofl:' in sueh perfeet order, that
not only were there no stragglers, but not au
article of baggage, however valueless, was left
behind. Our movements had, however, be en
closely watehed by the enemy; for on the morn-
ing of the 27th they appeared in two eolumns,
each consisting of twelve squadrons of cavalry,
and a division of infantry, upon the two roads by
which our right wing' was retiring. These eolumns
mutualIy supported one another; and their great
object appeared to be, notso much to overtake
and force us to give battle, as to hurry us in our
march; but they were in no single instance suc-
cessful. On the contrary, their obstinacy on two
different occasions· enabled portions of our corps
to beat them back with sorne 10ss, and with á.
great deal more ofcohfusion.

The enemy's force which marched by Furcal-
hos, was stopped at that place by the infantry of
the light division. They had fallen in with the
,cava1ry early in the day ~ which, retiring before
thero, drew them to sorne broken ground, where
fhe infantry was formed; .and a few discharges
from the skirmishers served to convince them that
here at least our line of maTch was not to be
pressed. They therefore abstained from making


die attempt ;.but the corps which followed the
Aldea de Ponte road seemed animated by a more
daring spirit, and pushed vigorously to obtain
possession of a range of heights which lead from
that village to Nave d'Avel; and had they suc-
ceeded, the communication between the right and
left wings of our army would have been destroyed.
But Lord Wellington no sooner obset:ved their de-
sign than he took effectual me.asures to defeat it,.
by cornmanding the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions,
with a considerable force of cavalry, to haH and
concentrate upon the point threatened. The dis-
position was hardly effected, when our people
were assailed by clouds ()f tirailleurs, which, as
usual, covered the front of theFrench columns,
and a very brisk skirmish ensued. Jt feH chieBy
upon the 4th division, supported by General
Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry; in ...
deed, the brunt of it was borne by the fusileer bri-
gade under Colon el Packenham;· but though
warm for the moment, it\Vas not of long -conti-
nuance.. The enemy were chased at once froro
the high grounds which they had gained. They
fied, rather than retired, -beyond Aldea de Ponte,
and they were pursued with . the impetuosity
which English soldiers generally exhibit, consider-
ably further than it had been intended to follow
them. The consequence was, that our light
troops were, in their turn, driven back by the

220 NAHRATIVE oto' 'I'HE

enemy's supporting column, which, roused by the
sound of firing, had crossed over from the Furcal-
ho~ road, and were compelled to retire upon the
divisions in posit-ion, which had not, sine e the
commencement of the affair, once changed their

An opinion now began to prevail, that it was
Marmont's intention to push us across the Coa,
with the rapidity of one who had already con-
quered, or was, at aH events, secure of conquest.
Lord Wellington himself adopted the idea, and in-
dignant at the presumption which aH his adver-
sary's movements displayed, he resolved to render
the proposed task somewhat more difficult of per-
formance than it appeared to be regarded by the
French Marshal. There were some heights, or
rather acclivities, about Rendoa· and Soito, which
offered an extremely favourable position, the Coa
covering both flanks, and a retiring angle oí the
river forming their point d'appu1. Thither the
army moved on the night of the 27th, and there it
was proposed to fight a battle on the morrow, in
case the French should persist in the design for
which we gave them credit. With this view the
fifth division received orders to pass the Agueda at
Navas Freas, and to form the right of the line
aboye Quadraseias. The fourth division was to
draw up upon the left of the fifth ; the light above
Soito; the third in· front of Pouca Tarenha; the


first. and sixth at Rendoa~ where the ground
was peculiarly strong; and the seventh, with the-
cavalry, in a second line in the rearo There can-
not be a doubt that we should ~ave fought here
with much greater security to ourselves than at
Fuente Guinaldo; because the natural defCnces
would have shielded our troops far more effec-
tively, whilst the approaches for the enemy were
both difficult and exposed; yet there were objec-
tions even to this position, which the most s~­
guine found it difficult to overlook. There wa,g no
secure retreat. With a river like the Coa in our
rear, it would have been absolutely necessaryo-
either to repel, at all points~ the enemy's attacks,
however formidable, or to perish; for the line,
once broken, could not be withdrawn without suf-
fering a 10ss, which, in ou1' case, must have proved
fatal. As it happened, however, the excellence
of the position was not destined to be tried, for
the enemy never approached it. Whether it was
that Marmont's provisions failed him, 01' that he
deemed it unwise to attack us upon ground so for-
midable, 1 know not; but on the morning of the
28th, the strength of bis columns had disappeared,
and only a rear-guard of cavalry remained to
keep possession of Aldea de Ponte.

N otwithstanding the apparent retreat of the
enerny's columns, Lord Wellington did not con-
sider himself justified in abandoning the line


which he had taken up, till sorne more decisive
proof should be afforded that immediate danger
was at an end. About noon on the 28th, how-
ever, aH doubts on the subject were removed by
the return of Major Gordon, brother to the Earl of
Aberdeen, to head-quarters; who, so long ago as
the 25th, had been sent to the French army as the
bearcrof a flag of truce, and whom Marmont had
very prudently detained during the progress of
his,late operations. Major Gordon was, as might
be expected, well stored with interesting anec-
dotes relative to the situation and feelings of the
French army. He had received the most marked
attention froro Marroout and others ofthe generals,
with whom be lived on terms of familiarity, and
who scrupled not to carry him along with them in
their rides, and to give him the fullest insight into-
all their dispositions and arrangements. He spoke
of the enemy's troops as being generally well ap-
pointed and equipped, especially the cavalry and
imperial guards; and he estimated their numbers
atfull 60,000, with 120 pieces of cannon. The
French, it appeared, expressed themselves in
terms ofthe highest respee! touching the military
tal.ents of Lord Wellington, o{ which they con-
sidered his retreat from Fuente Guinaldo as fur-
nishing another brilliant specimen; for they had
fully anticipated an action at that place, and all
their plans were laid to secure a decisive victory.


The great bulk of their army, it appeared, was to
have been directed against our right, partly forc-
ing and partly turning it; and whilst the cavalry,
of which theybrought full six thousand into the
field, amused and occupied the centre, our left
also was to have been assailed. They were there-
fore not a little disappointed, when the dawn of
the 27th displayed our works and position aban-
doned; and whilst they lamented the mischance
which had thus wrested the laurel from their
brows, they gave our chief full credit for the pru-
den ce which dictated his determination to fall
back. Major Gordon further stated that the
French, when they first passed the Agueda, enter-
tainednoother design than merely to reconnoitre
OUT position, and to retire again; but that, irri-
tated by their cavalry 10ss, they pushed on, and'
wer~ afterwards tempted, from a contemplation of
our _extended alignment, to bring up, as they did
on the 26th; the whole oftheir army.

Now, however, the campaign was at an end.,
They were aU in full march towards Spain, for
the purpose of separating into corps, and retiring
to different quarters; that of General D'Orsenne
into Galicia, where, after it should have received
large reinforcements, and passed un del' the com-
mand of Oudinot, it was to become the army of
thenorth; whilst that of Marmont, with its an-

224 NAltItATIVE OF 'filE

cient title of tlfe Army of Portugal, was to retura
to its original station about Plasencia.

The single circumstance of Major Gordon's re-
turn sufficed to convince us, that in the opinion
which he had forrned relative tQ the future pro-
ceedings of the French arrny, he was not mis-
taken; since Marmont, had he ¡ntended to pro-
secute the invasion of Portugal any further, would
have scarcely permitted him-first, to acquire so
much accurate information-and then, to carry it
over to the English General; and it ought he re to
be recorded that the arrny possessed few more
able, intelligent, and active officers, and perhaps
none who móre largely possessed the confidence
of Lord Wellington, than Major Gordon. lt be-
carne, therefore, evident enough, that, for the pre-
sent at least, the carnpaign was at an end. Dnder
these circumstances, a question naturally arose,
how was it probable that the allied troops would
be disposed of?-in other words, would the close
investment of Ciudad Rodrigo be resumed, or
should we follow the example of the enemy, by
withdrawing into temporary cantonments? Against
the scheme of a renewed investrnent, there were
many and powerful reasons to be urged. In the first
place, every chance of reducing the place by fa-
mine was removed, the late convoys having amply
supplied it with aH manner of stores; whilst to


the vigorous prosecution of a siege, the approach-
ing rain y season threatened to oppose obstacles>
such as we could scarcely hope, even with means
more ample than those our disposal, to
surmount. But these, though sufficiently weighty,
were not the only objections to which the under-
taking was liable. The enemy had already. given
proof that they were disposed to make any sacri;.
tices in other quarters, rather than permit a place
so important to faH into oUt hands; and having
once drawn their force to a head, it was very little
probable that they would hesitate about doing so
again, should similar reasons for the rnovement be
he Id out to them. To sit down, however, before
fortresses, only that he might be compelled to
retire again, sll.ited not the policy of Lord Wel ..
lington; he therefore determined, at least fol' the
present, to suspend any attempt upon the place,
and to give to his soldiers that rest of which their
general exhaustion and increasing sickness stood
so much in need.

On the 29th of September the al1ied army broke
up from its position in front of Alfayates, and
leaving the light and fourth divisiolls to observe
Rodrigo, and discharge the duty oftheoutposts,
passed the Coa, and withdrew into cantonm:ents.
By this arrangement, a Ene was taken up, which
extended froID Penamacor, on the right, to Cele-
rico on the left; and head-quarters being estab-·

VOL. IJ. p


lished atFrenada, every disposition was made to
pay attention to the sick, of which the numbers
became every day nlore and more alarming. When
we first established ourselves in Fuente Guinaldo,
there· were, besides Portuguese, thirteen thousand
British soIdiers in hospitaI,-when we retired be-
hind the Coa, that number had considerably in-
creased; and we had not inhabited our new
quarters a week, before it swelled to the enormous
amount of sixteen thousand men: The unhealthy
season carne on, too; fevers and agues made rapid
progre ss amongst us, till scarcely a regiment could
muster upon parade two-thirds of ¡ts numerical
strength; and the medical attendants almost sank
beneath the fatigues which they were condemned
to endure. To add to our present discomfort, the
billets were, for the most part, extremely smaIl
and incommodious. The rain, which feH in tor-
rents, soon penetrated the thin roofs of the cottages
among which the troops were distributed; and
even the Iarger mansions, or chateaux, of which
the general and staff officers were put in possession,
ceased, at last, to resist a deluge so incessant.
Then, our out-of-doors occupation was destroyed.
We could neither hunt nor shoot, nor folIowthe
differentemployments which, in dry weather, COll-
tributed equally to our hea1th and amusement;
whiIst a total abs~nce of books, with fare some-
what scanty and coarse, enabled:i\,ls to struggle



with difficu1ty against en~~i. On the whole, 1
have no hesitation in pointing to the period of our
sojourn among the villages on the left bank of the
Coa, as one of the least interest~ng throughout the
Peninsular war, during which there occurred ab-
solutely nothing to individuals, calculated either
to excite or amuse; and in which public events

. were, with a few memorable exceptions, such as
to depress, rather than elevate, the spirits of those
who gave to them any grave or serious attention.

Having premised thus much, 1 shall cease to·
drag the reader through a detail of the petty
actions which dístinguished one day from another
in this tedious time of rest, but merely state the
least unimportant; and as these happened to be
neither numerous nDr very unusual in theirnature,
a few words will suffice for the purpose. It is
first, however, worthy - of remark, that· though
driven by circiImstances into this state of tempo-
tary inaction, Lord Wellington ceased not for a
moment to devise plans for the future, or to pre-
pare the means of carrying them into execution.
Before the weather broke, serious thoughts were
entertained of making an attempt up~n Ciudad
Rodrigo by escalade; but the rising of the waters
caused it to be abandoned, perhaps not unhappily
for the credit of our arms. N ext, a scheme was
devised for the commencement and p~secution of
a síege, as soon as the aspect of affairs in La·


Mancha and Galicia might authorise the measure;
and working parties were in consequence employed
at Almeida, with the view of converting it into a
place d'armes against the projected undertaking.
Without absolutely investing it, flying parties
passed contillually round Rodrigo, so as to in ter-
rupt the communications between the garrison, and
the army in its rear; and these performed, on
several occasions, services of considerable impor-
tance: the following may be taken as a specimen.

Don Julian de Sanchez was one of the most en-
terprising and able of aH the guerilIa chiefs whom
the progress of the war had called into active life.
He commanded a small body of irregular horse,
with which he repeatedly executed exploits such
as few men besides himselfwould have attempted;
till hisname became as famous in the rude songs
of his countrymen, as it was dl'eaded and abhol'l'ed
by his country's invaders. Don Julian had thrown
himself into Ciudad Rodrigo, when Massená laid
siege to it; and contributed not a little OOth by
his example and personal exertions to the gallant
defence which it offered; and when at last a sur-
render became indispensable, he cut his way, at
the head of his troops, through the enemy's lines,
and escaped. Since that period, he had harassed
and destroyed numerous convoys in Asturias, Ga-
licia, and others of the nol'thern provinces; and
llOW, having attached himself at length to oul'


army, he rendered himself exceedingly useful, by
taking an active part in those patrolling expedí-
tions of which 1 have just spoken ..

1 t was the custom of the French garrison to
send out their cattle every morning beyond the
waIls for the purpose of grazing, under the protec-
tíon of a guard, which at once tended them, and
watched the movements of our partíes. Don
J ulian determined, ir possible, to surprise the
herd; for which purpose he concealed his people,
day after day, among the broken ground on the
bank of the river, not far from the town; but the
guard proyed, for a time, so vigilant, that no op-
portunity occurred of effecting his designo At last,
however, an accident occurred, which enabled him
to accomplish, not only his original purpose, but
one which he did not dream of accomplishing. It
so happened, that on a certain day-on the l5th
of October-General Regnaud, the governor ofthe
place, rode out, attended by his staff and a slender
escort, and ventured, somewhat incautiously, to
pass the Agueda at the very spot where Don
Julian's ambuscade lay concealed. He was in-
stantly surrounded by the Spauish cavalry, aud
made prisouer; aud as if fortune had determined
to reward the latter for their patienee, the cattle
appeared at the same moment at a sufficient dis-
tance from the walls to authorise an attack. The
attack was made with the most perfeet success.


and both Governor and cattle were conveyed in
triumph to our head-quarters. In a native of any
country except France, sucb an unlucky coinci-
dence would have produced a degree of gloom not
to be sha,ken off; but by General Regnaud, bis
misfortunes were borne with the utmost pbilosophy
and good-humour. He became a frequent gl1est at
Lord Wellington's table, and we found him an ex-
tremely entertaining as well as intelligent com-
panion. He talked very freely of the designs of
his own superiors, and laid open to us much of the
internal economy of the French armies, among the
leaders of which it appeared, from his statements,
that no great cordiality prevailed; and his reason-
ings on the general aspect of the war, though not
always sound, were invariably speciaua, and al-
ways interesting.



lncreasing jealousies among the Spaniards, and numerous
disasters in the south, produce gloom in the British army-
It continues in its quarters, and makes preparations to be-
siege Ciudad Rodrigo-The French arroies suddenly with-
draw towards the south and east of Spain-Lord Wellington
moves to the front, and invests Rodrigo-Progress of the
siege-Storming and capture of the place.

WHILs'r we were thus conductillg ourselves on
the banks of the Coa, affairs gradually assumed"
in other quarters of the Peninsula, an appearance
less and less cheering. At Cadiz, discord the
most ill-timed prevailed, both among the inhabi-
tants and the government;. whilst the troops in
general, instead of improving in discipline and
military skill, became more and more inefficient
every day. AH c1asses, too, manifested towards
their allies a degree of jealousy, for which no
adequate cause could be assigned; they suspeded


every proposal, however disinterested in its nature,
and threw impediments in the way of every de·
sign, provided only the one chanced to originate
with an English officer, and the other were to be
carried into execution by English soldiers. Nor
were matters in a condition many degrees superior
to this eIsewhere. Madrid suhmitted quietly to,
the domination of the usurper, and the whole
country from thence to the Bidassoa was overrun.
In Galicia, General Abadia was at the head of
only 7,000 recruits, miserably clothed and fed,
though sufficiently armed; whilst Castanos's ariny
of Estremadura mig'ht muster perhaps 750 officers,
and 2 or 300 men !! 1 t is true that in· Catalonia
the Spaniards were reported to have obtained
somesuccesses under Lacy; and that the Empe-
cinado and Mina were both actively employed as
guerillas; but Suchet had already achieved so
successful a campaign, that, with the exception
of a few strong places, the southern provinces
might be considered as subdued. AH this was
discouraging enough; yet was it less discouraging
than the paI pabIe proofs which every day pre-
sented themseIves of the exhausted patriotism of
the Spanish peopIe, Men of all ranks spoke
openly of the folly- of continuing a struggle so
hopeless; and most of the higher orders hegan
seriously to provide for their own safety, by giving
in their suhmission ta the new dynasty. In a


word, the nation at large seemed weary of the
war, and desirous of being relieved from its mise-
ríes at any cost and upon any terms; whilst the
government appeared more anxious to recover the
revolted colonies of South America, than to deliver
the mother country from the presence of its in-
vaders. At the very moment when every exer-
tion ought to have been made to ¡ncrease the
numbers of the army, and improve its discipline,
the regency was sending its bes! regiments across
the Atlantic for the purpose of keeping Mexico
in obedience, and re-conquering tIle Caraccas,
till the troops themselves refused at last to pro-
ceed. and mutiny threatened to fill up the mea-
sure of the calamities under which Spain laboured.

With such prospects in the political horizon,
.and an absence of comfort amongst ourselves, a
spirit of dissatisfaction began to arise in the
bosoms of many, as well as a powerful feeling
that the cause had at length becomedesperate.
The Portuguese, no doubt, were still true to them-
selves; thatis to say, the dissensions in the local
government were rendered comparatively harmless
by a decree from Rio Janeiro, which placed the
resources of the country at the disposal of Lord
Wellington and Marshal Beresford, and left tbem
at liberty to act, in military matters, according to
the dictates of their· own judgment. But there
were few individuals attached to the army so


short-sighted as not to be aware that, should
Spain finally submit to the power of France, any
effort to maintain Portugal must be futile. Mul-
titudes accórdingly now began to turn their eyes
e)sewhere, and to desire employment either in
England or the colonies; and the numbers of
those who actually requested and obtained leave
to quit the country, were by no means inconsider-
able. Our chief alone appeared to retain his
usual sanguine expectations; for he continued his
preparations for a fresh caropaign with the same
diligence and with the same composure, as if the .
state of the Peninsula had been as favourable, as
from the proclamations of the Cortes, and the
statements in the English newspapers, it was re-
presented to be.

We were thus situated, when the report of a
brilliant enterprise, admirably conducted by Ge-
neral HilI, in Spanish Estremadura, came in to
enliven uso When Marmont withdrew to his can-
tonments around Plasencia, he left a corps of his
army, under General Gerard, at Merida, which
subsequently returned to the vicinity ofZafra,
where it took post. Gerard remained quietIy here
for sorne time; but being ordered to levy contri-
butíons on the inhabitants of Caceres, he moved,
about the middle of October, towards that place;
thus endangering the depot of Castanos's corps,
which had there lts head-quarters. To counteract

l'ENINSULAR - W AR. 235 movement, and defeat its object, General Hill
was directed to take the field. He advanced from
Portalegre on the 221id, and causing the enerny to
evacuate Aleseda, of which they had recently pos-
sessed thernselves, he pursued them as far as AI-
cuerca, where he contrived, in a rnasterly and
scientific rnanner, to surprise and disperse thero.
The foHowing is a briefaccount of this splendid
affair :~

General Hill passed the night of the 21st at
Malpartida, where he obtained such inforrnation
of the enemy's incaution, as induced hirn to en-
tertain a hope that they rnight, by dint of ex-
traordinary exertion on his part, be overtaken, and
brought to action. With this view, he put his
columns in march at an early hour on the morn~
ing of the 27th, and following certain by-paths,
artived that evening, unobserved by Gerard, at
Alcuerca. He was now within one short league
of Arroyo del Molino, the village where Gerard's
corps was to pass the night; so he prohibited aH .
fires frorn being lighted, and took other necessary
precautions to conceal his approach.. He was
perfectly successful; for the enerny remained in.
utter ignorance of his proximity, till they found
thernselves attacked on the morning of the 28th"
just as tbey were preparing to co~mence their
marcho Thus taken by surprise, they offered, as
might be expected, no very resolute resistan ce ;:


and the victory was such, that out of 2,500 in-'
fantry, and 600 cavalry, of which the French
corps originally consisted, seareely 500 made their
escape; General Gerard himself being wounded,
and his artillery taken. General Hill received, as
he deserved, the highest encomiums for the ability
with which his enterprise was eonducted; and
the enterprise itself continued, for sorne time, to
furnish the ehief topie of conversation at head-

In the mean while, however, Lord Wellington,
with that unwearied diligence whieh so peculiarly
distinguishes him, was applying all the powers of
his mind to the removal of certain inconveniences,
under which, both now and at former periods, his

, army had painfully laboured. The two great evils of
which we found principal cause to complain, were,
the impoverished state of our military chest, and
a very inadequate as well as uncertain supply of
the means of military transport.· To obviate the
former, our chief devised a scheme for the passing
current through Spain and Portugal of exchequer
bills; and to try how far tbe theory could be re-
duced 'to practice, be requestoo that a supply

. should be remitted from England to tbe amount
of 150,0001. For thé diminisbing the latter, he
caused a number of cars to be fabricated after a:
particular model, so that boys might be capable of
managing them ; and arranging them ¡nto brigades,


composed ea eh of thirty-five carriages, he placed
them, after the fasbion oí tbe commissariat mules,
under their several capitaos or leaders. How far
the fi1'st of these devices was found to answer its
end, 1 take it not upon me to determine; but tbe
last proved productive of the greatest advantages,
and at once rendered us independerit of tbe ca-
price and jealousy which too frequently stood in
the way of our most important undertakings. Un-
happily, however, out efforts to straiten the gar-
rison of Ciudad Rodrigo were not attended with
the same beneficial results. In spite of our utmost
diligence, the enemy contrived to tbrow convoy
after convoy into the place, till in the end the
investing force became infinitely more straitened
for provisions, forage, and other necessaries, than
the force whiqh it sought to inconvenience. The
truth ¡s, tbat our troops were, at the present
juncture, at too great a distance from the fort,· to
watch it to any good purpose; whilst they were
too far in front to find subsistence for themselves
in a country which had so long and so frequently
been the seat of active operations. It was in vain
that one or more divisions moved up, from time to
time, towards the Agueda, as often as a report
carne in, that sorne fresh supplies were collecting,
and sorne fresh convoys about to move upon Ro-
drigo. They arrived either to learn that the
stores had already passed, or that the wholehad


been a false alarm; till both men and officers
began to grow heartily tired of a species of war-
fare which harassed and fatigued themselves,
without bringing the slightest inconvenience upon
the enemy. At last the General determined upon
withdrawing a portion of his army further to the
rear; where the horses, which hadwasted away
to mere skeletons onaccount of the scarcity of
provender, might be enabled to· recover their
strength, and to scatter the rest over a widet SUf-
face, wherever more convenient accommodations
could be found for it.

In accordance with this arrangement, the fifth
and sixth divisions; with the whole of the cavalry
except a single brigade, retired towards the Douro
and theMondeg'o, where they occupied a range of
villages infinitely more commodiou·s than any
which had oflate been assigned to them. Head-
quarters, howevel\ continued, as before, at Fre-
nada; whilst the first division, under General
Graham, took post at Pinhel on the left, the third
and fourth in the centre, between the Agueda and
the Coa, the seventh on the left, extending as far
as Penamacor, and the light, under Crawford, con-
siderably inadvance, at Guinaldo, on the right
barik of the Agueda. The good effects of these
changes .were almost immediately feIt. Our sic k
daily díminished, our horses gradually returnedto
condition, arrd the spirits of all rose, as they felt


themselves becaming more and more efficient;
whilst a blessed change in the weather, byenabling
us to resume our ancient out-of-door occupations~
tended, in no slight degree, to r~store our primitive

In this channel affairs continued to flow, till
the year 181] "came to a close. Our parties la-
bouring assiduously at Almeida. brought it, by
degrees, to assume something like tbe appearance
of a fortified place; whilst preparations ~ere bu-
sily made for throwing across tbe Agueda a bridge
upon tressels, sufficiently durable to resist the in-
fluence of the stream. Stores and ammunition,
with a considerable train of heavy artillery, were
likewise moved towards the front; and the divi-
sions of infantry stationed tl1e1'e, busied them-
selves in the construction of gabions and fascines.
Everytbing, in short, appeared to indicate that
sooner or latter Ciudad Rodrigo would be regu-
larly besieged; and the first opportunity which
offered for the purpose, was not permitted to pass

During the last three months, the enemy's
troops in the nortb and centre of Spain had 1'e-
mained "tolerably quiet, there being no force, with
the exception of General Abadia's corps, to occu-
py their attention; whilst in the south, hostilities
were carried on with increasing vigour. Master
of Tarragona, and victorious over everything in the


field, Suchet sat down before Valencia, whilst
Victor drove back Ballasteros under the walls of
Gibraltar, and directed a considerable division of
his corps against Tariffa. In the mean while,
General Drouet, at the head of twelve thousand
men, insured the subnüssion of Spanish Estrema-
dura; and Soult, whose head-quarters were under-
stood to be at Seville, kept that kingdom also in
subjection. Thus were the -Spaniards pressed
on every side by corps against which they could
make no head; and it appeared as if the subjuga-
tion of all those important places, which up to the
present moment had offered the most steady resist-
ance, were at hand.

I have in former parts of this narrative taken
occasion to observe, that whatever might have
been their conduct in the field, the Spanish troops
seldom failed to do their duty when employed in
the defence of fortified places. The fortress of
Murviedro, which Suchet found it necessary to
subdue, as a preparatory step to the reduction of
Valencia, cost him dear; and the same spirit
which had animated the garrison of the one place,
appeared to prevail among that which held the
other. Tarifra, too, being happily occupied by a
thousand English soldiers under Colonel Skerret,
withstood and repelled all the efforts of the enemy
to carry it; whilst bands of guerillas gathered
round the rear of the French armies, and seriously


retarded . their progress. It beeame necessary,
under these circumstances, to reinforee their
strength from other provinees. The whole of the
disposable regiments in the vicinity of Madrid
were, in eonseq uence, moved to Toledo; and to-
wards the end of the year, Marmout himselfbroke
up from his cantonments at Plasencia and Talave-
ra, and fell into the same lineo It so happened
that D'Orsenne, with the army of the centre, took
the road, about the same time, to Burgos; and
we were left without any thing in our front, as
weIl upon the side of Beira as in the direction
of the Alentejo ..

Lord Wellington was no sooner made acquainted
with these several movements, than he hastened
to avail himself ofthe opportunity whieh they pre-
sented, of effecting that end towards which his
most anxious attention had been so long and so
steadily turned. Directing General Hill to ad-
vanee upon Merida, as well with the view of
alarrning Drouet as to effect a diversion in favour
of the beleaguered plaees, and to draw off part of
the enerny's force from Ballasteros, he himself
made ready to invest Ciudad Rodrigo in form, and
to wrest it, if possible, out of the hands of a garri-
son, now unavoidably left to its own resources.
There were not wanting amongst us sorne who
criticised this design, and would have greatly pre-
ferred a general inroad into Spain, bare as it was of ~~=E::':"



French armies up to the very walls of the capitat;
hut Lord Wellington was too well aware of· the
difficulties to which his troops must be exposed,
were they, in the month of January, 1812, to pe-
Retrate into an exhausted country, to give to that
suggestion one moment's consideration. Besides,
his own honour, and the honour of his army, were
in some degree staked' upon the recovery of the
fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst the safety of
the province of Beira might be said mainly to de-
pend upon it. Orders were accordingly issued
fuI' the immediate advance of as many stores as it
was possible to collect; whilst the divisions in
front closedone upon another, and made ready to
move upon the Agueda.

Seldom has an army embarked on a business so
arduous, under circumstances more unfavourable
than those which attended us at presento In the
first place, the situation of the place to be at-
tacked, standing, as 1 have already said, upon the
brink of a rapid river, and surrounded by a vast
plain destitute of positions, water, or even cover
for the troops, rendered it impossible to establish
ourselves permanently about it, without exposing
the men to hardships which must soon prove fatal
to their health. It would therefore be necessary,
after driving the garrison within their lines, to
carry on the siege by relays of divisions; in other
words, to keep the main body in cantonments oa

l' J¡~NINSULAR W AR. 243

the 1eft bank ofthe Agueda, whilst a certain num-
ber of brigades should push on the works on the
right bank, the rest relieving them in that duty at
the expiration of a certain space of time. N OW,
tbough the Agueda be fordable in several places
.during dry weather, it requires but a few hours
of heavy rain to render the fords impassable ~
whilst the rain, which might chance to last for a
few days, would inevitably sweep away the only
bridge which we had found it practicable to 1ay
down. At the present season of the year, how-
ever, such rains were not only of probable occur-
rence, but confidently to be apprehended; and
therefore we set out with a: prospect before us, of
continual interruptions, from causes which no
exertionson our part would suffice to obviate. In
the next place, the means at our disposal, whether
of transport 01' attack, fell infinitely short of the
very lowest calculation which the superintending
engineer had been able to formo Instead of 1400
cars, th~ amount demanded, we could muster no
more than 450 j and our whole mate riel consisted
of 38 twenty-four pounders, with 12 howitzers.
We possessed not a single mortar, and our stock,
bothof powder and she11s, was exceedingly scanty.
There was, moreover, every reason to apprehend
that, as soon as the enemy should be made aware
of our design, they would hasten to defeat it, and
a question naturally arose, whether, under a11 cir-


cumstances, it would be possible for us to bring
the undertaking to a fortunate termination. Now
a repulse, in any case, would have been abun·
dantly distressing.; had this been our first attempt
of the kind, not to succeed in it would be infinitely
more injurious than not to embark in it at all; but
were we again thwarted, after all that had oc·
curred already, it was hard to calculate upon the
mischief which might be expected to ensue. Yet
was it absolutely necessary that something should
be done, as well for the gratification of the people
of England, as to satisfy our allies that we were
not indifferent to their calamities; and as the only
choice submitted to him lay between the siege of
Rodrigo, and an advance into the interior of Spain,
Lord Wellington w1sely deterrnined on the former.
On the 5th of January, the divisions in the rear
began toclose up; on the 6th and 7th, the army
assembled, and on the 8th we crossed the Agueda
in force, and completed the investment.

Of the general features of the country by which
Ciudad Rodrigo is surrounded, a sufficiently ela-
borate account has been given already. 1 will not,
therefore, repeat it here; but as little 01' no notice
has yet been take!1 of the defences by which it
was covered, it may not be amiss if 1 endeavour to
make the reader acquainted with their nature,
before 1 proceedto detail to him any circum-
stances--attending the siege. The following de-


scription is extracted from Colonel Jones's Journal
of Sieges; a work which every soldier would do
wel1 to study, and which every eivilian may pe-
ruse with satisfaetion :-

" Ciudad Rodrigo is built on a rising ground, on
the right bank of the Agueda ; it has a double en-
ceinte all round it; the interior wall is of an old
construction, ofthe height of thirty-two feet, and
is generally of bad masonry, without flanks, and
with weak parapets and narrow ramparts; the ex-
terior enclosure is a modern fausse-braie, of a low
profile, and is constructed so far down the slope of
the hill, as to afford but Httle eover to the interior
wall; and from the same cause of the rapid deseent
of the hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imper-
fectly covered by its glacis. Onthe east and
south sides, there are ravelines to the fausse-braie;
but in no part is there a covered way, nor are there
any counter-mines: without the town, at the dis-
tance of three hundred yards, are the suburbs;
they are enclosed by abad earthern retrench-
ment, hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during
the investment of the place in 1810; and the
French, since they had been in possession of Ro-
drigo, had made strong posts of three convents-
one on either flank of the suburbs, and one in the
centre; and they had also converted into an in-
fantry post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated
just beyond the glacis on the north-west angle of


the place. The works of the suburbs, therefore,
though contemptible in themselves, yet as sup-
ported by these convents, were considered as fully
competent to resist a coup-de-main.

"The ground without the place is generally
flat, and the soil rocky,_ except on the n01'th side,
where there are two hills, called the lesser and the
greater Teson; the one, at 180 yards from the
works, rises nearIy to the level of the ramparts,
and the other, at 600 yards' distance, to the height
of 13 feet above them.The soil on these hilIs is
very stony, and during winter, water (usual1y)
rises at the depth of six ¡nches below the surface :
the French had erected a small redoubt on the
highest hill, which, from its situation, prevented
anyattack on that side ti11 it should be taken : this
redoubt was supported by two guns, and a howit-
zer in battery, on the top of the fortified convent
of Sto Francisco, at 400 yards from it, and a large
proportion of the artillery of the· place, (particularIy
mortars and howitzers placed behind the rampart
of the fausse-braie,) was in battery to fire upon the
approach from the hill."

There were two points at which this place
might be readi1y assaHed; one on the eastern and
southern sides, where the ground was more flat,
but the suburbs extensive; the other on the north,
where the hill and redoubt just alluded to pro-
tected it from insulto Lord W~llington seemed.

l'E~INSULAR WAlt. 247

át first disposed to make his approaehes from the
former of these quarters; but, on mature delibe-
ration, it was found that the superior fire from the
northern face would l}Ot present obstacles so seri-
ous as those which the rocky nature of the soü,
and the resistance to be expected from the for-
tified convents and suburbs, would offer on the
other. 1 t was known too, from the system of
aítaek adopted,by Massena, that the walls on the
northern front might be breached at a distance;
whereas, on the southern and eastern fronts, it
appeared doubtful, from the natural faH of the'
ground, whether any impression could be made,
exeept froID batterieserected on the erest of the
glacis; and as the saving of time was to us a mat-
ter oC thefirst consideration, that which promised
most speedily to lay open the body of the place,
was pronouneed to be the best. For these, among
other reasoris, our chief readily laid aside his first
intentions, and having closely reconnoitred the
eity in all its faces, he determined to act upon
the second with as much promptitude as vigour.

With this view he resolved that ground should.
be broken on the night of the day in which the
investment was effected; afid as it was~essential,
as a preparatory measure, to obtairi possession oí
the redoubt which crowned the greater Teson,'
orders were issued that it should be attacked by a
party of the light division, and earried by escalade.


Our troops, to whom no ladders had be en issued
out, and who probably did not dream of requiring
such implements thus early, immediately sat down
to construct them, and the sides of a few Spanish
cars which had conveyed intrenching tools from
Almeida, supplied them with materiaIs. They
tore them to pieces, and long before the appointed
hour a sufficient quantity for the service in con-
templation was completed. Three hundred men
of the 52nd and 95th regiments then prepared,
under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Col-
bourne, to assault the outwork. They were to be
supported by two firing. parties, which received
instructions to keep up a warm discharge of mus-
ketry upon the opposite flanks, for the purpose of
distracting the attention of the garrison; whilst
the storming party, descending into the ditch,
should cut away the palisades, and mount, with
the assistance of their rude ladders, into the re-
doubt. Everything was done with the most ad-
mirable order and daring courage. At nine o'clock
at night, the several detachments moved to the
posts assigned them, and our brave fellows, find-
ing thatthe palisades were close to the outward
side ofthe ditch, sprang over them, without paus-
ing to break them down. They then rushed pell-
mell into the redoubt, and taking the enemy com-
pletely by surprise, made themselves masters, not
only of it, but of the entire garrison which had


been appointed to defend it.Two officers, forty
men, and three pieces of cannon captured, were
the fruits of their success; and it was purchased
by the loss of only six men kilIed, three officers
and sixteen men wounded.

The way being thus cleared to ulterior opera-
tions, 700 men irnrnediately advanced towards
the hilI, 300 of whom were to effect a lodgmelít
close to the redoubt, whilst 400 should open the
communication to it from the rearo They suc-
ceeded in both objects with wonderfully little
los8; for the enerny, irritated by the fall of the
outwork, directed all their flre upon it, and our
people were in consequence enabled to pursue
their tasks unmolested. When morning dawned,
therefore, the cover was found to be such, that
reliefs might, with perfect safety, be employed to
complete by day what had be en so welI begun at
night; and hence, within little more than twenty-
four hours from the investment of the place, 'our
engineers found themselves in a situation to mark
out the first parallel. That, again, was begun,
and so far brought to perfection, between sunset
on the 9th and sunrise on the ] Oth, as to afford
excellent shelter to the workmen; indeed, so
unremitting were the zeal of the superintendents
and the activity of tÍle troops, that hefore noon on
the 13th, not only was the first parallel completéd,
but three batteries, capable of containing thirty-


two 'pieces . of artillery, were erected. The guns
were likewise brought up, the platforms laid, and
an ample supply of ammunition lodged in the
magazines ; . and we began already to talk of tbe
opening of the batteries as an occurrence which
might be hourly expected.

We . were thus situated when intelligence ar-
riyed at head~quarters, which, without aIarming
either Lord Wellington or his followers, increased
the anxiety of all to bring the undertaking before
them as speediIy as possible to an end. We
learned that Marmont, after proceeding in the
direction of Valencia as far as O~ana, had sud-
denly given out that his presence in the east was
not required, and returning with four of his divi-
sions, had taken the route of the Guadarama pass
towards Valladolid and Salamanca. His object
was represented to he, a desire to throw supplies
into Ciudad Rodrigo, of our operations against
which, however, both he and D'Orsenne were
said still to be in ignoran ce; indeed we ascer-
tained, upon what appeared to be good autbority~
that even at Salamanca, a distan ce of only sixteen
leagues from our' trenches, not a rumour of the
siege had, so Iately ~s the 12th, got abroad. A
good deal of time had thus been gained by us,
upon which, ai the commencement of the business,
it wouId have been idIe to calculate; but it would
have been: worse than idle to suppose tbat a

i'Jo:NINSULAlt WAH. 251

secresy, under any circumstances so remarkable,
would long continue to screen our operations.
On the contrary, it was but just to believe that
the French generaIsmight, even whilst we were
discussing their plans, be made acquainted with
the perilous predicament in which Rodrigo stood ;
and it was beyond a question, that whenever they
díd aseertain that faet, they would make the
utmost exertions to relieve i1. The matters, there-
fore, upon which alone we eonsidered it necessary
to speeulate, were, the probable period at which
they would be enabled to arrive, and the amount
of force with which, within a given space of time,
they could be in a condition to threaten our be-
slegmg army.

With respect to the former of these conside-
rations, it was the opiníon of Lord Wellington, that
were they to exert themselves as they might, suffi..,
cient time would not be granted for a regular and
scientifie prosecution of the siege to a close. He
therefore directed that the batteries in the first
parallel should be armed, and that they should
open at once upon the body of the place, without
pausing to silence the enemy's fire, or ruin his de';'
fenees. By this means he hoped to effect a breach
in the course of a few days at the furthest; -when
he wouldeither storm with the counterscarp entire,
or approaeh by the more secure but tedious process
of sap, according as Marmont should, 01' should


not, sho\V a disposition to molest him. With re-
speet to the latter question at issue, it \Vas not so
easy a matter to eome to any eertain eonclusion.
Some time ago a rumour had prevailed that D'Or-
senne, with the division of guards, was recalled to
Franee; but that was now aseertained to be desti-
tute of foundation. On the eontrary, that general
was stated to be himself at Valladolid, with a
portion of his corps; whilst the remainder were at
Burgos, and in the country to the north of it.
Now, were Marmont and D'Orsenne again to
unite, their force would doubtless outnumber liS in
the same proportion in whieh it outnumbered liS
before; indeed the odds against us would be
greater, inasmueh as \Ve could not now, with any
honour, abandon our works, and must therefore
separate our army into eovering and besieging
corps. For the enemy to effect this junction,
however, a larger space oftime would be required
than would be necessary on our part to accomplish
the reduction of the place, even by the most
tedious process contemplated; and hence we felt
no great apprehension that our labours would be
interrupted by the united armies of Portugal and
the centre. Still a very considerable force, per.-
haps forty thousand men, could, it was believed,
be brought against us so early as the 27th 01' 28th;
and even fo1'ty thousand men would oceasion no
t1'iBing inconvenience to troops entangled, as we


were, round a strong place, and destitute of any
favourable position from which to aet against them.

With this prospect before him, Lord Wellington
at once urged forward the siege by every means
in his power, and took such steps as promised
most effectually to secure those employed in it
from interruption. Sorne of the divisions whieh
had hitherto oeeupied eantonments eonsiderably in
the rear, were moved up, and placed themselves
in quarters, the: fifth at Albergaría, at Janea, and
on the Coa; and the seventh at Payo. The
cavalry, consisting of the brigades ofGenerals Slade
and Anson, of the 1st hussars, of Alten's. of the
3rd dragoons and 4th dragoon guards under Le
Marchands wíth four troops of horse artillery, were
at Ituero; and General Bradford's brigade of Por-
tuguese infantry at Barba del Puerco. General
Híll, likewise, reeeived instructions to throw a
couple of brigades across the Tagus at Villa Velha,
for the purpose of giving additional support to our
right; whilst he himself, in case of need, should
faH back upon Portalegre and Niza. Thus it was
ealculated that an arrny of 38,000 infantry and
2500 cavalry could, within a few hours, be assem-
bled at any given point; and with 38,000 infantry
and 2500 cavalry, it was felt that there existed but
srnall ground of apprehension, let Marrnont take
the field when he rnight.

In the mean while, out' works before the town


were proceeding with the same diligence and
vigour which had bitberto characterised them.
There was a fortifiedconvent on the right of the
captured redoubt, which commanded the very
spot upon which it was proposed to form a second
parallel. This it was considered necessary to re-
duce; and the service was performed on the night
of the 13th, in the handsomest manner, by the
light companies of guards, supported by Lord
Blantyre's brigade. OUl' men approached the
post wholly unobserved, and making their way
within the barricade, found the garrison of fifty
men collected round a large fire; and sound asleep.
The enemy. roused thus awkwardly from tlíeir
slumbers. fled in all directions, without making the
fa¡ntest effort to defend thernselves; and as they
left arrns, knapsacks. and every thing behind, they
.easily leaped froin the windows, and effected their
,escape; but the convent remained in' our posses-
sion, and it proved óf the utrnost utility in covering
the progressof the sap, which was irnmediately
.begun, and carried ón to the line of the projected
parallel. .

The enerny had hitherto confined their resist-
ance to a heavy ccmnónade frorn the walls; on the
14th, they tried the fortune of a sortie, and for a
moment or two their success was such as to
threaten the most serious consequences. An ex-
ceedingly culpable custom prevailed among the


troops stationed for the defence of the tren ches, by
which the old guard, as soon as the relief came in
sight, began to move off; thus leaving the ad-
vanced line wholIy undefended fromany effort
which the gal'rison might make to take possession
o~ iL "From 'tn.e 'tops {)l tn.e \()Wel'll" ~\) wn.\ch ~'ffi.­
cers were constantIy stationed, this extreme negli-
gence on our part was repeatedly observed; and
the Governor having ascertained that it was a mat-
ter of daily occurrence, resolved to take advantage
of it. At eleven o'clock, therefore, in the forenoon
of the 14th, about five companies sallied from the
town, just as one of our guards had quitted the
trenches, and the other was as yet at sorne dis-
tance from thern; and they pushed on with so
much haste, that they arrived at the very waU oí
the convent before they were stopped. The work ...
men, unarmed and surprised, could only retire be-
fore them; but an alarrn being immediately given,
Lord Blantyre's brigade, with a detachment of
Germans, hastened to the spot, and with difficuIty
threw themselves between the French troops and
the point of attack. The latter were then driven
back, and they fled within the town, having
effected no other object besides upsetting most of
the gabions which had been placed on the pre-
ceding night; neither they nor we suffering any
serious 10ss in killed or wounded.

There had been mounted, during the earlier

256 NARRATlVE 01' 'fHE

part of this morning, twenty-five heavy twenty-
four pounders in the batteries already constructed
in the first parallel. With these a fire was
directed to be opened, partly upon the point in-
tended to be breached, and partly upon the con-
yent of Sto Francisco, another fortified post which,
from the left of the redoubt, enfiladed our pro-
jected communication between the first and second
parallels. At four o'clock in the afternoon it be-
gan; and of a spectacle more strikingly magnifi~
cent, it has rarely been the good foríune even of a
British soldier to be a witness. The evening
chanced to be remarkably beautiful and still;
there wasnot a cloud in the sky, nor a breath
of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artil-
lery broke in upon its calmness, and volumes
of smoke rose slowly from our batteries. These
floating gently towards the town, soon enveloped
the lower parts of the hill, and even the ramparts
and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the towers
and summits lifting their heads over the haze,
showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial
castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on
a summer's day. The flashes from our guns, an-
swered as they promptly were from the artillery in
the place, the roar of their thunder reverberating
amongthe remote mountains ofthe Sierra de Fran-
cisca; these, with the rattle of the balls against the
masonry, and the occasional crash as portions of


the wall gave way, proved, altogether, a se ene
whieh, to be rightly understood, must be expe-
rienced. 1 eonfess that J have seldom been more
powerfully and yet singularly affected, than 1 was
by this magnificent combination of sights and
sounds; and the chances are, that 1 shall nevel'
again enjoy another opportunity of experiencing
similar sensations.

The point against which our present efforts
were direeted, was that which the Freneh, during
the siege of 1810, had breached, and which, ac-
cording to the opinion of our ablest engineers, had
not yet obtained that solidity which time, and
time only, bestows on masonry. It was, how-
ever, so well covered by the fausse-braie, that se-
rious doubts were entertained, whether it would
be practicable to reach it with effect till after that
should have .been blown in; whilst the distance
at which our batteries were erected, fuIl 650
yards from the crest of the glacis, rendered the
practice less accurate, as well as less destructive,
than it would have otherwise been. Both of these
circumstances told against uS; but our guns, of
English· manufacture, were excellen t of their kind,
and our gunners skilful; and hence it was easy
to perceive that the top, at least, of the rampart,
crumbled rapidly before them, and that it required
only a better position to enable our object to· be
attained to ¡ts fullest extent. Preparations were

VOL. n. It


accordingly rnade to advance our works further;
and a sap, destined to crown the surnrnit of the
lesser Teson, was begun.

The guns, which were directed excIusively upon
tbe convent of Sto Francisco, made of that post,
after sorne hours of heavy firing, a heap of ruins ;
and it, as well as the suburbs, were taken posses-
sion of by the 40th regiment 800n after' dusk on
the 14th. Partieswere then sedulouslyemployed,
as well in extending the second parallel, as in
throwing up fresh batteries; and on the 17th, our
trenches were advanced to the surnrnit of the
nearest hill, within 180 yards of the body of
the place. From the new batteries, likewise, so
commanding a fire was brought to bear, both
upon the main breach and upon an old tower,
somewhat to the right of it, that the latter át length
fell with a tremendous crash, and the former was
pronounce4 practicable. Pits were next dug, here
and there, along, the glacis, into which riflemen
were introduced, with orders to fire unintermit-
tingly upon the embrasures; whilst a continued
shower of grape and canister, thrown in both by
night and day, kept the faces of the breaches

. cIear, and hindered any attempts at repairing them.
Such was the condition of Ciudad Rodrigo-

the fausse-braie shaken to a,toms, and two for-
midable breaches in its main wall; when Lord
Wellington, wil1ing to spare the lives both of his


own troops and of the garrison, sent in to demand
a surrender. The reply, though not such as could
have been desired, was nevertheless one which all
brave men must admire; and 1 give it in the
words of the Governor, because these alone can
do it full justice: .. Sa Majesté I'Empereur,"
said he, " m'a confié le commandement de
Ciudad Rodrigo. Je ne puis pas le rendre. Au
contraire, moi et la brave garnison que je com-
mande s'enseveliront dans ses ruines."

N othiug therefore remained but to carry the
place by assault; and to this end all our future
exertions were turned. On the 18th the town
was closely l'econnoitred by Majol' Sturgeon, of
the staff corps, whose exertions and ability from
the· commencément of the siege had been very
conspicuous. He reported that on the enemy's
left of the main breach there was a favourable
point of entl'ance fol' a body oftroops, which might
assist in flanking the appl'oach .of the column of
attack in that qual'ter, whilst the lesser breach on
the right was perfectly accessible; and Lord
Wellington, satisfied by the declal'ation, detel'-
mined to defer the final struggle no longer. The
night of the 19th was accordingly fixed upon as
the proper period fol' commencing the assault;
and in the mean while, aH the details of the plan
upon which it was deemed advisable to condud it,
were drawn up, and maturely considered.


AH who know Lord Wellington are aware that,
to the kind of influence by which other men are
liable to be effected, he is and ever has be en an
entire stranger. In all his undertakings, be they
great or small, the single circumstance which had
weight with him was, that yverything should be
done correctly; and that the least possible incon-
venience should be experienced, not only by the
persons immediately employed, but by the army
in general. Acting upon this principIe, he issued
orders that the attack should be made by the
divisions, whatever they might chance to· be,
which should happen to be on duty that day in
the trenches; and as the light and third divisions
enjoyed that good fortune, upon them the honour-
able task devolved of carrying Ciudad Rodrigo
by assauIt. The third division, consisting of the

. brigades of Major-general M'Kinnon and Lietlte-
nant-colon~l Campbell-that is to say, of the
45th, 74th, 88th, and five companies of the 60th
regiments on the one hand, and of the 5th, 77th,
83rd, and 94th on the other-were to attack the
main breach. They were to be preceded by the
light companies, under Major Manners, as a
storming party; as these, again, were to be
headed by parties carrying wool-packs and lad-
ders; the former for the purpose of filling up the
ditch, the latter to enable too assailants to mouot
the wall. They were to form, General M'Kin-


non's leading aud Colouel Campbell's supporting,
in the second parallel; and they had as their re-
serve a Portuguese brigade, drawn up in order in
the trenches. To aid this principal attack, a de-
monstratlon was to be made on our right by
Major O'Toole of the 95th rifle corps, at the head
of five companies of that regiment, and of the light
companies of the S3rd aud 94th; aud the parti-
cular care of guiding this little column was as-
signed to Major Sturgeon, at whose suggestion it
prepared to acto In the mean while the smaller
breach on our left was to be stormed by the light
divisiou, consisting of Major-general Vandeleur
and Colonel Barnard's brigades-in other words,
of two battalions of the 52nd, one of the 43rd, two
of the 95th, and two of Ca~adores. The attack was
to be. led by General Vandeleur's brigade, which
issuing from the left of the convent Sto Francisco,
was to descend into the ditch, and advauce, first
upon the breach in the fausse-braie, and then upon
that in the body of the place. As soon as they
should succeed in gaining the summit of the
fausse-braie, they were to detach to their right,
for the purpose of communicating with General
M' Kinnon's brigade, and flauking the assault of
the principal wall; and whenever they had
crowned the breach in that wall against which
they were directed, they were in like manner to


tur~ to the right, and join the main aUack. This
done, and a communicati0Il: between the tw~
columns being established, an effort was to be
made to burst open the Salamanca gate, opposite
to the convent of Sto Francisco; upon which the
rest of the division, which up to that moment were
to remain in reserve, would enter and se cure the
eonquest of the place. Here, as at the greater
breaeh, a select party of men were appointed to
head their comrades; they consisted oí 300 volun-
teers under the eommand of Major N apier; and
they, like the storming party elsewhere, were
preceded by tbe bearers of bags, ladders, and
the other engines of assault. Finally, the parties
appointed to carry these necessary implemEmts
were prohibited from taking with them their arms;
arid the storming parties received positive instruc-
tions on no account whatever to tire a shot.

Partly with a view to draw a portion of the
enemy's attention from the breaches, and partly
under the idea that, during the confusion, an en-

. trance might be obtained by escalade, General
Pack's Portuguese brigade feceived instructions,
as soon as the tiring should become general, to
demonstrate against the outwork of Sto Jago, and
the convent of La Caridad. They were to plant
their ladders at the moment when their comrades
issued from the trenches; and they were to ren-


der the attack either a real or a false one, accord-
ing as circumstances should direcL The last
clause in these instructions was not, perhaps, the
least interesting to those affected by it; it was
this :- "Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by as-
sault this evening at seven o'clock."

As the preceding orders appeared at an early
hour in the day, ample time was afforded for mak-
ing every preparation which the circumstances of
the case required, and both men and officers were
fullyand correctly apprised of the duties which
they were expected severally to perform. They
were not inattentive to these instructions, and ex-
actly at the moment specified, each column took
its station, in readiness to obey the signal of ad-
vance. It would be no easy matter to describe
the state of a soldier's Jeelings during the pause
which ~nsued. The evening was calm and tran·
quil, and the moon, in her first quarter, shed ayer
the s.cene a feeble light, which, withouf disclosing
the shape 01' form ofparticular objects, rendered
their rude outline distinctly visible. There stood
the fortress, a confused mas s of masonry, with its
breaches like shadows cast upon the wall; whilst
not a gun was fired from it, and allwithin was as
still and mbtionless as if itwere already a ruin,
or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On
our side, again, the trenches crowded with armed
men, among whom not so much as a whisper might


be beard, presented no unapt resemblance to a
dark thunder-cloud, or to a volcano in tbat state
of tremendous quiet which usualIy precedes its
most violent eruptions. But the deJay was·
not of long continuance; at a few minutes past
seven o'clock, the word was quietly passed that all
things were ready, and the troops poured forward
with the coolness and impetuosity of which Bri-
tish soldiers alone are capable, and which nothing
could successfully oppose.

No piece of clock-work, however nicely ar-
ranged, couId obey the will of its maker more ac-
curately than the different columns obeyed that
night the wishes of their chief; and his orders
were, in consequence, executed at every point
with the same precision and regularity as if he
had been manrenvring so many battalions upon
a revue plateau. General M'Kinnon's brigade,
amidst showers of grape and musketry, rushed,
without a check, to the foot of tbe great breach,
and in spite of numerous obstac1es, and the most
determined resistance, succeeded in gaining the

But a serious opposition awaited them there.
The enemy, driven from the main wall, took shel-
ter behind aretrenchment, in front of which they
.had dug a ditch of considerable width; and whilst
our men were vainly endeavouring to pass it, a
mine was 8uddenly sprung. The havoc oc-


casioned by that terrible explosion was prodigious,
numbers of the bravest and most forward of the
men being b]own up and destroyed. Unfortu-
nately for the army at Iarge, the galIant M'Kinnon
was among them; but the rest, nothing daunted
by the fate of their comrades, only redoubled
their exertions, with a courage which seemed to
rise in proportion to the difficulties opposed to it.
They were thus situated, when Major Q'Toole's
little column, which had acted under the guidance
of Major Sturgeon upon the right, joined them;
when finding that all their efforts were fruitless,
and that it was impracticable to press further till
the results of other attacks should be known, they
established themselves among the ruins.

In the mean while, both the light division under
Crawford, and the Portuguese brigade under
Pack, were following up with equal reso]ution the
measures pointed out to them. The former is-
suing from the convent, made for the lesser breach,
their brave chief leading as few like himself could
haveled, when a musket-ball struckhim in the arm,
and penetrating the side, lodged in his lungs. He
feH to the ground, and was borne from the field in
a dying state. Almost at the same moment,
Major Napier commanding the storming party,
Colonel Colbourne of the 52nd, and General Van-
deleur, all most distinguished and brave officers,
received severe wounds, and the troops were left

266 NARRA'TIVE .01" 'fHE

to tbe guidance of accidental Jeaders, and tbeir
own bravery; but neitber tbe one nor the otber
were wanting. Tbe pause of a moment, and only
of a moment, occurred, when, with a shout which
was distinctly heard over the roar of musketry
and cannon, they renewed the charge, and in five
minutes had won tbe ascent. Then arose the cry
of victory from every quarter; for General Pack's
Portuguese had succeeded in their escalade, and
tbe troops rushing along tbe ramparts, speedily
opened the way to the third division, and the
town was our own. The enemy fled in the utmost
disorder. They were pursued from street to
street, and froro house to house, with the fury
which is irrepressible among roen flushed witb
eonquest, and exasperated by the roemory of coro-
rades slaín; and all who continued to offer the
slightest resistanee were iromediately put to the
sword. To the honour of British soldiers, how-
ever, be it recorded, that not a single Jife was
taken in wantonness. He who threw down his
arms was spared by the very hand which had
been uplifted to rlestroy him, and hence out of a
garrison which consisted originally of 1800 com-
batants, full 1500 wel'e made prisoners.

It were vain for .me to attempt any description
of the .scenes of plunder and confusion which now
presented themselves in every quarter of the town.
The firing, which had eeased fol' a moment, be-


cause the contest was at an end, was renewed,
here and thel'e, in the extravagance of triumph;
whilst shouts amI screams lllingled fearfully with
the groans of the wounded, and the outcries of
men in a state of intoxication. Many houses like-
wise, in different districts, burst forth into ftames,
whether wantonly or accidentally excited it was
impossibIe to determine; whiIst the churches were
ransacked, the wine and spirit cellars emptied, and
for several hoursevery species of enormity was
perpetrated. AH these things occurring du~ing
the night, the darkness of which being but imper-
fectly dispelled by the light from the burning edi-
fices, produced an effect which non e can desire to
experience again. At length the drunken dropped
gradually asleep; the wounded were removed to
temporary hospitaIs; and though of the houses al-
ready on fire the greater proportion were burned
to the ground, the further progress of the ftames
was arrested; and by dawn on the following morn-
ing a degree of order was restored, such as few
who beheld the condition of things immediately
posterior to the assauIt couId anticipated.

The casualties among the allied forces, during
the progress ofthis important siege, were, as might
be expected, numerous; 9 officers and 217 men
being killed, and 84 officers and 1000 men wound-
ed; and of these 6 officers and 140 men were
killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded,


on the night of the assault alone. It is scarcely
necessary to add, that the 108s of so many valuable
lives was keenly felt, not only by private friends,
but by the army in general; but among them aH,
there fell not one more universally nor more justly
lamented than Major-general Crawford. He was
an officer of whom the highest expectations had
been formed. and who, o~ every occasion, found
an opportunity to prove, that had his life been
spared, the fondest hopes of his country would not
have been disappointed; and he was aman, to
know whom in his profession without admiring
was impossible. To me his death occasioned that
void which· the removal of a sincere friend alone
produces. From the moment of receiving his
wound, he knew that all hope of recovery was
idIe; he lingered on for several hours, and at last
submitted to his fate with the magnanimity of a
hero, and the resignation of a Christian.Poor
Crawford !-whilst the memory of the brave and
the skiIful shall continue to be cherished by Bri-
tish soldiers, thou wilt not be forgotten; and the
hand which scrawIs this humble tribute to thy
worth must be cold as thine own, ere the mind
which dictates it shall cease to think of thee with
affection and regret.

The task does not devolve on me, as 1 have al-
ready more than once expressed, to enumerate
those who, on the present occasion, peculiarly dis-


tinguished themselves. AH díd their duty, and
beyond this a British soldier knows not how to
proceed; because, when in the presence of an
enemy, a British soldier consiq,ers his utmost ex-
ertions as called for, and therefore gives them.
To the talents of Colonel Fletcher, chief engineer ;
of Major Dixon, director of the artillery; and of
Major Sturgeon, of the staff corps, the highest
praises were given by our illustrious chief; whilst
to the ·bravery of Lieutenant Gurwood of the 52nd
regiment, who, after leading the forlorn hope~
escaped unhurt, he bore th~ most decided tes-
timony, by presenting him with the sword of the
captured governor. The fruitsof the victory were,
as 1 have already stated, 1500. prisoners, a ver y
large quantity of ammunition and military stores,
and no fewer than 321 pie ces of cannon, of different
calibr~s, but almost all serviceable.

Thus fell the important fortress of Ciudad
Rodrigo. Its conqueror lost no time in putting
the works once more in a state of defence; and
long before Marmont, who was exerting himself
to relieve it, could bring his troops into the field,
the British army wasin full march towards other
and no less memorable triumphs.

1 have nowarrived at that period of the war in
the Peninsula, when 1 am necessarily compelled
to take leave of my readers.

Asevere fever, caught on the banks of the


Guadiana, increased by fatigue and anxiety of
mind, compelled me to solicit, when our army
removed to the south, Lord Wellington's leave of
absence to return to England for the recovery
of my health.

To abler and more competent pens will the
task be hereafter assigned, of giving to posterity
the full and perfect details of the great events of
this war, and especially of its glorious conclusion,
of which these sheets are only, and that up to a
certain period, a very weak outline. If, however,.
my humble undertaking should call into play the
greater talents and abilities of others, it wiU not
have been made in vain; and if 1 should be so
fortunate as to carry the ¡nterest of my brother
oflicers along with me in the précis of events, of
which my qescription must now close, 1 will, next
year, venture to submit to them, in a similar
shape, my military recollections of the campaigns
of 1813 and 1814 with the allied armies on the
continent, where it was my fortune to proceed,
under the gracious commands of my Sovereign,
after 1 lefr the Peninsular army in 1812; first as
Minister to the court of Berlin, and afterwards as
Ambassador at the court of Austria.



e o R R E S P o N D E N e E.

SI NCE the publication of the first edition of tbis

Narrative, the Author has received communications from

sorne of bis brotber oflicers; and he deems it but justice
to them to give these letters, with bis answers, to the

public, in this Appendix. For bimself, the Author must

again repeat what he stated in his Advertisement,

"That tbe defiCiency of the work is at once acknow-

ledged; and he hopes, under the circumstances in wbich

it was written, it will meet with indulgence."

v. L.




Copy of a Letter from I .. ieut.- General Inglis to Lord
Londonderry 27'1

Lord Londonderey's Reply • 278
Second Lettef from J .. ieut.-G€OOral Inglis to Lord

Loudonderty 279
Lord Londonderry's Answer . 280
Letter froID General Lord Howden . • 281
Lord Landonderry's Letter to Lord Howden 283
Lord Howden's Second Letter • 287
Lord Howden's Tbird Letter 288
General Order by Sir J ahn Cradock 289
Letter of Lord Castlereagh to Sir J ohn Cradock • 290
Extract froID Lord CastlE'reagb's Letter to Sir John

Cradock 291
Letter froro Sir J ohn Cradock to Lord Castlereagh ib.
Letters froID Sir J ohn Cradock to General Stewart. 292
Letter froro Sir J ohn Cradock to Marshal Beresford 296


Letter from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock. 297 from Sir John Cradock to General Robe 298
Letter from Sir John Cradoek to P. Rawlings, Esq. 299
Letter of General Robe to Sir J. Cradock
Extraet of a J~etter from Sir John Crudoek to Mr.

Hookham Frere
Letter from Major-General Sir N. ,Trallt
Lord Londonderry's Reply .
Letter from Lieut.-General Sir H. Fane to the Mar-

quis of LOl1donderry



Lord Londonderry's Ánswer • 316
Letter from Mrs. E. Matthews to Lord Londúnderry 317
Letter from Mrs. Robert Crallfurd, Widow 'Of Gene-

ral Craufurd to Lord Londonderry • 319
Lord Londonderry's Answer • 320
Major-General Sir J. Wilson to the Marquis of

Londonderry • 321
The Marquis of Londonderry to Major-General Sir

J. Wilson 3'14
Tables of the State of the Forces, Returns of Killed

and W ounded, &c. &c.


Copy of a Letter f1'om Lieutenant-general Inglis to tite
Marquis of LondonderJ'Y ..

Brighton, 2nd uf May, 1828.

My Lord,
It is with great regret 1 observe in your History of the

Peninsular War, that your Lordship mentions that the
57th regiment lost their colours at the battle of Albuera,
and, in the same paragraph, that many prisoners were made
by the enerny.

My being in co:mmand of the 57th regiment un that day
will be sufficient apólogy for my addressing you on this
subject, which your Lordship will admit my feelings as a
soldier are naturaIly most deeply interested in.

I take the Jiberty to annex a copy of the paragraph
aUuded to, with one or two remarks.


I have the honour to be,
My Lord,

y our most obedient servant,


The Marquis of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &0.

COPY.-Page 535. Quarto Edition.
" At this moment we had 10st a whole brigade of ar-

" tillery, a large number ofprisoners l and eight stand of


''''colours beJooging to tbe huffs, the 66th, tba 48th, and
.. the 57th regiments."


The 57th rf'giment brought into tbe field on the 16th
of May, 1811, at the battle of Albuera, 579 rank and
file, out of which llumber 415 were killed and wouaded ;
the remaining 164 were marched off the field by Lieute-
nant-adjutant Mann, who was only the fourteeuth officer
in rank at the commencement of tbe action. The colours
are in my possession, and not one man was missing.


Lieutenant-general •.

Copy of a Letter from the Marquis of Londonderry tu

Holdernesse House, May 9th, 1828.

On my arrÍval froDÍ Paris yesterday, 1 receÍved
your letter of tbe 2nd instant. 1 much' regret tbat
there should have been any inaccutacy on my part in my
allusion to the 57th regimento My information as to the
events of the battle of Albuera was collected hastily at
the moment~ and 1 was not a· personal observer in the

The passage you alIude to mentions, "at one moment
.. we had lost a whole brigade of artillery, a large number
" of prisoners belonging to several different corps;" but
tbere is no specitication of any number of prisoners par-
ticularly to tbe 57th regiment; and out of 415 killed and
wounded, it is not surprising if, amongst these, prisoners
~'ere stated to exist. With regard to the colours, sorne


were at one moment taken, as 1 was informed; but your
own knowledge c1early proves the standards of tbe 57th
were not taken; and if tbere is a second edition,· 1 sball
be very glad to rectify an error by construction, whicb,
however, permit me to say, 1 consider as reflecting not in
tbe smallest degree upon the corps who so gallantly and
gloriously triumpbed at the conclusion of that memorable
battle; and 1 hope you will permit me to add, from the
various opportunities which 1 had of remarking tbe 57th,
tbey do not possess many more sincere admirers than


1 bave the honor to be,
&c. &c. &c.


Sir W m. Inglis, K. C. B.

SecondLetter from Generallnglis, lo Lord Londonderry.
Brighton, 18th July, 1828.

My Lord,
1 am extremely sorry to observe in the 2nd edition of

your Lordship's N arrative of the Peninsular War. it still
appears that the 57th regiment lost their colours at the
batde of Albuera on the 16th May, 1811; and tbat it
likewise appears in too N aval and Military Magazine as
an extract from your Llrdsbip's bistory.

1 beg to refer your Lordship to my former letter on this
subject, with your Lordship's reply, dated 9th May, 1828.

Considering tbe high authority of your Lordship, holding
the first otticial situation in tbat army at the period, 1 trust
you will allow me to express myself, fecling it an impe-


rious duty to defend the honour of my old friends, as theÍr
commander, besides my very long service witb them, having
entered the service as ensign in the 67th regiment in the
year 1779.


1 hal'e the honoor to be,
My Lord,

y our Lordship's most obedient
Humble servant,


The Most Noble The Marquis of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &c.

Answe'r to 2nd Letter from General Inglis.
J uly 21st, 1828.

1 am honoured witb your second letter, in date the 18th

JuIy. relative to the error in my book as to the 57th regi-
mento In the next edítion your Ietters to me, and my
answers, will appear in the Appendix. and 1 am entirely
ready to admit your more accurate knowledge and infor-
mation relative to the corps commanded by yourself.

1 have the bonour to be,
y our obedient



Copy oj a Lelter jrom General .Lord Howden fo the
Marquis of Londonderry.

May 14th, 1828.
My Dear Lord,

There are spots in the sun without impairing its splen~
dour-so is a very small error in the beautiful composition
of your book.

In my humble case, page 245, (Quarto Eclition). there
is a paragraph that wiII misIead tha ordinary reader, and
in it there is not the justice 1 feel due to me. It could
only proceed from mis-information, and therefore 1 will
venture to correct it. 1 will transcribe tbe passage;-

" He reached Lumiar on the 6th April; wbere Sir
"John Ctadock had fixed his head-quarters, and found
" him making such dispositions as díd not indicate offeu~
"sive measures. General HiII, it was said, at this time
" suggested bolder measures. and he was aided by Bere~
" ford's eouncil; and it was agreed that, instead of con-
" tinuing preparations for a retreat, the 'combined Bl'itish
" and Portuguese armies sbould move forward. The ene-
" my were at tbis time in a state of perfeet ¡naetion."

Lumiar is but two or three miles from Lisbon, and
therefore no preparations for retreat could be made tbere,
as, undoubtedly, if the idea of retreat, or rather say em-
barkation. was tbe least in contemplation, it would have
taken place in Lisbon itself. 1 suppose Leiria must
have been meant, whicb is above eighty miles from Lisbon
011 the road to Oporto, to which place the army, such as
it was, had moved under my command ; and it may at once


be asked, why proceed so far? For no otber purpose,
than to retreat? For tbe enemy had no! made any for-
ward movement, from Oporto, of consequence.

General Hill never suggested to me " bolder" measures,
and 1 do not recollect tbat Marsbal Bercsford urged any
movement of a more positive nature than those already

1 believe it must be allowed that the security of Lisbon,
the object upon which every thing turned both then and
thereafter, couId never, for a moment, be out of the
thoughts of the officer who commanded in chief; and
until sorne light appeared as to the intentions of Soult,
who commanded in the north, and Victor in the south,
a rapid and thoughtless march from Lisbon would have
been deemedunjustifiable rashness, not to be iedeemed by
attractivc "boldness." Had those French generals joined
in common uníon, and made a simultaneo lIS movement,
notbing could have given a chance of saving Lisbon, but
a determined reslstance in and about the town of Lisbon

'¡tself. Why they did not act in concert must remain an
impenetrable mystery, or be ascribed to the worst of pas-
sions, and most destructive jealousy on their parto

1 will, some time or other, lay before you intercepted
letters, to prove that the united march to Lisbon was tbe
original intention between these two generaIs, as also a
copy of my orders-that, notwithstanding the very weak
and defective state of the army 1 had (one' reginient of
cavalry, the 14th, only) until the arrival of aH your gal-
lant and glorious band from England, it never was my
intention to retreat or embark; and my letters io govern-
ment will evince that we should have made a stand to
tbe last moment at Lisbon, in a more contracted Jine than
Torres Yedras, with sucb powers and defellces aswe


could array. Tbis resolotion may. be viewed as one of
temerity, but still it was so determined.

Now. my dear lord, forgive the shadow of a reproach to
you, and from my pen too, which,. sllVe this Httle expla-
nation, with my voice is always employed in unbounded
admiration of your eloquent and lucid work.

Ever most truly yours,

Copy of a Lelter from Lord Londonderry to General
. Lord Howden.

H oldernesse House, May 16th, 1828.
My Dear Lord,

I lose no time in replying to your leUer of the 14th
instant; and aUow me to assure you, if 1 endeavoured to
avoid one thing more than another in my imperfect book,
it was the .giving offence to any one. Above an 1 must
deplore having, 'however inadvertently: expressed my-
self in a manDer of your position and services which might
mislead; because, my dear Lord, there are few men whom
1 respect publicly, and value privately, more than your

An extreme desire to avoid delicate questíons, the who]e
bearings of which I was not officially and properly in
possession of, added to tbe caution that was imposed
upon me by knowing tbe secret thougbts ofmy brother,
induced me to confine myself in my Narrative as near to
simple factsas the several cases would admito But as you
can upon me for a more accurate explanation, 1 can have
no difficulty in transcribing from my manuscript the part
1 omitted in reference to yom situation and intenti~ns.

Under date of the 23rd April, 1809. I write as follows.


from Lisbou. Previous to General Hill's arrital, whieh
bappened OD tbe 6th, Cradoek, from tbe inadequ3ey oí his
force, had determined most properly not to advance from
Lumiar, and had every tlting prtparedfor tIte worst, But
when HiII came, and he heard other eorps were following,
(and being also pressed by Beresford,) be took. the resolu-
tion of advancing, and it was settled that a combined move-
ment both of the British and Portuguese army towards the
north, should be made, &c. This day, 'THE 23RD' the
British troops are to assembJe at Leiria.

The former certainly with prudence, previous to IIill's
arriva], resisted an advance, while the laUer, perhaps with
too little precaution in the judgment of some, was urging
it. From Mr. Villiers' general tone about Cradock up
to the present moment, he has aeted most judieiously
in every r.espeet. As to his feelings, it is in vain to
deny he was deeply wounded, the orders coming the
very moment he hád determined to advance the army.
His first wish and impression was to returo home, but
afterwards gallantly resisted this impulse, and deeided
to go to Gibraltar, exerting himself to the utmost to
stop any murmurs that might be amongst the indivi-
duals most attached to him7 so that} upon the whole,
this difficult and delicate arrangemellt has beeo earried
into effect as well as the circumstances of tbe case would
allow. Mr. Villiershas aeted with much judgment in an
the business here, beloved by the army, whom he takes
great notice of, keepipg tbe generals together, respected
highly by the people of Lisbon, and enjoying the confidence
of tbe government. Wellesley has written to Cradock and
Beresford, announcing his arrivaI and intentions, and
begged them to come here; so we loo k out for them to-
'morrow, when some general determinatioo will be taken.


Under date of the 21th April, 1 write as follows, froRt

1 have just seen Cradock, with whom 1 have had a long
conversation. Jt is impossible not to admire the gooa
sense whieh sooms to actaate bis conducto The Ietter he
wtote to yousufficientfy marks his feelings ; but he assured.
me, upon his honor, white he, personally, must suffer, that
he thought the gov-ernment were right to do what tbey
tbought most judicious. At thesame time, a righ.t mea-
sure often brougbt on itldi'Viduals unmerited misfortunes.
He aeemed quite sure to receive fr{)m the government
tbosemarks of approbation ror his conduct, 'Which under
critical circumstances be trusted he had merited. In
deciding .on goiug to England ultimately, aOO resigning
Gibraltar, wben anotber lJetson can be appointed, he says
be has been led by what is the feeling oí tbe army, as
many general officers may look upon Wellesley's employ-
mertt in the active army of the cou-ntry as tbeit bemg laid
aside; and he might incur aU their dísapprobatiGn, if he
1lilemly sat down uoder the arrangement proposed. 1
replied that no man was to sacrifice himself on a supposed
tmblic feeling. He asked me ihen, upon my honour, what
1 shollld do in a similar predicament, as to the offerof
Gibraltar; and 1 said tbat, if 1 wouId have Recepted
Gibraltar when in England as a €ommand tbat was agree-
aMe to me, 1 should go there now,more especialIy if 1
thought, in so doing, 1 was additionaHy promoting the
king's service. 1 tbink Cradock 1S satisMed of yonr
friendly feelings iowards him; and oue canDot éOntem-
pInte his sitnation without pain.

Uuder date of the 1st Muy, 1 write as follows from

1 s1ated that {)radoCk had determilled not to ad\'ance

286 AP]'ENnIX

previous to HiIl's arrival; and Villiers sbowed me 11 letter
from Cradock, in which there was no fixed intention of
moving mentioned, which were the grounds of the opinion
1 gave in my letter of the 23rd April. Jt appears, how-
ever, since, that on the Saturday before Cradock could
know we were landed, he met Beresford half-way between
Leiria and Thomar, and settled an aavance upon Coimbra,
but no operation was actualIy commenced.

1 have now, my dear lord, copied my original manu-
script letters, where they relate to you, your conduct, and
your determinations, nearly verbatim. But rather than
give this long detail in my book, which in some parts
embraced delicate points, 1 simply said as follows:-
"General Hill rcached Lumiar on the 6th April, where
Sir J. Cradock had flxed bis head-quarters; and found
him making such dispositions as did not indicate offensive

Allow me just to observe, tbat yoo must know if your
bead-quarters were 00 the 6th at Lumiar, which my
leHers assert; and if so, and if, previous to General Hill's
arrival, no fixed plan of advance had been ordered, 1 hope
you will agree, tbis part of tbe paragraph is not incor.

Permit me, however, to observe, 1 only state a general
J' on dit," for the truth of which 1 canDot Dor do not
vouch, but which wu'J probably excited by Hill's arrival
witb a corps eager for battle; and that preparatwns for
the WOfl'st (viz. emba:rkation,) which might have been
necessary, if you had been aUacked by a joint operation of
the enemy from north and soutb, before your reinforcements
arrived, were no longer so necessary.

This, my dear lord, is the Resumé of my impressions a.t
the time, connected witb my leUers; and allow me to hope


that all your reasoning justifies the tine that seems tó have
been taken so properly 'at the time, upon which, however,
1 have not presumed to express my individual opinion.

In conclusion, 1 have only to add, that it will afford me
the greatest pleasure to give publicity to any or every
part of this explanation you think tit; or to afford further
information, as far as my documents or memory serve, on
every part of the subject.

Ever yours, my dear Lord,
Mos! sineerely and affectionately,


Second Letter from General Lord Howden to
Lord Londonderry.

lt:lth May, 1828.

My Dear Lord,
1 only write a word to return my warmest thanks for the

Ietter of yesterday, alld the other communications, that
must have given you so much trouble to annex.

Could any thing make me more attached to you, it
would be the generous feeling, so strongly displayed in
your letters to LordCastlereagb, towards me, at the pe-
riod 1 endured the most distressing circumstance that ever
fell to the lot of a Commander-in-chief-his supercession
in command, almost in view of the enemy. and at the same
time receiving the united praise and approbatioD of aH his
measures from his king and government.

The painful remembrances can never be obliterated from
my mind; but the lapse of nearly twenty years afforded
the usual lenitive of time; they therefore slumbered, but
still are awakened by the luminous records of your work.


1 am lookiog over sorne papers, and among tbem 1 find
leUers to you, in office, of tbe 3d and 5th of April,l809,
from Lumiar, wbich hear strongly upon the situution of af-
fairs in Portugal at that period, and show the well-
grout1ded apprehension of un united attack from Sonlt and
Victor in the soutb, who had advanced within a few
leagues of Badajoz.

Lumiar, which gives rise to the Jittle point between us,
being but two miles from Lisbon, crea tes aH the mistake.
" Head-quarters there" is, in fact, Lisbon itself, and the
idea of any retreat from thence, would only he immediate
em harkation.

Ever most truly yours,

Lord Londonderry merely acknowledged the receipt of
the ahoye Ietter, and expressed his readiness to act upon
this correspondence in any manner Lord Howden pointed

May 28, 1828.

Thil'd Le.tte1·from General Lord Howden to tite Marquis
of LondondernJ.
Hereford Street, 21st May, 1828.

My Dear Lord,
1 r~i'Ved your note this morning, and shall say Jittle

more, tban fbat you are very gODd, and it is like yourself,
to think further of me.

Without boubling you with more particulars, 1 believe
1 have laid before yOu sufficient materiaIs to do away the
little paragraph in y{)l:Ir excellent work, tbat has given
mepain, and (lid ñot, as 1 conceived, do me justice-how it

is to he repaired, 1 sbalI leave toyour kindness; for 1
cannot enter into ally controversywith you.

It was my unbappy lot to be debarred from any par-
ticipation in aH the glories of Portugal and Spain that
followed my supercession; but 1 may be alIowed to main-
tain that all that was possíble, very critical circllm-
stances, was done before the arrival of the reinforcements
from England, and that no one false step took place; foro
if any one error had been committed, the transcendent
triumphs that succeeded, and the brightest annals in
English history, migbt and would have been lost to the
world; to this alone 1 lay claim.

The warmest and repeated thallks of his Majesty, and
the British government through Lord Castlereagh, to the
very close of my command, were the gratifying but sol e

Tbe. Marquis of Londonderry.
&c. &c. &c.

Ever yours,
Most truly,


(Copy) Before the arrival of General HilI with tbe rein-
forcements from England, the 6th April, 1809.

General Order by SIR JOUN CRADOCK.

Lumiar, 29th March, 1809.

The several arrangements for the troops to en ter upou
the campaign will take place immediately.

The Deputy Commissary-general will distribute, with
tbe least possible delay, to the several corps, and the beads
of departments, the allotted means of transport; and a re-

VOL. n. T


turn will be made to tbe Adjutant-general of tbe aetual
equipment, or of tbe defieieney, jf any arises.

Lieutenaut-eolonel Robe wiIl exeeute aU the arrange-
ments andorders be may baye already receiyed about tba
artillery, and report tbe conclusion to the Commander of
the Forces. Especial care is to be taken by tbe command-
ing officers of the cayalry aOO artillery, andtbe Deputy
Commissary-general, tbat a sufficient quantity of spare
sboes be seeured for tbe lengtb of marcb tbey may be
engaged. The Commander of tbe Forces desires, in tbe
most urgent manner, tbat tbe greatest care and attention
be paid to the preservation of tbe mules, &c. as no de-
ficiency can be supplied.

LeUer from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock.
Downing Street, 16th February, 1809.

y our dispatches of the 19th, 21st, and 31st uIt. and of

tbe 2d inst., bave been received and laid before the King.
His Majesty has commanded me to express his high

approbation of the line of conductyou haye pursued, and
entertains a conyiction that tbe same good sense, temper,
and steadiness. which seem to guide your decisions,. will
be persevered in, and will finaIly oyercome any unpleasant
difficulties that may arise. 1 haye nothing to add to my
despatches ofyesterday.

Lieutenan t- General

1 haye the honour,
&C. &c. &c.


Sir J oho Cradock, K. B.


L:tract from Lord Castlereagh's letter lo
Sir John Cradock.

Downing Street, Mareh the 30th, 1809.

" Y ou must believe me sincere when 1 assure you tbat,
witb respeet to yourself, in addition to mueh personal eon-
fidenee, the government feel very strongly, indeed, with
respeet to the whole of your eonduet io Portugal, whieh,
io times and under circumstanees ofpeeuliar diffieu1ty, has,
io every instanee, met with their unqualified approbation,
and, 1 can truly say, fulfilled every wish and expeetation
1 had, or eould have formed, when you were seleeted for
the eommand."

Copy oj a Letter jro'fn Sir John Cradoclc to
Viscount Castlereagh.

Lumiar, 1st April, 1809.
My Lord,

1 lose not a moment, as thevessel is under weigh, to
state that tbe aeeouot has arrived tbat Oporto has sur-
rendered to the enemy. 1 lament that 1 eannot send to
your Lordship the partieulars. 1 learo, however, that the
Bishop is on his way to LisboD.

From the very imperfeet information that is eurrent,¡t
appears that no resistanee was made. It would be too
sanguine to expeet mueh any. where, eonstítuted as the
'Portuguese troops are, and from the general iosubordina-
tiOD that prevails.

1 am not in possession of any furtber aeeounts from tbe


French and Spanish armies in Estremadura, nor of the pro-
ceedings of the Salamanca corps, since they invested
Ciudad Rodrigo.

Our movements will be either to advanva to Leyria, as
the best mode of forming a junction with the Portuguesa
troops in the neighbourhood of Thomar, or it may be ne-
cessary to retir"l tbence still nearer to Lisbon, to protect, as
well as our means will permit, tbe capital, which compre-
hends, in aB probability, all that is really an object to the

Viscount Castlereagh.

1 have the honour,
&c. &c.


Copies 01 Letters from Sir Jo/m Cradoclc lo
B. General Stewart.

(By the Isis, Captain Towers.)

N.B. 'fhese letters passed B. Generat Stewart on his way
out from England.

Head-Quarters, Lumiar, 3rd April, 1809.
My Dear General,

Though an opportunity offers, 1 do not write to Lord
Castlereagh, as 1 really have nothing to submit to his
Lordship in an official shape. AH my ideas and reasonings
are before him, andwe now seem just approaching to the
crisis to put them in execution. The total defeat of Cuesta
will allow the enemyto do what he pleases upon our most
vulnerable quarter; and General Beresford told me last


night, that a division was within a league of Badajoz,
the inhabitants of which were imploríng our assistance.

1 cannot yet send you the particulars of the miserable
resistan ce made at Oporto, hut it teaches us to expect the
same in every place where the British army is noto The
enemy, 1 learo, has pushed on a small advanced guard
beyond the Douro. The Salamanca division, after show-
ing themselves before Ciudad Rodrigo, has moved to
San Felice to execute their ultimate designs.. We have no
reason to alter the former estimates of the numbers of the
enemy: the Oporto. division from 20 to 15,000; San
Felice from 12 to 9,000; and the Estremadura, deduct-
ing what they may have lost in the late action with Gene-
ral Cuesta, from 35 to 33,000.

y ou may guess how unpleasant are my feelings, not to
move the British forces, small as they are, against General
Soult, or the enemy in possession of any part of Portugal;
but 1 do notbelieve there is any person in the army who
would encourage sncb an idea.

Prepared as we are on aH sides, we bave no choice but
to rémain in the best po sitian tbat can be fOlind, (and aH
are bad,) to cover Lisbon and tbe Tagus, and wait the
reinforcements that must be sent, if we are to maintain
Portugal. lt is unnecessaryto repeat that no dependence
whatever can be placed, 5n their present state, upon the
Portuguese troops; if 1 said that the whole were ready
to mutiny and revolt, 1 believe 1 speak General Beres-
ford's real sentiments, They will not be commanded by
their own officers, and they do just as they please. 1 have
given an tbe British officers that General Beresford has
asked foro To quit the defence of Lisbon, and march the
British troQPs to join such people as these, was impos-


sible. Tbe best of tbem will come to join us, and tbey are
to have our flank at Sacavem under Genera) Beresford.
y ou know how unequal our force is, to extend to the left
-properly to Belem. We have no intelligence of the
approach of General HilI with his troops •.

Had we sufficient force, even under the pressure tbat
surrounds us, we might strike a blow at Soult, or the
Salamanca corps; but, a~ we are, nothing can be done.

Your's most truly,

The Honourable B. General Stewart .

.,er Sarah.
Head-quarters, Lumiar, 5th April, 1809.

My Lord,
I.have the honor to inform you of the arrival of tbe

force under the orders of General HilI, with the exception
of one transport, containing about 300 men, which parted
company during the voyage. Tbe. packet is under weigh,
which prevents my giving your Lordsbip any further parti-
culars. The position of tbe enemy, 1 may say, remains
almost the same as when 1 wrote on the 3rd instant to
General Stewart. The closer approacb to Badajoz, how-
ever, must more mark tbe intention to invade Portugal
with the powerful force from tbat qllarter.

U nless upon sure· grounds, 1 will not move the Btitisb
force so far from Lisbon as to expose this valuable station
(in any point of view) to more than tbe common danger ;
buí, since the present accession of strength, it may be

advisable to make a movement to Leiria, there awaiting
and acting upon the events of the dáy.

1 have tbe honor,
&c. &c. &c.

The Viscount CastIereagh,

&c. &c. &c.

P. S. 1 bave the honor to annE'X tbe report of Captain
Rose, just come in from Elvas.

Lumiar, April 6th, 1809.

M Y Dear General,
N othing material has occurred since my lctter of yester-

day to Lord Castlereagb. We sban move on Saturday
and Sunday to Leiria; but 1 shaIl nothing adventure
from the protection of Lisbon and the Tagus, without being
somewhat ascertained of tbe movements and intention of
General Victor, now apparently tbreatening Badajoz;
and prepared, if it be bis design, to enter the Alentejo,
in the line of the Tagus.

1 send you our order of battle. 1 hear the ellemy is par-
ticularly strong in cavalry at Oporto; in this we are very

y our's most truly,

The Honourable B. General Stewart.
&c. &c. &c.


CopY of a Letter from Sir Joltn Cradock lo

Marshal Beresford.
Caldao, 20th April, 1809, twelve o'clock.

My dear Beresford,
I have this instant received your letter of the 19th. 1

was upon the point of writing to you, to state I had made
sorne alterations in the disposition of the British force, froID
the arrangement I lately sent to you. 1 shaIl now concentre
the whole at Leiria and Batalha for the sake of accom-
modation, with an advance corps in front. The army will
march to-rnorrow and reach Leiria, as soon as it is predica-
ble. Mr. Commissary Rawlings must be severely checked
for his totalIy unfounded representations of supplies,
which were only calculated to mislead every one concerned,
in the most dangerous manner. AH the recommendations
you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the
coasts, have been ever since acted upon to the utmost of
my exertiolls; but the difficulties started by the admiral
and the commissary were so great, that 1 cannot say 1 have
any dependence upon immediate aid.

My dear general, 1 have only to repeat that it is the
first wish of' my mind to reach General Soult, or any part
of his force; but nothing can persuade me to commit the
British army, either from the want of suppIies or ammu-
nition. 1 will never allow them to be in any state but
a formidable one; alld 1 wilI not depart from the established
principIe and instructions of government. 1 alone am re-
sponsible. If false and ill-judged steps are taken, the


weigbt of blame will fall upon me. It will give me tbe
greatest pleasure to see you. 1 shall be at Leiria on Satur-
dayabout noon. 1 will either go to Overna on Sunday, or
meet you at any other place. Let me know by your next

Yours most sincerely,

Marshal Beresford.

Copy of a LeUer from Lord Castlereagh lo
Sir John Cradoclc.

Downing Street, J une 2d, 1809.
My Dear Cradock,

1 have delayed my answer to your letter written to me
on your departure from Lisbon, till 1 coutd be assured it
would find you atGibraltar. Yonr wish to return has been
80 strongly conveyed to me by your friends here, tbat 1
can have no desire tban to fulfil your request. You have
do~e everything tbat honour and duty could require from
you towards the service and government in the most ex·
emplary manner. What i8 most satisfactory to your OWll
feelings, it can only be necessary for roe to be assured of,
to fee! it incumbent on me to promote ; and, in this sense
1 most cheeJ'fulIy advised the' King to leave your return
in your OWll hands. If 1 have not entered into tbe extent to
which some of your friends (whose judgement upon such
a point may be more correct than mine) have felt upon the
nature of your command at Gibraltar, 1 am sure you will
believe it has not proceeded froro any indifference to your
military character or reputation. For both 1 must always
feel the utmost solicitude, and shaIl be happy to avail


myself of any oecasion of markiug it. As we shall probablj
800n meet, 1 shall only assure you of the same regard and
esteem with which 1 am,


Dear Ctadoek,
y ours most sincerely,


Sir Joho Cradock, K. B.

Oopy 01 a' Letter Irom Sir J. Cradock to General Robe.

Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.
My Dear Sir,

I very sensibly feel the want of horses and mules you
represent for the service of the artillery; and the more &1,
as all the efforts to make up the deficieney, sioce my ar-
rival io Lisboo, have not had any effect with the Regeney.

As it is my intention to take up a position at sorne
distance without deJay, 1 am to request th~t you will
this day see the commissary-general on the subjeet, and
report to me what can be don~ upon this mostimportant
poiot. Every exertion must be made.

General Robe,
Commanding artillery,


I have the honour,
&c. &e. &e.



From Sir J. CradocTc to P. Rawlings, Esq.
Lisbon, December 3Otb, 1808.

Dear Sir,
1 lose no time in commuDicatiDg to you my intentioD to

take up a position at Sacavem for most of the British
force left in Portugal, exclusive oftbe garrisoDs at Almeida
and Elvas. 1 cannot as yet point out the Dumbers, Dor for
what exact time the provision should be made; but it
may assist your arrangements to te11 you that you may, in
a great measure, draw back tbe supplies at SaDtarem,
Abrantes, and Castel Branco, on]y leaving sufficient for
those corps in Colovera.

Stc. Stc. Stc.

P. Rawlings, Esq.

Alter Orders.

Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.
The several corps in Lisbon and the vicinity will hold

themselves in readiness to march out of the town. The
_ details will be arranged in the course of to-rnorrow.

The quarter-master-general wi11 irnmediately take the
necessary measures for the embarkation of the sick.
U pon returns being seDt to Commodore Halket, the
proper number of transports will be provided.

Major-general Mackenzie will take upon himself the
command of the troops to be p1aced in advance, aud will


give such general directions as he sball tbink necessary.
The Commander of the Forces directs tbat tbe troops
about to take the field, sbould regulate themselves upon
the equipment presented by General Moore; with the
addition, that each man shullId take his hlanket.


l-eUer from General Robe to Sir John Cradock.
Lishon, December 31st, 1808.

In ohedience to your orders, 1 have seen tbe commissary-

general, who is using every exertion; hut from the want
of co-operation by tbe Regency. he can do littleor nothing.
He can only procure ten mules to-night, and be is pro-
mised twenty to-morrow. He says he will he able to let
your Excellency know, by to-morrow, the utmost of his
ability in that way.

His Excellency,
Sir John Cradock.

1 have the honour,
&c. &c. &c.

Commanding Artillery.


Extract of a Letter* from Sir John Cradock lo
Mr. Hookham Frere.

February 17th, 1809 .

.. 1 fear your Excellency is led to entertain a more
favourable Dotioo of the efficiency of the Portuguese army,
than in any shape they are entitled to; in short, in my
opioion, they want every thiog that co~stitutes a respect-
able force. Except about 10,000 English arms, they have
no other. Many of the regiments of cavalry are without
horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are
not half clothed; aod as to subsistence, they live at free
quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To
take the field with effect, or assurance of food, seems to
me out of the question. Sioce the first moment of my
artival in Portugal, 1 wished to produce the advance of a
small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has beeo im-

1 t is a matter of serious lamentation, that such mis-
representations of the Portuguese force should go home,
or reach your Excellency; for it appears absolutely neces-
sary tbat, at tbe present crisis of the war, the foreign as-
sistance tbat we bave to depend upon, should be duly
estimated, and brought into close calculation."

lO This ¡eUar was founded upon the report oí Brigadier-general Cotton,
who inspected the Portuguese cavalry. The verbatim repolt is. mislaid, Ol
probably sent to England.-H.


Before the arrival of General HiIl with the re-inforce-
ments from England, the state of the British forces in
Portugal were as follows :-

10,225, including every man in Portugal; occupying
Lisbon, Almeida, Elvas, the forts on the Tagus, &c. &c.

5221 being every disposable man, capable of marching,
ioc1udiog convalescents.

From the adjutaot-general's reporto

Copy 01 a Letter Irom Major-general Sir N. TrallJ;
to Lord Londonderry.

My Lord,

No. 7, Hertford Sreet, May Fair,
19th .JuIy, 1828.

Haviog been absent upoo the continent when your
Lordship's Narrative of the Peninsular War made its
appearance, 1 have had no opportunity uotil this day of
noticing one.or two passages which you have introduce?
ioto it, wherein roy name is mentiooed in reference to the
movemeots of a corps of militia which had served under
roy orders during Massena's invasion of Portugal in 1810;
and as those passages appear to have been writtenunder
an erroneous impression, 1 coosider it to be my duty to
replace the facts with which they are cOl:lDected in a more
accurate point of view than your Lordship has represented
ibem; but 1 would assure you, that in resolving to address
this letter to you for that purpose, 1 have been influenced
by no other feeling tban tbat wbicb would attribute wbat
you bave stated to tbe imperfect information which had
reacbed you; and which you had 00 reason to discredit
wheo you accepted it as your authority.


In page 443 of your book, (first edition of it,) after com~
menting upon the want of penetration which had been
manifested by MasselJa in having attacked the position of
Busaco on the 27th of September, instead of resorting at
once to the measure which he subsequently adopted, of
turning it by its left, your Lordship remarks as folIows :-
" It is true that at this time Colonel Trant, with his corpa,

. ought to have taken post at Sardao: be had been ordered
to proceed thitber witb a view to strengtben our left; aod
it may be tbat tbe enemy had been led to think of him as
already in that position; but had tbe case been so, it
requires no depth of discernment to discover tbat aU the
resistance wbich it was in bis power to offer would bave
availed bim notbing against tbree French corps; and more
especialIywheo it is considered that tbere are numerou~
passes into the Oporto road by the Vouga, whicb Trant
had oeither meaos nor force adequate to watcb." And
agaio, in the folIowing page, your Lordship observes, tha!
"when Lord W ellington's army abandoned the ground of
Busaco, be did so, not because Trant had failed in reach-
ing bis aUotted station, but because tbe ground in itself
was indefensible."

Now. my Lord, abstracted from the error wbich your
Lordship was under, in supposing me, throughout the aboye
observations, to have been absent from Sardao at the
period to which the last quoted paragraph in particular has
alIuded, 1 should only have to acknowledge myself in-
debted to you for the pubJic expression of an opinion wbicb
would so effectually contradict tbe very absurd assertions of
one or two other writers upon the same event, and whe
would pretend that my absence frQm Sardao, (as presumcd
also by them,) had been the principal cause of Lord Wel-
Iington's refreat from Busaco; as if it wasto be expecfed


that the undisciplined corps of Portuguese militia whieh
1 then eommanded, who were embodied and 'armed only
within the preceding nine or ten months, reduced in
number to barely 1,500 men, through causes which 1 shall
hereafter explain, and who, in faet, should only have been
considered as little else than a eollection of armed pea-
santry, could possibly, and however well disposed in other
respects, have arrested the progress of an army of veterans,
consisting of 650r 70,000 men, headed by their numerODS
cavalry, and marching in a single column upon the given
point whieh these writers would have allotted to me to de~
fend; the idea is altogether too ridiculous, and 1 have
therefore never thought it worth my attention to refuje h.

But as what your Lordship has written upon this sub-
ject, and for which 1 would again avow myself under obli-
gation to you, has been grounded npon the mistaken
notion that 1 did not reach the post which 1 had been
instrueted to oecupy, before the enemy had effeeted his
operation, and consequently before Lord Wellington had
commenced his retrograde movement, 1 believe that the
following explanatiQIl will leave no doubt upon yonf mind,
that upon this point your Lordship had been misin.

Sardao was in faet the only place mentioned as my
destÍnation in the order which directed IDy removal to the
Lower Vouga ; and as my corps did absolutely arrive there
before Massena crossed the Serra de Caramula, that
order, it must be allowed, was to all intents and purposes
put into execntion, .as far as it was possible for me to
understand tbe intention of it, where no more specific
object had been annexed to it.

It had reaehed me on the 23rd September, when we
were in tbe vicinity of Moimento da Beira, moving upon


Lamego; and as we had marched in the three or four
preceding days about seventy miles, your Lor~ship wouId
perceive, on consulting a map of the country, that we
had marched a distance of two hundred miles in nine
or ten successive days, as calculated by the route through
Oporto, that by which 1 was directed to move,' and
to which 1 had not myseIf given a preference; and it
cannot be doubted for one moment, that where the
roads are so generally in abad state, as they are
throughout Portugal, w~ must have made extraordinary
efforts to arrive at Sardao on the 28th September, the day
on which my militia entered it, ann as early in that day
as from twelve to two o'c!ocI., P. 1\I. The first French
troops that arriveu at Boyalva, where the passage of the
Caramula was effected, and which is four miles distant
from Sardao, only entered that village at five in the after-
naon of the same day, aecording to un official intimation
which was transmitted to me by Sir Stapleton Cotton, who
commanded the British cavalry upon my right, and with
whom 1 was then in free communieation.

But, my Lord, if you were, as 1 presume was the case,
present at this crisis at head-quarters, possibly you may
recollect that 1 had an interview with Lord \-Vellington in
the forenoon of the 28th, upon the heights of Busaco,
having pushed forwanl in advance of my troops, in order
to receive his J .. ordship's eommands; and 1 now request
your particular attention to what passed upon that oeca-
sion, as it forms the most essential eircumstanee conveyed
in tltis explanation, as f¡jr as my own proeeedings are con-
cerned in it.

'- c.

Ris Lordship, after enquirillg in what position 1 had
left my militia, and on being informed that 1 hourly ex-
pected it at Sardao, thrn, (and for the first time that 1 ~oo:;¡,,_.~~:

VOL. Ir.



bad beard the village mentioned in any form) pointed out
Boyalva as the ground upon wbich be was desirous to see
me posted. 1 instantIy proposed to bi's Lordship to follow
up bis suggestion, and 1 was stiU in time to act upon it, as
two hours would have sufficed to have carried me back to
my corps, and another would have removed it to its new
position; but this offer was declined; and as his Lordship
then expressed himself, because be considered my militia,
under aH its disadvantages, as incompetent to offer resist-
ance. 1 would bere observe that 1 found, through my
observations at a later period, that in reality (but which
Lord Wellington was not aware of) the village of Hoyalva
was altogether useless as a point of defence-lst, because
it is situated upon the western slope of the Caramula, and
does not protect the of it, or the approaches from
the eastward; 2dly, because it is in itselfentirely open;
and 3rdly, because there are to my own knowledge, passes
practicable for cavaIry 011 either flank of it.

From what 1 have just now mentioned, it would natu-
rally appear that Lord Wellington at this moment, having
ascertained what were M¡:¡ssena's intentions, had aIready
made up bis mind to retire upon his lines: he could only
have defended the passes of the CaramuIa by detaching
several thousands of his more efficient troops in that direc-
tion, and his front would, in this case, have been too ex-
tended not to have rendered it vulnerable in some one
point, if attacked, according to Buonaparte's tacties, byan
overpowering mass of the enemy's best troops. He
would thus, perhaps, have saerificed aH the advalltages
whieh he had just "then acquired by his recent victory, as
the Portuguese troops; who were only in the iofancy
of their experience, might have lost their eonfidellee in their
allies as well as in tbemseIves; and, in short, the fate of


Portugal, as well as of Europe, might have been unfavor-
ably decided by any other measure than that which he
adopted at this critical momento It is in this reasoning
alone that the real motive of his Lordship's retreat from
Busaco is to be found, and certainly not in attaching any
degree of credit to the very unfounded imputatioo which
has beeo attempted to be thrown upon the corps of militia
meo which was uoder my orders.

Inthe course of your nanative, your Lordship has esti-
mated the strel!gth of my corps at five thousand ; but at no
time did it exceed three thousand five hundred io effec-
tives durillg this campaign: the mean may have be en two
thousand five hundred. Two of my regiments were em-
ployed upon the lines of Torres Vedras, and the others

. were never completed to their complement, in conse-
quence of the rigorous system of recruiting which had be en
exerdsed in order to supply the deficiencies of the regular

When 00 our march to Sardao, wc had traversed the
districts in which the militia had been levied, and as very
many of the men had, notwithstanding my precautions,
availed themselves of the opportuníty of revisítíng theír
families, this. circumstance, joined to extreme fatigue, had
reduced our numbers, as 1 have above described it.

Had not my communication with the army been inter-
cepted by the enemy's movement upon the night of the
28th, no possible doubt could have arisen in regard to my
arrival at Sardao; as Lord Wellington would have beeo
more thoroughly acquainted with my precise situation

. ,

since 1 oot only held possession of that post 00 the 28th,
but duriog the entire of the 29th; 011 the eveoing of which
day, the Freoch, after cutting off one of mypatrols, posted
a piquet at one extremity of the village, whilst mine oc-

:308 APPENDrx

cupied the other, and our respective videttes were in pre-
sen ce in the centre of it. It was, indeed, only at day-
break on the 30th, that, when 1 became assured of the
complete evacuation of Busaco, 1 determined to shelter
my corps behind the Vouga, about six miles in my rearo
But as this measure could not pass unnoticed by the ene-
my, my rear-guard was penetrated by a charge of his ca-
valry, and it lost an officer and twenty-five meno

This affair in itself was in other respects of no impor-
tanee; and if 1 have brought it under your Lordship's no-
tice, it is only to explain what must have been hitherto
mysterious even to Lord \Vellington himself,-the extra-
ordinary allnsion which M"assena made to it in úne of his
reports oC that epoch: here are nearIy his words :

.. General La Croix, when scouring the country widl
his cavalry, feH in with a British division, which he com-
pelled to retire across the Douro, after destroying several
hundreds of its number, and capturing six hundred." The
fact is, that after the charge 1 mentioned, La Croix recon-
noitred the defensive position which 1 took up at the Vouga
Bridge, and not having any infantry to support hÍl,n, made
no attempt to force it, hut quietly fell back upon his army.

In olle of the passages which 1 have already quoted,
your Lordship seems to imagine, that if Massena did not
tum fhe Busaco position on the 27th, it was probably be-
cause he conceived me to have arrived at Sardao. But
besides that circumstances had already made him ac-
quainted with my small number, he had been enubled also
to trace my motions up to the 23d of September, when his
army was between m"e and the vmage yon mention, and
that 1 was then moving in an opposite direction.

1 had made an attack upon the escort of his heavy artil-
lery on the 20th, at aplace called Raanz or Rantz, on the


road from Trancoso to Viseu, and 1 subsequentIy moved
upon Moimento da Beira, and towards Lamego.

Upon the occasion 1 alIude to, we captured two officers
and one hundred men; but, although:.r was disappointed in
my principal object, that of seizing upon the park of artil-
lery, which 1 am persuaded might have been effected had
1 been accompanied by a detachment of British dragoons,
the atrair was in so far fortunate, that according to the
aceount given ofit by General Pampalona, who was then in
l\Iassena's army, and has sínce published a memoir of this
eampaign, it essentialIy eontributed to the defeat of the
enemy on the 27th. The eseort was obliged to faH baek a
day's mareh upon Trancoso ; Massena's ad vanee was by this
mean s delayed during two days; and it was preeisely in this
interval that Lord Wellington was enabled to pass his
army from the left to the right of the Mondego, and with-
out molestation to oecupy the position of Bnsaco.

It was after tbis affair that 1 was ordered by General
Bareelar, who commanded in the north ofPortngal, to march
to Sardao by Oporto, rather than by the more direct but
more diflicult route ofPedro do Sul-an error which Lord
Wellington publicly animad verted upon, but in which he
was aware that 1 had not in any degree participated. Bar-
celar, in fact, conceived the intention of the order he re-
eeived tobe for the protection of Oporto; and for the first
time of his life perhaps, for he was conscientiously obe-
dient, he took upon his responsibility to act upon his own
prívate opinion.

As a matter secondary to that whieh had induced me to

310 API>El\"DIX

trouble your Lordship with this very protracted communi~
cation, 1 beg leave to observe to you, that in your mention
of the recapture of Coimbra, you made the following mis~

1st, That event took place on the 7th, not the 9th of
October. 2dly, General MilIer's corps was not present in
the attack-it only arrived on the following day, and mine
alone had been engaged upon the occasion. And, 3rdly,
Thcre were very nearly five thousand prisoners taken, in-
cluding one hundred and fifty-seven officers-not four thou-
sand as you have stated.

1 would here conclude this long letter, by requesting your
Lordship to make every allowance for the anxiety which
had induced me to address it to you; but on reading it
over, 1 findit incumbent upon me to devote a few lines, at
its termination, as a tribute due from me in recollection of
the intrinsic good qualities of the militili. soldiers who were
under my command during the war in the Península. It
has happened that the· mention 1 have already made
of them, has represented them, as a body, in unfavor~
able colours; and such only was the picture 1 could draw
of them at the period then before me; but from my gene-
ral experience of the individual characters of the men who
composed my corps during the several campaigns that J
eommanded it, 1 do not hesitate in my opinion, that
no better material s could be found to form excellent sol-
diers: they were patient when under great privations;
temperate in their habits ;-obedient to their superiors;-
and they possessed at once a constitutiollal bravery, which
only required adequate discipline to be usefully called into
action; and as much, if not more, perhaps, of genuine

patriotism than the natives of any other country in Europe,
with the exception only of our own.

1 have the honour to remain, my Lord, your Lordship's
mo¡;;t obedient humbIe servant,

l\fajor-generaI in the Portuguese ser vice,

and late Lieut.-Colone! British.

Letler ¡roin Lord Londonderry io Major-General
Sir N. Trant.

Holdernesse House, July 21st, 1828.

1 am honoured with your Ietter of this day's date, and
1 am entirely ready to acknowledge that your statements
of the facis you describe may be more authentic than the
information 1 have detailed in the part of my book to which
you have alluded, as regards the conduct and services of
yourself and corps under your command.

In great military operations, various views will be taken,
and different opinions formed; and it is difficuIt to com-
bine the sentiments of officers on abstraet details.

My object has been, without wishing to give offence tú
any of my brother officers, to eoUeet a general precis for
future historians of those eampaigns which 1 witnessed;
and 1 eoneeive 1 can in no better way answer the object
your commullication has in view, as bearing upon my
History of the Peninsular War, than by publishing the
same, together with this answer, in the Appendix to thc
next edition of my work.

1 have the honour to be,

&e. &e. &e.

3]2 APl'ENDlX

FrulIl Lieutenallt-General Sir H. Fane to {lle ltlarquis
of Londonderry.
Avon-Ringwood, 14th August, 1828.

My dear Lord Londonderry,
1 have only recently found leisure for reading your

" N arrative of the Peninsular 'Var."
Taking for granted that, where the proceedings of named

individuals are detailed, you will be desirous of having auy
material errors pointed out, 1 take the libel'ty of addressing
you; and of calliug your atteution to the following quoted
passage in the .said work, relative to me.

At page 465, 466, Quarto Editi.ou, you write as follows :
" General Fane, with a brigade ofPortuguese cava1ry, ac-
companied by several guns and a howitzer, had been passcd
over the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march along
the southern bank of the ríver, and to destroy, if possible,
any boats which he might observe in progress cf prepa-
mtion at Santarem, 01' elsewhere. He had obeyed theso
orders, and kept up a long and warm cannonade on the
enemy's incipient flotilla; but his howitzer having been
disabled, his round-shot proved of little utility; and, as no
attempt teas made wít/¡ the Congreve rockets, which now
for the first time migltt ltave been brollght inlo play, the
enemy succeeded in completing the task which thcy had
begun, and in furnishing themselves with ample mean.'>
to cross the river at pleasure."

1 bcg leave to trouble your Lordship with copies of parts
of tltrf'c dispatches 01' mille, dated the 8th., 12th, alle! lGth
of No\'('rnber, 1810.


Almeirim, 8th November.
My Lord,

1 am just returued to this place after having reconnoitred
thc whole river as hig'h as the mouth of the Zezere.

The number of boats we have been able to discover is as

1st, Below Santarem, in a creek 2
At Santarem 3

&c. &c. &c.
To Lord Wellington, &c. &c.

Almeirim, 12th N ovember, 1810.
My Lord,

From a spy sent over the river, by my desire, by Colo-
nel Mestre, and from a peasant who escaped from San-
tarem last night by swimming the river, 1 learn that there
certainly is a large quantity of rnaferials collected in the
Pra~a. He states himself to have been made to work
daily, and that he was employed in the Pra~a three days
ag'o; that he saw as many as twelve boats at least, and
a great quantity of plank, poles, &c. which, he says, are
piled as high as the roofs of the houses.

As the attempt t'o destroy these will be attended with
the destruction of the Iower town, 1 shall take no step
until 1 receive your Lordship's further instructions. The
materials cannot be made use of in the present sta~e of
the river; therefore no ill consequence can arise from my
delaying, &c. &c. &c.

'1'0 Lord W clling'ton, &c. &t:.


The reply to this last dispatch, was a desire tbat 1 should
try what could be done; and on the 16th of November 1
wrote as follows :

Almeirim, 16th N ovember, 1810.
My Lord,

I have to make known to you that 1, this morning, ac-
cording to your wishes, endeavoured to set fire to the ma-
terials collected by the enemy in Santarem.

We fired forty- two 32-pounder carcass rockets; four or
five of which only, (I think) feH into the town; alld wbich
did not appear to me to do any damage. At any rate,
they elltirely failed in effecting my object.

Four of them burst almost immediate\y after leaving tbe
frame, but fortunately did no injury to any one.

The range of these weapons appears to me to be too
wild to be of service, employed as we employed them; for
a town no larger than tbe lower town of Santarem, is too
small an object to be hit with any certainty, as our ex- .
perience of this morning proved. Fired into a large city
fuH of combustible materials, or amongst crowded shipping,
they certainly must have a most terrific effect; particularly
if fired in tlights of 30 or 40 together. Going, however,
into a town in the state Portuguese towns 1l0W are, with
little but the waUs and roof of any house remaining, I
think they will do no good." &c. &c. &c.

To Lord Wellington.


From these extracts, your Lordship will perceive,
1st, That only 5 boats could be seell at Santarem; and

tbat what others migbt have been there, were in the midst
of the town.

2ndly, That the reason why the rockets were not tried
hnmediately upon rny having the power of trying thern,
was, an apprehension tbat 1 rnight not meet the appro-
bation of the Commander of the Forces, if 1 burned the
town of Santarem.

And, 3rdly, that as soon as 1 received his sanction for
the attempt, 1 díd make it; and did "bring into play the
Congreve rockets;" and made a very fuH report to the
Cornmander of the Forces of rny having so done, and of

. my opinion relative to tbese missiles.
The rockets were under the control of Lieutenant Lind-

sey, of the Royal Artillery; who was the officer specially
appointedfor their management.

U nder these circumstances, 1 am at a loss to imagine
how your Lordship's statemellt, that" no attempt was made
with tbe Congreve rockets, when they mighthave been
brought into play," can have been inserted in your Nar-
rative; and 1 cannot but tbink that. you will desire to cor-
rect tbis statement, should anotber edition of your work
be called foro

1 am, rny dear Lord Londollderry,
Very faithfully yours,

To the Marquess of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &c.




Answer from Lord Londonderry io Lieulenant-General
Sir H. Fane.

Wynyard Park, August 17,1828.
M Y Dear Sir Henry,

1 ha ve to acknowledge the receipt of your Ietter of the
14th instant.

In my advertisement you will observe that the defi-
ciency of my narrative is at once admiUed; and under
these circumstances, I had hoped it would meet with in-

, dulgence, especialIy from my friends and brother officers.
1 am anxious, you may be assured, to correct every

error t~at is pointed out, especialIy where the proceedings
of named individuaIs are detailed; and 1 shall send you!"
commnnications togethel' with this answel', to be inserted
in the Appendix to the 3rd edition, 8vo. which is just
coming out.
. 'Vithout entering into discussion, 1 shall only say, I

wrote from the best information 1 could procure at the
time, entircly unauthorised ol' unassisted by any body in
the army. 1 seldom or ever saw communications ad·
dressed by general officers direct to the Commander of the
Forces; and the impression at the moment at head-quarters
was, that the enemy did avail themselves of the means of
crossing the river; and it was in general report, that the.
Congreve rockets had not been brought into play. How-
ever, from your statement, this must be erroneous, and 1
shall have much pIe asure in placing your letter in my hum-
ble record before the publico

Bclieve me, my dea)' Sir Henry,
y our's very faithflllly,



Leiter Irom Ml's. E. Mattlzews to tlze Mat'quis 01 Lon-

7, Cecil Street, Margate, September 14th, 1828.
My Loro,

Dnder the most proud though painful feelings, 1 take
tile liberty oi' addressing you, ano 1 am sure your Lordship
will pardon the intrusion when 1 explain the motive.
Having been informed that your Lordship had lately pub-
lished an admirable work on the War in the Peninsula, 1
felt "ery desirous to peruse it, but could not procure a copy
from any of the libraries of this place; but on taking up
the Kent Herald of the 28th of August last, the first ar-
ticle that met my notice was an extract from that part of
your Lordship's publication which treated of the Battle of
Albut<ra, the impressive description ofwhich renewed again
in my breast painful feelings, which time had in sorne mea-
sure softened, though not healed. The subject to which 1
allude, is the notice your Lordship has been pleased to par-
ticularly take of the gallant conduct of my nephew, Ensign
Thomás of the Bnffs, who feH in that battle, bravely de-
fending acolour of his regimento The little hero was bom
in Jamaica, and being an orphan, was committed to my
care at the age of four years, and was,edncaíed and pro-
vided for by my husband Doctor Matthews, who was tnen
surgeon of the same regimento The extract, as 1 read it,
with respect to his endeavouring to preserve the colour by
the forfeiture of his life, was not the only act of heroism
performed by him on that memorable day, and which your
Lordship probably 1I0t being aware of, 1 will take the
liberty ofmentioning. He had, previously to his regiment's
being broken by the French cavalry, taken the commano of


Captain Stevens' company, there being no other subaltern
but himself attached to the company, and the Captain being
wounded ot the commencement of the battle, The circum-
stances are detailed by Captain Stevens in a leUer he wrote
Doctor Matthews from Olivenza four days after the action,
which letter 1 have now before me, and beg leave to trans-
cribe an extract from it for your Lordship' s inforrnation, under
the impression that it might not be displeasing to you, as
tbe Author of tbe History of a War which terminated so
gloriously to the British name, to be made acquainted with
anyadditional minutia which your Lordship might in sorne
fnture edition thillk of sufficient value to be recorded.

The extract runs thus: "1 cannot refrain from tears,
while 1 relate the determined bravery of your gallant little·
subaltern, who feIl on the 16th instant, covered with gIory;
and it must in some measure alleviate the grief 1 know you
will feel at his 10SB, to know that he felllike a hero. He
rallied my company after 1 was wounded and taken pri-
soner, crying out, ' Rally on me, men, 1 will be your pivot.'
Such glorious conduet must surely meet its reward in
that world where a11 troubles cease, and aU grief is at an
end. He was buried witb all the care possible, by a ser-
jeant and private, the only two survivors out ,of my com-
pany. which consisted of sixty-three when taken into
action." The colours he died in protecting, it appears he
took possession of at the moment the officer who held
them was killed, his company being dispersed. This
gaUant little fellow was not sixteen years of age, when
he so bravely sacrificed his life for the honour of his
King and country. His 10ss was, and is still most painfully
felt by me, for he was as truly amiable in his private life,
as he was gallant and brave in performing his duty to his
King and coulltry as a.soldier. With mally apologíes for the


liberty 1 have taken, which 1 am sure your Lordship will
excuse as the effusion of grateful . feeJings for the kind
manner in which you was pleased to call to notice the re-
membrance of one so near and dear to me,

I havethe honour to be,
My Lord,

y our Lordship's Most obedient,
Humble servan,t,

To the Right Honourable

The Marquis of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &e.

Letler from M1·S. Craufurd, widow of General Roberl
Craufurd, to Lord Londonderry; and Answer.
My Lord,

1 have lately fead, with strongly awakened feelings,
your Lordship's account of the Peninsular War. It has
brought before me the observations and opinions upon it 1
was used to hear, in a remarkable degree, and placed me
where 1 was when listening to them.

The tribute to the memory of him from whom 1 heard
them has called forth the deepest emotion.-At the close
of the book, 1 am led to address a few words to your
Lordship, not that 1 would presume to trespass on yon
with a detail of the feelings of an individual almost un-
known to you, and after the lapse of a number of years,
since the onJy link between us was broken, but because 1
am anxions to beg as a favour of your Lordship, that you
will have the goodness to direet the publisher in any


future editions of the work to correct the spelling of the
name; which, being peculiar to the Craufurds, to whom
my husband belonged, is often 1pistaken, and is so in your
Lordship's work. It is a point of no great moment on
most occasions, but very important to myself and to my
family on this.

\Vith every grateful and gratified sentiment,
J have the honour to be,

My Lord,
y our Lordship's

Obliged Servant,

Dawlish, 16th Octoher, 1828.

Dear Madam,
J. am hOlJoured with your letter. J feel much flut-

tered that my humble testimony to your husband's glori-
ous career should have met your approbution. Those who
knew him onlyas an officer, appreciated, as they deserved,
his science, skill, and matchless bravery ;those who re-
garded him also as a friend, (as J did,) never can forget
him. 1 shall send your note and this answer to m y pub-
lisher, as the best way of having your wishes complied

I have the honour to be, &c.


Major-General Sir J. Wilson to the
Marquis of Londonderry.


2, Somerset Street, Portman Square, 3rd Dec. 1828.
My Lord,

Having only very recently had an .opportunity of peru-
sing your Lordsbip's work entitled " Narrative of the War
in Spain and Portugal," I have noticed an error or two
respecting myself which 1 feel extremely anxiolls to have
corrected; and as I now find that the third edition is on
the eve of publication, 1 take the liberty of addressing
your Lordship with this view ere the new edition meet the
public eye. 1 am quite contident from your Lordship's
high mílitary feeling and sen se of justice, that you will
readily concur in the correction of a paragraph, which
1 cannot doubt upon your Lordship's pemsal of the fol-
lowing explanation will appear to require it. The pa-
ragraph in question, p. 481, is as follows: " In the mean-
while, Trant and Ba~ellar were on the alert at Coimbra;
and Wilson, retreating from Espinhel, thr~w himself
with his corps on the other side of the Mondego. The
lattet movement was indeed, on one account, a subject of
regret to us, inasmuch as it deprived us of our readiest
and surest source of intelligence, which could henceforth
be obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was made
under the impression that a further continuance in Espin-
hel would be hazardous, and could not be risked." The
facts were plainly these: In December, 1810, 1 occupied
Espinhel and other small villages on the Thomar road,
with about 1500 mili tia and a' detachment of Portuguese
cavalry, the enemy being strongly posted in my front at
Cabac;os, from. which point he had lately compelled me to
faH back after two sharp attacks upon my isolated corps,

VOL. JI. x


being then full thirty miles or more from Coimbra, the
nearest support. At this time .Drouet's reinforcement to
MasseDa's army entered Portugal, taking the Ponte de
Marcella road; aDd as the enemy progressively closed
iD upon my rear, those in my front moved to give their
hands to him. It now became imperative upon me, iD order
either to avoid being hemmed in by an overwhelming force
approachiDg iD my froDt and rear, or being cut off from
GeDeral Ba~ellar's army, of which my divisioD formed tbe
advanced guard, to throw myself across the Mondego j but
as soon as the enemy presented his flaDk, 1 re-crossed the
river, and at Corvo, not far from Espinhel, had an affair
with his rear guard, makiDg Dear a hundred prisoDers, and
posting myself as near as 1 could to the latter village,
where Dr~~et's corps halted sorne days, thus recoveriDg

. the former !ine of commUltication with the grand army by
the Zezere and Abrantes; (for these movements 1 refer to
Lord WelliDgton's dispatches of January 1811;) but my
subsequent removal from this line of country a few
days afterwards, was whoUy independent of what was
occurring near me, to the south of the Mondego; it was
the result of other causes, which were these: In the mean
time Silveira's movements had brought Claparede's divi-
sion UpOD him, and the enemy meeting with no serious
resistance in his advance, entered Lamego without oppo-
sition, Silveira retiring to the right bank of the Douro.
The enemy's rapid advaDce upon Lamego necessarily gave
General Ba~ellar considerable alarm for the safety of
Oporto and the lipe of the Douro, the defence ofwhich
was one of the principal objects committed to his charge.
He, therefore, ordered Miller's division and mine tI} hasteD
to Silveira's supp~rt, expecting that some stand would
be made in a country ful! of pl}sitions, in order to cover


Lamego, and enable us to eo-operate with him; but before
we eould arrive, he had erossed the Douro at Pezo de
Regoa with preeipitation.

From this simple statement of faets it will appear evi-

1st, That when 1 threw myself aeross the Mondego,
it was to avoid being erushed by a superior force closing
upon me in front and rear, and that it was not then, the
ineonvenience alluded tO\ by your Lordship eould have
been felt; for having immediately afterwards re-erossed
the river, the former eommunieation with head-quarters
was presently restored.

2ndly, That when sorne days after tbis, my distant
removal from the south of the Mondego to tbe Douro took

. place, thereby suspending the more direet eommunieation
witb head-quarters, it was tbe eonsequenee of positive
orders 1 -reeeived to move in an opposite direetion against
the enemy, wbo was t.hen seriously rnenacing the line of
tbe Lower Douro, and to whom the glove bad hastily been
thrown down in that quarter, without any adequate exer-
tion -having beeo made to redeem it. In neither the one
case nor the other did I then aet from any impression of
my own; but from an unavoidable necessity eaused by the
movements of the enerny, as well as in eonformity with
the orders 1 received ; and if in this there was any thing
that formed a subject of regret to the army, it is to the
causes 1 have just endeavoured to explain, and to these
aloue they ought to be attributed.

1 have the honor to be,
y our Lordship's most obedient,

Humble Servant,



The Marquis of Londonderry lo Major-General
Sir J. Wilson.

Wyoyard Park, Dec.15th, 1828.

1 am honored with your letter, and shall have much
satisfaction in inserting it in the Appendix of the 3rd
edition of my work which is now coming out.

1 had much rather give your fuH explanation, than pro-
ceed to any partial correction of my own. My wish has
been only to record events as far as 1 was acquainted
with them, and 1 feel much pleasure in any explanation or
elucidation being afforded by the parties concerned.

1 have the honor to be,
y our obedient Servant,







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No. I.
State of the Forees in Portugal under the eommand of Lieutenant-gencral Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.

Head-quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1S0t).

General Officers

Stations. Regiments.

l · D ' Alterations since las! 'O

I SerJeants. rumrs. Rank and File. R " ,,; elurn. "'"t:I
, • ~ ~ g'.,
~ 2 ~ . 4 4' ..¿,.¿ C':S"C

" ." .. >-. "t:I"t:I 'O ",. .,...:. P:;CQ ~2. a ~ w E~ ~ ~.! § ~ § ... ~~bDt~~ ~~ ~ j ~ 'g 2 ~ • 2 ~ ~ s ffi • E 2 . $3 -: a) ~ ~ ..¿ ~ "E .~ ~ o ~ '-g ~
.3 .~ ~ g '00 ~ ~ u ~ ..:sa s ~.!:I:I E ~ .!;( S .5 ~"'3 ~ C'd ~ <n ~ § § 'Tj Q) Q)


j j ~ Ó j ~ cñ &0 ~ J3:5 ~ J1:3 ~ Ji 8 ~ ~;;;E ~ o Ci o ~ ~ ~ cC ~ ~
------11--11:--------11 ------- --:--- ---------1-----------

B. G. Fane {

M. G. Colton {

B. G; H. camPbel{

M. G. Hill {

M. G. Tilson r
B. G. A. Campbcll f

B. G. Cameron r I
B. G. R. Stewart {

B. G. Sontag r
M. G .lVl'Kenzie r

B. G. Langworth {

5 3rd Dn. Guards , 1 2 ¡ 10 5 5 4 3fi ., .. 8 ... , 045 10. . 655: 60~" l1304
t 4th Dragoons . 2 2 S 9 (j 6 6 37 .... b .... (;59 13.. 6721 702.. 5

(14th Lt. Do. . 2 2 7 15 1 4 6 3, ... 2 8.... 579 21 71 6711 506.. }
, 20th Lt. Do. . ..] 1 4. . 1 2 14 1 3 3 l.. :l18 4 60 2821 188,. 1 1 1463

) Srd Do. K. G. L. . .. " 2 ].. 2 6 ., 4 .... 1 49 2 72 ]2~1 61.,
{" 16th Lt. Do. . l 1 6 15 ].1 6 6 3h.. 1 8 .... 617 20 34 671 665 ..

( 1st Bn. Coldm. Gds. , b.. 10 .• 14: 5 69 5 2 22.... 1102 75 1 11"8 1 .. ~
~ 1st Bn. 3rd Gds. 1 Ú 1 12 .. 14 5 6~ 2 2 16 4.. 1133 73 ti 1212 ~2292

l 1 Co. En. 60th o o ••• o 1 ]. . . , 3 1 'o 1... . S7 3, . (]O o. • •• , ., J
"3rd or Buft's o.. 1 7 14 (j 2 33 ;¡ '2 18 2.. 668 99 3~ 805 .. .. .... 4.. }

, (j6t.h Fo"t 2nd Bn. . '" o 1 g 14 10 6 311 2 1 1& 1 .. a1ó 38 9 662 1 ,. 2001
) 48th Do. Do. .. 1 2 7 13 !! 4 3u z.. ]4 2.. 667 48.. 715

{" 1 Co. 5th Bn. 60th o o ••• , 1 1. . . . 3 l.. 1... . 67 3. . 60 f 5th Co. Do. .... 2 3 3 6 2 19 .. " 8 .... 'rT7 32 l! 311 ")
) 88th Foot, 1st Bn. . o • o 2 8 15 5 4 S!, .. " 15 .. ' . ~50 143 28 721 ¡1439

{ 87th Do. 2nd Bn. "" 2 G 17 8 5 38 .... 14.... 6]2 88 1 701 .J
f7thDo.2ndBn. .. 1 .. 817 .. 5 21¡ 4 2 13 .... 515 46 , 572 ~

) 53rd Do. 2nd Bn. .. 1 2 5 6 9 6 36 1 1 16 1.. 635 571 2 691 (1206
t.. 1 Cn. 5 th Bn. 60th .... 1 1 1 1 2 {j .." 2 .. .. 56 11 1 61; .J

(9th Foot, 2nd Bn. .. .. 1 6 11; 2 5 3~ lU ~ 9 7.. ~9!; 21U! 20 728 J ! 8Srd Do. Do. .. 1 1 !.< 17 12 5 46 2 1 19.,., 163 7I! 22 856 1316
L 1 Co. 5th Bn. 60th o o • o •• 1 l. . . . 4 .' .. 1 .. ,. 55 31 1 59

5 1st Bn. Dts. I 1 5 15 f. 5 48 9 4 9 2.. 14] 157 20 918 12 ., 4 .. 1 1 , 1290
~ 29th Regl. .. I 1 ti 15 3 6 2(; ¡; 2 15 3.. 549 7ti 5 630 ~ S 2nd Bn. Dts. .. 1 , 7 17 !J 4 SO 9 ~ ]0 1 o 133 211 14 958 3.. J

:1 97th Regl. .. 1 2 6 8 5 4 3~ 4 ~ 19... SI: 70 17 604 1 .. 1307
ti Co. 5th Hn. 60th o o o o •• •• 2. o •• :1 2.. 1." 51 4.. (jI

(27th Foot, Srd Bn. o 1 3 U 10 8 4 42 ... , 22.,. 658 134 2 794 ~ ! 45th 1st Ditto lIS 6 Il 4 34 .. .. 18.. . 615 125 27 767 S( 1980
L 31 s t 2nd Do. o.. 1 7 11 b 4 37 2 2 17". 107 97 4 808


5th Bn. K. G. L. o .. ] 7 12 8 4 31 b 1 14 1" ~71 92 11 774 1 1 1


h Do. Do. o '. 2 Ii 10 4 5 SI; ., 1 14 2.. 631 81 9 721 2 .. 2 ., 2769
2nd Do. Do. J 2 7 15 7 6 37 :1 1 15." . 146 49 8 803 1

1st Do. Do. . o 2 10 19 3 2 32 4 J 12' 3.. 121 11 ¡; 8 847 ........
2~th Foot. 2nd Bn. '2 5 7 3 2" ... o 22, o •• 100 26 3 72!l

30th Do. Do. 1 '. 2 6 5 6 29 2 é 14 2" 398 4ó 189 632 .. 1
rndts. Co. K. G. L. ¡~.... 1 2.. .. 4 . o •• l ... '1 30 14 4 48

Total"I a 32~~m; M/ll93 137 24 1097;¡; ~ 42332 1 mo1238g ~90 22580, -28-1-.(' ..... -<. 'c-I-E .... 2-·-. -1. -13"7'] -;]
I :

No. n.
State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, and Royal Engineers,

Head Quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1809.

Oflieers. Serjeants.


]1'1 ~ "O 'T.. ._ ::.J S .'~ ~
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ce :::::l ';::::;->.. ~ .&~J5~.S
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El.! 1 ~ ~ ~
;lo W U


Rank and File.

'"' 00






'" ::c:

'" :;

.inee lasto

-d .r;;
'" ." ~1'1~] ] !l) "'O.l:: 1004 rn

.S ffi .~ ~ ~ '::::<::<::<~

Civil Braneh.

." .

<1 ~
.. ... ....

o o ~..: ~ ~

" ª S>.¡"'=~·...t 8~ G 8~ !í E-<
-------!l-I-I--'--I-II_II __ '_' __ II_I_I __ II __ ' __ ' __ '__ II __ '__ 11_1_1_1_1_11 __ '_' __ ' __

t Artillery British Drivers
f Artillery

German .)
\.. Drivers


Wn. Tn. attaehed lo Artillery

Waggon Train

31 .. 1 10

.. ,11 5

1, .. 3

11 15 " .. 8 11 5

61' '11 4 12 1 ••
6 7 , ..

7 , .. 1)

•• ,"'1 •• 1 , •.

8 1"11.' 2, .. 1 ••

21 .. 111 5 14 5

2 "'11 •• 3 11 1)

22 2 161 12 l •..


1 244

5912861 628

311 2111921457115291146" .. ,., •. , •. ,."

3111 2 179 2711021 308 •• I 1, .. l. o" •
14\ 61 24117111 182 5111. o¡ •• , •• 1. O,"

25 26

56 14 771247

62 20 12 94 lO, •• , .• J • .o".

Total •• 1I4111-;-~~I-;II~II33l;;l2~11712IuI1990 IMsIW31193Illmlmll¡-;;I7I~I~IJI-2 16r¡;-I~-

No. lB.
Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Battle of Oporto, 10th, 11th, and 12th May, 1809, under the command of

Lieutenunt-general Sir Arthur Wellesley.

KiIled. Wounded. lVIi;sing. Total.

!Í oi iI:i .j, oi lI:i .; 'ti oi '" .~~ '" 00 ~ tl ~ al := tl .; . f "ó Corps. ti) .<: .., e ~
-= ~ ~ ....... If~ . -= . 2 ...... en E-< • <l " . ~ ~ )j '" ~ El )j en '" S )j • i':l " . ~ El .'d -= en e rñ ~ .: ~ al -= o: ;: ¡:: ca -= ~ e ~ 'a

" " ';; ~ OJ., ~ ... ... .~ "
,.. ~ -c; '" ~

- ""
¡'j "E ..>4

'" ~ ¡:¡ ..>4 Q) o '" - ",,'" 6 ..>4 " .., ct ~ ¡:¡ .... '" o .., .~ 'g ~~ .~ .~ !3 .~ '" o .., .~ ~ 'P 2 ª -= . .." " " ~ .~. f/l ¡:;. E á " ~ª" " ~ 'f ¡:; " " '" '" ... '" '" '" ~ '" '" ¿s8 ........ J]~Q:; ;,:¡;;'¡ ú~ " '" ;::¡~ ;,:¡::a )::1 a; ;::¡o:: (.;) ;.:3>2 if.!;::¡ o:: (.;) ....en .... if.! u



.I.:¡:rr· 1 .. 1 .. 31 35 1 .. 49 50 11" 1 .. 16 17
. .. o, o, .. 4 4

1 .. .. ....

J 1

1 1
21 2

~ >, Royal Engineers
.: :E 14 th Light Dragaons .. 12 1 1 18

() .c Srd Foot, 1st Batt. 7 12
~~. 48th D". 2nd Do. 3 1. I~
~ '" ~ 60th Do. 5th Do. 4
~ ~ ~ 66th Do. 2nd Do. 1 1 7

- o 18t Batt. Detachments l' .
Jfo 1st Line Batt.K.G.L. 1"

:.§ Rifle Companies .. , .. ,. '1"""""'1 .. " .. 1 •• 1 .. 1 .. 1 •• 1 •• 1 •• 1 :1
-< ;::¡ General and Staft' Officers ...... .. .. .. .. .. 2

21' 'l"l"l"!""'" '11 2 -.-.-.-,-,-,-,-,,-,-,- -,-,-,-,-,-,,-,-,-1-1-1-1-1-;\\--; -; -; -; -:-.riT~ U2 l23 General Total. .11 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1~3112 1 3 121 3 l .. 11 l .. 18711 .. 1 •• 1 •• , ..

N ames of Officers killed and wounded. Remarks.

16th Lt. Dragoons, Major L. Stallhope
Do. Lientenant Tomkinson

1St Bn. Detach. Capto Ovens (38th Regt.)
Do. Do. Lieutenant Woodgate (52nd Do.)

1st En. K.G.L. Capto Detinerillg
2nd Do. Do. Capto Lan!(hren

Rifle COSo Do. Lieutenant Lodders
Staft', Lient. Gen. The Han. E. Paget {

Do. Capto Hill, A.D.C. to Majar Gen. Hill




Lost his right arm,
doillg well


'" Dates. 11'15

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Wonnded. Missing.

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tl '" ti) ~ . f .;::¡ 00 a

. .; ~ ~ a ., " ~ rñ " ¡:: .'d E iJ o: ¡:: en .., ... ,.. .~ " '; ~

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" o " ~ ~.~ ; ~ '" S en '" o: . .." .., " " . .." 0..::: 00 .~

'" '"
.:>.'" ~~~ '" '" '" c3~ -= ... '" '-;,:¡¿S u .... o:: ;,:¡;; ¡

.... Jl

- -


- -- - -



¡:¡ ....
" a ... ..


14th Light Dragoons, Majar Harvey { 10th May, 180911 ............ _ ... .. 1 •• o- o. _. o- 3 .. •• o • o. o. o.· •..


f! e . ~ rQ § . 5 5

f cti .S ~ e 2 6
Q,) ti ~ .- .~ el) E § .~ ~ g ~ .~ e

-- - --

.. 1 •• o, o ••• ..



'" ¡; 'O~ E-<

" Do. Captain Hawker

Do. Lient. Knif'e

Lost his rigbt arm,
doing well

Do. Uth Do. Do. . d. dI 1. .111 .. 1 .. 11911 .. 1 .. 12141 .. 131 .. 1 6311· -l .. 1 .. 1 •. 1..1 .. 1211411 .. 1 .. 13141113121 9611109

3rd Foot, or Buft's, Lieut. Monaghan
48th Fo"t, Majar Er,kine

66th Do. l\I8j<Jr l\Inrray
Do. Capto Benning
Royal Engineers, Lieut. Geo. Hamilton
~ Lient. ----Portuguese .. E . ( nslgn----





12th Do. Do. ~¡~l" U· 'IJ' '1~11~1~12'~1' 'I~ I"I~:I" '1' '!j' '1~1~1~1~¡1~1~1~1~¡~¡~1~1~~11~23
.... ~1..~ .. r. 42 2 " 417 14t 153 [1 .. [ .... 2 16 2 4 5 7 I " 2211 236

I ~c
No. LV.

State of the Forces in Spaill and Portugal, under the commalld of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.
Head Quarters Placencia, 15th July, 1809.

- ¡;

.:i Offieers. Serjeants. Rank and File. Horses. ~ .~ ~ lI1en. Horses. i~' ~ IV rz _:~ .S a ---1 ----... o General Officers


. 1
i. l • .e;'""'Oü~ I'l.- commauding Regiments. Stations. o; ro 'O

'"" ·1"8 '" -"" " '" ..¿ ..¿ ..¿ ..¿ ~cdc:..r~ '" I;r~ <=: ;;

""O r~ '" h~ Brigades. ro o ro 00 -n " " " § ~i~ " "'C 2l g ~~~O) ~ e E
" I " '" "' ' .... '" 'O ro '0; " ;;:: • El I ;:¡ ..¿ ....:I~ t::~ o " a a: ~ ;:; :;.¡ ... oh :;g " & ~ ~ ;ji E ¡, S " ... ..¿ . '" .:2., ;:;., " 'en ~ ..; ~ g El ..; § ~Iii ~ e a; u " : § p::; .:e!' " 'O '" '" <lo r.:l :;, u t: ~ J1 o t: .;:: '0 ~I~ O~ o ~ " p:¡ :;.¡ ;¡ :2 U ~ iñ W U ¡:.. cnu U E-< o... if) (; -, ¿; p::; ;::::; ~ U-

--- ----

B. G. Falle S 3rd Du. Guards Camp Placencia .. 1 2 ti 9 5 4 4 30 4 2 7 .... 5:19 67 ¡¡g t;(J5 582 .. o. o. o' o. o • o ••• o. 8 1 :! ..
} 1081 ~ . " t 4th Dragaolls Do. :! 2 8 10 ~ ti 5 28 2 7 8 .... 552 54 5~ 6¡¡4 055 3 .... 0= ..

•• o. .... •• o. o, o. o •• , ~ S 14th Lt. ])ns. Do. 2 1 6 14 1, ti 211 4

7 1 411:i 54 110 ¡¡4!1 fíO(; .. 1 .. 1 .. .. 9 ....

} 1014 S 304 ~~ M. G. eotton .. "1 • , o. .- .. t 16th Do. Do. Do. .. .. 1 7 14 3 4 (j 32 1 4 H .. .. 519 73 62 654 líO'¡ .. ,. o. o • o ••• .. .. o- •• 4 ....
B. G. Anson ~ 23rd Do. Do. Do. .. 2 1 8 14 11 5 4 33 .. 1 !) ..

"1 41:)0 45 3 52~ fi:!1 •• o. o. , . o. o. o. o. o. o, 5 .... } 952 - t 1st Do. K. G. L. Do. 1 1 6 8 51 4 (j :!5 3 5 Ü .. ,172 75 20 5()7 587 1 .. 3 .... ..
. ~I •• o. .. o. o. o, o • .. S 1st lIn. Coldm. Gds. Do. .. 8 .. 10 I 121 4 .. 62 8 3 20 2 986 118 .10 1184 .. o •• _ 1 1 .. o. o, •• " o. o- ... ~ 1 ~ B. G. H. Campbell Do. 1 ,í 1 7 .. .1.:11 3 .. 55 11 4 19 1 "li 1025 lGl 13 1200 .. :; t 1st Do. 3rd Do. I 1 .. :: 52068 ~ 1 Ca. ¡¡Oth Do. •• o- .. 1 .. . . .. 4 .. 1 .... ' 5¡¡ 1 1 58 .. S" 6bt Foot. 1st Bn. l\1arching to jo;n .. 1 2 7 17 7 :; .. 40 4 1 I 18 2 I 1I S~O 5U 13 883 ..

.. ¡l4"r .ll B. G. Cameron t !:I3rd Do. 2nd Do. Camp PlacencÍa .. 1 1 8 22 (Ji fi 3fi 5 1:1 15 4 .. ' 537 26~ 31 850 .. .. 1 fIl . 1 Ca. 60th Oo. .... .. J 1 I "3 4 .. 1 .. .. 1 51 4 4 5U .. O B.G.Low ~ 5th Ln. Bn. K. G. L. Camp Galistia •• lo 1 5 II 7 32 8 2 13
2 "1' 60fi 142 26 774 .. .. 3 .. l1151 ..¡ l 7th Do. Do. Do. o, •• 2 4 10 5 5 .. 38 4 2 14 .. 545 158 25 72H ..

.. ~ f 1st Do. Do. Do. .... 2 7 l() (j 4 .. 211 4 ¡¡ 11 4.. 506 110 7 713 ..

:: 1m6 1-- B. G. Langworth t 2nd Do. Do. Do. .. 1 2 7 15 6 (j .. 37 3 1 14 1 .. I 67!J 97 14 790 .. 1st aud 2nd Ln. Do. ])0. " -, .. 4 4 2 1 .. 6 a 1 1 .. .. 101 39 2 142 .. $ 53rd .Fo"t 1 st lIn. Camp Placencia .. 1 1 8 1;, 5 2 .. 39 fi 10 16 5 .. 727 178 132 937 .. o. o. o. o. o, o. o- o. o- o, o •••
:: (19"} M.G.Tilso~ 66th Do. 2nd Do. Do. o, •• .. 8 13 8 4 .. 2H 2 3 13 4 .. 543 88 28 650 .. .. 1 ci { 48th 2nd Do. D". .. 1 1 5 10 7 3 .. 31 5 2 10 4 .. 591 110 2 703 .. .. J

:: j 394 ~ 1 Ca. 60th Do. ., , . .. 1 1 .. .. .. 4 .. .. 1 .. .. 52 6 1 5!! .. .. 1 flstBn. Dls. Do. .. 1 1 4 1:¡ 2 2 .. 43 8 9 7 4 .. 609 277 47 933 ..
:: }2034

B. G. R. Stewart t 48th Foot 1 st Bn. Do. .. 1 1 9 20 2 4 .. 46 3 1 17 2 .. 8:15 60 .. 885 .. '--- 20th Do. Do. Do. 1 1 ti 14 5 (j .• 30 9 3 1'; 2 500 123 H 731 .. ci·~ .. .. f 45th Vo. ])0. V cnta da liase goua .. 1 1 9 8 6 a .. 35 4 ~I ~i.3 .. 752 107 97 956 .. o, o. o ••• 2 .. .. .. o. o- o • o, ,. ~2244 .5 M. G. l\1'Kenzie t :nst Do. 2nd do. Do. .... 1 7 7 !J 3 .. 32 3 737 (;6 17 820 .. 1 .. ~tt4 24th Do. Do. ))0. .. 1 2 9 9 7 2 .. 4~ I I 22 1 75~) 1I7 22 894 ..
.. "1" 5 ~





~ ~ ~

o ~.~

.. S';;:
~ S'~ ~or:l

a> "

General Officers

Regimenta. Stations •

No. V.


.... S . D l' d "1 I AlteratiOJlS. J .¡ Officers. ..!::: elJeants. rmrs. ..ank an ]< 1 e. Horses. ---1\-i I H . o ~ 'en. ürsps. 1 ~.:~
'" u 1


¡:~.c,;; Q) -rl ~ • • • ..-d""Ci. "Ó '.;::]~~
• ~ • ¡:: o '"C '"C "'O "C' (l). ClJ •• ,' ID CJ «1' ~

(f".j o rIl (c.:. rñ.w: ;:::. ;:::. ¡;:l • ¡::: bJl "'C f:: ~ ""O ,~ ~ ~ ........ ~
-- • s:: ~ ... ~ o:d - cd..... cd +J ro' '- Q;I ...... I-o~_

C) o oo..... v ~ .!:: ~ .::: e S ¡::¡ E' e ¡:; '"d • ~ .-. e2 o ~";:::.:. ~ ~ s:::I Q :1,)

M.G. 1I IIf5 Coso 60th Camp Malperteda

~ U .~ -[ ~ .;;1 ~ ~ ~ .:< § % ~ S 3:i ~ S ~ ~.J! S ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ E.g 5] ~ ~ ~]
o ...! ~ ro .~ ¡:: jg ~ ~ .~ o 2::.::! o ~ .~ o o ~.~ " .. 0 ·0 w ..... C) f¡ 2 ~ '" v ~ ~ .~

___ 11 !1------II~~~_'=__~I~~:1 ~ <fl_~ ~ <fl U ~_~~~,~~=- ~=_=_=_~~=_:...:¡ ~~ ~
1 41 7 5 3 21 2 2 8 1 1 268 S6 10 S14

M'KeDz;e Col. Donkin t 88th Foot 1st Bn.
87th Do. 2nd Do.

<ti I r 7th Do. Do.
. -'" n. G. A. C=Pb·1l1 t ,,'" Do. " •. O"" 1 Co. 60th S ... f 2nd En. Detach. ¡:C;u

<ti C 1 K' 97th Foot, 1 Bn. O • emmlS { 40th Do. Do.
1 Co. 60th r 43rd j.'oot, 1st En.

B. G. R. Crawfordll t 52nd Do. Do. lI;¡th Do. Do.
{5tl. Do. 2nd Do.

• . 28th Do. Do.
M. G. Llghtbournell .12nd Do. Do.

88th Do. 2nd Do. r 34th Do. Do.
B. G. C. Crawfurd (S9th Do. Do.

68th Do. Do.
Lt. Col. l\1'Lean 27th Do. Srd Do.

Major Dundas Royal 8taft' Corps
Captain Plate l. G. Co. K. G. L.


Camp !'Iacencia
Do .



Marching to join


Camp near Eelem






- - !I !J 20 4 6 32 8 5 13 3 1 606 10H 61 776
"'''11 6 In II 5 37 6 4 16 1 _. 618 188 22 828

1" 5 12 5 20 11 4 12 1 _. 414 144 5 56S
1 .. 2 5 4 H 4 28 5 3 13 4 537 131 22 6110

1 2 4 1 1 l.. 6·t 6. . 70


1 1

8 25 1 3 25 11 3 11... . 627 301 1l 9311
3 H 3 4 32 4 2 lb.. 1 506 106 23 635

7 2\ 6 6 39 10 5 17 4 _. 753 142 21 916
2 4 1 1 .. _ _ 56 41" 60

1 2 9 20 6 6 5:1 23 .. .. !J9S. . • • 993
1 2 8 20 7 5 55 ]!J _." 1001" " 1001

1 2 10 27 6 Ü 55 19 _. .. 1023" _ _ 1023
1 2 9 12 8 6 40 20 .. .. 562 39 .. 601

1 2 6 13 9 6 40 3 19 1 .. 575 70 .. 645
1 3 9 5 10 6.. 31 l!J 2.. 615 35 .. 650

1 2 8 5 12 5 33 2 20 ... _ 613 S!J .• 652
1 .. 5 8 6 6 39 1 \2 .. 10 629 S9 47 715

1 2 6 5 4 4 21 16 .. .. 644 30

1 675
2 5 8 4 5 32 1 18 .. .. 522 14'. . 536


.. j ..


11' _, ..



~ 5 lt 13 6 4~ 7 iI2~.~:: 8~~ l:~: ~~ 10;:~ -. F'R' ~'I"
_. " .. 2 " 2" 2 l.... 16 ni 20 47 .. " .... " .. 1¡:W~2965¡¡6259 192 ;) 1542178130 63~-3151278á4 3ll(1008~317S, 3556' ·2 10~¡ ¡¡ I ¡f;lll!-S¡;-¡--;'-

~5} 1 ~



No. VI.

State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, Royal Engineers, &c.
Hea(l Quarters Placencia, 15th J uly, 180lJ.

--. __ ._._~._-•• _----' 11 seJjts.11 Drmrs. II Rank and .File. Officcrs.

" o ~ o ,¿ ~
u . " " ~ ~ .~ 2 .•

g ';? ;.. ~ I~ :3~:3~w


'" ill~ 'l:: ~
oC '" W ~


..,< I ~ ~ o
'ñ u

" ¡¡l v • ¡::::: :J:¡ ..:< E ~J58 ~ ~ ~ il< ".¡ " i:í3







" "3


.¿ ,.Q

'¿I'I~]~~] ~~-5&~=-5
'S v .~ =lJ ~ 2 ~

.. QQQ':;il<~

Civil Branch.

r-: iJ.
..... '" ~ 3 . ~ 00 ~

"'.... o

§ ~ ~
''>: 't:> E'" <::1

o ~ o


:s ;::

-------,11-1-1-1-1-11-11-1-1-11-1-1-11--1--1--1--11_11 __ 11-1-1-1-1-1-1-11-1-1--1--f Artillery
British )

t. Drivers

f Artillery

t. Drivers


Wn. Tn. attached to the Artillcry

Waggon Train

31..1101121 511 .. 1112111111 4111511 33tll 6912201627 3181 17 I 49

21 61 111 4 II! 01. .1 2 11 51 .. 1..11 3491 381 651 45211 49tJ11 81

5112 912 3111211 1821 251 1011 308

111 1511 31 101 17011 19611 36

11 .. 1 4112, .. :!, .. 24 3 27

1 1 3 1 71 3112 1123, .. ~I. ~ 2371 131 411 29111 139

Total..1141212*91IO/l61I,171414111412171112871151143711815/18201111111 .. 1..1 .. 1..1..1 .. 1 .. 11318111149

No. VII.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.
in action with the French Army, commanded by J oseph Buonaparte in person, in front of the town of Talavera de la Reyna,

on the 27th July, 1809.


14th Light Dragoons
1st Do. Do. K. G. L.

Royal British Artillery
Do. ~~ngineers

1st Bn. Coldstm. Guards
2nd Bn. 24th Regt.

1st Bn. 29th Do.
211d Bn. 31st Do.

1st Bn. 45th Do.
1st Bn. 48th Do.

2nd Do. Do.
5th Do. 60th Do.

Ist Do. 61st Do.
2nd Do. 87th Do.

1st Do. 88th Do.
Ist Bn. Detachments

1st Line Bn. K. G. L.
lstand 2nd Lt. 130. Do.


.' ~ E l.i
'I:l = . :;.l .-

m o ~ <..,.. • ~
oom8 rñ~. ~rñ~ ~ ~ • ~ ,§ B ~ ~ § § ~ .3 g ~ E. ~ 'Cñ ~ ~ ,~, § ~j~~ú:.3~w5Jj~




:0.1 •• 1 •• 2

1 "1"

'g l' ~ ~ .-"1 "
" ...

" o ~ ;r:

"1 9 2 7



10 ..



4 ..

3 ..
3 ..

26 ..
7 ..

13 ..
2 ..

4 ..
2nd Lt; Hattll. Do. 1,"

5th Do. Do.

Wounded. Missing. Total.

00 ~. 00
.,; ~ . [) ~ ;;:; ~ & cD ~ t-[) "


o . ...

-o e..2 ~ ~ cri~ ~ ..9 w.o.~ .... -0 (1)'0
• Ü ::= ,.¡ ~
.~ ~.~ .~

'11 m
~ '" .~~ ~ <i S ~ S ~I~ ~~~oo~=oo ri~~ ~ .--;~ü !i:; ~ .; 8 .~ ~ s.o • ;2 ~ S .!t gs ~ .: ..; a~vl ~~il.IC .-~U.~'" ~ I ~ & 51 . ..:: 2 a m ~ e ~ ~ ~ 'a ~ .~ ::l ~ ~ ~ ... ...

,,"[l)O' Jí~
.-"1 "

" ~ .. o
~ ::r: ~ ~ .~ .~ ª".~ 'a ~ ~ .; 8 a ~ ~ -a .~ v:;.l-l:iE:;.l-l:;ilwO'JíCi ~::r: ~:;.l-l
~ c. :s 'tij >t:: ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~.E: ;::I.~"'P... !:)

.5l c:l ~ ~ E "'" 1ü .... cd o a,¡ o ~ ~ CI:l ,~
-=- =-:.. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ =- =-=- =- -=- =- =-1-1-1-1-

"1" . ...
.. 1







1 ti
2 ..

2 1\11 413
2 ..

2........................ . ... 1 ........ 1 ...... 2 ..
6.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 ........................ 12 .•

42 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. l............ l ...•...... 53 ••
31 .. 1 85 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.......... 2 l 2 .......• 109 .,

13.. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... 7 ...... 1 ................ ~4 ••

~ :: :: :. :: :: : :1:: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :::: :::
4 ............ 1 .......... 1 lb ........•. 1 .......... 1 25 ..

3.. .. ................... .. .... 1 .............. 6 ..
3 .. 124 ......... , .......... I .. 33 ........•. 2 5 4 .. .. 4 •. 183 ••

2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. I ., •• •• •• •• •• 30.. .. .. .. .. .. 2.......... 62 .•
í! .. 38.. .. .. .. .. 211 ., .. .. .. .. 13.. .. .. .. .. 2 2...... 3.. 64 ..

7 ....... , .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. .................... 9 ..
2 .. 23.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5.......... 1 l...... 2.. 49 ••

3.. .. .... .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 ..
61" .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.. 32.. . .... , .. .. .. .. .. 11.. ., .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.. 49 .•

.. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. :; 1 43.. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. 1 7 G .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 5 2 138 •• T"t'l"':~~~; ~ ~ ;kt 1~1~ - -;-~ ~~ ~ ; ::~~ t~,;' •••• "" ". ;; •••••• ";"., 2 ::: ~ ;; ~ ~ ~; 7~ "; 7th Do. Do. General Staff

N ames of Officers Killed, W ounded, and Missing, 'falavera de la Reyna, 27th J uly, 1809.

Killed. Wounded. Missing.

Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rernarks. Rank and N ames. Regiments.

Capto Fordyce,D. A.A. G. 8Ist Regiment. Lient. Hembruck 1st Lt. Dns. K. G. L. Severely Capto Poole { 1st Bn. Detachts. 52d Hegiment
Lient. Col. Ross Coldstream Guards Capl. Boothby Royal Engineers. Do. Walsb 91s1 Hegiment

Capto Lodge 31st Regt. 2d Bn. Capto and Adjt. Bryan 1st Bil. Coldstr. Gds. Do. Lieut. Cameron 79th Do.
Lient. Graydon 88th Do. 1st Do. Lient. Popham 29th Reg. Do.

l\1-Carthy Do. Do. Capto Coleman 31st Do. 2d Bn. Do.
Lieut. George Beamish Do. Do.

lWDougall 91s1 Regt. Ensign Gamble Do. Slightly
Ensign La Serra 87th Do. 2d Do. Soden Do. Do.

Lient. Col. Gnard 45th Do. 1st Bn. Severely
Capto Woolf 60th Do. 5th Do. Do.

Major Coghlan 6lst Do. 1st Do. Do.
Capto M-Crea 87th Do. 2d Do. Do.

Sorncrsall Do. Sligbtly
Lient. Kavcnagh Do. Do.

Bamall Do. Severely
Kingston Do. Do.

Johnsoa Do. Do.
Carrol Do. Do.

Ensign Moore Do. Slightly
Knox Do. Severely

Bntler Do. Do.
Capto Dnring Rifle Corps, K. G. L. Slightly

Lient. Holle Do. Sevrrely
Adjt. Deliris 7th Line Bn. K. G. L. Do.


1\0. IX.

Return of Killed, 'Vounded, and Missillg, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-gelleral Sir Arthur W ellesley, K. B. in action with the
French Army, commanded by J oseph Buonaparte in person, at 'falavera de la Reyna, on the 28th J uly, 1809.


Killed. _~~,~n~~d. __ .__ JlJissíllg. 11 ________ Tota~
. ~ .~ I ~ ·I:!: .~ 1 ,; . 1:1: I'~ ,; .,..".,

::::;;::: . - r- >:t::= " - :-=! ~ Q,) • -....i ;-: I
ro o ", '- "" "ol ~ ... . ~ I "e.. "" I~ .....--. +-' ::;;.' ~ - Ul ...... '"' ....... ......... ':"':;l .......

'f) • e .;:::: • ~ ""d rn r .:3 .;: .:l. l-o '"Ó :r... - . ¡;;;: o. ~ ""C n -i . rl O. ¡.:.,
_ m...; '!'''.,¡ ": 1;; lo e _ ' ":;,.¡ • ., ". .,¡!3 <l>" _"' ,ol ",,,, • • tl " = ... ~, f< ",. .,¡ '" <l> ] ~ ~ . 0 :: H.:: ~ ¡:::: = ~ rñ ~ 1-; ;J'I .S H a I ¡..., ¡:: == ce 00. ;:: c::; U rñ = :=.. I ro ~ ¡:;: C':l ~ '"2 ¡; ::.J ~ e ;::::: ':.. .... ~ ...... ro: I . ~1~s·-.~;·~(¡t~I·~.§~ ~ ~~2.~.~.r,I.~.r..;'~~~§ ~ ~,~21~9-ª1~,.~"";2~~"'á ~ ~.s:;I~IªII~I~,""~II~ S ~ ~

:¡¡ ~ - ~ :t :¡¡ ..... «:í • ,...., ¡..., ce: -. ¡¡,¡ - ~ ... __ G" - ~ I-f :::"' .... ~ o :;.. o '-' 0:= -1 "'" .::: ro • .... ;::j w o _ o ::,; ,-o::: (- 'l.I .... ~ .' t:'::I ~ 104 ~~=-::.~~ ~ ~~i~=-~-~. ~,~=_:;;~,¿_,~~::yI-~I.=-~I=-I~-~I~~~I=-~~~~.:5- 2 ~ I:~ :;"¡J,=-:::'I~:~:~~ ~'rZ ~ ~ :il
. 9 ' l' 1', I 1, l' 1 , General Staff 1 . . , .. .. .. .. l' . . ·1" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. 13. ·1" ....... .

3rd Dragoull Guards . :.! l ........ ¡ .. ,.. L, "1" .... "," .... "1.. 1 "1

,, "l'· .. l ... 1.. ~ a
.1th Dragaoll' ~ 9 . '1' . 2.. 71 4 . ..,... . ........ 1 .... , .... l. ... i .. ~ . . 10 13

Uth Light Dragoolls "¡"I" ~ 2i 2 3 ...... [ .. "1 61. 3. ..' .. ,,, .. 1 .. 1.. .. •• 1:; ' .. "jl .. ¡ 2 :1'." .. 31
16th Do. Do. .. .. .. (j :.!I ··1 1 ...... 1 .. •• :,: 2 ··; .. '1· .. ···· 2 2 ........ 11 .. ··.. 13 25

23rd Do. Do. .. 21.. 3 .. 44 70 3' .. 1 .... ¡ 2,1, 43,:.!i ..... :.! 1 7 :l 9ül2U ...... 5 ;': 1.. 12 3 18~224
1st Do. Do. K.G.L. .. 1 .. 1.. . ""1" .. 1 32, .. 1 1 .. 1 .. : 11 2: :!!l27 ...... ·1·· 2 5 .. , .... " 1'11 "1'" 1:1 3164

Hayal. Brítísh Artillery .......... ¡ 1 .. .. .. :? .j0l .. ·· 1 ...... , .. : .... 1 ~~I" .... 1 .. "1" .. "1" .. 1 .. :.!I J •· ".'. 2h 4() Do.~ermaDDo. ..1 .. ··1·... ..:!~ 11 .. ·· ...... 1 ... 3 .. 1 :jll" .. 1.. ......... . ............. ,. 4 .. 30
Do. hllglll~ers l" .. l .... ¡ .. I .. "1 .......... J.... .... .. .. . ....... I .... J.

D". Statf COT!,' 1 l.... .,.. .. .. .. .. ' .. i . . I 1
Colrbtrealll Guardo, 1st lIn. 3;~:.I 5 .. 1 ..... : 1111, 2:1!1 .. , .... ,.. 21" :, .. 2." I1 1 27!< 31'11 Do. 1st ])0. .. 4.. 4" .. 1 I 1··I:l .. 1 •• 1 111 1, 2.1!)! .. I .. 1 i¡ 4.. 4 l.. 1:¡ 1 :W5

3rd Hogt. Jioot, 1st Do. 1 .. :'!'j .. 1 1 ........ ' .. ' ;" .. ' lO:.!' .. !.. 1I ¡l.... ü .. 134
7th Va. :.!Ile! Do. I .. ü .... 21 .. 1 .. : ~I~: ;il: .. :.. 1 .. l .. 1 .. ;1 .. ti.. 1 2 5~

24th Do.:.!ne!Do. 2 .. 42 ," :JI 1'¡4 1 .. : 1.11"12;'.;, .. ,.. :!I l' 12. I 11 .. I~ .. 31b
20th Do. 1st Do. 1 .. '2:, l·· .. :!14 .... '. ". "f \1:.. .. .. "'l" :j .... ;!: 11" .... l .. 12:;

., 1 t D .) J 1) 1 "0' I ') " '1 \ 1 . .. 1'''/
.) ~ O. _11 o. .. '" _ .. .. . '. . . 4 .• •• •. o' ,. • •• •• ' :.::...... u. . ~_

40th 1)0. IstlJo. 7 1.. .. 1,.... 2,..·17 .. 1.. .. .. '.. ..1.. . ... 1,........ ;! .. 55
45th Do. ht Va. !J' .. [1.. .I! .. 1:\0'.. 11' JIj l JJ :1'" .. 5' 14[;

4Hth Do. 1st Do. 2:! .. I I,:j 5 1 ':\' .. 1:\2'.. .. .. ~, :; 1.. 3 .. 15',
·1Sth Do. :lile! Do. 11 .. :.. 1 1 .. , :\'.. 50' .. 1 !.. ". . ..1 1 i 1 .. 4.. {l]

5:I,d Do.2nd])o. .. .... 1.. (j;.. 1111.... .., Ji .. ¡ :10i.. '.... I! .. !.... 1 .. 3(j
(iOth [)o.:,th Do. ..!.. t: '.. .. 1i 3 J .. , 11"1 :11:.. 2: .. 1(0 :! .;11.. :¡ 1 40

Oht ])0. 1st ])0. '1" 1 1 i 1 ·12 .. ' 4i .tl] "I IO J .. Pi::.. .., .. \l. ;" ~i 1 ¡ ]0 I :.!41
6tith ])". 2ml Do. !.. ,,!.. 1 .. \.i "l·· :.¡ :¡I (;, :! .... : ;'1" r:l'.. 11 .. lO :\' .; :.! .... I 7 .. I()S

ll:lnllJo.2T1J ])0. 11·· .. 1 .. ··1 :¡.. :l7 .• ,.. ..,21,,1 :1 1 II¡ I:-\!I,.. ..' .. :¿~. :/1 b :\ 1 "Il~ 2 254
87th Do. 2nd Do. 11... "'.. ti .. ; .... ' .. 1; .. 11 .... · 3 •. 411.. ..1 .. " .. I 1 .... el .. 53

IlHti: Do. 1st Do. l.. I 111 ...... i .. "111111 .. ' .. l .. Ü!J...... .. " ..... . .. ",' 2 1 1.... l .. 8ú
!l7th Do. 1st Do... ,,1 (, ........ "," .. .. .... :!;¡.... ..·1 '21 .. "", .. 1 1.. .." .. 5~ ~st Ha·tahon Detachments 11.. "J :.J:! ..... j .. ¡ 1; 3i 5" O~ 1 ]";)"J" "l··· .. ' 1 1 1.. .. 1 31 ',.. ..1 6 2 1~(;

:.!nd ])0. Do. ¡.... " 1, .. • 1"1" .... 1"1,, ...... , .. 1 \.\.. .. .. .. '... .... 1 1"1'1" " .. .... ...... :!I lstLi.,~ llalt:K.G.L... 11" .. 1 1 3f .. ","," 1, :1151 1 .... l;ll I1 :.!~7,,,J.. .. .. : ....... "i" 1 .. " .. 1 4; ('11 ··ll;l! li 264
bt and 2nd Ld¡t Bu. K.G.L.. ,,1·· .... L ..... "1" .. ··1·. .. .... :Ji .. 31 .. ,.. ""'1 .. 1 ...... "J" l ........ ",","" .. , H,,, 4('

'!ndLine Bu.K.G.L. ...... .......... ~ ... ;il ... '11 J :11.1,4" ,,' I~ :¡ 271:.... .. .... '"...... :14 .... 1 11 :\1 5' 4 .... U'I 3 3:;:¿
",,1>0. ,"'- '. ··1··, , .. .. "''''1···· ' .... , '1"'" ··1 ' , "", . .1.. ...... ' ...... , .. , ... ,lO' .. 1 ...... , .. , " '1 "· .. 1 "1' "'1"

n" Do Do. TOOI..I, -';",~; ;It:; ~ ,;~j,~ ;, •. ; ~1;-7,~1~ ;, ,,:::d ~: ~:-f,!~ IJ H~ ~:¡~;i 7 k ,;:;:!~:~:,,: ;,! ;::,fo u:: ,;;;



Hank and N ames. Regiment8.

Captain Goodman 6lst Regiment 1st Bn.
Hartley Do.

Lieutenant J\1' Lean Do.
Trench Do.

Collins Do.
Givill Do.

Emign Brackenbury Do.
Adjutant Drew Do.

Capta;n Kelly Do. 2nd Do.
Ste",ar! Va.

Adams Bt. LI. Col. Do.
Lientenant Morris Do.

Dudgcon ])0.
Hnmbly Do.

Steele Do.
Shewbridge Do.

Morgan ])0.
Ensign Cotter Do.

M'CaTthy Do.
Captain Summerfield IS3rd Do. 2nd Do.

Reynolds Do.
J~ieutenant N icholson Do.

Balowyn Do.
Johnsoll Do.

Abell Do.
Pyne Do.

Ensign Boggie Do.
Carey Do.

Lertoller Do.
Adjutant Brahan Do.

Major Gongh 87th Do. 2nd Do.
Lieutenant Rogers Do.

Ensign Pepper Do.
Captain Brown 8l:itb Do. ] st Do.

Lieutenant Whittle Do.
EIIsign Whitelaw Do.

!\Iajor Hoss
"'" n'g;moo' l Captain 1\1 'Pherson 35th Do. '"

Bradby t~lb Do. _" !l
Chancellor ;ISth Do. "5 ¡¡

Lieutenant Gilbert I ~Hlh Do. d §
M'lleth 1""" no_ J ~ ., Fullerton I~HthDo. ::; ~

l\1unroe 1421111 Do. >=1 i
Brown 43rd Do. i

No. Xl.


-1 ltemarks. I~k and N ames.

Slightly }!ojor 1I0dl'cker
Do_ Captain Marshall

Do. Captain Salt'e
Do. Petersdorft

Severely Lieutenant Go',ben Senior
Slightly Ern. H odenberg

Va. Fk. Hodenberg
Severely SaJfe

Slightly Schlutter Senior
SevereJy Ensign Allen

Do. Lieutenant Col'mel Dranns
Do. ,Majar Helleville

])0. ICaptain BreJman
Do. Heldrill

])0. Sharnl'oust
Do. Lientenan! Buerman

Do. Wcnckstern
Do. Wessell

SlightIy Wick
Do. Holle

Leg ampu!ated I Ensign Tineh
¡';everely ¡';chllliat

Slighlly I llilleb I ])0. I Elumenhagen
Sever~ly eaptain Hamelberg

Slightly Gerber
Severely Lieutenant Linsingen

Do. During
Slightly Ensign Brandfs

Vo. Kohler
Severdy Majar Berger

Slightly Lieuteuant Volger
Do. Freytag

Severely Ensign Offen
Do. Captain AlIen

Do. Jhake
Do. Lieulenant An.Ierson

Do. Captain Leckey 13. Major
Sligbtly EIlsign Reeves

1)0. Lieutenant Shipley




Regiments. I


1st Line Dn. K. G. L. I Do.
1st Line HIl. K. G. L.




2nd Line Bn. K. G. L.





5th Line En. K. G. L.



7th Line Bn. K. G. L.


23rd Lt. Dragoons ~1 Do.
Do. S

45th Foot 1 st Bn. t 48th Do. 2nd ])0. 11
197th Do. Do. 1



Hetllark: s.














No. X.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Talavcrade la Reyna, 2t!th July, 1809.

Killed. Wounded. WOllllded.

Rank and Nallles. Regiments. ,Rank and, Names. Regiments. ~emarks. ~k al:d Na~1 ~egiments. Hem~
}lajor Gen. l\i'Kenzie M~.Jor ~eneral IhU t>hghtly Lieutenant Klrwan 7th Foot :lnd Bn. Severely

Br. Gen. Langworth Bngr. Gen. A. Campbell Do. ,Muter Do. Do.
Captain Reckett (Bde. Ms.) Coldstream Guards H. Campbell Severely not dangerous A dJatant Page Do. Slightly

Gardner Do. 4:~rd Fool ,Capto Whittingham 13th LI. Dns. D. A. Q. N. G. Slightly Liellt. Cul. Drummond 24th Do. 2nd Do. Severcly
Lient. King 23rd LI. Dragoons i Blair !lb! Regiment Brigad" Majar Severely :\-Iajor Popham Do. Do.

Power Do.' Bouverie Cold. Gds. ~ A. D. Cam~s to Lieut. Gen. ~ srd tI ICaptain Callis Do. 1)0.
Wyatt Sritish Artillery Burgh !l2nd Re~t. i Sir A. Welle.ley S ' 1" I Y Evans Do. Do.

Ensign Parker Coldstream Guards Z,er~sell ~st Le. Bn. A.D. C. tO,B. ,G. Langworlh Se~erely ~ie~tena?t Vardy Do. Slightly
eaplain Walker 1st Bn. 3rd Guards ~ra1~ (SlClhan ltt.) Do. lo Lt., GI. Sherbrooke Shghtly "nslgn ~rant Do. Severely

Buehanan Do. Captam Enee 3rd nn. Guards. Severely Skeene Do. Do.
Dalrymple Do. IColonel Ha"ker 14th Lt. Dragooll" t>li~htIy Johnson Do. Do.

Ensign Ram Do. I'Captain Chapman Do. Severely JesBamin Do. Do.
Adjutant Irby Do~, Hawk~r Do. (Jo. ~djut~nt Topp ]).0' SlightIy

Lieutenant Beaufoy 2nd Do. 7th F oot Lleutenant Elh. Do. Do. CaptaJ.n G auntlett :l9th Reglment Severely
Majar F. Orpen tilst Do. 1st Bn. I Wainman Do. Slightly Newbold 1)0. Slightly H. James Do. ¡ SlIlith Do. Do. Lieutenant Stan~ns 1)0. Severely
Lieutenant IIemus 1)0.: Bellee 16th Do. Do. Do. Leshe Do. Do.

Lieut. Col. Gordon H3rd Do. ':lnd Bn. Capto Howard 23rd 1)0. Du. Severely Stanhope Do. Do.
Lieutenant D.hman (Jo. Frankland Do. Do. Nicholson Do. Slightly

Montgomery Do. Lord W. Russell Do. Slightly ,Captain Niehnols 318tDo. :lnd Do. Do.
Hood Do. Cornet Dudwell (Ju. Do. Lieutenant Girrllestone Do. Do.

Captain Blake 88th Do. 1st. Do. Lieutenant Polen 1st Do. K. G. L Sevl'rely A. Beamish Do. SevereIy
Wersabe 1st Line Bn. K. G. L. Cornet Tueto Do. t>lightly Captain CoIquhoun ~lOth Du. 1st Do. Sligbtly

Lieut. Hy. Hodenburg . Do. Lient,. C.o!ollel Framingham Royal British Artillery Do. i\~ajor Gwynn 45th Do. Do. Severely
}~vert 5th Lme Bn. K. G. 1. Captam 1 ay lar Do. Do. Lleutenant Cale Do. Do.

Dachenhausen Do. Baylles Do. ])0. I Liellt. Col. Donelan 18th Do. Do. Do.
Hemelman Do. ,Lientenant Stanway Royal Engineers Do. :\lajor Marston Do. Slightly

Captain Todd Royal Stalf Corps Do. Captain Wood Du. Do.
Lientenant Shanahan . Do. Do. FreJlch Do. Do.

Lieut. Col. Stibbert Severely Lieutenant Dronght Do. Sevcrely
. Sir W. Sheridan Do. Do. Page Do. Do.

Captain ¡'lilhnan Do. Do. Cheslyn Do. Do.
Christie Do. Do. Gill Do. Slightly

Collier Slightly Cuthbertsoll Do. Do.
\Vood Do. Do. Ensign Vandermeulen Do. Severely

Jenkinson SevereIy Lieutenant Johnson 48th Do. 2nd Du. Slightly
Ensign Sandilallds Do. not dangerons EJlsign RenIly Do. S~verely
Li~ut. Col. Gorrlon 18tl~n. 3rd Guards t>lightly :\Iajor Kingscote 53rd Do. 2nd Do. Sli~htly

!\lajor F'otheringham Do. 1)0. Captain Stowell Do. Do.
,Captain Giels Do. Do. Garlifte U.Major 60th Do. 5th Do. Do.

Emign Aitchison Do. Do. Andrew Do. Do.


Towers ])0. Do. Lieutenant Zuhlke Do. SevereIy
Seolt Do. Do. Ritter Do. Do.

Lient. Col. l\Iuler :~rd Foot or Hnlfa Severely Mitchell Do. Do.

:\lajor Drummond (Bt. Lt. Col.) Do. t>lightly Ensign Altenstein Do. Do.

'aptai:J Furllaee 6lat Do. 1st Do. Slightly
Laing Do. 1)0.

No. XV.
Return of KiIled, W ounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-

general Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. OIl the Advance of the French Army towards the
Position of Busaco, OIl the 25th and 26th September, 1810.

KilIed. 'Nounded. Missing. Total.

¡ ~. ~. ~ I .. ~.

'-> ~ • ü ~ . U ¿¡ . U ~;~ ~ I~ cA ~ ~ "'::: i ~ ~ 1.- • ~ ~ ... tñ ~
:: O.$.o"'d .Q '-' .. M"O • .:: O.~":l .= OOh"O

é ~ ~ i: ~ S ; rñ .8 a ~ ~ g E 2 ai 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ e § ~ .S ~ ~ ~ ~ s § ~
g 1" ,~!ti ;:;; ~ El ~ ~ fl ~ ':!'!ti ;;; ~ El "á ~ ~ ':í ,';f!ti ;;;¡ ~ El"", ~ 5 ~ ,';f!ti;:S ~ E ~ ~ g- ;:: d ~ ~ ¡:;-- Z ('j s ª'".~ ~ Ctf ;..: ¡:-> E ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ s..: ¡:""l 2 ~ o ~.2:: = ~ ~ ~ E d ~

Ü ...:¡ ;.; ;5 P' .Jj :::=< ~ :::: '->...:¡ ;iI :ñ 01 )] :::=< ;::; :::: ü --' ;.; r7í 01 Ji :::=<1;::; :::: '-> ...:¡ ;iI :ñ 01 :Jj :::=< ;::; ¡::c:
~.:::;:~:~:...o",I~~~::·-~I~~ :.~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~II~III~I~ ------ --

16th Do. Do. I . . .. .. .. 2 .. " 4 3
11 .. 15[12

4[ 9

.. l··
Total British Lass. "']~[']]]]]~li]]~[[I-~[[I~I[I=!=[[[i]~I~il~[I~[[I~[I~127

1st Hussars, K. G. L. 2 31 4 11 .. 1 3[ 6

+HF ~~,: ~~i ••. ~ :,I~:ldl-I:I+I+II~dI:,+I~I+F.I~~I~ Portuguese Arllly General Total ..
Captain Hoey, 99th Regiment, D. A. A. G. severely l wounded.

Comet Keating, 16th Light Dragaons, slightly S


,· ..... l ~,

No. XVI.

Retllrn of Killed, W oundcd, and Missing. of the Army under thc Command of His Execllcncy J.ieutenant-general Lord
Viscollnt 'Vellington, K. B., in Action with the French Anuy, Ilnder the Commaml of Marshal Massella, Prince oi'

Esling, in the Position of Busaco, on the 27th September, 1810.

K~]Jcd., . . wounde~. . Missing•. 1I Total..
~~ ~ '* -~ 2 ~ : ~ I ~ I r~ ~

<1 • I U ;- " • '-' ;;: " • U ;- 1" . U .-o ¡n '- .... o .e ..... .,..... o ~ ~ • ~ o ~ '- . ~
"O .;: O.¿~"'C 0"0 .¡:: O.,;~"'O .0 .::: o .~"C ....... • ¡:: o.~ "C

00::,) OO:;<;l' rñ"'~ ¡:::: 00::.,) OO~.' i:,"-'C.,l ¡:: 00:..;; r.n<:C", oo!So,.¡p l.Il¿:;il Ul<:::l;ñ i3a.. ~ ~ rñ.9 ~ ~ lo-; ¡:; S ce: al ~ 00 .S f ~ $o-, ~ S c: rñ ~ al .9 § ~ ¡..., ¡:::; E tt: 'J~!'"¡; 00 .~ ~ ~ ~;:: S (Ij ;, !:"':~ct$+>!::.o.·2~S~ ~ ¡::":5.;E~b.o··;;;Cl,;S~ ~ ;::...=8-f ....... t.l..2~S..::r::~'¡:::.J185f-'OJ..2~8..!4 ~
-; .~ ~ ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ § 8 ~ .~ ~ ~.~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ § ~ 1-3 .~ '~' ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ '~. e ~ ~ 1-3 .E '~. ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ 'C-O e § a

G"",¡ swr I~. ~f ~~~ -': ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ :' ~' ~ ~ "-,:~~,, " =,' ~~'. ~~ ~;~ ~ ~~ ~~: ~ <, ~ ~ ~ :' ~ ~. A " "
British Horse Artillery l" .. .. .. 2. . 1 .. .. " .. 2
Do. Foot Do. .. .• .. ] .. 1 .. 4. . . .1. . .. •• .. •. .. ].. 5

German Do. Do. .. .. .. 3.. ..," .... "1" .. 3
3rd Foot 1st Bn. 1" 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. 2

5th Do. 2nd Do... 1 .. 1.. 1i .. 1..' ." '1" ,," 1 .. , 7, ..
7th Do. 1st Do... I .. 1 .. 22 .. ' .. .. 1.. .. l.... 2:3'

9th Do. l~t Do. r, .. l" 1 .. 1 .. 17.. .. .. .. l.... 1 .. 22
24th Do. 2nd Do. .. "," 1 .. " .. 1·· . '1" l ......

3!'thDo.2ndDo. 1 .. 4 .. '.. .. 1.... 17.. ' '...... I .. ¡.. 1 .. 21
42nd Do. 2nd Do. .. .. l.. .. .. .. .. 2 1 3. . ' ..' . l! 1 3


43rd Do. 1st Do. .. .. 1" 1 .. 7. . ' .... 1. . 1 .. 7


45th Do. 1st Do. .. 1 21 .. l" :1 . . 3 .. 101i .. 12 .. . . i 2 1 4.. 4 .. 13!J
50th Do. 1st Do. .. .. .. .. . .' 1 ., . '1" ..

52ndDo.lstDo. 3.. 11.. lO.. 11 .... ' ...... 13
60th Do. 5th Do. 3·· 1 3.. lli .. 5 .. !.. 1 3.. .. .. .. .. 24

74th Do. Ii .. 1 .. 1.. 20.. .. .. i .. 2.. .. .. 1 1 .... 1.. 21'
711th Do. 1st Do. 7.. 41.. .. .. 1 .... 1.... ti.. .. 2...... .. 1 .. 54

83rd Do. 2nd Do. 1 . . .. 1 3. . . " . . .. "1 .. .. l.. '" '. 1 3
88th Do. 1st Do. I ., 29.. 2 3 l! 1 2 .. 92.. ' I .. ¡'.. 2 3 3 1 3'.. 122

95th Do. 1st Do. 9 . . 4 I 27.. . ... 11 • • •• •• •• •• 4 1 1 36
1st Line Bn. K. G. L. :1 •. 1 .. I .. 4. . 1 .. 1 .. 7

1st Light Do. Do. ..1.. 1 .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 10.. 2 .. "1" 3.. 12
2nd ])0. Do. Do. I .. .. .. 11.. 11" 5.. ..!.... ..,.... 1.. 1 .. Ii
2nd Lino ])0. Do. 1 .. 2. . ] I .... ", .• , . . Ii. . . " I .. . '1 1 1.. 9

5th Do. Do. Do. 1 .. '" ., .... ' .. i . . 11. . ¡'. " . . . ... I •• • • .1.. .. .., . I .. 1I
7th Do. Do. Do. .. ..... .. .. .. 1 i. . b .. ' . . . ....... ¡ ........ i •. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. 1.. l'

------1-1----- -- ' ---1-- -------'--------'-----1--:---'-- ---I_~ __
Total1ossBritish ...... 1 1 2 1 .... 5 .. 97 .. : .. 1315 1Ol() II .... :JI :)4311 .. ' ...... 1 1 .... 1 .... 1 .. 12g .... 31 (j 1218 21 .... :J7 :1 .jIJ5'1"

Do. Portngnese .. ~.:..:..:..:.~ ___ .;..:. .... ~~_~':":'I.~j~~~ I~.:..:..:..:.-=.'.:.~~~~ ___ ~~ ':":'':'':'--~':'':'.'.:L·· '!'.Ij~t' ____ I,! ~I~ -=~ ~I':":'I~' 12 1!~~_._.
Total. ·1 .... i 1 .1 2 31·'~r~ Ii 1 179 "I! 1 316 1521 141 .... 30 :l 11I17 .. 1 .. 1.. .. 1 .. \ .. / .. "13 1 .. /.17 .. ¡ 1 3 7 :.n¡23 17¡ .... :l9 41143 ..







Rank and N ames.

.jor Smith
ptain Urquhart

eutenan! Ouselcy
!Sign Williams

eutenant lIenry John80n

'. Foot Captain W. l\'l'Intosh

Do. De 80uza
th Foot ])0. Charles Fax

ndDo. Do. Sali,bury
Eusign Castes

Das N ovas Franei


Names of Ofllcers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810.

'Vounded. Woullded.

ltegiments. I Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. Rank and Names. Regimeuts. Remarks,
45th Foot 1st Hu. ¡Lieutenallt Colonel Barclay 52nd }'oul SJightly ¡ Major Prior . 1st Regt. Ports. Slightly

Do. I C. Campbell 70th Du. A. A. G. Do. I Ensign J. M. de Pantos Do. Do.
Do. eaptain Ld. Fitz Somerset 43rd Do. A.D.C. lo Ld. Wellington, Do. I B. de Senio Do. Do.

74th Do. G. Preston 40th Do. Do. to Sir B. Speneer Do. : Captain F. Auzabis 8th Do. Do. Do.
8t:!th Do. 1 st Bn. Lieutenant Majr 7th Do. 1st Bn. Do. ! Lieutenant V. Matthias Do. Do.

Liudesay 9th Do. Lst Do. Severely I Ensign Jno. A. Rodrigo Do. Do.
Captain Meaeham t4th Do. 2nd ])0. SJightly Manuel Pedro Do. ])0.

Lieutcnant Miller 3~th Do. 2nd Do. Do. I J. Manuel ])0. Do.
;\lajor Gwynn 45th Do. 1st Do. Severely l Felix Antonio 9th Do. Do. Do.

Lieutenant Harris Do. Do. ¡Captain P. Jose 16th Do. Do. Do.
Tyler Do. Do. ,'Ensign J. Maria Do. Do.

Anderson Do. Slightly , Lientenan! J. Galderio 19th Do. Do.
Majar Napier 50th Do. 1st Do. Severely Colonel Champion 21st Do. Do.

Captain G. Napier ;,2nd Do. 1 st ])0. Slightly Captain S, Hurgess Do. Do.
Lieutenant C. 'Vood Do. Do. Lieutenant J .. Maehell Do. Do.

Lieutenant Col. Williams 60th Do. Do. Ensign J. Montero Do. Do.
Captain Andrews Do. Do. J. Alberto Do. Do.

Lieutenant J oice Do. Severely Botello Cas 3rd Cassidores Do.
Eberstein Do. Do. Segurada Do. Do.

Franhein Do. Slightly J. Chrostimo Do. Do.
Cargill 74th Do. Severely Captain J. Bernardo 4th Do. Do.

Captain Douglas 70th Do. 1st Do. Do. Lieutenailt A. Queroz Do. Do.
1st Regt. Portugllese Lieutenant Colthurst 83rd Do. 2nd Do. Slíghtly J. D. Vasconeella Do. Do.

8th Do. Do. Major Sil ver 88th Do. 1st Do. Severdy (siuee dead) Ensign }'eliziamo Do. Do.
16th Do. Do. J\l'Gregor Do. Do. Captaiu L. Homm íith Do. ])0. Do.

21st Do. Do. Captain J\I' Ut'rmott Do. Do.
Dansey Do. Slightly

4th Cassidore. Bury Un. Do.
Lieutenant }'itzpatrick Do. Sev('rely

Nickle ])0. ])0.
E",ign Leonard Do. SeveTely

Lieutenant During 1st Line Hn. K. G. L. Slightly
i"Uajor Wurmb Do. Do.

. Lieutenant Stoltc Det. 2nd Lt. Do. Severoly
!Captain J. Cameron 79th Regiment 1st Bn. Missing



Rank and N ames.

Majar Smith
Captain Urquhart

Lieutcnant Ouseley
Ensign Williams

Lieutenant Henry Johnson


4th Fool Cap!~in W.l\f'Intosh

Do. De 80uza
66th Foot Do. Charle, Fox

ü2nd Do. Do. Sali,bury
Enoigu Caste.s

Das N ovas Franci


Names of OfficeJ's Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810.

I Hegiments. I Rank and N ames.

45th Foot lst Bn. LieuteJl:mt Colonel Ilarclay
Do. C. Campbell
Do. Captain Ld. Filz Somerset

14th Do. G. Prestan
88th Do. 1st Bn. Lieutenant Mair

Captaio Meaeham

Lieutenant ~Iiller
Majar Gwynn

Lieutenant Harris

¡Majar N apier
¡ G. Napier

iLieutenant C. Wuod
\ Lieutenant Col. Williams

'CaptalIl }\ndrews
Lieutenant Joice


Captain Douglas

1st Regt. Portuguese Lieutenant Colthnrst
8th Do. Do. Major Sil ver

16th Do. Do. l\I'Gregor
21st Do. Do. Captain l\l' ])ermott

4th Cassidores

Lieutenant }'itzpatrick

En,ign Leonard

Lieutcnant j)uring
,Uajor Wurmb

Lieutenant Slolte
ICaptain J. Cameron

w, Jlluded. 1


Regi ments. Remarks'!1 Rank and Names. llegiments.

52nd Foo'
70th Do.

'13rd Do.
40th Do.

1th Do. 1:
mh Do. 1:

24th Do. :
3tith Do ..

45th Do.

50th Do •.
• 2nd Do.

60th Do.

74th Do.
7!Jth Do.

83rd Do.'
88th Do.

1st Line .

Det. 2nd
19th H~g:

Slightly '1 ~,faj~lr Prior' ls! Regt. Ports.
. A. G. Do. ,Enslgn .l, M. de Pantos Do.

A.D.C. to Ld. Wellington, Do. I B. de Senio Do.


Id Do.
nd Do.

sI Do.


st ])0.




st Do.
Id Do.

st Do.




n. K. G. L.

.1. Do.
,nen! 1st Dn.

Do. to Sir B. Speneer Do. Captain F. Auzabis 8th Do. Do.
Do. Lieutenant V. l\latthias Do.

Severely Eusign Jno. A. Hodrigo Do.
Slightly Manuel Pedro Do.

Do. J. Manuel Do.
Severely Felix Antonio 9th Do. Do.

Do. Captain P • .lose 16th Do. Do.
Do. Ensign J. Maria Do.

Slightly Lieutenant J. Galderio 19th Do.
Severely Colonel Champion 21st Do.

Slightly Captain S. Burgess Do.
Do. Lieutenant J. MacheIl Do.

& ~~L~~ ~
Do. J. Alberto Do.

Severely Botella Ca. 3rd Cassidores
Do. Segurada Do.

Slightly J. Chroslimo Do.
Severely Captain J. Bernardo 4th Do.

Do. Lieuteflallt A. Queroz Do.
Slightly J. D. VasconceIla Do.

Severcly (since dead) Ensign Feliziamo Do.
Do. Captain L. Homm Gth Do. Do.

Do. .










Do •








Return of Killed, W ounded, and Missing. of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general

Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in skirmishing with the Enemy's Advance on the 4th,
5th, 8th, and 9th October, 1810.


3rd Dragoon Guards

1st or Royal Dragoons

14th Light Dragoons

16th Do. Do.

1st Hussars K. G. L.

]st or Royal Dragoons

16th Light Dragoons

1st Hussars K. G. L.

Wounde'l. ,1 ___ ~l\Iiss~~_ Total.
"1 oi ,; ~ ':; r.Q~ ~.... rñ;: B <; <ñ~

,,:§. _.~~~ I;~. ~.~~~ m~ ••. "~~~ ~¡::itll i,';>-''C=Ct! .¡:;¡:::¡r. ~~:::¡;; .C::C W Z;'>,~c8 •
.§ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ E ~ -: ~ I ~ I ~ .~ .. ¿ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ 'B ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ § -:5 .-: ~

o..-rn t .~~=SP!"" _~-=, .... ...., .... :...-rn't:: .;;..!""""'l:::-,S ....
ro .~ .::: c:::: !-.o ct: ~ k ~ :: o ro.~ =. a:! .... ~ ~ - ~ o o '3:1.~ ¡::: e 1-0 ~ ~ 1-0 ~ o O


I ,, :J_=-~~ :::IU ~=-=-=-=-I'=-I=-::.I~bu ~=-=-c=- =-=-=-:ñ :::1:,) ~:.=- '"' =-
--,---._,--,-- I I1 i 1 I I

•.. , .. .. •• . ...••..•. 1

" I l. ___ .1 .. . ....... 1

" .J.
", .. ,1 1 "1.1



.. ,11 1315, . '1 ..

5 5 Ili .. ,,,, ..

31311,,,, .. , ..


I ~ ~ ~~ :01 • ~ -~I~"; ~~= . .~ "Sb ~"" ~ ~ .§~ ] ~ ~ I~ I~ I ~:,)....::~·'LJ'fl~~ -~

81 !JI 7

111 1 3112





~12Illlrl"l"n 3 3 2 4

4 ti 2 ... oO ....... 16 1824

5 () 3

41 4 4 " .. .... .. 1 .. 4 5 lO


4 4 .. .. .• .. .. .... 8 810

11 .. IH:17 42 ........ 2 .. 252923

Total. .11 •• 1 .. 1. ·1 .. 1 .. 1· .13131;;112r~I~I~I-·· 121~1281;I;¡¡rlll~n-·· l-¡n;oI;I;1141~TT~I-.. 13D;;Jlfi;l;
16th Light Dragoons,

lst HIlSS:lI'S, K. G. L.

Captain lHurray. slightly.
Sweetenham, sevorely.

Aly, slightly.
Linsingen, Do.

1,t or Royal Draf!:oom-, Lielltenant Carden (mi~sing.)

No. XIX.

Return of Killed, W oUl1ded, ul1d Missil1g, of the Arrny undt>r the Command of Lieutenant-general
Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in an affair with the Enemy near Sobral, 14th October, 1810.

Killeel. 11 \Vounded. l\lissing. Total.

i ·0 i. li ~ 'o . .;: 'S I 00 i ~ fFJ
;,g. i..~~-g lul2. oo.i;~-g cñ;;. riJ.~É)-g rñ~. ;..rl8'"g ,~ :: = !; ~ e S ro I.~ ~;; ..:; t' ~ El ro .c ~ ~ ~ ~ :: S.:a .S ~ ~ ~ ~ e S ~ ~ ~ ~., ~ ~ ~ El ~ • li~ .... ?f.' ~ ~ ~ := ~ • B "!: ~ .• ~ ~ ~ S ~ • .g -::: .~., ~ ~ ~ s,..:.¡: • ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ¿j ;1 ~ § ~ ] ~ ~ :f 2 ~ ~ ~.~ el ~ ~ ~ ~ e § ~ ª".f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ¡; ;;.~

R .. giments.

ü ,...:¡ :.:¡ 'lJ 3'ü 'lJ ~ ;:¡:; >-< I,ü ,...:¡ ~ 'lJ 3'ü rn ~ ~ >-< ü H :.:¡ 'lJ 3'ü lfJ e :>:: >-< ü >-1 ;.;¡ lfJ O'ü rn ;:::: :>:: >-<
GeneralStaff I~~~~-.. ~~-"I'i--¡-:-:~~-" ~~-.. ~I~'~'~'-" ,~,~,-.. --------

2Hh Foot 2nd Bn. i '.... .. .. , .. , .. ,
, I

11 . . 1_ ., ••


11 .. , ..

7 11



2 11 .. 1

50th Do. l,t Do.

60th Do. 5th Do.

7lst Do. 1st Do.

Dets. 95th Do. 3rd Do.

1st Line Bn. K. G. L.





41 .. 1 23 .. , ..




4 10

4 30

... } 9


2nd Do. Do.

5th Do. Do.
1 ..


4 'j' _lo.

"J" 4


7th Do. Do.

Total .. ::H+IH·I~::ii~~l ~~~ .: ::::I+~I+r. ~I~ +~~:i;'-
General Staff, Captain 1Jouglass Mercer, arel 11001 Uuarus, acting A. D. C. to Lt. Gl. Sir B. Spenccr, slightly.

!)iith Foot, 3rd Battalioll. LieuteIlant}~eles, severely.
"lh Line B"llalioJl, K.(;.L. .\Iuller. Do.

No. XX.

Heturn oI' Killed, W ounded, and Missing,of a Division of the Army under the command of His Excellency Lientenant-general Lord Visconnt
Wellillgton, K. B. in action with the Frcnch Army near Almeida, on the 24th J uly, 18] O, Head-quarters Alverca, 25th J uly, 1810.


General Staff

Royal Horse Artillery

14th Light Dragoons

16th Do. Do.

1st Hussars, K. G. L.

43rd Foot, 1st Bn.

52nd Do. 1st Do.

15th Do. 1st Do.

Total British Loss ..

1st Bn. Cassidores

3rd Do. Do.

Total Portuguese Loss ..

Grand Total. .

. ~~~~~~d. J Missing.~! Total.:
.!'l I ~ ¿ ~ ¿ I·~ I . I ~ 1 ..'!! ~ ~ ~.i! ;;. W

KilIed •

al CJ _ rr..... c....: Q) V ~ 00 ....: a;¡ ,r, -::.:n ~ C) U ~ ~ ¡::: .,..,. '+-O ;: ~ I ..... ¡...¡ 'Io.i c:: • ...... .~ J- 4-i;:. ..... H
o oi ...... ~o \"1:0 ~I ~ • ~ o dO ~ I+-t .~o ~o rn. ....... ~ o I ~ ~ rñ .5 ~ é ~ E S ~ ~ rñ ~ ::J 00 .S ffi ~ ~ ~ I a § I:!: '" 1 ';j u J, .S \j rJ Z!" S :;; 'en J, ~ U W .S "rJ ¡';" s ;a .., w :o ~ 1:i. ~ rñ 5 -= :e ci2 :5 ro §. ~ al ~ ""O '~ W -O rñ §. ~ cA ~.~ ~ :n:o rñ §. ~ w t ""d ;:::; ~ ...; 8 .5 .8 b(¡ •• :E g3 e,.!tl ~ ~ t.; o .5 -;:: b.I:., ~ ~ I E ..:.d (!.I ~ ~ .:; S 5 ~ .~., ~ gS a..:.:: ~ ~ t:: ~ t:: s B b.O • :2 ~ ;::: .!:4 H ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ g .~ ~ ;.: .~ E § ~ 8 ~.~.~ §'.; .~ ] ~ '~I E ~ ~ a I ~ .~ 3 ~.~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ 2 ~ ~ t: S ~ ~ ~ ~ '§ ~ ~ .~ 2 ~ y ~ ~ ~ ~i~e.I='~~~ =-~~~ ~I=-~~=-ei~~~=--=-~~I,:::.=- -=-~ ~ ~ w ~'=-,- ~ =-=-=- a ~~~~ ~ ~~~:"-=-I~=-

...... 1 .. ··1" .. .. .. .. .. .... 1" "1" "1"1" .. ··ji" .. '·1 ..
.. , .. , .. , .. ,.. .. l ............ 1.. .. 21.. .. 2.. .. .. , 211 3

11 .. 14j....I.. l' 1 .. 4 •• 1 •• 1 1 .. 1 .. li ..

o.' ••


11 .. 1 .• 1 .. 121"1131' '1"11"1"1'.1 41 (j,.,
.. , .. , .. , .. , .. 1, ........ 1 1 .. 1 ..


3'.. "l'. 3
21 .. 13... .... 2 .. 4

771 .. 1 .. 11··, .. 1 114, .. 1 5171 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1101:.! 1104, .. , ..

• _l •• 1 •• t •• 1 •• 1" -l' -l' -1 31 •. 11 .. [ .. 41 •• 1 ••

~~.I':'·-H~'~~~~ ~i~~ ~II~ ~~I~- ~1~lj~ ..!.~~I~ ~.:.' .:--.~~ j~I~I~I~~~ ~j.~ ~~~":'~~~~-=I~I~Cj~
-- '1-r ' ¡ -- - - -- , --1'" " 1, -- , , ,'-- ---- "' ''',- -" --------1 ' 1- - - - -- , '" --1- - , , , , >ti - - - - - - '" '"'1' " ~~[[IT~~~~·:-~'~~~~~'~~~~ ~--::~[ ~,~~~. II~~ ~ ~:~I~ ~~~~: . ~~~~::~.: I~.
;~~t[;IJ;;1 ~;~~:~~~~~ ,::~;I=l;--I[;~~ :'::[; ;; ;o~:--=;: ~ ,::;~

No. XXI.

Returo of OfIicers Killed, Wounded, amI Missing, on the 24th July, 1810.

Killed. Wounded. I 1\Iissing.

Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. I Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks.
Lient. Col. Edward HuI! 43rd Foot 1 st Bn. Lieut. Shaw 43rd ltt. A. D. C. ~


Slightly ¡Lt. J. 1\I'Culloch 9"th Regt. 1st Bn. taken prisoner Captain E; Cameron Do. to B. General Crawford S
Lieutenant J "bn N asan Do. Lieutenant B1atchford 14 tll J"ight Dragoons Severely

D.lH'Leod 95th Do. 1st Do. Captain P. Deshon 43rd Regut. 1st Bn. Slightly
'fhomas Lloyd Do. Do.

W. F. 1:'. Napier Do. Do.
J. W. Hull Do. Severely

Lieutenant George Johnstone Do. Sligbtly
J. P. Hopkins Do. Severely

H. Harvest Do. Slightly
James I\I'Dearmid Do. Severely

J ohn Stephenson Do. Do.
Roger Frederick Do. Do.

Majar Hcnry Hidewood 52nd Do. 1st Do. Slightly
Captain R. Campbell Do. Do.

James Creagh 95th Do. 1st Do. Severely (sínce dead)
Samuel l\Iitcbell Do. Do.

1st Lient. H. G. Smith Do. Slightly
Mathias Pratt Do. Severely

Reilly Do. Do.
Coane Do. Do.

T. Smitb Do. Do.
2nd Lient. George Simmons Do. ])0.

3rd Cassidores ~ One Officer, rank t and name unknowll



State of the Royal British and German Artillery Drivers, Engineers, &c.

Head-quarters, Cartaxo, 15th February, 1811.

Officcrs, Serjeants, Drurnmers. Rank and File. Alterations sinee last, I
---~-----c----~ Branch.

" Siek. l~ Siek.¡ 1:: I Sick, ~ Men. Horses. I~ ~ ~ ~ ¡ 1::: '"' - ::: '"'1 :::: ,,¡, I .. I.~ ,S '
..,.J CI:l .Oc .o¡;: .O!=l ""'d "'O .. '"dl ..... ~wcn

.... • ¡:: Q.l -o 1.... "'C I ''''' "'o..... <l) • c.J"¿ • '"O Q) ro. M·
2 i .S ~ ~ ~ ~ .; § E:g ~ .: ~ fJ ¡ ~ .~ ~ ...: ...! § ~.~ ..... I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ E 1 ~ ~ 'O ~ t


p ;... ('C <U T.. ¡:: ¡::l ::: ;:: ¡::H ¡:: e ¡:: :::'~ ...... 1::: ::: ¡:: ~:::"::;:! ~ rI> ""O .. ~ t: ~ o u I~" o:.¡... el ~ <Il ~ t.J ~o ....... ""'~ ..... <l.>~-o~lc..::.....¡,-or-!. c:J <l.J (jJ ,.., OF-l""': C) QJ""O ..... Q)"'s;::s ..... "'Cl·:r. ¡::¡Cl..!:ld~--=
........ '" ;:j ~ ~ ifJ JJ 1Jl ;:: 'Il q) T.J 00 a. 1> '1' 'n 00 E rJ). ro: ~ ~ ¡::; c:; :..:. !.Il el - u ~ ~ e S" 1- ¡:: '.;:s

...: ! ;;.~ ;:; ~ ¡:; E ~ i5 ~ "'O I ¡.; ~ -=- o c: '"d ~ ~ ~ o'C "'O 'O o ::l ...... CJ ;!l <l) f :2 ~ V IV a f o ~ ~ o ....
H '" ~ ...:¡ en :Ií ;:.., ;:.., --1 ;,);:.. ;; ¡Ii: :lo. --1 U ,:lo.:'l il< il< < U ¡¡,,:'l ¡..., =: ;;::¡ ~ ~ ~ :::¡ ;.- ;:.., ~ i~ ;l U;'- U il< U u <1


' {Horse l~rtiJlery - -: ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ --, -; ~ ~ --,-- -H/-l -; 29 ~3 -,-,- -2-7-0 -·-·-r~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -.-,-,~,~,~
Do, Duvers 6 ]26 <1 20 42 1921420 I 9 .. ,," 9,"

_ B, FootA~tillery 3" 1122 5 16 .. 1 2 7 .. 2 3 63022,62 97 12 823 .' 1"1" 1 .. 11 1 .. " .. ,,11 4 118118147
~ Do. DrIvers 2 7 1; fi :! 17 5 .. 4 :;07 11 5334fi 7 724 5791230 .. " . ,l .. 1" ,. Iv:; 5 3, ..

P:; lG'f Do. Artillery 5 12 2 .7 5 .. . 229 10 13 25:;, '
t. Do, Drivers 1 " 120 4 11 1 136 1881 78

Engineers 10 12 .. 3 .. 16 " 17 ,.!

Waggon Train 1 1 615 3 2:l0 .. " 16 1 4 ... , 1 " 1

.. 28196 3 45!11 2!1.. ............


31"''''1'''' '" 'l" Total,,1~2 :W~IM WI ;g2~;-3~!~1~1;; ~218-. '-!~I;;:!J4 738 -;;- 287411480 317. ~3~~11, ;9~~ -6-;;;41
, , 1 ; l' • 1 ¡

314,,, 2

No. XXV.

Rcturo of Killed, W oundcd, and .M:issing, of thc Army under the Command of Lieutenant-
general Lord Viscount W cllington, K.B. in Action with the French Army froro the 6th

to the 15th March, 1811. Head-quarters Lousao.

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

~. ~. ~. ~.
00 ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ui ~ .~ ~ O'~"'Ci .~ o.¿.-o .~ ,o.~'"Cl .~ O.~'"d

(/lCfl. ~CIJ(1)~ cnco:: • • r,:¡". __ Ulct:.oOOa,..= ¡flcc· '~vs:: ~ .s ~ ~ ..::;;¡ a ..: rñ ,ñ ~ S ~ !: ~ S ~ :ti 00 S S ~ ~ ~ S ~ cñ rñ.S s: ~ E e El d 00 ~i~~~~.~§~~ 2.a.~~L~~~~"á ~ ~~~1~~~~;~~ ~~~ftc:~~8~ ~
..! ctl.~ ~ .5 t.. t; ;.. ~ o ~ ce I'~ :: ::.. ..... :; l-o ~ :: I~ :'ti .~ 1 ¡:; i1 :... t ... ;'1: :;:¡ ~ C':l .~ ¡:; .5 '"' ~ ¡..., ~ o

"" U -l ;:.< en O' en :::¡ ::c ;:: "" U -l ;,;¡ "fj O' "f) :::¡ ~ ~ 1'" U -l ~ W O' :f] :::¡ ~ ;:¡; "" U ....:: ;:.< W O' :f] :::¡ ~ ::c:
8th March 18111[~~~~~·~~~ 1 ~~I~~~~~~~-~~ ~~j~~~~~-;-; ~~~~~~~1~---;;10

9th Do. • .,. ·1· ., •• , •• , •• , •• 11 1

10th Do.

.01 •• , •• 1 •• 1' .1 •• 1211 .. 211 213

11th Do. •• I •• I.ol •• I··! 1 ........ 1 o. •• •• •• 4 .. 5,··

""'j" .......... 8 3 5 1 .. 5 .. 106 4 ................ 5 .... 1 5 .. 5 .. 11917
..1 .. l .......... l~ .. ,1 531 .. 10 .. 93 .................. 4 .. 541 .. 10 .. 109, ..

l .... 2 1 .. 6 .. 1 ..•. 1 1 .. " l.. 57,. ., , .•.. , ..... , ,. .. .. .. ,. 3 1 ., ., 2.. 631~

12th Do.

14th Do.

15th Do.
------~--,- ---------- --1------- -----.-----

British 1

" .. 3 .. .. .. 1 .. 27 (j: 1 6 !JI I .. lü .. 264 ~ .. .. .. .. .. .. I(j 8 1 ti 12 4 1 .. 17 .. 307 :,21
Portuguese ¡ ................ 21 .. 11" 21 1 3 .... 6 .. 80.. .. ...... ~ .. !J.. 2 1 3 .... 7 .. llol~

Grand Total .. II~~3~~~-¡~:u;-;;-II-¡-;1~7-¡~;-:-:- 344 7 ~~-:-:F~~ 1 ~;;-; l--;137\~~;~ 417 121


E.1\'[, Pakenham,

Col. D. A. G.


"l\ ames 01' thc Otlicers Killed aud W oUllded
from the 6th to 15th March, lS11.

Date. Rallk alld Names. !I Regiments.

Uth March, l~ll

Lielltenant 'fhomas Gifford 1: i;2nd Foot 1st En.

Sawatzky 60th Do. 5th Do.
15th Mareh Hepenstall 1 88th Do. 1st Du.

11th March, 18U Lientenant Hopwood 9i\tb Regt. 1st En.

I En,ign Jose Joaquim Figeo 3rd Caeadores Lientenant Clark 5th Foot, 2nd Bn. March 45th Do. 1st Do. Cross ¡¡2nd Do. 1st Do. Ensign Lifford Do. Do. I;!lh Do. Adjutant Winterbottom Do. Do.
< Lientenant lIippenstall 8!lth ])0. Do.

I Captain Rogne 94th Do. Lientellant Beckwith 95th Do. 1st Do. Captain Chaproan (15th 1st Caeadores Waldron 27th II th of the Line Ensign Jase Felicissimo 4th Cacadores Jose P. de Carto 6th Do.
Captain Napier 43rd F 001 ] st En.

DalyeIl Do.
Ensign Carroll Do.

Captain George Napier 52nd 1)0. 1st Do.
William Mien Do.

14lh Do. < William Jone! Do. Lientenant Wynne 60th ])0. 5th Do.
Crabb 74th ])0.

]'IJajor Sle"ar! 95th Do. ht En.

Lieutenant Strode Do. \'1 Joa'luim Manuel I bt Cacadores ~ 1
I I.t LiclItellant l\1'ClIlIoc!t ;, U5th .1)0. bt Bu. 1 ;¡(It Do. t I tlld ])0. Kincaid ])u.

I Remarks.












~ ;;;:



Return of Killed, W ounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of His ExceIlencv Field-marshal the
Marquess of 'Vellington, K. B., in the Affair at Fuente Honore. •

11 ' ~ :ill"~. ¡ ~ !111 ' d 1, "':~d. ~ I III I l. t"ij"1 i~ I I 1I . . . T."I .
:-0: " ;:: 0::" - S ~ o ~ I "' _ ,," ;; El '" 00 - "' " ¡; "1 1" :: ~ ,,; , ,n.,," ~ 10:: I e 1;;,3 ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ t 5 ~ ~ ~ -; ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ § ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ '$JC ~ ~ E ~ "'ª & 1 ~ 5 ~ ~ § . ~ E

1": ..e ~.~ e .3 i: e ,.:;: I ~ .3 .~ ..:s _~ .~ ,~ !'E I ~ ~ d o c.~ ~ ~.;:; -:: E ';:;> ¡: 2 "3 o . .:: S ;;.§ é ~ ~ 2
_____________ II=__-=-=-=__:.. ~Cf]_=_=_I=-=- =-:=..:::..=-~~~=--=--~ ::: =--=-~ =-'"'-~! ~=-~ ::; =-:=..:.J.=-=--~!=_, __ , __ _

/ Royal Horse Artillcry ].. . '1" I .. . .1

" ... _¡l .......... 1 ..
I·lth Light Dragoons l' . 1, 1 1 .. .. .. 1 1 .. ...... I 1 1 ..

16th Do. Do. .. .. ] .. 1

,,, "1" "1" "1" ...... ..
1st HlI;;,ars K. G. L. .. o • • • .[.. 1 .. .. .. 4 5 5 .. .. .. .. .. . .. .

5th }'not 2nd 13attalion .. 1. . .. , .. "1 .. . ·1" 4 4 ..
24th Do. 2nd Do. .. .. ..l·· .. .. ..1.... 2 2.. "l"

4¡!nd Do. 2nd Do. ..1.. 1:. 1.. .. 1.. 5 7.. .. .. 111
45th Do. ht Do. ..1.. .. "1-' .. 2 :2 ..

50th Do. 15tDo. ..¡ .. I.. 1 1 ... ¡.... :¡ 5.. .. ..
fiOth Do. 5th Do. 3 :l.. J •. " •• .• !J 11. . 1>1 1-1 ••

7lst Do. 1st Do. h ~.. :2 I 1 2.. 31 3H. . 61 6 ..
74th Do. Do. .. .. 1 l.. .. .. .. .. 9 9 . . . ...

79th Do. 1 sI Battalion I 1.. 4 5 .. 1.. ..1 1.. 1 í 20 ..
8:{rd Do. 2nd Do. . ·1· . H 9 . . :¡ :l ..

88th Do. 1st Do. o • '11.. 2 .. 3 5 .. 2 ..
8!lth Do. 2nd Do. .. . (¡ b . . 6 6 ••

92nd Do. 1st Do. !I 10.. 1 .. 9 10 ••

1111 .. 1 1, ..

•• 11"

" Jo ••

11 .. 1 .. 1 .. 11, ••

1, .. 11 1 ~ ';1'1 ¡-31::

:1 3 3

4 5 5

4 4 .•
2 2 ..

7 !I ..
2 2 ..

3 5 ..
20 22 ...

43 52 ..
10 10 .•

21 25 ..
12 12 ••

3 5 ••

..!l ¡;:;

~ I I ~"'" . '" ¡::: "(; ~ ~:i:

94th Do. Do. 2 :1 • • 1 •. 2 3 .•
95th Do. 3rd Battalion 1 .. !I 10 .• i . . 1 .. 9 10 .•

1st Jjght 13attalion K. G. L. 2 2 .. o 5 5 "1 .. 7 7 ..
2nd Do. Do. . .1 1 .. I •• 3 3 .. .. . ... i. . 4 4 .•

1st Line Do. Do. . . l' . :2 4 .. ' . . . .'. . . .. '1" 1 1 2 4 ..
2nd ])0. ])0. <1 4 .. 1 . . . .1. . .. .. .. 4 4 .'

\ 5th Do. ])0. l. . . .1.· .. i. . l .. 3 4 •• 1 .• . .•. " .. 1 . . 3 4 ••
7th Do. Do. 1,,:,,-,_":"-'1":"-' _______ 1 ______ 1 __ ~..:..-.~_1_:I ..:..-.1..:..-. __________ I]..:..-.~· ..:..-...:..-. __ ~ ._. ~_2 __ 3..:..-.
~:t~~'~~~~~~se ~~~IL~~L~~~~~IL'~ii,l_!11,L l~~ 1;~~!:~~~:~~~ 1 ::~~í!~I!L~~)~_~~~~ 1~~ 2!:~

GeneralTotal ... " II] .. ··:! .. :12:¡¡;4Il .. 4101521111111701 :W4/G¡ .. I ...... -... 1 .. 21221

1 1 .. 5lJ 5:2 1,1122326211


Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded on the 3rd of May, 1811.

Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and Narries. llegimen Is. Remarks.

Killed. Woundeu.
Lieutenan t Cowsell 7lst Regt. 1st Bn. Captain Krauchenberg 1st Hus.ars, K. G. L. Slightly

Captain Imlach 19th Do. 1st Do. l\1'Donald 42nd Regt. 2nd Bn. Severely
Lieutenant Rudkin 50th Do. 1st Do. Slightly

Ensign Gran! Do. Do.
Lt. Col. Williams 60th Do. 5th Do. Severely

Duchestaletle Do. Slighlly
Captain lWlntyre 7lst Do. 1st Do. Severcly

Lieutenant Fox Do. Do.
M'Crea Do. Sligbtly

Ensign Kearns Do. Dangerou"ly
Adjutant Law Do. Slightly

Lientenant Calder 19th Do. 1 st Do. Do.
Ensign Brown Do. Severely

Lieutenant Hill 92nd Do. 1st Do. Do.
Uniacke 95th Do. 3rd Do.

Captain de Barros 6th Cacadares
Lientenant de Moratto Do.

Manuel J oaquim Do.
J. de Sto Anna Do.

Eusign F. de Roxa Do.
Antonio Pinto Do.

Adjulant B. de l\Iagelhomes Do.



Retllrn of Killed, WOlluded, and Missing', of the Arrny under the Cornrnand of His Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B.
Oll the 5th Muy, 1S11.

Killed. ----------vVounded. Missing. Total.

,l. . 1 . 'l' I i ,S'. ~ . í I • I i 1 1 <::i'1 '1 . i i~1 \ iI:i' • • -l· . ~ I ~ ~ r.ti • ~ w. .:; rñ ~-t • 1, ~ .!!:. ~ • ~ rñ ZJ rÍJ ~.... • e '~ rñ .:!: 00 !!!.;.... • ;s .!! lOO • r~. • !:.::::
I ro <J.) -;::tl.~ rñ ¡::I ¡::: H ~ rIJ. i en ~ ~ IJ'J ..... .;, ¡::::¡ :::... ~ IJ'J :f] ~ -- en.= . ¡:: ¡:: t! ;...:., rn 'l1 :¡" ...... :r..~ • m =?l ~ tT.I

: Uí 8 j :s %. ;; '~I<::i ¡j El 0 .;;¡ 'Ji i ' <i 8 ::..;J ~.s ;; .=.L <::i ¡; S 0 ~ 'Ji 1 -' 'l 8 :s 5 § .;.r <::i ::; \ El ,~ .;;¡ :l? ,.: 88 S. .':; tJ S. <::i ~ S 0 -.; g¡
! ~ 'O ~ ';i' ¡t¡5 .~ ~ I!S '5"' ~ ~ <5 ~! ~ 'O ...; ~. ;-.~ ~ 5 'P 2.,:.; a s I (U "'§ ...; '~. ª"'.~ ~ ~ .~ e ~ o ~ ¡:"O: _' ~ ~I ~ ';¡j ~ 'c:;; 2 ~ 'O s I ~=-'::'~~::' :';I-'=-~I:",~~_=J~"=-=-~'I=-=-='~~=- '" ... ~J::.. ~~=-~=-I::.=-~~!:..~ .. ~J:.I~=-I.=-,=-~I~ ~0..~=-~...':-.-1 =:


1 , " ,_
IGelleralStajf i·· .. ·· .... ·· .............. 1 :! .... ··1;·1............ 2 .................... 1 ........ 2 .. ¡ •.•••• 1.......... 2

Horse Artillery : . . " " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 3


.... .. , "1 .. 1" .. .. ". •• 1 I 3 .. ,.... .. ...... i .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. '.. .. "1" .. .. .. 2 2 6
E'ootDo. ...•...... l .. 4 5!J .... "]"1 112 .. 18 2121 ' ........ ' .... 12 .... 1 .. 2226 30

1st Hoyal Dragoons ¡ .. .. .. .. 4 418 ...... · ... 1 J .. 36 37 ~4, .. .. .. .. .. "' .. 1.... 40 41 42
14th Light Do. , ' •.. " .. .. 3 3 5 .• .. .. .. 21:! l.. {¡.. 21 32211...... 3 3 3 .. 1 2, 2 l.. 6.. 27 38 30

lGth Do. Do. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7 41.... .. .. 2 ........ 1(¡ 18 5 1.. .. 1 .. 2 2 11 2 .... 1.. 33 27 11 1st lIussar. ~. G. L. l· .. ·...... 1 :! 61 .... I 1. ... ~ .. 3~ 4:11:!0.............., 111 .... 3 2 37 ~? 26
ColdstreamGds. IstBn., •• "1" .. .. 4 ·1 "1" .. 1 1.... 2 .. 4/ 50 .............. 1.. 7 8.. 1 11 .. 1 .. 2 .. 58 02

3rdFootGuards,lstDo.: .......... 1 .... ;; 6 .......... 11···· 3 .. 4953 ...... 1........ 1213 .... l .. l .. l .. 3 .. 6672
1st Fo"t, 3rd Do. I " •• •• •• • .,.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. b 9 .. 1" .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1.. 8 9

5th Do. 2nd Do. 1 .... " .. .. .. .. ...... .. . ... '. .. .. 3 3 .. ' .... " .. .. .. .. .. ., ...... " .. .. 3 3
9th Do. 1st Do. " ., " .......... " . ·1.. .. .. .... 4 4 .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 4

24th Do. 2nd Do. . ......... 1.. 45 .................. ~ .. 17 l!J .. I ........ 1 ........ 45.. 1 l. ... 2 .. 2529
30th Do. 2nd Do. .• .• •. . ... \ ...... 1.. 3 4.......... .. ...... 1.. 3 4

42nd Do. 2ud Do. .. 1.. 2.. .. ........ 1 .. 22 23.......... ..,.... .. ...... 2.. 23 25
44th Do. 2nd Do. .. " .... " .. 4 4......... . _ .. 1. . . ... " " .. 4 4


45th Do. 1st Do. 3,3.. •.······ .... 1 l .. , .......... l ..•... 4 u .... 1 ................ 4 4
50th Do. 1st Do. 1 .... ,...... .. 3 :1 ..

.............. ~ .. 1921..................... .. ...... 1 .... 2 .. 2629

51st Do. .. .. '.. .. .. .... ...... '.. ...... 5 5...................... 1 1.. .......... .. .. .... 5 5
.;..' 60th Do. 5th Bn. .. .. 1.. .... . ... , .... 1.. .. "1" 1. ... 1 .. II 14 ............ 2 .... 12 1 34,39.. .. ...... l .... 1.. 12 15 ~ l1lst Do. 1st Do. . ... " .. .. :! ..•. I 1 .. 10 13.. ., l.... ~ 1 (j 1 64 74...................... . .. '1·" I 4 2 1 9 2 108 126

-:: 74th Do. " •• •. .. .. 1 2 3. . 2 •.. ' I l.. 52 56................. . .. .. .. .. 2 l.. 1 l.. 54 5\'


~ 79th Do. 1st Do. I .. 2(j 27.. 1 ., 2 5 1.. 5 .. 121 135.. " ........... " .. 2.. 92 94.. .. .. l.. 2 5 l.. 8.. 239 2.56
83rd Do. 2nd Do. . ......... 1 .... 11 3.. 1 .... 2 .. 2ti 2!J .... ' ............•... \.. .. .. \ .... 2 .... 31 26 32

85th Do. .. ........ 1 ...... 1213 ...... li2' .... 313:! 39 .. 1 ................ 2140431 .......... 3 .... 528492
88th Do. 1st Bn. . ....... 1.. 1 2.. .. .... 1 1 1 .. 1 1 45 49...................... 1 1.......... 1 1 .. 1 1 47 52

!J2nd Do. 1st Do. . •. '1" .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7.. .. "I··t 1 .... 2 .. 32 3ti ...... ·· ........... '1" 1 2.. 39 43
!J4thDo. ..••.............. . ..... 1·.······ ...• 44 ... ,...... .... 44

!J.,th Do. 1st Bn. .. " " .. " .. .. .. .. ' .... ' ... " .. l.. (j 7. ......... . .. .. 1 .. 6 7
!J5th 2nd Do. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "1" .. .. .... 1 l. .. .. 1 1

95th 3rd Do. . ......... 1........ 1 .. .. .. ..... .. .. .... 2 2 ....... ·.... 11.. 1 2.. .. 1 .... 1.. 1I 5
ChasscUIs Brittaniquo ...•.•.... .. 2.. 28 30.. .. " 21' 1 1.. 2 .. 15 21... . ..... 7 7.. .. 2 1 1.. 4.. 30 58

lstLightBn.K.G.L............. ........ 22 .. , .. 1............ 11 .. 1 .................... 33
2nd Do. Do. Do. . .. '1" .. '. .. .• .. . • .. 1 1 .. \.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 .. í.. .. .. .. .. .. .... .... 2 2

1st LineDo.Do. .. .. ,........ .. l ......... 3 .. 14 1~.. ................ 1 1 .. !.. 1 ........ 3 .. 15 19
2nd Do. Do. Do. .. ...... 2,2... ... , 21" ........ 11 la .. ".............. 2 2 .. 1.. 2 .......... 15 17

5th Do. Do. Do. . ..• ¡.. .. . .\.. .. 1 ........ i .... i. ... .... 8 ~ .. 1

" .. .. .. .. .... .. .... 3 :~.. .. " .. .. .. .... 11 11
7th Do. Do. Do. .. .. ; .. " .."...... 1 J .. ," .. ' .... :..... 1.. J.. 4 (j.... ........ "........ 2 2...."........ 1.. 1.. 7 9 Brun~~i~o~:I:ritiSh .. ~ ~i~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~!~~ 141.~ }I'~I~I~ ~¡I,~¡i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ -;~ ~,I ~ ~ ~I~ ~¡~ ~ ~ ~.~ 2~ 2:: ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~lli~~i.~ ,,:: ":l:'

Do. Portuguese •.. "," .. ' ... "1" J 11 44 50 .... " l. '1": 2 4 .• 11 .. 140 l;,I> ... , .. " .........• 117143 51 .... " 1 .... 2 4 .. 17 8 22/ 2J!J ..
Grand Tutal .. ~~I~~""-I71~"t;3[~3W8 4;r2!-:-:-24:¡;I23112~4 9061030;M1 ~~1~2a 1~!;!;26!J 294 '5 2~13418 ;-;132831613481522145


No. XXX.

CasuaIties which have occurred in the Trenches and Batteries before Badajoz,
betwecn the 15th and 18th May, 1811.

\ Killeu. 1 WOllnued. ,Misoing• Tot.1.

11 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ i i ~ I~ i iJ J. ~

o rñ ¡:: ,;; f..., "'O e . e & .... "O 1:3 . el ,; ¡..,"-o ""::: • e rñ ~ ""O U ~...¡..l (l.o::: ::..) 7l.:t::. !J Q,l o ,::..) (/1 ttI· ...... Q) Q .'; ~:.: c' -+-':¡". ¡:::
. w.: ~ ~ ;:: S co:: i .g § 'a o:: co:I ,;..s ~ g: o a I cd - ~~ .~ ~ ~ ~ s '"


-'-' 13 .5 ..... ~ .• m El ~....:: ....:. ~ ::: ...., bJ) • ro El ~ -.:: ~ 5 :o: ~ 1M.· ~ El I~ ~ ~ Él 5 -- ;:1 .• ~ ;: ..!.:: \ ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ ; 1';-- ~ .. ~ '§ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ I ~ .~ ~ ~ II"§ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ ! ~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ § § -S --------II=-~~~~ ~~=_~==_ ~I;;; ~~~~:!=__=__~'=--I~~~~I=-~~=-~==- ==-~~~~Icñ ~=-~-~
Royal Engineers 1 1 l.. 2 2 2 .. " ... '1" .. 3 1 .. [". ".. 4

27th Regl. 3rd Do. .. I .. 4 ¡¡ 2 ti 1 52 6·1 ..... , ] .... 2 " .. 9 1 56 69

34th Do. 2nd Do. .. " " 1

40th Do. 1st Do. 10 lO 2 1 11; 2\ 2 1 "... .. 28 31


60th Do. 5th Do. .. .. .. •. 1

91th Regimeol 7 71" 1!J 19 ...... " 26 26
2nd Lt. Bn. K. G. L. i' • ., •• l.. .. .. .' ... .. " ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1

I! I
Total Dritish LOSS"II~-----~~~~I~~-:-~--~I~ 921091........ --~~~ -l-~:-:-- -~-~~ 133

Portuguese Los8 .. 1 ... , .. 1 1 .• 2 .. 4014 , ...... I l.. 4 1 88!J5 ...... 1 ...... " ~2 231" 3 2 .. 6 1 150162
1_-________ 1_1 _________ --- ,--------- -1-.--.-------

General L08s"ll .... 1 2 ] " 3 ,,6168 1 .. 4 4 1 " 122 18012041 .... " 1 " .... "¡22¡2311 1 .. 5 7 21 .. lo 21 263 2!J5


" ~


'" .. ~
'" ....


.,J;¡ ~
<U .-< ~ ""

+=< .:




Return of Killed, 'Voullded, and Missing, of the Army ullder tho Command of his Excellency Field-marshal
the M arquess of Wellingtoll, K. B. Commander of the Forces at the Siege of Badajoz.

,; Killed. . 1 lo Woundcd. . 1,; l\IiSSing..,; - Total. •

- "'1 - " - '" - '" ~ cñ .~ I~ r.r: .r:!~ w .~ ~ 'J~ .~ ~ ...., rn e :: rn o ...... oc. o ...... ;r¡
~ 00 ~. i ~ ~ 1:0 w ~. 2 ~ ~ ~ rñ ~. ~ ~ -g :o 00 ~. $ t -g ~ al .9 ~ P ~ § ~ . 1~ ~ :: g ~ e = :o: • --: rñ .~ § ~ ¡:; S c;l .:~ ~ .:= S ~ ;:; S ~ •

:; .§.. ~ ~ .~D ~ ~ ; .; ~ I -; .~ ~ ',; '~:b .~ § ~ ~ -;.~ ~ I'~ ,:1) t¿ ~. ; -2 3 I ~ .2., á :; .~ í:ti .~. ; ~ ]
~ ;2 j I~ ~ 33 ~% ~ ~ ~ :.~ ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :J; o J ~ 6 ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~:~ ~ ~ J :3 ~ ~ ~ ;:S ~ ~

-7th Fllsileers, lstH~~----- ----------~ II~---------- -----,------- - ----------;-1
40th l<'oot, 1st Do. 1 .. 1 1

48th Do. :!nd Do. .. l" 1 1
51st Do. .. .. 4 4

66th Do. 2nd Do. 11·· I 1 1
1<11" Do. 1 1" "1" 1 ~ 1 .. 23 83rd Do. 2nd Do. .. .. 3 3 . . 3 3

85th Do. .. l.. .. .. 1 1 . . .• .. 1 1
Chasscurs Britannique _ 3 :: 1.. ..1.. 4 4 "1" "1" 9 9

Detadt: 1 st and :!nd 1t. Bn. h_.G.L. . '1" 1 1 "1" " " .. 1 1
Brunswlck üels . '1" " .. 4 4 •• .. 2 2 .. 4 4


TotaIBritish10SS .. II ..I"I .. I"" .. " .. 6 6¡ .. "" .... " 1,,~021 ...... " "1"1"1 .. 121211 .. 1"1"~.I .. I .. lll"12812!l
Do. Porlugucsc. '1 ~ ~ ~.2 ~ ~ ~ ~ -= ~ ¡.2.2 ~ ~ -= ~.2.2 ~ ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~_ -= -= .2.2 ~ ~ -= ~.2.2 ~:~ ~

General Total.. . ..... I 1 .. .. .. .. (5 161] l.... ~.. ~ 1 ,,3 1;(1 ........... [.. •• •• 4 4 l l.. 1 2.. ~ 1 72 80


5th ltegiment :!n,l Bn.
'" Chasseurs Britannique

'" .;; Total British ..
'g Do. Portuguesc ..

·1 .. i["11 .. " ...... 11" ........ ,,! .... "1 .. 1" .... 1 ...... 1 .. "1" .. l .... 1 .......... 1
.. .......... " " .............. " .... 1 1 .................... "," ............ 1 1

_' ___________________ ,_ 1---------- -1--- _-_'-__ -_-

~~~14~~~~·~ ~.~ .... p~ •• ~i~~~~~ ~~ •. ~H·4 ~~ .• 1~ J "" General Total. .


Contiuuation of the Siege of Badujoz.

w Killed. \ -:-__ . WOl1nde~~ __ . __ 1 ;. .l\Iissing.
~ i ~ ~ w ~ ~

§ ~ .~ g ~ .~ 5 ~ ~~ § ~
:o rJi~. ~~"'C ~ oo~. ~~]:O ~~. ¿~""O e <7:§

::.,¡ 'OI,,~ OlE" ::.,¡.·"OI~ '"E" ::.,¡ '''"en "E;; ::.,¡ ."" ~ .~.~ ~ .~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ 'ª ~ .~ ~ ~ § ~ ~ :; i'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ [. ~ ; ~~j~~~~d~~3~3~&~~~~~~~jJ~~jd~~3~~~



~Iiti 'fii .:a
" ~ ;:il:n

I~ .:.. '~'"d ~ ~¡' ¡¡l' 83 S ~ ce .~ E ; ~

·-------11---,-,-- _. - - - - - - - -- - - --'- - - - - -. - - ---- - -.- - - ---,-,.-,-,-,-,-.

f39th Fool, ~nd Bn. 51st Do. " 51th Do. 1s1 Do. § 85th Do.

11 ••

1 r ••
11 1

2: ~
li 1

11 2 ) 1
------ --- --I-=I-r----I-I---------- ------


1 l
1 ~

2 2

Total British.. .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 .. .. .. .. 11·....· 5 ni.. .. .. .. .. .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. l...... 6 1
lJo.rortuguese •. \I~~.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:._=_= .:..:..:..:. ... ~. ':":'I.:..:.~~j-=¡.:..:..:..:..:..:. ... -..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:..:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:. ... .:..:..:..:..:..:.~~

General TotaL. i ........ " ..... .:...- 3 __ 3 .... l·· .. '1...... 7 1 El "_~ _ .. _. :_. '" .. .. ........ 1 ...... lO 11

Royal Artillery
48th Foot, Ist'J3n.

74th Do.
o 83rd Do. 2nd Bn.
~ § 85th Do.

~ ~rD'.
............ 1 .. 1·· .... ' ................. J' 1 .. ' ........ ' ........ ·.:'1·· .. ·· .... 1 ...... 1 1

. .1..1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .................. ' ..... 1 1¡ .................. "1" ........ l·· .... i 1
:: :: :::: :: :: :J~ :~ :~ Ili ., •.•..• : .. ¡ 11 " .•.• : •• : : ••• '. ·f •...•••.•. ' .. ¡ ¡

l· I " , . . 1- - -- - - -1---,--------------------11'-- - -1- -1-----; fotal Bnbsh .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1 ] .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. 7 8 ................ " .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. 1; [)
Do. Portuguese. ·I.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~~ ___ ~i~ ~.:..:.-..:..2..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:. ~~I~.:..:..:..:. -..:..:..:.-..:. .:..:.~.:..:..:..:.'.:..:..:..:. -..:.¡.2..:..:..:..:..:..:. .:..:.~~

General TotaL. I ............. .!.. 515 .. .... ,1.... 1 .. 21 23 . ·1·· ................ 11 .... ··1 ) .. i" 1 .. ~6 28
Royal Artillery .... 1.... .. 1:.. .. .... 11 JI ...... 1.. .. .. 11 .. ····.. 2

7th Fusileers, 1st HIl. .. .. .. .. .• 1 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1
5th Regt. 2nd Bn. 3 3'1" .. 1.. 3 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... 1.. (j 7

45th Regl. 1st Du. .. ... " " .. .. 2 2 ...... " .... " .. 2 2
51st Do. .. .... , .... 1.. .. <1 4 .. 1 .... ,.. .. .. 1 .... "l" 4 4
~ I 66th Do. 2nd Do. . . i 1 1 ..•. l. • . .•••• ! •• ' •••• 1 ••••• , •• " 1 1

..; 74th Do. .. ·.1.... ........ .. 22 ........ .. ...... ~ 2
.::; \88th Do. 1st En. . ....•.... " .. •. I l .•.. I •• •. .•.••• 1 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ..... .. .. .. 2 2

>r.> 94th Do. .. .. " .. .. .. .. •. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. " .. .. 1 1 .. " .. .. .. .. " .. I •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 1 1
--- ------- ------.---- -----------1----------

Total British ...... " l·· ...... 5 6 ...... " .. " 1 .. 1516 .... " " ........ " ........ 11.... 1 .. ;l0 22
Do. Portuguese .. . ... .:..:. .~.:..:. "- .. 4' .2..1 . .:..:..:..:..:.:. .. .:..:. .. .:..:. ~ -=..: ~.:..:. .. r .:..:.,.:..:. .. .:..:. .. ~I.:..:. .. .:..:. ~I.:..:. .-..:..:..:. .. ~ ~

GeneralTotal ........ 1 ........ fl 7 .... ! ........ 1 .. 24125 .... "," .. ; ................ 1, .... 1 .. 3032
. ' 1 1 I i I 1 I

.\0. XXXIlf.

COl! tillllatioll 01' t1w Sieg·t· of lJadajoz.

1 KilJed. WOUlléit-d. l\1issing. Total.

1-1; --1 ¡411-- ·I-;-I~--¡ I'~I-;--l- ~I~,I-'-i ·--I--I~ -
1 . \ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ I ~ I~' I . ~ ~,~ I ;3 i ~ ~: l. ~ ~ [.; i ~ ':g 1 ' .1 f ~"~ 1 ~ ~ ~

I ~ lE 1; I.~I~ ~ i 6 ~ I~ 1, 5 B j ~: ªIft I ~ § -~ ¡~ i ~ j ~ i ~. - m § .: '~ ~:'3 ~ I.~ •• ~ sI'; lo¿
':1 ~I.~ I ~ lE 1 ~ 2 (~, ~ i ~-, ;-Ij ¡ ~ .e f ~ 181 ~ 13'1~! ~ I ~ I~ .~ 81 § le ~I ~¡ § 1 ~ 'B ¡ f' ~ ~ 'O

_________ . ____ I:,::,!~!'" i~.I:J) 'f2 ,=i~ ,-=-",", ,=-;=_~;';:~ 1'" :~ ::::: ,-:1 ~i--- !"'I~ 0_ if1 =-I=- f-< ~'::..I==-l~,~ 1(j)_I=-_::::: 1'::..'
Hoyal EII¡únpprs 1 .. / .. 1 .. 1 .. 11 ...... 1 .. ' ..... l: . .¡..¡ .... ' .. 1 '1 ,'",,,',,1·, .. "1··1·· .. 1 .. 1 J, ... I .. ! .... 1 J ()o.SUdl'Corl" .... 1 .. ; ...... j ••••.• 11 ' .. ¡ 1\ .. : ..... 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .......... I..i .. ' '1 .. 1 .. 1 .. : .... I 1
~th Ltl'gllnrnt:!m\Hu. "1" ··1' .... ,,,1 1' 11:" .. : .... 1 .. · ' .. J ] "'''' ""1" "1"1"" 1 .. , .. 1· .. · .-: .. 2 l' ~

I tb Do. . .. ·1·· "l·· . ·1· . , .. , . ',' ·1········· 1 1 .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. '1" .... "," J, 1
45th Do. 1>t Jlu. 1 ...... ' .. i"· .. 1 l' 1,1. ..1 .. '...... , :! ~. .. .' ...... 1 .. 1... .............. 31 3

';Ist])o. 11., .... '·'1'····' ~"·· .. Il .... 11 .. :11 .. ' .. I .......... 13~ .. ' .. ¡I .... 1, .. 101 42
ro ,74th Do. ¡"'" .. ; .. ' ...... J 11,.... .. ... "'11 1 .. 1 .. 1 .......... 1 ..... 1 .. , ........ , .. ~I 2

": 83rd !Jo. 2nd Bn. .. .... ' .. ; .......... 1,· .... 1 .... 11 .... 1 .. 1 ., .. , ........ 1 ...... ' .. 1 ...... 11 ... , 1
;g 8.'tll])0. ··1···· ··'··1··,···· .. ¡, ... ::1"'" 1'''1 51 ~ ,.¡ .. I .. I .... " .......... ,2 .... 1, .. 51 8

';/SSth])o.[stlln. ..1 .. ' ...... 1 .. ' .... "11 "l' "," .. , .. ;;,:~ ... '1'.' ........ 1 ........ 1 ..

...... 1 .. 31 :; ~ '¡ (lC1l1h Do:, l' ·t· . ""1,, . 1

"!'" ., .. ;" 1

" ," : "1'" .... ::1' ~l'" I ", .' "1" .. "1" .. "1" . '1" .. ,,!.. 4:\' 31
.a"ScUlo ,n .fllll'lue ... , .... "1" ........ ,' '1" .... " "1 el e .. "1" .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. e ~ [)etach.lstOilld~IldLt.Bn.K.U.L. .... I·T·:"I·~" [ 1 .. ¡ .... i .. "''''''1 1 l' .. i .... , .. " .. "1"1" .. 1 .. 1 .... ! .... 1 .. ~ :l ~ !Juke of IllullSWlCk ~:~al BIitish,. -:-~I~:~~I~:IH::'~I:~I~ ~¡J~:< 1: l;:~II~~ ~ i~:h:t~< ~~:~II"~ I'~II;~'II~~ ~:II~-: <i~-li:'~:

Do.l'orlllguese .. ~~I~:" ~~~I~!~~~_!J J~,~~I~J-=~:l~::I~~I"I~~,.:...:.~~j~~,.:...:.~~~ ~j:..:.~~I-~
(ieneraITotal.. ·T·! .. I .... ¡! .. l.;,lIi ,,1 11;.: ¡1 .. 151 .. 82!14[ .. ; ... \ ........ 1 3 31/ .. 11" 1 .. 61 .. )00113

=!"=th=lte=gi--I!le=llt--b ...... IB=n· .......... --:\~'II ... .' .. , .. I·Tel"1lJll.I .. "l' . 1· ..1.-. l;-ll¡.J~:· ' .. 1


" · .. ·I .. I· .. ¡I.~I .... ··I··~ ,,1 1; 1
.,[,tDo. 1" .... "1"1" ...... 1 .. · .... " .... ",,, " ............ 1 )' .. " .. "1" .... 1, 1

701th])o. .., ........ "'1" ]1 1 \" .. i .... 1 .... " 11 1 :. ' .. , ... " ... 1 •• 1 ............ •• .. 1 21 ~
;g 83nlllo.2no Do. '\ .. ,,, ........... , ...... 1··\ .. " .. , . ::,2"":"1'" .. 1 ...... ' .. 1 .. : ....... .' ...... ~I ~

" .' l'!8th Do. lst ])0. 1'" .... ·[ .. 1" .. ' .. 1 .. 1. r .. , .... , . 1[ 1 .. 1" ... -¡-. .. .. .. ", ... ..........1 1 1 ~ 1 '1' tI I3 't' 1 --1-'1- '--)-1\: '---I-I-·I-,-~I-=-:I--:--! -------1 -ll---'-I--'-I-~11-7 t::. O a n l~ l. '1 .. ... .... ," \. _ .... '1" ., I •• I . n ¡ ni .. '"1 .• , " •• .. \ ., .•• , •• •• •• •• ~ [):e~:::::~I~:;:~:::\<'" ::1:'1::1:' :::1 J. ::j~I-:-+~ :¡-~\·i·f~-~~~~I'::~I~l~II~:I~··~~:I·.~·~ ~~I-l::-¡:
1 1 ' ,1 1, I ,1 !,' ., :


45th Regiment 1st Bn.

SBth Do. 1st Do.
~ !)4th Do.

:; Chasseurs Britannique

00 l Total British ..
Do. Portugnese ..

General Total..

Royal Engineers
52nd Regiment 2nd Bn.

29th Do.
51st Do.

'" , 57th Do. 1st Do.
~ ~ B3rd Do. 2nd Do.

¡=¡ ..:; / 85th Do.
.<=: ¡Chasseurs Britannique ó> Duke of Brunswick Oels

Total British ..
Do. Portuguese ..

General Total ..

'" (7th Fusileers


Continuatioll 01' the Siege of Badujoz.

Killed. I WOlJuded. --~1~"----'------'-'---Total.
-, , ,--, ,¡--- :-- I '1

. 1 " v -
- .~ I :!:~ :.~ .~~ .~ ~ !l.l "'CI I U) C"e. ~ CJ) :::: ti) ce o: 8" ."" ~ "8 '" ''':'' '" onl§ -"1 ~ ~ " o: " ~I"' ..!l ~ "d ~ '" • e ¡::: <f.l ~ I§ l' '" ~.; "d ~ " '"1'S ~ ;... cd ..¡..j o ~ _ ~ ~.§ a~~ "~ <t; = ~ ;,;¡ "n ~ :: ..: ...: i ~ '§ ~ .; ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ '§ ~ w :::¡ ~ ""' k .. ¡ u ..... '" w w :::¡ ~ ""' '" U 1 ..... .~ e ; ~ ¡3 ;- ~ d 3 ~ e ~ ~ ~ ;- .~ "~Iiti '" '" o: ~:.loo '" -" El '¡:;: =' " ... en:::¡ " tJ " o ,'<11-~¡... r~ '§ ~ ·~ttl :~I-3 ~ ~I~ ~ '" ,'<1 ~ ~ '3 o E-<

• ... 00 00 "1" .. 00 11 1' .. 00 .... 00 00 "1" .. " " " .. " 1 1
001·· "1" .. 00 " .. 00 00 " ...... 1 1 ............ 00 00 .. .. .. .. .. •• .... 1 1

..: ........ 1 1 ... ",," .. 00 3 3 .. " .. " " 00 " " " " .. " .. .. .... 4 4
"1,, " " .. 1 ] .""""" 00 .. , .... " " " .. " " " " " " " " " .... 1 1

..... ~'-:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:---;;2:~ -:-:-~~-:-:-'-:-:--:-:--:-:---;-,--;- -:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:-¡-:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:-~-7 ,,~+::~~~:; f~~ ::~~~-:I :il:~i:~~~~+ :: ~ >:: ~i:,:
" i 1 1 -' -.


1' ¡ l' -
11" " .. " 00 1['" 1 "," ........ 1 .. " .. " " .... " .. " 1 1" " " .. " i!

.. " .... " 1 1 '" " " "" 1" .. 11" 00 " .. " .. " " " " .. " "" 1" 2
,1" " .. " " "!,, " " " " "" 1 1 .. " " " " ........ " " " .. " .. .. 1

1 .....•.. 23 24, .. 1 1.... 2 .. 29 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 2.. .. 2.. 52 51
.. " ,,' " " .......... 1 1 " .... J ........ 1 ...... 1"".. 1

.. " "1" " "1" ...... 1 1 .... " " .............. " .... 1 1
11.. .. .... 6 7 ,," 1.... 2.. B 11 .. J .. ""...... 1 .. 1 2.. .. 2.. 14 1!1

"1" .. 1 1 .. 7 8, .... 1 ........ 1314 " 00 .. " " .... 2 2 .... 1 .... l .. 22 24 -,-,~~"~'~~~~I~~ .!:I~~.~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~,.!:~~.!:~~-'::
.. , .. ¡3'.... 1 .. 38421 .. 2 4".. 6: .. ,,668.. 1.. 1 ...... 2 4 .. 31 7 1.. 7 .. 96 114

.... 21 .... 1 .. 913:, .... 1 .... 1'1 .. 1517 .. 1 ............ 11113 .... 2 .. 2431
1" ,

-:-:-,-:-:-'~-:-:--:-:-2-:-:-47~F2~1-:-:--:-:-7-:-:-nl85 -:-:-2-:-:-1-:-:--:-:--:-:-2--;-1141 0 1-:-:-

9-:-:- 1201-~
a 'Portuguese Los.

ii General 'l'otal"II"I"I"¡"I"¡"I"I"I"'I."¡"¡"I"I·+H 21211"1':~'J"I"I"I"I", " , , , , , ' , , General 21 i! -'-'-'-1-1-1-1-1-·
]," 1


1 1 ..


" SBritiSh Artillery a Portuguese Do.

~i General Total. .
"I"¡"¡"I':I"I'J" "1" .......... " 2 2 ........ " .... " .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 2 2

.. .. .. '" .. .. .. 6 fj •• 1 l........ 28 30 •. .. .. .. .. •. .. .. .. ". 1 l.. .. .. .. 34 36
------ ---- --------- ---------.- -----1---- ---

6 ül.. 1 1 .. ". .. .. 30 32 .. . "l" .. .. .. .. .. .. " 1 l........ 36 31l
I ! ,1 '"'

Namns 01' the Otti('ül'S al Badajoz, frolll tlw :lOth May lo 11th J une.

Killed. -------.--.--¡----l[~~=--:~:=~ ___ :--=~;~~~-~.-- =~~~==-
!tclllarks.¡I¡ ltank and Numes.

1I 30th l\lay.

30th Mayj .. Lt. R. de Mello 2nd Portuguese Line I¡Lieut. Col. Oliv('[ t.1th Portuguese
2nd June .Lieut. ;':"dgwick 5th Regt. 2nd HIl. MaJor (jomes 21st Vo.

5th ])0. i K J lawker H. B. F. Arti!l"ry i En"gn Jose Vlcente UD.
Jlunt ltoval J.:llgiueers :lrd June

Westropp lil;t Regillleut : Ensign Leslic 57th Foot 1st Rn.
Jlog¡( 8:¡th Do. ! 4th June

J. l'c;reira 7th of the Une ¡Lieut. J. B. <1" Lo¡wz Portuguese Artillery
'Majo!' 1\1'(;,,"chy 17th Do. l 5th JUlle

.Léut . .I. ,le lUeneara HJth Do. ¡Lil'u!. Furs!er Royal Engineers
I I Westmacott Royal Stall' Cur!,s

Heal'dsley ,)1 s! Rt'gt.
i GamUlell 85th Do.

l Grant Do.

'Cal'taill l\Iaxwell 17th l.tcgt.of the Linc

IErl'ign J. E. ]\ugu"se ])0.


, (H!t June
'Captain Patton Hoyal Enginecrs

Hank and N ames. Regiments. l{egÍlnen ts.

I Smcllie 5!,t Fuot
¡Licut. Hicks : D,.. I

Mortan Id5th !Jo.
Dnfief ChasseursBritannir¡ue

Lewzcllew,ky L. B. Lt. Lllfmltry
Jose Forlis 17th of the Line

, 11th Jnne
,Captain V. J~arricros 31'(1 J)ortuguü¡;C

¡Lient. Bal" Lo!,,,,, I ])0.
I 1



S"VNe!y (sinee al'a,,)¡,
Do. i

Do. :¡
Sligbtly 1:

])0. 11
Severely 11

Do. 1









Rank ana Names.

Ensign Leslie
Cuptain Nixon



Regimcnts. i ltcmnrks,

!Jlh JUIlC
57th Foot 1st Bn.

)l5th Ho.
l!Jth of the Linc


Ueturu of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of thc Army under the Command of his Excellcncy Field-marshal the Marquess of WeJlington, K. B.
Commander of the Forces at the Siege of the Fortress oi' Ciudad Rodrigo.

Killed. l. Wounded. . l\'Iissing. Total.
Ql ~ •• ~ ~.~ ~ ,-

<l' ¡;:: ,ti:: <l' .~ 'l;;;:. ,- ti:: lO' .-
.... o 5 rf¡ I'¡s o ,!; rñ ~ .... o ~ rñ .fl o ~ ;. ~

if1 • o. . s:I 00 ~ "O 1m. 'O • a JJ ... "O r.n. o . ~ .;, I-t "'O rn. 'O • e W '"' '"'O iiU~.~¡~ ~¡§ ~i~~~.~a~ ~¡§ ~iiU~j§~ ~~~ ~iiU~j~~ ;¡~ •
a,¡ c..3 s.s ..... b() • ~ 8 ~ ~ ~ tl.l ¡:I - (; !3 ..... bll,_ ~ S ~ -! ~ c,.¡ = ....; 15 .s +" So • ~ S,.::( -=: a,¡ QJ ¡::: ..; o ~ +" So,. ~ E..!:il -=: (1.) ~ ~ ~ .~ ~.~ .~ ~ .~ E: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ .~ ~ .~ .~ ':a ~, E a ~ ~ ~ ~ g ~ g. ,§ .~ ~ J:1 e 2 ~ ~ ~.z.§.~ ~ .~ 'm ~ ';:-: g a ~ ~ ~u~~uH~~~~~~~DUH~U~~OO~~~~~~u~2u~~oo~~~~~~UH~UH~~~~~~~

'Royal Engineers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "," .. .. .. .. 1 l.. .. .• .. 2 4.. .. .. .. .. .. .. '. •. .• •. .. •. .. .. •. .. •• I l.....·.. 2 4 ..


7th Foot 1st Bn. " ...................... i.. . ........ , .. .. .. .. .. 3 3.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. .. •. .. .. •. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. •. .. 3 3 .•
;g 40th Do. 1st Do. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. ].. .. 1.. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. .. l .. ¡ :J 4.. . .•...•...• , '. .. .. .. •. .. •• .. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. 2.. 3 5 .• 23rd Do. 1st Do. . ................... 1 11" .................... , 7 7 "1" ............................................ 8 8 .•

.; 48th no. 1st Do. . .... , .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. :¿ 2.. . ........... " .. .. .. .. .. .. . ...•... '. .. •. .. .. .. 3 3 ••
..::: II Duke uf Brunswick Oels ....... , .. .. •• .. .. .. 1 l.. . ............. " .... 11 l............................. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .... 1 ] ..

- Tutal British. ................ l.. 2 3.. .. .. .. .. 1 l.. .. ] .. lA 21 .. 1 .. .. .. .. •. .. .. •• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 l.... 2 .. 20 24 ..
"' ______ ---_ -----------.~ -1---1 ------ - ~ ----- - ---- - - -- - - --
~ Do. l'ortuguese.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. l.. 7 8.. . ...... , .• l ........ 33 34 . '1' .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1.... 1 .. 41 43 ..

¡ ----------------------~----- ------ ----------------
Ci General Total. ................. 2 .. 911 .......... 12 .... 1 .. !5155 .. 1 .... ~ ............ ~· .... · ........ 1 2 .... S .. til67 1 ..




Royal Artillery
Do. Engineers

5th FODt 2nd fin.
45th Do. 1 st Do •

74th Do.
88th Do. 1st Do .

.. "1" .................. ~I" -2 2.. ..1 .. - "1"- .f"'j" .. 1 .. ~.' 2-;~
.......................... 1 1 3.. .. .... "1" .. .. 1 1 3 ..

.......... 22.............. 23.. .............. 45 ..
. ......... 22.............. 89.. ..1 .......... ·· 1011 ..

.......................... 1 ........ 6 7.. .. ............ ," .... .. .. .. 1 .. 6 7 ..

--~'~-~.:..:.~~~-=-.:~. ~~~~~-~~~~I~~~~ ~.:..:.~I.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.I.:..:..:..:..:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.!..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~~.:..:.
Total Britisb.. .. .. .. .. .• .. .• .. .. .. 7 7.. .. •. .. .. 1 4 J.. 11" 32 39 .. . ... " " .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 4 l.. l .. ;1946 ..

Uo. portuguese. ~'':'':'':'':'.~ ~~.:..:.C~-~.:..:.!.!..:..:. ~~.:..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:.~. ~ .. .:..:..:..:. _~-=.:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~ ~.:..:.~ ~~.:..:..:..:.~~.:..:. ,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,~,:,,:,,:,,:,~~._~~,:,,:,
(;eneral Total ...................... !J 9 .......... 1, 4 1 .. 1 .. 3542 .................................... 1 4 1.. 1 .. 4552 ..


'" .,


• E










'" ...,



Con1 inllation of tIJe Sieg'c of Ci lldad Rodl"igo.

Killed. Wounded. Missing. 1 Total.

11_.;:; -1' -~--. --I----.~ - ~---i~r - . .~ t ~----~---- 1
~ i ~ ~ --o ---I~

:Z . -3 . ~ I . ~ ~ :.~.s !I . ~ .~ ~ ~ .~. ~ . ~ al l 0 ~ '~. ~ .@ ; ~,~
. rn ~ rI):':. l1'.l ~ ¡::: ;..0 'fJ:¡:;' u. <V e "11 :;,) ~ ~ .' ...... 1 v .:::: - w ~ tIJ;:· ~ a,.. ¡:: ~ i~ 00..5 ~ ~ ~ S... ,;.. ~ ~ :.J 00 :e ;::: ~ i=: S ~ 'I~ ~ ~ i1:: ¡ ~ ;::::;c:: ;. i~ v ri:,.~ ~ ~ ¡::: S ~ I .;

¡¡ I g .: c; .s ~ ~", ~ E ~ ...: g ~ ;::: ~ 18 5 ~ =-1 • ~ E ~ ~ ~ ~ ;:; .:. o ~ ~ .;f.. ~ I S ~ ....:: ~ te . .: ~ 5 ~ .bI: -' ~ S ~ ....: ~

;: -O .~ ~ ~ ~ .~ I~ :'F ~ ª ~ e ~ -3 ~ I ~ ~ 2 ~ ~ E' 2 ~ 'O ~ t '3 .~ g' ~.§ ~ ~ f'l ~ 3 ~ 8;1 ~ i I'~ .~ ~.~ ~ ~ .~ E § ~ o 1'" ü ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,:ñ:oo ~ Xi ~ =::: ~ ...J ....:¡ I~ ~ ...:: I~ ·ñ 'f2 :::: ~ ~ - :) :,.) ...J ~ ~ ~ ~ Cf) Ti o ~ ~ :t i::..:J ..) H ;:; lÜ ~ ~ cf] 'T.1 :::¡ ::: ~ ~
---,-. ,---'----------------1-------1-- ---- ------ ----_._.------

Royal Engmeers l.. .. I 1 .. ," .. .. 61 ti.. 7 7 "
13r<l FOOl, 1st Bn. l' .. ;, 5.. 5 5 ..

52nd Do. 1st Do. . . 3 3.. 3 3 ..
52nd Do. 2nd Do. . . 1 ] 3 3.. " 4 ..


95th Do. 1st Do. j •••• "1'" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 2.. 2 2 ..
95th Do. 2nd Do. ¡ •••••••• ",' _ " •• •. •• 2 ~ .. . ..... [ ................ "1" 2 2 .•

: , I I Do~~;~;t~:~t!::~:: [~~1~1:~~~1=,~~4~~ ~ ~1~11~~~I~~~~~~i~ ~~~~~~~~I~'=~~~I~ ~=,=~c~~~r
General Total. . ..1 ............ 1 .. 1" ;, ~.. .. .. 1 ........ ," ...... 3232:" .............. "," ...... "1" .... 1 .. : o. .. \ o. .. o. .. :n 37¡ ..

Royal Artillery .......................... 1 ...... ~.. li .. l1112 .. .. .... 1 .. 1.. .. "1..r.~I~I" .. .. .... 1 .. IJ 1:1 ..
Cold,tream Glla. rds, 1st Bn. . ..........• " .......... "1 ..•...... ·1·· ... , .. \0. 2 2 .......... "l' .,.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 :.! ..
~~~hFf)o~.~:d~:.j)o. ::::.::::: .~.: ::1:: .......... :::::::: ~ ~:: :::::::::::::: ...... :::::::: o. .... ~ ~::

42nd Do. 2nd Do. . .. '1" ...... o. o. o. .... 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ••• '1" 5 5.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ..........;, 5 ..
60th Do. 5th Do. .. .. .. .. . ..... 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 2.. ...• .. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 í ..

IstLineEn.K.G.L. .......... 11 .• 1 ..............•..•.. 1212 ....••.............••....... j.. ..1313 ..
;~~d~~·to~· : :~.~.~~~~~~.~~J~J_~~!:~~~ ~~d~~~~ ~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~

Total British.. . ..........• " •... ¡I.. 7 7 .. ; ....•..... 1.. .. •. 1 .. 57 ;';8 ., ! .••••••• '. .• •• •• •• •• • •••• _l' . '.. .. .. .. .. .. .. l .. 64 ti5 .•
Do. Portuguese.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 ;-¡ .. I.. .. .. .... 1.... .... 4 '; "1" .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1........ 7 8 .•

1 ______ ------- _________ 1 _____ ---------------~;---- ----- - ------
General Total..: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . -1-. 10 10 1" i .. .. .. .. .. ].... l' 6\ 63.. .. .. .. .. ..1.. .. .. .. .. .. .. l·· '.. .. .. .. .. 1.... 1 .. 71 73 ..

----- "-- ---------..-.-..-

fRoY",IArtillery ¡-\ ...... \~: .................. -\I..~"" "1" 5 7 .. ¡ ...... \ ...... ·T' .. 11...... .. .. 2 .......... () fi .. ;~I;/ ~~~, 1Is~\~:: 1 :: .. :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ; ~::! : : :: :: :: :: ~ ;:::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: 1 :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ! :::
"i 48th Do. 1st Do. 1·.····1 .......... ·· .. 1 1 ... ' .................. 1 .. ] 1 .. : ................... 1 .......................... 33 .. ~ 60th Do. 5th Do. j .•••• , .. .. .. .• •. •• •• 2 2 .. 1.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ] 1 "1" .. .. .. ... .. o. ...... o. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1 J ..

I ~ ----

-g; Total British .. 1 ¡-:-:- ~ -:-:-I~ -:-:-j~ ~ ~ ~ -:-:- --; --; -:-:- 1-:-:- ~. ~ ~ '2 -:-:- ~ -:-:- ~ -:-: ~ lo. " .1:: ~ ~ -:-: ~ ~ ~.r~ ~ ~.- ~ ~ -:-:- ~ ~ ~ ~ .-;; ~.' ~. ~ .... 22 24 ~
- D:,::::::,::. ¡. ~F t~ ~ ~ .. ~";'I~ •• ". ~ ~ ~~-~;~~:I. t •• ~ ~ ~"~ ~I~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "~~; ~ ~~ ~.~:~ :: ~


:'\ o, .'e'e". \' II L
'rhe Stol'miug (Ir Ciudad Rodrig-(L

-··-·.------:1---- .-- Killcd, -----11-- ,Voundc,L

1'- ._. __ ~ _____ ... __ _
-1-- ~ 11 1...--1 t: >. ;,

I ' "; -~ I ' I ¿ I 1; ~ ! ., 1 ~ I J' I ~ .:, -¡¡; 'l. ~] 0 ª ; ~ :~] ~ ~ , ,: ~ ~ j 4 ª;, ~ ''3] te ~;, ~

ifj • o ." " ~ "; ~ - 1....· ~ . '" o ~ - .'" ¡ .... j." ." ,o i ~ "'" or,. e • S e ,; I ~ ''0 ~ 'J •• ::,.., I.í.~ 00.:0::. ___ Ifl Ch' .... • '~r- mr ~", .......
- '!! ~ • ;;: ;'S !. I ;n ~ I ~ e 1-:= "'="' '-' • ~ ;::~. r. ".:: ::; ¡:::: (2 '":" u ·1 \'::; .: m V~ 1;:: :::: -:: 1-:: - v 1. ¡::: .:: u¡ :L ~ e 8 o:: '-' í..-<:;".... .........,.....,.w ,,, "-' LI' '...... Q) _ ...... - _ ro "" • 'J •• ..., ""' ¡::¡ .....,.....;...0 I;'~ I'~:¡'" J..... 'J,.. ¡::::: -.... ¡.:;;¡ .... ~ 5 :; os: ~ I~ I·ft q,i 2 ~I ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ ",:,'! ;; ~~ ~ ::: I s. ~ "i I,ª ,~,.§ ¡; l·?'" ~I'= 1,·2f 'Zi ~ 1 ~ § '-;3 j § i ;; 1 ~ ~ := ¡.g <i ;::: .~ ~ ~ 1-;; r~ ? ~ -= .7 % rC .s :.: :; 1;:: :; .'0 I c:: . .= .;: !: .~. ~ r~ ;.~ ~ I ~ -!:: :; I rO ~ :.c '1 ..:. I_~ ~ e 5 .::;. ~ ~ ~ ,0 r~ o .2: ~ ,:;'.% ~ e '"'=,.. t .... cr! -o

. ------k: -=- =-:::. =-=-=:'I~ ~r2-!=- ':...:... ~::.=-:=.:::.. =- =-:". - ,~:-' - t-. ~~~ ::.!:'..:::.. =-¡=-~ :::"1'" ::.'=-:. :-' =_ =-1"" :::.. =- =- ~.:"- -=.i=- .=J:... Gcneral.St~ff 111 ........ ··1 .. :···· .. , .. "1 ¡ 3 ......... : ...... ¡ .... "1 ~L .. '"I"I .. I·y·· .. 1·1·· .... 41 ......... .J ....... 1

.... ~ ~~~~tlC~::l~~ncer~ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :::::::::: i::::: r :: :: 1 ~II: : 1:: :.;:: : t : 1:: :: :: I J: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: i::::::::,::" i
5th Foot,:llldHn ... ', .... ¡ ........ 11 .. 32134 •..... 1 1411 "1 <l ••• 19, (i°ll .. ¡ .... 1 .... 1 ........ 1' ........ ! ...... [ :1 4111 .. 41" 81 9c!

43rd Do. I sl Bn.1 .... " " .......... 1 .. (¡ 7··...... I :1.. .. .. 4 1 :lfi 3,j,,, .... , .. "!" .......... " ... :.. .. .... I 2...... 5 1 :\2 41
C'1l4;¡thDo.htJ)O, ........ 1 :1 ...... IIIl~ 17 .. 2 :l ...... JI :':;¡!:\I ...... 1 ........... ·1 .. · , ............ 341 ...... 2,237 ·1tl

:;; 5:lnd Do. 1 sI Do. .. .. .... I ... o ...... 1.. 2 a .... 1 1 .. .. .. .... 1.. :.::.: 25 ................ "1" .. .. .. .. .. 1 I 1 .... · .. 11·· 24 28
,..., Do.J)o.2ndDo ............ o ..... o .... 1 1 1 ...... 1 ~ .. ;:¡ H .................. 1 .... 1 .............. 1 .. · .. 2

" ti !)

i- (iOlh])o.5th])0 ................... 1 .... l·· .... ,. 1 .... ·· ..... , ::1 4!' ................. 1 .. ..1.· ........ l .... 1 .. 1··· .. 11" 3 5
Sl 74th])0. .. .................... 4 4 ........ 2 1 j .... ~ .• 11

1i,: ............ I .. ¡ .. ··1 .... 2 :! "1" .. ," 2 1I I .... :.: .. 17 23

:;J' 7:th Du. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 13 .!........ ;¡ 1 1 I .. :.:.. ~~I 3hll"' ....• ' ... '·1 .......... 1 ••• ' •••••• :.. :\ I 1 1 .. :\.. 41 50 :;1!l·~rdJ)o.2ndDO'"'''''''''''''''''''' 1, l .. ···o .... '; .. "1" , .... ,.'! .~! ................ "1" .... ,; '.; "," "1"" ··1·········· .? .5 ~ H~thDo.lstDo ....... , ............... 71 ' ............ , .......... -.1 -." ," , .. " ............ 1 .... ~ " ...... ' .. '.' ~i""""" 3.\ 37
C> [Ji '1) .., 2 1" O," " .) 1 ~ ., .. ~!". , ." •• L ( •. , '7 (i7 ~ " th _ o. . •.. o ••• .:.. •• '" " •• •• '-' ":',1' •••••• v.... ••.. ¡ di .'0: .)-1 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• l" .... i" ;; ~ ......, otJ '.

.5 !Ji;thDo •• l stuo·I ............ ¡ .......... 11 J ...... ' .. 1 :l ....... 1 .. ll.jl'l~;."I· .. · ........... ··' ........ 1' ........ 1 " ....... 1 .. ](i 2~
o g~: V)~··~~~~~<L: ~~: ~;~~,~~~~~~ ~¡_~:~ :::::: ~~~~ ::I'_~ J.Ji _J:,:~~~~,~~~~::: ~:!~~~~~I~i,~~:: ~~~ ~~~I~i~_ ~ J ,f~."l,::~~:~J, I : .:: l' I :: :: ~~. ~i:; ~ e, " '; ';" I';";':,":~: :: i t :: :: J I 1" ¡' f¡" ':¡t ~ ¡~ 1.' ';;<¡i

(;,."J T"r,L 1-;-::,:: ~, "~I··· ::,' I 1 ,"'1'" : JI' '¡"'it' 1;.', ~ ,""'1''' .. Til .. ti Ti'" l' IT? ,; l;;;i'l ' I 1"1 ' :;, ;;¡

J'llissing:. Total.








i\o. XXXiX,

Retul'n 01' Killed, 'Voumletl, and Missing, of the Army under the Commnnd of His Excellcl1cy l"ield-marshal tho Marquís oi'
'VeIlington, K. B. at the Battle of Albuera.

: ____ !"iJ~ed. __ .y-. Woullded. 'l. , Missing. . Total. ,

u, I ' . I "' I . 1", , I I ."' .
. • Q3 I ~ • • w ~. . 1;:; ~. ~ ~

1] e" i o: ~ '3] i ~ :;:; 3 ~ 3.1' "' :;:; ~.2 i .; ~ en ........ • -= 10;"'''0 "1'1.0.~ .~"O 'fJ"':::.= 'M~ oc.:;.~ '".....-0
- 2; W . := x .;,: j;;:::I . '_ 2: '-> • ",1;::;, :'J;,:" . - ci. ij l. "' '" u: ~"' '= . ~ ."'- '-> • :!2 "'.;, ;;:"" •

"':¡... '.1) l...... ~ -, :;::; ~ ro Xl"'=" r.n .8 1-"'" ¡:::,.... cI'j if! ...: C1,; I ,¡n.S ~ ;: I -1 S·... rn IX: ~ <F:...... "':' = ....;:::: ctl u:< ;¡;~"':~,~'¡:;ClJ.~S~ ~ CJ C:;;:"';=:c::i¡"::SJ:.. ~ ~,.!:t: ....! :o.. ~~"'=I~ro ...... ~··~S..;::1 ~ CJ ,¡;,C~~·¡;.3 :'1..' ~ 8...::d -.:: ~
::l -=. :: ·......,1 ~ ~ 1':;: ~ .~::::: I=l r;: ~ 1= :: ~ .~ ",:.; 1::: '¡¡:J é:: .~ a ¡ J;::: ~ ~ ;::. o· ::: ,.::::.... ";:! ? '7, Iq:::: 'r¡;:j ;::::: ¡<::: ~. ';::::::2, ;31,-,;:! ::s ';:¡; q::: .~::: = ro: M ~ o Q) ot: I~ ~ = .::; ....... ro .... - " - Q.I ..:: ~ ~ ..: ro H ~ ro ...... o :¡, - Q.¡ ce ~ ..... ,:::, ............ ~ ~ e o¡, O,Q.¡Ir.; - (¡.t = ~ :... .... ro "O o ::.~= ~ I~~'=-~.!=--=_ ~_=-,~ j~ I~I~I~::.~ 0 __ ~ ~I-=- ~ I~ ::'~I~~~~I';'< I~~=- =_ ~=-r~~j;:¡ :~~,_~_=-0..¿=--=-~-::"

General ~t~fr, 1 ....•. ' .........• ,. .. 1.. 7 .... ' .. "," .. .. .. ., . . 71,··· .. 1 .. ' ...... , ....... , .. .. .. t. '1' .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 .•
RoyalBntlshArtillery .................... 3 3!1 ...... ·· 1


.......... 10 111'10 ...... 1 .............. 1 11 ..... ,. 1 .... ,. .... H 15;0
Do. German Do. ........24 .... ,1 Hí 17 .... ·· .. 1 .... ] 2!J 3110 ..... ,. .. 2 .. ,. 45 48 34

3rd Dragooll Guards '!J 10 l) .. 1.. !J H ú .. .. .. •. .. .. 1 ) 14 .... ',... 1 .. · . ) H 20 l!)
4 th Dragootls 2 3 11 l' I 1 1 1 15 20 110 ..••..•. 2 .. 2 4 2 " '1" •• :l 1., I 2 1 19 :!í 2a

13th Lt. Dragoons .. .. .. .. 1 l.," ..... , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. , .. '1" ,. .. .. ,. ,. ) 1 1
3rdFoot htlln. ..1 12' .. 4 .. t082lU.. 41 ~ l .. 11 1 222 248 ........ 1 ... , 2 1511 HiI17!J.· ! ..... " ,,112 :¡" 30 2 5!JI ti43

7th Do. 1st Do. . .•..... 1," 2., ti3 6.';., .. :;',11"/,, 14, .. 263 29t.. ........ ,.1 ...... ,. ~ ... I ,. 3111 .. ,. ]ti,. 321; 357
7th Do. 2nd 1)0. . . '11 1 "1" ].. 4(j .19.. 1 3, (j.. 1 1 (¡ 1 2(j(i :lOO.. .. .. .. .. .. .. :' "," 1 ·1 10" 1 17 1 315 34\1 ~3nl D". !"t Do. .. 1 .. 1, .. 1 .. n llJ ,. .. 3! 4 3 1 Il! 1 23~ 25~ .... " .. .. 1 .. 5 1;··.··· 1 ,. 41 4 4 1 14 1 :HO 33!)

27th Do. :lrd Do. .. 1 1 2, . . ... ,.. •. .. 5" . , ......... , 1 ., .. ¡; 8
28th Do. 2nd Do. .. 1 2fi 27.. :.oi 3 1.. 8 .. 123 137.. , .... ",. 2 3 1 t) 1 14f1 ](;4

2!Jth Do. .. 1 I 3 2 .. 73 80.. 1 3, 4 :1 1 12.. 220 245.. . '1" II 11 ...... 1 ,1:, fi 1 14.. 304 3:3(j
31st Do. 20d Do. 2 1 26 2!).. ' 2: 3 2 .. 4,. nfJ lt(;.. .. .. :.1 :1 ~ •. (j 1 141 155
34th Do. 2nd Do. .. 1 1 I 3 .. 27 33.. 21 2 .. .. ().. !l5 \151" :\ 3 1.. !J.. 112 128
39th Do. 2nd Do. 1 .. .. 14 15.. 1; 2 1.. 4,. 73 81.. 2 ~..... .. . 1 1.. 4. . 8!J !J1l

40th Do.lst Do. 3 3.. ., .. .. .. 8 8.. . ... \.. ..1...... II 11
48th Do. 1st Do. .. 1 2 .... (¡.. 58 67 .. 5: 7 1 1 !J 183 2071.. Il fi ..... : 1 5i \! 1 1 15 1 247 280

48th Do.tlld Do. 3 I .. 4 .. 40 4~ ...... '.," 4: 4, 2 .. :1 1 S~ !l6:.. 125 ~ 71751!l0 ... , .... 1 U,'I12 ,1 .. 1~ 8 2!l71:\43
57th Do. 1 st Do. 1 1 3 I 8:1 ~!J.. •. 1 I (ji 11 ~.. 11 ¡¡ 304 33!J.. " .. 1 2 7 II ::.. 14 4 387 4:!H

60th Do. 5th Do. 1.. 1 2.. ..' 1 .. .. :!.. 16 H,'.. .,.. .. .... 1 .. ·· 3.. 171 21
6tith Do. 2nd ])0. 1 1 .. 1 1 50 5;' .. 11 ~ 3 .. 13.. !lI Ilfil.. 4 1 96101 .......... :! !J 4., 1101 2 237 212

97th Do. .. .. .. .. 'l" .. .. ) 1. . .. 1 )
1 st Lt. Do. K. G. L. " .. .• .. .. 4 4. . .... 1 1 1 1 1 3, . 55 63. ' 2 2..:"... 1 1 1 1 1 3 . . ()) 6!)

2nd Do.])o. _______ ~ ,:_:.I.:_: . .:..:..:..:.~_~~ .:..:~~~.2:.:..: ~':":_:.:_·L~~~ ~~~.:..:.~:. ~~~ -':'C ~ _~ ____ ~~~~ .. ~~ .2.:..:.~_:~ 32 ~ __
DO~'~!~~!ul~~t!:~::li~j~ .. ~~~ ?J~.I~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~: _:I~:;i~~!~¡ J;2~i~2;~7:~ ~~~~~~~j~:~ ~ ~~I~~I~ 1!1~,~i~~~~ll~:; ~:J;~r~~~ l~

General Total.·1 I • _1 1 I I ti 13 lI! 1 133 4 !J13 !l84 ti:; I ti 1 .. I ;¡! 51 1S:ti6 22 7 146 IOj2656 :.!!l9· 35j ...... i 1 4 H J 1 .. :!8 11 51715701171IOj· ·1 ti \ 7 5U 10732 8 207~5 408H 45017 115


No. XI,.

N ames of tite omcers Killetl, \Voullded, amI }[issing', at Albuera, 1Gth May.
--~-"-- --~-~--- _._---~---

Killed. WoulIued.

British. Regimcnts• Portuguese. ltegimen ts., Driti,h. llegimcnts. Remarks.

----, ----~~"----~----~ ----~----- ------~~--

Maj. Gen. D. Boghton Staff-surgeon Boolman ~Iaj. Gen. (he lIon. U. L. Cale Sli,,;lltly
Lieutenant Fox :lrd Dn. Guards J. P. J. Jase I\lontro I Hon. W. Stewart Do.

Captaill BUl'ke 3rd 1<'oot, ,,,¡ Bn. Capto J.:gerloll 34th Rpgt. Do.
Lieutenant Herbert Do. \Valler I03rd ])0. Severely

Ensi¡;:n Chadwick Vo. Houveria, A .D. C. to Major Gen. 1 Sici]ian Hegt. Do. Thomas Do. the Hon. G. L. Cole ~.
Captain Erek 7th Do. IstBn. Warle l:lllll Do. Do.

Lieutcnant Archie Do. : Baring,A.D.C.toMaj.Gen.Altcn 1st Lt. Bn. K. G. L. Slightly
Captain MOlltague 23rd ])0. 1 st Do. I Capto Hawkcr ¡{oyal Artillny Do.

2nd Lieutenant Hall Do. Lient. Thiele Do. Ger. ])0. Severely
Captain Humphrey 20th Do. Capto Holmes Hit Dragoons Slightly
J~ielltenant D uguid Do. Lieut. Wildman ])0. Do.

Ensign Killg Do. Adjt. Chantry Do. D".
.Furnace Do. Capto Marley :3rd }'oot, 1st Bn. Do.

·Vanee Do. Gordon Do. Severely
Captain GibboflS :14th Do. 2nd Bn. Rtevens Do. Do.

Lit"utenant C. Caslle Do. Camerun 1)0. Do. and taken prisoller
Ensign Sarsfidd Do. Lieut. Juxon Do.

Lieutenant Beard 30th Do. 1st Do. Shepherd Do. Slightly
Lient. Col. Duckwartb !8th Do. 1st Do. Hooper Do. ])0.


Lieutenant Page Du. Latham Do. Do.
Ansaldo Do. Wright ])0. Do.

Lieutenant IJiddon t8th Do. 2nd Bn. Woods Do.
Loft ])0. Hougltton Do. Se\<rely

Drew Do. Titlow Do. Do.
Ensign Rothwell Do. O'Donn"ll Do. Do.

Major Seotl nth Do. 1st Bn. Ensign Walsh Do. Slightly
Captain'Fawcett Do. Lielltenant-eolonel Sir vV. l\Iyers Bn. 7th Do. 1st Do. Severely (,ince dead.)
BelJnin~ 56th Do. 2nd Bn. Capto Cholwick Do. Slightly

Lientellant Shewbridge ])0. Singer Do. Do.
Ensign Coulter Do. Crowder Do. Do.

Lieutenant Whitney Lieut. Provost Do. Severely
IHaultry ])u. Do.

ElIis Do. Du.
S. B. J ohnstonc Do. Do. (since dead.)

Jl.lullens Do. Severely
H('nry Do. Slightly

Joncs Do. Severely
;\lor~an nu. Do, •

No. XLI.

Continuation of the N ames of Killed aml Wounded at Albuera.


Hauk aud Names. HegiIllents. Remarks. Rank and Namcs. IlegillJents.
------I------I-C-·-----II- -·-----1-----·---

Lient. R. J ohnson

Br. Lt. Col. lllakeney

Capto M'Ginncs

-LiBul, Erwin





Acting Adjt. l\k'gher
Lieu!. Col. Elli,

Capto H urfor"

I sI Lieut. Ilarrison


2nd Lieut. C"stl,,"


Adjl. M'Lean

Lieut. Crulllmer


Ensign lngraJ~L
Lieut. Col. White

Major Way
Capto Hod~e


Lient. Stall11u<j

7th }'usiIeers, 1st B", Slightly
llo. Do.'

Do. Sevcrely (sinee de?d)
7th Do, 2nd Hn. Sevcrely

])0. Left arm amputated
])0, Severely

Do. Slightly
])0. Severely





23nl Do. bt nu.





i8th Do. ) ,t Bu.



29th Do.















t :-. "'

"-P""l'i'l y'


Lieut. Popham

Rnsign Lovelot'k

Adjt. Wil!!

Capto },lemming

Lient. Bntler

Ensign \Vilson

Capto Weddringtoll

Lieut. Hay

Capto Brine

Lieut. Ha)'t

Ensign Cox
Capto Wilson


i Parsons

I Lient. Crawlcy
I f'terrj"g

! Vfrigllt
! O'DollOgllUe


Ensi~n Collins

\ djt. Sleele
Capt. Watkins

- Wangh

I Wood

, Lient. John:-;nn
\' a!'LkrHlf~ 111111


~9th Fusileers



:\ 1 st Do. 2nd



¡.14th Do. 2nd

t Do.

I Do. :l:lth Do. 1st
1 Do.

'1 Do.

!18th Do. 1st
1 Do.


I ])0.




i ])0.

·l~th Do. 2n(1




j .
. ,





Slightly I ])0.











N ames 01' Olliccrs Continuccl. Killed aud 'VOllllded aL Alhuera,

'Vounded. Woundcd.

--------.,--.------ --------,-------:------
Rank and ]\"ames. n"giments. Hcmarks. H.ank and i\ ames. ltegÍments. Hemarks.


I,icutenant Sharp
Ensign N orman

Lieutenant Col. Inglis

MajoT Spring
Captain Shadforth



],ieutenant Evatt

Bax!er :

J\l'Farlane 11
Patter!"on ¡



Ensign Torrens

Lieutenant lngerleben

Captain Fcrns
'Licutenant lIiclen




Crompton I

18th .Foot 2nd Bn.

,7th Do. 1 st Do,







¡Ot\¡ Do. 5th Do,
';¡¡th Do. 2nd Do.

Ellsign Walker

,\I ajur H artwig
Ensigll Srnalkenson

Adjutant Tapie
Captain L lJ rrsc

Ilst Lt. Bn. K, G, L

I lnd Do. Vo.










P ortn {1Ut':-;C.
Colonel Collins ~

.\rljutant Jose de Mello
Ensign P. Broquet

Captain Jose de Mattos
James Jolmsoll

Lieutenant J ose Miranda
Ensign J. S. Yascoucellas
Lieutcnant J. 1'. de Carvalhos

n. de N "pules
Captain A. P. D, Aragas

Majar .J. Paes

Captain F . .r acob
.T. P. HoeaJo

Lieut, Ant. Carlos
. t\nJrcw Camaeho

1"DI-:-"Ij",l) 11'1. .\, J. \AI.l'}, .l:~J.:,1) J,Jo.' {o)l'fll, UhJ..'1 ::-IULLL

2nd Rr>giment
Hit ])0.

ith Do.


11th ])0.

23rrl Do,
1st Bu. L. L L,




tí ¡ir:
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