NARRATIVE OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, FROM 1808 TO 1813. BY LIEUT.·GENERAL CHARLES...
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NARRATIVE


OF THE


PENINSULAR WAR,


FROM 1808 TO 1813.


BY LIEUT.·GENERAL CHARLES WILLIAM VANE,


MARQUES S OF LONDONDERRY, G.e.B. G.e.H.
COLONEL OF THE TENTH ROYAL HUSSARS.


THIRD EDITION,


,¡; •.


HENRY COLBURN, NEW BURLINGTON STREE'r.


1829.




PRINTED BY A. J. VALPV, llEll LION COtJRT, FLEET 3TREEY".




TO


MIS MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY


GEORGE IV.
SIRE,


Al\-IONGST the many distinguished honours
your Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer
on one of your most devoted subjects, none was
more deeply appreciated than your appointment of
him to the colonelcy of that regiment which your
Majesty so long commanded in persono It is from
a constant and everlasting sense of this military
distínction, that he has ventured most humbly to
lay at your Majesty's feet a short narrative of
those campaigns in the Península in which he
had the honour and good fortune to be engaged.


With the profoundest respect and devotion, the
writer begs permission to subscribe himself,


y our Majesty's
Most dutiful Subject and Servant,


VANE LONDONDERRY, Lieut.-Genl.
COL. lOTII ROyL. HUSSARS.






ADVERTISEMENT.


TliESE Reminiscences of some years of an active
professional life were never íntended to meet the
public eye. They were written alwáys in great


. has te, sometimes at long intervals, ahd sometimes
when fatigue entirely oppressed the· body, and
when the frame courted sleep rather than the
most trifling occupation. But the great motive
which prorripted the first committal to paper of
the imperfect details which these sheets embrace,
was the affectionate and indulgent spirit with
which they were received by him to whom they
were addressed. They would probably have
remairted buried with the object of that unbounded
aUachment and devotion which gave them birth,
had not the circumstances attending the late events




Vl ADVER'fISEMEN'f.


m Portugal recalled the former scenes passed
m that country, where British soldiers had en-
joyed so many triumphs, and where the deepest
¡nterest had been blended with their career, by
their Iearning, practically, under the greatest
Master of this or any former age, tha! profession
in which their destinies were involved.


When a new force was equipped, and, launched
under new auspices, was about to sail for that
quarter, it occurred to me that these hasty
sketches of a former period, however light and
imperfect, might, not be wholly uninteresting to
those l1rave brother soldiers, who were embarking
again for that land where so many laurels had
been already gathered.


1 therefore determined to a:range, with a friend,
my letters a~d memoranda in the form of a narra-
tive. Their deficiency, in many respects, is
frankly acknowledged; and it is hoped that, being
composed under the circumstances of const~nt
fatigue and activity, the Author may meet with
indulgence. On another _point also he has to
claim consideration from his' brother officers.
They know, as well as himself, how impossible it




ADVERTISEMENT. VIl


IS for any individual to render justice to the
meritorious deeds of every division and corps in a
long campaign; to describe all parts of a field of
batt1e; to enter into the various views tbat are
taken; or lastly, to detail the heroism 01' the
several officers in tbe performance of their duties
and exploits. Happily, the task of a eulogist or a
critic belongs to higher powers. The following
sheets have been compiled for other purposes;
1f they stimulate young officers to record the
events ofthe moment as it fiies, and the interesting
scenes they may engage in, for the Ínformation of
parents and friends at a distance, their publication
will accomplish one useful purpose ;and if they
enlivenone leisure hour, in camp or quarters.
of the brother soldiers of tbe author, bis object js
more than gained.


V, L.




MAPS AND PLANS.


Map of Spain and Portugal, showing the seat of war,


lo Jace page l. Vol. l.


The following six plans to be placed at the end of the Ap-


pendix of Correspondence, Vol. 11., preceding tbe 'tables:-


l. Plan of tbe action near Corunna, Jan. 16th, 1809,


Ueutenant-generalSir John Moore, commander-in-chief.


n. Passage of the river Douro, on the 12th May, 1809, by
the British arm~ under tbe command of Lieutenant-general
Sir Artbur Wellesley, K. B. in face of tbe French army, com-


manded by Matsbal Soult.


lB. Plan of the battle of Talavera.


IV. Sketch of part oí the ground about Fuentes and Villa


Formosa, occupied by the amed army on the 5tb and 6th May,


1811.


V. Plan of Badajoz and its environs, invested March 17th,
1812, and carried by storm on the night of April6th, by the


allied army, commanded by General the Earl of Wellington.


VI. Plan of Ciudad Rodrigo, describing its siege by tbe


allied army, 1812, General tbe Earl of Wellington, commander-


in-cbief.




CONTENTS


OF


THE FIRST VOLUME.


CHAPTER l.


The English army previous to 1808-DisinclinatiOIl of the
ministry to commit it.fairly against the armies of }'rance-
Causes which Ied to a change of policy-State of Europe in
consequence of the peace of Tilsit-Abject submission of Spain
to the will of Buonaparte, and ruinous consequences of the
war with England-The war of 1801 between Spain and
Portugal-Terms of peace-Miserable state of the Peninsular
nations-Mad,attempt of Godoy to excite them against France
-Secret treaty of Fontainbleau-Assembly of the corps of
observation of the Gironde-Protest of the French and Spanish
ministers ~t the court of Lisbon-They quit Lisbon Page 1


CHAPtER n.


March of Junot's army arross thc frontier-It arrives at
Salamanca, passes Alcantara, and enters Portugal-Hs suffer-




x CONTENTS.


ings by the way-Alarm of the court of Lisbon-Proposal to
emigrate to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and
Sir Sydney Smith-The court gives its consent, appoints a
regency, and embarks-Junot ~eaches Lisbon-His measures
for the preservation of public tranquillity-His behaviour, at
first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical-The tri-coloured
flag hoisted-The regency abolished-Junot assumes supreme
power--The Portuguese army disbanded, and a heavy fine im-
posed upon the people-General discontent of aH classes-
N umerous broils and arbitrary punishments - The Spanish
troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection- Exertions of Junot
to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against the
English 29


CHAPTER IIl.


Entrance of fresh armies into Spain-Seizure of the frontier
fortresses, and advance of Murat upon Madrid- Consternation
of Charles and Godoy - Preparations for escape to Sonth
America defeated by the mob-Godoy dragged to prison--
Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king-Murat
arrives in tbe capital-Departure of the royal family for Ba-
youne.-Tumult of the 2nd of May-Resig'nation of the rights
of the house of Bourbon-Secret instructions of Ferdinand to
the regency-Measures adopted by Murat to preserve public
tranquillity M


CHAPTER IV.


Gf'nt!ral insurrection ofthe Spanish provinces, and formation
of juntas-The junta of Seville peculiarly vigorous and orderly .
- It assumes the title of Supreme Junta of Spain and the
Indies-Reduction of the French fleet in the harbour of Cadiz
-Expeditions against Seville' and Valencia onder Dupont and




CONTENTS. xi


M{lncey- Actíons at Alcolia and Baylen, and surrender of
Dupont's corps-Moncey repulsed from before Valencia-
Proceedings at Bayonne, and proclamatioll of King Joseph-
He enters Spain-Battle of Medino del Río Seco; and arrival
of Joseph in Madrid-His flight in consequence of Dupont's
capture-An expedition fitted out at Cork sails for the Penin-
sula-Sir Arthur Wellesley arrives -at Corunna, and directs his
course towards Portugal-Proceedings in that country-Mu-
tiny of the Spanish garrison of Oporto-Seizure of General
Quesnel, 'and the standard of independence raised - Junot's
measures to suppress the revolt 80


CHAPTER V.


Arrival of Sir Arthur WelIesley at Oporto-Hisconference
with the junta-The transports assemble off Mondego, and
the troops are landed- Strange conduct of General Freire and
the Portuguese army-Junot t~llleasures to oppose the pro-
gress of the English, and calls in his detachmeIJts-Delaborde
retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley-Battle ofLorip-Arrival
of General Anstruther on the coast-March of the British army
to Vimiero-Sir Harry BlIrrard arrives in the offing-Is visited
by General Wellesley; but refuses to sanction an advance-
The British attacked by Junot's army-Battle of Vimiero 122


CHAPTER VI.


Inactivity of the British army under Sir Harry Burrard-
Arrival of General Kellerman at Vimiero, with proposals--Sir
Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters ¡nto a treaty
with Kellerman-Difficlllties as to the disposal of the Russian
fieet, and preparations for a renewal of hostilities--Arrival of
Sir John Moore's corps--Junot consents that the two Ad-
mirals shall arrange the point at isslIe between themselves-The




XII CON1'EN1'S.


convention of Cintra condemned by lrotb Portuguese and
Spaniards-Almeida and Elvas given up-The Briti!\h troops
enter Lisbon~Joy of the inbabitants-Clltaffa's corps restored
to liberty, and re-arlned-The French army sllils fot France,
and the Russian fleet is cOllveyed to England 146


CHAPTER VII.


Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir Arthnr Wellesley
returns to England on leave-Sir Harry Burrard resigns the
command to Sir John Moore-Preparations for an advance
into Spain-March tbrough Alentejo-Villa Vicosa-March
to Elvas-Elvas, Badajoz-Difference of character between
the Spaniards and Portuguese-Colonel Lopez recei ves de-
spatches from Castanos - Merida - Its antiquities-State of
agriculture in its vicinity 176


CHAPTER VIII.


Advañce wwards Madrid~Rumours of Blake's defeat-
Anival at Nil.val·cárhero~Madrid: the state of public feeling
there-W ant of energy in the Spanish government, exhausted
state of the treasury. aRd miserable plight of the armies-
MoverneIi.t of General Hope's corps upon Salamanca-Fears
lest it should be cut off-Causes of them-Overthrow of the
Spanish armies, commanded by Blake, Belvedere, and Castanos
-A French corps at Valladolid-Skirmish at Amvola-Ru-
mour of General Baird's retreat---Retlections on the conduct
oí the war 194


CHAPTER IX.'


Visit to heád-quartel'S, and interview with Sir John Moore-
A retreat determined upon - General dissatisfaction of the




CONTENTS. XIII


army-The idea of retreatiog abandoned, and orders issued to
advance-Movement upon Tordesillas - Skirrnish at Rueda.
-Sir John Moore resolves to attack 80ult on the Carrion
- The arrny advances for that purpose-Brilliant affair of ca-
valry. at Sahagun-Preparations for a battle suddenly coun-
terrnanded 219


CHAPTER X.


Dissatisfaction of the arrny-Sir John lVloore prepares to re-
treat-The infantry and artillery retire in two columns, covered
by the cavalry-Movements of t11e FreÍlch armies~Affair of
cavalry at Majorga--Sufferings of the troops on their march
-Alarrn at Benevellte, alld brilliant cavalry action-Destruc-
tion of 8tores at Astorga-'V retched plight of Romana 's troops
-Disorganisation of the English army-March from Astorga
to Villa Franca-Serious skirmisb at Villa Franca-Retreat
to Liego, where battle is offered, but declined by the French-
The armies in position three days-Retreat upon Corunna-
The fleet arrives, and the embl,lrkation is begun-Battle of
Corunna, and death ol' Sir .John Moore - The army is
withdra.wn 247


CHAPTER XI.


Consequences of Sir John Moore's campaign-Departure of
Napoleon for Germany-Military condition of Spain and Por-
tugal previous to 1Ihe arrival of ¡¡jir Arthur ""' ellesley-Invasion
0,( Portugal by Soult-He passes the Minho at Orense, defeats
the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey, and enters Chaves
-Oporto carried by assault-Lupisse fails to reduce Ciudad
Rodrigo, and goes to join Victor-Battle of Medelin, and
overthrow of Cuesta's army-Sir John Cradock and Marshal


. Beresford make preparatioDs to oppose Soult - Sir ~O\ rthur




xiv CONTENTS.


Wellesley embarks at 'Portsmouth; reaches Lisbon; is re~
ceived with enthusiasm-He makes arrangements to take the
field 292


CHAPTER XII.


Dispositions of the allied troops-They assemble at Coimbra,


and are reviewed-State of the French army beco mes some-


what changed by the defeat of General Lefevre-Rumours of


a mutiny among the enemy-Sir Arthur Wellesley arranges


his plaus, and the brigades are commanded to move 310


CHAPTER XIII.


The armyadvanees towards tbe _ 1)ouro-A 'D(ifi~ ~\ ~~
enemy attacked and driven from Albergaria N ova-Affair of


Grijon-Passage of the Douro, and defeat of Soult 327


CHAPTER XIV.


Sir Arthur WeUesley foUows the French army-Skirmish


at Salamonde-Soult makes for Orense, and the. pursuit is


abandoned-The allies eountermareh upon Coim,bra, where a


reinforeement of five thousand men reaehes them-Movement


towards the south-Communieations opened with Cuesta.."..His


plans for the eampaign opposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley-


The army beeomes sickly, and is distressed for money and


stores 346


CHAPTER XV.


The British army moves nearer to Victor, and threatens hi:l


flanks-The latter withdraws across the Tagus-Sir Arthur




CONTEN'IS. xv


Wellesley fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia - He visits
Cuesta at Casa del Puerto, and is shown the Spanish army by
torch-light-He returns to his OWIl troops, which are put in
motion, and Victor's posts driven from Talavera across the·
Alberche-Preparations for attacking ~im there, but he effects
his escape-Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur ,,y ellesley with the
conduct of the Spaniards-lIe is compelled, by the ,1lI!gligence
of Cuesta, to remain inactive 371


CHAPTER XVI.


Cuesta fol\ows the Frcnch, who turn upon and drive him back
in confusion--Battle of Talavera - Sutferings of tile British
army after the action, and its consequent retreat towards Por-
tugal 400


CHAPTER XVII.


Defeat of Cuesta's army at the bridge of Arzobispo-Victor
enters Talavera-Sir Robert WilsoJ;l's corps w.orsted at the
Puerto de Banios-Sir Arthur 1Vellesley takes up the line of
the Tagus-=-'Cuesta is superseded, and General Eguia succeeds
to the command of the Spanish army-Distresses of the British
army, and extraordinary conduct of Eguia and the Spanish
government-Sir Arthur Wellesley retires upon the Guadiana
":""General A rrezaga defeated at Ocana, and the Duke del
Parque at Pamarue-Successes of the French in Andalusia-
Fall of Gerona and Astorga-Massena assumes the command
in the Peninsula-The British army moves towards Almeida,
leaving General Hill's corps at Abrantes-Comparative strength
of the opposing armies, and mutual preparatiolls for the cam-
paign


'.
426




xvi CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XVIII.


Low state of the finánces of the British army, and appfeben-


sions entertained by many respecting the issue of the war-


Massena opens the campaign by investing Ciudad Rodrigo-


Skirmishes at the outposts, and retreat of the light division on


Almeida-Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which surrenders-Affair


of cavalry in front of the British outposts-Rumours of the


enemy's intended operations, and dispositions to meet him 458


CHAPTER XIX.


Preparations proceed, and plans are formed-The light di-


vision attackjld at Almeida, and falls back towards Alverca-
General movement of the British army towards the rear~In~
decision of Massena-Difficulties against which Lord 'Velling-


ton is called upon to struggle-Almeida besieged and taken-


The garrison enter the French service-The enemy advance,


and the Britisb army retires towards Busaco 489




NARRATIVE


OF THE


PENINSULAR WAR.


CHAPTER 1.


The English army previous to 1808-DisinclinatiOIl of the
ministry to. commit it fairly against the armies of }'rance-
Causes which led to a change of policy-State of Europe in
consequence of the peace of Tilsit-Abject submission of
Spain to the will of Buonaparte, and ruinous consequences
of the war with England-The war of 1801 between Spain
and Portugal-Terms of peace-Miserable state of the Pe-
ninsular nations-Mad attempt of Godoy to excite them
against France-Secret treaty of Fontainbleau-Assembly
of the corps of observation of. the Gironde-Protest of the
French and Spanish ministers at the court ofLisbon-They
quit Lisbon.


THE memorable struggle in which, during fifteen .
or sixteen years, England had been engaged,
may be said, up to the year 1807, orráther 1808,
to have be en a mere war of defence. Whilst her


VOL. I. A




2 ,NARRATIVE OF THE


fleets swept the seas in each quarter of the globe,
crushing, wherever they came in contact with it,
the naval strength ofthe enemy, her armies either
rested idly upon har own. shotes, or were scattered
in detachments among her colonies, or at best
found themselves from time to time called upon
to bear a part in some petty expedition, the object
of which was usually as unprofitable, as the means
employed for its attainment were insignificant. If
we except the short campaign of Egypt, and the
still shorter though hardly less brilliant affair of
Maida, the entire period, from 1793 down to the
commencement of the Peninsular war, presents us
with no single record of deeds performed, worthy
of the ancient rrÍilitary renown of Great Britain;
for neither the capture of a few islands in the W.€st
Indies, nor the seizure aild súbseqtient abandon-
ttiertt of Tóulon, llor ihe coíitests in Flanders and
at the Texel, nor even the reduction of Copen-
hagen, can with any justice or propriety be referred
to, as adding much to the lasting reputation of this
country.


But though the case \vas so, abd government
appeared aH ihis while unaccountablyanxious to
avoid bringing its l.and forces fairly into contact
with those of France, it was by no means indif ..
ferent either as to tlie numencal strength or to the
internal discipEne and organisation of the atmy.
The threat of ah invasion, followeu up as it was by




PENINSULAR W A R. 3


the assembIy ofn~merou,s bodies oftroops aIong the
French ~oast, infuse<\ \fttq \lIe peopIe of EngIand
a military spirit, ol which, for many generations
hack, they had known nothing; and the minister
of the day was far tooprudent not to turn it to a
right account. Every encourageII1ent was given
to the enrolment of corps of vol~nteers; and these
corps ofvolunteel's. as well as the regiments of mi-
litia, all served as ~o many nurseries fQr the lineo
Men who had Qnc~bQr!W ~rm~, ~ve,n though they
carried them in sport, pegan to feel their objections
to the Jife of a soldier graduaIly abate; and many
an individual who put on a uniform with no other
design than that of protecting the peace of the
country, b~came, before long, a member of the
regular army. The vi<;tory of Trafalgar, likewise,
as it left us !lO epem.ief:¡ with whom ~ C9I!teU(~ at
sea, naturally enough tqme<\ tll~ views of the brave
and the enterprising to the land sel'vice. From
an these causes, recruits, both in officers and men,
presented themselves as rapidly as thlJ; most warlik~
administration could have desired ; insoJlluch, that
on t4e 1st of ,J"aPlJa.ry, ¡SQS, t~fe w~re en~oll~<!
under the British stand~.f(l, of regul~ infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, exclusive offoreign mercena-
ries, little shart of three hundred tllOusand J.ll~ll.


Of the discipline which perva.ded thjs Pf{)q.j-
gious mass, it is not necessary to sa, mnch;
even oul' enemies-those !tt least who were our




4 NAURATlVE OF THE


enemies, and who still entertain towards us a
degree of rancorous jealousy for which no good
cause can be, assigned-allow that the discipline of
the British army was, and is superior to that of
any other army in Europe. Under the wise and
paternal management of the late venerated Com-
mander~in-Chief, acode, stern enough in theory,.
but mild though firm in practice, had been esta-
blished. ~ ·Promotion too, which in former times
had proceeded without any regard whatever to
the fitness of individuals, was rendered as equita-
ole as it ever can be, under a system which adinits
of advancement by purchase. Boys were no
longer permitted to hold commissions, w hilst they
were yet acquiring the first elements of educa-
tion; nor was it any more in the power of the mi-
nister of the day, to reward the favourite who had
proved in any manner useful to himself, by bestow-
ing 'upon him the command of a regimento A re-
gular scale was drawn up, in accordance with
which no man was permitted to hold an ensign's
commission till he had attained the age of sixteen.
Three years' service was requisite to qualify him
for the 'rank of captain, seven years for that of
major. Nor were, other and equalIy important
matters left in the condition in which they once
stood. In former times, each colonel or command-
ing officer of a regiment was in the habit of ma-
nreuvring his corps in any way or upon any plan




PENINSULAR WAR. 5


which to himself inight appear most convenient.
The consequence was, that in the British army
there were almost as many systems of fieId move·
ment as there were regiments of cavalry and infan-
try; and, that hardly any two could, when called
upon to act together, act to any purpose. This
disadvantageous mode of proceeding was abolished.
Oneuniform and consistent system was drawn up
for the infantry; another for the cavalry; and aH
regiments were expected to. render themselves
perfect in these, before they attempted to learn
any thing besides. Such changes, together with
the establishment of hospitals for the wounded and
disabled soldiers, and for the education of children
whose parents had fallen in the defence of their
country, cou1d not fail of producing the most be-
neficialeffect upon the morale of the British army ;
which, from being an object of something Iike
abhorrence to ¡ts own countrymen, and of con-
tempt to the troops of other nations, rose to com-
mand, as well as to deserve, the esteem of the
former, and the respect and aclmiration of the
Iatter.


There were, however, one or two considerations,
which, notwithstanding these acknowledged im-
.provements, longcontinued to keep alive a disincli-
nation on the part of the ministry, to commit the
British army on the great freId of continental
warfare. In the frrst place it was doubtcd whe-




6 N ARRATIVE OF THE


ther, among out own generaIs, !líeré could be
found any, capable of opposing the experienced
and skilful warriors of France. We had never
been accustomed to carry on war upona large
scal~ except in India; and in India, it was be-
lieved that, for the successful conduct ofa .cam-
.paign, talents of the first order "\Vere hardly
'required. In the next place, itwas not'considered
either prudtmt or just topus'h a handful of British
troops into theheart of Europe; where, at a dis-
tance from the sea, and cut off from an communi-
eation with their own country, they might be com-
promised at, any moment, either through the im-
'becility or treachery of OUl' aUy. EngIand, it was
imagined, ought not to take part in a continental
war, unless she could do so on somepoint not very
remote fromher, own shores, and covered by an
extensive line of coast; because, in spite of the
magnitude of her army in the mass, she could
never, it was asserted, pretend to bring more
than thirty or fotty thousand men into the field.
These considerations, it ishardly necessary to add,
prevented a British army from appearing in lthe
neld at Austerlitz and Jena,or taking ashare in
any of the 'previous armaments which from time
-to time rendered' Germany ,the theatre of war.
'Butthelatter objection to the employment-of our
own troops, 'the mad ambition of:theFrallch ruler
at length removed; whilst it only requiredthe ex~




PENINSULAR WAR. ¡


perience of ·~single c~paign \0 demonstrate, that
in the for~er th~r~ had never ,been any solid
grounds oI c~~>son.


By the treaty of rilsit, N apoleon BUOllfl,parte
was left ma~:1;er of the cOl~tinent of Ellrope; tp,e
greater part being actually in \lis possession, :;lnd
the rest entirely lInder his controL Over t4e Ger-
manic body he exercised an ~ut,hprity mqre l."eal
and mOre absolute' tha.n JIad ev;~r been. e~eI:Ciliied
by ihe tnqstpo~eI~l of ~W ~~l'Qts. ',Switzer-
l~d sub~tted to call him h~r prQtector, obeyed
his edicts, andfil1ed up his ranks with meno
Holding France, Flanders, and Italy forhimself,
l1e had placed one brother upqn the throne ofNa-
pIes, another upon t}:lat of Holla)1d, whilst Jor a
third a kingdoOl waserected in theheart of
Germ:,¡;ny, withterritories ~aken indis,crimin,ately
froID frien,d and (oe. Joa~mMurat,the hus-
band of his sister, possessed a principality, with
the title of Grand Duke of Berg; Eugene Beall-
harnois, his wife's son, was, married to a princess
of the b,o,l,lse ,OfJ3,avaria, ~nd governed I,taly as his
vicer.oy ; ,;Whil~~ .. l+e :wasprepare,d, upon ~he 1;lext
vacancy, to place ~~uncle, 9f!-rWllal ~~sche, upon
t,he papal tbrone. N ot s~t~sfied with thus enrich-
ing and loading with honours the mewbers of .his
.own faroily, ~e ¡port,ioned out. ClIlloug hi~ marshals
and compa1).ions. in arUlS, ,kiJlgdQms and princi-
palities w~rn by the sword; and D.ukes Qf Istria,




8 NARRATIVE OF THE


and Dalmatia, and Ragusa, and Dantzic, were
numbered among the new nobility of France. His
own reputation moreover, political as well as mili-
tary, had risen to a height quite unprecedented;
for it is not going too far to affirm that the whole
civilised world, dazzled by the splendour of his
achievements, lay, with the solitary exception of
Great Britain, at his feet.


An empire acquired as had be en that of Napo-
leon, can nevereven for a moment be said to rest
upon asure foundation. ' One error in poIitics,
one failure in war, may suddenly excite a storm
which all the vigour of its chief will not be able to
surmount; and of this trúth the Emperor of the
French was doomed to furnish a memorable exam-
pIe. N ór will it readily cease to afford matter of
astonishment tó the reflecting mind, that thefirst
and most decisive blow to his power, should have
come froID a quarter where, aboye all others, he
believed himself, and had just ground to believe
himself, the most secure.


When the sovereigns of Europe deemed it
expedient to arm for the purpose of opposing the
progre ss Df the French Revolution, the courts both
of Madrid and Lisbon entered, with apparent cor-
diality, into the general league. Spain sent an
army across the Pyrenees, to which a few batta-
lions of Portuguese attached themselves; whilst
Portugal despatched nine sail of the line to follow




PENINSULAR WAIl. 9


the fortunes of the British Heet. The war in the
south of France was not conducted either with
skill or vigour. For a time indeed, that is to say,
as long as the Directory found· itself too busy to
pay much attention to the state of affairs in that
quarter, the allies obtained a few successes, but
they in no instance followed them up with the
slightest intrepidity; and they had hardly been
opposed by moderate forces, when the ti de of for-
tune turned against them. They not only lost
the little ground which they had gained, but
their be aten coJumns were pursued across the
frontier; Catalonia was overrun, and Madrid itself
threatened. An imbecile prince, and no less im;.
becile fa~ourite, alarmed by the progress which the
victorious republicans were making, hastened to
put an end to a disastrous war, by a disgraceful
peace. lt was concluded in 1795, by the treaty
of Basle, which, at the distance of ayear after,
was succeeded by a league offensive and defen,..
-sive, entered into at St. Ildefonso. .


From that moment Spain became, in point of
faet, nothing more than a mere appendage to
France. The family compaet, as it was nowab-
surdly termed, having been renewed with the
Directory, it was not to be expected that it would
cease to operate when the democratical form of
government gave place to the imperial; or that the
Emperor of the Freneh would be les s ready to avail




10 NARRATlVE QF THE


himsélf of it. !han had been the rulen; of the re-
publico .Al ~he i~tigation oC Buonaparte, Spain
declared war against England; am;l acontest be-
g!ln" which could hardly fail of bringing upon her
tM ~aviest disasters. During ita progtess, her
marine, which Charles III had taken .the utmost
care to fOlSt~r, was destroyed; her coU!merce re·
ceived a ~tQ.l blow; the iI?-tercourse with her Souta
AD;lerican <!pIonies was interrupted, and the way
"paved fOl' ibat ijepa,rati()fi whi~b. h1'U! since occur-
.red; her finan~.s bec.ame every day morea1;ld more
embarrassed; and public credit sank to the Iowest
ebb. HerarJUY, likewise, w~s drafted away to
1ight the b&,ttl#s of her 1wd.ly ally in the most
distant partsofEurope; and she was left in a
situation as helpless and pitiable as has eN'er
heen filled by a nation.


ltis hardly necesaary:to state that, at this
period, and forsome time previous, Spain was
governed by an individual on whose head fortune
appeared t~ ha~e taken delight in :showering the
rich{\~t of her favours. Manuel Godoy,aman
.4.oosc,"re bir$, who or.ig~nally~Ued no higher
.station th~n tbat qf~ pr·iv:ate in the royal body-
guards, having attracted the notice of the Queen,
,was by her influence raiaed to th~highest dignities
in the state ;andcaIlle at last to possess an au:-
thority more <;lecid~d-:j¡\lan thatofthe weak master
whom he professed to serve. Godoy was, at the




PENINSULAR WAR. 11


breaking out of the French Revolution4 commallder-
ill-chief of the armies, and lord high admiral
of the Heets of Spain; and at the close of 1792,
he was appointed to the important 0ffice which
Florida Blanca had filIed under Charles 111, that
of President of the Councils. He it was, who,
after conducting the war with so little abrlity,
accepted peace, upon terms which laid Spain at
the feet of her neighbour; and he received, as the
reward of his 'sernces on that OCcasiÓlll, the title
of Prince of thePeace. Godoy appears to have
been a strange compound of weakness with genius,
and of numerous vices, with a few virtues. That he
willingly and knowingly betrayed his country, there
is no reason for supposing; but like all upstarts,
he considered thegeneral good as a matter to
be postponed on every occasion.to .his private be-
nefit; and heun-questionably broughtabout the
downfall of the Spanish monarchy in the vain
attempt to uphold his own power. Godoy was
not disposed to favour the 'Prench, for heboth
feared and hated their ruler; but, like ,his sove-
,reign,he fearedthatextraordinary man more than
he hatedhim, and .therefore sttbmitted to receive
his yoke. When the peace of Amiens was broken,
N apoleon, in virtue of the treaty of Sto Ildefonso,
called upon Spain to join ;11im with herlleets and
armies; hut Godoy was desirous of ,evading the
request; and he even succeeded, for a short time,




12 NARRATIVE OF THE


in purchasing an insecure neutrality, by the pay-
ment of forty. thousand pounds per month into
the imperial treasury. At last, however, Spain
was hurried into the war, which brought so many
.and sueh severe calamities upon her; from the
effects of which she has not yet recovered, and
probably never will recover.


Whilst Spain was thus acting the part of a
province of Franee, Portugal, faithful to the terms
of her aneient allianee with England, eontinued to
maintain a hostile attitude towards the eommon
.enemy. N ot that she aeted thus either willingly
or eonfidentIy. DepFived by the treaty of St.
Ildefonso of a barrier against French invasion, upon
which she had been accustomed to count, Portu-
gal could .not but feel that, in striving, even with
the aid of England, to assert her independence,
she was attempting that which neither the con-
dition of her defences, nor the numerical strength
of her population, authorised her to attempt. But
she was well aware that no peace would be granted
to her on any other terms besides the shutting of
her ports against English vessels; and she felt
that a rupture with England must speedily reduce
her to the lowest extremities of distress. Under


. these circumstances, the eourt of Lisbon issued
orders for the enrolment of large bodies oftroops.
The arsenals were filled with warlike instru-
ments; the forts and towns on the frontier were




PENINSULAR WAlto 13


put in a state of repair; and the Qrdinances, or
levies en masse, received instructions to repair,
each company to its accustomed place of rendez.;.
vous, on the first alarm of an enemy.


It is not necessary to detail at length the parti-
culars of the war which ensued. For a time no
event occurred of greater importance than the
occasional capture of a Portuguese merchant-man
by one of the French privateers, which, in great
numbers, found shelter in· the ports of Spain.
An invasion was indeed threatened; Buonaparte,
when in Egypt, declared to his troops, that .. a
time would come, when the Portuguese nation
should pay with tears ofblood for the insult which
it had offered to the republic," by despatching a
squadron to act in conjunction with· the British
fleet in the Mediterranean. But the continental


. ,var which broke out in 1799, delayed the execution
ofthat threat; nor was it till1801, that any serious
movements were made for carrying it into effect.
Then, however, the fate of Germany being de~
cided, and peace dictated to the rest of Europe,
the FirstConsul began seriously to turn his atten-
tion towards the accomplishment ofhis prophecy;
under the persuasion that, in detaching Portugal
from England, he would be striking· a blow at
the power of the latter empire, in what he was
pleased to term the most accessible part of her
~dominions.




14 NARRATIVE OF THE


A convéntion was, accordingly entered into at
Madrid, between the French republic and his
Catholic Majesty,. which had for its object the
forcible deliverance of Portugal froro the alliance of
EngIand. It was foUoweds 00 the 27th of Fe-
bruary, by a declar,ation of war by Spain, for
the prosecution of which her troops were already
in motion; whilst a Freneh corps of fifteen thou-
sand men pa.ssed tbe Pyrenees, and took up its
quarters in tha vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, for
the purpose of supporting the Spanish army, to
which the task of invading Portugal was assigned.


To oppose this attack, tbe Duk.e de Lafoes,
prime minister of Portugal, oceupied both sides
of theTagus with a eorps of thirty thousand meno
They were miserably armed, wretchedly equipped,
and neithet· paid nor fed; and the only British
force at hand to support tbem, eonsisted of a bri- -
gade of foreign regiments, a detachment of the 20th
light dragoons, and a few can non, under General
Fraser. The campaign was, as might be ex-
pected, unfavourable to the Portuguese, tbough by
neither side was much aetivity or talent displayed ;
and before the middle of J une, peace was signed
between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz. But
.with the terms of that peace, though they in-
cIuded the shutting of the Portuguese ports against
all intercourse with England, the First Consul
was not satisfied; nor was it till the 29th ()f the




PENINSULAR WAR. 15


following, Septembet that the court of Lisbon
succeeded in obtaininghis approbation. of the
treaty. To secure this, Portugal was content to
pay one million sterling to the French govern-
ment; besides consenting to other arrangemen.ts,
both commereial and territorial, all of them in the
highestdegree prejudieial to her own interests.


The peace of Amiens suspended for a while
the operation of that article in tha treaty which
closed tha pom of Lisbon ,and oporto against
English merchandise, and the old commercial
intercourse between the two nations was re-
newed; but the rupture, whieh so soon followed,
again placed Portugal in a diffieult situation.
At fil'st, Buonaparte insisted upon the necessity
of reeurring to the prohibitory system, and ap-
peared bent upon allowing no modification of ¡ts
operations; but a variety of considerations Ied him
at last to change his tone. The war in which
Spain by his dictation had engaged, unavoidably
produced an interruption in the arrival of those
treasures from South Ameriea whieh he fOUlld so
useful to himself in the prosecution of his schemes
of eonquest: it was necessary thatsome harbour
should be left open for their reeeption. On this
aceount, and on condition of securing,. during the
continuanee of the maritime war, a monthly tri-
bute of forty or fifty thousand pounds, Buonaparte
consented that Portu al should continue to main-




16 NARRATIVE OF THE


tain a íriendly intercourse with Great Britain; and
she became, in consequence, the only neutral state
in the south of Europe.


In this condition both Spain and Portugal re-
mained, from 1803 up to 1807; the one suffering
a1l the misery attendant upon a compuIsory alliance
with a power which exhausted her revenues, and
ruined her commerce; the other writhing under
too pain of aheavy contribution, and exposed every
day to fresh vexations, which she possessed not the
means oí resisting. N or were the internal affairs
of either kingdom in a more prosperous state than
their external connexions. In Spain, the nobility
were suilk to the lowest pitch of degradation; the
clergy, avaricious and domineering, ruled the peo-
pIe with a rod of iron; and the King, was not
ashamed to appear as a tool' in the hands oí the
very man, who, to an appearance, was living in a
state of adultery with his wife. Every depart-
ment of the state was mismanaged. The towns,
deserted by their inhabitants, presented a melan-
cboIy picture of what a nation must come to,
whose rulers are possessed' neither of energy of
mind nor honesty of character ; and the very fields
were in many place s left uncultivated, for want
of sufficient hands to till tbem. In like manner,
the Spanish army, which, under the Emperors
Charles V and Philip, had been the admiration
of Europe, was nowa thing of no name,--a very




· PENINSULAR WAR. 17


by-word of derision and contempt to the troops of
other nations. The few soldiers that remained in
the country were without ray, 01' clothing, or even
arms; tlle officers, taken from the lowest dasses,
were not ashamed to wait, as servants, in their
uniforms, behind the chairs of the grandees. AH
the arsenal s were empty. There were not provi-
sions or stores of any kind, in any of the fortresses,
s~fficient for a month' s consumption of the wretched:
garrisons which held them; and the very foun-
dries had ceased to work, except at remote inter-
vals.


Yet wasthe spirit of Spain far from beingwholly
broken. Driven from the higher and prouder
circles, it took refuge among the peasantry; nor
would it be easy to point out, in any quarter ofthe
world, a nobler or finer race of men than those
who cultivated the vine on the banks of the Ebro, .
or led their long lines of mules from one q uarter oí
the kingdom to another. These men had partaken
in no degree of the degeneracy of their superiors.
The memory of their country's former greatness
was kept alive in them by those traditionary bal ..
lads whichSpaniards, more tha~ the inhabitants
of any othe1' European state, delight in repeating;
and they never failed to contrast it with the humi-
liating attitude which the imbecility of their pre-
sent g'overnment condemned them to aSSllme. Had
there been in Charles sufficient firmness to desire ~


VOL. I. BiÍ;." ji!' '
:J, .




]8 NARRATIVE OF THE


an emancipation from foreign thraldom, he might
have foused, in one day, the whole male popula-
tion of Spain abouthim. But there was no- such
fj.rmness in that weak monareh. The dupe of
Godoy on the one hand, and of his own fears on
the other, he eontinued to hug the chain which
bound him, as long as i1 was possible so to do;
nor, when that ehain was burst at last, did the
sDlallest credit attach either to him or to his
worthless minis"ter.


In Portugal, the sarue, or nearly the same,order
of things prevailed. The Regent, a weak and-su-
perstitious prinee, was not, indeed, like his father-
in-Iaw, under the influenee of a favourite minister,
but he was as eompletely theslave of his eon-
fessor, as, Charles was the slave of Godoy. As
long as it was permitted him to attend religious
processions; as long as the ehurch seemed to
flourish in its primitive grandeur; he cared not
how other departments of his kingdom were guid-
ed, or in what plight his people dragged on exis-
tenee. N or were the nobles who surro~nded him
more patriotie or more respectable than those who
surrounded the tbrone oí Spain. In Portugal, as
in tbe neigbbouring country, all tbat bad ever be en
admirable in the mitional character could be found
only among the peasantry; who, in spite of the
corrupting influence oftheir superiors, eontinued to
the last a high.;.spirited, brave, and obedient race.




PENINSULAR \VAR. 19


It has been said that Godoy cannot with truth
be aecused of submitting wilfully and knowingly
to the yoke which France had placed upon the
neck of his country. Like the ;roass of the people,
he writhed painfully under ii; and as it afterwards
appeared, nothing but an overwhe1ming dread of
the consequences had deterred him from making a
vigorous attempt to cast it off. At last, however,
the general feeling on that subject became so
strong, that he determined to do something for the
purpOse of indulging it. The plan which he de-
vised, and the method which he pursued in matur-
ing it, are already well knownto the public; but
since to these the whole series of events which
followed may be traced back, as to their immediate
canses, it may not be amiss to offer here a brief
recapitulation of the .leading circumstances which
attended them.


The overthrow of tbe Bourbon dynasty in N a-
pIes. had sensibly alarmed the court of Madrid;
and the prospect of that rupture with Prussia
which ended in the peace of Tilsit, struck Godoy
as fumishing a favourable opportunity of stil'ring up
all Eurape against aman· whose ambition seemed
to be without bounds. A secret alTangement was
accotdingly entered into between him and the
ambassador Strogonoff, into which the Portuguese
Envoy was admitted, that the two kingdoms of
Spain and Portugal should iustantly arm, for the




20 NARRA'l'IVE OF THE


purpose of attacking France at a moment when
her troops should be called away to oppose the
;Emperor of Russia in the n01'th. These prepara-
tions were to begin in Portugal; with the ostensi-
ble view of overawing which, Spain was next to
increase her armies; whilst expeditions being
fitted out in the English ports, a combined force
was to invade the south of Franee, which, it was
pelieved, would not be in a fit state to offer any
efficient opposition. ~uch were the plans of Go-
doy, in proposing which so much secreey wa~
preserved, that no other agent of the government
either at home or abroad was made aequainted
with what was pending; but they were destined
neyer to be carried into effect. Before a single
step had been taken either in Spain or Portugal;
before any direct c()mmunication had been opened
with England, there suddenly appearad a procla-
mation of the Prince of the Peace, ealling upon all
good Spaniards to arm, and to assist in delivering
their eountry froro the perils whieh roenaeed it.
This proc1amation was given to the world at a time
when Buonaparte was absent on the Prussian
campaign ;and its tenor was sueh as no person
could possibly misunderstand. 1t produced a very
powerful effect; but the effect was directly the
reverse in kind from that which it was intended to
produce.


Baron Strogonoff and the Portuguese Ambassa-




PENINSULAR WAR. 21


dor, equally startled at the great imprudence of
the step which had been taken, lost no time in
disavowing all participation in a· project which
they now equally pretended to condemn~ So
fearful, indeed, was the court of Lisbon of being
supposed to be a partner in the conspiracy, that it
compelled Ear! Sto Vincent to withdraw, with his
fleet, from the Tagus. Godoy instaritly . saw the
folly of the act into which his natural precipitanéy
had hurried him. He hastened. to bifer snch ex'"
planations to tbe French Ambassador as he judged
most likely to aIlay the anger of N apoleon~ and he
instructed his private agent, Don Eugenio Izquier-
do, to make the most abject submissions in his
name to N apoleon in persono Paragraphs like-
wise appeared in the Madrid newspapers, sorne of
tbem ascribing late events to an apprehensiOll of
an invasionby .the Emperor~of Moroe~o; :otbers
oifering rewards for thedetection of the miscreant
who had forged a circular letter to the intendants
of provinces in the name of the Prince of the
Peace; whilst the motives of the proclamation, of
which tbe authenticity could notbe denied, .were
industriously pronounced to be a sense of duty
towards Franee, and an over-anxiety to oppose the
projects of England. .


Buonaparte received the documents aboye al-
luded to subsequent to the battle of Jena;· and he
read in the palace of the King of Prussia a corres-




22 NARRATIVE OF THEo


pondence which placed the íntended revoltofSpain
beyond a doubt. He vowed at the moment to
take revenge, but it suited his policy to utter the
vow in secret; and he affected to have cordially
forgiven the fauIt Ínto which his aliy, the King of
Spain, had been drawn. Itis now, however, per-
fectIy ascertained that this disclosure of the feel;;.
ings of the Peninsular nations towards him, opened
his eyes fully to the danger to which his power
must always be exposed whilst these nations con-
tinued to be governed by their present royal fami-
lies. He determined, on the instant, that ihe
houses both of Bourbon and Braganza should
cease to reign, and that their places should be
supplied by those upon whose subserviency to his
own views and wishes he IDight have better reason
to dependo


Had Buonaparte, al!! 800n as the designs ofSpain
became known to him, directed his viCtorious ]e~
gíons upon Madrid, the dethronement of Charles
would have been viewed by the rest of Europe as
an arrangement dictated by self-defence; whilst it
is not improbable that the war never would have
assumed the character whicl1 his future proceed-
ings gave to it. But it was not in the nature of
the Freneh Emperor to aet, in any case, either
with openness {)f candour. Though a passionate
lover of war, he never effected that by force of
arms, which he bélieved it practicable to effect by




PENINSULAR W AR. 23


diplomacy; and the principIe which guided him
in other cases failed not to operate heteo There
were, however, other reasons for the system which
he pursued, and these deserve to. be recorded.


There are few states in which the favourite of
the reigning monarch becomes not, sooner or later,
an object of hatred to the heir apparent, and, as a
necessary consequence, to aU who are disposed to
worship the risingwn rather than the sun in its
meridian. This was peculiarl y the case at· the
court of Madrid. Godoy was, and had long been,
at variance with Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias;
and so bitter was the feeling of animosity which
subsisted between them, that the bare adoption by
Godoy of one line of policy, was sufficient to guide
Ferdinand to the adoption of its opposite. As
soon, therefore, as GOdoy'lil hostility to the French
hecame known, Ferdinand made hMte toO declare
himself a suppórter of the French interests. He
even went so far as to address a private letter to
N apoleon, in which he entreated him to deliver his
father and mother from the influence of an artful
favourite; to free Spain from the thraldom of an
upstart; and to honour himselfby granting him an
allianee with a princess of the imperial blood.
Whether Buonaparte e\'er entertailled ally serious
intention of complyillg with these requests, it wei'e
diffieult to determine; but this much is known,
that he answered Ferdinand's letter kindly, and




24 N ARRATfVB OF ,'fHE


that he readily consented to become the arbiter in
the disputes which divided the royal family of
Spain. -Howhis arbitration was conducted, Spain
and Europe will not soon cease to remember.


In the mean while however, under the pretext
of standing in need of their services, Buonaparte
required that a corps of sixteen thousand Spa-
niards under Romana should proceed to join his
armies on the shores of the Baltic. To these were
added a division of six thousand men, which, with
General O'Farrel at their head, had previously
served in Tus~any; and thus almost all the regu-
lar troops on which the government could depend,
wereremoved to so great a distance from Spain as
to be perfectIy useless. But N apoleon's duplicity
ended not here. At the very moment when he
was giving Ferdinand assurances of his regard and
protectiQn, he induced the weak Charles to heap
upon Godoy án additional10ad of favours, till both
the king and his favourite beca me intoxicated, the
one with joy, the other with vanity. By this
means,by appearing to each party inc1ined to
countenance it in its projectsand wishes, he not only
kept alive, but widened the breach which already
existed withinthe court of Madrid, and put mat-
ters in a train for that issue which, in all probabi-
lit y , he had already determined to bring about.


Thepeace of Tilsit having restored him victori-
ous to his capital, Buonaparte began to make im-




PENINSULAR W AR. 25
mediate preparations to support a war of diplomacy
by one of vi?lence. Withoutany reasonable ex-
cuse having been assigned for the measure, a rorps


·of twenty-fh·e thousand infantry and three 1ho\.\-
sand cavalry was seen to asseroble in the month
of August, 1807, at the base of the Pyrenees,
which assumed the somewhat enigmatical appel-
lation of the Corps of Observa:tion of the Gironde.
Whilst this force was organising itself under th~
directions of Marshal Junot, the Spanish roinister
at Paris was entering into a secret treaty; tlle
object of wllicll was nothing less than tlle erasure
of Portugal froro the list of nations. By the terms
of that tre.aty, since become illustrious as the "se-
cret treaty of Fontainbleau," it was agreed tllat
J unot's army should enter Portugal at once, aided
by three divisions of Spanish troops; that a se-
cond army, of forty thousand French soldiers,
should assemble in Gascony, ready to support the
first, should it meet with any serious opposition;
and that Portugal, being subdued, should be di-
. vided into tllree parts, of wllicll the following dis-
tribution was to be made. The province of Entre
Minho e Douro, with :the city of Oporto as its
capital, was to be erected into a kingdom, under
tlle title of N orthern Lusitania, and· given to the
King of Etruria, in exchange for his Italian pos.;...
sessions, which he ceded iIi full and entire sove:-
reignty to Buonaparte. In like manner, Alentejq




26 NARRATIVE OE' THE


and Algarve were to be given to Godoy, who was to
assume the style and title of Prince of the Algarves;
and the remaining Portuguese provinces wer~ to
be held by Napoleon himself, till a general pacifica-
tion should enable him to restore them to the house
of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad,
and the other Spanish colonies which the English
had conquered. These three sovereignties were,
however, to be held by investiture from the King
of Spain; and their princes were to owe to him
the same sort of obedience which, in the feudal
times, the holder of a fief owed to his sovereign
lord. The colonial possessions of Portugal, again,
were to be equally divided between the crowns of
Franee and Spain; and the Emperor of the French
was, as soon as it should be convenient, to acknow-
ledge his Catholic Majesty as emperor of the two
Americas.


Though nothing officially transpired indicative
of the object which the army of observation was
intended to effect, Europe was not so short-sighted
as to remain for one instant in doubt as to the ulti-
mate field of its operations. In the ftrst place, the
officer who wasplaced atits head had long filled,
and still continued in name at least to fill, the sta-
tion of ambassador·at the court of Lisbon from the
imperial cabinet. It is true that, on the opening
of the Austrian campaign, Junot had quitted the
seat of his diplomatic c;luties, that he might exe-




PENINSULAR WAlt. 27


cute the more congenial offices whicn devolved
upon him as aide-de-camp to tbe Emperor; but
he had done so by tbe express permission of his
master; and instead of his place being supplied by
anotber commissioned representative, the business
of the miss ion was intrusted, as in the case of
other temporary absences of tbe principal, to the
chief secretary, M. de Rayneval. This circum-
stance was of itself sufficient to create a suspicion
that something prejudicial to the interests of Por-
tugal was'intended; and if tbere were any who at
first appeared wiIling to doubt on tbe subJect,
their doubts were not permitted long to existo
The treaty of Fontainbleau was hardly. signed,
when the ministers, both of France and Spain,
presented a strong remonstrance to the Prince
Regent, requiring that the Berlín and Milan de-
crees should be strictly enforced at every harbour
of Portugal; and it was further required, on threat
of the immediate commencement of hostilities,
that all the British subjects then resident in the
kingdom sbould be seízed, and all tbe British pro-
,perty connscated.


Tbe conduct of theRegent of Portugal under
circumstances so trying, was not very different
from that which might ha ve been expected at bis
hands. He dared not refuse obedience to the first
mandate, and he remonstrated against the second
only in the mildest and most submissive terms.




28 N ARRA TIVE OF. THE


But tbe powers with whom he had to deal enter-
tainedno wish.that he should pay to tbeir relJlon-
stranees a. prompt attention; they were pleased,
rather tban the reverse, at every appearance of
~issatisfaction wbich he happened toexhibit. Find-
ing that "his sense of religion, and. the regard
which he had for existing treaties," would not per-
mit bim at once to commit so flagrant an act of
jnjUs~ice, the French and Spanish ministers de-
manded theirpasspofts; and before either these
could be given, or the unhappy Prince was ena-
bled to appeal through his own ambassadors to the
generosity of his neighbours, the troops destined
to overrun Portugal were .in motion.




PENINSULAR WAR. 29


CHAPTÉR Il.


March of Junot's armyacross the frontier~i:t p.rriveil at Sala~
tnanca,passes Alcantara, ana enters Portugal-Itssufferings
by the way-Alarm of the court of Lisbon-,-Proposal toeúlÍ~
grata to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and
Sir Sydney Smith-The court gives its consent, appoints a
regency, and emharks-Junot reaches Lisbon-His measures
for the preservation of puhlic tranquillity-Hishehaviour, at
first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical-The tri.coloured
flag hoisted-The regeney abolished-Junot assumes su-
preme power--The Portuguese army disbatíded, and a heavy
fine imposed upon the people-General diseontent of aH
c1asses-Numerous broils and arbitrary punishments-The
Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection~Exertions
of Junot to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against
the English.


THE treaty of Fontainbleau was not yet signed¡
when on the 17th of October, 1807, Junot received
orders to put his troops in motion within twenty-
four hours. At daybreak on the 18th the first
division of the ármy of observation of the Gironde
crossed the Bidassoa; it was followed on the 19th




30 NARRATIV.E OF THE


by the second; and the whole army, marching in
six columns, each at the interval of one day from
that whicn had preceded it, entered Spain. About
the same time, three corps of Spanish troops be-
gan to take the road towards Portugal, by diffe-
rent routes. One of these, which was appointed
to act under the immediate orders of the French
Marshal, was directed to assemble at Alcantara,
on the Tagus. . It consisted of eight battalions of
infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, one troop of
horse artillery, and two companies of sappers and
miners; and it was commanded by Don Juan Ca-
raffa, captain-general of the province of Estrema-
dura. Another, destined to act by itself, for the
occupation of N orthern Lusitania, mustered four-
teen battalions, six squadrons, and one company
offoot artillery, and was placed under the direc-
tion of Don FranciBcu TaTanco y Plano, captain-
general of Gallicia: its point of rendezvous was
Tuy, on the borders of Minho. A third, at the
head of which was Don Francisco Solano, marquis
del Socorro, and captain-general of Andalusia,
was composed of eight battalions, five squadrons,
ahd a troop oí hone artillery,and received instruc-
tions to collect in the vicinity of Badajoz. In
order to complete these corpa, it is scarcely neces-
S3Ty to !ltate that everydis:posable soIdier in the
Spanisb army was put in requisition; thateven
the King's body-guard furnished its quota; and




PENINSULAR W AR. 31


that in the capital itself there remained, after their
departure, a garrison made up of skeletons only,
and the depots of regiments.


The French army was every where received,
during its progress through Spain, with the utmost
cordiality; it was supported at the expenseof the
government, and it reached Salamanca, where the
General expected to winter, before the middle of
November. But the last division had not come in
when a courier arrived at head-quarters, bringing
the most urgent amI imperative directions that
no halt should be made between the Bidassoa and
Lisbon. Junot had accordingly no alternative sub-
mitted to him. Without having had time to make
the slightest preparation forsuch a march, he set
forward in the dead of winter, to pursue a route
along which no depots of provisions or stores of
any kind were established; where it was at least
doubtful whether he would not meet with a formi-
dable opposition from a peasantry brave to a pro-
verb, and proverbially jéalous of the appearance of
foreigners among them; and where, at aU events,
he was quite sure of having the serious obstacles
to overcome, which a mountainous district, lntel'-
sected in every direction by rapid rivers and moun-
tain streams, would not fail to throw in his way.
The apprehension, however, that an English army
migh.t arrive at Lisbon before him, was quite suf-
ficient to make aH these' difficulties appear light.




32 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


He pushed on, and with the leading brigade of his
army, reached Alcantara on the 15th.


In this place he found General Caraffa with his
corps of Spaniards; but there was a woful scarcity
of means by which to recrui t the vigour of his own
battalions, worn out by long marches through a
difficult country, and in tremendous weather. It
was with the utrnost difficulty that the French
sóldiers could be supplied, each with rations for
twó days. Still the Ernperor's orders rnust be
obeyed; and on the 19th; after having circulated
proclarnations in which the Portuguese were 'as-
sured of protection froni insult in the event of their
reinaining <i uiet, and threatened with the rnost
terrible puníshmerit if they should in any way irn-
pede the progress of ttoops which carne only to
deliver them froro the yoke of England., the allied
arroies were mice niore put in motion.


It is not necessary tó follow the movel.llents of
Junot's corps very minutely. It is sufficient to
observe that, though the peasantry in general
either rested peaceably in their cottages, 01' at the
most fied toO the mountains and left their hornes
desolate,"thé routa of the invaders rnight be traced,
by gard.ens devastated, houses ruined, and whole
villages burned to' the ground. Notwithstanding
this was the case, and though not á. gun was fired
from the day whén the head of the first French
colurnn passed the front¡er, till the ar1'ival of its




PENINSULAR WAlto 33


rear-guard in Lisbon, the march was far from
being a tour of pleasure to those who performed it.
The seasonchanced to be particularly stormy and
inclemenL The rain feH in torrents, cutting up
the indistinct paths which traversed the moun-
tains, and swelling into formidable rivers, streams
whichmight usually be crossed without apprehen-
sion, either by man or beast. The reader is doubt-
less aware that the road, if such it deserves to be
termed, which leads from Alcantara to Lisbon, by
way of Castello Brarico and Abrantes, passes over
the summits of a ridge of rocks, and through a
coulltry as desert and unfruitful as any which tl}e
European traveller is in the habit of visiting. 1 t
was by this track that J unot thought fit to pro-
ceed; and the fatigue and privations which his
troops were in consequence condemned to endure,
are represented to have been more terrible than
generaIly fall to thelot of a retreating army. As
a matter of course, neither wintry torrents nor per-
manent rivers were, in that wild district, supplied
with bridges; the soldiers were consequently ob-
liged to cross as they best could, whenever such
obstacles carne in their' way; 'and such was the
rapidity of the streams in many places, that whole
companies of men, and whole troops oí horses,
were swept away and destroyed.A march throúgh
defiles like these could not long- be conducted
with order or regularity.· The artillery was soon


VOL. J. e




34 NARHATIVE Ol>' TIIE


left behind; of the cava1ry, only the best mounted
were enabled to keep up; and even the infantry
lost its ranks, and straggled, for many miles, over
the face of the country. Long before the towers
of Abrantes rose upon their view, the French co-
lumns may . be said to have dissolved themselves ;
for there were not aboye five thousand men who
followed the General that were in any condition,
either from bodily strength or local situation, to
oppose an enemy.


But though fully aware of this, and of the risk
which he'ran by disregarding it, Junot feltthat
other and still stronger reasons forbade his paus-
ing, even though a pause of a few days might bring
back to their standards the thousands whom wea-
riness and famine had left by the wayside. At
Abrantes, intelligence reached him of the line of
conduet which thePortuguese government was
preparing to pursue; and it was with him an
object of the first importance to reach the capi-
tal, if possible, in time to interpose for its pre-
vention.


The treaty of Fontainbleau had not been kept
so secret, but that the English government obtained
information of its object; and that information it
lost no time in communicating to the cabinet of
Lisbon. England had given her assent to the pro-
position made by the Regent of Portugal, of shut-
ting· the ports of his kingdom against· her mer-




PENINSULAR W A H. 35


chants; she was aware that her aneient ally, in so
doing, aeted only by compulsion; and she there-
fore connived at the transaction. But it was im-
possible for her to forgive the next step which his
timid poliey indueed him to take; and when he
proceeded, in obedienee to the mandate of Franee,
to arrest all British subjeets, and confiseate all
British property, Lord Strangford, the ambassador,
could do no otherwise tban retire on board of one
of the. ships of tbe squadron, which,under the com-
mand·of SirSidney Smith, lay at that time at
anchor in tbe Tagus. As soon, however, as the
details ofthe secret treachery reached them, both
the Ambassador and the Admiral requested and
obtained an audience of the Prince Regent. In
this they laid before him the particulars ·of the ae-
counts which they had received; and in the mast
foreible terms urged him to adopt sorne means for
the preservation of his own persan, and the safety
of the royal family. The great question, however,
was, of what nature these means were to be. He
had hesitated too long to permit any idea of open
resistance being entertained; besides, neither the
army, nor tbe fortresses, nor the: general state of
the nation, was such as to inspire any hope of
resisting successfulIy. It was then that the Bri-
tisb functionaries pressed upon him the wisdom of
removing with his court and family to the Brazils,
and fixing there tbe seat of his government, till




36 N AURATIVE OF THE


the troubles of the present times should pass away.
This was a terrible alternative; nor can it surprise
any one, that the Regent of Portugal should have
wavered long, and frequently changed his de ter-
niinations, before he could muster sufficient cou-
rage to adopt it. But, at last, the famousarticle in
the Moniteur was shown to him, in which it was
openly announced that the house of Braganza had
ceased to reign. AH ground of hesitation was now
removed. The British subjects who had been ar-
rested were set at liberty; the British property
which had been seized was restored to ¡ts rightful
owners; and the royal family of Portugal made
every preparation for quitting the ancient seat of
its sovereignty under the protection of the British
flag. These resolutions had been formed, and
these preparations were in a state of forwardness,
when Junot reached Abrantes; and it was the no-
tice which he received of the intended emigration,
which induced him, without pausing to refresh his
followers, or collect those who lagged behind, to
press on towards the capital.


The consterriation and anxiety which were
evinced by the inhabitants of Lisbon, as soon as a
rumour of the intended departure of the Prince
got abroad, beggar all attempt at description.
Devotedly attached both by nature and habit to
the persons of their sovereigns, the Iower orders
beheld, in the proposed ellligration, a certain pre-




PENINSULAR WAR. 37


lude to national ruin and individual misery; whilst
the higher classes, such at least as r,easoned at aH,
carne to the conclusion that, as surely as the royal
family shouId abandon the paIace of their ances-
tors, so surely would the prophetic declaration in
the Moniteur receive its accomplishment. N or
was this the only circumstance which tended to
excite general alarm, independently of the im-
pending approach of the French troops. As if he
had come thither, by appointment, Junot's army
hadhardly crossed the frontier, when the Russian
admiraI Siniavin entered the Tagus, with nine
ships of the line and two frigates. Such a coinci-
dence could not fail deeply to affect men already
agitated by a thousand fears and doubts; ror
though his 'arrival was purely accidental, ít ap-
peared to the ill-fated Portuguese tha! a plan of
ca· operation between the French General and the
Russian Admiral had been laid; and that the lat-
ter had come, at thís critical juncture, to render
assistance to the former in the subjugation of the
kingdom.
, _ In the mean while, great preparations were
making by the court for its' iritended emigration.
The royal treasury was emptied;' much of the
pIate, both ofthe Prince and of the courtiers who
designed to follow him, was packed up and made
ready for removal on board of ship ;and fillaIly, a
proclamation appeared, assigning as the motive for




38 NARHATIV.E OF THE


a step so decisive, the conviction which rested
upon the mind of the Regent, that his person, and
not the oppression of tbe Portuguese people, was
the desjgn of the p:resent invasion. A regency
was likewise nominated, to consist of four indivi-
duals; namely, the Marquess de Abrantes; Lieu-
tenant-general Francisco da Cunba de' Menezes~
regidor das justi~as, principal castro of tbe royal
conncil; Don Pedro de Millo Breyner, likewise of
the council; and Don Francisco de N oronha, lieu-
tenant-general, and president of the board of con-
science. In case any of these should refuse to act r
the Conde Monteiro Mor was nominated to take
his place; and the same nobleman was appointed
president of the Senado da Camara, having the
Conde Sampaio, or Don Miguel Periera Forjaz,
and Joam Anthonio Salter de Mendon~a, as his
secretaries. These functionaries were instructed
to use every exertion for the. preservation of the
general peace of the kingdom; they were to admi-
nister the laws in every respect as if the Regent
bimself were present; and aboye aH, they were
themselves to receive, and to instruct aU good
Portuguese to receive~ the French troops as friends.
Upon tbis point the proclamation was the nlore
explicit, inasmuch as both the English Admiral,
and the inhabitants of Lisbon, had manifested a
strong desire to defend the city to the last; and
as the Regent was satisfied that aH resistan ce




PENINSULARW AR. 39


must be fruitless, he positively forbade any to be
offered.


Whilst matters were in this train on the banks
of the Tagus, J unot was moving, as rapidly as the
state of the weather and the disordered condition
of his troops would allow, upon the capital. He
had assembled together as many soldiers of every
corps and division as appeared capable of bearing
the fatigue of a renewed march, and he caused
large vessels to beconstructed for the conveyance,
down the stream, of those multitudes whom disease
or weariness rendered incapable of proceeding
further. General Caraffa, with a portion of the
Spanish corps, was. detached to Thomar for the
purpose of collecting provisions, and keeping that
part of thecountry in awe. The Teserve of artil-
lery and the heavy baggage, which had been left
behind, received instructions to follow by the road
which passes Alcantara and Badajoz; whilst the
guns attached to the divisions in advance, were
most of them conveyed by water carriage. Having
. completed these arrangements, he found that it
was possible for him tomove forward at the head
of six or eight thousand men; and he 10st no time
in putting them in motion.


On the 26th of N ovember, the advanced guard,
consisting of four chosen battalions and a regiment
of Spanish hussars, reached Punhete. On the
following morning it pas~ed the Zezere in boats;




40 N A RRATIVE OF THE


and J unot, who accompanied it, was met on the
opposite bank by Jose Oliveira de Barreto, com-
mandant of Aranjo. This officer was desirous that
the march· of the French troops should be sus-
pended; and that sorne confidential person should
be sent forward, for the purpose of arranging all
the details of oécupation with the proper authori-
tieso But as .he accompanied his request with an
enunciation of the proposed departure of the royal
family, Junot would on no acc()unt accede to it.
The troops continued their marcho .


The rains had fallen so heavi1y, that the whole
plain of Golega was inundated, and the advanced
guard which traversed it found the water· cover
their knees; the rest of the troops, by turning
off in the direction ofTorres Novas and Pernes,
escaped ·that inconvenience. Buí no obstacles
impedéd them. They reached Santarem in due
time, and found ít in a state of great order and
prosperity. N one of the inhabitants had aban-
doned their homes, and all received the invaders
with kiridn-ess; they were repaid for this conduct
by the sack and ruin of the town.


At last Sacavem, a· vi-llage situated abont two
leagues from Lisbon, was gained; the head of the
colurnn reaching it at an early hour on the 29th.
Here the French general was met by deputations
fl'om the supreme council, from the city, and from
the mel'chants ofLisbon, who carne to congratulate




PENINSULAR WAR. 41


him on his arrival, in the names of these bodies;
and here he was informed of too embarkation and
actual departure of the royal famny. At the same
time the representatives of the .regency~ Lieute-
nant-general Martinho de Souza e Albuquerque,
and Brigadier-general Francisco de Borga Gar~ao
Stockler, warned him of the state of violent ex-
citation into which the inhabitants of the capital
were thrown. They assured him that an English
fleet was at the mouth of the rivet, evidentIy
waiting for a falr wind to carry it up; and that,
unless the greatest pl'ecautions were used, it would
be a hard matter to preserve that amity between
the French and the Portuguese, which not pru-
dence only, but the express orders of the Prince
Regent, required them to preserve. Junot heard
them to an end, and then dismissed thein with
a declaration, that he would hold the regencyre-
sponsible for the peace of the city: To the other
deputations, again, he recommended diligenee and
zeal in calming the spirits of their fellow-citizens ;
and he sent forward numerous copies of a proc1a-
mation, to be posted in the most conspicuous parts
of Lisbon, declaratory of the good-will of the Em-
peror towards the Portuguese natioll. This done,
he made ready to pursue his journey.


But though he thus affected to hold the perils of
his situation in contempt, it was not possible for
J unot to feel himself really at his ease. Of the




42 .NA,ltRATIVE OF 'l'liE


twenty-eight thousand men whom he had led
across tlle Pyrenees, scarcely six thousand were at
this moment !n a condition to acto The rest were
se.attered over the line "ofmarch in one long column,
.dividedhere and there by impassable torrents, or no
less impassable inundations. The division nearest
to his advanced guard was that of General Dela-
borde, which had as yet penetrated no further
than t-o Santarem. Of the cavalry and artillery
which had fallli!n into the rear soon after the army
began to move from Alcantara, no intelligence had
reached him; and he was quite ignorant whether
or not the Spanish corps, which had been directed
to move by Alentejo and Entre-Douro-e-Minho,
had yet begun their march. Thus situated, and
with a large and populous city before him, in which
at least ten thousand regular. troops were in gar-
rison, JunotcoulQ. not but look forward to the
event with serious apprehension. But he was
aware that any appearance of doubt or misgiving
would now prove fatal to him. He accordingly
got together as many men as could be collected,
and on the following day entered Lisbon.


It is hardly necessary to remind the reader,
that whilst the French Marshal was thus per-
forming his painful journey, the royal family of
Portugal were hurrying their arrangements for
the abandonment of their country. The morning
of the 27th had been fixed upon for their embar-




PESINSULAH. W AR. 43


kation; and on that day, amidst the tears and
regrets of many thousand spectators, they as-
cended the vesseIs appointed to convey them.
But the wind proved not only adverse. but bois-
terous: it blewa perfect hurricane, and the fleet
was unable to move. At last, however, a favour-
able breeze sprang up, and at daybreak on the
29th the anchors were lifted. It was well that
the storm ceased when it did; for the ships were
scarcely across the bar when the French entered
the city.


For sorne little time after the arrival of Junot,.
all things went on, or appeared to go on, in the
Portuguese capital, as they had be en accustomed
to do. The French soldiers coming in by small
detachments, were conducted by the native ma-
gistracy, and by the native troops, to their quar-
ters; -and both they and their officers possessed
sufficient prudence to conduct themselves with
decency and decorum. But the stragglers were
scarcely collected, and the strength of the weary
restored, when French domination began to show
itself in its . true colours; and a blow was struck
at the national pride of the Portuguese, such as
they found it difficuIt even at the moment to
bear.


As soon as he found himself sufficiently strong
to act with a high hand, J unot gave orders that
Lisbon and all the ports in the Tagus should




44 NARRATIVE OF THE


be evacuated by the Portuguese troops; whose
pIaces were to be supplied by French divisions.
Delaborde was nominated governor of the capital;
and his soldiers were quartered~ not in barracks
or .public-houses, but in the convents. General
Loison with his division occupied Cintra, Mafra,
and the sea·coast as far as the mouth of the Mon-
dego; one brigade, under General Thomieres,
being q uartered in .the castle and península of
Penniche. . To the third division, at the head of
which was General Travot, was intrusted the
defence of the entrance of the Tagus. Its héad-
quarters were at Ocyras, and it had garri~ons in
the forts St. Julien and Cascaes on the right
bank; whilst on the left, two battalions were
encamped upon the heights of Mafarem. The
cavalry and artillery were kept éntire in Lisbon;
there were detachments of infantry in Santarem
and Abrantes; and a Swiss battalion had the
garrison of Almeida. Such was the disposition
of theFrench troops; the Spaniards were ar-
ranged as follows ;-
. The division ofGeneral Caraffa having recalled
its detachmentfrom Thomar, took up its quarters
in Lisbon, and was intermixed with the French
corps; Solano, again, w ho had presented himself
before . Elvas on the 2nd of December, and to
whom that important place opened its gates,
having disposed three battalions in the fort, es-




PENINSULAR WATL 45


tablished his own head-quarters at Setubal. From
that point he sent out parties, which occupied the
casUes and towers of the Alentejo and Algarve,
and completed the subjugation of the new prin-
cipality; whilst Taranco was in like manner
spreading his force over the northern provinces.
The last officer having secured Valen~a, a place
of considerable importance as commanding the
passages of Minho and the Lima, threw a garrison
into the chateaux oí Sant lago j and on the 13th
took possession of Oporto, where he fixed his
head -q uarters.


Having ascertained that, of the arrangements
just described, sorne were already complete, and
the rest hurrying to their completion, Junot pro-
~eeded to impress upon the minds· of the Por-
tuguese by decided proofs that they were a con.,.
quered people. 011 the 13th of December, a grand
review of all the troops in the capital was an-
nounced. The soldiers assembled in the principal
streets and squares, the infantry in battalion~, the
cavalry in squadrons, and the artillery limbered
up and in order for service; and the whole popu-
lation of the place flócked from their houses in
order to witness the spectacle. They were gazing
with deep interest at the scene before them, when
a salute of artillery from the walls of the Moorish
fort attracted their attention. AH eyes. were.
instanUy turned thither, and they beheld the .




4G N ARRA TIVE OF THE


aneient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon
which the tri-coloured standard of France was
mounted. It was a sight which seemed to affect
them with emotions too deep for utterance. At
first a solemn silence prevailed, broken onIy by
the rattle of the soIdiers' arms, or the voices of
their commanders; but by and by a murmur arose,
l'esembling rather the roar of the ocean upon its
bed of sand, than any other sound in nature. The
people were grievously agitated. Cries of "Por-
tugal for ever! Death to the French !" were heard
on every side; and it appeared that sorne mighty
popular convulsion was inevitable. But Junot
had taken care to secure the persons of the re-
gency, and of the principal men of the city, whose
heads might pay the forfeit of any act of insurrec-
tion; and the mob, without leaders and without·
arms, gradually" melted away. The rest of that
day, and the whole of the night, were spent in a
state of feverish agitation, which, without leading
to any immediate results, gave sure indication of
a spirit of discontent abroad; and which, sooner or
later, must bring about sorne dangerous convul-
SIOn.


In spite, however, of this flagrant attack upon
their dignity as an independent nation, the Portu-
guese continued for some time to bear their fate,
if not in absolute quiet, at all events without giving
vent to their feelings in a way calculated to excite




PENINSULAR "'A R. 47


the senous alarm of their conqueror. Private
quarrels, ending even in bloodshed, between indi-
viduals of the garrison and the inhabitants, were
by no means unfrequent; but in public, that is to
say, on a great scale, events appeared to flow on
in their usual channel. Junot made no other
change in the form of the government, than by ad-
ding to the list of regency one or two creatures of
his own; and the laws continued to be adminis-
tered in the name oí the legitimáte sovereign as
heretofore. Above an things, J unot was extremely
cautious in concealing, as far as he could, the terms
ofthe treaty ofFontainbleau. So far fromdivulging
these, he took care .on all occasions to make it
known that the Emperor was particularIy desirous
of preserving the integrity of the kingdom of Por-
tugal; till at last the idea began to be entertained,
that at the worst the Portuguese might apprehend
only a change of dynasty.


The same line of conduct which he pursued
himself, the general s in eommand of the Spanish
corps had been pointedly requested to adopt; but
to the wishes of their chief they paid, in this
respect, very Httle attention. Taranco, indeed~
went no further than to insinuate to the authori-
ties of Oporto, that they ought from thenceforth to
regard their city as attached to the monarchy of
Spain; but Solano, the personal friend of Godoy,
went mueh further. He appointed a grand judge,




48 N ARHATIVE OF TIIE


anda superintendent of finan ces, in . the na me of
Emmanuel, prince of the AIgarves; and he caused
certain pieces of money to be coined, bearing upan
them the arms of that minion, with a suitable in-
scription. Except in these particulars, however,
Solano did nothing very offensive to the prej ud ices
of the Portuguese, by whom, on the contrary, he
seems to have been highly, and not undeservedly,
esteemed.


Matters continued in this state, Junot directing
the principal share of his attention to the sea-side,
and making every exertion to oppose anyatterripts
which might be made by the English against him,
up to tJ1e 1st of February, 1808. On that day,
however, he published a decree, which had issued
from his master whilst at Milan, and bore date
the 23rd of the preceding December. It dissolved .


. for ever the· council of regencyappointed by the
Prince of the 'Brazils, and directed Marshal J unot,
duke of Abrantes, to govern Portugal alone, in the
name of the Emperor· N apoleon. It required that
a chosen body ofPortuguese troops should be sent,
with as little delay as possible, into Franee. It
éhaIíged the appella.tion of the corps now stationed
about Lisbon, from that of the army of observation
of the Gironde, to· that of the army of Portugal;
and it condemned the Portuguesenation to pay,
as the price of the protection of their private pro-
perty, a fine of one hundred millions of francs~




PENINSULAR WAR. 49


Such were the orders of N apoloon; and these the
Duke of Abrantes proceeded, without the slightest
compunction, to enforce.


The effect produced by the promulgation of this
decree, and by the changes in every department of
the state which arose out of it, was such as it
were no easy matter to pourtray. It was felt, not
in the capital only, but through every part of the
mosi' remo te provinces. The army, already in
a state of disorganisation, disbaiided itself, and
those who had carried arms as soldiers, continued
to bear them as robbers and plunderers. The pea-
santry, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow
their fields with corno The higher classes, whose
usual place of residence was Lisbon, fled in dismay
from their homes, till the city presented the ap-
pearance of a place lately visited by the plague.
True, indeed, there were traitors to their country,
who continued to surround the throne of the in-
truder, and to flatter his vanity, or that of his
master, by addresses the most fulsome and degra-
ding; but the mass of the nation felt keenly the
insults and wrongs to which they were subjected,
and seemed to wait only for the proper momen!" to
take revenge. .


It was not long before the offended pride of the
Portuguese began to vent itself in acts of violence,
for which the growing insolence of the French fur-
nished ample grounds, but which were invariably


YOL. 1. D




50 N ARRATIVE OF TI-lE


followed by punishments the most terrible and the
most arbitrary. At Mafra, because the popuIace
had uttered cries indicative of the state of their
feelings,one citizen was condemned to death by
sentence of a military commission, and publicly
executed. A few days afterwards, a quarrel arose
at the village of Caldas de Ranha, between certain
of the French troops quartered there, and sorne
soldiers of the 2nd regiment of Oporto. The affair
was represented to Junot as a seditious commo-
tion; upon which not only was the regimentbroke
unde.r circumstances to it the most ignominious,
but six peaceable inhabitants of theplace, who
had taken no part in the disturbance, were shot.
Similar scenes occurred in almost every city,
townJ village, and hamlet in Portugal, tiU the
minds of the people were wrought up to dare as
well as to endure every thing.


As soon as J unot perceived the state of feeling
to which the Portuguese in general were brought,
he 10st no time in fulfilling another of N apoleon's
directions, by disbanding the whole of the army,
except those regiments onIy which he had ap-
pointed to proceed into France. Previous to the
present invasion, .the standing army of Portugal
amounted to thirty-seven regiments of horse and
foot.' Junot permitted no more than six regiments
of infantry and three of cavalry to remain. with
their colourso The rest were dismissed to their




PENINSULAlt WAR. 51


homes; al1d even this paltry force reeeived posi-
tive orders to mareh, under the guidal1ce of the
Marquis de Alorna, towards Bayonne. The militia
had long ago been relieved from the fatigues of
military serviee; and now to complete his mea-
sures, an ediet was given out, requiring every
Portuguese to surrel1der up to eertain constituted
authorities his fire-arms; and prohibiting even
swords from being worn in the streets or public
ways.


Things continued in this state from the month
of February till summer had considerably ad-
vanced. In every part of the eountry. sueh pie-
tures, carved devices, or emblems of any sort, as
had a tendency to keep alive a recollection of past
national independence, were removed or defaced.
The royal arms were pulled down from over the
gateways of the palaces; the Quinas, or old 'Por-
tuguese standard, was universally displaced, to
make way for the imperial eagle; and even
justice was now administered according to the
French code, and in the name of the French Em-
peror. Yet were there occurring froID time to
time events which might have served to satisfy
any reasonable person that matters had been
pushed too faro Not to dweIl at Iength upon the
tumults and massacres which here and there took
place, it soon became evident that the Spanish
troops who had accompanied the French, were




52 NARRATIVE OF TUE


allies only in name. The chiefs, disgusted
and


dissatisfied with so flagrant a violation of
the


treáty of Fontainbleau as the recent acts of Ju
not


presented, hardly affected to eoneeal their e
ha,..


grin; whilst pieces of information began gradu
ally


to circulate among the eommon soldiers, wh
ich


stirred up in thero a disposition the reverse
of


friendly towards their nominal comrades. At
last,


an order arrived froro Madrid, aeeoropanied by
an


humble request on the part of Godoy, addres
sed


personally to Marshal J unot, for the return o
f the


several corps into their OWll eountry. Aeq
uies-


eehce with it was of course refused, where
ver


J unot possessed the power oí refusal; and
the


divisions of Caraffa and Taranco remained at t
heir


stations. But Solano's corps actually took
its


départure, with the exeeption of four battali
ons,


which continued to garrison Setubal. Junot
was


alarmed by this movement, and despatehed K
el-


lerman with his brigade to Elvas, for the purp
ose.


of watching its results. In the same disposit
ion,


he ordered General Quesnel, a Freneh officer, to
proceed to Oporto, and take the cornmand of


the


Spanish troops there, whoro the death of Tara
nco


had deprived of a leader; and he particul
arly


directed him to overawe the Portuguese by
the


presence of the Spaniards, and to keep the S
pa-


niards to their duty by exciting in them a dr
ead


of the Portuguese. N 01' was he reroiss in
the




53


adoption of other expedients for tne preservation
of public peace. Whilst his emissaries were
busily employed in all quarters collecting a
tribute oppressive beyond endurance, he gave
every encouragement to those worthless Portu-
guese, who judged it a ·prudent measure to ap-
proach the imperial throne with their petitions,
and to draw up the forms of a new constitution,
to be administered by sorne prince of the Em-
peror's choice. To the state of the marine, like-
wise, he paid considerable attention. Through
the exertions of M. Majendie, a captain in the
French navy, he fitted out and armed two ships
of the line, 'of74 guns each, three frigates, and
seven smaller vessels; besides several hulks, in
which it had be en customary to confine prisoners.
It is true that none of these were rendered effec-
tive; ·but they at all events served the purposes
of floating batteries; and they promised to prove
of considerable utility in case an English squadron
should endeavour to force the passage of the bar.
AH Junot's dispositions, however, were of no avail.
A doud had already collected in another part of
thehorizon, which there was no reason to expect
would dissolve without a storm; and the storm no
suoner began to rage, than it extended its influ':'
ence to every part of his insecure vice-royalty.




54 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER III.


Entrance of fresh armies into Spain-Seizure of the frontier
fortresses, and advance of Murat upon Madrid- Conster-
nation of Charles and Godoy- Preparations for escape to
South America defeated by the mob-Godoy draggéd to
prison-Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king
-Murat alTives in the capital-Departure of the royal family
for Bayonne-Tumult of thc 2nd of May~Resignation of
the rights of the house of Bourbon-Secret instructions of
Ferdinand to the regency-Measures adopted by Murat to
preserve public tranquillity.


THE sixth article of the treaty of Fontainbleau
had stipulated, "that a corps of forty thousand
French troops should assemble at Bayonne, on or
about the 20th of N ovember, for the purpose of
supporting the force previously sentinto Portugal,
in case the English should oppose its progress, or
menace it with an attack;" but it was expressly
specified that the latter corps should make no
movement in advance until the two high Contract-
ing parties had come to a perfect understanding
on the subject.




PENINSULAR W AR. 55


In accordance with the tenorof this arrange-
ment, Junot's corps had hardly commenced its
march, when the army destined to aupport it be-
gan to be formed. Earl y in N ovem ber there were
twenty-four thousand infantry, between three and
four thousand cava1ry, and thirty-eight pieces of
artillery, in the camp; and by the 22nd of the
same month, the whole, under the orders of Ge-
neral Dupont, crossed the Pyrenees. For this
movement the assent of the Spanish comt was
neither obtained nor requested. Buonaparte felt
himself already too strong to stand in need of it ;
and the corps pressed forward without opposition
of any sortto Valladolid. Here the head-quarters
were established; the troops being cantoned in
the villages along the COUfse of the Douro, whilst
detachments were pushed on as far as.Salamanca,
in order that a persuasion might be generaUy
created that its ultimate destination was Lisbon.


N ot satisfied with having thus introduced two
armies into the hcart of nations professedly in a
state of profound peace with his government, N a-
poleon caused a third to form itself where the two
former had been stationed, and a fourth· to be
organised at Perpignan, in the very opposite ex-
tremity of the Pyrenees. N o great while elapsed
before both the one and the other penetrated into
Spain. The former, under Marshal Moncey, con-
sisting of twenty-five thousand infantry, three




56 N4.RRATIVE OF THE


thousand cavalry, and forty pie ces of cannon,
passed the Bidassoa on the 9th of January, OCCU""
pying the th~ee provinces of Biscay, and extending
as far as Castile; the latter, which amounted in
all to about fifteen thousand men, and was headed
by Duhesme, made its movement about a month
latero The progress of both was marked by deeds
oftreachery, ofwhich a few words will suffice to re-
call the particulars to the recollection of the reader.


As soon as N apoleon had fully determined upon
the proceedings which he afterwards adopted with
respect to Spain, it became to him a matter of the
first importan ce to be put in possession of the dif-
ferent fortresses and strong-holds which covered
its .northern frontier, and protected it against
French. invasion. These, it is probably needless
to add, are St. Sebastiari, in Biscay; Pampeluna,
in N avarre; and San Fernando de Figueres, and
Barcelona, in Catalonia. Whoever may happen
to command these four cities, may be said to com-
mand the four great passes of the Pyrenees; and
to obtain the command of them at any cost and
by any means, was the last and most urgent order
given by their chief to the French generals.


The methods which these severally adopted. to
carry their master's projects into effect, are too well
known to require a very minute repetition. San
Fernando, feebly garrisoned, and more feebly go-
verned, opened its gates to the brigade of General




PENINSULAlt WAR. 57


Nicolas, as soon as that officer demanded permis-
sion to lodge his soldiers in the citadel for the
night; and the troops which thus obtained an en-
trance, rewarded the hospitality of tbeir allies,
by turning them out of the place, and keeping pos-
session of it themselves. At Barcelona, a little
more of cunning was requisite by the general-in-
chief Duhesme. Having obtained quarters for his
men in the town, be feH upon the fol1owing strata-
gem, for the purposeof introducing them into the
two castles,-the Citadel, and Fort Mon Jouich,
.:-which, at opposite extremities, hold the city in
subjection. On the 16th of February, the troops
were ordered to assemble on the glacis of the cita-
del~ under the pretext of being reviewed previous
to their departure. Lecchi, an Italian officer,
commanded on that occasion; and the soldiers
who acted their part in the busines's so cleverly,
were aH Italians. Whilst the Spanish garrison-
the guard upon duty at the gate not excepted-
were intently occupied in watching the progress
of the inspection, two companies upon the right of
the line suddenly feH to the rear, and throwing off
their knapsacks, ran with great speed towards
the drawbridge. This they covered, before there
was time given to raise it; and General Lecchi
following with the whole of his staff, and exclaim-
ing that he only came to pay La visit to the Go-
verno~, two battalions were enabled to make




58 NARRATIVE OF THE


good their entrance, whilst the Spaniards were
yet wondering at the cause of the sudden tumulto
As soon as his object had been so far effected,
Duhesme proceeded to attempt the reduction of
Fort Mon Jouich by a process somewhat different.
He boldly demanded, in the name of N apoleon,
that it should be surrendered to him, threatening,
in . case of refusal, an instant declaration of war ;
and the Governor was too timid, or too faithless,
to resist such an appeal.


The most important, however, of an the frontier
towns is Pampeluna; and the task of obtaining
possession of it devolved upon General Darmagnac.
Pampeluna, like the other places already occu-
pied, lies wholly at the merey of its citadel; and
though Darmagnac's troops were very readily ad-
mitted into the town, the Governor, an old and
faithful Spaniard, took every precaution to hinder
them from making a lodgment in the castle. With
this view he would admit no greater number than
sixty or seventy French soldiers within the walIs
at a time, who carne only to receive their daily
rations; and behind whom, as soon as they had
entered, the draw-bridge was carefully drawn up.
1t required some management to deceive an officer
possessed of so great a degree of caution; but Dar-
magnac's mind was fruitful in resources, and he
contri ved at last tooutwit his wary antagonist.


The French General had taken up his abode in




PENINSULAR WAR. 59


a house which stood upon the esplanade, midway
between the town and the castle;, into which,
during the night of the 15th February, he intro-
duced a hundred grenadiers, well armed, and
amply supplied with ammunition, one by one, and
in profound silence. On the morning of the 16th,
a fatigue party of sixty men proceeded, according
to custom, to receive their rations in the citad el ;
but they were aH rnen of tried courage, and at
their head was an officer of valour and known
judgment, M. Robert, chef de battalion of the
70th regiment. Under the pretext of being be-
fore theirtime, and of waiting for the arrival of
lhe quarter-master, sorne of them remained stand-
ing upon the draw-bridge, whilst the rest took
shelter against;; a passing shower, in the guard-
room. At a given signal they rose upon the
Spanish guardo The sentinels were disarmed,
and the rnuskets of those who were not on duty,
and with which the French soldiers had pre-
tended to arnuse thernselves, were suddenly
turned against their owners. The hundred grena-
diers now advanced at a run; and two battalions,
which had been for sorne time formed in expecta-
tion of the event, showed themselves on the glacis.
In spite of all his vigilance, Don Francisco Cer-
nero saw that his post was carried, and he sub-
rnitted.


The manner in which Sto Sebastian, again,




60 NARRATIVE OF THE


changed its masters, was even more simple than
any of the preceding. General Thouvenot having
been sent thither with the ostensible view of
forming a depot, for the assembling of stragglers
from different regiments in advance, and forward-
ing them to their respective stations, took care to
increase the number of his detachments so largely,
that they becarne at last too many for the Spanish
garrison; and the garrison was in consequence
marched out, t6 make way for a corps of French
troops.


Having thus succeeded, almost beyond his ex-
pectations, in opening a way into the very heart of
Spain, Napoleon no longer deemed it necessary to
affect concealment as to his ultimate purposes.
Column after coiumn poured across the Pyrenees,
till the whole line of road from the Bidassoa to the
Douro was covered with French soldiers. In
Catalonia again, fresh reinforcements daily ar-
rived, ti11 Marshal Bessieres, to whom the chief
command in that district was assigned, found
hirnself at the head of twenty-five thousand men,
including six thousand of the infantry, cavalry,
and artillery, of the imperial guardo But it was
to Murat, grand duke of Berg, that the important
task of subjugating' Spaill was committed. He
was recalled from Madrid, where for sorne time
back he had acted ostensibly as arnbassador,
though in reality as the promoter of internal dis-




PENINSULAR WAR. 61
,


cord in the bosom of the court; and being ap-
pointed lieutenant to the Emperor, proceeded to
take command of the grand army.


In the mean while, events hado occurred in the
Spanish capital, such as to draw upon the actors
in them the attention, not o.f Spain only, but ofthe
whole of Europe. First of aH, the inhabitants of
Madrid were astonished by the sudden appearance
of a royal' proclamation; in which it was an-
nounced that Ferdinand, prince of Asturias, had
been detected in a conspiracy to. dethrone and
murder his father, and was arrested. This was
folIowed in a few days by a second proclama-
tion, which informed the public that the Prince,
having confessed his guilt, and given up the names
of his associates, had been pardoned, " the voiee
of nature prevailing over that of strict justiee," and
admitted once more into the royal favour. The
surprise excited by proceedings so extraordinary
had not subsided, when intelligence ofthe opera-


. tions of the French armies on the frontier, and
their rapid advance. into the heart of the country,
excited in a much more forcible and natural
degree the consternation of all classes. Godoy,
alarmed not so much for the probable fate of the
nation, as for the destiny which might befall him-
self, thought at one moment of recalling the Spa-
nish troops from Portugal, and keeping them in
readiness to act as circumstances might require;




62 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


and an order wa,s actually issued to that effect.
At other times he urged the King to forward a
scheme, to whích he had formerly opposed himself
with all his influence, namely, the procuring a
wife for Ferdinand from among the princesses of
the imperial blood. ;N ext, he threw out hints
as to the propriety of abdicating the crown, as
soon as the proposed marriage should be com-
pleted; whilst for himself, an asylumsomewhere
in the heart of France appeared to 1101d out the
best hopes of protection against the violence of his
enemies.


J n the midst of these deliberations arrived two
announcements, of which it would be difficult to
determine whether the former or the latter struck
th is imbecile court wi th the greater degre'e of horror.
A letter from N apoleon himself, accompanying
certain presents of beautiful horses, informed the
King of Spain that it was the Emperor's intention
to visit Madrid, and there to settle with him,
upon a solid foundation, the affairs both of Spain
and Portugal. Such an arrival was by no means
desired either by Charles or his favourite; but
whilst they were yet hesitating how to act, Don
Eugenio Izquierdo, who had long resided at París
as the tool of Godoy, suddenly made his appear-
ance in the Escurial, and communicated the fol-
lowing details. The Emperor, he said, had
determined to seize Portugal for himself, and to




PENINSULAR WAR. 63


exchange it with the crown of Spain for the pro-
vinces north of the Ebro. N ew treaties of COffi-
merce and of alliance, offensive and defensive,
such as tbe safety of his empire required, were
about to be drawn up. Tbe title of Emperor of
the Indies would be assigned to the King of Spain,
whose son, the Prince of Asturias, should receive
the hand of the Emperor's niece; but the marriage
must be the subject of an especial negociation,
an.d might be deferred till other arrangements were
complete. In addition to this oflicial intelligence,
Izquierdo took care to inform his master of the
suspicions which he himself entertained touching
the Emperor's real designs; and the statement
threw all parties affected by it into the most se-
rious alarmo


lt was now that the wisdom of following the
example set by the Regent of Portugal, and re-
moving the court to its South American posses-
sions, suggested itself to the mind of Godoy. His
dreams of sovereignty were by this time wholly
dispelled, and his highest ambition was to secure a
place of retreat for himself, whatever might be the
fate of Spain; nor did he find Charles in a mood
at all different [rom his own. The plan was no
sooner proposed than it was agreed too The King
and Queen both professed their willingness to fly;
and preparations were instantIy set on foot fol' se-
curing a safe embarkation.




64 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


With this view the corps of General Solano was
recalled from Alentejo, and ordered to occupy the
mountains of Guadarrama. Detachments of infan-
try, cavalry, and artillery, were directed to cover
the road from Madrid to Seville ; whilst the body-
guard, nine squadrons of the royal carabiniers, the
battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and
the regiments of national infantry and cavalry
which composed the ordinary garrison of Madrid,
were marched from the capital to Aranjuez, where
thecourt was then resident. AH things,.in short,
were already in a state of forwardness, when an
unexpected tumult frustrated at once the inten-
tions both of Godoy and the King.


Though - the greatest precautions had been
adopted. to keep secret the object of these prepa-
rations, it .waf? not possible to hinder a rumour of
the intended emigration from spreading abroad.
The Spaniards were deeply affiicted at the pros-
pect of being abandoned by their King; and as it
was understood that Ferdinand had expressed the
strongest aversion to the measure, the whole was
attributed to the selfish and wicked councils of the
Prince of the Peace. The consequence was, that
the hatred which had long been harboured towards
Godoy, now increased with tenfold violence; and
in this general feeling the soldiers fully partici-
pated with the multitude. To such a height, in-
deed, was this universal discontent carried, that




PENINSULAR WAH. 65


Charles found himselfunder the necessity of aban-
doning his design jand he issued a proclamation,
in which he as,sured his belovedsubjects that no
consideration whatever should ,induce him to
leave them. This appeared on the 16th, and on
the . 17th the preparations for departurewere
ágain renewed. But popular indignation was now
excited to its highest pitch. A mob hastening to
Aranjuez, found a cavalcade of carriages ready,to
proceed. They instantly cut the traces, andthén
turning their fury against Godoy, ran, in a tumul-
tuous manner, to assault his house. Of the sol-
diers whom he called in to his assistance, aH, ex-
cept his own body-guard, deserted him j and he
with difficultyescaped to a place of concea,lment
for the night.
- N ext day Ferdinal1d shoWed himself to the peo-
pIe, and the tumult was appeased. The .houses,
indeed, of Godoy, and of his nearest relatives and
most abject dependents, were levelled to the
ground; whilst he himself, dragged from his hi-
ding-place, was with difficu1ty conveyed toa
public pl'ison ; but this done, the mob immediately
returned to their duty. Charles, however, ha~
learned a lesson, such as he had no desire tÍ> Jearn
again. The burden of sovereignty, he said, had
become too heavy for him; aQd it was, in the
existing circumstances of the country, highly im- .
proper that an old and infirm man should endea;~;'


E. /%:>'t' \'OL. J.
I ó_




66 NARRATIVE OF THE


vour to bear it any longer. He therefore, of his
own free will, abdicated the throne, and named as
his successor his eldest and beloved son, Ferdi-
nand, prince of Asturias.


The joy of the people of Madrid, when this re-
solution was made known to them, is represented to
have known no bounds. AH ranks and degrees of
men partook in it. The houses were decorated du-
ringthe day with flowers and green boughs; and at
night, one vast illumination extended from sq uare
to square, and from street to street. Ferdinand
was hailed, wherever he appeared, as the' pre-
server of his country; and for the moment, at
least, both the advance of the French troops,and
the fears which their approach had so lately occa·
sioned, were forgotten. But this state of general
satisfaction was not destined to be of long conti:-
nuance.


It has be en stated that Ferdinand, instigated
perhaps by personal hatred towards Godoy as much
as byany other motive, aH along dec1ared him-
self friendly to the wishes of France; and the line
ofpolitics which'he had pursued whilst a subject,
he did not think it necessary to abandon after he
became a sovereign. Though aware of the ap-
proach of Murafs army, the first use which he
made of power, was to order 801ano's corps back
to its former quarters in Portugal; to countermand
the return of the divisions of Caraffa and Taranco;·




PENINSULAH. W A ¡lo 67


and to dismiss the whole body oftroops which late
events had drawn around the capital, to their
original stations. Madrid was thus left almost
without a garrison, and the very heart of the
kingdom laid open to the will of the Frencn
MarshaI.


In the mean while the Grand Duke of Berg
was leading his numerous armies, by columns of
brigades and divisions, towards Madrid. The
columns marched as through an enemy's country,
bivouacking every night, and taking all the pre-
cautions to secure themselves which are usually
taken in a .state of war, until they made them-
selves masters of the chain of mountains which
separate Old froID N ew Ca~tile. The officers in
eommand, likewise, having received instructions
to that effect, delayed the posts at all the stations.
and arrested su eh bodies of Spanish soldiers as
they anywhere met by the way; whilst they in-
dustriously gave out, at every town or village
through which they passed, that their final des-
tination was the camp of Saint Roche, before
Gibraltar.


Proceeding in this order, the advanced.,.guard
. reached Boytrajo, where intelligence of the late
commotions in the Spanish capital met them.
Murat instantly set forward. He took with him
only a numerous and brilliant staff, besides one
division of the imperial guard, and arrived just in




68 NARRATIYE OF THE


time to be an eye-witness of Ferdinand's trillm~
phal entry into Madrid. The spectacle was not
without its effect upon the mind of the French
Marshal. He saw that the feelings of the peopIe
were all in favour of their new prince; and he
probably anticipated, even then, the occurrence of
sorne such events as in a few days afterwards
carne to pass.


Beauharnois. filled, at this time, the office of
ambassadorto the court of Spain. It was but
natural that Ferdinand should appeaI both to him
and to the Ernperor's lieutenant for a recognítion
of his new title; but neither Beauharnois nor
Murat had received any instructions on the sub-
ject. No sooner, however, was a sufficient body
of French troops at hand, than both the one and
the other began to give evidence that their master.
was by no means prepared to view with a friendly
eye the revolution which had just occurred. Fer-
dinand was neither visited nor alluded to by them
under any other title than that of Prince of As-
turias. A correspondence in the country was
opened with his father and mother, whose per-
sonal safety was provided for by die substitution
of a French guard at Aranjuez, in lieu of the
Spanish troops which had hitherto done duty
there. These proceedings on the part of the
French . diplomatists could not but alarm Ferdi-
lland; but his alal'm was grievously augmented,




PENINSULAR WAlt. 69


when day after day passed by, and no answer
arrived to the letters whieh he had addressed to
N apoleon, informing him of the ehanges which
had placed him upon the thron,e of Spain. At
last it was eommunicated to him that the Em,.
peror in person was on his way to ,Madrid, for the
purpose of aetillg as an arbiter in the divisions
whiéh unhappily reigned within the bosom of his
family; and the eommunieation was aceomp~nied
by sug'gestions, a too ready compliance witlI which
broughí. matters to an issue.


The sword of Franeis 1, whieh had hung in the
.armoria real sinee the date of the battle of Pavia,
was demanded by Murat, in the name of the Em-
peror his master. Ferdinand was not sorry to
have found so good an opportunity of evincing his
deferenee to the wishes of the man on whose pro-
teetio,n he relied; and he gave up the weapon at
once, with a suitable compliment, to its new owner.
Then followed a recommendation that the Infant
Don Carlos, his brother, should proceed a few
days' journey towards the frontier, to meet the
Emperor. To that hint, likewise, the most prompt
attention was paid. But the next implied a
measure, of whieh even Ferdinand doubted the
wisdom; ana it required more than an. ordinary
degree ofpersuasion to ove reo me his reluetance to
its adoption. The ambassador B~auharnois repre-
sented that it would be particularIy agreeable to




70 NARRATIVE OF THB


his master, if Ferdinand would consent to go as
far as Burgos lo receive him. Ferdinand wavered
long, between the dictates of his hopes and his
fears; and it was only when the arrival of a new
actor on the stage turnoo the balancey that he gave
a reluctant consent. Assured by General Savary,
who professed to be little else than an avant cou-
rier to the Emperor, that N apoleon was actually
on the road ; that he had left him so near Bayonne
as to render his arrival at Burgos by this time
certain; and, that if Ferdinand entertained any
hopes of being recognised as King of Spain, he
must take care to give the most satisfaetory proofs
of his desire to obey the wishes of the man in
whose hands his destiny lay ;-assured of aH this,
he judged it imprudent any longer to hesitate;
and inspite of the remonstrances and entreaties of
his own most faithful counsellorsy the memorable
journey was determined upon. It began on the
10th of April, and it ended ón the 20th; leaving
this ill-fated prince a prisoner in Bayonne.


Previous to his departure, Ferdinand had ap-
pointed a supreme junta, to direet the affairs of
the nation during his absence; at the head of
which was his uncle, the Infant Don Antonio. He
was hardly gone~ when Murat addressed to this
body a requisition, that the Prinee of the Peace
should be set at liberty. The junta, afraid either
to refuse or grant the request, referred him to the




PENINSULAR WAR. 71


sovereign. Murat was indignant at the reply. He
threatened to force the prison, and to put the
troops who guarded it to the sword, in case they
should presume to offer any opposition to his will ;
and the junta felt that they possessed no means of
hindering that threat from being carried into exe-
cution. Godoy was given up to the French, and,
like his rival Ferdinand, conveyed to Bayonne.


The next removals which took place were of the
old sovereigns, whom it required no very urgent
entreaties, nor any depth of policy, to expatriate.
Charles had already protested against his abdica-
tion, as having been effected by compulsion; and
thrown himself upon the justice and honour of
Napoleon for redress. He was advised to seek
the Emperor himself, and to plead his cause be-
fore him in person; and he readily adopted the
suggestion. Charles and the Queen arrived at
Bayonne exactly ten days later than their son.


Of the extraordinary and disgraceful scenes
which followed these extraordinary movements,
it is not necessary in this place to enter into a par-
ticular account. The world will not readily forget
transactions which were marked by the most
shameless violation of all laws, human and divine,
in every individual who took a part in them. A
mother demanding the death of her own son, and
proclaiming her own infamy in hatred to her-child,
is a spectacle which has not often been presented




72 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


before the eyes of the public; nor has it frequently
be en called uPQn to witness duplicity carried to
the length to which it was carried by N apoleon
and his agents. Such things stand in no need of
being detailed frequently.


In the mean while, affairs were every day as-
suming a more alarming aspect in Spain. Though
there was not, as yet, open insurrection in any
quarter, cases of individual quarrels were very
frequent between the inhabitants and the French
soldiery; and no trifling q uantity of blood was
shed on the one side as well as on the other. The
French, no longer caring to coneeal that the claims
of Ferdinand would never be recognised by their
master, only provoked the Spaniards to indulge
the more frequently in cries of "Ferdinand for
ever!" till the adherents of that prince carne to re-
gard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as
the personal enemies of the intruders. To so great
lengths were these feelings earried at Toledo, that
a general commotion seemed at hand, and nothing
but the prompt arrival of Dupont, with a strong
division of troops from Aranjuez, preserved the
public tranquillity. But events were by this time
in rapid progress, which brought in their train
that universal opposition to French influence,
which no efforts were ever afterwards able to over-
come.


There remained iü Madrid, towards the end of




PENINSULAR WAR. 73


April, no other members of the royal fatnily, ex-
cept the Queen of Etruria, her children, her bro-
ther the lnfant Don Francisco de PauIo, and Don
Antonio, the head of regency;. and the Grand
Due of Bel'g received a letter from Charles IV,
desiring that they likewise should be forwiuded to
Bayonne. When this letter arrived, the people of
Madrid were in a state of the most violent excite-
ment, brought on by certain rumours of the pro'-
ceedings of the congress at Bayonne, which not
aU' the vigilance of N apoleon or his servants could
hinder from getting abroad. Men, women, and
children, might daily be seen in crowds about the
post-office, anxiously waiting for so me fresh intel:-
ligence; and ir the courier chanced, on any occa-
sion, to be delayed, the symptoms of dissatisfac-
tion exhibited on all sides were of the most appal-
lingkind. The inhabitants of Madrid were in this
frame of mind, when the determination of Murat
with respect to the Regent and his relatives ·was
cornmunicated to thern. The people protested
that Don Antonio should not be taken from them;
but in spite of these appearances the preparations
for his departure continued to go on.. lt was now
the 1st of May, and for the last two days no post
had arrived. On the 2nd, a similar reply met
those who again assembled at the post-office; whilst
it was rumoured that the royal carriages were
already harnessed, and that the princes were rre.-




74 NARHATIVE OF THE


paring to set out. The people ran to the palace,
cut the traces by which the horses were fastened,
and forced back the carriages into the stable-yard ;
and an aide-de-camp of Murat happening to pass
at the moment, they loaded him with insults and
execrations. The aide-de- camp resented this treat-
ment, and words were instantly followed by blows.
And now began a tragedy which Spain willlong
retain in her recollection, not onIy because of the
blood of her citizens which was shed, but because
of the results which sprang out of it, and the ar-
duous struggle of which it was the forerunner.
But this, like the transactions at Bayonne, is too
generalIy known to stand in need of minute rela-
tion. Jt is sufficient to observe that the firing
{!ontinued for nearly three hours, with considera-
ble slaughter on both sides; that it was not till
after the most strenuous exertions of the authori-
tíes, both Spanish and French, that order was re-
stored; and that it proved by no means the least
distressing thing to the people of Madrid, that a
combat which had aIread y cost thus dear, should
be followed by a multitude of indiscriminate mili-
tary executions.


The imlllediate effect of the operations of this
bloody day was tó strike with a momentary terror
the inmates of the 'capital; a sensation of which
the French failed not to make the most, by circu-
lating proclamations that spoke a language of




PENINSULAR WAR: 75


mingled threatening and conciliation. The Jnfant
Don Francisco departed, as soon as order was
restored, for Bayonne; and he was followed within
four-and-twenty hours by Don Antonio. The lat-
ter, indeed, voluntarily expressed a wish to share
the fortvnes oI tbe King .bjs nep.bew; beca use he
felt that, for the management of affair~ so perilous
as those which were around him, he was totally
unfitted. His departure was followed by the ad-
mission of the Grand Duke of Berg as a member
into the councíl of regency; and a few days after-
wards the same Grand Duke was, by a decree of
Charles IV, nominated to fill the office of presi-
dento


The news of the insurrection at Madrid reached
Bayonne, at a moment when the Emperor ap-
peared to be busily engaged in an attempt to
reconcile Ferdinand to his parents, and his parents
to him. He gladly availed himself of it, for the
purpose of precipitating the designs which he had
long ago formed. As might be expected, the
amount of lives sacrificed was magnified greatly,
as well by the terror of the Spaniards, as by the
policy of the French; and to these exaggerated
accounts N apoleon offered no contradiction. On
the contrary, he made ofthem a handle for loading
Ferdinand with maledictions. He accused him of
being the cause of all this bloodshed, and insisted
that he should instantly restore the crown to hfS




76 NARRA'l'lVE 01<' 'CHE


father, from whom he had impiously usurped it.
Ferainand, who at first had displayed sorne symp-
toms oC courage, sank at last under the invectives
of N apoleon. He not only obeyed the mandate,
but, in his capacity of Prince of Asturias, affixed
his signature to the deed by which Charles IV in his
own name, and in the name of his family, resigned
the sovereignty of Spain into the hands of the
Emperor of the French. A similar proceeding
was followed by the rest of the princes. They
gave up their rights for ever, and declared, in a
published document, that the Spanish nation could
not evince its affection for their race in a manller
more satisfactory, than by paying a ready obedience
to the sovereign, whoever he might be, that should
be appointed to succeed them.


Whether Ferdinand had foreseen the lengths to
which matters would be carried, or whether he
only expected to be detained for a time in cap-
tivity in Franee, does not appear; but imme-
diately previous to the grand catastrophe, he
wrote; and despatched by a trust y messenger, a
letter of instructions to the council of regency~
In it he declared that his actions ",ere no longer
free, and that it was impossible for him, situated
as he was, to atteJ1.d to the honour of the throne,
or the welfare of the country; He therefore
granted to the junta unlimited powers, permIttmg
it to remove whithersoever it would, and in his




PENINSULAR WAR. 77


name to exerciseall the authority of the sove-
reign. He recommended that a general cortes
should assemble ,,,ith as little delay as possible,
for the purpose of adopting su eh measures as
might appear most eondueive to the publie good;
and he positively required that the removal of his
person into the interior of France, should be the
signal for the commencement of hostilities. That
letter was conveyed by one who, for greater se-
curity, performed the bulk of his journey on foot.
It was faithfully delivered to the junta; but as it
reached its destination two days later than the
official account of Ferdinand's resignation, the
junta decreed that :they were not a~thorised in
paying' to it any obedienee. On the contrary,
they showed themselves to be the ready and
willing tools of the Emperor's lieutenant, who ae-
cordingly proeeeded to order all things in the
kingdom as he judged most conducive to his mas-
ter's interests.


The first and great object to be attained in his
view of affairs was, to seatter the Spanish army
so as to render it ineffeetive, and to seeure the
fidelity of the great and important cities of Ca~i~
and Valencia. For this purpose, the two Swiss regi-
ments eantoned near Madrid, were ineorporated
with the eorps of General Dupont; the body.
guards, with four battalions of Spanish and Wal-




78 NARRATlVE OF THE


loon guards, were placed under the orders of
Marshal Moncey; directions were given to pre-
pare an expedition of three thousand men, which
might embark without delay for Buenos Ayres;
and the Mediterranean fleet, at that time laid up
in Port Mahon, was required to proceed at once to
Toulon, for the purpose of joining the French squa-
dron. Many changes were likewise ordcred in the
different garrisons scattered through Catalonia and
elsewhere. General Solano, for example, was
enjoined to proceed 10 Cadiz, there to execute his
original functions as captain-general of Andalusia;
whilst the most strenuous exertions were made to
attach to the new order of things General Casta-
nos, whose situation as commandant of the camp
at San Roche, furnished him with powerful means
either of advancing or thwarting the views of the .
French Émperor. Nor were other andhardly
less important matters neglected. Every maga-
zine of arms and stores throughout the country-
every magazine at least which lay within their
reach,was seized and appropriated by tbe French
authorities. Preparations were made to fortify
and victual the heights of the Retiro~ that they
might serve as a citadel, to keep the inhabitants
of the capital in order; whilst a regular chain of
posts between it and the frontier was established.
N othing, in short. was left undone, which ap-




PENINSULAR WAR. 79


peared in the most remote degree calculated to
secure the ahsolute subjection of Spain; and it
was even hinted that, as 800n as that great end
should have been attained, other and equalIy
gigantic projects would be undertaken.




80 NARRATTVE Ol<' THE


CHAPTER IV.


Gf'neral insurrection of tIte Spanish provinces, and forroation of
juntas-The junta of Seville peculiarly vigorous alld or-
derly-It assumes tbe title of Supreme Junta of Spain and
the Indies-Reduction of the French Heet in the haroour of
Cadiz-Expeditions against Seville and V álencia under
Dupont and Moncey-Actions at Alcolia and Baylen, and
surrender of Dupont's corps-Moncey repulsed froro before
Valencia-Proceedings at Bayonne, and procIaroation of
King Joseph-He enters Spain-Battle of Medino del Rio·
Seco; and arrival of Joseph in Madrid-His flight in conse-
quence of Dupont's capture-A n expedition fitted out at
Cork sails for the Peninsula-Sir Arthur WelIesley arrives
at Cornnna, and directs his course towards Portugal-Pro-
ceedings in that country-Mutiny of the Spanish garrison of
Oporto-Seizure of General Quesnel, and the standard ofin-
dependence raised-Junot's mea¡¡ures to suppress the revolt.


1 T has been stated that the details of the event-
fuI 2nd of May reached Bayonne on the 10th;
they were not more tardy in making their way
through all parts of Spain; and the effect pro-
duced by them, from one end of the kingdol11 to




1'ENINSULAR WAR. 81


another, was the same. From the mountains of
Arragon to the pillars of Hercules, and from Va-
lencia to Cape Finisterre, t~ere arose one loud and
simultaneous shout, "Long live King Ferdinand-
Death to the French!" The people thought not of
the defenceless state of the country, its frontier
towns in the occupation of the enemy, its soldiers
dispersed, and its arsenals and treasures plun-
dered. They saw only the degradation to which
they were reduced; and they ran to arms with
the alacrity of men determined to regain their
freedom, or to perish.


Whilst in other provinces a general rising took
place, distinguished more by the zeal of those who
followed, than by the prudence of, its leaders,
a regular form of government, such at least as the
state of the times would admit of, was almost in-
stantaneously organized at Seville. On the very
dayafter the insurrection broke out, a junta con-
sisting of twenty-three members, chosen from the
principal men of the province, from the nobility,
the higher clergy, the general officers and me m-
bers of the .municipal body, met together, and
assumed the title of Junta, and Supreme Govern-
ment of Spain and the Indies. Acti:p.g in this
capacity, the Supreme Junta proceeded to give
directions, that in every town or village which
should contain two thousand householders, juntas
of six persons should be formed, whose business


VOL J. F




82 N ARRATIVE OF THE


it should be to enlist under the national standard
aH males between the ages of sixteen and forty-
five. Messengers were líkewise despatched to the
captain-general of Cadiz, to General Castanos,
commandant of the camps at San Roche; to the
eities of Cordova, Grenada, and Jaen; and to all
the towns and villages near, to acquaint them with
the resolution which had been formed of deliver-
ing Spain, and to entreat their best assistance in
so just a cause. Light vessels were fitted out and
sailed both for the Canaries and South America;
eommissioners has tened to AIgarves and Alentejo.
to request the co-operation of the Portuguese;
and war, an interminable war, was solemnly
declared against France and N apoleon. At the
same time, proclamations were circulated, inviting
aH· Italians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, andother fo-.
reigners, to abandon tbe French standard, and
promising tbem the best treatment in the event of
their taking service in the armies of Spain. In
a word, every thing was done promptIy, actively.
and vigorously, whilst the most perfect order was
preserved; and tbe new government showed itself
not unworthy of the style which it employed, and
which by the juntas it was permitted to employ.


Wherever the emissaries of the Supreme Junta
appeared, they failed not to stir up among the
people a spirit in. every respect accordant to that
which animated themselves. In Cadiz, the niul-




l'ENINSULAIt W AR. 83


titude rose upon Solano, whose attachment 1'0
Godoy and the French continued unabated; and
having dragged bim from tbe bouse ofMr. Strange,
an Irish banker, with whom he had taken shelter,
they put him to death in a manner the most igno-
minious and cruel. Similar scenes were acted in
different towns of Spain, whilst as yet the fervour
of patriotism was too violent to be guided by rea-
son; and not a few, both of Frenchmen and tbeir
adberents, fell a sacrifice to popular fury. But to
tbe bonour of Spain be it remembered, tbat sbe
had suffered long and grievously under her op-
pressors; and that tbose wbo feH the effects of
tbe first effervescence of her wrath, were tewer by
far in number, tban fell in one day under the re-
gulated fusilade of tbe Frencb garrison of Madrid.


It was, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for
Spain, that the first great operations in which ber
patriot forces embarked, proved most of them suc-
cessfuL At Cadiz, a French fleet of five sail of
tbe line and three frigates, was compelled, after
a lengtbened cannonade, to surrender atdiscretion.
Two expeditions, simultaneously undertaken-one
under General Dupont, for the purpose of securing
the obedience of Andalusia; another under Marshal
Moncey, designed to establish the new govern-
ment in Valencia-were defeated; the latter with
the 10ss of a .large proportion, the former at the
expense of the wbole body of troops engaged in it.




84 NARRATIVE OF THE


As these were among the most brilliant services
performed by the Spaniards during the whole of
the war, and as they operated powerfullyupon its
results in other quarters, and in after campaigns, it
may not be ami ss to give a brief and conuected
sketch, both of the oue and the other.


N othing had as yet occurred to attract the at-
tention of the conquerors, beyond the murmurs
and complaints'which resounded from one end of
Spain to the other, when General Dupont, at the
head of six thousand infantry of the line, five
hundred marines of the imperial guard, two S\viss
regiments in the service of Spain, about three
thousand cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of can-
non, all well appointed and equipped, set out
from Toledo, where, for a month back, he had
established his head-quarters. He was directed
to rally under his standard as many Spanish troops
as he should chance to meet by the way; and he
was to be joined at Seville by a brigade of three
thousand men detached from the army ofPortugal.
General Dupont knew of no reason why he should
entertain a doubt of the final success of his enter-
prise: he was ignorant that he was about to enter
a country everywhere hostile to him; he there-
fore moved on WitilOut much circumspection, and
had no scruple about encumbering hiscolumns
with a long train of waggons and cars.


The road from Toledo to Cadiz, the extreme




PENINSULAR WAR. 85


point which Dupont had been. commanded to
reach, runs through the plains of La Mancha, over
the ridges of. the Sierra Morena. There is a
bridge upon the Guadalquivir at Andujar, which
the traveller passes, and then keeping close, to the
stream for a considerable distance, he recrosses
the same stream at Venta de Alcolia. Abont a
day's journey from this point lies the town of
Cordova, on the same side of the river as Andujar;
and at a sÍmilar distance from it, on the other
side, is the town of Jaen. Cordova is built upon
the direct road, as well as Cremona and Seville;
but as the French army never succeeded in pene-
trating beyond' the first of these places, it will not
be necessary to describe, with great minuteness,
the topography of the others.


Dupont traversed the plains, and reached the
vilIage of Carolina in the mountains, before any
symptoms of the kind of reception which awaited
him were exhibited. Carolina was almost en-
til'ely deserted; and from the reports üf the few
stragglers who still clung to their houses, it ap-
peared that the men had withdrawn with arms in
their hands. Dupont, however, contihued his
journey: he arrived at Andujar on the second
day; and there his doubts, if indeed he enter-
tained any, as to the accuracy of the report which
had been made to him, were dispelled. The
spirited resolutions of the junta of Seville were




86 NARHA'fIVE OF 'fHE


here made known to him; and he was given to
understand that his entrance into Cordova would
be disputed by the whole of the mal e population
of the province.


Startled, but not intimidated by this intelli-
gence, Dupont held his course; causing the sol-
diers to march with greater circumspection, and
covering his front and tlanks with skirmishers. He
crossed the Guadalquivir without opposition; but
as he approached Alcolia, the point where it be-
hoved him to cross again; he found it occupied in
considerable force by the Spaniards. A levy en
masse had . been formed, of which the command
was intrusted to Don Pedro Agostino de Echever-
ria, lieutenant-colonel, and president of the mili-
tary council of Cordova, for the suppression of
smuggling and other crimes in the Sietra Morena;
and supported by three or four thousand soldiers
of the line, it was now prepared to dispute with
Dupont's army the passage of the river.


The main body ofthe Spaniards was drawn up
along the right bank, so as to cover the bridge,
which they had neglected to break down; but a
considerable division, of which sorne part was
cavalry, remained .on the left bank for· the purpose
of taking the enemy in reverse. 1 t is hardly ne-
cessary to state that these dispositions, neither
justifiable in themselves, nor at all such as the
nature of the force employed might have sug-




PENINSULAR W AR. 87


gested, proved useless. The isolated corps twice
attempted to charge, but it was each time re-
pulsed with 10ss ;whilst the bridge and village
were . both carried at a rush, and the undisciplined
peasantry dispersed in every direction. Echever-
ria, however, rallied his regular troops as soon as
they had cleared the village, and began his retreat
in tolerable order; but the French cavalry speed,..
ily broke in upon them, and the rout became
general.


Dupont lost no time in following up the success
which he had obtained. He reached Cordova that
night; and finding the gates shut, and prepara-
tions apparentIy making for defence, he gave or-
ders that it should be carried by assault. These
orders were promptly obeyed. One round from
the artillery sufficed to burst the gates, and th.e
troops rushing in pell-mell, swept the streets with
a fire of musketry. This was,"perhaps, one of the
most wantonly cruel acts of violence committed
during the war; for the people offered no resis-
tance, only a few random shots having been fired
from sorne of the windows. But it was deemed
prudent, in the present condition of affairs, to
excite, as far as might be, the terror of the Spa;-
niards; and on this principIe Cordova was given
up to pillage.


Though he had so far succeeded in his under-
taking, Dupont was by no means disposed tú con-




88 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


sider his present situation as an enviable one.
Bands of armed peasantry soon began to gather
together, till they hemmed him in on every side ;
and such was their audacity, that it became im-
possible for individuals or even smaH parties to
stray to a moderate distance from the camp, with-
out running the risk of being killed or taken. On
endeavouring likewise to open a correspondence
with Madrid, he found that all means of communi-
cation between himself and that city were cut off.
1 t is true that his patrols of cavaIry, though pushed
as far as Carlota on the road to Seville, encoun-
tered no enemy; but rumours of numerous masses
in motion, of the advance of one corps from the
camp of San Roche, of another from Grenada, and
of a third already forming at Ecija, taught him
that one such victory as that of AlcoJia, was not
sufficient to secure the submission of a large and
populous province. Under these circumstances
he determined, at least for the present, to give up
aH idea of further conquest, and to establish him-
se1f at some point which should at once enable
him to re-open his communications with his rear,
and place him in a situation to renew, at his own
pleasure, offensive .operations.


With this view he evacuated Cordova at an
early hour on the morning of the 16th of June, and
reached Andujar without molestation on the 19th.
His next measure was to attempt the dispersion of




PENINSULAR WAR. 89


a band of armed peasants, who had assembled at
Jaen; and who, more than any others, pressed
upon his out-posts, and harassed his foraging par-
tieso The troops employed upon that service
found no great difficulty in accomplishing it; for
the insurgents were poorly organised, and gave
way as soon as attacked; but the conquerors went
much further than their chief intended them to go,
in punishing what they chose to designate as re-
bellion. General Dupont was desirous that the
town of Jaen should pay dearly for its patriotism;
but he was still more desirous that it should be
left uninjured as a place ofshelter, in case of need,
to his own army. The victorious detachment
committed in it the most horrible excesses, wan-
tonly destroying every morsel of food and every
cask of wine, which ought to have gone towards
the -sustenance of themselyes and their comrades.


Bythese movements Dupont so far bettered his
condition, that he was enabled to receive a strong
reinforcement under Generals Videl and Gobert,
and, to a certain extent, to re-open his communica-
tions with the capital; but he was still as far as
ever from being safe. The rumours which had
alarmed him whilst at Cordova were repeated,
with even greater semblance of truth, till he
reac~ed Andujar. It was soon ascertained that
levies were assembling in every direction around
him; and that, unless the passes of the Sierra Mo-




90 ~ARRATIVE OF THE


reria were occupied in force, he would be entirély
separated from every other corps of French troops
in the Peninsula. To occupy these passes, how-
ever, by detachments from his own army, was a
me asure upon which he was afraid to venture; he
considered himself barel y strong enough to main-
tain his present pqsition-to divide his strength
would be ruinous; but he despatched message
after message to Madrid, entreating that he might
not be abandoned, and stating, in the plainest lan-
guage, both the difficulties under which he then
Iaboured, and his apprehensions respecting the
future. Of these despatches a few only reached
the place of their destination, the remainder being
intercepted and carried to the Spanish generals ;
and as an opinion widely different from bis own
prevailed at head-quarters respecting the means
alreadyat his disposa1, no efforts were made to
comply with his wishes. It was, at the same
time, broadly hinted to him, that to abandon the
enterprise on which he had set out, would prove
extremely mischievous to the cause, and,as
a necessary consequence, bring down upon him-
self the displeasure of his master.


Dupont had acquired considerable reputation in
the wars of Italy and Germany, as a general of
division; but never acted before as commander-in-
chief of an army. Though the junction of Videl's
division increased the strength of his corps to full




PENINSULAR WAR. 91


sixteen thousand men, he persisted in keeping it
in a state of unaccountable inactivity. Ha:d he
moved at once either to the front or to the rear, it is
probable he would have carried.every thing before
him; for it was not till towards the middle of July,
that the junta of Seville succeeded in bringing to-
gether a force capable of opposing him; but he
was unwilling to advance' before a furthe;r rein-
forcement, for which he had applied to Marshal
J unot, should have come in; whilst to retreat,
would be to íncur the censure of which he had
been already forewarned, and of which he enter-


. tained at least an adequate degree of apprehen-
SlOn. He accordingly contented himself with the
destruction of the . bridges over the Guadalquivir,
and the erectionof a redoubt here and there along
its banks; whilst by occupying Baylen in his rear,.
ando keeping a garrison in the tete-du-pont at
Mengibar, he persuaded himself that his position
would be amply secured against any attempts
which the insurgents could make against i1:.


Whilst he was thus 'Yasting time, the Spanish
government strained every nerve for the purpose
of bringing into the field a force adequate, both by
its numbers and its discipline, to act on the offen-
sive. EarIy in July, about thirty thousand..men,
the greater part of w hom were old soldiers,
moved towards Andujar. They were commanded
by Castanos, who had been recalled for the pur-




92 NARRATIVE OF THE


pose from the camp at San Roche; and they num-
bered among their generals of division two of the
most distinguished officers in the Spanish service,"
General Reding and the Marquis de la Coupigny.
Part of this force encountered at Jaen a French
brigade under General Cassagne, which had pro-
ceeded thither as a sort of advanced-guard from
the main army, and after a sanguinary conflict,
compelled it to retire. A position was next taken
up within cannon-shot of Dupont's lines; and
there a plan was ente red into, of which the success
proved to be even more complete than the most
sanguine could have possibly anticipated.


It was agreed that Castanos with one division
should temain where he was, to keep the attention
of Dupont, as far as might be practicable, fixed
upon a single point. In the mean while General
Reding, at the head of eight thousand men, was to
force the tete-du-pont at Mengibar, to march upon
Baylen, and attack the enemy there; and he was
to be supported by the Marquis de la Coupigny,
who, from La Heguerita and Villaneuva, -was to
straighten the left of the French army; whilst a
corps of two thousand men, under Don Juan de la
Cruz, was to push for the Sierra Morena, and
block up every line of retreat in that direction.


The plan was carried into execution on the 16th
of July. Reding assaulted and reduced the re-
doubt at Mengibar, crossed the Guadalquivir, and




PENINSULAR WAR. 93


drove in the French posts upon Baylen; but find-
ing that Coupigny had not come up, he fell back
again after dark, and repassed the river. As soon
as Baylen 'was known to be in danger, General
Videl, with six thousand men, hastened to cover
it. He arrived there that night, but he found in
it neither friend nor foe; because the Spaniards
had already executed their retrograde movement,
and General Dufour, who on the fall of Gohert suc-
ceeded to the command of the French, had evacu-
ated the place as no longer tenahle. Videl was
naturally a good deal alarmed at this; and his
alarm hecame greatIy increased when it was re-
ported to him that the sound of firing had been
heard in the direction of the Sierra Morena.
He made up his mind in a moment that Dufour
had be en driven back upon Carolina, and that,
unless he hastened to support him, the retreat
upon Madrid would he entirely cut off. Under
this persuasion he lost no time in despatching a
messenger to Dupont, informing him of what he
meant to do, and then proceeded, without allowing
his troops a moment to rest, in search of Dufour.


General Vid el reached Carolina on the 17th;
and on the same day Reding and Coupigny hav-
ing formed their junction, returned to Baylen.
They took peaceable possession of it, and instantly
sending to make Castanos aware of their success,
desired to be instructedas to their future move..,




94 NARRATIVE OF THE


ments. They were ordered to march forthwith
upon Andujar, against which the united efforts of
the whole Spanish army were now about to be
turned.


The troops had hardly taken their stations on
the morning of the 19th, preparatory to this move-
ment, when they found themselves in presence of
the advanced-guard of Dupont's corps, which was
now in full retreat towards the Sierra Morena.
The arrival of Videl's despatch had at length
opened the eyes of the French General to the real
perils of his situation. He saw that the póint
from which he had hitherto apprehended an attack,
was, comparatively speaking, one of slight impor-
tance, and that it was from the rear that danger,
if it came at all, was to be apprehended; and he
reluctantly determined to abandon Andujar, and
to retreat as fir at least as La Carolina, from
whence other operations could at his leisure be
undertaken, either offensively or defensively, as
circumstances might point out.


With this design he moved from the town soon
after night-fall on the 18th; but as he carried
alon~ with him vast multitudes of carriages and
waggons, his march was necessarily rendered both
slow andstraggling. Though the head of his co-
lumn quitted its ground aboutten o'clock, dawn
was beginning to appear before the last sections
moved off; and when the momerit of trial carne,




PENINSULAR W AR. 95


the former were found to be at the distance of
nearly three leagues from the latter. It was well
for the Spaniards under Reding, that Dupont had
deemed it expedient to bestow so much care upon
the preservation of his plunder. Had the French
moved in compact order, so as to bring the whole
of their force into action at once, their enemies,
however brave and resolute, could have hardly
withstood the shock; for there was no great dis-
parity in point of numbers between them, andthe
advantages of discipline and experience were aH
in favour of the French; but this they were not
able to effect. On the contrary, regiment after
regiment, and gun after gun, were hurried into fire
as fast as they carne up; the French fought as an
army always fights which is taken in detail; and
one part was utterly and irretrievably destroyed
before another could render it the smal1est as-
sistance.


It might be about three o'c1ock on the morning
of the 19th, when the scouts of the French army
suddenly feIl in with the advance of General Re-
ding's corps. By neither party was thé meeting
anticipated; but both sides made every disposi-
tion which their relative situation and the exigen-
ces of the moment seemed to require •. Dupont
felt that, unless he made good his passage at once
through the force opposed to him, his rear would
he assailed by Castanos; and he therefore directed




96 NARRATIVE 01< THE


the leading division to charge the Spaniards, with-·
out waiting for the arrival of their comrades. The
attack was bravely made, but it was no less bravely
resisted; and the affair, after a warm and deter-
mined struggle, ended in thé repulse of the assail-
ants on aH points. Very shortly, fresh troops ar-
rived, inc1uding a battalion of the marines of the
imperial guard, who renewed the contest with the
utmost gallantry; but neither their numbers nor
their pbysical strengh, worn down by a night-
march, and still further diminished by the rapidity
of their advance to the front, were competent to
carry them successfully through. The Spaniards
were superior to them in every respect, in num-
bers, in position, and in the quantity and weight
of their cannon; and though the French performed
prodigies of valour, they were foiled in every effort.
At last it was felt by all the officers present that
their case was a hopeless one; and just as Casta-
nos arrived upon their rear, and Don Juan de la
Cruz took his ground upon their flank, it was de-
termined to request a suspension of arms. The
request was immediately complied with. In spite
of the arrival of General Videl's corps, which, as
soon as the firing was heard, had hastened from
Carolina to the assistance of their comrades, the
negociation continued; and it ended in the sur-
render of the whole French army, to the amount
of fourteen thousand men, as prisoners of war.




I'ENINSU'LAR WA'R. 97


The entire course of the Spanish campaigns
produced novictory so decisive, or so ,influential
in its con sequen ces, as this. Not only was An-
dalusia freed frOln the presence -of the enemy, but
a degree of confidence was communicated to the
patriots in other quarters, such as they had not
previously experienced; and many an individual,
who up t~ that moment had wavered between his
duty and his interests, ceased to waver any
longer. At ,Madrid, again, the newsof the vic-
tory produced a verypowerfuleffect, as well upon
the French as upon the patriot party. The latter,
who for some time backh-ad dissembled their
sentiments, began again to give them vent in na-
tional cries and acts of petty disturban ce ; whilst
the former exhibited the líveliest symptoms of
alarrn, lest the conquerors 'should follow up thar
success by marching at once upon thecapital.
At this time Joseph Napoleon was resid,ent in the
eity; he had entered it only two days previously,
and had scarcely begun to exereÍse the functions
of royalty, when. the intelligence carne \1pon him
like a thunderb01t; and ,though eom:;cious of the
evils which' must necessarily attend the step, he


. determined t@ retire for thepresent upon hi8 re-
sources. He quitted Madrid on the 3Jst, and
issulng orders that all his scattered divisions'
should follow him, that the siege ,o{ Saragoza,


. then in progress, should he raised~ and further
VOL. J~




98 NARRATIVE OF THE


attempts upon Valencia abandoned, he fell back,
with the utmostprecipitation, beyond the Ebro.


In the mean while the expedition against Va.,.
leneia was conducted by Marshal Moncey under
circumstances not very dissimilar to those which
attended the progress of Dupont's operations.
When he quitted Madrid on the 4th of lune,
Moncey was indeed aware that his object was
not likely to be accomplished without opposition;
and he took his measures, as an able officer might
be expected to do when setting out upon an un-
dertaking of doubtfulissue. The force which im-
mediately followed his own, amounted to sorne
eight or nine thousand men of all arms; there
were in quarters,along his line of march, two
battalions of Spanish and Walloon guards, and
three companies of the king's body-gUards, whom
he ordered to join him; and he requested, and
obtained a promise, that General Chabran's divi-
sion, which consisted of five thousand men, and
which was then stationed at Barcelona, should be
erdered round to Tortosa, and placed at his dis-
posal. With sueh a force he naturally concluded
that any resistance 'Y hich an armed peasantry
€ould offer, would. be easily overcome; and per-
haps, had the whole of the force assembled undet
his standard, these expectations would not have
proved groundless.·


Moncey reached Cuenca on the . 11th, where>




l'E"NINSULA R W A R. 99


instead of a strong brigade of Spanish troops, 'he
found only the skeletons of a few companies, the
rest having deserted to join ,the cause of the in-
surgents. He was; as might be expected, both
alarmed and disappointed at the event; and he
wrote instantly to Madrid, to request that a
column might move from that place upon Albacete,
in order to cover his right. N ot satisfied with
this, he despatched an aide-de-camp to General
Chabran, to request that he would'instantly proceed
to Castellar de la Plana, that he would there take
under his orders the corps of General Requena,
and hurry forward to reinforce his own corps. This
done, he halted for eight days, not more to collect
his own resources, than to enable his messengers
to reach their several points of destination; aod
thenhe renewed his march, which was conducted
throughout with the utmostcaution and circlim-
spection.


Theinsurrection at Valencia had been attended
by ciréumstances of fearful crue1ty, hundreds oC
innoeent French inhabitants falling a sacrifice tJ
the fury of tbe mOD. 'But it wa-s not in this casé
as in most others, that they who exhibit the
greatest ferocity against people uilable to defend
themselves, are the fitst to turn their backs,upen
danger. The Valencians entered zealously irito
the national cause; insomuch tlíat, not content to
await the approach of the Prehch, they marched




100 N ARRATIVE.0.F TUE


forwarq to meet them. The first encounter took
place at the bridge of Pajazo over the Cabriel, and
it ended, as might have been antiéipated, in the
defeat of the patriots. A second stand was. made
among the mountains, in the gorge of the principal
defile between Siete Aguas and Venta de Bunol.
This position was occupied by two thousand regu-
lar infantry, six or seven thousand armed peasants;
and twelve pieces of cannon; who did not give
way without offering a resolute and lengthened
resistance; nor was it till after he had a third
time beaten his enemies in the field, that Marshal
Moncey found himself in a situation to summon
Valencia. Bu! his summons was disregarded.
Thepeople were determined to bury themselves
';1nder the ruins' of their city; and it consequently
Decame' necessary to carry the place by assault. '
, Valencia contained, at that time, a population


little short of one hundred thousand souIs. It
was ,surrounded by a low stone wall, well flanked
by towers and angles, and covered with a ditch,
into which, fromacanal hanL 'Qy. water couldat
any moment be admitted. There was an arsenal
in it filled with muskets, swords, and other wea-
pons; and there were a considerable number of
heavy cannon mounted upon the. ramparts. The
easy rate at which Moncey had advanced, enabled
the authorities to turn these advantages to a good
account; and when' theFrench appeared,' the




PENINSULAR WAR. 101


city was in aÍl excellent condition to receive arid
repelan assault. Of aH this the French were, oí
course, ignorant; and expeéting that no serious
ópposition would be attempted, they advanced, at
three o'cIock in the afterÍloon of the 28th, in
columns of attack.


The Spaniards were now in that sítuation which
they have invariably shown themselves best calcu-
lated to tm. Coveredby their walls, and amply
supplied with ammuriition, they poured upon the
assailants an incessant and heavy shower ofmusket
and cannon balls, which swept down whole com~
panies of rilen, and disabled the few light pieces'
which were opposed to it. The French dashed
boldly up to the edge of the ditch; some of them
even forced their way within the gates; butthe
fire was so tremendous, and the obstacles th,rown
in their way so insurmoun"table, that their disci-
pliried valour availed them nothing. Having kept
their ground, under shelter of the houses in the"
suburbs, till dark, they fell back to their camp,
leaving behind them upwards of two thousand men,
in killed, wounded, and missing.


The result of this day's operations was sufficient
to convince Marshal Moncey that any further
attempts, with his present force, upon Valencia,
would end only in his own destruction. He ac-
cordingly determined on a retreat; which, after
having manreuvl'ed during the 29th so as to keep




102 NARUATIVE OF THE


the Spaniards in doubt as to his inteniions, Ile
caTried, on the 30th, into effect. lt was high time
for him to. adopt this measure. Several corps,
composed partIy of regular troops, partly of .armed
peasantry, were forming in his rear; nor was it
tiU he had overthrown sorne of these, first on the
han ks of the Xucar, and afterwards in the vicinity
ofAlmanza, that he made good his entrance inta
Albacéte.


N ot less gratifying· to the friends of freedom was
the defence which, much about the same time, th.e
eity of Saragoza offered to the attempts of General
Le Febvre ;and ha,d tt not beeu for the fatal dis-
eomfiture at Medina del Rio Seco, the Spaniards
would have had no cause to speak with regret oí
the issues of theÍr first campaign. But that defeat
was asevere hlowupon the patriot cause; not
only because it opened 3; way to Madrid to the
sovereign whom Buonaparte had appointed, but
because it contributed to prevent a British army
from appearing in the field at a moment ahd
uuder eircumstanees whieh would have rendered
. its appearance peculiarly fortunate. It will be
nccessary, however, before enteriJilg at all inta the
narrative of that battle, to give, in few words,. an
abstract of the transactions which, both iu Eng-
]und and at Bayonne,. wel'e going on with reference
to the mighty con test.


The Spaniards had no 800ner raised the standard




PENINSULAR W AR. 103


of independence, than they felt the necessity of
applying to England for aid. The first deputies
who arrived for that purpose,. were desp(i.tched by
the. principality of the Asturias; and they-were
followed by a successíon of envoys from other
provinces, including -that of Seville, where the
Supreme Junta had established itself. Their re-
ception was such as the nature of the business on
w hich they came, and the disposition of the people
to whom they weresuitors, might have authorised
them to expect. AH ranks and classes of men
appeared eager to evince their respect for the
representatives of a nation engaged in a struggle,
sacred, in the eyes of Englishmen, as the object
which it sought to attain; and not the government
only, but corporate bodies and private individuals,
made haste to mark the sense which they enter-
tainéd of the gallantry and devotion already dis-.
played in the contesto


Subscriptions were opened in most of the large
towns in the kingdom, from which considerable
sums were realised, and applied to the service
oí the patriots. AH the Spanish prisoners taken
during the late war were set at liberty; and
being armed, clothed, and equipped, they were
transported to their native shores, that they might
assist in the great work of liberating their count~y.
Nor did the efforts of Great Britain end there.




104 NARRATIVJ:<: OF 'l'HE


"Large quantities of inuskéts, of cannon;balls, -p6w-
der, and othe}; military stores, were- conveyed to
different ports of the Peninsula, for the purpose oí
at:m'ing a population which professed to stand in
need only of arms to instue success; whilst the
admirals on the station, as well as the Governor of
Gibraltar, received orders to comrnunicate with
the Spanish autlÍorities as often as need be, and tó
lend every assistance which the latter might re-
quire,. or the former might be able to afford.


The Spanish deputies, acting in accordance with
their instructions,.. had taken care to assure the
British. government that Spain required no troops
trpm this country> because every Spálliard capable
9f wielding a musket was anxious" to take the field
against the invaders. N otwithstanding these de-
clarations, the British government was too much
alive to the important results which hung upon the
issues of the struggle, to leavethe maintenance of
it altogether to the undisciplined valor of the
patriots; it determined to support them with an
army ofBEitish soldiers;and it resolvedthat the
force employed $hould be such as, without alarm-
ing the jealousy or wounding the pride of the pa-
triots, IDight constitute an efficient nucleus round
which larger armies might gather.


The first British force which showed itself UpOIl--
t)le theatre of war; consiBted of a small diviBion óf




PENINSULAR WAR. 105


infantry and artillery, detached, rinder the ordeÍ's
ofMajor-g.eneraISpencer, from the fortress of
Gibraltar.


It has been stated that the authorities at horne;
as soon as they were made aware of the state of
public feeling in the nations of the Peninsula,
issued orders for the cordial co-operation of the
governor of that place, as well as the British ad~
mirals on the station, in any movernents against
the French force s which might hold out.a P!o"spéct
of success. Neithel' Admiral Collingwood, how-
ever, nor Sir Hew Dalrymple, had judged it ne-
cessary to wait the arrival of these orders. From
the first cornmencement of disturbances iti the
province of Seville, a constant intercourse had
been kept up by both, with the chiefs and leaders
of the Spanish mSllrgents; and as soon as the
disposition rnanifested on the part of thé people
of Cadiz became known, an armament both of
ships and troops was prepared to support it.
Major-general Spencer, with several English and
two Sicilian regirnents, arnounting in aH.to about
five thousand men, embarked on, board of a fleet
of transports, and covered 'by the squadron of Lord
Collingwood, set sail for Cadiz. The jointpropo..;
sal of these officers to assist in the subjúgation of
the French Heet was indeed declined, the Spa-
niards being confident in their (>wn resources, and
perhaps entertaining sorne apprehension· lest the




106 NARRATIVE OE THE


views of the allies might extendfurther than to the
aid proposed; but General Morla gladly av~iled
himself of the presence of the British corps to
cover the rear of Castanos's 'army, and to secure it
against any attack from the side of Alentejo, whilst
prosecuting the plan of operations on which it had
embarked. General Spencer accordingly landed
his division at Ayamonte, on the Guadiana. By
this movement he caused certain reinforcements,
which pupont had earnestly requested froro Junot,
and which had begun their march for the pur-
pose of joining him, to fall back with precipi-
tation upoQ Lisbon; and. though he steadily re-
fu sed to' commit himselfwith the Spanish columns,
which were gradualIy enclosing the French troops
at Baylen, he nevertheless gave aH the additional
vigour to theircouncils, which arose froro the'
knowledge that, in case of any reverse, there was
a point behind them on which they could safe)y
faH back.


Whilst the naval and military commanders in
the Mediterranean were thus exerting themselves,
an effort was made in the north, and made with
the most complete success, to restore to the ser-
vice of his country one of the ablest officers of
which Spain could at that time boast.One oí
Buonaparte's first measures, when meditating the
subjugation ofthe Peninsula, was to demand from
S pain a corps of sixteen thousand veteran troops,




PEN~NSULAR W AR. 107


whom, under the Marquess de la Romana, he em-
ployed for a time upon the banks of the Vistula,
and 'afterwards removed to tbe shores of the Great
Belt; They were distributed at different points in
that district, when the standard of independence
was raised; and one of tbe earliest rneasures of
the Supreme Junta was to issue a proclamation,
calling upon them, in the name of their country,.
to return to its defence. This was necessarily
consigned to the care of the British cruisers'; and
it was not given to thern in vain. A scherne for its
delivery, as well as for the removal of the soldiers,.
should they, as it was believed they would, desire
to cornply with its terms, was immediately devised
in London ; and the execution of it was committed
to Vice-admiral Keats,. an officer· well worthy of
t\le trust. lt succeeded to admiration; and seven
tho1J$3.nd ,men, with Romana at their head,wert}
transferred from the ranks of the enemy, and
éldded, at a moment of peculiar interest, to those-
oí the patriot army.


It wasnot, however, by such assistance alone,.
that the cause of Spain and of Europe could be;
effectually forwarded ; and to such a$sÍsta,nce. the
Britü;h government was not disposed to limit itself.
The wÜldom, or rather the necessity under which
England lay, of striking a great blow, now that the-
very field of action which she had so long desired
was opened to her, could not escape the penetra-




108 NARRA TIVE OF THE


tion of the most obtuse-minded; and preparations-
begari to be made for carrying on hostilities by
land, on a"scale which had never beforebeen at-
témpted since the commericement of tbe war.


lri tbe eiuly part óf the summer, and before any
expectation had arisen of the events which after-
wards occurred, a corps of nine thousand men had
assembled at Cork, under the orders of Lieutenant-
ge"neral Sir Arthmi Wellesley. Of General Wel-
lesley' s ear]y services, and of the reputation which
he had already earned fo"r himself, it is not neces':
sary in this place to take any notice. It is suffi-
cient to observe that there was not an officer in the
ármy, to whom both the profession and the nation
at large would have more readily intrusted the"
~om!lland of a force which required courage of the
highest order, and ability in the most extensive
sen se of the tern:, in its direction; and that his
past conduct, both in Europe and in India," fully
justified all classes in the opinion which they had
formed; whilst his nomination and selection im..,
mortalised the judgment ofthat minister whó laid
his name before the King for~ tlle cornmand.
With what view the corps in question began to
concentrate itself, was not, at the moment, accu-
rately known. By some, an attack upon" Cuba
was spoken of as in meditation; by others, a fresh-
attempt upon Buenos Ayres was represented as
more probable; but whatever the object might




PENINSU LA R W A R. 109


be which the armament was originalIy intended to
serve, of that object the recént events in Spain
caused an immediate abandonlI1ent. General
Wellesley was directed t{) proeeed without 'delay
to the assistanee of England's new ally; and as the
northern provinces held out, in m~ny respects, the
greatest facilities for a British force to aet with ~f­
fect, the port of Corunna was specified as a conve-
niElOt point from which to commence his opera-
tions.


In the mean while, N apoleon was following up,
with all the vigour of mind which so peculiarly
distinguished him, the first steps which he had
taken towards the, establishment of a princeof his
own blood upon the throne of Spain. The abdi-
cation of Charles IV, and the résignation of the
rights' of his family, weré speedily proclaimed to
Spain, and to the world; and it was further ao-
nounced that the Emperor, anxious to iusure the
glory and integrity of the Spanish monarchy, had
determined to waive his own pretensions in favoÜi.
of Joseph. King of Naples. But Napoleon was
desirous. not only that his, brother should reig'n,
but that he should have the appearance of reigúirig"
over a free aÍld a conteRted people; and the cortes
w'as, in consequence, invited to assemble. for the
purpose of framing a constitution which might
mSure to lhe Spaniards the' blessing' of just laws




110 NARRATIVE OF THE


and an equitable administration of thero, among all
ranks and classes of meno


The proeeedings of the body which, under the
appellation of an Assembly of Notables, met toge-
tUer' in obedienee to the summons of Buonaparte,
have been so often laid before the poblie, that to


. repeat them here would be to waste time for very
little putpose. Let it suffice to state that, towards
the éndof May, and during the first days of June,
there arrived in Bayonne upwards of ninety per-
sons, all that eould be eollected together out of
ane hundred and sixty who had been deputed;
that they were, with few exeeptions, men distin-
guished for their rank, their talents, or for the
stake whieh they held in the eountry; and that,


. llfter many moek sittings and delibel'ations, they
aeeepted Joseph as their sovereign, and dtew up
the charter whiehwas to form the basis of his sys-
tem of government. This done, Joseph was pro-
claimed King of Spain and the lndies in due formo
He nominated his ministers, appointing tooffiee
110t only those Upon whose fidelity 11e felt that he
might depend,but· many' oIi whose aequiescenee
in the new arrangements he tiad no right to caI-
eulate, but whom he trusted, by this show~ of
clemency and eonsideration to gain over to his
party; and on the 10th of JuIy, surrounded by the
members of his eouneil, he passed the Bidassoa.




PENINSULAR WAR. 111


At the moment when Joseph. eommenced his
journey towards Madrid, the' armies of Marshal
Bessieres on the one hand, andofCuesta and Blake
on the other, were executing that series of move-
ments and manreuvres which ended in the dis-
astrous battIe of Medina del Río SeGo. For some
time previous, the northern provinces of Spain
had been the scene of numerous skirmishes and
encounters, to enter into arninute detail of which
would be altogether foreign to the design of the
present work. In the course of these, the usual
quantity of enormities were comrnitted on both
sides. As' often as a fewstragglers frorn the
French army, or the French inhabitants of a
Spanish town, feH into the hands of an enraged
peasantry, they were put to death with circum-
stances of peculiar cruelty.; whilst tbe French
failed' not to avenge these excesses, by giving up
to plunder, and levelling with tbe ground, every
town or village which ventured to oppose their
progress. On the Iatter principIe, because a few
hundred half-armed men presumed to defend it,
Logrono' was severely visited; Torquemada was
destroyed; and Palencia escaped a similar fate,
only by.tbe haste of its dignitaries in giving 1ft
their submission. The focus of the insurrection,
however, was kno",n to be Valladolid, a city
which contained upwards of twenty-five thousand
inhabitants; and .against it Bessieres, whose head-




112 NARRATIVE al' TH'E


quarters were established at Burgos, gave orders
that an expedition sftould be fOl'med,


Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, an old, brave, but
headstrong officer,commanded, at this time, an
assemblage of undisciplined peasantry, with whom
he seemed determined to make a stand in defence
of Valladolid, He was one of those who, at the
commencement of the troubles, not only gave no
éncouragenient to the feelings of the people, but
exerted himself to allay them ; eitber pecause he
was satisfied that successful resistan ce would be
impracticable, or that in the changes which a re-
volution could not fail to bring about, many sub-
stantial benefits would accrue to the nation ¡¡.t
large. As soon, bowever, as he became satisfied
that it was the nation which had risen in. arms, he
hasteried to make amends fol' his former back-
~ardness, a,nd entered heartily into the cause,
which he now regarded as thatof his country. It
was somewhat remarkable that Cuesta was among
the number of those who held office both under
Ferdinand and under Joseph. By the former he
had been appointed captain-general of Castile and
Leon, an authority which he actually exercised;
whilst by the lattel' hewas nominated to the vice-
royalty of Mexieo, at the very moment w,hen his
~ettel' judgment led him to draw the sword against
the power which desired to promote him.


General Cuesta, with bis half-armed rabble.




PEKINSULAR WAR. ]13


took up a position at Cabezon, about two leagues
from Valladolid. He was attacked there on the
12th of JUlle by two divisions of the Frencharmy,
011e under General Lassalle, the' other under Ge-
neral MerIe; and after a short but warm con test,
was dislodged and overthrown, with the loss of an
his cannon, and nearly one thousand meno The
immediate consequences of this victory were, not
only the submission of Valladolid to the conque-
rors, but the occupation of Santander; the latter
being a place of which they were peculiarly jea-
IDus, because of its excellent harbour. But
Cuesta,thóugh defeated, was far from heing dis-
couraged. He withdrew with the remains of his
force to Benevente; where he employed himself
in raising new levies, and in giving sorne appear~
ance of organisation to tllose which were already
enroI¡ed under his standard.


It was not long before intelligence reached
Bessieres, not only that Cuesta's troops were re-
assembling, but that a considerable army which
had been formed under Blake, in the province of
Gallicia, was about to advance against him. Bes.;.
sieres issued orders for the concentration of an his
forces at Palencia, with the exception of three
battalions, which were left to protect Santander,
and a like number af Vittoriá, to keep open the
communication with France. . He himself, like-
wise, prepared to take the field; and having


VOL. l. H




114 NARRATIYE OF 'CHE


learned that Cuesta and Blake were actua11y in
conjunction, and that they had taken up a posi-
tion at Medina del Rio Seco, he set out, on the
13th of July, for· the purpose of bringing them to
action.


The battle of Medina del Río Seco was fought
on tbe 14th of July. It ended, as the reader
knows, in the utter rout of the Spaniards; over
whom, however, the victory was not won, till all
the energies of the conquerors had be en brought
into play, and a heavy 1088 sustained, in killed and
wounded, on both sides. Tbe Spaniards appear,
even by the confession of their enem}es, to have
fought well on, tbat day; and their defeat may be .
attributed, rather to a want of judgment in their
1eaders, than to any absence of courage among the
troops. Yet were the issues of the struggle of
the most disastrous nature. Fifteen pieces of
cannon, and upwards of six thousand men, were
1eft upon the fie1d; wbilst the road was coro-
plete1y laid open to the invaders as far as the capital.
But even these, though heavy calamities, were not
a11 which may be traced back to the defeat at Rio
Seco. It was at this unlucky moment that the
British army, destined to support the patriot cause,
set sail froro the harbour of Cork; and its General
reached Corunna only in time to be told that there
was no longer a fleld fol' its operations in the north
of Spain.




PENINSULAR WAlt. 11;


The army in q uestion having completed its ar
rangements, put to sea on the 12th of July. Afte
continuing with the fleet only a few hours, Si
Arthur Wellesley, who was embarked in a fast
sailing frigate, hastened on, and arrived at Co·
runna on the 20th. He lost no time in opening !
correspondence wíth the junta of Gallicia, fron
whom he reeeived the distressing intelligence o
the overthrow of their army; and by whom hf
was assured that, the enemy being now in pos·
session of the course of the' Douro, all communica·
tion between that provine e and those to thE:
south and east, was cut off. There is reason te
believe that in this dilemma, and because the~
still persisted in believing that Spain stood in n<J
need of men, but of arms and money only, they
recommended to him the propriety of effeeting a
debarkation somewhere in Portugal, and aeting in
conjunction with the insurgents there against the
corps of Marshal Junot; and as the advice ac-
corded perfectIy with the tenor of his instructions j
as well perhaps as with his own views, Sir Arthur
prepared to adopt it. Having supplied the Galli·
cians with 200,000l. in money, and assured thero
of the speedyarrival of a large quantity of military
stores, he once more put to sea; and directing hi~
own fleet to follow him thither, made at once fOl
the harbour of Oporto.


Of the polítical condition in which Portugal




116 NARRATIVE OF THE


then stood, a few words will suffice to convey to
the mind of the readei- a tolerably accurate idea.
The discontent which has been represented in a
former'chapter, as prevailing among aH ranks of
men, increased in violence every day, till it be-
carne manifest to every observer that a general
insurrection was at hand. It was not, however,
till the whole of Spain was in arms, nor indeed
till the Spanishtroops which accompanied Junot's
army had set them the example, thatthe Portu-
gu~se ventured to raise the standard ofrevolt; but
when it was raised, the same spirit of persevérance
-the same determination to live or die in free-
dorri, which was already in the full exercise of its
energies among their neighbours, appeared every-
where to animate them.


N otwithstanding the numerous .private quarrels
which arose in parts of the kingdom, and the' occa-
sional bursts of hatred against the intruders which
from time to time showed themselves both in the
capital and elsewhere, J unot persisted in repre-
seriting-perhaps in believing-that the Portu-
guese were brought completely into subjection,
till the delusion became suddenly dispelled ina
manner which w~s far from being satisfactory.
In the' month of June two detachments, to consist
of four thousand men each, were demanded from
the army of Portugal; one for the purpose of
supporting Bessieres by the occupation of Ciudad




PENINSULAlt W AR. 117


Rodrigo; the other to co-op~rate with Dupont in
taking possession of Andalúsia. The first of these,
under Loison, having advanced as far as Rodrigo,
and finding the whole country in arms, and the
gates of the place shut, suspended its operations,
and fell back; the second under Avril, was not
more fortunate in its undertakings. Badajoz had
declared for King Ferdinand; the whole of the
frontier was in arms; and the Spaniards and Por-
tuguese, ofwhom a considerable number were at~
tached to his division, deserted by ",hole compa-
nies. Besides, General Spencer, with his five
thousand English, lay between him and the point
which he had been ordered to reach, and General
Avril abandoned his enterprise. Bufsuch misfor-
tunes were trifling when compared to others which
shortIy followed.


N () great while ehipsed before the agents of the
Supreme Junta found means to communicate both
to the Spanish corps, which, Ululer Quesnel, occu-
pied Oporto, and to Caraffa'sdivision in Lisbon,
the course which events had taken both at Ba-
yonne and Madrid. The intelligence was received
by the troops with the utmost indignation. In
Oporto, they rose at once upon the General; ar-
rested him with his staff and his escort; and hav-
ing given up the city into the hands of the munici-
pal authorities, marched away to join their coun-
trymen in Gallicia. ,In Lisbon they were only




118 N AltRA'fIVE OF THE


prevented from adopting a similar course by the
promptitude and decision of J unot. InstantIy on
the news froro Oporto being reported tohim, he
caused the whole of Caraffa's corps to be arrested
and disarmed; and putting them on board of cer-


. tain hulks which lay at anchor in the· Tagus, he
kept them there as prisoners. But the ímpetus
to a general revolt was given; the match was al-
ready laid to the train, and no exertions on the
part of the French functionaries could hinder it
from exploding.


On the first impulse of the moment, the autho-
rities at Oporto cast Quesnel into prison, tore
down the French flag, and hoisted the national
standard in ¡ts place. By degrees, however, they
became alarmed at. the boldness of their own pro-
ceedings; and seeing themselves deserted by the
Spaniards, they began to devise schemes for avert-
ing the vengeance of the French General. Don
Luiz d'Oliveira, ¡nto whose hands the temporary
power had been intrusted, betrayed that trust so
far as to write, in terms unworthy of a Portuguese,
to Junot, and to· restore the tri-coloured flag to its
former position; whilst he endeavoured, by various
acts of kindness . towards the French, to make
amends for the violence which they had suffered
a few days before. But a spirit had gone abroad
in other quarters, which soon renewed in the in-
habitants of Oporto that hatred of their oppressors




PENINSULAR WAH. 119


of which they had already given sorne proof; and
the cry of " Death to the French-Long live the
Regent!" resounded through the streets. These
cries were speedily followed by a second decla-
ration ofindependence. Oliveira was put to death;
and a junta having formed itself, in imitation of
ihat of Seville, proceeded, with the venerable
bishop at its head, to issue proclamations, and to
call upon all good Portuguese to unite against the
common enemy.


The appeal of the junta was heard through ...
out the whole kingdom; and it was everywhere
obeyed. The students at the University of Coim-
bra were among" the first to take up arms; the
peasantry of Tras os Montes were not less on the
alert; Algarves was in open revolt, and the Alen-
tejo ripe for insurrection. That which he had long
apprehended, Junot saw at length in progress, and
proceeding with a violence and energy which
threatened to set all endeavours to suppress it at
defiance; but Junot was not aman to succumb
under difficulties, however imminent. He set
himself vigorously to the task of allaying the
. general ferment; and he applied to that object
not force alone, but all the expedients of flattering
harangues and conciliatory measures.


Bis first act ",as to remit what had not heen
paid of the contribution formerly imposed upon
the people. He next affected to take the Portu-




120 N ARRA TIVE OF 'CHE


guese troops under his especial care, augmenting
thcir pay, discharging their arrears, and appearing
to place the utmost reliance upon their fidelity
andvalour; and hedid his best to amuse the in-
habitantsof Lisbon," by a renewal of the proces-
sions and religious festivals to which they had in
former tim€s be en accUstomed. Butwhilst he
pursued this course in h:is more general measures,
he was not.· unmindful .of the policy of striking
terror by particular examples; and he set on foot
a rnultitude of separate expeditions, with the view
of crushing the rebeHion in each of the towns or
districts where it rnjght appear to rage with the
greatest violence. On that errand Loison, who
had returned to Lisbon, was despatched against
Oporto, at the head of three battalions of infantry
and several squadrons of horse; Thornieres was .
directed to reduce Fort N azareth; whilst Keller-
man . was sent to insure the obedience of Villa
Franca, Alcoentre, and Alcoba~a. These are but
a few of the expeditions which the Duke of Abran-
tes found it necessary to fit out,.of which sorne
were áttended with mornentary. success, whilst
others entirely failed. But even the successes of
the French proved of little solid utility to thero.
As long as an arrned force was at hand, to oppose
which no rneans existed, a town, or village, or
even a district, would remain quiet,-the ver y
next instant aner the troops were withdrawn, aH




PENINSULAR W AR. 121


became again tumult and commotion. Junot saw
and felt his embarrassments keenly; but the
moment was now rapidly approaching which pro-
mised to bring these difficulties to a head. Ru-
rnours were in hourly circulation of the coming of
a British arrny, and at last it was officially corn- .
municated that a British arrny had landed.




122 NARRATIVE O}' 'fHB


CHAPTER V.


ArrivaI of Sir Arthúr Wellesley at Oporto-His cOllferencc
with the junta-The transports assemble off Mondego,and
the troops are landed- Strange conduct of General Freire
and the Portuguese army-Junot takes measures to oppose
the progress of the English, and calls in his detachments-
Delaborde retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley-Battle of
Loris:a-Arrival of General Anstruther on the coast-March
of the British army toVimiero-Sir Harry Burrard arrives
in the offing-Is visited by General Wellesley; but refuses
to sanction an advance~The British attacked by Junot's
army-Bat~le of Vimiero.


SIR AR'fHUR W ELLESLEY, as soon as he had c1osE'd.
his corresponden ce with the junta of Gallicia, and
directed the transports which conveyed his troops
to rendezvous at the rnouth of the Mondego, pro-
ceeded in person to Oporto, for the purpose of
arranging sorne plan of campaign with the govern-
ment of that place, or, as it then termed itself, the
Suprerne Junta of Portugal. He was received by
the bishop, as head of the body, with every ap-




PENINSULAR W AU. 123


pearance of cordiality; and all the supplies of dif-
ferent kinds of which he stood in need, including
draft cattle of various descriptions, were readily
promised to him; but when he proposed to effect
a landing there, and to co-operate with the gar-
rison in a movement upon the capital, a variety of
objections were started to the measure. lt was
suggested that, by landing on sorne part of the
coast nearer to Lisbon, Junot might be attacked
beforeall or even most of his detachments, at that
moment scattered through the country, could be
called in; whilst the Portuguese in Oporto would
be ready to intercept his retreat, in case .he should
endeavour to make any movement towards Gal-
licia. How far Sir Arthur was swayed by this
reasoning, it would be presuming to pronounce; a
communication from Admiral Sir Charles Cotton,
it is' believed, determined him to seek a point of
landing elsewhere; and he followed his transports
to the appointed place of meeting in Mondego
Bay.


On his arrival there, he found that important
despatches from England were waiting for him.
By these, he was informed that fresh troops
might be expected to join bis army every moment;
one division being aIread y embarked at Ramsgate
under Brigadier-general Anstruther, whilst ano-
ther was assembling at Harwich; but it was at
the same time intimated to him that Sir Hew




124 NAltRATIVE OF THE


Dalrymple had received orders to proceed from
Gibraltar in the character of commander-in-chief ;
Sir Harry Burrard had been nominated as second ;
and Sir Jobn Moore, who had just returned" from
the Baltic with a corps of ten thousand men, was
likewise to serve in Portugal. In spite of these
arrangements, however, Sir Arthur was enjoined
to make good his landing, whenever a favourable
opportunity should offei-, and to enter at once
upon any series of operations, for the successful
accomplishment of which he might judge himself
sufficiently strong.


In obedience to these instructions; and having
conferred with Sir Charles Cotton, General Wel-
les ley issued orders for the immediate disembark-
ation of his "corps at the mouth of the Mondego.
A fast-sailingvessel was" at the same time des-
patched, to require the immediate junction of
General Spencer and his division;" and every
arrangement háving been made, the landing
began. A strong west wind and a violent surf
rendered this both a tedious aúd "a perilous opera-
tion, several boats being swamped, and sorne men,
both sailors and soldiers~ perishing among the
breakers; but after fourdays of severe fatigue,
the force was diseníbarked', incIuding the" division
of General Spencer, which arrived just as thelast
divisit)U began to"leave their" transports. The
whol€ British ar"niy, amounting; to rather more




PENINSULAR WAR. J25


than thirteen thousand men, bivouacked on the
8th of August on the beach.


Whilst the British force was thus employed,
General Bernardin Freire arrived. at Coimbra with
about seven thousand infantry and six hundred
cavalry of the Portuguese army, for the purpose
of joining and co-operating with Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley. These were, for the most part, wretchedly
armed, and their discipline had attained to no
higher degree of excellence, than usually attends
raw levies suddenly called out, and as snddenly
embodied; they were not therefore likely to add
much to the real strength, whilst they would draw
heavily upon the supplies of the invaders. N e-
vertheless, as it was advisable upon political
grounds that the Portuguese should accompany
the English in their present undertaking, it was
arranged between the Generals, that both .corps
should move in the direction of the capital, and
that they should form a junction on the 11th or
12th at the town of I. .. eira.


In ¡lccordance with this arrangement, the ad-
vanced-guard of Sir Arthur's army began its
march on the 9th of August. It consisted of
some companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th
regiments, supported by the brigades of Major-
general Hill and Major-general Ferguson; and it
was followed on the day after by the ",hole of the
corps. The men marched with sixty rounds of




126 NARRATIVE OF THE


arnmunition in their cartouch-boxes, and provi-
sions of meat, biscuit, &c. in their haversacks,
sufficient for the consumption of three days; and
the column was followed by a string of mules,
bearing stOl'es of every kind. N o troops ever took
the field in higher spirits, or in a state of moré
perfect discipline. Confident in their leader,
likewise, and no less confident in thernselves,
th~y desired nothing more ardently than to behold
their enemy: for even thus early in the war, it
was the custom of a British soldier to admit of no
apprehensions as to the issue of a battle. The
entire strength of the corps made up barely thir-
teen thousand three hundred men; there were
attached to it two hundred cavalry of the 20th"
1ight dragoons; and -its artillery muste red in aH
eighteen pieces.


The troops arrived in Leira, without having met
with any opposition, on the 11th and 12th, and
they were received by the inhabitants with enthu-
siastic rapture, as by persons who had long groaned
under oppression, and at last beheld their de-
liverers. On the same day, General Freire's corps
made its appearance; but the General himself had
lost that zeal for sharing in the glorious enterprise
before them, which seemed to animate him during
his late conference with Sir Arthur Wellesley;
He begao by doubting whether it would be prac-
ticable to find supplies for both armies 00 the same




PENINSULAR WAR. 127


1ine of march; and he ended by requiring, as the
pl'ice of his adherence to the British standard, that
Sir Arthur Wellesley should subsist hiro ando his
troops from the stores of the English commissary.
This was a dernand with which the English Gene-
ral could not, of course, comply. He represented
that his army, fresh from a voyage, and Hable to
be separated at any moment from its ships, instead
of being able to furnish provisions to the troops
of the country, ,would, in all probability, be com-
pelled to draw upon the country for its own sup-
pIies; and he expressed his astonishment that any
such unreasonable expectation should have be en
formed. The discussion was maintained for sorne
time with much forbearance on the side of Sir
Arthur Wellesley, and with a degree oí obstinacy
on that of Freire, for which it was not very easy to
account; and it ended at length in the latter de-
cIaring his determination to withdraw himself en-
tirely from all share in the intended series of
operations. With sorne difficulty he was prevailed
upon to leave a brigade of infantry and two hun-
dred and fifty horse with the British army; but
the remainder he positively prohibited froro moving.


N otwithstanding this exhibition of the kind of
aid which he roight expect from his allies, Sir Ar-
thur determined to lose no time in prosecuting the
undertaking which he had begun. From all ap-
prehensions on the side of Spain, the inteIligence




128 NAURATIVE OF 'fUE


of the vietory of Baylen, and of the consequent
flight of Joseph from Madrid, completely freed
him; and he still hoped, notwithstanding the well-
known activity of the Freneh generals, that he
might be enabled to engage J unot before Loison
should have had time to join him. U nder this
persuasion, he renewed his march on the 13th, and
on the 14th reached Alcoba~a, the enemy having
evacuated it during the preceding night; and on
the 15th his head-quarters were established at
Caldas.


It has be en said that, at the moment when in-
telligence of the landing of the British army
reaehed Marshal J unot, his troops were scattered
o'Ver many districts of Portugal. with the view of
extin"guishing, as fast as they appeared, the first
spal."ks of rebellion, and putting in a state of de-
fence such fortified posts as remained in the hands
of the Freneh. Among other generals, Loison and
ThomieresJ each with his division, had departed
from Lisbon-the former, for the purpose of quiet-
ing the Alentejo, and relieving Elvas, already
blockaded by the Spaniards; the latter, to over-
a'Ve Coimbra, and reduce Fort Nazareth. Of
these, Thomieres was illstantly recalled; and his
brigade being added to that of General Delaborde,
the latter officer was directed to ad vanee towards
Mondego, that he might watch the movements of
the English, and, as far as he was able, retard




PENINSULAR WAlt. 129


their progress. General Loison was likewise
called in, Junot urging him by letter, when pro-
posing to bombard Badajoz, " to abandon all
his projects, and to hasten, without delay, to
Abrantes." But though he made every possible
exertion, leaving behind him multitudes of sick
and weary' whom he found it impossible to drago
along, he failed in joining Delaborde in sufficient
time to prove of any essential service; for Dela-
borde, in obedience to the orders of his chíef,
marched down at the head of five or six thousand
men towards the coast. As the English advanced,
he gradually feH back, manifesting, however, no
disinc1ination to risk an action, whenever the
nature of the ground should authorise the measure;
and it was not long before a fitting opportunity
presented itself. lt was the rear-guard of his
coluinn which retired from Caldas on the evening
preceding the day of Sir Arthur Wellesley's al':"
rival; and on the following morning the two
armies were in sight of one another.


A trifling skirmish had occurred at Obidos on
the 15th, between four companies of British rifle-
men and the French outposts, in which sorne lives
were lost on both sides, and no very deeided ad-
vantage obtained on either. On the 16th, again,
all was quiet; Sir Arthur devoting that day to thé
arrangement of his own plans, and to the institu-
tion of striet and aeeurate inquiries as to the


,"OL. I. I




130 NAltltATIVE 01' 'l'I-IE


situatioll of General Loison. He likewise recon·
noitred the position which General Delaborde had
assumed, and found it to be one of extraordinary
strength and diffieu1ty; indeed, its seleetion re-
Hected the highest eredit upon the military talents
ofthat officer, as the following tolerably ac(mrate
deseription of its-loeality may serve to proveo


The villages of Caldas and Rolj~a are built
110rth and south from eaeh other, at the opposite
extremities of an immense valley, which opens out
largely towards the west; and midway betweeu
them stand s the littJe town of Obidos, with its
splendid aqueduct and its Moorish castle. Rolip
itself erowns an eminenee, which again is Hanked
on the oue hand by a range of hilIs, on the other
by rugged mountains; by the very mountains,. in-
deed, which bend round to girdle in the vale 01'
basin, of which notice has just been taken. lm-
mediately in front of it there is a sandy plain, not,
perhaps, in the strictest meaning of the term,
woody, but studded with low firs and other
shrubs; and in its real' are four 01' five passes,
which lead through the mountains. This was the
situation in which Delaborde saw fit to await
the approaeh of th~ English army. His outposts,
driven in from Obid08, extended now along the
plain to the hi118 on both sides of the valley; and
bis line was Cormed on the high ground in front of
the village, so as that both its flanks might rest,




]'ENIXSllLAlt \\' AR.


one upon the mountains, the. other upon a steep
eminence. Of his force it is not easy to speak
with confidence, the writers of different nations
having made different estimates.of it; but by Sir
Arthur Wellesley it was computed at six thousand
men; and there i8 no reasan to believe that his
judgment was formed on mistaken grounds. Be
this, however, as it may, there it stood presenting
a bold front to its enemies; and' covering the


" passes by which, in· case of a reverse, its retreat
might at any moment be made good, or a new
position seized in the mountains.


Every necessary ordér having been iEsued, and
every man made aware on the evening of the 16th
of the business in which he was about to be em-
ployed, the troops on the following morning stood
to their arms; and just as day began to dawn,
marched from the bivouac in three columns of
attack. 'rhe !'ight column, which consisted of
twelve hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Por-
tuguese horse, was directed to make a considera-
ble detour, and to penetrate into the mountain8~
for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; it was
then to wheel up, and bear down with all its
weight upon the real' of Delaborde's lineo The


. left column again, consisting of two brigades of
British infantry-those of Major.general Ferguson
and Brigadier-general Bowes; three companies
of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, twenty




132 NARIL\TIYE OF 'l'HE


B,ritísh and twenty Portuguese horse, reeeived
orders to ascend the hilIs at Obidos, to drive in all
the enemy's posts on that side of the valley, and to
turn his right to Roli~a. It was at the same time
directed to watch the motions of General Loison,
of whose arrival at Rio Major, on the preceding
nÍght, intelligence had been obtained; and in. case
he should come up, to engage him before he should
have had an opportunity of communicatíng with
Delaborde. The centre colurnn again, which was
composed of four brigades, namely, Major-general
Hill's, Brigadier-general Crawford's, Brigadier-
general Nightingale's, and Brigadier-general Fane's,
together with four hUlldred Portuguese light infan-
try, the remainder of the British and Portuguese
cavalry, a brigade of nine and a brigade of six-
pounders, had it in charge to attack the enemy in
front.


As the distance between Caldas and Roli~a falls
not short of three leagues, the morning was consi-
tlerably advanced before the troops arrived witbin
musket-shot of the French outposts. N othing
could exceed the orderly and gallant style in
which they traversed the intervening space. The
day chanced to be .remarkabl y fine, and the scenery
through which the columns passed was varied and
striking; but they were themselves by fat the
most striking feature in tbe whole panorama.
'Whcl'ever any broken piece of ground 01' other




YENINSCLAR WAIt. 133


natural obstacle carne in the way, the head of the
column having passed it, would pause till the rear
had recovered its order, and resumed its station ;
and then the whole would press forward with the
same attention to distances, and the same orderly
silence, which are usually preserved at a review.
At last, however, the enemy's line became visible,
and in a few minutes afterwards the skirmishers
were engaged. The centre divisioll now broke
into different eolumns of battalions; that on the
left pressed on with a quick pace, whilst the rifle-
men on the fight drove in, with great gallantryand
in rapid style, the tirailleurs who were opposed to
them. At this moment General Ferguson's column
was seen descending the hills, and moving rapídly
in a directioll to cut off the enemy's retreat. But
Delaborde was not !'lO incautious as to permit that.
The"posts which covered his position 011 the plain
beiug all carried, he lost no time in abandoning it,
and withdrew his troops, in excellent order, and
with great celerity, into the passes. It was
evident, indeed, that to the gorges of these passes
he had an along looked, as furnishing him with
the most advantageous battle-ground; for he in-
stantly assumed a new position there, and pre-
sented a front more formidable than ever, because
more than ever protected by the inequalities of the
ground froro the approach of the assailants.


U nder these circurnstances, it became nece"s-




NAItRATTYE 01" TtlE


sary, in some degree, to alter the plan of attack.
Five separate columns were now formed, to each
of which was committed the task of carrying a
pass; but as the ground was peculiarly difficult,
and the openings extremely narrow, no more than
five British battalions, a few companies of British
1ight infantry, and the brigade of Portuguese,
could be brought into play. The following lS
the order in which this second assault was ar-
ranged :-


The Portuguese infantry were directed to move
up a pass on the right of the whole line, through
the pass next on the right to which the light com-
panies of General Hill's brigade, supported by the
5th regiment, were commanded to penetrate. The
office of forcing the third pass was committed to
the 29th- and 9th regiments; the fourth became
the province of the 45th regiment; aud the fifth
fell to the lot of the 82nd. Than these passes, it
is not easy to imagine any ground capable of pre-
senting more serious obstacles to an assault, ol'
more easy of a desperate defence. They were not
only overhung on either hand by rocks and groves,.
among which skirmishers might lie secure, and do
terrible execution with their fire; but as the troops
advanced, they carne upon spaces rough with myr-
tles and other shrubs; which unavoidably .de-
ranged . their order, at the same time that they fur-
nlshed admirable cover to the enemy. This was




PENINSULAR ."'AR. 135


particularly the case in that pass which the 29th
and 9th regiments had been directed to carry; and
the enemy were not remiss in making the most of
their advantages. Having permitted the column
to go on, almost unmolested, till the leading com-
panies wel'e within a few yards of the myrtle grove,
the French suddenly opened a fire~ both from the
front and flanks, which nothing but the most de-
termined bravery on the partof .the British troops
could have resisted. As may be imagined, the
advanceofthe column was for a moment checked;
but it was only for a momento Colonel Lake, who
led the attack, waving his 'hat in his hand, called ·on
the men to follow; they answered the call with a
spirit-stirring cheer, and dashed on. But the
enemy were full ofconfidence in themsel ves and
in their position, andthey disputed every inch,of
grotind; nor was it till after a considerable los8
had been sustained, ineluding the gallant officer
who had so far conducted them to victory, that the
29th succeeded in crowning the plateau.


Thei were not yet formed in line, and the 9th
was still entangled in the pass, when a French
battalion advanced boldly tocharg'e them. The
enemy were met with the same spirit which they
themselves exhibited, and the slaughter was ver y
reat . on both sides; but the charge was re-


pulsed. It was renewed in a few minutes after
hy' increased numbers; fol' the columns which




130 NARItATIYE OF THE


were ascending the other passes being fal' in the
rear, the Fr~nch were enabled to bring the great
mass of their force to bear upon this point; but the
gallant 9th was now at hand to aid their com-
rades; and the enemy were again driven back
with much slaughter. Nor was an opportunity
afforded them of repeating their efforts; for the
heads of different columns began to show them-
selves, and tbe position was carried at an points.
The enemy accordingly drew off his troops, and
began to retire, though in excellent order. Se~'e­
ral efforts were made to harass him as he feH
back, as well by the ligbt infantry as by the
cavalry; but his superiority in the latter arm, as
well as the nature of the country, rendered these
of little avail. He made good his retreat, leaving
behind him three pieces of cannon, and about a
thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing.


Sir Arthur Wellesley having followed the ene-
rny as fal' as Villa Verde, on the road to Torres
Vedras, halted for the night. On the following
morning the pursuit was about to be renewed,
and it seemed as if no check would be given to
the ardour of the troops, ti11 they should have won
a second victory, and established themselves in
Lisbon, when the arrival of a messenger at head-


,


quarters caused a suspension of the orders already
issued. This person was the bearer of despatches
from Brigadier-general Anstruther, who, with a




PENINSULAR WAH. 137


Iarge fleet of store-ships, and a reinforcement of
troops, was now at anchor off the townof Pe-
niche. As it was no doubt a matter of the first
importance to bring these reinforcements into the
line without delay, Sir Arthur resolved to move
in such a direction as would at 'once insure their
landing, and facilitate their ready junction with
his corps. With this view he directed the head
of his column towards Lourinho, which· place he
reached that evening, and on the following day
took up a position near the village of Vimiero.


The point at which General Anstruther's bri-
gade was directed to land, was on a sandy beach
at the mou th of the' Maceira. There the disem-
barkation accordingly took place, but amidst dif.
ficuIties of 110 ordinary 11ature; for the surf ran
tremendously high; and flying bocEes of the ene-
my's' cavalry hove red about, as if with the design
of cutting off each detachment as it stepped on
shore. The skill and perseverance of the seamen,
however, triumphed over the former of these dan-
gers; one or two boats only being swamped, and
about half a dozen men losing their lives; and
against the latter, the vigila11ce and good order of
the troops themselves offered defence e11ough.
The whole were got 011 shore at an early hour on
the 20th; and 110011 had barely passed when they
took their station along with part of Generar
Spencer's brigade, in the advance.




138 N ARRATIVE OF 'l'RE


On the very day which saw this division joiri.
bis army, 1t was announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley
that General A ucland was in the offing; and before
dark, Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira Roads.
Sir Arthur 10st no time in opening a communication
with that officer. He went on board of thefrigate
in which he was embarked the same night, laid be-
fore him a statement of affairs as they then stood,
and ente red into a minute detail of the plans which
he had himself formed, and which he was already
prepared to carry into effect. He represented to
him the wisdom of resuming the offensive, whilst
the British troops were yet flushed with their recent
victory, and the enemy. distracted and disheart-
ened; and he proposed to move on the following
morning tooccupy Mafra, and to turn the position
whichhe understood that the French had taken up
along the heights of Torres Yedras. Whatever
were real1y the objections to a plan so bold, and
yet so judicious, Sir Harry Burrard saw many. He
urged, in the first place, tha~ since Sir John Moore's
corps might be reasonably expected on the coast in
the course ora few days at the farthest, it would
'be more prudent to remain quietIy where they
were tillit shouldhave actually arrived; in the
next place, that the army was sadly in want of
cavalry, and that the horses which dragged the
guns were represented as being of the 'worst de-
scription. Then again there was a risk 'of losing




PENINSULAR WAH, 13D


thei¡' f3upplies, in case they should diverge far froro
the shipping. It was in vain that Sir Atthur
pointed out, in reply to aH this, the irnpossibility
of remaining quiet; beeause, if they did not ad-
vanee to attack the enemy, the enemy would
surely advance to attaek them. It was in vain
that he represented the great advantage which
would al'ise, were Sir John Moore's ~orps to land
in the Mondego, and rnarch upon Santarem, thus
cutting off the enemy's retreat both by Alrneida
and Elvas, Sir Harry Burrard's mind was made
up. He would sanction no rash rnovement with a
force as yetineornplete in every one of its branches;
and as the senior offieer, his will eould not be dis-
puted, Sir Arthur returned to theeamp that
night, and the very next day gave arnple proof.~
that he had not erred in one,· at least, of bis antiei-
pations,


Whilst Delaborde was executing the ordel's
which he had received, and watehing and retard-
ing the progress of the English in a style worthy of
his well-earned reputation, Junot was straining
every nerve to bring into the field a force eapáble
of sustaining, with sorne prospeet of success,a
general action with the British arrny. With this
view, the garrisons of Lisbon, and of the forts in its
neighbourhood, were drained of every rnan WhOlll
it was deemed prudent to withdraw ;and the
corps of Loison, Thornieres, aneI Kellerman, and




140 NA'RR'A TIV1l:. OF THJJ:


latterly of Delaborde himself, received orders to
concentrate, withou"t delay, in the position of Torres
Yedras. The concentration too k place during the
18th and 19th, and on the 20th the army was ar·
ranged into divisions and brigades. Of the former
there were two; one of which was given to Dela-
borde, the other to Loison; whilst Kellerman took
charge of the reserve, composed entirely of grena-
diers.


These arrangements being complete, Junot im-
mediately advanced towards Vi mi ero, where he
had heard that the British army was encamped.
The village of Vimiero stand s in themidst of a
beautiful valley, through which the Maceira flows,
at the distance of about three miles, or something
less, from the sea. On either side the hilIs rise to
a considerable altitude, particularly towards the
north, where a chain of detached heights rear
themselves, with striking abruptness, out of the
pIain. Over the ridges of these runs the high-
road, through the hamlets of Fontanel and Ven toza
to Lourinho; and on the eastern side is a deep
ravine, at the bottom of which stands the village of
Toledo. On the north-east of Vimiero, again.
there is a sort of table-Iand, covered in part with
shrubs, and in part bare, which commands all the
approaches from the side of Torres Ved ras ; and
which is itself commanded in rear, and towards
the west, by a mass of mountains that occupY the "




l'E~INSULAR WAH. 141


whole space between the left bank of the Maceira
and the sea. Such was the nature of the ground
along which the British army now lay in bivouac ;
its arrangements in detail were these ;-


The greater part of the infantry, including the
1 st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, with
eight pieces ofartillery, were posted upon the mass
of mountains just described; on the south-eastern
hill, again, or table-Iand, Brigadier-general Fane
and Brigadier-general Anstruther took their sta-
tions; the former with his riflemen and the 50th
regiment, the latter with his whoIe brigade; and
they were supported by half a brigade of nine-
pounders and half a brigade of sixes, which had
been sent to them during the night. The high
road to Lourinho, however, and the heights which
it crosses,can hardly be said to have be en occu-
pied' at all, only a single picket keeping guard
there; because no water being in the neighbour-
hood, and Sir Arthur not intending to continue OH
his ground longer than till daylight should enable
him to quit it, he did not esteem it necessary to
place anynumber of troops in a situation where
so many inconveniences must attend them. But
the village itself was fulIy occupied; the reserve~
both of artiIlery and cavalry, being stationed
there.


Marshal J unot quitted his position at Torres
Ved ras soon after nightfall on the 20th;- and hav-




142 NAHItATIVE Ol<" 'fUE


ing executed a tedious and difficuIt march, throug'h
narrow defiles, arrived, about seven o'dock in the
¡norning, within a league and a half of theBritish
outposts. The ground which he occupied was,
however, complctely hidden from the view of the
English. He was accordingly enabIed to form his
coIumns of attack unseen; nor was it ti11 a con-
siderable mass of cavalry had deployed immedi-
ately in front of the picket which observed the
Lourinho road, that on the part of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley an action was anticipated. But Sir Arthur,
who was never taken by surprise, perceived -in a
moment that the principal attack would be di-
rected where he had most cause to apprehendit,
and where his line' was most unq uestionably the
weakest: he ordered the brigades of Generals
Ferguson, Nightingale, Aucland, and Bowes, suc-
cessively to cross the ravine, and long before the
first shot had been fired at the outposts, his left
was secure.


The enemy carne on in two powerful columns,
supported and flanked by weaker bodies; the
right, which consisted of about six thousand men,
moving, upon the Lourinho road; the left, of about
-Q.ve thousand, directing its efforts against the table
land. The first onset of both was, as the first
onset of Fre~ch troops always is, extrcmely impe-
tuous; insomuch that, on the left of the table
land, the skirmislters .were fairly driven in, and




PENINSULAR WAR. 143


the head of the advancing column presented itself¡
almost without a check, in front of the 50th regi ...
mento The 50th, which was drawn up in line~
permitted the enemy to approach till scarcely
twenty yards divided them; and then pouring in
a well-directed volley" made ready to charge. The
enemy stood, for a moment, as if determined to
await the shock; but the bayonets of the British
corps were hardly crossed, when they began to
waver; and befare the rush was made, they broke
and Hed. Almost at the saine instant, the 2nd
battalion of the 43rd found itself vigorously at-
tacked in the town of Vimiero by a lesser column,
which Hanked the greater. The 43rd had thrown
part of its body into the church-yard> whilst part
filled the houses, and covered the road ""hich led
to it; and it firmly met and bravely repel1ed every
effort which was made to dislodge it. A similar
result attended the attack which took place upon
the extreme left of the British line, which was
condueted with eonspicUDUS gallantry by General
Delaborde .. It was repelled with immense slaugh-
ter, chieHy by the exertions of the 97th and 52nd
regiments.


In the mean while a tremendous eontest was
going on among the hilIs, on the British right, and
in the direction of the Lourinho road. The enemy
forced their way in thisquarter as they had don~
on the other flank, through the body of skirmishers




144 NARRATIVE 01<' 'fHE


which covered the British line; nor did they make
the slightest pause, till they beheld the 36th, the
40th, and 71st regiments in close array before
them. Their line was likewise formed in a mo-
ment; and severa) terrible discharges of musketry
were exchanged at a distance which hardly al-
lowed of a single bullet passing wide of its mark.
At length, the 82nd and 29th regiments carne up
to the support of their cororades, and the word
was given to charge. One cheer, loud, regular,
and appalling, warned the French of what they
had to expect; but the French were roen of tried
valour, and they stood to the lasto That was
a treroendous onset. The entire front rank of the
enemy perished; and the men who composed it
were found, at the close ofthe action, lying on the
very spots where each, during its continuance, had
stood. Instantly the line gave way; and being
pursued with great impetuosity, six pieces of can-
non were captured on the field. An attempt was,
indeed, roade to recover these, at a moment when
the 71st and 82nd, who had halted in the valley,
were lying down to rest after their labours; but it
was made to no purpose. These regiroents only
fell back to a little rising gronnd, from whence
thelr fire could be gi ven with greater effect; they
gave it, and once more bringing the bayonet into
play, carried every thingbefore thero.


The French fought well in this action. They




PENINSULAR WAR. 145


fought like men who had been accustomed to con-
quer, and had not yet learned to suffer defeat.
The grenadiers oftheir reserve, in particular, per-
formed prodigies ofvalour, advancing under a cross
fire of musketry and cannon, and never giving way
till the bayonets of the British troops drove them
down the deseent. But they were routed at all
points, and that with a slaughter far greater than
usually occurs to armies of a similar magnitude.
Out of twelve or thirteen thousand men whom
they brought into the field, three or four thousand
feH; besides a large proportion of prisoners, of
whom several were officers of rank. On the si de
of the British, the total los s amounted to 783, in
killed, wounded, and missing; among the former
of whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, com-
manding the 20th light dragoons. He was 8hot
through the heart whilst leading a brilliant charge
which his detachment made; and in which, after
committing terrible havoc among the enemy's in-
fantry, it suddenly found itself beset by a whole
brigade of French cavalry.


The battle had hardly begun, when Sir Harry
Burrard, followed by his staff, arrived upon the
field. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as a matter of
course, proposed to resign to him all further
responsibility; but Sir Harry possessed too much
judgment not to ,perceive that the execution of
plans could not be left in safer hands than in


VOL. I. K




146 NARHATIVE 01<' THE


those of the man who had formed them. He
accordingly declined interfering in any way till
thé result of the struggle should be known, and
took upon himself the direction of future ope-
rations only when the defeat of the enemy was
ascertained. At that critical juncture, Sir Arthur
Wellesley represented to him, in the strongest
terms, that this was the moment for advancing; that
whilst part of the army followed up the be aten
enemy, part should push on by the nearest road
to Torres Yedras. . He pointed out that snch a
movement must inevitably cut off the French from
Lisbon, and either place them between twofires,
or compel them to begin a ruinous retreat, by the
route of Alenquer and Villa Franca : he reminded
himt~at there was no deficiency either of ammu-
nition or provisions in the camp; that the British
soldiers were in high spirits and admirable dis-
cipline ; . theirenemiesdisheartened, wearied with
their late marches, and almost disorganised. AH
this he urged upon the field with the warmth and
earnestness of a successful officer, and the clear-
ness and perspicuity for which he is remarkable.
But Sir Rarry was not to be moved from his de-
termination. Re had made up his mind already
not to quit Vimiero till Sir John Moore should ar-
rive; and he saw nothing in the events of theday
to cause a change in his sentiments. The cavalry,
he said, were certainly notstrengthened, nor the




PENINSULAR WAR. 147


artillery horses improved, by the exertions which
they had undergone. In a word, he was resolved
not to act with precipitation; and the British
troops were accordingly commanded to rest upon
their arms.




148 NARRATIVE O:E' THE


CHAI~TER VI.


Inactivity of the British army under Sir Harry Burrard-Ar-


rival of General Kellerman at Vimiero, with proposals-Sir


Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters into a


treaty with KelIerman-Difficulties as to the disposal of tite


Russian fleet, and preparations for a renewal of hostilities-


Arrival of Sir John Moore's corps-Junot consents that the


two Admirals shall arrange the point at issue between thern-


selves-The convention of Cintra condemned by both Por-


tuguese and Spaniards-Almeida and Elvas given up-The


Bdtish troops enter Lisbon-Joy of the inhabitants-Ca-


raffa's corps restored to liberty, and re-armed.-The French


army sails for France, and the Russian fleet is conveyed. tI} .
England.


lT has be en stated, in the preceding chapter, that
among the variety of motives which induced Sir
Harry Burrard, bbth before and after the victory
of Vimiero, to cheGk the advance of the British
army upon Lisbon, one, and certainly not the
least influential, was the expectation which he
entertained, that every day would bring into his
camp a re-inforcement often thousand men, under




PENINS ULA H. ''''A R. 149


the· command of Lieutenant-general Sir John
Moore. The corps in question (to which it was
the writer's good fortune to be attached) had em-
barked at Portsmouth so early as the 3] st of July;
but owing to a continuance ofbaffiing and adverse
wÍnds, it was the 19th of August before it arrived
in Mondego Bay. It arrived, too, at a moment
when the leaders of the divisions which had pre-
ceded it were too much occupied with other
matters to pay to its movements any particular
attention; and it became, in consequence, essen-
tial to open an immediate communication with
them, and to ascertain how, and upon what
service, it should prepare to empIoy itself.


Having Iearned from sorne of the coasting ves-
seIs that fue right of the British army was in
position at Sto Martinho, Sir John Moore did me
the honour to desire that 1 should proceed at once
to that point, and communicate. to Sir Arthur
Wellesley, or Sir Harry Burrard,or the officer,
whoeyer he might be, in command, the fact of his
arrival. In obedience to these instructions I set
sail in a light frigate, hoping, and indeed expect-
ing, that I should be able to reach my destination
on the following day; but at an early hour on the
20th the breeze died away, and what was still
more distressing, the appearance of the sky and
the state of the atmosphere, indicated a long con-
tinuance of calm weather. Under these circum-




150 NARRATIVE OF THE


stances 1 did not consider it prudent to remain
any longer bn board of ship; a boat was therefore
manned, which conveyed me twelve leagues by
rowing, and landed me soon after sunset at the
village of Sto N azareth.


lt was not without great difficulty, and the loss
of several precious hours, that 1 bere succeeded in
procuring either a guide to direct my steps, or the
means of'conveyance; indeed, of my journey from
thence to head-quarters no iriconside~able portion
was performed on foot. On this account 1 failed,
unfortunately for myself, in reaching Vimiero' till
the 24th, three days after the battle had been
fought, and the campaign was, to all intents and
purposes, at an end ; for the heads of departments
)"ere, 1 perceived; all busily occupied in conduct-
ing a negociation, of the origin and end of which
the following is a brief account :-


Sir Harry Burrard, in pursuance of his system
of procrastination, continued inactive in the po-
sition of Vimiero, when, at an early hour on the
22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar
to take upon himself the chief command. Sir
Hew was of course ignorant, as well of the condi-
tion of his own army, and the state of the country,
as of the means and resources of the enemy; and
he could form no other judgment respecting the
line of conduct which it behoved him to pursue,
than that which his predecessors in cornmand




PENINSULAR \VAR. ltj]


might happen to suggest. But for the attainment of
sufficient informatioll sorne time was necessary; and
before any definite COurse had been determined on,
an event occurred which gave a .new turn to the
General's deliberations.


In the evening of the same day on which Sir
Hew reached the camp, a body of cavalry was
espied advancing by the road which the enemy
had taken in their retreat. The pickets instantly
stood to their arrns ;but the alarm, 'if such it de-
serves to be called, which had momental'ily seized
them, was at once allayed, when it was observed
that the body in question were the bearers of a
flag of truce. They were stopped, as is usual in
such cases, at the out-posts, till a report of their
corning should be made at head-quarters, and an
officer sent down to ascertain their business.
They proved tobe the escort in attendance upon
General Kellerman, who had been despatched by
Marshal J unot, in consequence of the resolution
to which he and his principal officers had that
morning come, in a council of wal'; and who
was the bearer of proposals for the conclusion of a
suspension of arms, as the prelude to a more de-
finitive treaty respecting the evacuation ofPortugal.


Various rumours pr€!vailed in the camp, as to
the reception which General Kellerman's propo~
sitionreceived in different quarters. By sorne it
was asserted that it gave singular satisfaction to




152 NARRATIVEOF THE


all ;and that even Sir Arthur W ellesley, feeling
that the moment for action. had passed away,
offered no objection to the measure; by others
his opposition to it was represented as having
been both strenuous and persevering. Be this,
however, as it may, Kellerman was c~nducted,
with every mark of respect, to the house where
Sir Hew Dalrymple resided; and after a con-
ference of some duration, his first request was
granted. An armistice, to continue during forty-
eight hours, was entered into; and then began
the more important negociation, to the eonducf of
which the armistice was hut a fore-runner.


With admirable tact Kéllerman opened his part
in this transaction by magnifying, in every possible
form, the strength of tile French army, and the
amount of its resources. He spoke of his General
as determined to aecept no terms whieh should
not be to the most minute tittle honourable to the
French arms; and represented him as prepared,
in ease matters should be driven to an extremity,
to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon. This
done, he proceeded to lay before the British eom-
manders a string of propositions, rather as if they
had be en suggestions from himself, than official
communications; for he earnest1y desired it to be
understood that he had no powers to eondude a
tre aty , and that his. present business was simply
to ascertain the faet, whether any desire to treat




PE!\'I~SUJ,AR "'AlL 153


existed on the part of the English. The conver-
satíon had not, however, proceeded far, when
either his memory, or his regard to consistency,
forsook him; for he produeed a .written doeument,
which authorised him to act at his own discretion,
and pJedged the honour of the Commander-in-
chief to fulfil any agreement into which he might
be induced to entero


1t is hardly necessary to repeat he re that the
evacuation of the whole of Portugal, including the
forts of Elvas and Almeida, in whieh the French
had garrisons, formed the basis of the present ne-
goelatIOn. To thís the enemy would consent only
on the following eonditions :-first, that the French
arrny should, on no aceount, be considered as pri-
soners of war; seeondly, that the troops should be
transported with their arms, baggage, and private
property to Franee, and be at liberty to serve
again, either in the Peninsula or elsewhere, as
soon as they should re-assemble; thirdly, that no
individual, whether Frenchman, Portuguese, or
foreigner, in alliance with Franee, who chanced to
remain in Portugal after the departure of the.
Freneh, should be molested in any way, onac-
count of the sentiments which he might have ex-
pressed, or the line of conduct which he might
have pursued, during the late oecupation; and
that all sueh persons, if they desired it, should
be at liberty ta withdraw from Portugal, with all




154 N ARRATIYE OF THE


their effects, within ayear; fourthly, that the port
of Lisbon should be recognised 'as a neutral port,
and the Russian fleet which lay there treated as
enemies' vessels are usually treated when in the
harbours of a neutral power; and lastly, that aH
the horses attached to the Frency army, as well
those belonging to the cavalry and artillery as
those of the staff, should be conveyed to France
together with the meno ,


When the su bstanceof these proposals began to
be generally l.mderstood, and a rumour got afioat
that they had be en conditionally agreed to, the
indignation of aH ranks and classes in the army
rose to a great height. There was not an indivi-
dual who appeared to entertain a doubt that Junot
felt his situation to be a desperate one; and that
nothing 8hort ofsucha feeling would have tempted
him to treat about an evacuation at all; whilst the
terms which he sought to obtain fOf himselfwere,
as if by one consent, pronounced to be absolutely
and totally inadmissible. But that which most
powerfully stirred up the wrath at least of the
junior dépaitments, was the impudent endeavour,
on' the partof the French leader, to stipulate for
the unmolestéd departure of the Russian fleet. Jt
was' seeIÍ at once that his object in. introducing
that artiCle was of a twofold nature ;-that he
wished both to reconcile his own master to the
disgrace which his arms had suffered; and tocon·




PENINSULAR WAR. 155


ciliate the good will of the Russian autocrat,
whose squadron he hoped to preserve; and it was
earnestIy trusted that the British Admiral, to
whom reference must of course be made, would
not give his consent to an arrangement so deroga-
tory to the dignity of the British flag. N or was
the general discontent directed altogether against
the details of the convention. Murmurs might
here and tb."ere be heard, all of them condemnatory
of that'excess of caution which hadch~cked a victo-
rious army in the midst of its career ; whilst a thou-
sand wishes were expressed, that the new chief's
arrival had been delayed till the campaign, so pros-
perously begun, had been brought to a conclusion.


Whilst one part of the army, and that by far the
most numerous, thus expressed themselves, there
were others, who, equally regretJing that ad-
vant~ge had not been taken of the victory of
the 21st, were nevertheless disposed to view the
pending arrangement as, under existing circum-
stances, an extremely prudent one. In their eyes
it was a matter of the firstmoment to deliver
Portugal Emtirely from the presence of French
troops, even though the troops thus expelled
should be immediately brought into play at sorne
other point on -the theatre of war. These persons
no more doubted, than their more sanguine com-
rades, as to the ultimate results of the campaign,
were it renewed; but they saw. in the loss. of




15G NARRATIVE OF TIIE


time which a recommencement of hostilities would
occasion, evils which not the most absolute suc-
ces s would be sufficient to compensate. Besides,
it was by no means impossible that the French, in
possession of the commanding position of Torres
Ved ras, masters of Lisbon, and having garrisons in
Elvas and Almeida, might protract the war till
reinforcements should reach them from Spain;
fol' though at the present moment their prospects
in Spain appeared clouded, no one dreamed that
the cloud would not soonel' or later be dispelled.
Then, again, winter was hard at hand; the re-
sources of the country were exhausted; and to
obtain supplies from home might not be at all
times practicable. Under aH these circumstances,
they gave their ready assent to the terms of
the convention, with this solitary exception, that
they saw no wisdom in treating with the Russian
Admiral through the medium of a French Marshal.


During the period which intervened between
the conclusion of the armistice, and the return of
the messenger who had carried a copy of the
convention to Sir Charles Cotton, an things re-
mained in a state of perfect quieto Officers of
every rank met together, indeed, in coteries, to
indulge in an occu'pation to which soldiers upon
active service are peculiarly prone, namely, spe-
culation as to the future; and couriers carne in
from time to time with despatches of greater or




PENINSULAR WA IL 157


less moment from different parts of the country.
But neither the speculations on the one hand, nor
the despatches on the other, proved worthy of
being recorded at length, though they were not
without interest at the moment, and that. too of
the highest order. Among other topics of con ver-
sation which chanced to be occasionally intro-
duced at head-quarters, it was but natural that
the probable plans of the French, after they had
cantoned their troops about Burgos, should prove
not the least attractive. On this head the gene-
ral opinion seemed to be, that they would attempt
nothing further than to keep their own ground,
till powerful reinforcements should have been sent
to them from France. Then, again, there arose
another question, namely, by the adoption of what
line of operations the British army would be best
able· to render effectual aid in their expulsion.
That we should not continue inactive in Portugal,
after it was evacuated by the French, was well
knowri; how then was it probable that we should
proceed? It was answered to this, that whatever
might be the plan s actually carried into effect,
Catalonia and the south of Spain held out nume-
rous advantages to a British force, which it could
not expect to enjoy in the Asturias or Gallicia.
The latter provinces, naturally barren and moun-
tainous, had alreadyendured the mi series of wal'
for some time; theil' forage was therefore con-




]58 N ARRATIVE 01' 'l'Hl!:


surned, and their resources exhausted. It was not
SO with Catalonia, where supplies of every kind
were represented to be abundant. and where the
people were spoken of as brave even to a proverb.
To Catalonia, therefore, it was hoped that a sepa-
rate corps rnight be despatched, even if it should
be deerned unwise to choose it for the scene
of our principal operations. N or were the present
and future condition of Portugal left unnóticed in
these social discussions. The desire of the junta
of Oporto, to transfer thither the seat of the exe-
cutive, was well known; and it was equallywell
known that the Bishop had received sorne encou-
ragernent, . even frarn British functionaries, to de-
clare hirnself the head of the governrnent; but to
thatarrangernent Sir Hew Dalryrnple .appéared
strongly opposed. He decIared hisdeterrnination
to re-establish thé regency as it had.been ap-
pointed by lhe . Prince previous to his' departure
for .the ~razils; and he expressed hirnself dissa-
tisfied with the coñduct of those persons who had
ventured, on their own responsibility, to excite a
cóntrary expectation. Then, again, there carne
despatches frorn. Castanos, stating his design of
marching direct upon Madrid, and his great an-
xiety to be inforrn~d of the expulsion of the enerny
from Portugal, and the advance ofthe British army
to co-operate withhim. But an these matters, as
has been already hinted, though full of interest at




PENINSULAR WAR. 159


the moment, possess no claim upon the attention
of the general reader now; they need not there-
for be enlarged upon.


Men's minds were wound up. to a pitch of very
considerable anxietr., when on the 26th a 1etter
from Sir Charles Cotton arrived, in which he de-
clared his decided disapprobation of that article in
the treaty, which had reference to the neutrality
of the Tagus, and the treatment of the Russian
Heet. No words can conveyan adequate idea of
the satisfaction which universally prevailed, as
soon as this most acceptable piece of intelligence
spread abroad. The French were understood,
with reference to this point, to have assumed
a tone so high, that no one entertained a doubt of
the immediate renewal of hostilities; and the ex-
pectation was certainly not diminished, when the
troops received orders to take their ground· in
marching order, at an early hom next morning.
In forty-eight hours the armistice would expire;
then would operations recommence; and so. con-
fident were all ranks that they would be resumed
in real earnest, that the following plan was openly
spoken of as on the eve of being carried into exe:-
cution.


It so happened that the Heet which contained
Sir John l\lüore and his division appeared at tbis
critical juncture in the offing.· N othing could
have occurred more opportunely; for though the




160 NARRATLVE OF THE


state of the weather was such as to render a dis-
embarkation at the instant impracticable, there
was little reason, in the month of August, to ap-
prehend a very long continuance of the gale. As
soon as the surf became moderate, the troops
would of course land; when it was understood
that they would press forward to Torres Vedras,
and occupy that important post, from which the
enemy had lately withdrawn to a fortified position
at Cabeza. In unison with this movement, Sir
Arthur Wellesley, at the head of his own corps,
was to advance by his left from Ramalhal to "Bu-
ceUas, for the purpose of turning the heights of
Cabeza, and threatening Lisbon; whilst the Por-
tuguese army would take the coast-road, and
straiten the enemy there by the occupation of
Mafra. By these arrangements, the French, it
was anticipated, would either be compelled to
fight on their strong ground, un del' the disadvan-
tage ofbeing assailed from three quarters at once;
or, in the event of their retiring upon Lisbon,
would probably be shut up there, and thell driven
at last to the necessity of surrendering at dis-
cretion. AH, however, must depend upon the
decision at which" J unot might arrive, whenever
he should be made aware of the Admiral's deter-
minatiolls; and that time might"not be needlessly
wasted, Colonel Murray, assistant quarter-master-
general, and Captain Dalrymple, military secretary




PENIl'\SULAlt WAR. 161


to the Commander-in-chief, were instantly de~
spatched to lay these determinations before him.


The hope which this sudden obstacle to the
conclusion of a treaty had for a moment excited,
was destined not to be of long continuance. Mar-
shal Junot was too well acquainted both with his
own weakness and the strength of his enemy, to
break off a negociation so favourable to- himself,
because orthe rejection of a single article; on the
contrary, he soon consented that the two admirals
should settle every question relative to the ship-
ping between thernselves, and th"e definitive treaty
was signed with as little apparent reluctance as if
no Russian fleet had lain in the Tagus. Thus, in
the short space of seventeen days, was the cam-
paign brought to a conclusion; and a kingdorn,
which previous to its cornmencernent lay, as it
were, at the feet of a conqueror, was restored most
unexpectedly to independence, and to its former
rank among the nations.


The excitement produced by these arrange-
rnents had hardly begun to subside, when new
sources of uneasiness arose. and that too in quar-
ters from which no causes of uneasiness had been
anticipated. The Portuguese, though they took
care to keep as much as possible aloof from their
allies whilst perilous attempts were to be made,
and great interests placed at issue, no sooner per-
ceived the turn which affairs had taken, than they


VOL. I. L




162 N ARRA TIVE OF TliE


chose to interfere in a manner as Httle agreeable
as, to say the trutb, it was unexpected. General
Freire, who had refused to co-operate witb Sir
Arthur Wellesley, but who, as soon as victory de~
clared for tbe English, had marcbed his trqops
towards Lisbon, visited Sir Hew Dalrymple on tbe
dayafter tbe conclusion of tbe armistiee, and de-
clared his dissatisfaction with every article in the
definitive treaty. He complained grievously of the
disrespeet shown to the Portuguese nation, as
well in the stipulation, that persons should not be
held amenable for their conduct during the recent
usurpation, as because no reference whatever was
made to tbe junta of Oporto, or to any other legis-
lative body. To tbis Sir Hew replied, tbat tbe
convention was in all its parts a military treaty, in
which no mentíon was or could be made eitber of
the Portuguese or of tbe British government; and
he further reminded Freire, that in point of faet no
government of Portugal existed. Tbe junta of
Oporto had, indeed, assumed to itself a superiority
over other juntas, and it had been, to a certain
extent, obeyed by the people of Portugal; but if
any legitimate government existed anywhere, it
must be sought for in the regeney whieh the
Prinee had appoirtted; and he took it for gTanted
that General Freire would not aeknowledge it,
adulterated as it was with Frenehmen and French
agents. He nevertheless requested tbat General




PENINSULAR WAR. '163


Freire would commit to writing all the observa-
tions which he might desire to make on the treaty
in question; and he pledged himself that the ut-
most attention would be paid to them, when the
terms of the treaty were in process of execution ..


This difficu1ty had scarcely be en got over, when
other and no less serious objections to the conven-
tion were started by the leaders of the two S pa-
nish and Portuguese corps, which at this time
blockaded the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida.
Elvas had long been kept in a state of irregular
investment by bands of armed peasants, whose
utmost exertions never went further than to poison
a well or two, where the cattle of the garrison were
accustomed to drink, and to cut off straggling par-
ties, as often as they issued from the town. Be-
fore Elvas, again, the Spanish General Galluza,
provisi<mal commandant of the army of Estrema-
dura, had seen fit to sit down; in ignorance, per-
haps, that a treaty was going on at the moment
for its surrender; but in positive contempt of or-
ders from his own superiors, which required him
to begin his march, without delay, for Castile.
The Portuguese, though, like their comrades
nearer to the capital, far from being satisfied with
the tone of the convention, were easily persuaded
to subdue their own feelings; and Almeida being
given up, the French garrison was quietly marched
under a British eseort, to Oporto. It was not




164 NAltRATIVE OE' THE


so at Elvas. When a British regiment which had
been appointed to take charge of the works ar-
rived in his camp, General Galluza positively re-
fused to permit its passing further. He insisted
that the Spanish corps under his command was
entitled to, all the privileges of a besieging army;
and he protested that the Freneh garrison should
Rot pass the ditch on any other terms, than as
prisoners of war prepared to lay down their arms.
Neither Colonel Ross, the commissioner, nor the
battalion which aUended him, coulel, of course,
compel an alteration in Galluza's sentiments; but
advice was instantly despatched to Sir Hew Dal-
rymple, who was justly incensed; and at first
declared his determination to withhold all suc-
cours from the Spaniards, and to cease aH corres-
pondence with them, if his wishes, in the present
mstance" w;ere not promptly attended to; but
being reasoned out of this resolution, Sir Hew con- '
sented that Colonel Graham should repair to EI-
vas, with fuIl powers to, coneiliate the Spanish
General. The Colonel, was, moreover, furnished
with 10,000 dollars, as a means of eaforcing his
arguments, should they be violently opposed ; and
as a last resource, he was required to proceed to
Madrid, and to lay before the Spanish government
a statement of the case. AH this was as it ought to
have been; but Sir Hew's feelings were too VIO-
lently, excited to permit him to stop here. Sir




PENINSULAR WAR. 165


John Hope's division of infantry, with two squa-
drons of cavalry, were ordered to cross the Tagus.
He was directed to move, in a rnenacing attitude,
upon Elvas; and in case things carne to the worst,
to compel, by force of arms, an adherence to the
terms of the treaty. Fortunately, for all parties;
this species of interference was not needed. The
Spaniards, convinced by Colonel Graham's weigh-
ty arguments, that no good, hut rnuch evil, must
arise, out of a breach of any compact, however
rashly or improvidently entered into, at last con- ,
sented to a:How thedeparture of the garrison with
its arms and baggage; and' the garrison accord-
ingly proceeded, as the garrison of Almeida had
done, undel' a British escort, to its place of em-
barkation.


It may not be amiss ifI recordhere the fate which
uItimately befell these detachmeúts. Wherever
they passed, on their journey from the Jorts to the
place of embarkation, they were met with the
revilings and hootings of an enraged peasantry;
nor was it without the utmost difficulty that they
were preserved from fue violence with which they
were threatened. By great exertions, however,
on the part of the escort, they were at length con~
ducted to their vessels; but the troops from AI-
meida, ordered to take shipping at Oporto, had
not yet weighed anchor, when an accident occurred,
which had well nigh pro ved fatal to them. In




166 N ARRA TIVE Ol!' TI-lE


moving a military chest on board one·of the trans·
ports, it fell to the ground, and búrsting open,
sorne church.plate rolled out. There was now no
arresting the fury of the populace. The ships
were instantly boarded, the French disarmed, theír
baggage taken on shore, examined, and plundered;
and when it became apparent that, under the head
of prívate property, the pillage of the most sacred
edifices in the kingdom was about to be conveyed
away, the lives of the whole detachment were
placed in irnrninent danger. At last, however, the
native authorities, aided by such British officers as
happened to be at hand, prevailed upon the people
to abstain from personal violence; but to tal k any
longer of the safe departure of these detachments,
would have been useless. They were disarmed,
to the number of fourteen hundred, and treated as.
prisoners of war.


In the mean while, one division of the British
army, under the command of Lieutenant-general
Sir John Rope, moved into Lisbon, and took pos-
session oí the different barracks, and of the castle.
Shouts and blessings greeted them as they passed
along; whilst persons of every rank, from the
fidalgo down to the beggar, vied with one another
in protestations of gratitude and affection. The
windows were filled with females, who showered
down flowers upon the soldiers' heads, and waved
their handkerchiefs in token oí amity; whilst the




PEN1NSULAR W AR. 167


men thronged the sides of the streets, and made
the air ring with their cries, "Long live the Eng-
lish!" "Death to the FreÍlch!" But the most
gratifying spectade of aH, whic.h met us on the
present occasion, was exhibited on the following
morning; when to the Spanish corps, which had
hitherto be en detained' as prisoners in the hulks,
not their liberty only. but their arms and accou-
trements were restored.


To render the ceremony as imposing as pos-
sible, it was determined that' it should take place
in public, and announcements of what was about
to be done were everywhere circulated. Great
crowds were accordingly drawn together on the
morning appointed, when the Spaniards, in num-
ber about four thousand, assembled in a large
open spa.ce· called the Campo d 'Ourique, and
forming a hollow square, with their generals and
other officers in the centre, awaited the result.·
They were not kept long in suspense, ere General
Beresford, to whom the arrangement of the cere-
mony had been intrusted, followed by a large con-
course of Britishofficers, made his appearance.
Instantly General Beresford, having passed along
the line, and saluted first the General and after-
wards the whole corps, presented to the former,
with gr-eat grace and dignity an elegant sword,
and in an animated speech requested that the
latter would again accept their arms from the




168 NAltRATlVf: OF THE


King of England, never to lay them down till the
cause of Ferdinand VII., of Europe, and of hu-
manity, had triumphed. This address;which was
forcibly and well delivered, had not yet come to
a close, when it was drowned in the reiterated
vivas of soldiers and inhabitants; whilst the roar
of cannon, and the braying of trumpets, echoed
from oneend of Lisbon to another. When the
tumult had in part subsided, the Spanish General
hastened to make his reply. He spoke evidently
under the influence of strong feeling, and every
sentence which fell from him gave testimony, that
what he did speak, was spoken without premedi-
tation; buí his speech possessed all the fire which
the circumstances under which it was delivered
were calculated to excite. He then addressed his
men in the language of genuine patriotism; ex-
horted them never to forget the events of this
glorious day; ahd ended by declaring that, when-
ever the people of the Peninsula should cease to
bear towards England the love and reverence
which were due froID the oppressed to their de-
liverers, they would prove themselves unworthy
of a better fate than that which, but for English
interference, would have befaUen them. Finally,
the troopsmarched past, and the business of the
morning was concluded by a grand dijeúné a la


Jou,rchette, at which the Spanish officers became so
intoxicated with wine and joy, as to dance waltzes,




PEKI~SULAR "'AIt. 169


fandangos, &c. in their boots, swords, and com-
plete field-equipment.


The rejoicings having ended, it became a ques-
tion of considerable moment how these troops
were to be disposed of. Destitute as they were
of money, and of almost every article necessary to
their efficiency, it was quite evident that they
could proceed nowhere in a body, nor act to any
purpose, unless the means of moving and acting
were advanced from the funds of the British
army; and the Commander-in-chief seemed to
entertain serious doubts, whether his instructions
authorised him to make such advance. After a
good deal of discussion, however, he was at length
prevailed upon to &upply them with 20,000 dol-
lars, in addition to a certain number of days' pay,
and complete supplies oí arms, ammunition, and
hor~es; and then thequestion as to their ultimate
disposal was resumed. The first idea on that
head was, tbat it would be advisable to march
them off in the direction of Badajoz; because,
being composed principally of detachments froro
different regiments, O) which the main bodies
were understood to be in the neighbourhood of
that place, they might be enabled, when there, to
join each its respective battalion. Preparations
were accordingly begun with this view; but be-
fore they were completed, there arrived from
Catalonia two deputies, whose representations




170 NARRATIVE OF THE


caused an immediate change in the plans. These
strongly pressed upon Sir Hew the necessity of
sending troops of all arms, but more particularly
cavalry, into their province. They stated that
the Catalonian arrny amounted to forty thousand
men, which, though miserably supplied with
eq uiprnents of every kind, were, nevertheless,
able to cope with the enemy arnong the moun-
tains; but that in the plains and level country,
owing to the presence of five or six hundred
French cavalry, they could not venture to show
themselves. Under these circurnstances, they
besought the British General to send round by
sea a corps of one thousand horse and ten thou-
sand foot, the arriva! of which would, they were
assured, occasion· an immediate rising throughout
the whole province, particularly in Barcelona and
other large towns, where nothing but the presence
of an overwhelming force kept the people in sub-
jection to the French yoke. There was a good
deal of justice in the remarks of these deputies;
nor, perhaps, would it have been an unwise thing,
had Sir Hew Dalrymple obeyed their councils;
but to do this he hárdly felt himself authorised.
The Spanish corps, however, being absolutely at
his own disposal, he could employ it at any point,
and on any service, which to hirnself might ap-
pear most desirable; and he instanUy placed it in
the hands of theCatalonian deputies. It was




PENINSULAR W AIt. 171


embarked in a few hours afterwards, and set sail
for Catalonia.


AH this while arrangements were busily making
for the transportation of the Fre.nch troops to their
own country. Whilst the few garrisons which
they had scattered through the interior, received
instructions to march upon Oporto, the main body,
including the corps which had occupied the castle
of Lisbon, and the forts at tbe moutb of tbe Tagus,
assembled in one Gamp, and made ready to em-
bark as soon as tbe sbips were cleared out for
tbem. Much discussion, however, and many dif-
ficulties arose, as to the construction whích each
party desired to put upon those articles in the con-
vention of Cintra, which had reference to the pri-
vate baggage of the army. The Portuguese were
naturaIly anxious that the men who had plun-
dered their churches, museums, and even their
dweIlings, should not be permítted to carry away
that plunder under the head of prívate property;
whilst the French protested violently against any
search being made, or any inquiríes instituted into
the contents of their trunks or store-rooms. It
was no easy matter for the British General to steer
a proper course in such circumstances, keeping, as
he desired, a striet regard to the sacredness of his
own promises. On the one hand, he could not but
feel, that wbatever might, be the words of the




-172 NARRATIVE OF 'rHE


treaty, its spirit was not such as to sanction the
numerous acts of peculationand robbery of which
the French might have been guilty; and he took
care to state this with great distinctness to Mar-
shal J unot. On the other hand, he saw that in
many cases of alleged plunder it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to iden-
tify the property said to have beeo stolen. Thus
embarrassed, he took the only judicious step which
it was in his power to take. A committee of ill-
quiry was appointed, before which all claims might
be brought; and the quantity of goods restored
by its decisions to the rightful owners was im-
mense.


Before dismissing the subject of Cintra alto-
gether, 1 consider it right, without at all desiring
to discuss the wisdom or impolicy of the arrange-
ment in question, to lay before the readeran out-
line of the impression produced in England by the
first intelligence of the convention, which was
communicated to me in the following extraet of a
letter :-


" The tumult of our joy on Wellesley's glorious
eonduct and successes has been cruelIy disturbed
by a communication of a supposed conventioo, the
operations of which instrument would, if carried
iato effect, secure to the French advantages be-
yond their reach, under the most brilliant success;




PENINSULAR WAR. 173


whilst their ten thousand men are now pressed
upon by. not less than thirty to forty thousand
men, British and Portuguese.


"In the first place, it is a .recognition, on the
face of the instrument, of Buonaparte as emperor
of the French.


"2ndly. It provides for the safe' retreat of an
enemy's corps, destitute of all other means of
escape.


o< 3rdly. It give.s France the entire. grace of
saving for Russia her Heet, whilst in truth she had
not a remnant of power left to pratect it.


"4thly. It makes a gratuitous sacrifice oí the
Heet of an enemy, and in the manner of doing it,
recognises rights of neutrality on the part of Por-
tugal towards Russia, which, if they could have
ever subsisted for a moment in a port occupied by
a French army, were destroyed, even in pretence,
by the formal appointment of J unot as Buona-
parte's Lieutenant of Portugal, andentails upon
us all the encumbrance of watching, witb a Heet,
a port of our own~ whilst we must give the enemy
forty-eight hours' start of us, lest we should catch
him.


"5thly. It gives France not only the immediate
use of her army, which, without an active assist-
ance, she could not have, but givesher also the
plunder of Portugal, under the mask of private
property.




174 NARRATIVE OF THE


" 6thly. Jt gives Franee all the graee of having
protected those Portuguese who have betrayed
their sovereign, whilst it entails upon us th~ dis-
graee of exposing our alIies to be attaeked here-
after by a fleet whieh Franee has had the authority
and means to proteet. Will Spain or Europe
believe that this was preceded by triumphs on our
part? and will not Franee be convineed of the
reverse?


"7thly. It lastly appears in its general result to
be a happy eontrivanee, by which England shall
have made a mighty effort, for no other purpose
than making a dependent state the protector of
one of its enemies, whilst it beeomes itself the in.,.
strument by which the other shall remove an arrny
from a position in which it is tost to one in which it
may recommenee ita operations with advantage."


At length the provisioning and storing of the
transports being complete, the Freneh army began
its embarkation. It took place in three divisions;
the first being protected by the two last, as they
again were covered by the British troops; and
before the middle oí September the whole had
c1eared the Tagus. The Russian fleet, likewise,
in accordance with the arrangernent entered into
between Sir Charles 'Cotton and Admiral Siniavin,
was taken possession of by the British navy; and
the seamen being sent baek to their own shores, the
ships were forthwith removed to England.They




PENINSULAR W.AR. 175


were conveyed thither, however, not as prizes, in
the strict sense of that term, but rather as a depo-
sit, the British government engaging to restore
them within six months after a. general pacifiea-
tion. Still it was a matter of no little moment to
render them for the time innoeuous ; and as Russia
already began to manifest symptoms of a desire to
break off her connexion with Franee, it would not,
perhaps, have been produetive of any additional
benefit, had they been absolutely and entirely
transferred to the English service.




176 NARHATIVE 0.1<' THL


CHAPTER VII.


Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir A rthur Wellesley re-
turns to EDgland on leave-Sir Rarry Burrard resigns' the
command to Sir John Moore-Preparations for an advance
into Spain-March through A lentejo-Villa Vicosa -March
to Elvas-Elvas, Badajoz-Difference of character between
the Spaniards and Portuguese-Colonel Lopez recei ves de-
spatches from Castanos-Merida-Its antiquities-State of
agriculture in its vicinity.


THE events which 1 have endeavo.ured to. reco.rd in
the last chapter were still in pro.gress, when a Ya-
riety o.f changes in the arrangement o.f the British
army to.o.k place, so.me o.f which were o.f the
greatest mo.ment. In the first place, Sir Hew
Dalrymple was recalled, and under circumstances
which sufficieI?-tIy implied that the co.untry was
no.t satisfied with the resuIt o.f the two. late victo.-
ries. Sir Arthur Wellesley, likewise, to. the sin-
cere regret o.f every Englishman in Po.rtugal,
departed upon leave o.f absence; and his example




PENINSULAR '" AR. 177


'was foJJowed by many other officers of all ranks.
The command accordingly devolved upon Sir
Harry Burrard; but to what use it would be
turned, no one appeared to know.. AH at on~e our
preparations and warlike declarations ceased:
there was no longer the fa¡ntest whisper of a move-
ment; and we gave ourselves up entirely, or at
least we appeared to give ourselves up, to the
amusements and dissipation of Lisboa.


A state of things such as this could not, how-
ever, be of long continv.ance. Rumours began
gradually to spread themselves, that Sir Harry's
sojourn with the army would be brief, and that,
as 500n as he saw fit to return to England, an
active campaign WQuld be opened. These ru-
mours werenot raised upon false grounds. Sir
Harry's constitution Was incapable of bearing up
against the fatigues and privations of active ser-
vice; he therefore applied for leave of absence.
and obtaiJ.?ed it; and the command then devolved
upon one, whom, next to Sir Arthur Wellesley.
the troops most respected and loved-Lieutenant-
general Sir J ohn Moore. It would be no easy
matter to describe, either the satisfaction which
all appeared to experience when these arrange-
ments became known, or the state of bustle and
activity which every department at once assumed.
An advance into Spain was now openly talkedof;


VOL. 1. 1II




178 N ARRATIVE OF TIiE


and everything seemed to imply that it would com-
menee ímmediately,


1 have stated, in one of the introductory chap-
ters, that assoon as intelligence of Dupont's cap-
ture reached Madrid, JoseplÍ made ready for a
hastyabandonment of his new capital. He had
enacted the part ~f royalty only two short days,
when he found it necessary to lay his power aside,
and to fall back from the stage on which he had
begun to perform it. The whole of the detach-
ments scattered through the northern and eastern
provinces were caBed in. Garrisons were, indeed,
thrown into some of the strong-holds, sufficiently
nJ.lmerous to man the works, and a post was here
and there established, merely for the purpose of
watching the Spaniards, and giving notice of their
movements; but the main body, amounting in
aH to about forty-five or fifty thousand men, con-
centrated in N avarre and Biscay. Here a position
was taken up, with the right resting upon Sto
Sebastian, the centre at Vittoria, and the left thrown
back as far as Pampluna; and here they seemed
disposed to await the arrival of those :ceinforce-
ments, which in great numbers were stated to be
moving through France.


Whilst the aboye was pretty accurately known
to be the disposition of the enemy, we were given
to understand that there were in arms, il} the As-




"PENINSULAR WAR. 179


turias and in Gallicia, sixty thousand Spaniards
undel' Blake and Romana. Two large armies,
independently of this, were stated to have formed ;
one, in the immediate front oC the French, the
other upon their left flank; at the head of the last
of which was Castanos. The very best spirit was
said to prevail inall quarters of Spain; every
Spaniard was, 01' was disposed tobe, a soldier;
there was therefore nothing to be apprehended by
US, let us enter the country when we might. It
was even asserted that, unless we made good
haste, there would be nothing left for us to effect;
since it seemed in the highest degree probable,
that before we should be able to arrive at the scene
of action, the French would be everywhere driven
across the Pyrenees. Such were the· cheering
communjcations which poured iti upon us, not
only 'from the Spaniards themselves, but from
sorne of our OWll functionaries; andit was with
hopes naturally elated to the highest pitch that
we looked forward to the prospect before uso


We were not left long in astate of uncertainty.
On the 6th of October, General Moore received an.
oflicial despatch, informing him that bis Majesty
had been graciously pleased to intrust him with
the chief command of an arrny, in tended to eo-
operate with the forces of S pain in the expulsion
of the French from the Peninsula. The army in
question was to consist of not less than forty




180 N ARRA TIVB OF THE


thousand men, namely, of thirty thousand in-
fantry, five thousand cavalry, and artillery and
engineers in proportion. Towards making up this
force, the army in Portugal was to furnish twenty
thousand men, including two regiments of cavalry,
the 18th, and King's German regiment of hussars;
whilst a corps of fifteen thousand men, under
Lieutenant-general Sir David Baird, was to em-
bark immediately at Falmouth for the harbour of
Corunna. Sir John Moore was further informed
that a scene of action had been already planned
out for him in the north of Spain, though it was
left to his own judgt11ent to name a point of ren-
dezvous on this side of it for the assembling of his
troops. He was likewise expressly enjoined to
move the cavalry by land; but his infantry and
artillery he might either despatch by sea, or
march across the country, as should to himself
appear most expediento Finally, he was in-
structed to pay to the feelings and prejudices of
his allies every attention; to preserve the strictest
discipline among his men; and to keep his divi-
sions, as fal' as might be practicable, together,
that they might act, at aU times, in one body, and
as a field army .. It was added that, from the
Spanish authorities and people, he might expect
the most friendly reception, and the l'eadiest com-
pliance with his wishes; whilst, in case of any
unlooked-for difficulties which it might be essen-




PENINSULAR W AR. 181


tial to remove, he was recommended to commu-
nicate directly both with the government at home,
and with the English minister resident at the 8eat
of the central junta.


Immediately on the receipt of this communica-
tion, Sir John Moore set himself actively and
seriously to prepare for a fuIl accomplishment of
the wishes of his government. After mature de-
liberation, he determined that it would not be
advisable to move any part of the army by sea,
but that the whole, infantry and artillery as well
as cavalry, should proceed by land. As, however,
the roads through Portugal were represented to
be extremely bad, and as no magazines or depots
of provisions had be en established, he resolved to
advance, not by one route, but by three; and to
unite his columns with that of Sir David Baird
at Salamanca. But to move beyond the frontiers
of Portugal, unprovided as we were with draft
cattle, and having no depots of any kind, was im-
possible. Though, therefore, the troops were put
in motion so early as the 13th, it was fully under-
stood that the campaign would not be opened
before November; and even then, from the aspect
of things immediately about us, from the inex-
perience of our own commissariat, and the supine-
ness of the Portuguese, it was extremely doubt-
fuI whether anything could be done to the purpose.


The hussar brigade, of which 1 was put in com-




182 ~ARRATlVE 01' TUE


mand, received instructions to assemble at Vill~
Vicosa, a- town distant twenty-eight leagues from
Lisbon, and consequently at no great distance
from the frontier. We began our march far this
purpose on the 18th of October, and taking it by
easy stages, arrived at our mustering place on the
24th. Here the information was communicated
to us, that whenever the moment of further ad-
vance should arrive, the whole army was to pro-
ceed in four columns; one under the command of
General Paget, by Elvas and Alcantara; one
under Beresford, by Coimbra and Almeida; one
under Frazer, by Abrantes and Almeida; and a
fourth under Hope, by Elvas, Badajoz, Merida,
Med'ellin, Truxillo, Almanza, Oropesa, and Tala-
vera de la Reyna,_ towa-rds Madrid. To the latter
column, which was to consist chiefiy-of artillery,
with four regiments of infantry to escort it, we
were attached.


In passing through the Alentejo, nothing oc-
curre€! to ourselves particularIy deserving of re-
cord. We found the country, indeed, in a state
of miserable destitu tion ;.~ flelds unsown, and ham-
lets ruined and deserted; whilst it was not with-
out great exer.tion~ and a serious waste of time,
that with all the previous arrangements which had
been entered into, we found it practicable to pro-
eure sufficient food either for men or horses; but
we met with no adventures, by the way, nor be-




PENINSULAR WAR • 183


. held any objects which had a peculiar claim upon
our attention. With such spectacles constantly
before the eye, it was impossible not to indulge in
a few idle surmises, as to what must have been the
fate ofthe French army, had it attempted to make
good its retreat in this direction. The French are,
unquestionably, a hardy and enduring race of
men; they exceJ, moreover, in the art of disco-
vering and bringing to account every morsel of
nutritious matter which may liein the direction of
their movements; but it appeared as if all their
ingenuity, and aJ] their patience, would have farled
in carrying thero safely through the Alentejo.
There was literally nothing left for them to con-
sume. But the difficulty of procuring subsistence
would not have been the only obstacle against
which they must have contended. The very
name of a Frenchman was, in that part of the


, country, a thing to be abhorred; the peasantry
were all ready to faH upon their stragglers;
whilst the Spanish army before Elvas, formidable
at least in numbers, would have stood seriously in
the way of troops disheartened bydefeat, and
broken down with fatigue and hunger. How
sincerely we all regretted that the convention
should have interfered to prevent a consummation
so devoutly to be wished!


Though our marches had been short, and nei-
ther men nor horses seemed at all distressed on




184 NAltR~'rrYE 01' THE


their arrival, we had not occupied Villa Vicosa
two days, when symptoms of dysentery began to
show themselves amongst uso The weather, too,
soon began to break, and the rain carne down with
such violence, as to induce an apprehension that
the wet season had actually set in. These would
not have be en very gratifying occurrences at any
moment; but at a moment like the present they
were peculiarIy distressing. N othing, however,
remained, except to make the best of them. To
the sick every possible attention was paid; and as
the disease proved, by good fortune, not to be
violent of its kind, the labours of the medical
officers were rewarded by their speedy convales-
cence. N or did the weather continue, as we had
begun to apprehend that it would, obstinately
unpropitious. On the contrary, after two days of
incessant rain, the clouds dispersed; and by the
3rd of N ovem ber every appearance in the sky
promised a long continuance of sunshine and
drought.


The whole of Sir John Hope's corps having by
this time assembled, and every other arrangement
being complete, on the 5th of N ovember we began
our march towards Spain. At first, neither the


. aspect of the country, nor the manners of the
natives, differed very materially from those which
had met us in our way hither; for we were still a
couple of days' march from the frontier, and the




PENINSULAR WAR. ]85


Portuguese, more than perhaps any other people,
carry their own peculiar manners to the extreme
line of their country. But the close of our journey
presented us with much both to interest and
amuse. We halted on the 5th at Elvas; and as
we carne in at an early hour of the day, such as
felt disposed were enabled to take an accurate sur-
vey of that highly-striking place.


The first object which here attracts the notice
of a stranger, is a magnificent aqueduct, measur-


. ing in altitude no less than one thousand feet. It
rests upon three or four arches, raised one aboye
the other, and is composed entirely of a rernark-
ably fine and polished stone. In length it mea-
sures about three miles, and it conveys aH the
water which is used in tbe place, to a. cistern of
such dimensions, as to be capable of contaiping a
suffieient supply for the inhabitants during six
rnonths. Of tbe town itself, it may be sufficient to
state that the streets are generally handsome,-
the houses being an built with stone, and ex-
tremely neat in their appearance; but though sur-
rounded by a wall, it is nota place of .any great
strength .. It lies, indeed, atthe foot of Fort La
Lippe, and consequently at its mercy; and it is
commandedby other heights, which overlook it
from various quarters.


Of Fort La Lippe, it would be no easy task to
convey to. the mind of the reader an accurate no-




186 NARRATlVE OF 'fHE


tion, unless some exact plan or drawing were sub-
mitted to him. It stand s upon the very summit
of a steep and commanding eminence, and over-
hangs the left ofthe town; the military occupation
of which is thus rendered totally impracticable,
llnless the fort shall have been previously reduced.
It appeared to me to be a chef-d'reuvre in the
science of fortification; and to consist of five
principal angles, or rather bastions, each covered by
batteries formed into smaller bastions, in tiers,
one aboye another, which gradually recede towards
the centre of the fort. From the highest of these
you command a view of the whole country for
many miles round, and they aH commul1icate with
oue another,-all, at least, which possess the same
degree of elevation by strongly casemated pas-
sages. The fo1't is abundantIy supplied with
reservoirs for water; and furnaces for heating shot
are erected in all the most convenient places; in a
word, nothing appears to have been omitted which
the knowledge of its founder could suggest as cal-
culated to place it beyond the reach of insulto


The only height, within a moderate distance of
the place, upon which, in case of a siege, it would
be possible to construct a breaching battery, stands
in a line almost di1'ectly opposite to the angle
which faces the north. It was upon this hill that
the Spaniards threw up works during the late in-
vestment, whell they were so unwilling to permit




PENINSULAR W AR. 187


the carrying into execution of OUt convention ; and
from it they contrived to throw a few shells into
the fort. But little or no damage was done;
nothing, at least, in any degree likely to affect the
issues of the siege. Yet, trifling as the damage
was, the Portuguese had not taken the trouble to
repair it: indeed, it was melancholy to see how
completely the nrttional indolence prevailed here.
Everything was, as far as it could be, out of order;
and it seemed as if the weather alone would shortly
lay in ruins. a work, which, if there were no other
or more powerful motives to preserve it, deserved
to be kept up as a mere specimenof the arto


Having halted at Elvas during the night, we
marched next morning soon after dawn; and
passing through a plaiu of considerable extent,
crossed the Guadiana at Badajoz, the capital of
Estremadura. This movement introduced us at
once into Spain; and the contrast which was in-
stantly presented to us, both in personal appear-
ance and in manners, between the people of the
two nations, 1 shall not readily forget. Generally
speaking, the natives 'of frontier districts partake
almost as much of the character of one nation as
of another; the distinctions between them become,
as it were, gradually blended, till they totally dis-
appear. It is not so on the borders of Spain and
Portugal. The peasant who cultivates his little
field, or tends his flock on the right bank of the




188 NARRATIVE OF 'I'HE


Guadiana, is, in aH his habits and notions, a differ-
ent beillg from the peasant who pursues similar
occupations on its left bank; the first is a genuine
Portuguese, the last a genuine Spaniard. N or are
they more alike to each other in their amities
than in their manners. They cordially detest one
another; insomuch, that their common wrongs,
and their cornmon enmity to the French, were
not sufficient, even at this time, to eradicate the
feeling.


It was not, however, by the striking diversity of
private character alone which subsisted between
them, that we were made sensible, as soou as we had
passed the Guadiana, that a new nation was before
us. The Spaniards received us with a degree ofin-
difference to which we had not hitherto been ac-
customed. They were certainly not uncivil ; they
poured no execrations upon us, nor did they
hoot or rudely annoy us; but they gave t.hemselves
no trouble to evince to US, in any way, their sa-
tisfaction at our arriva!. Whatever we required
they gave us, in return for our money; but as to
enthusiasm, or a desire to anticipate our wants,
there was not the shadow of an appearance of any-
thing of the kind about them. How differeilt all
this from the poor Portuguese, who never failed to
rend the air with their vivas, and were at aH times
fuU of promises and protestations, no ma.tter how
illcapable they might be of fulfilling the one, or




PENINSULAR WAR. 189


authenticating the other! The truth is, that tbe
Spaniard is a proud, independent, and grave per-
sonage; possessing many excellent qualities, but
quite conscious of their existente, and not unapt
to overrate them. On the present occasion, too,
they seemed to be more than or~inarily self-im-
portant, in eonsequence of their late achievements ;
they were quick to take offence, even where none
was intended, and not indisposed to provoke, or
engage in broils with our soldiers. Not that any
serious disturbance oecurred during our stay; the
discipline preserved in our own ránks was too


- good to permit it; but numberless little ineidents
were continual1y taking place, which served stlffi·
eiently to make us aware of the spirit wmch ae-
tuated the natives. Yet with all this. there was
much about the air and manner of the Spaniards
to deserve and eommand our regard. The Portu-
guese are a people that require rousing; theyare
¡ndolent, ]azy, and generally helpless: we may
value these our faithful allies, and render íhem
useful; but it ls impossible highly to respeet
them. In the Spanish eharacter, on the contrary,
there is mixed up with a great deal of haughtiness,
a sort of manIy independence of spirit, which you
eannot but admire, even though aware that it will
render them by many degrees less favorable to
your wishes than their neighbours.


Badajoz is a fine old town, situated on a lofty




190 NARRATIVE OF THE


eminence, which overhangs the Guadiana on its
southern bank. The fortifications were then in
a state oí tolerable r.epair;. and a tete-de-pont,
and a fort on the opposite side of the river, gave
indication that, in the wars between Spain and
Portugal, it ha~ been regarded as a place of sorne
importance. During my sojourn here, 1 met an
old acquaintance, in the person of Colonel Lopez,
an officer who had been sent forward by the
Spanish government, to assist in clearing the way
for our entrance into the country; and who had
delayed his journey back, that he might with
his own eyes see that proper accommodations
were furnished to the troops in their passage.
Colonel Lopez had just received despatches from
the army of General Castanos, which bore date
the 30th of Odober. He declined submitting
them for my perusal; but he acquainted me that
Castanos had narrowly escaped being made pri-
soner when executing a recognizance into the dis-
position of the French corps. His head-quarters
being at Logrono, he had ridden into Lodosa,
where a Spanish light battalion was stationed;
when the French, by a sudden movement across
the Ebro, contrived to surround both him and his
escort. Castanos himself escaped; but the bat-
talion, after a brave resistance of two days, during
which their ammunition became wholly exhausted,
were obliged to surrender. The same officer




PENINSULAR WAR. 191


described the position of the French, army, in the
terms in which 1 have detailed it at the beginning
of this chapter. He stated that it was Castanos's
intention to cross the Ebro at Tudela, to form a
junction with Palafox, and to penetrate into the
rear of the enemy; whilst Blake's corps should
hang upon their left, and observe Vittoria. These
were highly interesting and gratifying communi-
cations; unhappily a very few days sufficed to
bring proof that they rested upon no solid founda-
tion.


From Badajoz the column departed on the 7th,
reaching Talavera la Real that night; and on the
following day it carne into Merida. Between
these two extreme points the country is almost
entirely one continued plain; clear and open, and
admirable for the operations of cavalry. The ac-
commodations which we met with by thé way
were moreover such as we had no cause to com-
plain of. In the different towns, aH persons who
happened to possess stables, freely threw them
open, and took in both men and horses in num-
bers proportioned to the extent of these and of
their dweHings; whilst the alcaldes had invariably
men in readiness to eonduct the soldiers to their
quarters, and to colleet, at convenient points,
forage, bread, meat, and wine, ready for delivery.
Everything was done with the most perfeet regard
to order and precision; and though the marches




192 NARRATIVE OF THE


were gene rally severe, varying from twenty-eight
to thirty English miles per day, still, as the horses
were well fed upon barley and straw, there ap-
peared no reason to apprehend that they would
not be brought ¡nto the fleld in as good condition
as could be wished., And at Merida it may with
truth be asserted, that the hussars were in no
respect less efficient than when they first landed
at Cascais.


Merida is a handsome old town, full of relics,
not a few of which it owes to the skill and in-
dustry of the Romans. There are the remains of
what must have been a splendid triumpbal arch,
an amphitheatre, several statues, columns, and
old walls, all well worth the attention of the anti-
quary; and there is a bridge across tbe Guadiana,
which the inhabitants allege to have been built by .
direction of the emperor Trajan. Nor is it the
antiquary only who would find much to ¡nterest
and amuse him here. The agriculturist might see
in the province, generally, much which he has
never seen before-ploughs at work, each of them
drawn by a single ass or mule, and guided by a
single hand; and yet, in spite of the lightness of
the soil, crops produced, such as neither Kent nor
N orfolk will exceed. Then again there is the
breed of sheep, so justly celebrated for ¡ts wool, to
be found hefe in perfection, with pigs of the most
beautiful and perfect breed. There are no milch




PENINSULAR W AR. 193


COWS here, goat's milk being alone In use, and
that extremely scarce and difficuit to be had; but
the breed of draft cattle is remarkably fine. The
beef, likewise, is excellent; bU,t that which an
Englishman enjoys aboye all the other produc-
tions of the country, is the bread. The poorest
peasants here eat bread of the purest and whitest
flour, which they generally twist up into a sort of
ring, and knead and bake with the utmost careo
lt is really delicious, and it appeared doubly 80 to
us, who for so many weeks back had eaten nothing
but the sour and unwholesome loaves of Portugal.


VOL. J. N




194 NARHATIVE 01" 'fHE


CHAPTER VIII.


Advance towards Madrid-Rumours of Blake's defeat-Ar-
rival at N aval-camero-Madrid; the state of public feeling
there-)Vant of energy in the 8p'mish government, exhausted
state of the treasury, aRd miserable plight of the armies-
Movementof General Hope's corps upon 8alamanca-
Fears lest it should be cut off-Causes of them-Overthrow
of the 8panish armies, commanded by Blake, Belvedere,
andCastanos-A French corps at Valladolid-8kirmish at
Amvola-Rumour of General Baird's retreat-Refiections
on the conduct of the war.


HA VING passed the night in Merida, with very
considerable comfort to ourselves, we prepared to
renew our journey on the following morning.Pre-
vious to our setting out, however, two pieces of
intelligence reached us, neither of which had any
tendency to increase the feeling of satisfaction that
attended us on our' arriva1. In the first place, we
were given to understand that, as we proceeded
onwards, though we should find at least as good,
if not a better, disposition among the people, the




PENINSULAR WAR. 195


fare and general accommodations furnished, would
greatIy deteriorate. The country was represented
as naturally more sterile, and its rneans, scanty at
the best, were said to be quite ,exhausted during
the recent struggle. In the next place, and this
was a piece of news much more alarming, a report
got into circulation, that Blake had sustained a
serious defeat in Bi~cay, and had retreated, no one
knew whither, with the 10ss of three thqusand
rnen.The reinforcernents, likewise, to the French
army, of which we had heard somethirig previous
to our advance from Portugal, were stated to have
arrived; and their numbers were estimated at
sixty thousand infantry, and from five to seven thou-
sand cavalry. AH this was startling enough, but as
yet there were no authentic sources to which it
could be traced back; and as evils are usually
exaggerated, we , willingly believed that rnuch
exaggeration might have been employed on the
present occasion. At all events, our course was a
very simple one; we had only to follow our in-
structions, and move in the direction' of Madrid.


In the expectations which we had been led to
form respecting the receptionand entertainment
that awaited us, we were not disappointed. The
people, though supine, were remarkably civil;
whilst the treatment which we received from them,
if in sorne respects less agreeable than that which
we had hitherto experienced, was still as generous




196 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


as we had any reason to 100k for at their hands.
They gave us freely whatever they themselves
possessed, and we had no right to demand more.
We accordingly pllshed on in good order and in
excellent spirits, and passing through Medellin,
Miajadas, Truxillo, J araicejo, Almaraz, N avalmo-
ral, Talavera del Reyno, and St. Ollalo, at each of
which a night was spent, we reached, at last, a
temporary halting place, in the town of N aval-
carnero. As this place was distant from Madrid
not more than twenty miles, 1 determined to quit
the brigade for a couple of days, for the purpose
of visiting that city; and it may not, perhaps,
prove uninteresting to the reader if 1 lay before
him a sketch of the condition, military and poli-
tical, in which 1 found it.


The first person whom 1 made it my business to
see was Lord William Bentinck, at that time offi-
cially resident in Madrid, and in attendance upon
the supreme government. 1 found him discon-
certed, in no ordinary degree, at the manner in
which all things were conducted. The junta, it
appeared, did nothing, or rather it was doing
everything which Buonaparte could have desired.
There was neither energy nor decision in the
councils of the government-there was no money
in the treasury-stores of every kind were want-
ing; and anarchy and misrule seemed to prevail
in every department. Morla was at this time




PENINSULAR WAIL 197


secretary to the committee for the management of
military affairs; and MorIa was known to be an
able, as he was then believed to be an honourable
man; but the managing committee itself was
made up of men, as ignorant as they were credu-
lous. In their meetings there was abundance of
cabal and party spirit, but neither talent nor infor-
mation. Such were the accounts which Lord
William gave of the Spaniards; whilst of our own
situation he drew no more flattering picture. He
was himself totally in the dark, and he beIieved
that others were equally so, touching the amount
and situation of the French army; he knew onIy
that they were rapidly advancing, and in great
force; but where they were now, or whither they
might move hereafter, he was completely ignorant.
So much, indeed, was he struck with the absence
of aU vigour in the conduct of the Spanish autho-
rities, that he already appeared to regard the
game as desperate. Our columns might, he con-
ceived, effect their junction at Salamanca; it was
evenprobable, from the accounts which had re-
cently reached him, ihat they would; but it was
by no means impossible that the enemy might
succeed in throwing a strong corps in the way of
that junction; for there were no Spaniards up in
a state to oppose them.


These were certainly not the most acceptable
communications which might have been made,




198 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


particularly to one who was already aware of the
somewhat sombre temperament of his own leader.
Sir J ohn Moore was a most excellent but cautious
man; too much so perhaps to give his own abili-
ties a free scope, or to do himself justice in the
cause in which he had embarked : he had set
out with the avowed determination of acting -only
in conjunction with the Spanish armies; and he
would not move at all tiU the whole of his force
should beassembled. Now, if there could be
one truth more self-evident than another in the
existing state of affairs, it was this, that to look·
for any adequate support from the Spaniards till
he should have more decidedlyentered upon his
great enterprise, was useless; the q uestion there-
fore was, would he, when at the head of thirty
thousand British troops, including a brilliant,
fresh, and most efficient cavalry, abstain from
striking a bJow? There was too much reason to
apprehend that he would; though the army ap-
peared to feel that now was the time to strike, or
nevero It is true that Buonaparte in person was
stated to be either at Burgos or Vittoria, and that
large masses, bothof infantry and cavalry, were on
their march to join him; but the force imme-
diately up was represented as not exceeding that
under Sir John: why not endeavour to bring him
to action ?


On the other hand, the junta appeared to be in




PENINSULAR W A R. 199


a state of the most pitiable alarm, lest Madri.d
should again faH into the hands of the enemy.
They peste red General Moore with daily requests,
that, in case of any reverse, he should fall back, not
upon Portugal, or towards the north, but upon the
capital; and they were particularly desirous that
General Hope's corps might be detac~ed altoge-
ther; and assist in the defence of the city. For
they declared their determination to accept of no
terms; and to' make'no submission to the 'invaders.
Madrid, they affirmed, should be' a second Sara-
goza; and if any judgment could be formed from
the display of enthusiasm exhibited by the lowf>f
orders, it required but a moderate share of ability
and good faith on the partof their chiefs to realise
the boast.


1 have said that the situation of affairs in gene-
ral, as these' at least were represented, deIIlanded
a decisive line' of conduct from Sir John Moore;
and that, upon every principIe ofwarfare, a prompt
commencement . of offensive operationswas re-
quired at his hands. Of the jústiceof this remark
the reade(will be thé better able to judge, whén 1
inforrri him, that upon our first line of operations,
there' were computed to be in arms, of Spanish
and English troops, 116,000 infantry,and about
2700 cavalry. These were miserably scattered, it
is true. There were the remains of Blake's corps
at Reynosa, estimatedat 20,000 men; General




200 NARRATIVE OF THE


Baird's corps of J 2,000, including 1400 cavalry,
was on its march from Astorga to Benevente;
Moore himself had collected full 15,000 at Sala-
manca; and Hope's division, of five thousand men,
was at the Escurial, already under orders to move
upon Salamanca. There was also General St.
Juan's corps, estimated at twenty thousand men,
which occupied the passes of the Somosierra and
Guadarama; whilst the armies of Arragon, com-
manded by Palafox, Omel, and Doyle, and that of
Castanos united, could not amount to less than
forty thousand. No doubt the latter force was far
removed from any ofthe former, for its head-quar-
ters were said to be at Saragoza, and its right to-
wards the Pyrenees; it was likewise in the most
imminent danger; for Blake being overthrown,
the enemy seemed to be' collecting all their
strength, for the purpose of surrounding. and over-
whelming Castanos;' yet the probabilities were,
that a forward movement, executed with prompti-
tude, might defeat that design; and there would
be no very serious risk in advanc}ilg, at aH events,
to Valladolid. Nor was this the only circum-
stance which seemed to point out the propriety of
adopting decisive measures. The French, though
extremely formidable, were not as yet equal to
the allies in point of numbers; their army, in-
creased sorne time, ago to eighty thousand men,
hall received an additional reinforcement of thirty




PENlNSULAR WAR. 201


thousand only; the odds were therefore on our
side. But it was not' probable that we should
long enjoy this superiority, as fresh troops were
understood to be in progress from aH parts of
France towards the Spanish frontier.


But whilst thus arguing, let me not forget, in
justice to the memory of a most excellent, in-
trepid, and able officer, to state one or two reasons
why heshould not rush, as it were headlong, into
unseen dangers. Bis information, like that of the
Supreme Junta itself, was most defective. Upon


. public and official reports, no confidence whatever
could be placed; and from private sources of in-
telligence he seemed to be even carefulIy cut off;
lt was from his own officers alone, from Colonel
Graham, Gaptain Whittingham, and others, whom
he from time to time employed in coHecting such
facts as might faH in their way, that he received any
communications on which he considered himself
justified in relying; and these all united in repre-
senting the Spanish armies as not only half-armed,
and otherwise w~tchedly equipped, but inefficient
also in respect ofji.umbers. Corps put down by the
juntas at twenty or thirty thousand men, proved,
when inspected by these officers, to mus ter eight
or ten; and of these eight or ten thousand, per-
haps one-half, or nearly one-half, might be un pro-
vided with muskets. Then, of the position of the
enemy, no one knew anything. That they were




202 NARRATIVE OF THE


concentrating, seemert to he generally understood ;
and that their object was to overwhelm Castanos,
most men apprehended; but no one could speak
with' confidence, because no one spoke on other
grounds than those of common rumour. N or was
this aH. Dissensions and quarrels were said to
have arisen, both in the juntas and in the armies;
at this most critical momento Castanos was said
to be harassed in his' command by the presence of
the commissiciner Palafox ; and to be on bad terms
with those' under him. Romana was true and
able, but he was at a distance, and had hishands
fuIl; whilst Sir John Moore's own positiori, half-
way between us and Baird, rendered any 'im.:
mediate movement extremely hazardous, either to
the one flank or the other. That ,thesecircum-
stances 'carried great weight in the mind of our
chief, his future proceedings proved; but it is now
high time to resume this detaiL
. 1 have said that the central junta was ex-
tremely anxious that sorne British troops should
be detachedfrom the main army, for the express
púrpose of covering Madrid; and as General
Hope's division chanced to be nearest at hand, the
nÍost urgent entreaties were pressed upon him, to
corrie "into this plan at his own discretion. It was
strongly úrged upon him, that were his corps to
unite itseif to that of General Sto Juan, the passes
of Somosierra and of the Guadarama would be




PENINSUJ.AR WAR. 203


perfectly secured. General Hope, however, whose
head-quarters were now at the Escurial, could
not listen to any suggestion' of the kind. The
orders from his superior were abundantly explicit
to join him, unless something extraordinary carne
in the way, at Salamanca; and General Hope saw
nothing, either in the immediate situation or fu-
ture prospects of the Spanish capital, to lead him
into a neglect of these orders. Having, therefore,
halted a few days, for the purpose of collecting
his stragglers, and closing up the cavalry, which
had rnarched at sorne distance frorn the rear of
his colurnn, he made preparations for pushing
on, with as little delay as possible, upon Sala-
manca. ; .


On the 27th, the whole division passed the
Guadarama mO,unt~ins; and the 18th hussars, with
the 71st infantry, reached Villa Castrin; on the
opposite side of the Sierra. N ext day, the rest
of the infantry, together with three brigades of
guriS and the whole park of ammunition-waggons,
reached the same point; whilst the hussars pushed
on to Adanero, where they took the duty . of the
olltpostS. But though our movernents had been
so far abundantIy satisfactory, certain intelligence
carne in that day, which caused considerable un-
easiness, as well to General Hope as to all who
happened to be iritrusted with it. Ir was in sub-
stance as follows :-




204 NARRATIVE OF THE


Lord Proby had been sent forward by Sir John
Moore on the road to Valladolid, with the view, if
possible, of ascertaining whereabouts the enemy
were, and how they might appear disposed to
acto Lord Proby had proceeded as far as Tor-
desillas, when a patrol of the French cavalry
entered the town, and he with great difficulty
escaped being made prisoner. In spite of this
interruption, however, he so far effected his ob-
ject as to be able to report that six hundred
French cavalry, with two field-pieces and two
howitzers, were actually in Tordesillas, and that
they were supported by six hundred more who
occupied Valladolid. The former force, he stated,
had advanced their posts as far as Puerto del
Do~ro and Arnajo, and detachments from both
were scouring the country, levying contributions, .
and acting exactly as if no troops were in tbe field
against tbem. But this was no! all the intelli-
gence which his despatch contained. It ap-
peared that tbe magistrates of the towns and
villages near, had received requisitions, accom-
panied by proclamations, from Marshal Bessieres,
indicating that he was on his march from Palencia,
at the head of ten thousand men; that he ex-
pected to be in Valladolid on the 24th; and that
he should look to find rations prepared for· his
men, as well as forage for his horses, along the
whole line of his marcho




PENINSULAR WAR. 205


The reader will easy believe that such informa-
cion, coming fram such a quarter, produced no
little stir among the principal functionaries of our
little corps. Whoever will take the trouble to
consult the map, may see that the distance from
Valladolid to Salamanca is at least not greater
than from Villa Castine to the latter place; and
hence that, supposing the two corps to have ar-
rived at their several destinations on the same
day, there was every probability. that Bessieres,
unencumbered as he doubtless was with waggons,
and even with artillery, would be able to throw
himself between us and our point of rendezvous,
should he feel so disposed. But if such were the
case on the supposition of our arriving si multa-
neously at Valladolid and Villa Castine, the danger
of being intercepted was doubled, provided the
French Marshal should have acted up to the pur-
port of his manifestos, and entered Valladolid on
the 24th. Bad, however, as this was, it was not
the worst news that met us here; for on the very
same night a courier carne in with accounts of the
disastrous battle of Tudela. That the reader may
the better understand how this misfortune threat-
ened to affect us, it wilI be necessary for me to
draw off his attention, for a few moments, from
the details of our own proceedings, and to make
him acquainted with the operations of the different




206 NARRATIVE OF THE .


Spanish corps, upon whose efficiency we had been
all along led to calculate.


Previous to 'our entrance into Spain, we had
been given to understand that three large armies,
oneunder Blake and Romana, another under
Castanos, and a third, which kept up the com-
munication between these two, under the Conde
de Belvidere, were all manceuvring in the front
and on the flanks of the French line, and would
probably overwhelm it erewe should be able to
join them. The manceuvring of the three corps
proved to be nothing more than a mere retention
of their separate positions, in which they watched
the French, with extreme caution no doubt, but
from which they never dreamed of attempting any-
thing offensive. In this state things continued till
the enemy's reinforcements arrived; arid then it
was lefttothem to form' their own plan, and to
choose their own field of operations. The first
Spanish General who felt the weight of their
prowess was Blake; he was attacked in his posi-
tion in the debouches of Villarcayo, Orduna, and
Munjuca; from which, after a very spirited and
obstínate resistan ce, he retired upon Espinosa.
No time, however, was granted him for breathing.
On the very day after his arrival there, he was
again assailed by an overwhelming force; andhis
army, worn out with fatigue, and destitute of pro-




PENINSULAR WAR. 207


visions and clothing, was utterly dispersed. It fled
in all directions, and . the magazines at Reynosa,
as well as the harbour of Sto Andero, were both
taken possession of by the enemy.


Whilst the operations which led to this victory
were going on, Buonaparte himself entered Spain,
and fixed his head-quarters, on the 8th of Novem-
ber, at Vittoria. His first act was to send forward
a corps, under the orders,ofMarshalSoult, against
the • Estremadura army, which, headed' by the
Conde Belvidere~ lay in his front. Belvidere was
a young man of great bravery, but said to be defi-
cient in military talent; he took up a defensive
position near Burgos, and awaited the approach of
the enemy. The consequence was, that, attacked
in an open . country by veteran troops, of which a
large proportion was cavalry, he suffered a com":
plete'. defeat, upwards of thre'e . thousand dead
being left upon the field, and the rest scattered,
beyond the possibility of immediate reunion:
Thus ,were two of the three' armies, of which so
much notice had been taken,' summarily disposed
of; it 'remained now only to dispose of the' third
in a like manner; nor did any great while elapse
ere it also was made to succumb under superior
discipline and numbers.


Castanos was at this time posted in the vicinity
of Calahorra, and had undel' his orders the united
al'mies of Andalusia and Arragon. Of the num-




208 NARRATlVE OF THE


bers which composed that army, it is impossible
even now to speak with accuracy; for the records
of Spanish historyare so overrun with exaggera-
tion, that it would be extremely unsafe, in almost
any case, to rely upon them; but from every cre-
dible rumour, it could not exceed forty thousand
men; and of these, perhaps, one half only were
adequately armed. As soon as Castanos heard of
the fate of Blake's and Belvidere's armies, he de-
clared his determination to retreat, and to avoid,
as long as he possibly could, bringing matters to
the issue of a battle. But Castanos was not left to
the guidance of his own judgment. He was beset
by spies from the central junta, which, on all
occasions, appeared to distrust its generals, in
exact proportion to their abilities; and he was by
them urged and importuned to take a step, of the
folly of which his better reason had long convinced
him. He fell back from Calahorra upon Tudela,
and there risked an action. As he had antici-
pated, his raw army was beaten; and it was with
the utmost difficulty that the General could keep
together,after the defeat, a force sufficient to
form the nucleus of another. With this he fled,
rather than retreated, to Calatayud, where his
troops endured ali the miseries of destitution, and
even famine to the utmost.


1 t soon became known that the enemy were
moving in force upon Segovia; and though Segovia




PENINSULAR WAR. 209


was occupied by a division of St. Juan's army,
amounting to six thousand men, under General
Aradia, no great confidence could be cherished,
that such an impediment would long deIay him.
The resistance to be offered by Segovia had
already been measured, by the faciIity with which
St. Juan might be able to ~efend himself in the
Somosierra pass. In case he shonld succeed in
holding that, then was General Aradia to keep his
post to the last ex trcmi t y ; but if the Somosierra
were carried, then was Aradia to fall back at once
upon the Guadarama pass. N ow the' Guadarama
pass was the only road left open for our retreat, in
the event of our junction with Sir John Moore
being cut off by troops from Valladolid; should
it likewise -be forced, our situation would become
a desperate one. N othing indeed remained, ex-
cept to throw ourselves into A vila; where, as it
was a fortified place, we must needs maintain
ourseIves, till Sir John Moore should be. able to
advance to our reIief.


When General Hope began his mareh from the
Escurial, he intended to proceed by Adanero to
Arrivola, and from thence to Madrigal, Penaranda,
Huerto, and so onwards to Salamanca. As soon,
however, as the aboye intelligence reached him,
he prudently determined to alter his route, alld to
move by a road considerabIy to the left, and of
course further from the direct line of the enemy's


VOI •• l. ()




210 NARRA'l'IVE OF 'l'HE


probable operations. The cavalry accordingly re-
ceived orders to ,march on the 30th to Fontiveros,
~nd to occupy posts for the protection of the co-
lumnof artillery and infantry, which moved on
the same day to Avila. On the follQwing morning
the march was resumed, and the road to Pena-
randa taken, where the column arrived without
molestation on the 2nd of December; but the
p¡ain body of the cav.alry was still kept at Fonti-
veros, whilst its outposts were extended as far as
Adanero, Arrivola, Villa N ova de Aroud, Madrigal,
Royama, and even to Penaranda itself. Thus
were the rear and the right flanks of the division
perfectly secured; and it was rendered quite im-
practicable for the enemy to harass its movements,
without at least sufficient time being gaine<J. to
provide against any,emergency.


It is hardly necessary to say, that my own posi-
tion was with the cavalry. While thus employed,
1 instituted various in quiries as to the nature and
strength of the French troops which had shown
themselves in this quarter; and 1 heard that they
consisted only of portions of a partisan corps, de-
tached at a great distan ce from their main body,
and intended to effect no other end, than merely
to spread alarm ayer the country, and distract
people's attention. In this they had certainly
succeeded; whilst the chief part of thei.r force was
moving all the while towards their left, with the




l'ENINSULA R W AR. 211


design, after the defeat of Castanos, of ovel'whelm-
ing St. Juan, and taking possession of Madrid.
How it carne about, that they made no attempt
to penetrate between our columns; whether the
possibility of succeeding in the effort had not oc-
curred to them, 01' that they considered the other
an object of much greater importance, 1 had of
course no means of ascertaining. But 1 did as-
certain that they had not, from the first, made any
movement, either partially 01' generally, which
could lead to the supposition, that such an un-
dertaking had ever entered into their contempla-
tion.


We had traversed a large portion of Spain, and
during the last few weeks had been almost con-
stantly in the immediate presence of the enemy ;
yet, strange to say, we had never exchanged shots.
On the 29th, at night, that event occurred for the
first time. It Ihight be about midnight, when the
videttes, furnished by the picket at Arrivola, gave
an alarm that the French were coming on. The
troopers mounted and made ready, and in a few
minutes found themselves attacked by a strong
party of cavalry; concerning the nature of which,
whether it were the advanced-guard of a corps, 01'
a mere patrol, they were unavoidably ignorant.
As nothing was to be gained by keeping possession
of Arrivola, our people, after skirmishing fDr a few
minutes, feH back; but they were not pursued,




212 NARRATIVE OF THE


and they halted for the. night at a house upon
the road-side, distant about half a mile from the
village. At daylight they once more advanced
upon Arrivola. The movement was, of course,
made with extreme caution; though for caution,
as the event proved, there was no necessity; for
the enemy had abandoned the place several hours
before, having taken time merely to plunder the
post-office. This was the only event which befell
uso from the hour of our quitting Lisbon, up to the
day ofour junction with the main body of the army
at Salamanca.


During the Srd of December, no change took
place in the position of the cavalry; its main body
stillcontinuing at Fontiveros, whilst iís posts were
extended, as before, along the f!ank of the column
of infantry: littIe, therefore, occurred calculated
to amuse or excite; for the enemy made no move-
ments, and we were left entirely to ourselves.
Whilst thus situated, every little piece of intelli-.
gence which happened to come in, attracteda de-
gree of attention far deeper and more lasting than,
in aH probability, would have be en the case had
our minds and bodies been more actively employed.
AH the rumours which reached us were not, how-
ever, in themselves uninter,esting; at least there
was one, which, under any circumstances, would
have driven us, in spite of ourselves, into a train of
speculation and inquiry. .




PENINSULAlt WAU. 213


We were given to understand that Sir David
Baird's column, which had landed at Corunna
on the 13th of the preceding month, and had ad·
vanced on the road to Salamanca as far as Astorga,
had suddenly received orders to fall back agáin
upon eorunna. Such intelligenceexcited in us
great surprise; nor could we see either the motive
which should lead to such a measure, or the ne-
cessity which could compel ¡t. Was it that a
retreat had been determined upon, in order to save
Portugal, by abandoning Spain altogether? or
were we to take shipping, and proceeding south-
wards to Cadiz, to make the south instead of the
north of Spain the theatre of our operations? These
were questioIÍs which,' at the outposts, it was im-
possible to answer; yet was it equaUy impossible
not to perceive the unhappy results which would
cert~inly. follow out of the one as well as the other.
This was not the moment for retracting, unless we
should be fairly driven to it by a force overwhel-
mingly superior; and of such we certainly saw
nothing, at least in our immediate front. Our
business, on the contrary, was to advance; and
the late disasters, so far from taking away froro
that necessity, only increased it.


In order to carry on operations with at least a
fair prospect of Sl1ccess, several modes of acting
were before uso In the first place, supposing the
Somosierra and the Guadarama passes to be de-




214 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


fcnsible by Sto JUan's army, and that the remains
of Castanos's troops should have arrived, as they
were said to have arrived, at Siguenza, on the 30th,
aH immediate apprehension as to the fate of Madrid
might safely be la id aside. lil this case, Moore's
column might endeavour to unite itself with that
of Blake, either at Leon or at any other conve-
nient spot in that quarter, Sir David Baird's corps
directing its march upon the same point; and as
Blake was represented to have still twenty thou-
sand men under his orders, the junction of the two
would make up a formidable force, fit either for
offensive or defensive undertakings. U pon this
centre, the scattered battalions from the other
armies might easily rally; and then, or even
earlier, should it be deemed advisable, an advance
upon Valladolid might be undertaken, and a cam-
paign opened, upon a grand scale, with the com-
bined strength of the whole.


In the next place, and still taking it for granted
that the passes could be maintained for sorne timey
the British army would run but littIe risk, were it,
unconnected witlÍ any Spanish force whatever, to
advance froro Salamanca, by Abba de Tormes,
upon Madrid. There was no force between these
two points capable of resisting it; and the very
knowledge tIlat it was in motíon to the front,
would call off the attention of the enemy from
their present plans, and give time to the broken




PENINSULAR W AR. 215


Spaniards to collect and recover their order. And
lastly, should matters fall out in every respect
contrary to our wishes and interests; should the
Somosierra pass becarried, and all communication
between St. Juan's army and the army at Sigu-
enza be cut off; should Blake's corps be so Cotn-
pletely broken up, as to be rendered incapable of
rallying or re-assembling; and Portugal be fallen
into a state of helpless inactivity,-even in the
event of all these misfortunes hefalling us, we
were not without a resource. There was nothing
to prevent St. Juan's and Castanos's troops from
retreating with all speed upon Cuenca or Va-
lencia, and to unite themselves there with the
Catalonians; orpassing the Sierra Morena, to
collect everything around them under the walls of
Cadiz; whilst we also, with a good grace, might
change our ground froro the north to the south ;


,whither our shipping could convey us' from any
ports between Corunna and Lisbon. At all events,
a precipitate retreat, at a moment like the present,
was unpopular. Our arroy had suffered no dis-
asters; it had never come into contact with the
enemy; it was now inthe very centre of SpttÍn,
and tite eyes not of Spain only, but of all Europe,
were upon it ;-what would be the consequence
were it.to abandon the capital without striking a
blow, and quit tite field before a single encounter
had taken place r N o doubt the game was a deep




216 NAHRATIVE OF THE


one; but it was the last which Eng1and had ta
play, and it appeared desirable in the eyes of the
army to play it boldly.


Such wete the ideas which occurred at the mo-
ment, and which, in spite of very dispiriting intel-
ligence from other quarters, continued to remain
uppermost in our minus. The supineness and
inactivity of the Portuguese, excessive as these
were repl'esented to be, in no respect led to a
change of opinion. It is true that, from these.
little efficient eo-operation was to be expected;
the energies of the people being appliedwhoUy-to
the arrangement of religious processions; and the
government, either froID the absence of power or
of ability, making no attempt whateverto support
us; for even a line of dragoons, between Sir John
Moore's army and thatof the British cornmander
in Lisbon, though requested in the joint names of
these two functionaries, was refused. Yet in Spain
the case was certainly differel1t. There the com-
_ mon people, with sorne remarkable exceptions.
were all enthusiastic in the cause; in Madrid
this was particularly the case,_ as their expressions
of joy, at beholding a British uniform, abundantly
testified. Why should men thU8 actuated be
abandoned? It was- no good reason to urge, that
the inhabitants of Estremadura and Toledo had
exhibited symptoms of a self-confidence sadly
misplaced, and.of a hauteur and irritability of tem-




PENINSULAR W AR. 217


per highly disagreeable to their allies. Among
them the French had not yet appeared; they
knew nothing, therefore, either of the sufferiIigsor
of the defeats of their fellow-countrymen, except
by reporto Withas little justice might it be urged,
that the people of Old Castile deserved no support,
because they were either unwiliing or unable to
defend themselves. The people of Old Castile
present doubtless a poor specimenof the Spanish
character; and resernble, in indolence and sloth,
the natives of Portugal rather than those of Spain ;
but the people ofOld Castile constituted but a small
portion of the Spanish nation. Spain itself was
not to be abandoned, because sorne Spaniards
were spiritless or uncivil.


But N apoleon himself was in the freId, his head~
quarters being already' at Aranda. Itwas to ·be


_ regretted that the case shouldbe so, and that
Alexander had not detained him somewhat longer
at Erfurth; for hehad, beyond question, appeared
upon our stage too soon. Still, even Napóleon
was not invincibIe. And, lastly, there wasno
unanimity, no vigour, no energy, in thé proceed-
ings either of the Spanish government or the Spa-
nish generals. Instead of nominating some ·one
person as commander-in-chief, to whom all the
other generals might pay obedience, each leader
of an army was left to act according to the sug-
gestions of his own faney; and all were, or claim-




218 NARRATIVE OF THE


ed to be, on a footing of the most perfect equality.
PaJafox, Blake, and Cuesta, were continually in-
triguirig and caballing against one another; Cas-
tanos had been ruined by the presence of spies,
and Blake sacrificed to a similar interference.
As to Romana, his place of sojourn was quite un-
known, though r~mours were in circulation, both
that he was about to be placed at the head of the
Spanish armies, and that he might be daily ex-
pected at Salamanca, to consult with Moore. N o
doubt these were terrible evils; so terrible, as to
bring upon Spain greater danger and greater cala-
mities, than she ran the smalIest risk of incurring
from the efforts of th~ enemy. Yet were they. not
such as to authorise our withdrawal from the scene
of action, at a time when upon our presence the very
existence of the country might be said todepend.
Besides, there was something so galling to the
mind of a British soldier in the prospect of flight
before he was beaten, that no one could think oÍ,
it with patience. The very common troopers
seemed indignant at the suggestion; and it cer-
tainly did appear strange, that whilst the women
of Madrid were labouring night' and day to put
their city in a posture of defence, we should be
preparing to abandon them.




PENINSULAR WAR. 219


CHAPTER IX.


Visit to head-qua,rters, and interview with Sir John Moore-


A retreat determined upon-General dissatisfactioIÍ of the
army-The idea of retreating abandoned, and orders issued


to advance -Movement upon Tordesillas - Skirmish at


Rueda-Sir John Moore resol ves to attack Soult on the


Carrion-The army advances for that purpose-Brilliant


affair of cavalry at Sahagun-Preparations for a battle sud-


denly countermanded.


HA VING good reason to believe that the French
were aH moving upon Madrid, and that there was
no probahility of any attack heing made upon our
posts for sorne time to come, 1 set off at an early
hour on the morning of the 4th, and reached Sala-
manca about noon on theday following. 1 was
induced to take this step~ not from mere curiosity
alone, hut in consequence of certain letters which
1 had received from Sir John Moore, concerning
the contents of which 1 was desirous of personally
consulting him. 1 entered the place full of doubts




220 N'ARRATIVE OF THE


and apprehensions; and 1 certainly did not quit it
with apprehensions allayed, or doubts removed.


Having waited upon the General, and the com-
pliments usual on such occasions having passed,
our conversation naturally took the turn into which
the present situation of affairs, and the position of
the army, were calculated to guide it. lt was then
that Sir John explicitly stated to me, that he had
come to a final determination ta retreat. He had
caBed the general.officers together, he added, for
the purpose of acquainting 'them with his decision,
as well as with the reasons which led to it; but
he had neither requested their opinions, nor de-
manded their judgment. He next entered, at
great length, into the motives ,which swayed him,
reasoning, in conversation, as he reasoned in his
letters, with a decided leaning to the gloomy side
of the picture. He spoke warmly in condemna-
tion of the Spanish government, and.of the nation
generally; and enlarged upon the absence of all
right understanding among the general s, as well
as upon the abs~rdity of their military movements,
which had subjected them all to be beaten in de-
taiL . He expressed his sincere regret that they
had not marched, as theyought to have done, when
he first began to enter the country, so as to unite
themselves with him; and declared that, with a
fOTce as yet uncollected, and having nQthing but
the remains of defeated corps on his flanks, a




PENINSULAR WAR. 221


choice of evils alone remained for him. The de-
termination to which he. had at last come, was
not formed without extreme pain to hims~lf; but
the duty ofpreserving his army"situated as it now
was, presented to his mind a consideration para-
mount to every otber; he was, therefore, resolved
to retreat.


Though 1 could not but feel deeply on hearing
such a declaration, 1 deemed it my respectful
duty to say little in reply. further than by ex-
pressing my regret that so strong a necessity for
the measure should exist, and my apprehension of
its consequences 10 the cause. The slightest in-
dication of a retrograde movement, exhibited at
such a moment as this, would, 1 feared, produce
fatal effects; for, Spain would fall, Portugal would
fall, and the whole of Europe be once moreat the
feet .of the enemy. Then what would become of
Madrid, ,whose inhabitants were enduríng the
severest privations, chiefly with the hope of re-
ceiving aid from us; and of Castanos, and Pa-
lafox, and Blake, aH oí whom, OH the same ex-
plicit understanding, were labouring to re-as-'
semble their scattered troops. No doubt, 1 added,
the General's information was more likely to be
correet than mine; but 1 dreaded the heavy dis-
appointment which his proposed s~ep would
occasion to the people of Epgland, whose very
bearts seemed set upon the success .of his under-,




222 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


taking; and whose mortification at his failure
would be biiter, in proportion to the degree of
hope with which they saw him embark upon it.
1 then retired, with the painful conviction on my
mind, that the army would begin its backward
journey in the course of a day or two at the
furthest.


The feelings of regret under which 1 laboured
were not, 1 soon fonnd, confined to my own
breast; they were shared by many in the army.
Even the General's personal 8taff sought not to
conceal their chagrin at tbe adoption of a system
which seemed so unsatisfactory. General Hope
having by this time joined, there were at Sala-
manca and in the neighbourhooq full twenty
thousand British troops, in a state, both from
their equipment and discipline, to oppose any
French force of almost double the number. Ge-
neral Baird, with a strong reinforcement, particu-
larly in cavalry, was at Astorga; nor were there
any impediments whatever in his way, which
should hinder him from arriving within six days at
fue furthest. But if it should be deemed unsafe
to wait so long here, why not move towards him,
and concentrate the divisions behind the Douro,
from whence ofi'ensive operations might be under-
taken? Any thing, in short, was pronounced
preferable toa retreat, which, independently of
the disgrace which it would bring upon the Bri-




PENINSULAR W AR. 223


tish arms, must expose Madrid to destruction,
and cause the certain annihilation of Castanos and
Palafox's armies. Seldom did men, situated as
we were, venture to speak out, so boldly against
the measures of their chief. But murmurings and'
remonstrances were useless; the die was cast,
and it could not be recalled.


In the midst of these discussions, news carne in
from tha capital, which served to produce an effect
upon the mind of our General. The Spaniards
were represented as prepared to bury themselves
under the ruins of the city, and to perish to a
man, before the French should entero In the
short space of forty-eight hours they had unpaved
the streets, and loaded the balconies and flat roofs
of their houses with the stones, in readiness to be
burled on the heads of the assailants. A huge
trench was already drawn round the entire cir-
cumference of the city; numerous outworks were
begun, and men and women of aH ranks and
classes were labouring incessantly for their com-
pletion. Morla had assumed the chief command
of the place; and all were united in one enthusias-
tic resolutioI} to conquer or perish. It is pro-
bably needless to add that the annunciation of
these tidings served but to increase our disconten t.
Men were no longer contented to express gene-
rally tbeir disapprobation of the retreat, but each




224 NAURATIVE OF THE


wasready with his own plan, from the adoption of .
which he was perfectly convinced that the most
advantageous results might arise. Why not move
to. the right, cried one, and endeavour to unite
with Castanos? Should matters come to the
worst, there will always be a retreat aeross the
Sierra Morena, upon Cadiz. Why not make a
forward movement at once, exclaimed another, or
else close up our own troops in. the rear of the
Douro? this will at least retard the enemy's
operations, if it do not absolutely defeat them?
Was it tobe expeeted that Buonaparte, having
gone so far, would relinquish Spain, till bis whole
strength shóuld have been brought against it? or
that . the raw Spanish levies would not suffer de-
feats? Were .there no provine es whither, in the
event of being overpowered, the British army
could withdraw, still warm in the cause, and stiU
capable of .exertion? W ould not a British force
in the north of Spain, ev.en though driven to act
on the defensive; or the same force retiring gra-
dually towards the. south, and gathering round it,
as it went, the remnants of the different Spanish
,corps, cast prodigious difficulties in tbe way of the
enemYI alld give prodigiolls ellcouragement to our
allies? AH these questions were asked with the
tone which men will assume, when matters are in
progress of which they disapprove; and it was




PENINSULAR \VAR. 225


answered, as if with one voice, tbat balf the army
had better be sacrificed, tban the cause tbus
abandoned.


N otwithstandlÍlg these murmurs, of which be
was not left in ignorance, General Moore exlií-
bited no signs of any alteration in his previolfS
resolutions. On the contrary, Lord Paget, who
had been previol1lsIy commanded to close up from
Astorga with the whole of the cava1ry, reeeived
<>rders nQt to march; and it was given. out that
the retrograde movement would commence on the
day after the morrow ; one cavalry regiment only
was summoned, but it was called in for tbe
avowed purpose of strengthening the hussar bri-
gade, and enabling it to cover more effectualIy tbe
retreat of the column. Thus, on the night of tbe
5th, the troops retired to rest, in the unshaken be-
lief th~t the proud hopes with which they had
entered thiscountry, were aH doomed. to suffer
overthrow.


Having remained during the night in Salamanca,
1 departed on the following morning to the out-
posts, whieh had been drawn in, and now oceu-
pied stations in the immediate front of this city.
1 had not resumed my ordinary toutine of duty
many hours, when, to my in,expressible satisfac-
tion, intelligence was communicated to me that
the General had altered his plans. Sir David
Baird, who had actually begun his retrogade


VOL. J. l'




226 NARRATIVE OF THE


movement from Astorga, was ordered to retrace
his . steps; and an advance, instead of a retreat,
was u~derstood to be in contemplation. N ever


,has a condemned criminal rejoiced more heartily
at the receipt of a reprieve, than did the British
army when these tidings got abroad among them.
But a few hours ago, and every face looked blank
and woe-begone; men did their duty, indeed, at~
tended to their horses and accoutrements, and
performed all the other offices which their stations
required; but they set about every thing with the
air of people who took no manner of interest in
what they were doing. Now all was life and
activity, insomuch, that even occupations, which
but a few hours ago would have cost many a com-
plaint whilst in process of execution, were exe-
cuted, not only without murmur, but withapparent .
satisfaction.


It was but natural that the curiosity of all
should be powerfully excited respecting the causes
which, in so short a space of time, had produced
effects so remarkable. Whilst by sorne it was
surmised that the disapprobation of the general
officers to his proposed measures, had of itself
induced Sir John Moore to take them into further
and more serious consideration; others, with per-
haps more reason, attributed the circumstance
.mainly to the receipt of fresh information from
Madrid, and letters which were known to have




PENINSULAR W AR. 227


come in from Mr. Frere. From the formerofthese
it was collected, that the inhabitants of the capital
had abated nothing of their ardour; that the
French had made oneassault, ~n which they were
repulsed with loss; and that, from the temper 'of
the people andthe zeal of their leaders, it was
anticipated that no better suécess wouJd attend
them in others. Such were the news from
Madrid; whilst Mr. Frere's letter was understood
to contain little el se than one tissue of cogent
reasons ag'ainst any movement to the rear. Mr.
Frere was doubtless fully justified in writing in
this strain; as minister from the court ofEngland.
he was perfectly authorised to give advice respect ..
ing the course to be pursued by the English
General, even if that officer had abstained froID
requesting it; but Sir John Moore having re ..
peatedly soIicited his opinion, as to the p'rudence
or imprudence of schemes in agitation, his right
to speak or write stl'Ongly became increased four~
fold. Mr. Frere, however, in my humble judg.:.
ment, erred, in desiring that Colonel Charmilly
should be examined before acouncil of war prior
to any movement being made. Respecting ~olonel
Charmilly's trust-worthiness, 1 beg to be under-
stood as offering no opinion; he might have been
a very good and a very prudent man, or he might
have been the reverse; but in either case it would
have beeri not onIy insulting to the Commander of




228 NARRATIVE OI-' TIlE


the forces, to have the judgment of an unofficial
emigrant set up in opposition to his own; but the
consequences might have been in every way
ruinous. Sir John Moore dismissed that person
with marks of dissatisfaction ; and I think I should
have done the same.


In spite of all this, however, and in spite of the
excessive timidity of the Supreme Junta, which
on the first alarm of danger had fled to Badajoz,
at the very extremity of the kiugdom, only oue
opinion can, I conceive, be formed, as to the sound-
ness of the views taken by Mr. Frere on the presént
occaSlOn. No doubt we should have had serious
difficulties to contend against, not the least serious
of which was presented by the disorganised and
disjointed state of the Spanish armies; but of the
evils arising from. that system, even the imbecile
government seemed to be aware; and there was a
prospect that the separate corps would be shortly
brought together under sorne single chief. Romana.
too, was generaIly spoken of·as the man; and in
Romana we had all great confidence. N ow should
thisplan beacted upon, as we had good reason to
believe it would, the absence of the junta, so far
from beiug a subject of regret, ought rather to be
viewed as one of cordial congratulation; inasmuch
as the intrigues, cabals~ and absurdities, whích at-
tended constantly upon its deliberations, were
likely to produce less mischiefwhen the body itself




PENINSULAR WAR. 229


was at a dístance, than if it were near at hand.
But to return to our own movements.


It was on the evening of the 5th,-on the even-
ing.of the very day on which 1 'had my last inter-
view with him, that Sir John Moore's sentiments
began to waver .. A courier was accordingly de-
spatched that night, with directions to General
Baird not to persist in his movement upon Corunna;
ánd on the following morning a second courier set
off, bearing orders for him to retrace his steps upon
the Astorga road. At the same time Colonel Gra-
ham was despatched to Madrid, for the purpose of
ascertaining the real condition of the city, and of
bringing back such accounts as might be worthy of
confidence. This officer, who throughout the war
peculiarly distinguished himself by his activity and
diligence, had come in, only a few days before,
with tidings of the defeat of Sto Juan's' army, and
the forcing of the Somosierra pass by a corps of
French cavalry. It was then that men began to
inquire why measures had not been adopted to
secure that pass more effectualIy, than by leaving
it to thecare of a Spanish levy of half-armed
peasants; and many were of opinion, that had
General Hope's corps taken a position there, much
time might have be en gained; whilst Baird's
column joining Sir John Moore's, the whole might
have advanced togcther, or, in case of reverses,
fallen back in a body upon Madrid. That advan·




230 ),[ARRA'flVE OF THE


tage, however, was lost; and hence not only would
any movement of troops upon the capital he made
at a double risk, hut even a single messenger-
such as Colonel Graham-was compelled to make
a long detour, in order to reach it in safety. By a
circuitous route, however, Colonel Graham pro-
ceeded; and upon the results of his mission, and
the report which he might happen to hring back,
the future operations of the army were understood
to dependo


In these uncertain measures, and still more. in
the general tenor of his conversation, it Was easy
to perceive marks of the gloom which at this time
overshadowed the mind of General Moore. That
he was an officer of great distinction, every
one acknowledged during his life, and posterity
will never deny it; hut it was too manifest that a
fear of responsibility, a dread of doing that which
was wrong, of runnirig himself and his troops into
difficulties from which they might not be able to
extricate themselves, were a great deal too active
lo permit either his talents or his· judgment pro-
perly to exert their influence. Sir John Moore
had earned the highest reputation as a general of
division; he was aware of this; and perhaps he
felt no inclination to risk if--at alI events, he was
clearly incapahle of despising partial ohstacles in
the, pursllit of some great ultiinate advantage; in
one worcl, he war-; not a Wellington. Of this no




PENINSULAR WAR. 231


more convincing proof need be given, than the fact
that, even at the moment when preparations for
an advance were going on, his whole heart and
soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese fron-
tier. Did any one talk to him of the possibility
of gaining Valladolid, and then, in case of the
worst, of retiring into the northern provinces, and
acting on the defensive, he would answer by a
declaration that in the north there were no sup-
plies; and that it was a country, in every point of
view, most unfavourable for military evolutions.
Perhaps this might be true. The northern pro-
vinces are certainly barren enough; and we should
have doubtless be en met by a variety of inconve-
niences, had we made them the theatre of our
operations; but with the sea open to us, what had
we to apprehend? Besides, even upon the suppo-
sition that our first and greatest object was to de-
fend Portugal, it was by no means certain that we
mig'ht not cover it as effectually by taking up posi-
tions in the north of Spain, as by falling back at
once upon the frontier. Unless the French pos-
sessed a disposable force much greater than we
had reason to believe they díd, it was extremely
improbable that they would venture to pass us by;
whereas, were we to retire, they would of course
pursue, and t11U8 the whole of the Península would
be gradually overrun.


But though our leader seemed in no way dis-




232 Nil.RRA'fIVE OFTHE


posed toembark upon any hazardous undertaking,
he showed himself well inelined, in the event of a
favourable communication froID Colonel Graham,
to attempt something. Ofthe motions and strength
(9f the enemy, no tidings had of late beenreceived;
but our own torce was in the highest spirits, and
in the best possible order. The' hospitals were
almost entirely tenantless, and the regiments of
infantry were complete, not only in mumbers, bui
in their equipments and clotbing, and everything
necessary for taking the fleld. The cavalry, again,
were in admirable ease; whilst of the artillery it
is necessary to say no more, than that it never
IJresented a more imposing appearance. How sin-
cerely did aH regret that the unhappy delay, oc-
casioned by Baird's retrogression, should keep
such an anny idle, even for a single da.y !


From this period up to the return of Colonel
Graham, only one event occurred of sufficient im-
portance tú< be narrated. It was this: A couríer,
who was carrying despatches fmm Bayonne ad-
dressed to N apoleon at Aranda, having fallen into
thehands of some armoo peasantry, was by them:


. sent in to the head-quarters of our army. Whe-
ther the rnail contained any very interesting in-
telligence 1 cannot say, not having personally
examined it; but 1 learned that sorne of its
contents were at least arnusing, if not instructive.
They were of old date; for they spoke of the army




PENINSULAR WAll. 233


of Portugal as on its march through Bourdeaux,
under the orders of J unot, whose letters were a11
written in a style of humility Huite unprecedented.
Their purport, however, accounted for their tone
pretty effectualIy; for tbey were chiefly devoted
to entreaties that some increase of pay might be
granted; the writer being but badly provided for,
now tbat his Portuguese resourbes had failed him.
lt will easily be believed that the perusal of these
piteous petitions created no little merriment among
the men, to whose exertions the Marshal was in-
debted ror bis present poverty.


On tbe 9th of December, Colonel Graham
returned from his mission. He bad taken the
route by Talavera, at wbich place he arrived on
the 7th, in time to be told of the surrender oí
Madrid, and of the murder of General Sto Juan by
his mutinous troops; and not judging it either
prudent OF necessary to proceed further, he in-
stantly retraced his steps. According to his report,.
though many· reverses had been sustained, still,
from the attitude which the country continued to
maintain, and the divided state of the French
army, something might yet be done. The chiefs
in the capital bad indeed betrayed their trust;
and tbe enemy were in possession of tbe Retiro;
but tbe indignant populace bad refused to Iay
down their arms; and tbere was Httle probability
that they would 800n be induced to change tbeir




~34 NARRATIVE OF THE


sentirnents. There were about thirty thousand
French troops thus kept in ernployment. Of the
rest, sorne had proceeded against Saragoza, sorne
against Toledo; sorne liad taken the road to Valen-
cia, and othel's had bent their steps towards Cadiz.
AH this appeared to Sir John Moore as inviting a
forward movernent on his part; and the army were
too much gratified at the prospect of advancing
at all, to question very minutely the grounds or
motives upon which our General acted, or changed
his opinions.


The l110vement began on the 12th frorn various
points. On that day Lord Paget, with the prin-
cipal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro,
whither he had moved up in the course of the
week, to Tordesillas; whi1st the hussar hrigade,
under my own orders, proceeded froID its ground
at Arrivola. The divisions likewise defiled from
Alba de Tormes, Salamanca, and Ludesrna, and on
the 14th a new position was taken up, the right
resting on Tordesillas, the centre at Alayoz, and
the left at Toro. In order to render it as secure as
possible, the whole ofthe cavalry was placed upon
the right of the stream, part occupying posts on
<me side of the river, and part upon the other.
Lord Paget's corps crossed the stream; whilst that
of which 1 was at the head, distributed itself
throúgh Patricios, Rubios, Madrigal, Nava del
Rey, and Pollos, on the Domo. Thus we had




PENINSULAR \VAR. 235


completely reversed the order in which, but a few
days ago, we stood. Then our real' was to the
Guadarama, that pass being in the hands of our
friends, and opposed to the enero.y; now we were
facing the Gúadarama, and expecting the enemy
to debouch from the very places which we our·
selves had formerIy occupied.


lt was the good fortune of a squadron of the
18th hussars to cOIne, at this time, into contact
with the enemy. There is a large viUage, 01'
rather a small· town, called Rueda, situated about
half-way between Nava and Tordesillas; in which,
we had been given to un.derstand that detach-
ments of the enemy's cavalry, with sorne infantry,
were quartered. Having caused it to be re con-
noitred, and finding that the Frenc4 seemed quite
ignorant of our proximity, 1 determined to sur~
prIse thern, ir possible; at all events to bring them
to action. With this intention a squadron pro-
ceeded against them on the night of the 12th;
and having happily rnade good our entrance un-
observed, we soon tJ1rew thern into corifusion.
The greater number were sabred on the spot,
rnany were taken, and only a few escaped to in-
forrn General Franceschi, who occupied Valladolid
with a body of two 01' three thousand horse, that
the British arrny had not retreated.


When he began his movernents, it was, 1 believe,
General Moore's intention to advance by Valla-




236 NARRATIVE OF THE


dolid, to unite himself with Romana's army, and
to threaten the communieations between Madrid
and Franee. With this view he had taken up his
position at Tordesillas, and haddespatehed a mes-
senger with a letter to Romana, making him ac-
quainted with his plains. But on the 14th a
French offieer having been intereepted by the
peasantry, the despatches of whieh he was the
bearer were brought in to me; and seeing that
they were of the firstmoment, 1 lost no time in
forwarding them to head-quarters. An imfi?c-
diate change of plan was the eonsequenee. 1'he
army, it was understood, would move to its left,
for the purpose of effeeting a junetion at once with
Sir David Baird's column; and then, either in
connexion with Romana, if he could be found, or in-
dependently of him, should hekeep out ofthe way,
attaek Marshal Soult, who, at the head of sixteen
or eighteen thousand men, was in position about Va-
lencia and Saldanha. The plan seemed to be both
a wise and a spirited one; and it deserved sueeess.


Whilst the eolumns of infantry were filíng off
in the direction of Toro and Benevente, the
cavalry enjoyed several opportunities of again try-
ing its strength with that of the enemy. In every
instance the superiodty of British soldiers was
well asserted; and in a variety of skirmishes we
succeeded in making prisoners of one lieutenant-
colonel, one major, with upwards of a hundred




PENINSULAR W AR. 231


privates, and sixty horses. It was in truth a glo-
fious spectacle . to see with what perfect con-
.fidence of success the smallest patrol of British
horse would charge bodies,often doubling them..:
selves in number; and it was no less gratifying to
find that a mere numerical superiority in no
single instance availed the enemy anything.


In the mean time intelligence carne in from
Romana, that he had actually commenced his
retreat from Leon, in consequence, as it was sur-
mised, of the arrangements into which Sir John
Moore had entered a few days ago, for retiring
upon PortugaL Such information, at a moment
like the present, could not fail of causing con-
siderable vexation to our leader. He blamed
Romana severely, and despatched another courier,
with a letter eouched in terms even more pressing
than any which he had employed before, to re-
quest that the Spanish General would re trace his
steps without a moment's delay. It was added
that, should he find it impossible to act upon this
suggestion at once, General Moore could not wait
any longer for his convenience; beca use an op-
portunity of striking a blow was now before him,
such as had never previously come in his· way,
and which the smallest 10ss of time might remove.
In due course Romana's answer arrived; and it
was to the effect, that he would eo-operate, to the




238 NARRATIVÉ OF THE


utmost of his power, in any enterprise III which
the British General might see fit to embark.


So far all was satisfactory enough; but the
same thing could certainly not be said with refe-
rence to the information which we derived from
our prisoners, touching the amount of French
troops employed in the Peninsula. From one of
these, Colon el Arvignac, we learned that there
either were, or shortly would be, opposed to lIS
ten corps d'armie, each consisting of two di vi .
sions, or nearly twenty thousand men; and the
following is the list of generals in command, with
their stations, as he enumerated them :-:-Ney and
Moncey, in the neighbourhood of Saragoza; Le .
Fevre and Ma~elliny moving on Salamanca; Bes~
sieres, at I Madrid; Soult and Lassalle, near Pla-
cencia; J un~t.. I;1dvancing to Burgos; Gouvion
SÍ; Cyr, in the direction of Barcelona; Milhaud,
in communication with Le Fevre; and Marmont,
whose exact province 1 have forgotten. The
cavalry attached to this mass he represented as
embracing no fewer thl;1n thirty-six regiments;
and he affirmed that there were full seven thou-
~alid of the imperial guards then quartered in
Madrid. How far these statements wére to be re-
lied upon, it was o(course impossible to say; but
of one truth no man could be ignorant,-namely,
th~t t~e enemy's force in the country was enor-




PENINSULAR W AIt. 239


mous, and that our only chance of success lay in
beating him in detail. But was it probable that
we should succeed in this? The most sanguine
amongst us could not but experience doubts, when
it was recollected that, of all tbe Spanish armies
wbich but a month ago had kept the field, Ro-
mana's alone remained; and that it could hardly
be counted upon, inasmuch as it was as yet only
in the act. of forming. Then, again, the French
generals were as. prudent as tbey werebrave.
Should any one of them be made aware of our
approacb, he would doubtless fallback, with tbe
view of drawing us after him, till we should' be
thrown into the midst of as many corps as the
Emperor might deem it advisable to employ in
our destruction. Still, much was to be effected
by promptitude and boldness; and though we
heard of nothing except immense ma,sses ofFrench
moving in every direction; though the people
undeniably began to exhibit symptoms of abated
zeal and decaying patriotism; and thougb, aboye
aH, our own General was not aman to attempt
anything, unless he saw before him a sort of moral
certainty of success, such as others wouldsCárCély
look for; in spite of an these considerations, not a
man in the army desponded, but all felt their
spirits rise in proportion as tbe prospect of meet-
ing the enemy became more decided.


With this feeling uppermost in our minds,every




240 NARRATIVE OF THE


march which brought us nearer to the position of
Marshal Soult was performed, not only without a
murmur, but with an excess of good-will. On
the 16th, the head-quarters had beenestablished
at Toro; on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, it passed
Villapondo and Valderosa, and on the 20th we
were established at Majorga. Here Sir David
Baird's column joined us; and here we could
lnuster no fewer than 23,000 infantry, 2,300 ca-
valry, and nearly fifty pieces of cannon of different
calibres.


Whilst head-quarters were established at Ma-
jorga, the cavalry and horse-artillery having ad-
vanced as far as Monastero Melgar Abaxo, suc-
ceeded, on more than one occasion, in measuring
tbeir strength with the enemy's outposts. Of the
skirmishes which took place at this time, few were
productive of any very serious effects; though all
tended, in a greater 01' less degree, to increase the
confidence of oul' people in themselves, and so fal'
to prepare them for the grand stl'uggle which
was supposed to be pending. ,But there was one
exploit which deserves lasting remembrance, not
onIy because of the gallantry which the troops
displayed in its performance, but because of the
complete knowledge' of his profes8ion which was
exhibited by Lord Paget in cDnducting it.


The Monastero Melgar Abaxo i8 distant about
three leagues from Sahagun ;in which place a




PENINSULAR W AR. 241


corps of seven hundred French cavalry were re-
ported to be 10dged. As they were at some dis-
tance from the main body of the French army, it
was deemed practicable to cut .them off, and Lord
Paget determined, at aH events, to make the at-
tempt. He accordingly put himself at the head
of the 10th and 15th hussars; and, in the middle
of a cold wintry nigbt, when the ground was
covered with snow, set off for that purpose.


When they had ridden about two-thirds of the
way, Lord Paget divided his force, and desiring Ge-
peral Slade, with the 10th, to pursue the course of
the Cea, and to enter the town by that side, he him-
self, followed by the 15th, wheeled off to approach
it by a different route. Jt was not long before his
Lordship's party fell in with a picket oí the enemy.
The picket was instantly charged; and aH, except
one man, were either cut down or made prisonersó
But the escape of one was as injurious, under
existing circumstances, as the escape of the whole;
for the alarm was given, and before the 15th could
approach the place, r, the enemy were ready to
receive them. 1t was now broad daylight; and
as our troops drew near, the French were seen
formed in what appeared to be an open plain, at.
no great distance from the town. The 15th were
~heeled into line in a moment; and as there was
no time to be lost, they followed their leader at a
prisk trot, with the intention of charging; but


VOL. I. Q




242 NARRATIVE OI<' 'fHE


when they were yet fifty yards from the enemy;
they fúund that a wideditch divided them, and
that the French had availed themselves of other
inequálities in the ground7 of which, when sorne
way off y they had not been aware. A pause was
now necessarily made, but one instant served to
put the whole again. in motion. The regiment,
wheeling to its left, soon found out a convenient
spot for. crossing; and though the enemy manreu~
vred actively to hinder the formation, they were
again in line and advancing to the charge, within
five minutes from the commencement of the check.
A few changes of ground now took place,. as each
corps strove to gain the flank of another; but they
were only a few. The British cavalry effected ¡ts
object; and then coming down at fuIl speed upon
theír opponents, who stood to receive the shock,
they overthrew them in an instant. Many were
killed upon the spot, many more unhorsed, and
one hundred and fifty-seven were made prisoners,
including two lieutenant-colonek On this oc-
casion the English cavalry amounted only to four
hundred men, whilst that of the French feH not
short of seven hnndred.


This brilliant rencontre took place on the 20th;
and on the 21st the head-quarters of the army
were advanced to the spot where it occurred.
The weather wasat this time remarkably inc1e-
ment, a succession of frost and snow .having been




PENINSULAR W AR. 243


followed by heavy rains; and the troops, who had
performed of late many severe forced marshes,
were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Under
these circumstances, though fulIy conscious that
every hour which passed was so much time lost to
him and gained by the enemy, Sir John Moore
determined to halt for a day; and he devoted it
to a careful suppIy of all the necessaries of which
the menseemed to be in need, as well as in pre-
paring against t11e events of the trial which he felt
to be at hand.


Whilst resting here, the corresponden ce be-
tween General Moore and the Marquis de la Ro-
mana was renewed. The latter made no secret of
the general inefficiency of his army, but he
agreed to co-operate with us in our attack upon
Soult, with an whom he could bring into the tieId
in a fit state to meet the enemy. He sent more-
over, from time to time, such pieces of information
as he was enabled, by means of spies, or the vigi-
lance of the peasantry, to collect. At first he re-
presented the French force as amounting to no
more than ten thousand infantry and one thousand
cavalry, with eight or ten piecesof cannon, whom
it would be perfectly practicable to surround and
destroy before any reinforcements could reach
them from other q uarters; but by and by he be-
gan to discover that these reinforcements had
actuallyarrived, and that there-werefulleighteen




244- NARRATIVE OF THE


ornineteen thousand men in position álong the
Carrion. Sir John Moore had b~en aH aIong
aware that SouIt's corps amounted to this force;
he 'was not therefore disconcerted by the inteHi-
ge11ce; but he neglected no means which pre-
sented itself, of obtaining fresh communications;
and his channels were, at this time, both nume-
rous and sure. Hour after ,hour however passed
on; without the occurrence oí anything caIculated
tO prod uce an alteration in his plans; hour after
hour, therefore, was believed by the troops to
bring nearer and nearer to them the opportunity.
fol' which they had long panted, of forcing upon
the enemy the issue of a battle.


So passed the whole of the 21st, and the greater
part of the 22nd of December. Respecting the
French it was understood that, out of the eighteen
thousand men of which Soult's army was com-
poscd, seven thousand were státloned at Saldanha,
and five thousand at the town of Carrion; whilst
the rernainder either lined the banks of the river
in files of communicatiol1, or covered, in force, the
different fords and bridges by which it could be
passed. On our part, again, no definite position
-fione at least deserving of the name in a mili-
tary paint of view-had been taken up. We
were 011 the eve of moving, and therefore our
regimellts were kept as much togetber, as a regard
to shelter would allow; but we had selected no




l'E);I.N'S\lLAR W A.R, '2.45


points d'appui, nor were we particularly prepared
to reeeive an attack, should such be made upon
us, to advantage; yet were we ready to aet in
almost any manner which circumstances might
require; though our object was manifestly to act
offensively ratber tban on tlle defensive; and to
this end a1l our other and minor preparations were
turned. Hospitals were established in every con-
vent near, and arrangements marle for the safe
and speedy removal· of the wounded to the rear;
whilst nothing was spoken of except the approach~
ing contest, and the probable consequenees of a
victory, which all anticipated.


The evening of the 22nd was now approaching,
and orders had actually be en issued, for an im-
mediate advanee against the enemy.The army
was commanded to march at eight o'cloek at night~
in twocolumns, for the purpose of forcing the
bridge at Carrion, and so penetrating to Saldanha ;
and the right column, to which this .charge had
been peculiarly intrusted, was making ready to
get under arms, when two couriers, one from the
head-quarters of the Marquis de la Romana, and
the other from Los Santos, arrived. They we.re
bearers of intelligence, of which it is no figure of
speech to affirm, that none could have been re-
ceived more replete with sources of mortification
to every member of the army. The enemy, it ap-
peared, were moving in all directions upon uso




246 NARRATIVE OF THE


The eorps which had begun its march towards the
south, had halted at Talavera; severa] strong di-
visions had moved froID Palencia, and were already
in the vicinity of Carrion; the Badajoz army had
wheeled round, and was in full march towards Sa-
lamanca; whilst N apoleon himself had set out
from Madrid, with the avowed intention of making
Benevente his next halting place. Sir John Moore
felt, or imagined, that this was not the moment,
nor these the circumstances, under which to risk
a battle. He believed that Soult would retire
before him, for the express purpose of allowing
time to these different divisions to get into. his
rear; and he was persuaded that the passage of
a few days would, in all probability, expose him
\0 the risk of being surrounded by sixty or seventy
thousand troops, of the flower of the French army.
With this prospect before his eyes, he instantIy
countermanded the orders which had be en issued
in the earlier part of the evening. The regiments
which had begun tomuster,were dismissed to their
quarters; and it was understood, throughout the
ranks, that all idea of áttacking, at least for this
night, was abandoned.




247


CHAPTERX.


Dissatisfaction of the army-.SirJohn Moore prepares to re-


treat-The infantry and artillery retire in two columns,


covered by the cavalry-Movements of th? French armies-


Affair of cavalry at Majorga-Sutferings of the troops 01\
their march-Alarm at Benevente, and brilliant cavalryac-


tion-Destruction of stores at Astorga-Wretched pligbt of


Romana's troops-Disorganization of tbe English army-


March from Astorga to Villa. Franca-::---Seriou,s skirmish at


Villa Franca.~Retrea.t to Liego, where battle is otfered, but
declined by the French-The armies in position three days


-Retreat upon Corunna-The fleet arrives, and the embar-


kation is begnn-Battle of Cornuua, and death of Sir Joho


Moore-The army is withdrawn.


I T would be no easy matter to describe the effect
which this unlooked-for event produced upon
every roan and officer in the arroyo The troops
who had long panted to roeet the ellemy, and who
'but an hour ago were full of life and confidence.
suddenly appeared like men whose brightest hopes
.were withered, and their favourite expectations




248 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


overthrown. Few gave vent to their feelings,
either by complaint or murmur; but aH retired to
their quarters in a state of sullen silence, which
indicated, more powerfully perhaps than any
words could have done, the extent of the mortifi-
cation under which they laboured.


We rose next morning perfectly ignorant, and
to a certain degree quite indifferent, as to the
fate which awaited us; norwere our spirits
greatly heightened, when we saw hour after hotir
pass away without the occurrence of any move-
ment either to the front or rearo There is good
reason to believe that Sir John Moore himself had '
hardly determined on the course which it behoved
him to follow. He was still imperfectIy informed
as to the amount of the different corps which were
advancing against him; though the natural tem-
perament of his disposition induced hiÍn to rate
these at the highest; and he was extremely un-
willing to commence a rapid retreat, tilI it should
have become indispensable. Besides, despatches
carne in this day from Romana, announcing that
he had advanced with all the disposable part of
his army, amounting in the whole to seven thou-
sand men, for the I>urpose of co-operating in the
projected attack upon Soult. 1t was necessary to
countermand this movement, as weH as to make
such arrangements with the Spanish General as
should prevent the two armies from incommoding




PENINSULAR WAR. 249


or commg into collision with each other during
the retreat: In settling this point, as well as in
preparing the hospitals and stores for a speedy
removal, the whole of the 23-rd was spent; and
the following is the order in which it was finally
determined that the two corps should be with- .
drawn.


As the defence of the Gallicias was esteemed
by no means impracticable, Sir John Moore was
desirous of retiring in such a direction as would
enable him, should circumstances authorise the
measure, to take up positions in these provinces;
whilst, at the same time, in case of the worst, á
retreat should be open to him towards the coasL
To effect this, it was necessary, i.n the first place,-
to cross the Eslar; which, from our present situa-:
tion, might be done by three ·routes. We might
proceedby Mansilla, at which point the river is
crossed by a bridg~; or by Valencia, where there
was on1y a ferry; 01' we might take the route by~
Castro Gonsalo, where there is likewise a bridge,
and from whence a road passes directto Bene-
vente. At Mansilla, however, the Spanish troops
were already posted; they had exhausted the
country of aH its. supplies; it was therefore vain
to think of going thither; but the roads by Va-
lencia and Castro Gonsalo were both open, and
ti: was resolved to make use of them; This was
the more necessary, as well ~ecause it would have




250 NAHRATIVE OF THE


been extremely inconvenient to lead the whole
column in the same direction; as because, were
such a measure attempted, the magazines which
had been established both at Benevente and Za-
mora, must, one or other of them, be exposed to
capture by the enemy. Astorga was named as the
place of meeting for the two columns, where it
was understood that a determined stand would be
made;' whilst the Spaniards were requested to
faH back upon Leon, from whence, in the event of
our offering battle, they might harass the rear and
Hank of the French. In the mean while, however,
Romana was to keep possession of the bridge of
Mansilla as long as possible; and the city of Leon
was not to be surrendered, till it should be re-
duced to the last extremity; Every preliminary ar-
rangement being complete, the armybegan, on
the 24th, to retire in the order whichhad been
assigned to it. General Hope, with his own divi-
sion, and that of General Fraser, fell back upon
Majorga, on the road to Castro Gonsalo; whilst
Sir David Baird, at the head of the other éolumn,
took the direction of Valencia. To cover these
ÍIlovements, the cavalry received directions to push
strong patrols toward.s Carrion, as far as the enemy's
pickets, and not to q uit the position till night-fall
on the 25th, -sorne hours after the reserve and light
infantry had been withdrawn. Everything was
~one with the most perfect regularity. Tbe ca-




PENINSULAR WAR. 251


lumns made good their march, the one to Valen-
cia, the other to Castro Gonsalo, without molesta-
tion, and the rear-guard withdrew, at the appoint-
ed hour, leaving the enemy in apparent ignoran ce
that a retreat was in contemplation.


In the mean while, however, Buonaparte was
advancing with rapid strides, from the Escurial.
On the 24th, he had reached Tordesillas with the
advance of his cavalry; sending strong detach-
ments on as far as Villalpando and Majorga; and
at the latter of these place s our troops were again
enabled to try the strength oftheir opponents. 1t
was on the 26th that a considerable force of the
enemy were seen drawn up upon the brow of
some rising ground, and apparently making ready
to cut off any stragglers which might lag behind,
or wander far from the ranks. Lord Paget, who
was present at Majorga, instantly directed Colonel
Leigh, at the head of two squadrons of the 10th
hussars, to dislodge them. Colonel Leigh, forming
his little band into two lines, rode briskly forward,
one squadron leading, and the other supporting,
till he had gained the top of the hill. Here the
roen were commanded to reÍn up, for tbe purpose
of refreshing the horses after the ascent; and they
díd so, under a heavy but not very destructive fire
froro the French. But the horses had no sooner
recovered their wind, than the word was given to
.charge. aild in five minutes tbe French were over-




252 NARRA'fIVE o.F THE


thro.wn. Many were killed, many mo.re wo.und-
ed, and upwards úf o.ne hundred taken priso.ners.


The 10th, ho.wever, was no.t the o.nly cavalry
corps which succeeded in distinguishing itself. 1 t
was remarked by aH, that as o.ften as the French
and o.ur peo.ple carne into. co.ntact, the superio.rity
o.f the British cavalry was shown to. a degree far
beyo.nd anything which had been anticipated.
They seemed to. set all o.dds at defiance; and in no.
single instance was their temerity punished by
defeat, o.r even by repulse. Matters went so. far
at last, that Captain Jo.nes, o.f the 18th, ventured,
with no. mo.re than thirty men o.f his regiment, to.
attack o.ne hundred French cavalry; and he put
them to. the ro.ut, killing fo.urteen, and making six
priso.ners.


Whilst the cavalry were thus co.ming into. almo.st
daily co.ntact with the enemy, and kept in excel-:
lent spirits by their repeated successes, the infan-
try, co.vered by two. o.r three light regiments, were
marching o.ver miserable ro.ads, and thro.ugh an
exhausted co.untry, expo.sed to. hardships mo.re
terrible than it has frequently fallen to. the lo.t o.f
British so.ldiers to. endure. The weather was no.w
more severe than it. had been since we entered
Spain; co.ld winds blowing, and heavy sho.wers o.f
sleet and rain falling; and it was no.t always that
the tro.o.ps co.uld findshelter, even at night, against
their influence. The Ulules and o.ther animals em ..




PENINSULAR WAR. 253


ployed to carry the baggage, soon began to foun-
der; 6r the muleteers, terrified at the prospect of
being overtaken by the French, left them and Hed.
In such cases it was found quite impracticable to
get the animals along, for they would obey no
voice but that of their master, and they were COll-
sequently abandoned, and their loads given up to
plunder. N or were these the only evils to which
qur men saw themselvesexposed. The Spaniards,
whether they were men in authority or not, either
abandoned their houses as the British army ap-
proached, locking their doors, and concealing, as
far as they were able, the little stock of provisions
of which they might chance to be possessed; or
they met our. requisitions for food and wine with
murmurs and complaints, suéh as they would not
have ventured to utter before French soldiers.
These things not unnaturally inéreased the irri-
tation under which the troops already laboured.
They began to view the S paniards as their worst
enemies, alld to treat them as people unworthy of
any consideration whatever. This was severely
retaliated upon them by an enraged peasantry;
and scenes of violence and bloodshed, in which
these allies were the actors, proved by no means
uncommon.


On the 27th of December the coIllmn reached
Benevente. Benevente is remarkable for an oId
baroníaI casUe, which for many generations has




254 NARRATIVE OF THE


been the property of the dukes-of Ossuna; and to
whieh, in point either of splendour or extent, it
would be diffieult to find in E urope a fellow. N ear
it runs the litt]e river Eslar, aeross whíeh, at soroe
distanee froro the town, a bridge was thrown, but
whieh was eommanded by some hilIs, that rise
rather abruptly from the opposite bank of the
stream. Our people had seareely entered the
place, when an alarro was raised that the enemy
were approaehing; and it proved to be so far not
without foundation, that troops were seen, as if in
the aet of forming, on the heights beyond. Pre-
parations were instantly made to reeeive thero.
The regiments assembled at their several points of
mm¡ter, and the cavalry rushing through the gates,
descended to the level country, where they could
most eonveniently aet; but neither the one nor the
other were called into play. ' The enemy, satisfied
with thus disturbing our repose, melted away, and
we returned again to our former quarters and our
original oecupations. The best precautions were,
however, taken, to provide against surprise; the
bridge over the Eslar. was broken down; and
piekets of eavalry were extended all along the
bank, so as to watch the fords, and give timely
notiee of any movem'ent.


The night of the 27th passed by in quiet; and
as soon as day-light carne in, the retreat was re-
newed. The cavalry, however, had not been




PEN INSULAR W AR. 255


withdrawn, when certain movements on the part
of the enemy appeared to indicate that we should
not be permitted to escape thus easily. A body of
flve or six hundred horse were observed, about
nine o'clock, to try a ford not far from the ruins of
the bridge; and in a few moments afterwards they
crossed, and bega~ to form on our side ofthe river.
Instantly t4e pickets, which had been appointed
10 do the duty of a rear-guard, made ready 10 op-
pose them. Though they mustered little more tban
two hundred men, they boldly advanced, under
the command of Colonel Otway, against the mass,
repeatedly charging its leading squadrons, and
keeping it fairly in check, till Lord Paget and the
writer of these pages arrived; wben the former
made haste to bring up the 10th hussars, whilst
the Iatter put himself at the head of tbe detach-
ments aIread y in tbe fleld. Many charges were
now made on both sides, and the squadrons were
repeatedly intermingled; whilst the pickets still
continued to give ground, as it was intended that
they sbould. But the 10th were now ready: tbe
pickets saw that tbey had support; and they re-
quired no entreaty to dash against the enemy.
One cheer was given, and the horses being pressed
to their speed, the enemy's line was broken in an
instant. They fled in great disorder to the river,
and repassed it much more actively than tbey had
passed it before; leaving in our hands General Le




256 NARRATIVE 01<' THE


Fevre, their colonel, with upwards of seventy otheI
officers and meno This was, however, the most
seriQus affair in which we had yet be en engaged.
The cavalry opposed to us formed part of the im-
perial guard; they were all tried soldiers, and they
fought in a manner not unworthy of the reputation
which they had earned in the north of Europe.
They lost in killed and wounded, independently oí
prisoners, about sixty men; our casualties fen
$omewhat short of fifty.
" It has been said that N apoleon himself was an
eye-witness of this rencontre, from the opposite
heights on which he stood. Whether there be any
truth iD: the rumour, 1 know not; but one thing is
quite certain, that the enemy did not venture, for
sorne days after; again to oppose themselves hand
to hand to oureavalry. The column accordingly
reached Astorga on the 30th, having heen very
little harassed by its pursuers. It arrived, how-
ever, in a state of great disorganisation; and it
carne to a place, where pictures of want and misery
were already too" frequent, in the persons of Ro-
mana's soldiers. For Romana, in spite of General
Moore's entreaty to the contrary, had seen fit to
fall back, not upon Leon, or the difficult country
near, but in the same direction with ourselves.
The conseq uence was, that all the houses were
filled with his peopIe, among whom a malignant
typhus rever was raging; and the roads were lite-




PENINSULAR \VAR. 257


rally covered and encumbered with men, horses,
cars, and aH the other accompaniments of an army,
which had foundered or broken down on their
marcho It is hardly possible to conceive any set
of men bearing less resemblance to soldiers, or
having a stronger claim upon the compassion of
those who beheld them, than these wretched crea-
tures. They were almostall in a state bordering
upon lludity. They had no provisions; their afms
were, for the most part, useless; and of ammuni-
tion, either for musketry or cannon, they were
wholly destiti.Ite. N or, to say, the truth, were our
own people in a plight by,many degrees superior.
With us, as w~th them, provisions had long been
scanty; and our shoes, that most essential article
in a soldier's wardrobe, were, in most instances,
worn out. Many officers had, indeed, brought
with. them from England considerable quantities
of apparel; and depots of stol'es had been
formed at various points, one of which chanced to
be Astorga; but the rnuleswhich carried the bag-
gage of individuals had almost all knocked up, and
of the stores deposited in the town liUle use could
be made. The Spaniards were, indeed, supplied
with muskets-for of muskets, a large quantity
had been collected here-and they received as
much ammunition as they were able to carry; but
as to c10thing and provisions, these we possessed
not in sufficient quantities to supply ourselves ;we


VOL. I. R




258 NARRATIVE OF THE


cotlld not, therefore, supply the wants of others.
Rornana's troops accordingly departed on the fol-
lowing morning, to follow the road by Fonubadon
into Gallicia, having derived frorn us none of the
refreshrnent of which they stood so rnuch in necd,
and in the hope of obtaining which they had, per-
haps, deserted their post at Mansilla l11any days
earlier than they needed to have done.


The arl11y had hitherto fallen back under the
persuasion that it would not be required to retreat
beyond its present position at Astorga; but that
here, or hereabouts, l11atters wOtlrd be brought tó the
issue of a battle. Though their conduct, in rnany
respects, cannot certainly be spoken of in high
terms, it is probable that this prospect, and this
alolle, had hitherto kept the l11en in sornething
like a state of subordination. They had com-
mitted various excesses, it is true; l11any had
individually robbed and plundered, and got drunk
by the way, and sorne had thus fallen into the
hands of the enemy, 01' perished from the incle-
l11ency of the weather; yet the army, considered
as a body, was still efficient, and required nothing
more than a few hours of rest, and a moderate
supply of provisions, to restore it to the state of
high ord~r in which it was at Salamanca. From
the moment when preparations began to be made
fol' a continued retreat from Astorga, all this l11ay
be said to have been at an end. In Astorga, the




P-ENINSULAR WAR. 259


blowing up of ammunition-waggons, the destruc-
tion of intl'enching tools, and the committal to the
flames of field-equipments for a whole division,
gave the signal, as it were, fór all the bad pas-
sions of those who witnessed them, to be let
loose; and mortifying as it is to confess it, the
faet eannot be denied, that from that hour we no
Jonger resetnbled a British arrny. There was still
the same bravery in our ranks; bat it wasonly
at moments when the enemy were expeeted to
come on, that our order and regularity returned;
and except in that single point, we resembled
rather a erowd of insubordinate rebels, in full
flight before the victorious soldiers of their sove-
reign, than a corps of British troops executing a
series of military movements in the presence of
their enemy.


When he began hisretreat in real earnest" it
was, 1 apprehend, Sir John Moore's intention to
fall back upon Vigo, and there to embarkJlis army
in. the transports which had be en ordered round
to receive them. With this view he had, when at .
Benevente, despatched General Crawford, at the
head of three thousand men, along the nearer but
steeper road by Orense, in order that ~ny at-
tempt on the part of the enerny to gain ground
upon him with a light eolumn might be prevented;
whiIst he himself took the more circuitous but
beUer route, by Astorga and Villa Franca. At




260 NARRATIVE OF THE


the former place he was joined by Sir David
Baird's division; and here everything, no matter
whether it might be private or public property,
for the removal of which means were wanting,
was destroyed; and the army began its march on
the following morning, in worse plight, and under
more trying circumstances, than ever.


The road from Astorga to Villa Franca leads
through the villages of Torre, Benivedre, Pin-
ferrade, and over a country as much diversified,
and as striking, as will be seen perhaps in ~ny
part of Europe. The first four or five leagues
carry the traveller up one continued aseent, and
along the face of a hill, steep, bare, and open; on
gaining the summit of whieh, he arrives at the
entrance of sorne tremendous passes, such as a
thousand resolute '!llen might easily maintain
against ten times their number. These extend as
far as the village of Torre, a distan ce of nearly
three leagues; after which the landscape becomes
as magnificent as the intermingling of hill and
valley:, rock and mountain, wood and pasture, can
render it. We, of course, beheld it under all the
disadvantages of a season remarkably inclement.
when the ridges ~ere covered with deep snow,
and the fields and roads little better than mere
heaps of mud; yet even thus it was impossible to
pass it by without feelings of the liveliest admira-
tion, and a strong regret that it had not been our




PENINSUJ"AR WAR. 261


fortune to wander here when the forests were in
fuIl leaf, and the green hills in their glory. But
it was not froID its temporary bleakness alone,
that a scene like that around us stirred up a
strange commingling of pleasurable and painful
sensatians. The candition of the army was at this
time a most melancholy one; the rain carne down
upan us in torrents; men and horses were foun-
dering at every step; the former fairly worn out
through fatigue and want of nutriment, the latter
sinking under their loads, and dying upan the
spot. N 01' was it only among the baggage ani-
mals that an absolute inability to proceed further
began to show itself; the shoes of the cavalry
horses dropped off, and the horses themselves
soon became useless. It was asad spectacle to
behold these fine creatures urged and goaded on
till their strength utterly failed them, and then
shot to death by their riders, in order to prevent
them from falling into the hands of the enemy.
Then, again, the few ammunition-waggons which
had hitherto kept up, fell one by one tó the rear;
the ammunition was immediately destroyed, and
the waggons abandoned. Thus were misfortunes
accumulating upon us as we proceeded; and it
appeared e:xtremely improbable, should our pre-
sent system of forced marches be persisted in,
that one half of the army would ever l'each the
coast.




262 N AHIlATIVE OF THE


The reader is doubtless aware that the spirit of
insubordination of which 1 have already s.poken,
as exhibiting itself in a variety of particular in-
stances, became now almost general. There was
no possibility of keeping the men in their ranks.
Some under one pretext, and sorne under another,
whole regiments strayed from their colours; and
as often as a wine-house or store carne in the way,
scenes of the most shocking descnption ensued.
The army moved, as is customary in such cases,
by divisions, the main body keeping a day's march
ahead of the - reserve and the rear-guard. The
former reached Benivedre on the 31st, and at an
early hour on the 1st of January was ordered to
leave it; but when the latter arrived, the place
was fuU of stragg1ers, aH, or almost aH, in a state
of desperate intoxication. At this time the ene-
my's cavalry, though they seldom sought an
opportunity of coming to blows with us, pressed
closely and incessantly upon our rear: we rode
frequently many miles in sight of each other; and
from ti~ne to time, our rearmost dragoons would
exchange pistol shots with their Ieading files.
Under such circumstances, no pause could, of
course, be made, for the meré purpose of closing
up such as lagged; and hence every one who
proved unable, either from intoxication or weari-
ness, to push on, was of necessity left behind.
But the multitudes who lingered in Benivedre




PENINSL'LAR WAR. 26.'3


were so great, that the utmost repugnance was
experienced at the idea of abandoning them; and
it was not till every effort to rouse them had been
made in vain, that they were left to their fate.
Even after the rear-guard hadmarched, a small
detachment of horse still endeavoured to cover
them; nor 'was it till the enemy, in great force,
were seen approaching, that it retired. Then
followed that scene which has been so frequently
described already; but of the horrors of which
none can form an adequate conception who were
no! eye-witnesses of it; when the French dra-
goons, pursuing our patrol, galloped through the
midst of a crowd of men, women, and children,
and wantonly slashed to the right and left, with-
out regard to the age or sex of the object of their
fury. Of thé numbers who thus fell a sacrifice to
their own intemperance, 1 cannot pretend to
sreak with certainty; but 1 know them to llave
been very considerable; and 1 am sure that Bri-
tish troops never looked upon a spectacle more
appalling than those few presented, who, having
come up with the col~mn, bIeeding and cut in nu-
merous pIaces, were, by order of the General,
paraded through the ranks as a warning to their
comrades.


We reached Villa Franca on the 2nd, having
performed a distance of upwards of sixty miles in
two days, where the greater part of the cavalry




264 NARHATIVE OF 'l'HE


took up its quarters, only a small detachment
remaining with the reserve at Caeabelos. Like
Benivedre, it was filled with drunken and dis-
orderly men, belonging to the divisions whieh had
preceded us; by whom the most violent outrages
bad been committed, not upon the natives only,
but upon our own magazines. A store of wine
bad been broken open, and the wine either drunk
or wantonly spílt; and a considerable quantity of
forage, of which we stood sorely in need, des-
troyed. One man was executed here, being
detected in the act of marauding; but the disci-
pline of the army was by this time too much
impaired to be very seriously affeeted even by
su eh an example. Similar deeds were performed
wherever opportunities occurred, and that with
the openness of men, who saw, 01' faneied,that
their case was desperate.


The enemy, who since the affair of the 28th had
kept generally out of reach, showed a disposition
on the 3rd to renew their system of attacking. A
large force of eavalry was se en about oue o'clock
in the afternoon, advancing at a leisurely . pace,
and with IDuch apparent caution, on Cacabelos.
Through the middle of the town the~e runs a small
stream, along the bank of which part of the re-
serve was drawn up; whilst the 95th rifle corps,
supparted by a picket of hussars, occupied a rising
graund about half a league in advance. The rifle-




PENINSULAR W AR. 265


men were eommanded to faH back, and retreat
through the town over a bridge. The greater
number had alreadyeffected this rnovernent, when
the French eavalry corning on in overwhelrning
nurnbers, our picket was forced to give way; and
the French getting in among the two rear com-
panies of the 95th, sueeeeded in rnaking some
pl'isoners. The riflemen had hardly reeovered
their surprise, and were barely able to spread in
skirrnishing order,· when a eloud of disrnounted
chasseurs dashed forward, and crossing the stream
in every part, cornmenced a sharp onset upon the
village. They were met with great gallantry by
the 95th, who retiring slowly up the hill in rear of
the town, took post among sorne vineyards, and
galled them terribly from behind that shelter.
From these the eavalry attempted to dislodge
them: they eharged boldly up the road, and
threatened to take the skirmishers in rear; but
they were almost immediately driven back by the
steady and well-directed fire of our troops; and
they retreated, leaving General Colbert, with many
other officers and men, dead upon the field.


The alarm had by this time spread to Villa
Franca, and Sir John Moore appeared at the se ene
of action. He had scareely done so, 'when a heavy
eolumn of infantry showed itself over the opposite
hills, in fun march upon our position. The artil-
lel'y attached to the reserve instantly opened upon




266 NARHATIVE OF 'fHE


it; and such was the excellence of the practice,
that the enemy, having suffered severely in killed
and wounded, was fain to withdraw his corps
before it had been able to fire a musket. N evel'-
theless, Sir John Moore was not desirous of bring-
ing on a general action here. He had heard of a
position near Lugo, of which he proposed to take
advantage by fighting there, should it be neces-
sary to 6ght at all previous to his' embarkation ;
he was not, therefore, willing to waste time, or
sacrifice lives, in the obstinate maintenance" of
ground to which he attached no value. Whilst,
therefore, the reserve was ordered to Villa Franca,
the main body took the road to Herrieras; and "jt
was foHowed, about ten o'clock, by the rear-guard,
which reached its halting-place soon after mid-
night.


The country became, from this point, such as to
render cavalry of no avail. It was universally
steep, rocky, precipitous, and covered with wood,
and, where in the few spots it was otherwise, too
much enclosed with vineyards and mulberry plan-
tations, to allow even a sq uadron of horse to form
up or acto The cavalry were accol'dingly sent on
at once to Lugo, whi.ther the infantry and arti11ery
followed, as fast as extreme exhaustion, and the
nature of the road by which they travelled, wOllld
allow. But they followed both painfully and
slowly; fOf though as many as forty miles were




.t>E!'JINSULAlt WAR. 267


performed in one march, that march compre-
hended, not the day onIy, but the night also.
This was more than men, reduced to the low ebb
to which our solctiers had fallen, could endure.
They dropped down by whole sections, on the
way-side, and died, sorne with curses, others with
the voice of prayer, in their mouths. lt was
dreadful, likewise, to know that not rnen onIy, but
women and children, were subject to this misera-
ble fate. By sorne strange neglect, 01' by the
indulgence of a rnistaken humanity, Sir John


. Moore's arrny had carried along with it more than
the too large proportion of women allotted by the
rules of our service too arrnies in the fieId; and
these pOOl' wretches were now heighten-ing the
horror of passing events by a display of suffering,
even more acute than that endured by their hus-
bands. Sorne were taken in Iabour on the road ;
and in the open air, arnidst showers of sleet and
snow, gave birth to infants, which, with their
rnothers, perished as soon as they had seen the
light. Others, carrying perhaps each of thern two;
chiIdren on their backs, would toil on, and wheTh
they carne to look to the condition of their precious'
burdens, they would find one or both frozen to·
death. Then the depth of moral degradation to!
which they sank, their oaths and críes, uttered;
under the influence of intoxication, were hardly'
less appalling than the groans which burst froID




268 N ARRA'fIVE OF 'fHE


them, as an hope of aid abandoned them, and they
sat dówn to die. 1 am well aware that the
horrors of this retreat have been again and again
described in terms calculated to freeze the blood
of such as read them; but 1 have no hesitation in
saying that the most harrowing accouIits which
have yet been laid before the public, fall short of
the reality.


The journey from Villa Franca to Lugo occupied
one night and two days, the army reaching the
latter place on the 5th of January. It was one
continued skirmish between the rear of the British
and the advanced-guard of the French, in which
the latter were invariably repulsed with considera-
ble loss. But, in spite of these advantages, the
Britis~ army became· every hour more and more
unfit for service. Its resources wasted away at
every mile. First, whole waggon-loads of clothing,
afms, shoes, and other necessaries, which had
just arrived from England for the purpose of re-
fitting Romana's army, were met, and after the
men had helped themselves to those articles of
which they stood most in need, the residue was
destroyed. Next, two bullock-cars, loaded wit.h
dollars to the amount of 25,0001. were found to be
immoveable. The casks which contained the
money were stove in, and the treasure thrown
from the road over a precipice. This was a most
unwise as well as uselcss measure. Had it been




PENINSULAR WAR. 269


distributed among the soldiers, there is little
doubt that they would have contrived to carry it
along; whereas the knowledge that it lay among
the cliffs, tempted many men to lag behind, who
aH feH into the hands of the enemy, or perished
from cold. But every thing was now done as if
our case was absolutely desp~rate, and as ifthe llt-
most that could be expected, or even desired, was
to escape with our p.ersons, at the expense of the
whole of our materiel. Even guns were now
abandoned, as fast as the horses which dragged
them knocked up ; and the very sick and wound-
ed were left behind in the waggons, of w hich the
bullocks or mules could proceed no further.


1 have said that the march from Herrieras tú
Lugo produced one continlJed series of skirmishes
between the rear of one army, and the head .of
tha other. For the most part, these were pro-
ductive of very trifiing results, and seldom pro-
mi sed to produce more than actually arose out of
them; but there was one occasion on which the
spirits of the troops became powerfully excited,
and when nothing but a degree of caution on the
part of Marshal SouIt. for which no one was pre-
pared, kept off asevere, if not a general action.
It was this : .


. The village of Constantino stands upon the edge
of a small stream, which runs along a deep and
rockychannel, forming the bottom of a ravine,




270 N ARRATIVE OF 'rilE


which, on either hand, is closed in by hilIs. The
hill on the left of the villag-e i8 ascended from the
south by an exposed and winding road, tolerably
steep and uneven; whilst on the opposite side ls
a long gradual slope, till you arrive at the head of
the bridge aIread y spoken of. Sir John Moore
was naturally apprehensive that, should he permit
the enemy to take possession of the summit, whilst
his own eolull'ln was yet withingun-shot, the troops .
wou'Id be terribly annoyed during their open and
g-radual deseent; he therefore determined to dis-
pute the further advance of his pursuers, and to
give time to all the regiments which should be
thus employed to make good the passage of the
river, and gain the village.


Withthis view ther.ifle corps, supported by a
brigade of horse artillery, halted on the brow of
the hill. The enemy perceiving the disposition,
and presuming that his troops, should they at-
tempt to carry the ridg-e by assault, would be
exposed to a murderous fire from the guns op-
posed to them, halted on the declivity of a range
of hilIs opposite, and continued for more than half
an hour to look at our people without attempting
anything. By this time· the column had gained
the head of the bridge, and the principal daúger
was past; the riflemen and artillery wereaecord-
ingly directed to retreat also, in good order, but
with all possible celerity. They obeyed these in-




PENINSULA R "r A R. 271


junctions faithfully; but they were soon followed
by the French, who carne poul'ing down the hill,
just as the rearmost companies had effected the
passage of the stream. Arrangements were in-
stantly made to receive the attack which seemed
now to be threatened. The 28th and rifle corps
formed so as to defend the bridge; w hilst the
20th, 52nd, and 91st, under Sir John Moore in
person, assumed a position on the summit of a hill
in the real'. Here, likewise, the _ horse artillery
took post; and now all was expectation and anx-
iety. The enemy carne on with great apparent
boldness. His cavalry and tirailleurs attempted
to pass the bridge; they were met, not only by
the fire of the riflemen, but by a heavy and well-
directed cannonade from the high grounds, and
they feH back. In a few mornents they renewed
their efforts on the same point, and with similar
want of success; and again, after a short pause,
for the third time. But they were be aten back
in every attempt; till at last darkness put an end
to the skirmish, and they withdrew. At eleven
o'clock at night, -however, our people abandoned
their post. The troops were dreadfully harassed
by their exertions, but not a roan sank under
them; and before rnorning they reached Lugo,
where they found the whole arrny concentrated.


At Lugo, as has been already stated, General
Moore had resolved, should the enemy press hard




272 NARHATIVE OF THE


upon him, to halt and offer battle. With this de-
sign, orders were sent forward to Villa Franca,
that General Crawford should re trace his steps,
and that General Hope's column, which moved a
days' march in advance, should rest at Lugo till
the divisions in the real' had arrived. These 01'-
ders were, 1 believe, transmitted by the hands of
Sir John's aide-de-camp, Captain Napier, and
were enclosed under cover to Sir David Baird,
who was req uested to forward them to their
several places of destination. Captain N apier
delivered his packet at N agaIes, and Sir Da\,jd
Baird instantly despatched an orderly dragoon,
with written instructions for General Hope and
General Frazer. It unhappily fell out that the
dragoon got drunk, and the pácket miscarried.
The misfortune was not discovered till the fo11ow-
ing morning, when fresh orders were instantly
sent off; but the loss of time nothing could repair.
General Hope, with his division, was already a
full day's march beyond Lugo; and though he
wheeled about immediately Oil the receipt of Sir
David's communication, he did not arrive at Lugo
till after the rear-guard had come in; and even
then his troopswere so fatigued, that their fitness
for immediate service of any kind seemed to be
extremely problematical. Many of the horses
aUached to this division dropped down dead in
the streets; many more were destroyed as usc-




PENINSULAR WAR. 273


less; and even of the men, more than one were
known to have perished of absolute exhaustion.
N evertheless, as the General had now determined
tofall back, not u'pon Vigo, but upon Corunna, it
was well that the detached columns had be en
called in. General Orawford, indeed. was too
far on his way to be overtaken, and he reached
Vigo without molestation, embarking there in good
order, and at his leisure; but had the rest of the
army endeavouredto follow him, the probability
is, that half its numbers must have fallen by the
way.


The ground upon which Sir John Moore pro-
posed to await the arrival of the enemy, was dis-
tant about a league, or a "league and a haH: from
Lugo. It offered, upon the whole, a tolerably ad-
vantageous position, along the summit of a range
ofIow hills, and eovered on both flanks by roeks
and precipices. Here the reserve, under General
Paget, took ¡ts station; whilst the rest of the
army found quarters for the night in the town, and
among su eh houses and cottages as were near.


About noon on the 6th, the French columns
made their appearance, and deployed, as it had
been antieipated that they would, upon the heights
opposite. Immediately the army got under arms,
and everything was in readiness, in case of an
attack, to be moved to its proper station. But no
offensive operations ensued. The lines looked at


VOL. 1. s




274 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


one another for sorne hours, as if each expected
the first movement to be made by its opponents;
till at last, as evening began to. close in, an. idea of
a battle was laid aside. Those who had it in
charge to keep possession of the position, piled
their arms, and prepared to bivouac; whilst the
rest retired, each brigade and regiment, to its own
quarters.


The morning of the 7th had scarcely dawned,
when the enemy showed a disposition, either to
attack us in real earnest, or to provoke us into a
forward movement against themselves. They
opened upon our line with four pieces of cannon ;
which, though they did little serious damage,
served to irritate and annoy the soldiers a good
deal. The fire was, however, speedily returned
by the British artillery, and with sucheffect, that
in a few minutes one of the French guns was dis-
mounted, and the remainder silenced. These
were the only hostilities which passed between
the two armies during the earlier part of the day;
but towards sunset columns were observed to de-
file, in considerable force, towards our left, at the
same time that a cloud of tirailleurs began an ac-
tive skirmish with the pickets. Sir John Moore
natural1y conceivecl. that he was about to sustain
a serious attack, and that it would be principally
made upon the point which was threatened. He
flew to the spot, and arrived just as a heavy co-




I'ENINSULAR WAR. 275


lumn of French troops began to ascend the rising
ground, and to press upon a wing of the 76th,
which held it. The 76th gradually retired till it
was joined by the 51st; a regirnent in which Sir
John had served as an ensign, and to which he
addressed a few words calculated to remind thern
of the fact, and expressive of his confidence in
their valour. The short address was not thrown
away. After exchanging a few discharges of
musketry, our people rushed forward with the
bayonet; the enemy scarcely stoOO tú receive the
shock, but fled in much confusion down the hill,
leaving a good many killed and wounded behind
them. This was the last operation on either side;
and the two armies again spent the night in
anxious expectation of what the morrow rnight
bring forth.


Sir John Moore no longer entertained a doubt
that the honr of trial was at hand. He sincerely
rejoiced in the conviction; f(}r the prospect of a
battle had restored to the army the whole of its
confidence, and much of its discipline; and the
General saw that it was only by beating his pur-
suers, and beating them efl'ectnally, that he could
hope to free himself from their presence, or secure
a safe and orderIy embarkation. The greater part
of the night mlS accordingly spent in bringing
gnng into the position, and making every arrange-
Qlent which the circuIÍlstances of the case seemed




276 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


to require; and men's hopes were excited to the
highest: but aH our preparations had been made
for no purpose. We were in position during the
entire day, anxiously desiring that an attack would
take place; but hour after hour passed away, and
the enemy made no movement. On our part it
was deemed unRafe to advance, because the French
were understood to surpass us greatly in numbers;
and they occupied ground extremely difficult of
approach, though furnishing. numerous facilities for
a retreat; whilst another corps. under Victor,
was known to have halted at Villa Franca, and
therefore to be within reach. Under these cir-
cumstances,' nothing remained for us, except to
make the most of the impression which our de-
monstration might have produced upon the ene-
my's confidence. The troops remained at their
arms till dark; and then large fires having been
lighted along the heights, the retreat was recom-
menced.


We marched all night, both men and horses
suffering dreadfully from cold, fatigue, and hun-
ger; and passing th~ough Lugo, we arrived at
Valenuda about ten o'cIock next morning. Here
the positive inability of the troops to proceed
further compelled á halt; and we lay upon the
ground, and under a pelting rain, totally devoid of
shelter, for several hours. But even this space of
time was not granted to undisturbed repose. A




PENINSULAR WAR. 277


cry arose, from time to time, that the enemy were
advancing; and at each alarm the regiments were
ordered to faH in. It is needless to say, how se-
verely this constant call to arms told upon men
already worn down by a night-march; indeed, it
is not going too far to affirm that many of the
corps which had be en most frequently roused from
their sleep, made ready to renew their march in
the eveIiing, as little refreshed as if they had not
halted at aH.


From this time ti11 it reached Corunna, the arrny
saw little more of the French. We had gained by
the late night-march twelve full hours upon Mar-
shal Soult, and he was never able to overtake us ;
yet was our journey, at least for a time, little less
harassing, and little less disorderly, than it had
been before. When we came in to Betanzos, in-
deed, at a late hour in the night, so many were
found to have fallen behind, not only from the
leading divisions, but from the reserve itself, that
to have pursued our progress on the following
morning, would have be en to sacrifice a large por-
tion of the army; and the 10th was accordingly
given up as a day of resto By this- means, mul-
titudes of stragglers were permitted to overtake
their corps; and though the enemy were certainly
enabled to recover part of the ground which they
had lost, that was a matter not to be put in com-
petition with the preservation of so many British




278 N ARRA TIV1: OF THB


soldiers. BesideF:, the only French force which
succeeded in corning up with us, was a small patro}
of cavalry, which our rear-guard had no difficulty
in keeping in check. The advantages resulting
from tbe day of rest were therefore very great.


At length the coast began to appear, and Corun-
na, with its citad el and towers, rose upon our view ;
but the harbour, in which we had expected to find
a large fleet. at anchor, was occupied only by the
few coasters and fishing-boats which usually find
shelter there. Though intelligence of the aIte-
ration in our plans had been sent off sorne days
previously, and the Admiral used every exertion
to bring. the shipping round, a continuance of ad-
verse winds had rendered the effort abortive; and
it was only after an interval of sorne days that the
fleet arrived. Most sincereIy did every one now re-
gret that a battle had not been fought long ago; for
it was quite manifest, that to embark without fight-
ing was entirely out of the question. But where
to fight, was a question which few felt disposed to
answer. \Ve had left behind us positions innu-
merable; in any one of which an arrny such as
ours illight have maintained itself against twice its
numbers; at all events till reinforcernents should
reach US, or sorne diversion in other parts of Spain


. call off part of the enemy's attention from uso In
the vicinity of Corunna, no such favourable ground
existed. There were, indeed, p~sitions here-




PENINSULAR WAR. 279


severa} of them very respectable, and one po-
sitively cornrnanding; but to oceupy these as they
ought to be oceupied, would require a force rnuch
greater than ours; whilst to oeeupy thern irnper-
fectly, would be to expose ourselves to prodigious
risk. Still there was no he]p for it. That we had
fallen into difficulties, every one seemed to be
aware; but there was no disposition anywhere to
magnifythem; and our General insta~tly set about
su eh arrangernents as appeared to hirn best eal-
culated to render them productive of no serious
results.


The Jeading brigades arrived in Corunna on the
afternoon of the 11 th; and the night was passed
by one division in the town, by another in the
suburbs, and by the reserve, partly at the villages
on the Sto Jago road, and partly in El Burgo, near
the bridge over the Mero. That bridge was of
course destroyed, as well as another sorne little
distanee further up the river; and strong pickets
were posted beside their ruins, in order to check
any atternpt on the part of the enerny to repair
them. But the ground whicb, in case of a battle,
the troops were to occupy, was not marked out till
the rnorning of the 12th, when the following final
arrangements were rnade :-
- There is a range of heights, or rather of swelling
knolls, which forrn a sort of arnphitheatre round
the village of Elvina, at the distance of perhaps a




280 NARHATlVE O.F 'fHE


mile, or rather more, from the town of Corunna.
Upon these Sir John Moore resolved to draw up
his army ; for though there was a much more formi-
dable range a mile or two further in advance, his
numbers were not adequate· to its occupation.
He accordingly stationed General Hope's division
upon the left,. posting it along a ridge which com-
manded the Betanzos road, and which sloped away
gradually, with a rearward inclination, towards
Elvina. At this place Sir David Baird's division
took up the line, covering the hilIs which still
continued to bend in, and extending to a valley
which divided this range from another on the op-
posite side of the Vigo road. Across that valley
the rifle corps threw itself in extended order; and
it was supported by General Frazer's division,
which covered the road to Vigo, and protected a
principal approach to Corunna; whilst the reserve,
under General Paget, took post at a village, about
half a mile in rear of General Hope.


These arrangements were still incomplete, when
the enemy made their appearance, moving in
force along the opposite bank of the Mero; but
there was no exchange of shots, nor any design
manifested on their parts to try the strength of our
posItlOn. The sanie state of inaction continued
during the 14th, except that on that day the artil-.
lery which was attached to General Hope's co-
lumn, maintained a short but warm contest with




}'ENINSULAR WAR. 281


so me of the enemy's pieces; and that a maga-
zine, containing four thousand barreIs of gunpow-
der, which had been lately brought from England,
was blown up. It expIoded with a force which
shook the ground like an earthquake, and threw
the inhabitants of Corunna into the utmost con-
sternation. On the 15th, the fleet began to ap-
pear in the offing ;whilst the enemy moved for-
ward a body of troops, for the purpose of occupy-
ing the height on which the magazine had been
constructed. A littIe skirmishing was the conse-
quence; but as the height in question was in no
degree valuable to us, the riflemen who had held
it, and who seemed disposed not to yield it up at
an easy price, were withdrawn. About the same
time some companies of the 5th regiment made
an attempt, under their commanding oflicer, Co-
louel Mackenzie, to possess themselves of a couple
of field-pieces, which the enemy had advanced
somewhat too far upon our left. - The attempt,
though boldIy made, failed; and Colonel Macken-
zie, who conducted it, was killed. Thus were the
two armies in sight of one another, during three
whole days, without any serious disposition being
exhibited, to bring matters to the issue of a
battle.


In the mean while, Sir John Moore was busily
employed embarking the sick, the woul1ded, the
womel1 and childrel1, and all such stores of am-




~82 N AlutATIVE OF THE


munition as yet remained, and could be spared .
from immediate use. This was effected with
great regularity during the afternoon and night of
the 14th; and on the following day, the bulk of
the artillery, for which our ground was no!
adapted, was likewise withdrawn. The cavalty,
after destroying the remainder of their horses, had
gone on board Soffie time before; so that nothing
now remained ex"Cept the most efficient of thein-
fantry in position. On the 16th, therefore, as all
appeared to be quiet in the French lines, orders
were issued for the gradual retreat of the different
divisions; and the boats of the Heet were col-
lected in the harbour, and along the beach~ to re-
ceive the regiments on board as fast as they should
arrive at the water's edge. But about noon, just
as the General had given his final directions, and
had mounted his horse for the purpose of visiting
the outposts, an alarm was spread that the ene-
my were in motion. Sir John Hew to the front,
expressing his high satisfaction at the intelligence;
and arrived just as our pickets were beginning to
skirrnish with the tirailleurs, which, in great mul-
titudes, covered the advance of the French army.


The enemy carne on in four strong columns,
two of which threatened the right of our position;
whilst a third bore down upon the centre, and a
fourth manreuvred so as to occupy the attention of
the left. It soon became apparent tbat his main




PENINSULAR ,\rAR. 283


object was to tum our right, which was decidedly
tbe weakest point in our púsition. It was de-
fended by Lord Wi1líam Bentinck's brigade, COll-
sisting of the 4th, 42nd, and 50th regiments;
having the brigade of guards in their rear, under
Major-general Warde. In order to secure these
against being turned, General Paget was ordered
to advance ínstantly with the reserve, and throw-
ing himself upon the right of Lord William, 10
take post in the foremost line; whilst General
Baird rnade ready, after he should have checked
the force which threatened his own position, to
succour both by a flank rnovernent of General
Manningharn's brigade against the enemy. The
left colurnn, again, needed only to keep its ground,
and to resist any effort which might be made to
force it.


The first attack of the French troops has long
be en noted for its impetuosity; nor was it less im-
petuous on the present day than on other occa-
sions. Our advanced post s were a11 driven in;
and the columns of attack moved forward with
every demonstration of courage, covered by a
cloud of skirmishers, and supported by a conti,nued
and well-directed fire from eleven pieces of artil-
lery. As they drew near, these columns deployed
partIy into 1ine; and it soon became apparent
that tbey extended far beyond tbe extreme rigbt
of the British position. But our troops seemed




284 NARRATIVE 01' THE


totally to despise this disadvantage; instead of
waiting upon their own ground to receive the
shock, they advanced to meet the enemy; the 4th
regiment, with admirable celerity, wheeling back
its right wing, and presenting a front in two direc-
tions. N or was the slightest impression made
upon them, either by the cannonade, which carne
fast and murderously, or by the appearance of
whole coi'ps of infantry, which seemed as if they
must make their way between our people and
Coruuna. Sir John Moore was near the 4th when
it executed this movement. He was highly de-
lighted with it, and cried aloud, "This is exactly
what J wished to be done 1" And feeling that
men who could act with so much coolness in the
presence of a superior force were not likely to give
way merely because the General quitted them, he
rode off to see that in other parts of the field a
similar spirit was in operation.


The French a~d English armies were separated
from each other by a number ofwalls and hedges,
and other enclosures; to pass which both parties
seemed equally anxious. A few moments sufficed
to bring them into contact; and though the onset
was spirited in no ordinary degree, it failed in pro-
ducing the slightest impression upon our lineo The
village of Elvina, which had been occupied by a
few light troops, was indeed carried, and the
enemy pressed on with high courage, and in great




PENINSULAR WAR. 285


f'Úrce; but their advance was soon checked by the
50th regiment, which not only drove them down
the slope, but pursued them through Elvina, and
to a considerable distance beyond it. It was on
this occasion that the generals," two majors,"
Napier and Stanhope, were both lost to the ser-
vice; the former being severely wounded and
made prisoner, whilst the latter was killed 'Ún the
spot.


The action became now extremely warrn along
the whole front of our lineo The 42nd, after re-
ceiving and returning several volleys, crossed its


. bayonets, and, supported by a battalion of g"uards,
repulsed a strong body of the enemy, which had
endeavoured to possess itself of the heights on the
left. The. charge was an exceedingly brilliant
one; and Sir John Moore was in the act of watch-
ing .and applauding it, when a cannon-bal1 struck
hirn on the left shoulder, and beat him to the
ground. Sorne time previous to this, Sir David
Baird had been cornpelled, by asevere wound in
the arm, to quit the fleld: the regirnents were
therefore left, in a great measure, to the guidance
of their own courage, and the rnanagement of their
respective commanding officers. But, to use the
words of the gallant soldier who succeeded to the
command, " the troops, though not unacquainted
with the irreparable 10ss they had sustained, were
not dismayed; but by the rnost determined bra-




286 N ARRATIVE OF THE


very, not only repelled everyattempt of the enemy
to gain ground, but aetually foreed him to retire,
although he had brought up fresh troops in sup-
port ofthose originally engaged."


His efforts to force our right being thus foiled,
Marshal Soult endeavoured to turn it, and to ad-
vanee a eolumn into the rear of our people un-
observed. His design was discovered at once;
and General Paget, moving forward with the re-
serve, met thecolumn in the most gallant style,
and drove it back with 10ss upon its original position.
N ot contented with this, General Paget pressed
on; and instead of filling the situation of men who
desired no more than merely to maintain them-
selves, and to repel assaults, the right of the Bri-
tish army became the assailants. The ellemy were
broken and dispersed; they not only desisted .
froro all further attempts in this quarter, but were
fain to alter, in so me degree, their own disposi-
tions, and to take ground considerably to their
right. N or were they more successful_ in the ef-
furts. which they made to penetrate our centre,
and; ln:e«k through 001' left. At these points the
ground was greatly in our favour; and as our
tr(;)Ops· showed' the same firmnes..c; which distin-
gnished: their comrades to the right, the issue was
neverfor a moment doubtful. For about half an
hoor; indeed,. they were in possession ofBetanzos.
from whieh their tire carne in heavily upon the




PENINSULAR W AR. 287


14th regiment; but from that point they were
speedily dislodged; and when darkness put an
end to the fighting,. they had been repulsed, with
terrible slaughter, in an their attacks. Ourloss in
this affair amounted to about eight hundred in
killed and wounded: that of the enemy is uncer-
tain; but it has been computed, and not, 1 should
conceive, without reason, at double. Some priso-
ners were taken on both sides; hut they were not
numerous, nor were there any officers of rank among
them.


1 have said that Sir John Moore received a se-
vere wound whilst animating the 42nd regiment to
the charge, in an early stage of the action; it is
hardly necessary to add, that the wound proved
mortal; nor is it more necessary to enter into any
minute deíailof the last moments of that illustrious
soldier's life, orof the melancholy solemnity with
which his funeral obsequies were performed. The
tale has been told already, with greater eloquence
than 1 could employ; nor is it probable that it will
soon cease to retain a place in the memory of the
people of this country. 1 t is sufficimlt for me to
observe, that not all the consciousness of vi€tory,
cheering and gratifying as that ¡s, was capable of
al1eviating, in the slightest degree, the grief of the
army for the 108s of ¡ts chief. Perhaps the British
army has produced sorne abIer men than Sir John
Moore; it has certainly produced many who, in




288 NAURATIVEOF THE


point of military talent, ~ere and are quite his
equals; but it cannot, and perhaps never could,
boast of one more beloved, not by his own perso-
nal friends alone, but by every individual tbat
served under him. It would be affectation to deny
that Sir John Moore, during his disastrous retreat,
issued many orders in the bighest degree painful to
the feelings of honourable men, who felt that their
conduct had not merited them. Mis warmest ad-
mirers have acknowledged this, and his best
friends have lamented it; but, in all probability,
no one would have lamented it more heartily than
himself, had he lived to review, in a moment of
calmness, the general conduet of this campaign;
because there never lived aman possessed of a
better heart, nor, in ordinary cases, of a clearer
judgment.


It would be superfluous in me to enter, at this
place, into anything like a review of the merits of
this our first military effort in the Peninsula.
From the observations which 1 have taken the
liberty to make here and there in the course of the
narrative, the reader will have doubtless arrived at
a knowledge of my opinion on the subject; andto
the justice of that opinion, given as it was on the
spot, and amidst the progress of the events re-
corded, everything which has since occurred in
Spain bears testimony. The truth is, that Sir


. John Moore, with many of the qualities requisite




PENINSULAH tv Alt. 289


to eonstitute a general, was deficient in that upon
which, more perhaps than any other, sueeess in
war must ever dependo He wanted eonfidenee in
himself-he was afraid of responsibility-he un·
derrated the qualities of bis own troops, and greatIy
overrated those of his adv~rsary. Yet let justice
be done. He acted under circumstances .at once
difficult and trying. He was harassed by being
made, in sorne degree, dependent upon the opi.
nions of others; whilst he was from the first abso-
lutely destitute of support from the authorities in
the country, as well military as civil. Sir John
Moore was, moreover, a brave and high-spirited
soldier. Of this the most satisfaetory proof was
furnished, by his refusal to aet upon a suggestion
made to him by sorne of the oldest- and most ex·
perieneed -generals in his army, and his declining
to enter into any convention for the quiét em·
barkation of his troops. He preferred the honour
of his army to its safety; and by preserving the
oue, he provided for the other also.


On the faH of Sir J ohn Moore, and the removal
.of Sir David Baird from the field, the command
devolved upon General Hope; who conducted
everytbing with that judgment and coolness which
peculiarly distinguished him. Though successful
in the battle, he did not consider himself autho·
rised to depart from the plan upon which he knew
that the late commander of the forces had intended


VOL. I. T




290 NARRATIVE OF THE


to acto The enemy no sooner retired than he re-
newed the preparations for embarking the troóps,
which their attack had interrupted; and the boats
being aH in readiness at ten o'c1ock that night,
brigade after brigade filed silently down to the
beach. The embarkation was covered by Major-
general Beresford, at the head of two thousand
men, who occupied the land-front of Corunna ;
and by Major-genCeral Hill's brigade, which took
post on, the promontory, in rear of the town. It
went on during the night with great celerity, and
without any interruption from the French; but on
the following morning they pushed forward a corps
of light troops towards the town, and seized the
heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour.
No attempt was, however, made to molest the
covering brigades. The situation of General Be-
l'esfol'd, undel' the walls of the place, was indeed
such, as to place it in a great ,degree beyond the
l'each of danger ; . and the Spaniards, to do them
justice, seemed resolved to protect our mov,e-
ments to the utmost. General Hill's brigade was
accordingly withdrawn at thl'ee o'c1ock on that
afternoon; and finally, as soon as darkness set in,
the last division quitted, its ground, and was re-
ceived in perfect safety on board of ship.


Thus" withO:ut any other interruption than arose
from a feeble cannonade, directed against our
shipping, froIn the heights of St. Lucia, was the




PENINSUI,Alt W AR. 291


whole of the British army, including its sick, it8
wounded, its artillery, its stores, and even its
prisoners, conveyed from the coast; and the first
regular campaign of our soldiers in lhe Peninsula
came to a close.


In the course of the preceding details, I am
aware much may be said and recorded of the par-
ticular exploits of different corps, and the conduct
of officers. The just view of everything cannot be
collected, nor individual merit marked out, by one
in my humble position; my desire therefore has
heen limited to give fairly my own general impres-
sions, without offence to any,and to apologise to
al1, whose corps, names, and actions, ought to be
recorded in militar y history by an abler pen than
mme.




292 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER XI.


Consequences of Sir Jobn Moore's campaign-Departure of
N apoleon for Germany-Military condition of Spain .and
Portugal previous to the arrival of Sir Arthur WellesJey-
Invasion of Portugal by Soult-He passes the Minho at
Orense, defeats the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey,
and enters Chaves-Oporto carried by assault-Lupisse fails
to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo, and goes to join Victor-Battle
of Medelin, and overthrow of Cuesta's army-SirJohn Cra-
dock and Marshal Beresford make preparations to oppose
Soult-Sir Arthur WelIesley embarks at Portsmouth;
reaches Lisboll; is received with enthusiasm-He makes
arrangements to take the field.


IN spite of its' disastrous and somewhat humi-
liating termination, the first campaign of the'
Brítish troops in Spain cannot be said to have
been wholly unproductive of benefit to the general
cause. The attentíon of the enemy being turned
mainly towards the north, an opportunity was
given to the southern provinces of repairing, at
least in part, the inj uries sustained by the defeats




PENINSULAR WAR. 293


of BIake, Castanos, and Bel videre; and of that
opportunity they were not altogether neglectful.
The remains of the beaten armies were collected
and re-organised, and fresh levies were indus-
triously set on foot. Palafox, Cuesta, the Duke
del Infantado, and the Marquis de Palacia, ap-
peared each at the head of a corps; whilst Ro-
mana, retreating towards the Portuguese frolltier,
did his best to rouse the energies of Gallicia; and
Saragoza, though too fatally for its brave garrison,
again made itself i1lustrious by the length and ob-
stinacy of its defence. But the event to which,
aboye an others, the Peninsula owed its escape
from immediate conquest, was the unlooked-for
arming of Austria, and the consequent departure
of Buonaparte towards another scene ofoperations;
He had scarcely returned to Madrid from his
movement against Sir John Moore's army, when
intelligence of the rising storm in the north reached
him; and he found himself under the necessity of
leaving to his marshaIs the compIetion of that tri-
umph, of which he persuaded himself that he had
laid the foundation. Having once more seated his
brother on the throne, 'and amused himself and his
adherents by the promulgation of a few de crees,
he took the road to France; whither he was fol-
lowed,on the 22nd of January, by the division of
imperial guards, amounting in all tofifteen thou-
sand meno




294 NARRA'fIVE OF 'fHE


Of the proceedings which took place, both in
Spain and Portugal, from this date up to thé
return of Sir Arthur Wellesley 'to Lisbon, it falls
not within the plan of the present imperfect narra":
tive to attempt any minute relation. Enough is
done, when the reader is reminded that the Spa':
nish armies, of whose re-organisation notice has
been taken, suffered, one after another, signal
defeats; and that before the mO~lth of March had
expired, the principal matter of which the French
generals had cause to complain, was their igno-
ra'nce upon what point it behoved them to bear,
for the purpose of cómpleting theirconquests.
In Portugal, again, an was alarm and dismay.
There remained in or about Lisbon, a corps of ten
or twelve thousand British soldiers, under the
command of Sir John Cradock, upon which alone'
the smallestconfidence could bereposed; fOÍ"
though the Portuguese ,were still as far as ever from
being reconciled to a foreign yoke, they were with-
out officers, without discipline, and without confi-
dence in themselves~ General Beresfordhad in-
deed, with the activity and zeal for which he is re-
markable, begun to exert himselffor the removal of
these evils. As soon as he received his appoint-
ment as commander-in-chief, he set steadily to t~e
task of re-modelling the Portuguese army in all its
parts, by introducing. into each battalion a system
both of drill and internal arrangement, similar to




PENINSULAR \VAH. 295


that which exists iIiBritish regiments; but a re-
volution so complete coüldnot be effected in a
moment, nor were its beneficial consequences
fullyfelt till a later period in the war. Tbe sole
means of defence, independently oE Sir John Crá-
dock's division, tberefore, which Portugal could
hope to oppose to a fresh invasion, consisted of a
corps under Silveira, mustering in an about six
thousand men, of which one-half only were fE;gu~
lal's; of the Lusitanian legion, organised by Sir
Robert Wilson; of Bel'esford's levies, then in pro-
cess of organization, of the gal'rison óf Oporto;
made upalmost entirely of volunteers; and oí
bands of ill-armed peasants, whose want of order
would necessarily incapacitate tbem from acting
with effect in the freId, though theirindividual
courage might render them tl'uly. formidable as
guerillas and partisans. . ,


Such was the state of Portugal, when three
corps d'armée from the French army prepal'ed to
inváde it. Having reduced Corunna and Ferrol,
and otherwise secured the tranquillity of Gallicia,
Soult set forward in the direction of Tuy, with the
design of penetrating through the province of Tl;as
os Montes, seizing Oporto, and so' advancing upon
Lisbon. To aid him ~n this attempt~ Vic'tor was
commanded to manreuvre on the side of Badajoz;
and to send on a strong' cQlumn, which should
unite itself with Soult's army in the capital. As




296 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


these two points of attack were, however, at a
great distance from one another, General Lapisse
was directed to strengthen them by occupying the
country between the Douro and Almeida, and by
the reduction of the important fortress of Ciudad
Rodrigo. Here he was to remain tilI the fall of
Oporto should be communicated to him; after
which he was to unite himself to Victor; when
both having covered Soult's movement to Lisbon,
and seen the imperial eagles once more hoisted
there, were to countermarch upon Andalusia, and
complete its subjugation :-This was the general
intelligence received, though for accuracy in all ils
parts it is impossible to vouch.


In accordance with these data Soult began his
journey; his place in Gallicia being supplied by
Marshal N ey at the head of a fourth corps. He
reached the Minho without encountering any
othe'r obstacles besides those which a wasted
district necessarily threw in his way; and he
made ready to pass the river in a flotilla of fishing-
boats, which had been collected together for the
purpose. But the river was wide and rapid; his
sailors were unskilful; and the opposite banks
being in possession of sorne armed peasants under
General Freire, wiih a couple of six-pounders, his
flotilla was either sunk or swept away. He gave
up the attémpt as, impracticable, and turning to
bis left, marched at a quick pace upon Orense,




PENINSULAR \VAR. 297


where there is a bridge. Here his passage was
made good; and here information reached him
that Romana, with a body of Spaniards,. and Sil-
veira, at the head of his Portuguese, were drawn
up near Monterrey, for the purpos'e of opposing his
advance upon Chaves. He hastened to give them
battle, defeated them with considerable slaughter,
and removed to Chaves the hospital and magazines
whichhe had pteviously established at Orense.
His next movement was upon Oporto; where
the spirit of discord, and even mutiny, which pre-
vailed among the garrison, not less than the ab-
sence ofjudgment exhibited by the authorities in
putting the place in a position of defence, gave
promise that no very obstínate or bloody contest
awaited him.


The resistance offered by the garrison of Oporto
was not more serious than Soult hadantici-
pated. Having overthrown a tumultuary force,
which ventured to oppose him at Braga, he ar-
rived before Oporto on the 23rd of March, and
on the same day sent in to demand its surrender.
The summons was rejected, and dispositions were
made for an assault. A long line of open out-
works covered the place, so extensive as to be
perfectly indefensible, except by a very numerous
army. These were attacked at three o'clock in
the afternoon of the 24th; they were carried al-
most at a rnsh; and before fourthe French soldiers




298 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


were in possession of the streets. Three or four
thousand regulars and rnilitia eitherescaped or
surrendered; the Bishop fled across the Douro,
never pausing till he had reached Lisbon; and the
town was given' up, during three whole days, to
indiscrirninate plunder. Several ships _were in
the harbour, laden with the property of indivi-
duals, which they had hoped to rernove; but the
north winds happening to blow, they could not
put to sea, and becarne, of course, a prey to the
conquerors.


Established here, Soult proceeded to make the
people of Portugal acquainted with the nature of
the cornmission which he bore, and the extent of
the powers with which he was intrusted. He
issued proclarnations, calling upon the peasantry
to return everywhere to their hornes, and threat-
ening with the severest punishrnents all such per-
sons as should be found with arms in their hands.
He assured the inhabitants oí Lisbon that the
hour oftheir deliverance frorn the bondage of Eng-
land had arrived, and invited them to placethem-
selves and their city under the protection of an
officer who had the honour to appear among them
as the Emperor's representative; and who, in his
capacity of governor-in-chief, would pay the strie-
test attention to their prejudices, and se cure to
thern the elljoyrnent oí just laws and personal
liberty. Finally ~ he denounced a terrible ven ..




PENINSULAR WAR. 299


geance against aU who should presume in any way
to offer to his progress an opposition as perverse as
it must be hopeless, and assumed generally the
style of a monarch returning, o at the head of a
powerful party, to the throne of his ancestors.


In the mean while, Victor and Lapisse were
each carrying on a series of operations, though not
exactly in accordance with the supposed general
plan which had been laid dewn for the conduct of
the campaign. o Lapisse, indeed, appeared before
Ciudad Rodrigo with a corps of six thousand men,
and endeavoured, by a coup-de-main, to make
himself master of it; but he was repulsed, and
being wholly unprovided with battering cannon,
he did not renew the attempt. On the contrary~
he marched to his left in search of Victor, leaving
nothing behind for the purpose of keeping open
theo communication with Soult; who became, in
consequence, cornpletely isolated in his new posi-
tion at Oporto. With respect to Victor, again, he
found employrnent enough in pursuing, from place
to place, the army of Cuesta; which led him first
froro Talavera upon Truxillo, and afterwards, by a
variety of circuitous routes, upon Merida and Me-
delin. Here,Oat last, the Spanish General, appre-
hensive for the fate of Badajoz, determined to
offer battle. An acfion was accordiugly fought in
an open plain, which surrounds the latter town, on
the left bank of the Guadiana; ánd it ended in the




300 NARRATIVE OF THE


total rout of the patriot army. In this affair the
Spanish infantry behaved well; they had even
gained ground upon the enemy at several points,
and were pressing forward with great gallantry,
when a sudden panic seized the cavalry, and it
fled froID the field without striking a blow. Cuesta
díd his best to rally the fugitives; but to no pur-
pose. The French broke in upon the Spanish
left, exposed by the flight of the cavalry, and
turned it, at the moment when Cuesta was thrown
from his horse, and severely bruised. AH now
became confusion and dismay. The Duke of AI-
buquerque, who commanded on the right, endea-
voured to form his division into columns, and to
retire in good order; but the columns were not
yet formed, when a heavy fire ofartillery dispersed
them, and the men could not again be recalled to
their standards. The rout was complete; and the
10ss, in killed, wounded, and taken, was greater
by far than a Spanish army had yet sustained from


, the commencement of the war.
It was not, however, a bloodless victory. The


Spaniards, particularly in the commencement of
the day, fought with determined gallantry, and to
great advantage; and the ,French suffered more
than their General had at aH calculated upon.
This was distinctly proved from the disinclination
which he exhibited to follow up, with alacrity, the
success which he had obtained. Though Cuesta




PENINSULA'R WAR. 301


retired towards Llerena overplains of immense
extent, with scarcely any cavalry to protect him,
Victor, who was particularly strong, in that arm,
attempted no pursuit. On the contrary, he re-
sumed his former position at Medelin and Merida,
from whence he sent to call in Lapisse; and where
he continued inactive, till the operations of the
British army at last compelled him to move.


Things were in this state, the designs of the
French having been temporarily frustrated, when
the British government carne to the wise determi-
nation of making another great effort for the deli-


, veranee of the Peninsula. For this purpose, large
bodies of troops were collected, here and tlIere,
along the coast, consisting partly of the regiments
which had returned from Corunna, and partly of
others which had not yet seen service; and these,
as they became severally complete, were sent off,
under able oflicers, to Lisbon. Among the first .
who arrived at the scene of action, was Major-
general Hill. He reached Lumias on the 6& of
April, where Sir John Cradock had fixed his
head-quarters; and found him making such dis-
positions as did not indicate offensive measures.
General Hill, it was said, at this time suggested
holder measures, and he was aided by Beres-
ford's council; and it was agreed that, instead of
continuing preparations for a retreat, the combined
British and Portuguese armies -should move for-




302


ward. The enemy were, at tliis time, in a state
of perfect inaction. The fe~ demonstrations of a
further advance, which, on first entering Oporto,
they had made, were at an end; and they con-
tented themselves now with pushing on their oút-
posts as far as the banks of the Vouga, whilst the
main body took post between that river and the
Douro. It was resolved to threaten them there ;
and it was confidently hoped that Soult, already
alarmed by transactions in his real', would not only
evacuate Oporto, but retire from the whole north
of Portugal. The latter was an event for the at-
tainment of which no exertions, it was believed,
ought to be spared; because a conviction every-
where prevailed, that the occupation by a French
army of th:e provinces ofTras os Montes and Entre
Douro e Minho, was an injury to the cause second
only to the faH of Lisbon itself.


These resolutions had been formed, and some
movementswere actually made towards their ac-
complishment, when Sir Arthur Wellesley. to
whom the chief command in Portugal hadbeen
intrusted, by an extraordinary effort of the wal'
minister of the day, embarked with his staff for
the seat of war. To that staff it was the writer's
fortune to be attached, in the capacity ofadjutant-
general. We set sail from Portsmouth on Satur-
day~ the 16th of April, with a stift' breez~ blowing
ahead, and had nctt proceeded beyond the Isle of




PE~INSULAlt WAR. 303


Wight, when an event occurréd which had well
nigh proved fatal to uso Itmight be about mid-
night, or rather Jater, when Captain Collier of H.
M. ship -- burst into the cabin, entreating us to
rise without deJay, for that we were on the eve of
shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time
in Jeaping from our cots, and mounting the deck ;
when a very awful as well as alarming spectacJe
presented itseJf. In striving to pass a bank which
runs out from S1. Gatherine's point into the sea,
the ship missed stays; this occurred again and
again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer
to danger; and now when we looked· abroad, the
breakers were to be se en at about a stone's-throw
froID the bow. There was not an indiyidual
amongst us who anticipated any other xesult than
that in a few minutes, at the furthest, the vessel
would strike; but we were deceived. The wind;
which had hitherto been blowing on shore, sud-
denly changed, and we were at once relieved
from a situation, than which the whole progress of
our lives had not before brought us into any more
uncomfortable. But it was the only adventure
which befell us by the way. The fair wind which
sprang up at a moment so critical, did Iiot desert
us during the remainder of our voyage; and we
anchored in the Tagus, after a: passage of only six
days, on the 22nd of April.


N o words would be adeq uate to convey the fainh




304 NARRATIVE OF TÍlE


est idea of the delight exhibited by all dasses of
persons, as 800n as the arrival of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley at Lisbon became known. AH day long
the streets were crowded with men and women,
eongratulating one another on the happyevent¡
and at night the city was illuminated even in the
most obscure and meanest of its lanes ana alIeys.
In the theatres, pieces were hastily got up, some-
what after the fashion of the masks anciently ex-
hibited among ourselves, in whieh Victory was
made to crown the representative of the hero
with laurels, and to address him in language as
far removed from the terms of ordinary conver-
sation, as might be expeeted from an allegorieal
personage. But it was not by sueh exhibitions
alone that the Portuguese nation sought to evinee
its confidenee in its former deliverer, and its
satisfaetÍon at his return. Sir Arthur Welles-
ley was immediately nominated Marshal-gene-
fal of the armies of Portugal; by which means,
whilst the eare oftraining and managing the whole
of the interior economy rested still with Beresford,
the fuUest authority to move the troops whither-
soever he would, and to employ them in any series
of operations in w~ieh he might desire to embark,
devolved upon him.


It wiU easily be believed that no time was lost,
either by the' commander of the forces, or by those
immediately attached to him. in endeavouring to




PENiNSULAR WAR. 305


make themselves thoroughiy aequainted, as well
with thesituation and amount of our own resourees,
as with the arrangements and designs of the enemy.
With respeet to our own resourccs, we found that
the whole of the British eorps had moved in tbree
eolumns, and that it was to assemble, on the 24th,
at Leiria. Of the Portuguese, again, two battalions
only remained at Abrantes, whilst the remainder,
with Marsbal Beresford, were colleeted at Tho-
mar; and so strenuous and unremitting had been
his exertions, that they were already estimated at
or about fifteen thousand meno But it was not
from their numbers only tbat the Portuguese troops
promised to prove formidable. Warmly attaehed
to their English officers, and reposing unbounded
confidenee in them, they had applied of late with
so mueh ardour to their military education, that
some were already in fit state to take the field ;
and it required only a litt]e experienc€, as well
as a more extensive intermingling of Englishmen
in their ranks, to put them on a leveJ with the best
troops of Europe. The battalions which gave way
so easilyat Oporto, entertained no respeet for their
leaders; there was not an officer of rank among
them to whom they conlel at alllook up. It was
not so in Beresforel's army. There the men were,
what the lower orders of Portugal always are, per-
fectly -brave; they were officcred, at least in part,
by persons for whom they entertainec1 the highest


VOL. I. U




306 NARRATIVE OF THE


respect; and had a few more English generals
taken rank among them, they would have been,
even now, not unworthy to take their places by
the side of British soldiers. There was one bri-
gade in particular, commanded by Colonel Camp-
bell, which struck me as being in the finest possible
order. It consisted of two battalions, each mus-
tering about six hundred bayonets; and it stood
under arms. and went through a variety of evo-
lutions with a precision and correctness which
would have done no discredit to many of the
brigades in our own army. N or was it less satis-
factory to find that the interior economy of these
battalions had been brought to a state of perfection
altogether in keeping with their external appear-
ance. Both men and officers had learned to mess
as themen and officers in the English service; the
pay of the common soldiers was increased; and
the mischievous system which heretofore had en-
abled the captains of companies to defraud their
troops, was abolished. Everything went on, in
short, as it ought to do; and the fairest prospect
was given, that with a little additional help on the
part of their allies, the Portuguese army would
soon become not only efficient in the field, but
orderly and well reglllated in its cantonments.


With respect to the enemy, a variety of rllmours
were afloat, out of which it was not very easy to
select one more plausible, or having a greater ap-




PENINSULAR W AR. 307


pearance of probability, than the rest. That their
armies, on both sides of the country, remained
stationary, was well known; but the causes of the
halt were differently reptesented, according to the
taste or faney of our informants. By sorne, it was
asserted that the war in Germany had eompelled
N apoleon not only to omit sending reinforcements
into the Peninsula, but even to draín off part of the
force which he had formerly kept there; and that
the French generals found themselves, in conse-
quence, ehecked in the midst of their career, and
ineapaeitated from bringing to a eonclusion the
work whieh they had begun. By others, their
inaetivity was attributed solely to the effeets of the
battIe of Medelin, on the one hand, and on the
other, to the intelligence which had reached them
of the arrival of our reinforcements; whilst, by a
third party, the French marshals were represented
as at variance among themselves, and not more un-
able than unwilling, to act up to the plans which
they had formed. As the event proved, there was
not one of all these sur mises which díd not possess
sorne truth, though we of course could not at the
moment aseertain this; but we did-ascertain that
their corps were far from. being efficient, and that
we might fairly calculate upon three or four months
of absolute freedom from attack. In this case,
little doubt could exist of our ultimate success, at
all events, in delivering and keeping possession of




308 NARRATIVE OF THE


Portugal; whilst it was by no means improbable
ihat we should take advantage of whatever suc-
cess might attend us, and carry the war into
8pain.


The reports incirculation as to the strength of
80ult's and VictQr's corps; were hardly less varied
than those which spread abroad respecting other
matters; but the opinion at head-quarters was,
that the former could not have at his disposal aboye
twelve thousand effectives, nor· the latter more
than double that amount. lt became, therefore,
rather a nice question to determine, w hethe1' an
attempt upon Victor would not be preferable to
an operation in the north. On the one hand, it
was quite evident that, were we strong enough t-o
destroy Victor, the great game would be played
at once; for, in this case, Sou1t could not venture
to remain at Oporto; and even Madrid would, in
alI probability, be evacuated. On the other hand,
it might be attended with hazardous consequences,
to Ieave the capital open, and Soult with his army
in our rear.These were matters which required
mature ,corisideration; and though few men pos-
sess the faculty of arriving, with promptitude, at
judicious determinations in the degree in which
it was possessed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he
could not pretend to make up his mind tillhe
should huye seen and advised with Beresford and
Cradock. In the mean while, however, that




:PENINSULAR WAR. 309


time might not be wasted, the lIlost active prepa-
rations were set on foot, to render the troops
moveable in any direction, and at the shortest no-
tice. Our commissariat arrangements, which had
fallen into miserable confusion, were once more
placed in train; mules, bullocks, and such cars as
seemed likely to be wanted, were put in requisi-
tion; and fIying' depots of hospital and other
stores were disposed in order for immediate trans-
portation. AH these matters served to satisfy the
troops that they would not be long kept inactive ;
and the promise which they held out, received, in
due time, its fulfilment.




310 NARRATlVE OF 'fHE


CHAPTER XII.


Dispositious of the allied troops - They assernble at Coinibra,
aud are reviewed-State of the French army becornes sorne-
what changed by the defeat of General Lefevte-Rumours
of a mutiny arnong the enemy-Sir Arthur \Vellesley ar-
ranges his plaus, aud the brigades are commauded to rnove.


SIR JOHN CRADOCI{ being at this time affiicted
with asevere illness, failed in reaching Lisbon as
early as he wished; but Marshal Beresford, on
whose report of rnatters great reliance deserved to
be placed, carne in without the 10ss of an hour.
He spoke in high terms of tbe Portuguese troops,
and exp~essed himself sanguine as to the result of
any operations wbich rnight be undertaken. Un-
der these circumstances, Sir Arthur Wellesley
deterrnined to take the field at once; and the fol-
10wing is a brief outline of the arrangements which
were entered into in consequence of that determi-
nation.




PENINSULAR WAlt. 311


The British troops, with the exception of one
infantry and one cavalry brigade, under General
Mackenzie, were directed to assemble, with as
little delay as possible, at Coirobra, and to take
up, in the mean time, the line of the Mon-
dego. They amounted in all, including two bri-
gades of Germans, to 17,000 effectives, the de-
tached corps mustering 2,700 men, about one-
half of which was cavalry; and they were to be
joined there by a portion of the Portuguese army,
which was so distributed, as that in each brigade
one Portuguese might take its place between two
British battalions. By this disposition, the fide-
lit y, and to a certain extent, the gallantry of our
allies, would, it was presumed, be secured; if
they should exhibit the slightest disposition to
desert their colours, or to turn their, backs upon
the French, they might at any moment be annihi-
Jated by the corps which hemmed them in. The
army, thus arranged, would amount in all to about
twenty thousand men, six thousand of which were
allotted to act as a separate corps under Beres-
ford; and it was understood that its undivide<\
attention would, in the first place, be turned
against Soult and the French force in Oporto.


In the mean while, a division of twe]ve thou-
sand men, composed entirely of Portuguese, with
the exception of the two British brigades already
aUuded to, was to take post. under General Mac-




312 :N ARRATIVE 01" THE


kenzie, at Santarem and Abrantes. The object
of this distribution was an exceedingly important
one, for a due comprehension of which it may be
necessary . to advert to other matters, of which
sorne notice has already becn taken.


1 have said that, according to the plan original!y
devised for the second invasion of Portugal by the
French, Victor was on no account to rnove into
Andalusia, till after he should have ascertained
the fact of Soult's success, and been joined by the
division of General Lapisse. Of this, certain . in-
tercepted letters frorn King Joseph and Marshal
Jourdan informed uso But Victor had been already
drawn into sorne deviation frorn these arrange-
ments, in consequence of the movements of Cues-
ta; and it was not improbable that the comse
which events had lately taken, would draw him
into still wider deviations. Though he knew no·
thing of Soult-nothing at least calculated to give
him satisfaction-he had been aIread y joined by
Lapisse; it accordingly became a matter of doubt,
whether he should proceed into Andalusia, Ol
march upon Lisbon by way of Alentejo. 1 t was
to provide against the latter contingency, that
General Mackenzie's corps too k post as aboye
described. In that position he cornpletely COffi-
manded the fords over the Tagus; and he occupied
ground, where twelve thousand men might, under
any circumstances, offer a successful resistan ce to




PENINSULAR WAR. 313


at least twice their O'wn numbers. 1t is true that
a nO'tiO'n prevailed, that if the French endeavO'ured
tO' crO'ss the Tagus at aH, they wO'uld rnake the at-
tempt atSalvatierra; from whence, shO'uld they
make good their passage, the strO'ng ground cO'uld
be turned; but that idea in nO' degree disturbed
the eq uanilllity O'f any O'ue whO' bore in mind, that
at the present seasO'n O'f the yeal' the Tagus, sO' lO'w
at least as Salvatierra, cO'uld nO't be passed except
in bO'ats. Effectual care wO'uld, hO'wever, be taken,
that with such means O'f passing the enemy should


. J-
not be supplied; and hence the occupatIO'n O'fr!
Abrantes, and Santarem, and the neighbouring _;',,-
villages O'f Golegam, &c. might be said to place ~ '¡
LisbO'n in perfect security frO'm all insult in that
quarter.


It was, hO'wever, extremely improbable that
VictO'r wO'uld embark in an undertaking sO' hazar-
dO'us as an advance upon Lisboll. He knew that
Cuesta was again in force; he could not, there-
fO're, tum his back upO'n him withO'ut leaving a
strO'ng cO'rps behind for the purpose of watching
his mO'tions; and this wO'uld necessarily expO'se
him tO' the risk·O'f being attacked and destrO'yed in
detail. It was mO're probable that, being strength-
ened by the junctiO'n O'f Lapisse, he wO'uld leave
SO'ult tO' his fate, and mO've, with all his force, upO'n
Andalusia. In this case, Sir Arthur Wellesley
repeatedly urged upO'n Cuesta the wisdO'm of


~.'. \




314 NARRATIVE OF THE


retiring to the mountains, and keeping wholly
upon the defensive; whilst the garrisons of Elvas
and Badajoz should march upon the enemy's rear,
and harass his convoys. This would give us an
opportunity of completing our projects in the
north; after which, by a rapid march to the eas-
tero frontier, we might come up to his aid, and by
a combined attack, overwhelm Victor's army.


Having put these matters as far in train as it
was possible to do at this stage ·of the business,
the head-quarters of the British army quitted
Lisbon; and halting at Pombal on the 1st, arrived
at Coimbra on the 2nd of May. Here, as in the
capital, General Wellesley was received with a
degree of enthusiasm which strongly marked the
confidence of all classes in his abilities. But
affairs were in too critical a posture to authorise
the waste of time, even in the agl'eeable occu-
pation of giving and receiving compliments; and
Sir Arthur was not aman to gratify his own va-
nityat the expense of the public good. He ac-
cordingly cut short many of the dispositions which
the Portuguese authorities had made, for the pur-
pose of manifesting their good-will, and set him-
self, on the very .day of his arrival, to the task of
arranging and distributing his army for irnmediate
operations.


It has been already stated that one brigade of
infantry, and another of cavalry, \Vere placed




l)ENINSULAlt WAH. 315


under the orders of Major-general Mackenzie, and
detached on a particular service. The regiments
composing the latter, were the 3rd and 4th heavy
dragoons brigaded together under General Fane,
and the 2nd and 24th regiments of footcomposed
the former. The 1'emainder were distributed into
seven brigades of infantry of the line, two bri-
gades of German infantry,one brigade of guards,
and one brigade oflight cavalry. Of the cavalry,
which consisted of the 14th, 16th, and 20th Bri-
tish, and the 3rd light dragoons of the King's
German Legion, the command was given to Major-
general Cotton; whilst a: brigade of guards, com-
posed of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream, and
1st ofthe 3rd guards, and additionally strengthened
by one company of riflemen from the 5th batta-
!ion of the 60th, was commanded by Brigadier-
general H. Campbell. Major-general Hill was at
the head of the fi1'st brigade, consisting of the
Buffs, tbe 66th, the 48th, and one company 5th
battalion 60th. Major-general Tilson had the
third brigade, composed of five companies 5th bat-
talion 60th, the 88th, and 1st battalion Portuguese
grenadiers, and the 87th. The fith brigade, made
up of the 7th, 1st battalion 10th Portuguese, the
53rd and 1st company 5th battalion60th, was
headed by Brigadier-general A. Campbell. Bri-
gadier-general Cameron commanded the 7th bri.
gade, which consisted of the 9th, 2nd battalion




316 NARRATIVE OF THE


10th Portuguese, the 83rd y and one rifle company.
The sixth brigade, composed of the 1st battalion
detachments, 1st battalion 16th Portuguese, and
the 29th, was under the orders of Brigadier-general
R. Stewart. The 4th brigadey consisting of the
2nd battalion detachments, 2nd battalion, 16th
Portuguese, the 97th, and a rifle company, was
headed by Brigadier-general Sontag; whilstthe
2nd brigade, madeup of the 27th, 45th, and 3Íst,
acted under the orders of Major-general Mac-
kenzie. With respect to the Germans, again,
they were divided into two brigades, under the
respective orders of Brigadier-generals Longthwert
and Drieberg; the whole being commanded by
Major-general Murray.


Inaddition to these ar-rangements, four major>-
generals,-namely, Sherbrooke, Payne, Lord Wil-
liam Bentinck, and Paget,-received local rank as
lieutenant-generals during the· continlJance of the
service, that they might severally take command
of such divisions as the General-in-chief should
from time to time see fit to consolidate. At the
head of the adjutant-generals' department was
the writer of these sheets, then Brigadier-general
Stewart; and Colonel Murray, 3rd guards, acted
as quarter-master-g~neral.


His troops being thus distributed, and placed,
each corps under ¡ts own leader, Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley proceeded to consider his plan of the cam-




PENINSULAR WA~L 317


paign which he was so soon about to open. That
the reader may the better comprehend the nature
of that plan, as well as the purposes of .the diffe~
rent movements which subsequently took place, it
will be necessary to remind him of the exact
situation in which Marshal Soult stood,or, to -speak
more eorrectly, in which he was believed to stand,
when the plan in question was formed.


It has be en stated that Soult made his way
with very little difficulty to Oporto, and that he
remained there for sorne time, with his advanced
posts on the bank of the V ouga, in a state of per-
fect inaction. In the mean while, the Spanish and
Portuguese troops, which he had wirb so much
ease dispersad, were again assembling, and gra-
dually closing in upon his communications. Sil-
veira, who had retired, first to the mountains of
Oura' and Reigaz, and afterwards to Villa Pouca,
no sooner became aware that the enemy were
moving upon the Braga road, than he quitted his
new position, and advanced again upon Chaves.
He entered that place without opposition, and after
blockading the castle for four days,compelled it,
with -a garrison of 1300 men, to surrender. En-
couraged by this success, he proposed to follow tbc
steps of the French army, and,' if possible, to cut
off their detachment at Braga, as he had done
at Chaves; but intelligence of the fan of Oporto
caused him to relínquish that determination;




318 NARltATIVE OF THE


whilst a rumour of· an intended movement
through the province of Tras os Montes, by way
either of Canavezas or Entre Ambos Ríos, induced
him to act upon another. He immediately occu-
pied the villages above-named; repulsed the énemy
in two attempts upon the former; and reaching
Amarante just as a body of Frerich troops were
advancing upon it, compelled them to retire to
Peñafiel, and himself took possession of the city.


Whilst Silvei.ra was thus straitening the left of
the enemy's position, and interposing himself in
that direction between the corps of Soult and
Victor, Romana was not id le in the rearo In spite
of his defeat at Monterrey, the Spanish General,
who had retreated upon La Puebla de Sanabria,
soon found himselfat the head of four or five thou-
sand men, with whom he resolved to strike a blow
upon the line of French posts between Astorga and
Villa Franca. The former city was, indeed, too
strong for him; it could not be won without artil-
lery, and in artillery he was deficient; but the
latter, after a trifling resistance, he contrived to
reduce, making prisoners of a colonel and eigbt
húndred meno This victory, trifling as it was,
roused, once more, tbe dormant energies of Ga-
licia into exertion. The French were attacked in
every point where appeared the slightest prospect
of success. Vigo was closely invested, on the
hnÜ ~)Ü~, b-:y G~n~l'O.\ 'M.\)l\\\\)·, \~(j\\"\ tn.e \;ea, b'Y




PENINSULAR WAH. 319


Captain Mackenley of the Lively frigate; and it
capitulated just as a force from Tuy, destined for
its relief, arrived under the walls. The retiring
force was attacked and routed, and Tuy itself
placed in a state of blockade; but in Tuy, Soult
had established considerable magazilles, and both
the garrison and the sick in the hospital were
numerous; he could not, therefore, permit it to
fall as Vigo had fallen. Generals Gramdorges
and Heudelet were sent, at the head óf a tight
corps, to its relief; and their force was such as
the half-armed and undisciplined levies employed
in the siege coidd not successfully oppose. They
entered Tuy, after having sustained sorne resist-
ance, particularly at Ponte de Lima. But there
was no designentertained of keeping· permanent
possession of Tuy, important as the place unde-
niably was. The orders of these generals instr.uct-
ed them only to withdraw the magazines and the
garrison; and this, as well as the removal of the
sick and wounded from Braga, they successfully
accomplished. That done, they returned to Oporto,
where Soult found himself fairIy hemmed in ;_.
in front by the British army, on the left by Sil-
veira, in the rear by bands of armed Spaniards,
and on the tight by the sea.


Aware that such had lately been the enemy's
situation, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to ma-
nreuvre, for the purpose of surrounding them in




· 320 NARRATIVE OF TITE
-'


Oporto, and compelling them to surrender. \Vith
this view, Beresford received instructions to pl'O-
ceed from Coimbra with his own corps, and sorne
Portuguese troops, which, under Sir Robert Wil-
son, occupied Vizeu, as far as Lamego; to cross
the Douro there, and to join General Silveira in
Amarante. As soon as this movernent should
have been effected, and the detached column es-
tablished in the provine e of Entre Douro e Minho,
the force from Coimbra was to advance, and rnake,
by the great roadsof V ouga and A vouros, upon
Oporto. In the mean while, Beresford's corps
descending the Douro, was to seize every boat
which lay along its shore, and so to arrange them,
as that the means of erossing might be at our dis-
posal, as soon as we should reach the banks of the
river. The probabilities were, that Soult, finding
himself beset on all hands, would not attempt a
resistance which he must pereeive to be in vain;
but in case his obstinacy should get the better of
his prudence, we \Vere instantly to pass the
stream; and nobody eould for one moment doubt
as to the r.esults of the struggle.


Everything was in readiness for carrying these
arrangernents into force, when, on the evening of
the 4th, a despatch from Silveira arrived, to in-
form us of asevere defeat which he had sus-
tained at the town of Amarante. The enemy, it
appeared, favoured by a dense fog, attacked him




PENINSU-LAR W AR. 32l


there on tbe 2nd, foreed tbe bridge over the Ta-
mega, and took fromhim eight or nine pieces of
cannon; and hewas now falling back, with the
remains of his corps, upon Lamego, in presence of
several bodies of French trüops which had crossed.
the Douro. In addition to this intelligence, a ru-
mour reached us, thatthe enemy had evacuated
Viana, Villa de Conde, and other places on the
.coast ;it was reported, moroover, that he was
busily employed in- the destruction oí stores and
magazines in Oporto, and numerou;s preparatíon¡;
were said to be going on for the immediate aban-
donmentof the city. AH tlús information coming
at once, could not but occasion sorne change in
our plans. It was now manifest enough that
Soult would not submit quietly to be surrounded;
on the contrary, no oue could doubt that he me-
ditated either the removal of the seat of war. by
circuitous marches 10 tbe Tagus, there 10 be sup-
ported by sorne movements on the side of Victor,
or designed to attempt an escape out of Portugal
by way of tha Tras os Montes. Tbe latterscheme
was justly regarded as by many degrees more
probable than the former; because, to bril'l.g bis
army 3.efOSS the Dóuro, and advance by Lunego,
would be to leave us upon his flank; and it was
r-esolved that no time shonld be lost in striving to
defeat it.


TI:e reader is probably awar.e, that at· tbe
VOL. L x




322 NAURATIVE OF THE


perlod concerning which 1 now write. the most
serious discontent was understood to prevail in the
ranks of the French army. There existed there a
secret society, the members of which, under the
title of Philadelphes, bound themselves by oath
to attempt, whenever a favourable opportunity
should occur, the abolition of the imperial dynasty,
and the restoration of a democracy in France.
Soult's corps was not free from men of this de-
scription, at the head of whom was an adjutant-
major. This personage was in constant commu-
nication with Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom he
proposed á. scheme for seducing the soldiers from
their duty, and arresting his general; and though
he was received with aH the caution, and treated
with the reserve which prudence required; still
there was that in his maimer and mode of acting.
which commanded attention. Frol11 him we
learned that a spirit, almost mutinous, was 30t
work in Oporto; that the hospital s were crowded
with sick; and that but one feeling prevailed among
all ranks, that of unmitigated dislike of the parti-
cular service in which they were employed. It
will readily be believed that su eh information
only increased our anxiety to be beforehand with
the enemy, of whose· design to evacuate Portugal
it was impossible any longer to entertain a doubt.
Preparations were accordingly made to lead the
army, in two divisions~ direct)y upon the Douro,




PENINSULAR WAR. 323


-one proceeding by Aveira, and the other by
Vouga; whilst Beresford, preceding it with his
advanced-guard a single day, should rnove by
Vizeu upon Lamego.


Sorne time was, however, required to bring upthe
various regiments and brigades from their detached
stations; and this interval was spent, partIy in
putting the commissariat into a state of greater
efticiency, and partly in smoothing down certain
awkward feellngs which had unhappily arisen
among ourselves, on the score of rank. There
was a considerable jealousy, on the part of sorne
of our senior ofticers, with respect to the stations
to which the Portuguese commission might ad-
vance their juniors, whilst acting with the com-
bined armies. General Beresford furnished a
case in point, who. though inferior in the date of
his British appointment to several locallieutenant-
génerals, took rank as a n.eld-marshal in Portugal,
and commanded, as such, the advance of the
allied forces. To obviate this, it was necessary to
explain, that Portuguese rank could be permitted
to have weight onlyas long as both British and
Portuguese troops were under their present leader;
but that, in case of any vacancy in the supreme
command, hewould of course succeed, whose Bri.,.
tish rank happened to be the most elevated. N or
was it ever in tended that a senior British officer
should act immediately under his junior, notwith-




324 NARRA'fIVE OF THE


standing the station which the latter might tero-
porally fill; and hence care was taken that no
man should be appointed to a command in Beres-
ford's corps, who was not, in point of faCt, his
junior in the British service. These were unplea-
sant discussions; and they were not the less so,
on account of the necessity which all acknow-
ledged for the employment of British officers in
the Portuguese service. But they came not aIone.
Other difficulties arose as fast as these ceased. to
operate, touching the mode of paying the officers
attached to Portuguese battalions; and it wasonly
by an exercise of that clear judgment and firmness
of mind w'hich so peculiarly belong to him, that
our chief was at last enabled to set them all at resto


As the troops began to arrive in and around
Coimbra, the difficulty of finding forage for the
horses and mules attached to them, became very
great. The markets were, however, good, the
inhabitants freely supplying us with everyarticle
of provision at a moderate priee; but the expense
of supporting the army here was enormoua. It
was calculated that the British troops aIone cireu·
lated through Coimbra a sum of not less than
10,0001. per day; and that the whole money
spent by the allies exceeded 100,0001. per week.
With respeet to our own employments, again, they
may be related in few words. Part of almost
every day was spent in inspecting the several




PENINSULAR W AR. 325


corps as they came up, and in seeing that their
arms, necessal'ies, and general equipments, were
in a serviceable condition; whilst the remainder
was consumed, either in the office, or in riding
over the country. When reviewing the different
brigades, it was impossible not to be forcibly
struck with the superiority of the EngIish over
the Portuguese soldiers in external appearance.
The latter either were, or seemed to be, by far the
worst description ofmen in the country, infmitely
inferior in every respect to the peasantry. They
were diminutive and narrow-chested in the ex-
treme, yet were they extremely steady under
arms; and, as the event proved, fully equal to
their allies in the endnrance of fatigues and priva-
tions, and in several instances not greatly inferior
to them even in the freId.


On the 5th of May, the army being at length
assembled, a. grand review took place; and
a most imposing and magnificent spectacle it pre-
sented. To some of the troops which stood that
day under arms, it is not going too far to affirm,
that the whole world can produce none superior.
Of this description were the brigade of guards, the
29th, the S3rd, and the four battalions of the
King's German Legion; and the rest, if in a few
minor points they fell short, were. such as any
general might be proud to command. The whole
were, indeed, in the highest state of discipline and




326 NARltATIVE OF THE


. efficiency; and all appeared animated by one
spirit-an ardent desire to meet the enemy. Nor
were they kept long in a state of suspense. On
that very evening the definitive pIans were ar-
ranged; and on the following morning it was un-
derstood that the columns would begin to moye.


As the intention of turning Soult's left by way
of Lamego and Amarante still he Id good, Beres-
ford, to whom that office was intrusted, received
orders to march at day-break on the 6th. He was
to be followed on the morning of the 7th, as pre-
viously arranged, by the brigades of General Til-
son and Fane. On the same day, Cotton, at the
head of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, sup- .
ported by General Stewart's brigade of infantry,
wasto March upon Mullanda, and to arrive at
Adigal on the 8th, followed by the King's German
l,egion. General Hill's brigade was likewise to
march on the 6th, so as to reach Aveira on the
8th; and the head-quarters were to move on the
latter of these days towards Adego and the Vouga.
Such were the orders issued on the evening of the
6th; and these the several divisions specified
made ready to obey.




PENINSULAR W AH. 321


CHAPTER XIII.


The army advances towards the Douro-A body of the enemy
attacked arid dríven from Albergaría Nova::-Affair of
Grijon - Passage of the Douro, and defeat of Soult.


THE dawn of the 7th of May was beginning to
appear, when the advanced-guard of. the army,
accompanied by General Cotton'-s brigade of caval-


. ry, began its march in the direction of Oporto. It
proceeded leisurely, and it was followed by the
whole of the arrny, divided into two columns, of
three divisions; two of which, under Generals
Paget and Payne, moved by the Vouga road,
whilst the third advanced upon Aveira, under the
orders of General Hin. The latter movements did .
not, however, take place till the 9th, the main
body halting during the 8th, in order that Beres-
ford, who set out on the 6th for Vizeu and La-
mego, . might be enabled to reach his place of
destination in good time, and take possession of




328 NARRATIVI<: OF THE


Amarante at the moment most desirable, when we
should begin to show ourselves in front of Oporto.
It was intended that, on the evening of the 9th,
Hill should embark at Aveira, where boats were
prepared for the purpose, and make good his land-
ing at Ovar, at an early hour on the morning of
the 10th. On the latter day, Cotton was directed
to beat up aH the enemy's posts between the
Vouga and Oliveira, opening a communication, by
this means, with General Hin; and he was to be
supported in the undertaking by Generals Stewart
and Murray, who, with their respective corps, re-
ceived directions to pass the Vouga, and move
upon Albergaria N ova. In the mean while, Sher-
btooke and Cameron ,vcre to follow, so as that the
latter; embarking at Oveiro on the evening of the
10th, might reach Ovar on the 11th. Then Cot-
ton and Hill, who~e junction, it was calculated,
lnight by that time be effected, were to march
rapidly upon Villa N ova; and it was confidently
hoped that the celerity of the movements would
be such as to secure the bridge, at aH events, even
if they should faH in cutting off the rear-guard· of
the enemy. This was the more necessary, as the
bridge at Villa N ova formed the only visible means
by which we should be enabled to pass the Douro ;
and were it to be broken down, a very serious ob-
stacle to the ultimate success of the expedition
would, ít was apprehended, be raised.




· PENINSULAR WAU. 329


Such were the general outlines of tbe plan as
far as 1 could colleet, which was of course liable to
change according as circumstances migbt direct,
but for which, were it to provemoderately suc-
cessfut in its main points, the following advantages
might be expected to resulto We had reason to
believe that the enemy's force was pretty equally
divided, one half being at Oporto, and the other at
Amarante. N ow by throwing Beresford across
the Douro, fun occupation wouId be given to· tbe
troops in Amarante; and hence our main attack,
which was directed upon Oporto, wouIa be mate-
rially forwarded. Again, by sending Hill and
Cameron by water, we shouId seriously facilitate
our line of march, and perhaps give an opportunity
to Cotton, on the arrival of the former at Oveiro,
to drive in part of the enemy's cavalry upon him.
But· the preceding arrangements were further cún-
firrned by a report 'which had Iately reached us,
that Soult was collecting his whole disposable
strength in front of Villa N ova, with the intention
of sustaining an attack upon some high ground in
the vicinity, which he had carefully fortified. We
were extremelyanxious that he should adhere to
this determination, inasrnuch as he could not pos-
Bibly do us a greater favour; yet it was hardly tú
be expected that he wouId so far cornmit himself.
On the contrary, it seemed more probable that he
wouId rnove off with his whole army towards




330 NARRATIVE OF TRE


Amarante, and endeavour to strike a blow at
Beresford before we should be able to come up.
In this case Beresford must needs keep the Douro
betweén him and the enemy; and thus a road
would be opened for the latter through Tras os
Montes into Spain. These were, of course, the
chances of war. Should the die' turn up in one
way, the enemy would escape us; should allother
cast be thrown, and his reported resolution of
fighting between Tidrusa and Villa N ova hold
good,-th~n was the game more likely to be our
own. Hill's c.orps might, indeed, be for a moment
in danger; but it would only be for a moment;
because there was nothillg to hinder the whole
a.rmy from reaching the field ofaction by the 11th
at the latest. In a word, the plan seemed the best
which, under existing circumstances, could be
Jormed; and it was vigorously carried into exe-
cution.


I have stated sorne reasons why Sir Arthur
Wellesley was anxious to bring Soult to action at
once, an of them originating in an apprehension,
lest the enemy should make good his retreat un-
harmed. There was another motive at work be-
sides these. It was confidently rumoured that
ten thousand men' from the armies of Spain, "'ere
ordered to reinforce the corps in Portugal; that
they had quitted Arragon sorne time ago, and might
be expected to reach Tudela on the 16th at the




PENINSULAR WAR. ·331


latest. Now, though no account of their passage
through Madrid or Burgos had come in, the rumour
possessed too much of probability about it to be dis-
regarded; and it mattered little to us, in the end,
whether Soult or Victor was to receive the addition
to his strength. Our business was to be before-
hand with them, and to despatch one, if not both
the French generals, before the reinforcements
could reach them. Even if Soult alone should be
destroyed, our prospects wouldbecome brilliant;
for the accounts of the Spaniards, sent in by
Colonel Doyle, were in the highest degree flatter-
ing; and nothing but the presence of the enemy
in Portugal stood in the way of our co-operating
with thero. AH these reasons had full weight in
precipitating our measures against Sonlt; and as
the army was well provided in every respect, and
provisions and other nece&saries were abundant,
little doubt could be entertained, that a few days
at the furthest would see the first part of our pro-
ject fully realised.


It has been said that the advanced-guard, ac-
companied by General Cotton's division of cavalry,
began its march on the morning of the 7th. The
corps in question consisted óf two brigades of
infantry, one British and one German-the former
commanded by Brigadier-general R. Stewart;
with two brigades of artillery-one of sixes, the
other of threes. It reached the village of Andeja




332 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


on the evening of the 8th; and finding that a body
ef the enerny, consisting of two regiments of
cavalry. with sorne infantry and guns, were can-
toned in Albergaria Nova and the villages near,
a scheme was devised for surprising thern. With
this design, the troops passed the Vouga soon after
it becarne dark, when General Cotton, diverging
from the be aten track. sef off with the cavalry, by
a road which led round the villages to the right.
Whilst he was executing this m overnent, the in-
fantry and artillery. led on by General Paget,
prepared to rnake their way over sorne very diffi-
cult ground, in what is called the pass of Vouga.
Having halted for about two hours, in order that
Cotton rnight have time to get well up, and to
niake his dispositions, they too began their
march, Colonel Trant, with his Portuguese,
undertaking to transport the guns through the
most rugged parts of the pass. It unfortunately
feH out, however, that the obstacles· opposed to
the progress of the artilIery, were greater than
had been anticipated; and the morning of the 9th
broke long before the pass was cleared. This
necessarily retarded both the infantry and the
cavalry; in addition to which, the guides on whorn
Cotton had relied, mistook, in the darkness of the
night, the proper road. The consequence was,
that when our cavalry arrived, not in the rear, nor
on the flank of Albergaria, but in its front, they




PENINSULAH WAR. 333


found the enemy dl'awn up to .receive them, their
horse being in line upon an open plain, covered by
a body of l'iflemen; whilst a party of infantry oc-
cupied a pine-wood on their flank. Cotton had
not antieipated su eh reception; he halted his
people, and remained stationary; and was thus
situated when Sir Arthur Wellesley arl'ived with
the infantry. The latter were instantly directed
to advance; the British,. under Paget, passing
through Albergaria; . and the Portuguese, under
Trant, through sorne hamlets on the left; whilst
the cavalry, forming the centre, pressed upon the
open space between the two villages. Both the
British and Portuguese infantry pushed on with-
out a halt, under an exceedingly brisk fire, which
they as briskly returned; but the eavalry were not
so fortunate. They found no convenient oppor-
tunity to act, and they were somewhat left behind
by their dismounted comrades; but the position was
carried with little 10ss on either side. The enemy
retreated hastily, and our advanced-guard passed
the night at Oliveira; the guards and the remain-
der of the column taking quarters in Albergaria.


At an early houron the 11th, the march was
renewed ; but we had notproceeded far, when a
strong bodyof the enemy, amounting to perhaps
fOUT or five thousand infantry, with four regiments
of cavalry, appeared in our front .. They occupied
a commanding position upon sorne hilIs beyondthe




334 NARRATIVE OF THE


village of Grijon, and seemed determined to de-
fend it. Sir Arthur Wellesley saw, in a moment,
that the height upon which the enemy rested his
left could be turned, and he took his measures ac·
cordingly. Without once halting his column, he
ordered General Murray, from thé rear of the ad-
vanced-guard, to move round by the right, throw-
ing, at the same time, the 16th Portuguese into a
pine-wood on the left. The latter were intended
rather to distract- the enemy's attention, than them-
selves to attempt anything serious; whilst General
Paget, supported by two battalions in reserve,
manreuvred upon their front. A very heavy firing
immediately began; but the enemy no SOOller ob-
served the judicious movement round their left,
than they abandoned their strong ground, and
Hed. U pon this, our troops were again thrown
¡nto column, and the march resumed as if nothing
had happened; every movement being made with
the same coolness, and in as perfect order, as if at
lit field-day.


It would be difficult to conceive any little piece
of manreuvring more beautiful than that which had
just been executed; but the business of the day
was by no means overo As soon as we mounted
the heights from which the French had just be en
driven, the rear was observed retiring in great
confusion; and it occurred to me that a good op..,
portunity was furnished, of making a successful




"PENINSULAR WAR. 335


charge with a few troops of cavalry. Sir Arthur
Wellesley instantly acceded to my proposal, and
two squadrons being intrusted to me, we galloped
forward in sections along the road, and overthrew,
by repeated attacks, everything which stood in
our way. Our prisoners alone amounted to up-
wards of one hundred meno The enemy, upon
this, halted, and forrned their infantry on the
heights of Carvalhos, whieh eornmanded the road
to a great distance,and checked the pursuit ofthe
two squadrons. A rnessenger was immediately


. despatched to the rear, to request that greater
force might be sent up; and in the mean while,
the squadrons wheeling offto the right, threatened,
by a road which ran in that direction, the enemy's
left. This movement, alone, had the. desired ef-
feet. Before the additional troops could arrive,
they were once more in full retreat, and the heights
ofCarvalhos were abandoned.


In this ma!1ner we continued our journey, march-
ing and fighting without any intermission, frorn
nine in the morning till five in the afternoon; for
the march of the column was never for an instant
delayed, because the advanced-guard happened to
be engaged. At last, however, we halted for the
night; the advance bivouacking on ·the ground
where it stood, and the guards oceupying Grijon
aud Carvalhos; and the head-quarters ofthe arrny
establishing itself in the eonvent of Grijon, where




336 NARRA TIVE OF THE


tbe French generals breakfasted tbat morning.
Respeeting these, we were given to understand,
that Marmet, Thomieres, Delaborde, and Fran-
cesehi, were this day opposed to us; and sorne
hopes were entertained, that even Soult himself
might be on this side of the Douro. N or was it
less satisfactory- to learn, that Hill'g landing at
Ovar sueeeeded to our utrnost wL'Shes. He Wa!3
followed by Cameron; and both were already
communicating with uso


Our casualties during the morning were consi-
derable, a good many roen having been killed, a
still greater number wounded; but they were not
more serious than might have be en e2lpected, for
the enemy's force opposed to us greatIy outnum-
bered the ~ivisibn of our army which was alone
engaged. Their ground, too, was generally ad-
vantageous to them; and in opposition to aU as-
suranees previously received, they fought like men
who were not willing to be beaten. . The result of
the affair~ however, tended greatly to elevate the
spirits ofall who had taken part in it. Once more
had English troops be en brought into contact with
French, and once more had they proved theif
superiority; they wanted but a wider and better
field, to prove 1t still more satisfactorily.


We rose next moming with frames considerably
refreshed, and began our march in the highest
possible spirits. As we proceeded, cottages un-




PENINSULAR WAR. 337


roofed and in ruins; gardens and enclosures laid
waste; and the most wanton destruction of every-
thing destructible, marked the rout which the
enemy had taken. But we fell in with non e of
his parties. Soult had withdrawn his whole force
across the Douro in the night, and breaking down
the bridge, was already congratulating himself on
his escape from, at least, immediate molestation.


It might be about ten o'clock in the motning,
when the advanced-guard, consisting of two bri-
gades of infantry, those of General Stewart and
General Murray, with two squadrons of the 14th
dragoons, under Paget, arrived at the village, 01
tath6"f suburb, oí Villa N ova. It was joined here
by General Hill's corps, which, marching from
Ovar along the sea-shore, overtook usat the en-
trance of the place. We found, as we had ex-
pected to find, that the bridge was destroyed; and
we discovered, likewise, that Soult had taken the
precaution to remove every boat and barge from
this to the opposite side of the river. Under these
circumstances, it became no easy matter to sur-
mise how the passage was to be effected; though
every one felt that effected it must be, and that
speedily. We were yet hesitating what course to
pursue, when Colonel Waters of the Portuguese
servíce, by whom the destruction of the bridge had
been reported, was ordered to gallop forward, arid
to secure the means of transport at any risk. That


VOL. 1. y




338 NARRA'fIVE OF THE


intelligent officer instantly proceeded to the river's
bank, at a spot where it forms a curve, opposite to
the Convento da Cerra~ and where, at the distance
of a mile and a half from Oporto, its course is con-
cealed by a thick wood.· He found here a small
boat, hid among the bushes; and standing near it
were the prior of the convent, and three 01' four
peasants. The latter, partly at his entreaty. aIid
partly by the exhottations of the prior, were per-
suaded to leap withhim into the little skiff, and
they made directly to the opposite bank, where·
there lay among the mud four large barges~ of
which they made themselves masters. The deed
was a daring one, because patrols of the enemy
passed to and fro continually; but it was produc-
tive of the very bestresults. They returned with
their prizes unobserved, into which General Pa-
get, with three companies of the Buffs, instantly
threw themselves; ann crossing the river without
a moment's delay, too k possession of sorne houses
on the opposite bank, before the enemy were at
an aware of their intentions. They had not, how-
ever, taken their ground many minutes, when the
French. awaking as it were from a trance, ad-
vanced to dislodKe them. Asevere action now
ensued, in which our troops resolutely main-
tained themselves, in spite of odds the most over-
whelming; nor was the slightest impression made·
upon them, till fresh companies arrived to their




PENINSULAR WAR. 339


support, and all chance of a defeat had been
averted.


In the mean while, our people on the opposite
side were busily employed in planting guns upon
the height of Sto Convento, from which a plunging
fire was speedily opened upon the enemy's co-
lumns. General MQrray too, who had been de-
tached with his division to a ferry higher up, was
fortunate enough to gain possession of ai many
boats as enabled him to pass over two battalions
ofGermans, with two squadrons of the 14th; and
these showing themselves upon the enemy's left,
the latter immediately retreated from the bank of
the river. In an instant the Douro was covered
with boats, which the inhabitants hastened to con-
vey across for our accommodation; and the 29th,
the two remaining battalions of Germans, and the
guards, were all passed over from Villa Nova.
We were now in complete possession of the town,
theenemy fleeing in aH directions. Their prin-
cipal retreat was, however, upon the road to Ama-'
rante, which they covered with infantry, cavalry,
ando artillery, all in the greatest confusion; and
thither they were pursued by the dragoons from
General Murray's corps, under my orders, with
the gallant Colonel Hervey of the 14th, who un-
fortunately lost his arm in this skirmis~. The
slaughter was very great,' for a panic had evidently
fallen upon them; and as we followed them a




340 NARRATIVE OF THE


considerable way, repeated opportunities were
furnished of charging to advantage. But at last
we were recalled; and the whole army assembled
to recover from its fatigues, in the city.


The affair which 1 have thus, 1 fear imperfectly,
attempted to describe, has be en considered, alld
deserves to be considered by all military men, as
not less brilliant than ally action of its magnitude,
either in the Peninsular or any other modern war.
To pass a wide, deep, and rapid river, in the face
of a formidable enemy, even with the assistance
of an adequate supply of boats and pontoons, re-
requires no trifling degree either of courage or
management; but on the present occasion the
passage was made good in spite of difficulties,
under which, perhaps, any other officer, except
the -roan who effected it, would have sunk. So
little, indeed, did Soult anticipate an attempt of
the kind, that he directed his undivided attention.
to the sea; and when reports were brought to him,
that the British trops were crossing from Villa
N ova, he refused at first to give them credit. But
Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the very boldness
of his plan went far towards securing its success;
he feIt, inoreover,. that upon the promptitude of
his movements, the safety of Marshal Beresford's
corps in a great degree depended, and he made
up his mind to hazard something, rather than.
permit such an opportunity of striking a blow to




PENINSULAR WAR. 341


escape him altogether. Had he adópted the re-
solutioR for which Sonlt gave himcredit, of
embarking his army, and so passing the mouth of
the Douro with the boats of the Heet, the French
must have escaped in good order; for a delay
would have arisen of at least two days, and two
days were aH that Soult required to insure his
safety. He therefore chose the more gallant
course, of crossing his troops by detachments;
and as he knew of what materials his troops were
formed, he entertained no apprehension as to the
results. His bravery and exceHent arrangements
were rewarded by a victory, which would alone
immortalise any other individual, had another been
so fortunate as to obtain it.


The evening was not far advanced, when the
sound of firing ceased, and the most perfect order,
consistent with a scene of universal rejoicing
among the people, prevailed in Oporto. Our
head-quarters being established in the house
which Soult had occupied, we found every prepa-
ration for a comfortable dinner in progress; for
the French Marshal quitted the place so lately as
two in the aftemoon, long after his sumptuous
me al had been ordered. It will be reádily ima-
gined that we were not backward in doing ample
justice to it. But ours was not a situation which
sanctioned the loss of a single hour in relaxation.
Orders were issned, and arrangements made, for




342 NARRA TIVE OF 'rHE


putting the army in a condition to resume the
pursuit with as little delay as possible; and On
the morrow the columns were again in motion.
Of the night advantage had been taken to bring
up and pass along the whole of the artillery, wag-
gons, and commissariat stores; and when the
dawn of the 13th carne in, General Murray's bri-
gade were in a condition to marcho They set out
accordingly on the road to Amarante; and the
guards, with the rest of the infantry, prepared to
follow in the evening. .


Whilst we were thus carrying everything before
us on the banks of the Douro~ Marshal Beresford,
with his detached corps, was not idle. Arriving
at Villa Real on the 9th, and being there strength-
ened by the junction of Silveira's troops, he began
bis march on the following morning, in the direc-
tion of Amarante. On the 11 th, his advance,
under Silveira, reached that place, where a slight
skirmish occurred with the division of General
Loison ; but the latter retreated almost imme-
diately, taking, as it was believed, the road to
Oporto. Of these events Beresford took care to
inform us; whilst he himself marched rapidly in
pursuit of Loison,. fearful lest his junction with


. Soult should render the latter too strong for USo
By this time, however, Soult was overthrown, and
in full retreat: the consequence was, that his
corps feH in with that of Loison, at Peñafiel, on




PENINSULAR "\VAH. 343


the evening .of the 12th; and they both prepared
to continue, in conjunction with one another, their
confused and disastrous flight upon Spain.


There were two routes b€fore Soult, by one or
otherof which he must necessarily move, if he
desired to preserve any of the materiel of his army
in its retreat. Either he would make for Galicia;
by Ponte de Lima, Valencia, and Tuy; or, as was
more probable, he would endeavour to reach Val-
ladolid by Chaves.. It was réquisite, on our part,
to provide against both emergencies. For this
purpose, instructions were forwarded to Beresford,
on the ] 3th, directing him,in case the enemy
should abandon Amarante, to move upon Chaves,
and to make himself master of that line of opera-
tions. In the mean while, our corps were to
march in such order, as would at once press upon
the. rear of the fugitives, supposing them to hold
sti11 to the Amarante road, and seize the communi:.
cations along the other rout~, towards Tuy. Ge-
neral Murray accordingly pressed forward in the
direction of Peñafiel, followed by the Hanoverian
Legion and a squadron of. cavalry. Thismove-
ment took place on the morning of the 13th. On
the 14th again, the rest of the army, consisting of
the guards, the cavalry, Generals Stewart's,
Campbell's, and Hill's corps, followed the lower
road towards Barcelos and· Valencia. On the
15th, authentic intelligence reached us, that the .




344 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


whole of the French force was retiring upon
Chaves, after it had burned and destroyed the
great bulk of its stores, and even its artillery, in
Peñafiel. An immediate alteration of plan was
the consequence. Whilst the cavalry, the guards,
and General Cameron's brigade, advanced as far
as Braga, the remainder stopped short at Villanova
de Famelicao; and the lower road being entirely
abandoned, all were instructed to move towards
Chaves. Thither, therefore, the whole strength
of the army directed itself; and it was confidently
anticipated that great events must follow; foÍ' no
one could doubt that the French army would suf-
fer here cOmplete defeat, provided Beresford's
corps should have succeeded in occupying Chaves
in their front.


In the mean while a variety of rumours respect-
ing the present and future uudertakings of the
enemy in Spain, were hourly pouring in upon uso
or N ey it was reported thathe had withdrawn
from Lugo, and was verging gradually in the direc-
tion of the frontier; whilst Bessieres was stated to
have detached from Valladolid a strong force, for
the purpose of acting against uso Then came cer-
tain letters from Victor to N ey, which our flying
parties had intercepted, bearing date at Merida,
on the 29th of April. From these; it appeared
that Victor had, by King Joseph's orders, opened
a communication with the junta of Seville, froID




PENINSULAH W AH. 345


which he expected the most favourable results;
and he accordingly informed his co.rrespondent
that he had withdrawn his advance frorh Medellin;
and should not, for the present, enter upon any
forward operations. It is probably needless to
add, that the latter piece of information afforded
great satisfaction to us, inasmuch as it freed us
from all immediate apprehensions on the side of
the Tagus, and gave us assurance of being enabled
to prosecute our designs against Soult without in-
terruption~ These completed, other and no less
splendid undertakings were before us~ We might
march rapidly to Alcantara, by way of Ciudad
Rodrigo, desiring Mackenzie to join us at the for-
mer place; when the whole concentrating at
Truxillo, might threaten Victor's right, and, in
connexion with Cuesta, force him to give battle, or
retire from his present position. For all this, how-
ever, more troops were wanting. At present we
could not muster, even with the addition of Mac·
kenzie's corps, twenty thousand effective infantry
and cavalry; and twenty thousand men were con-
fessedly not adequate to the undertaking. In
cavalry, especially, we were extremely wéak; and
it was unreasonable to expect that the successes
already obtained could be followed up with any
vigour, unless that arm in particular were ren-
dered perfectly efficient.




346 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER XIV.


Sir -Arthur Wellesley follows the Freneh army-Skirmish at
Salamonde-SouIt makes for Orense, and the pursui-t is
abandoned-The allies eountermareh upon Coimbra, where
a reinforeement of five thousand men reaehes them-Move-
ment towards the south-Communieations opened with
Cuesta-His pIans for the eampaign opposed by Sir Arthur
WeIlesIey-The army becomes sickIy, and is distressed for
money and stores.


THOUGH no man could feel more acutely than
our gallant leader, that his energies were sadly
cramped for want of means; and though the arri-
val of at least ten thóusand fresh troops was an,
event for which he, in common with his followers,
rather wished than hoped, he determined that no-
thing should be wanting on his part to make the
most of the victorious little band already at his
disposa!.


Having ascertained, on the night of the 15th, by
a report from General Murray, who, with the Ha-




PENINSULAR WAR. 347


noverians, had followed the enemy frorn Peñafiel
to Guirnaraens, and was now in comrnunication
with us frorn that place, that Soult was destroying
his artillery and stores, and that the utmost dis-
tress prevailed in the French ranks, Sir Arthur
Wellesley carne to the concIusion, that to 'pursue
any further with the whoIe of his force, would be
to harass the rnen for very Iittle purpose. It was
evident, frorn these preparations, that Soult had
made up his mind to retreat in a directión where
no 'army could pretend to follow him, unIess its
leader were willing to disorganise his own means
to the full as effectualIy as the enemy had disor-
ganised h!s. WhiIst, therefore, he directed M ur-
ray to fall from Guimaraens into our liné of
march, under the impression that menin a despe.:.
rate situation might even yet rnake a desperate
attempt, he commanded General Hill, with the
four brigades of which he was at the head, to haIt
at Braga; and he did so, bóth because he still
Iooked to a countermarch upon the Tagus, and
because he entertained no intention of wasting his
resources arnong the barren mountains of Galicia;
for, that Soult would make for the mountains; no
one could Ionger doubt. He had disencumbered
himself of everything calculated in the slightest
degree to retard his progress, not excepting even
the plunder of Oporto, or the caissons which con-
tained the spare rnusket-ammunition for his 801-




348 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


diers; and he was in fuIl march towards the rugged
pass of the Sierra de Montalegre.


In consequenee of these arrangernents, the ad-
vanee of our arrny began its mareh at an early
hour on the morning of the 16th, and carne up
towards evening with the enemy's rear-guard near
the village of Salamonde, about four leagues from
Braga, on the road to Chaves. The enerny were
posted upon strong heights in front of the village,
having the river Cavade in their rear~ over which
are thrown two small bridges. These conduct to
two roads, one of which passes through Ruevaens,
and along the tops of sorne lofty mountains be-
yond; whilst the other leads only to a sort of by-
path, which, after penetrating by a shorter cut
through the valley, ultimately winds into the main
road, over the hilIs. Though the brigade of guards
was the only portion of our force at hand, the Ge-
neral resolved to attack; and one mornent spent
in reconnoitring, served to satisfy hirn as to the
best mean s of proceeding. There was an exceed-
ingly high and steep hill upon the enemy's left,
which they oeeupied in sorne force; their right
being likewise upon a hill, but covered in front by
a deep ravine.. The latter point could not, of
eourse, be assailed; but the former appearing to
Sir Arthur Wellesley to be eapable of being
turned, he instantIy despatched the riflemen, sup-
ported by three companies, to rnake the atternpt.




PENINSULAH W AR. 349


The guards were then formed in column upon the
road, covered by two three-pounders, conveniently
placed for the purpose; .and they were directed,
as soon as the light troops should show themselves
on the brow of the hill, to charge.


As the ground over which the light troops were
compelled to pass, chanced to be peculiarly broken,
a considerable detour was necessary, and so me
time elapsed before they reached their point of
destination; but their arrival there was no sooner
known than the guards advanced. The enemy
made no attempt to offer them any serious resist-
ance. They gave their fire, indeed, as soon as
the head of the column came within range; but
having done so~ they immediately abandoned their
ranks, and. fled in the greatest confusion. We
pursued them through the village with al1 the
eagerness of men who had barely seen an object
which they were eager to overtake; but the dark-
ness carne on so fast, that no one was able to
determine exactIy by which of the two roads they
had retreated. At last, a large mass were descried
upon the lower bridge, passing in a state of abso-
lute disorganisation, and with much haste. Upon
these we got the guns to bear; and before they
couJd clear the defile, considerable execution was
done among them. Our infantry, however, were
soon obliged to abandon the pursuit; and we
returned to the village, where, in a few miserable




350 NAHRATIVE OF THE


hovels, stripped and plundered of everything porta-
ble, we passed the night.


At the first break of dawn, on the following
morning, we again made ready to advance; and
as day-light broke, we were able to discover
that terrible havoc had been made at the lower
bridge. The bodies of four or five hundred rnen
and horses lay there; sorne killed by cannon-shot ;
others precipitated, in· the confusion, headlong
into the river; whilst baggage of every desérip-
tion, cars, waggons, and even knapsacks, aH loaded
with plunder, blocked up the bridges, and ·ren-
dered thern quite impassable. The same species
of encumbrances filled the little streets. Articles
of the greatest value, such as silver cups, rich
tapestry, and cloth of gold, lay strewed about in
the mud; indeed, it seemed as if the enemy had
now, at length, lost heart, and were willing to
relinquish every thing in order to. preserve their
own persons. One advantage they certainly ob-
tained by this hasty abandonment oí the last
re:rimants of their property; for the roads were so
completely encumbered, as to render our passage
both disorderly and slow; and we were, in con-
sequence, obliged to halt that night at Ruevaens.


During the three last days the rain had come
down in torrents; and our men, who were con-
tinuaHy exposed to it by night as well as by day,
began to exhibit syrnptoms of suffering from their




l'ENINSULAlt WAR. 351


hardships. On this account, as well as becausé
it was now ascertained that Soult, instead of
moving upon Chaves, had turned off from Mon-
talegre to Orense, Sir Arthur' Wellesley deter-
mined to. relinquish the pursuit. Beresford, it
appeared, had anticipated the instructions sent to
him, and was already in possession of Chaves; so
that all which could be done to intercept the fly-
ing enemy, had been effected; but, as the General
expressed himself, "if anarmy throws away aH
its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and every-
thing whieh can strengthen it, and can enable it
to act together as a body, and abandons all those
who are entitled to its protection, but arld to its
weight and impede its progress, it must be able to
march by roads through which it cannot be fol-
lowed with any prospect of being overtaken by an
armywhich has not made the same sacrifices;"
and that such had been the case with Soult's
army, the most convincing proofs were before our
eyes. The whole extent of their route was
strewed with the careases of mules, horses, and
even nien, who, unableto keep up, had been left
behind; the horses and mules being either killed'
or hamstrung, and the men either dead, or in a
state of the most pitiable exhaustion. Broken
carriages, tumbrils, guns, and everything capable
of rendering an army efficient; met us at every
step. N or was it by such marks alone that their




352 NARUATIVE OF THE


Hne of march could be pointed out. Every vil~
lage, hamlet, or cottage, which they passed, was
wantonly set on fire, till the sky became obscured
during the day by volumes of smoke, and illu-
minated at night by the blaze of burning dwell-
ings. On the inhabitants, likewise, they exer-
cised the most wanton cruelty. But these out-
rages went not wholly unpunished. Such of the
peasimtry as escaped, collected together in groups,
and hung upon the rear and flanks of the retreat-
ing army, and every straggler who fell into their
hands was put to death under circumstances oftbe
most terrible atrocity. It was no uncommon thing
to come upon French soldiers lying by the road-
side, not dead, but fearfuIly mutilated; whilst
such corpses as bore marks of violence, seemed to
have died under lingering torture. Our retreat
from Sahagun was bad enough, - few retreats,
perhaps, in modern times, have been more harass-
ing; but the retreat of Soult through the moun-
tains of Galicia must have been fully as disastrous.
His loss in men alone could not faH short of four
or five thousand, whilst his whole materiel was
destroyed; and even of the troops who escaped, the
probability was, that more than one-half would be-
come denizens of the hospital. Yet is SouIt deserving
of the highest praise for the celerity and talent
with which his flight was conducted. True, the
army, after it should reach a place of safety, must,




PENINSULAR WAR. 353


like the Spanish armies, be entirely re-organised
before it could pretend again to take the fie1d;
but even thus, it was no easy matter to escape;
and the French Marsha1 was fully entitled to all
the applause ·which we liberally bestowed upon
him, for having, at the expense of any sacrifices,
extricated himse1f from his difficulties.


1 have said that Sir Arthur Welles1ey, as soon as
he had positively ascertained the route which the
enemy were pursuing, determined not to follow
them any further. He carne to this reso1ution
when the advance was already within a short dis-
tance of Montalegre, and he was confirined in it
by a report from General Mackenzie, which
reached him on the night of the 17th, that a corps
from Victor's army was moving· on Alcantara.
The four brigades, which had been 1eft behindat
Braga, were ordered instantly to return to Oporto;
and those which accompanied the head-quarters,
prepared to follow in the same direction. At the
same time advice was forwarded to Marshal Be-
resford, desiring him to meet us in Braga, for the
purpose ofarl'anging a defensive plan for this part
of the country; and Silveira with his Portuguesé
being left to pursue Soult, we an bent our steps
once more towards the -Tagus.


It will nO~;¡ge necessary to record with much
minuteness, the progress of the army during· its
retrograde movement. Enough is done when 1


VOL. r. z




354 NARRATIVE OF THE


state that, passing once more over the scene of its
late triumphs, it arrived at Coimbra on the 28th,
where head-quarters were established during a few
days, and a short respite granted to the weary 801-
diers. The latter was an arrangement of which
they stood much in need. Their sufferings in the
mountains, though cheerfully borne at the mo-
ment, began, as soon as the immediate excitement
abated, to take effect upon them; and not a few,
particularly of the younger and les s seasoned
among them, feH sick. Rest was therefore de-
sirable. N or was it a matter of indifference to us
to learn that a reinforcement of five thousand men
had landed, and that they might be expected to
join us in the course of the week, so as to take
part in the series of operations in which the army
might next embark. We should, indeed, have
felt greater satisfaction, had the numbers of our
recruits been doubled; but five thousand British
soldiers were not to be spoken of lightly, and we
were all extremely pleased at the prospect oftheir
arrival.


Whilst this brief period of relaxation lasted, we
found occupation enough, partIy in considering the
reports which were from time to time sent in re-
specting Cuesta, and partIy in striving to compose
those unhappy differences on th~ score of rank, of
which 1 have already said something, and which
now again began to show themselves. Much um-




PEXINstrLAR \VAR. 355


htage was taken, because the oflicers attached to
Portuguese 'corps received, not only an additional
step in the British armY1 but a second advance, as
soon as they took their places· in the ranks of our
allies. By this arrangement a British captain,
who might happen to volunteer into the Portu-
guese army, was promoted to a British majority;
and was still further pushed on, by receiving the
Portuguese rank oflieutenant-coloneI, immediately
on his attaching hiinself to a POrtuguese battalion.
As such, he necessarily took precedence of the
tnajors in the British army, no matter ofwhat date
their commissions might be. It was hardly to be
expected that such an arrangement should not
give serious offence to aH who thus found them-
selves commanded by men whom they persisted
in regarding as their juniors. Yet was the circum~
stance in a great measure unavoidable. To render
British oflicers of real utility in the Portuguese ser-
vice, it was necessary that they should enter it, not
as subalterns, but as persons of rank; and they
were generally the younger men who accepted
commissions in that service at all. The difficulties
respecting majors and lieutenant-colonels could,
however, be overcome. It rarely happened, and
it rarely could happen, that they would be brought
into coHision with one another; but the case was
widely different with respect to the generals,
Tilson, Murray, Hill, and eotton, were all the se ..




356 . N ARRA TIVE OF THE


niors of Beresford; though Beresford, in virtue of
his commission as commander-in-chief of the Por-
tuguese troops, necessarily took precedency ofthem,
as often as the two armies acted together. There
was, at least in one instan ce, no surmounting this ;
and General Murray gave up his command in con-
sequence, and returned to England.


With respect, again, to other matters, we learned
that Victor, as soon as he discovered that his
movement to save Soult was made too late, feH
back again from Alcantara, and that he. was
now retiring to his former position. He had not,
however, quitted it unobserved or disregarded by
Cuesta: on the contrary, the Spanish General
had followed him in his advance; had directed a
corps, under Zayas, to attack Merida, where four
or five hundred sick were left; and it was even
rumoured, and apparently upon plausible grounds,
that Merida had actually fallen. In the mean
while, the main body ofthe Spaniards were under-
stood to be at Caceres; from which it was ex-
pected that they would march upon Truxillo and
Almaraz, for the jmrpose of securing the bridge.
It was stated, moreover, that the Portuguese, who
defended the bridge at Alcantara, fought nobly;
and it seemed to be gene rally believed that, with
a due proportion of British officers to direct them,
the Portuguese troops would soou beco me exceed-
ingly efficient.




PENINSULAR W AR. 357


Of our own future movements, no one, except
the Cornmander-in-chief, knew anything; nor had
he, as far as I could learn, as yet determinately
fixed upon them. Officers were, indeed, sent to
Cuesta, with intelligence that Sir Arthur Welles-
ley was ready to co-operate with him in an attack
upon any Freneh corps whieh might be situated
between Lisbon and Seville; but, at the same
time, to make the Spaniards aware that any
promise beyond this could not be given. Portugal
was our field; and to mové from it altogether would
be to abandon the post which the British army
was required peculiarly to proteet. Still, our
chief was willing to attempt as much as his nu-
merical strength and the nature of his instructions
would permit; and if Victor would but remain
where he was, a great blow might possibly be
struck at him. In this case we should mareh to
Thomar and Abrantes, throw a corps on the left
bank of the Tagus, communicating on its right
with Cuesta's left; and detaching a division along
the right bank, to destroy the bridge, it was not
impossible that Victor might be surrollnded.


It so happened that, at the moment when these
dispositions were talked of, news reachedus, not
only from the north ofSpain, but from the Danube.
We read of the tuinous defeat of the Austrians in
a papel' printed at Madrid, and read it with the
feelings of deep regret which it was calculated to




358 NARRATIVE OF TH)!:


excite. Yet tbere was a good deal to cheer us in
tbe rumours wbich carne in from Galicia. It was
said tbat, whilst Kellerman had united his corps
to tbat of Ney, and both were marching against
Romana into tbe Asturias, four thousand French
troops out of the seven thousand wbich had be en
left to secure Galicia, bad surrendered, at Lugo,
to one of Romana's generals. Sto Jago, likewise,
was reported to have fallen; and hence a sanguine
expectation prevailed. that if these victorious
Spaniards would but fall upon Soult whilst he was
yet in disorder, and return again to 8upport Ro.
mana before Kellerman and N ey should bave be en
able to annihilate him, tbe affairs both of Galicia
and the Asturias might do well. But these were
httle better than ordinary rumours, and, like the
reporta of the evacuation of Saragoza, and of the
assembling of a strong force at Burgos, hardly de-
served to be relied upon.


At length the troops having been well refreshed,
and many of the sick restored to a serviceable
condition, the army renewed its march on the
6th of June, and fixed its head-quarters at Tho-
mar. Nothing occurred here, calculated in any
lively degree to. excite our interest. We were
again amused, indeed, by rumours respecting the
movements of Victor, most of which represented
hím as in full retreat upon Madrid; and under the
impression that these might be wcll fonnded, we




PENINSULAR W AR. 359


experienced something like a feeling of regret,
that our advance towards him had not be en con-


ducted from the Tras os Montes, by way of Ciu-
dad Rodrigo. Yet it was far from being too late
to follow up, with vigour, that plan of operations
which appeared to hold out prospects of ultimate
success. It was the policy of the French marshals
to unite their several corps, and to act in a body ;
it was ours to prevent their junction, to cut off
their communications, and to fight them in detail.
To effect this, nothing appeared more advisable
than that we should bring our army, in conjunc-
tion with that of Cuesta, to the north of the Tagus,
and advance from thence upon Plasencia, Sala.
manca, and Valladolid. By taking that step, the
probabilities were, that we should be able to over-
take one or other of the French armies, and des-
troy it before it could be succoured by the rest;
whilst we should certainly reduce Victor to the
necessity, either of abandoning the capital, or of
being cut off frorn the great road to the Pyrenees,
by our cavalry in Castile. Should we, however,
fail in this, and should N ey and Kellerrnan, and
Soult and Victor, succeed in uniting within their
lines on the Ebro, then, indeed, with our present
force, the chances of success would be rnaterially
dirninished. On Cuesta's arrny we were not in
the habit of greatIy counting; sorne service it
rnight doubtIess render us; that is to say, it would




360 NARRA TIVE OF 'fHE


probably enable us to cope to advantage with any
force which might be found between the Portu-
guese frontier and the Ebro; but it would not
render an army of twenty thousand Englishmen,
-and the sum total of our effectives at this time
barelycame up to twenty thousand,-competent
to the overthrow of the united corps of four French
marshals.


On the 7th, the army resumed its march, and
took up its head-quarters on the same evening at
Abrantes. Here other, and, as far as we could
judge, more correct reports relative to the motions
of Victor, reached uso He had not withdrawn, as
had formerly been represented, to the north of the
Tagus, but was busily concentrating in the neig'h-
bourhood of Merida, as if with the design of pass-
ing the Guadiana, and attacking Cuesta previous
to our arrival; and this was considered the more
likely, because the news of N ey's successes in the
Asturias must, by tbis time, have reached him.
But there were other and more interesting matters
laid before us than even this, and of these a few
words will suffice to give an account.


Lieutenant-colonel Bourke, of the Quarter-mas-
ter-general's department, had be en sent, sorne
time before, to General Cuesta's head-quarters at
Fuente del Maestro, for the purpose of concerting
with him a joint plan of operations against the
enemy in Estremaclura. The day after our arrival




PENINSULAR WAR. :361


at Abrantes, letters carne in from Colonel Bourke,
bearing date the 4th and 6th of J une, in whieh he
informed us that Cuesta was afHieted with a se-
vere ague, and henee that an his eommunieations
had been made through Major-general O'Dona-
ghoe, ehief of the staff. These, however, proved
so far satisfaetory, that tbe Spanish General was
willing to negociate with us on our own terms.
For it had been his original wish that our army
should divide; that part should keep possession
of the bridge at Aleantara, whilst part exeeuted
a movement on the enemy's right; and it was
chiefiy to impress upon his mind the utter impos-
sibility of acceding to that proposal, that Colonel
Bourke's mission was undertaken. After a good
deal of discussion, the point was conceded; and
now three propositions were submitted for Sir
Arthur Wellesley's eonsideration, eoncerning whieh
it was at the same time stated that Cuesta gave a
decided preference to the first.


In the first place, it was suggested that the
whole British force might move from Abrantes
upon Elvas and Badajoz, and uniting itself with
the Spanish troops, make a joint attack upon
Victor; whilst Cuesta should detach General .
Venegas, with a corps of seven thousartd men, by
Llerena, through the mountains towards Talavera,
which, turning the enemy's left, and heading them
in their retreat, would enable the combined armies




362 NAltRATIVE OF THE


toannihilate them by falling on their rear. At
the same time, Cuesta would detach a second
corps from Badajoz towards Plasencia, so as to
threaten their right; and he professed to be capa-
ble of sparing both detachments, and yet bringing
eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand
cavalry, to the assistance of the British near Me-
rida. In case this plan should not be adopted, it
was proposed, in the second place, that the Eng-
lish army should move, en masse, to Alcantara,
and press from thence upon the enemy; whilst
the Spaniards following them closely, should take
Merida by assault, and make themselves masters
of aH the artillery and stores which might yet
be laid up in that place. Lastly, it was submitted
that we should' march upon the Teitar and Alma-
raz, and equaHy threaten the enemy's right and
rearo AH these proposals, it is necessary to ob-
serve, were made on the supposition that the
enemy's head-quarters were at Caceres, and that
their troops were cantoned partly there, and partly
at Merida and the villages near. With respect to
the movements towards the rear, no opinion could
be formed, because they managed effectually to
conceal these, by. keeping strong patroIs of cavalry
continually in their front.


The force immediately under Victor was esti-
mated at twenty-six thousand meno In addition
to thes.e, there was at Ciudad Rodrigo a corps of




PENINSULAR W AR. 363


thirteen thousand infantry and three thousand ca-
valry, under Sebastiani; but the roads of commu-
nÍcation between these were either extremelyincon-
venient or fatally circuitous. Should theyattempt
to unite, with artillery and baggage, Sebastiani must
of necessity march round by Madrid; should they
choose the mountain path, the junction might no
doubt be effected, but it would be at the expense
of all the mate riel of one, if not of both corps.
Besides these, a body of four thousand men in
Madrid, and about one thousand in other garrisons
between the capital and the frontier, there was
represented to be no French force capable of being
brought immediately against us, or interrupting
the plan of operations, be it what it might, on
which our Commander-in-chief should determine.


In pressing upon our consideration the first of
his propositions, Cuesta strongly represented that
we might expect ample supplies of every descrip-
tion at Badajoz; and th~t, should more be re-
quired than Badajoz was able to furnish, the
deficiency could be promptly and sufficiently made
up from Alentejo. The case would be very dif-
ferent, were we to proceed by Alcantara.The
whole of that country was exhausted by the
enemy, who ravaged it in all directions; and we
should find it extremely difficult, as well as incon".
venient, to carry along with us both provisions for
the men, and forage for the horses. Besides, if it




364 NARRATIVE OF THE


were our design, as he was satisfied that it was
our wisest course, to bring the eneroy to action
with as líttle delay as possible, we should certainIy
enjoy a better chance of attaining that end, by
following the one route rather than the other.
Were we to advance by Badajoz and Elvas, we
should threaten the eneroy's front, who would
probably not abandon his position without a
strugg'le; whereas by moving froro AIcantara or
Almaraz, we should instantly alarro him for his
flank, and he would withdraw at once. For
Victor, he continued, was particularly jealous of
his right; and therefore the roost prudent policy
would be to turn his left by a corps pushed from
Llerena.


To each and all of these pIans Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, 1 believe, saw serious objections, and he
immediately wrote to Cuesta, pointing out, in
forcible terms, his own sentiments. With respect
to the first proposition, an opinion generally pre-
vailed, that by marching first to Badajoz, and
afterwards towards Cuesta, we should effect· no
other end than merely to throw ourselves in the
enemy's rear; whereas our object clearly was, to
cut him off entirely from all sources of communi-
cation with any other corps in the country. Then
again, as to the detached Spanish corps, it could
not for a moment be doubted that it would either
be defeated by Victor in his retreat, or, which was




PENINSULAR WAR. 365


not less likely to occur, find itself suddenly placed
between the troops of Victor on the one hand,
and of Sebastiani on the other. Besides, it was
not on the left at all that an aftempt ought to be
made, becau.se the right of the enemy offered to
us the readiest puint of attack. Of the three
plans, 1 conceive that our commander considered
the last less open to objection than either of the
others, though even in it there were too many'and
too serious difficulties for him to sanction its adop-
tion. The British army, therefore, it was consi-
dered, ought to direct itself upon Plasencia at
once, so as to compel Victor to fall back, if not to
receive battle; and whilst this was doing, Cuesta
might move upon Sebastiani, so that both the
French corps might be brought to action sepa-
rately, and at the same momento


It is probably needless to add, that the Spanish
and British generals differed on the present oc-
casion, not more in their views touching the sub-
ject immediately before them, than with reference
to the series of operations which they expected to
follow. Whilst Cuesta desired, aboye all things,
that the armies of the two nations should be united,
that they should fight side by side, and follow up
to the utmost any advantages which they might
obtain, Sir Arthur Wellesley was guidedby other
motives, and restricted his designs to a narrower,
but a much safer and surer field. The Spaniard




366 NARRATIVE OF THE


was eager to see his allies fairly committed, and
his native country made the theatre of their glo-
ries ;-the Englishman felt that, by the tenor oí
his present instructions, so bold a policy was not
authorised. The deliverance of Portugal, and the
repulse of the enemy from Estremadura, were
the two objects which he was required to keep in
view; and he limited his present designs to the
furtherance of these by the destruction of Victor's
army. No doubt Sir Arthur Wellesley judged
right; but it was said that, could we but succeed
in getting between Victor and his supplies, and
forcing him to give us battle before fresh troops
should reach him, a wide door to future enterprise
would be opened~ Yet we had many disadvan-
tages to overcome. In the first place, we were,
single-handed at least, innumbers greatIy inferior
to the enemy; in the next place, on our allies we
could not count, not only because of the want of
discipline among the men, but because of the ex-
treme obstinacy of their leader; and lastly, Victor
was strongly posted. Under all these circum-
stances, it seemed doubtful whether anything
could with prudence be attempted, till our own
long-promised reinforcements should arrive.


In this state of uncertainty we remained during
sorne days, no event occurring which at all merits
repetition. Letters, indeed, and despatches ar-
rived from England, the tone of which gave, in




PENINSULAR WAR. 367


sorne respects, general satisfaction to the army;
wbilst in others it was as generally condemned.
We were well pleased to find tbat, instead of ex-
citing public expectation too bighly, government
was exerting itself to keep' men's bopes within
bounds; because we felt that our game was not
yet won; and we were willing to receÍve credit
in the end for having done more, rather than re-
proach for having done less, than had been anti-
cipated.But we were not satisfied that sorne
higher and more decided proofs of the sense en-
tertained by h~s sovereign of our leader's merits,
had not been given. On Sir Arthur Wellesley
himself that circumstance produced no visible
effect; but his soldiers had looked for other re-
sults, and they were far from being reconciled to
the overthrow of their expectations. They ima-
gined that the passage of the Douro entitled him
who had effected it, to sorne striking acknowledg-
ment of gratitud e from his country; and tbey
were surprised to find that none such had been be-
stowed. These, however, were transient feelings ;
nor were others, which a somewhat unprecedented
promotion of a few individuals excited, more
lasting. But on one head an felt particularly
anxious.. The long-promised reinforcements were
not yet arrived, and the despatches contained no
information as to the period when they might be
expected. This was the more vexatious, as almost




368 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


every day brought in sorne fresh rumour respecting
Victor and the French army. At one time we
heard that he had actually quitted his position.
and that he was in full retreat towards the capital;
at another, it was confidentIy asserted that he
was preparing to pass the Guadiana, for the pur-
pose of attacking Cuesta. That the latter appre-
hended such an event, all his communications
made us aware; but for our own parts, we felt
perfectIy assured that he would not move till we
commenced our operations, and that, as soon as
we should approach Vera de Placencia, he would
begin his retreat. In this case it was vain to ex-
pect that any serious stand would be made till
after he should have been joined by Joseph's
guards from Madrid; and then at Segovia, 01'
somewhere in that vicinity, we anticipated that a
mighty struggle awaited us, in which we should
be opposed to an the force which it would be pos-
sible fol' Victor to bring together upon one field.


In the mean while, news carne from the north,
that N ey and Soult, having united their corps,
were employed in the siege of Vigo; and that, as
soon as it should fall, an event of which every one
appeared to anticipate the speedy accomplishment,
they were preparing once more to cross the Min-
ho, and carry the war into the north of Portugal.
Such an occurrence would naturally lead to
changes in our arrangements. In the first place,




PENINSULAR WAR. 36D


it would become absolutely necessary for Marshal
Beresford, who had accompanied us SO far with
three Portuguese brigades, to return for the de~
fence of the provinces, and to relinquish the in-
tention, which at present he entertained, of pene~
trating along with us into Spain. The fact indeed
is, that he was best placed at Oporto. There was
no second under him capable of carrying on the
organising system as he had begun it; and though
his services with us were doubtless highly impor-
tant, his presence among his own levies was infi-
nitely more so. N o doubt it would be extremely
galling to him, to quit the scene of active opera~
tions for the sake of training recruits, and watching
a distant enemy; but upon his vigilan ce our future
successes in a great measure depended; and there-
fore he was prevailed upon, in case untoward
events should occur in the north, to sacrifice his
own wishes to the public good.


1 have said that our effectives never exceeded,
at this period of the war, twenty thousand men'.
Even now, with the addition of the five thousand
lately joined, we barely carne up to that number ;
for our men had become extremely sickly of late,
and as the summer advanced, and the heat in-
creased in intensity, sickness daily, and even
hourly, accumulated upon uso It was not, how-
ever, the number of our sick alone which rendered
us, in a great measure, inefficient: we were des-


VOL, l. 2 A




NARRATIYE OF THE


titute of a variety of articles absolutely necessary;
in order to tit us for a campaign. Our shoes were
generally worn out, and no supply had reached
liS; and our military chest was quite exhausted.
There was not a regiment in the army, to which
many months' pay was not due; ando what was
infinitely more distressing, therc were no funds in
the country from which to supply what was want-
ing. Yet, in spite of an this, not a murmur or
complaint could be heard, from the highe'st to the
lowest. Generally speaking, our imrnediate sup-
plies were ample; that is to say, the men received,
for the most part, their full allowance of provi-
sions; and they were too thoroughly satisfied with
the honour of the government which they served,
to entertain any doubts as to the ultimate settle-
ment of their balances. On t1}e contrary, the
very best spirit prevailed everywhere; nor is it
going too far to affirm tbat, under their present
leader, the troops would have borne any pnva-
tians, and undertaken any services~




l'ENINSUI,AR WAllo 371


CHAPTER XV.


The British army moves nearer to Victor, and threatens hí3f
flanks-The latter withdraws across the Tagus-Sir Arthur
)Vellesley fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia-He visits
Cuesta at Casa del Puerto, and is shown the Spanish army
by torch-light-He returns to his own troops, which are put
in motion, and Victor's posts driven from Talavera across the
Alberche-Preparations for attacking him there, but he
effec1s his eseape-Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur WeIlesley
with the conduct of the Spaniards-He is compelled, by the
negligence of Cuesta, to remain inactive.


IN the last chapter it has been stated that Cuesta
sent in three proposals for the consideration of Sir
Arthur Wellesley, and that an opioion generalIy
prevailed that Sir Arthur had objected to the
whole of them, laying before him at the same time
sorne project of his owo. N o great while elapsed
ere we were given to understand, by Ietters from
Colonel Bourke, that the Spaniard remained bi-
gotedly attached to his own opinians. On no




372 NAHHATIVE Ol!' THE


account whatever would he agree to act as Sir
Arthur Wellesley suggested; and the only altera-
tion to which he would at aH consent was, that
after having joined him at Badajoz, we should di-
rect our march upon Caceres, in order to threaten
the enemy's right; whilst he moved by Merida
to Talavera. Whoever will take the trouble to
consult the map, must see that by this scheme
Cuesta proposed, first to form a junction between
the two armies, and afterwards to divide them by
a chain of almost impassable mountains. It is
scarcely necessary to observe that neither Sir
Arthur, nor any person of inteHigence in his army,
could approve of such an arrangement. We were
aH, indeed, well assured that the movement upon
Badajoz, and the combination of the armies there,
would compel Victor to cross the Tagus; but we
knew a180 that it would only drive him back upon
his resources, prevent our striking- a blow, and
enable him to escape with his army entire. Under
such circuqlstances nothing remained for us, except
to continue quietIy where we were, and watch
the evento Care was, indeed, taken to secure
every point which seemed at all in danger of an
attack from the enemy; and a few movements
were made, calculated, in the event of any un-
looked-for piece of good fortune occurring, to for-
ward our enterprises on the offensive. Marshal
Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the




PE~INSULAR WAR


north, was ordered to proceed, with one British
arrd two Portuguese brigades, by Castello Branco
to the Teitar, so as to menace Victor's flank, in
case his retreat should be delayed; whilst the rest
of the Portuguese troops were commanded to con-
centrate at Braga, for the defence of the northern
provinces. But the strength of the army remained
stationary; and as forage and provisions were suf-
ficiently abundant, it suffered nothing in conse-
quence. On the contrary, the cavalry horses
improved every day in condition, and fresh regi-
ments of infantry were continually brought up
from the coast; so that, in the course of three
weeks, we found ourselves, if not greatly more
numerous, at all events more efficient in every
respect, than we had yet been since our arrival in
Portugal.


In the mean while, however, Victor had taken
the alarm, and commenced his retreat towards the
Spanish capital. His whole army was withdrawn
across the Tagus; and Cuesta, as soon as he began
to move in pursuit, saw the wisdom of Sir Arthur
Wellesley's proposal, and agreed to it. Prepara-
tions were accordingly made for advancing upon
Plasencia; but whilst these were in progress, ad-
vice came in that the French armies in the north
had occupied Orense; and Beresford was, in con-
seq uence, compelled to resign his cornmand here,
and to hurry off where his presence was more




374 N ARRATIYE Oli THE


wanted, between the Douro and the Minbo. Of
course the departure of that officer produced no
alteration in our plans, which, on the contrary,
were brought at once to maturity; and it was
determined to enter Spain, without a moment's
delay, in two columns. Of these, one, consisting
of three divisions of infantry, and the whole of the
cavalry, was directed to move upon Plasencia, by
way of Coria; the other was to proceed across the
Gata, near Moraza, and to rendezvous at the same
point. 'Vith respect, however, to any future un-
dertakings, there seemed to be considerable mis-
givings. On Cuesta no reliance could be placed ;
his opinion of the English \Vas not a generous one;
and every body seemed to be aware that on the
fi~st favourable opportunity he would )eave us to
our fate, and follow up any desig~ wbich to him-
self might appear most advisable. N ow, from
intercepted letters addressed by Joseph to his
generals, which, one after another, fell ¡nto our
hands, it was evident that the. enemy designed to
draw their corps gradually towards one point, and
to ·act entirely upon the defensive. This would
of ,course lead to an evacuation of Madrid, and a
retreat to the north of the Ebro; and how far, and
with what prospect of success, the campaign could
be carried into these distant regions, were ques-
tions which no one could answer. But with
matters so contingent we were not, in the present




'PE:'Ii"INSULAR WAR. 375


instance, very deeply concerned. 1t was our bu-
siness to follow up the enemy with aH the energies
of which we were masters; and we lost no time in
,bringing these effectually into play.


'Ve had so far acted upon these plans, as to
reach Castello Branco with the head-quarters of
the army, when accounts carne in, that Joseph
had marched from Madrid at the head of five
thousand men to join Victor, and that the latter
had taken up a strong position at Talavera.
Sebastiani, likewise, was reported to be in motion
towards the same point; whilst Cuesta had sud-
denlyehecked bis advance, and leaving a corps at
Argaterem, had fallen back upon the Tagus at
Almaraz. To counterbalance these rumours, it
was stated that General Venegas was in close
pursuit of Sebastiani, and tbat he migbt be confi-
dently expected to form a junction with Cuesta
from the opposite side of the river. Then again
we were given to understand, tbat several corps
fmm tbe north were marching towards Salamanca
or Valladolid, and that their patrols had appeared
at Lenares and San Estevan, places as near to
Plasencia as Castello Branco. This was not a
matter of surprise to us; for we saw tbat, if Victor
should entertain serious notions of risking a battle
on. this side of Madrid, the Jatter movements were
absolutely necessary to secure him against being
turned. But thegrand question was, wbetber be




376 NAHRATIYE OF THE


would risk a battle at all; and in case he were
willing so to do, whethet we would accept the
ehallenge. It was surmised that, on the arrival in
camp of all t11e battalions and detachments, of
whose landing reports had within the last few
days reached us, our force in the field could not
fall greatly short of thirty thousand meno Cuesta,
again, had under his orders fun thirty-eight thou-
sand; but they were, for the most part, raw levies,
and could not in any respect be counted upon.
Of the French force, on the other hand, all reports
agreed in stating that it amourited to at least
forty-five or fifty thousand men; would it be pru-
dent, under such circumstances, to stake the issues
of the campaign upon one battle? The point
was, to say the least of it, an extremely delieate
one to determine; but we a11 felt that our desti-
nies were in the hands of one who was quite com-
petent to guide them; and hence we were all
ready either to fight 01' to manreuvre, according as
he should direet, with the fullest conviction on our
minds, that we were doing that which our circum-
stances required us to do, and which, sooner or
later, would bring about the most beneficial re-
sults.


1 have said that our plans were no sooner
matured, than they were so far carried into execu-
tion, that the army began its. march, and, on the
last day in June, fixed its head-quarters at




PENINSULAR "'AR. 377


CastelIo Branco. No greatspac'e of time was
wasted here; but entering Spain by way of
Zarza la Major, we arrived at the town of Coria
on the 5th of July. Intelligence reached lIS here,
that General Crawford, with his brigade from
England, had quitted Lisbon on the 28th, and
hence, that their arrival in the camp might daily
be expected. Some regiments, likewise, from
Ireland, and the islands, were stated to have
landed, respecting whom orders wcre sent back
req uiring them to encamp at Belem ; from whence,
as soon as they should have got into proper order
for field service, they were to push forward. But
it was not concerning our own people only that
rumours crowded in upon uso A great deal was
said both of the French and S panish armies-of
their strength and their position; and though we
we"re not disposed to place in these rumours impli-
cit confidence, it may not be amiss if I give here a
brief outline of their general strain and character.


Victor's corps, amounting in the whole to about
twenty-seven thmisand effectives, had taken post,
as was formerly stated, at Talavera, and occupied
ground so formidable, that any attempt at turning
could be made only by moving in force upon
Avila. On the other hand, Cuesta, who at first
had pursued at a quick pace, but who became
alarmed when he found that we were not imme-
diately inhis rear, and that he was in danger of




378 NARltATIVE OF 'fIlE


getting' entangled between the two rivers, returned
to his old p08ition on the left bank of the Tagus,
from whence, kecping possession of Almaraz with
his advance alone, he scoured the country in an
directions with his cavalry. He was not, how-
ever, regardless eithcr of us or of the means by
which our communÍcations might he rendered most
direct and secare; for he had alrea,!ly established
a bridge over the Teitar, and was busily engaged
in the construction of two more across the Ta-
gus; one in the vicinity of Almaraz, the other
below tlle point where the waters of the Teitar
and the Tagus meet. Whilst these movements
were going on, Sebastiani had advanced from To-
ledo, with the design, as it \Vas surmised, of at-
tacking Venegas; but the latter feH back to Vil-
lanova de la Fuente, anu drew Scbastiani after
him as fal' as Consuegra. Thus ,vere Victor and
Sebastiani as complctc1y separated from one ano-
ther, as Venegas was separated frorn Cuesta, and
Cuesta fram Venegas.


With respect to other points, again, the corps
of N ey and Soult were reported to have assembled
at Zamora, to the number of twenty-three 01'
twenty-follr thous;:md men; whilst Marshal Mor-
tier was represented to be with his force at Valla-
dolid. The latter piece of intelligence we acquired
fram General Franceschi, the officer to whorn our
hussars hau been so frcqnently opposed during Sir




'f'ENDíSULAR W A 11. 379


John Moore's campaign, and who, till he feH into
our hands, had been in command of the light ca-
valry and advance of the northern army. He was
proceeding from his quarters -at Toro, by way of
Tordesillas, for the purpose of visiting his friend
Marshal Mortier, when he was attackcd near the
ferry by a fríar and ten Spaniards, and himself
ll.nd his aide-de-camp made prisoners. The gallant
friar was in the act of conveying him across the
mountains, in order to present him to the Supreme
Junta at Seville, when the head-quarters of our
armychanced to be at Zarza la Major, by whích
means we were enabled to hold sorne conversation
with him. He appeared dreadfully out of humour
with his evil fortune, repeatedly ejaculating, "O!
comme e'est pitoyable pOOl' un général d'hussars
d'Hre pris par un capuchin!" Yet, Frenchman-.
like, he met an our ad\'ances with the greatest
frankness and candour. Upon his person were
found Ietters, which gave a very deplorable ac-
count of Soult's present situation and future pros-
pects. His army was stated to be perfectly di s-
organised; and the whole COlll1try round to be in
a state of the most alarming revolt.


The news from the south-east, which arrived
abont tile same time, were 110t, however, so fa.:.
vourable. There Blake, pushing forward \vith his
accustomed rashness, hacl suffered a great defeat,
and the French were said to be gaining ground, in




380 NARRATIVE OF THE


consequence, in every corner both of Catalonia
and Arragon. But, in the present state of affairs,
the south was infinitely less a source of anxiety to
us than the central and northern provinces. Could
we but contrive to destroy Victor, and afterwards
press on through Gallicia and the Asturias, carry-
ing with us Cuesta's and the Portuguese armies,
and picking up, as we went along, the different
corps which, und-er Romana and his compatriots,
were in arms there, it was at least within the
verge of possibility, that we might succeed in pe-
netrating to Burgos and Vittoria, and so act upon
the line of the enemy's communications. AH,
however, must depend upon circumstances, of the
exact bearing of which no one could, as yet, form
a judgment; for it was far from being a matter
absolutely decided upon, that a battle ought to be
risked at aH. But to return to my nal'rative.


On the morning of the 6th, the head-quarters of
. the, army moved from Coria to Galesto; and on
the 8th they were established in Plasencia. From
this point Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to
open a personal communication with General
Cuesta; and the 10th was selected as a conve-
nient day for the. purpose. As the events arising
immediately out of this detennination had in them
a great deal of interest at the time, and as its more
remote consequences bore powerfully upon the
issues of the war, 1 shall take the liberty of re-




PENINSULAR WAll. 381


cording, at length, most of the particulars attend-
ing our remarkable journey.


As soon as the official business of the morning'
was disch~lrged, and things put in a proper train,
we set out from Plasencia, on the day above-
named, for Cuesta's head-quarters, and were met
at a flying bridge, of which 1 have ·already spoken
as thrown across the Teitar, by a squadron of
Spanish hussars. The hussars, who belonged to
the regiment of Villa Viciosa, were, upon the
whole, well mounted and equipped; indeed, we
were not long in discovering that they had been
selected to do the duty of an escort to us, simply
because their appearance was superior to that of
any other corps in the Spanish army. Unfortu-
nately, however, in conducting us tówards the
bridge of boats upon the Tagus, our guides lost
their way, and darkness had, in consequence, set
in before we began to approach the campo This
was the more to be regretted, .as Cuesta had
drawn out his whole force for Sir Arthur Welles-
ley's inspection. The troQPs had been under arms
during four hours, in momentary expectation of
our arrival; whilst the poor old man himself,
though still lame from the effects of his bruises at
Medelin, sat on horseback at their headduring the
greater part of that time.


Our arrival at the camp was announced by a
general discharge of artillery, upon which an im-




382 X A lWATIVE OF THE


mense number of torches were made to blaze up,
and we passed the entire Spanish line in review
by their light. The effect produced by these ar-
rangements was one of no ordinary character. As
the torches were beld aJoft, at mOdel'áte intervals
from one another, they threw a red and wavering
light oyer the whole scene, permitting, at the same
time, its minute]' parts to be here anJ there cast
into shade; whilst the grim and swarthy visages
of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uni-
forms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as
the Rashes feH upon them. Then there was the
frequent roar of cannon, the shouldering of fire-
locks, mingled with the briefword of command,
and rattling of accoutrements and arms, as we
passed from battalion to battalion; an these
served to interest the sense of hearing to the fu1l
as much as the spectacle attracted the sense of
sight.Nor was old Cuesta himself an object to
be passed by without notice, even at such a mo-
ment and under such circumstances as these. The
old man preceded us,-not so much sitting on his
horse as held upon it by two pages,-at the im-
minent hazard of being overthrown whenever a
cannon was discharged, 01' a torch Rared out with
peculiar brightness; indeed his physical debility
was so observable, as clearly to mark his total
ullfitness for the situation which he then held.
As to his mental powers, he gave us little oppor-




PE~INSUL.AR WAR. :383


tunity of judging; inasmuchas he scarcely ut-
tered five words during the continuance of our
visit; hut his corporal infirmities alone were at
absolute variance with all a general's d uties, and
showed that he was llOW fit only for the retire-
ment of prívate life.


In this manner we passed abüut six thousand
cavalry, drawn up in rank entire, and not less than
twenty battalions of infantry, eaeh consisting of
perhaps from scven to eight hundred meno These
formcd but one portion of the army, the rest being
either at the bridge of Arzobispo, or in position
along the Tagus; and tbey were all, with a few
exceptions, remarkably fine meno Some, indeed,
were extremely young-too young for service-
particularly among the recruits which had lately
joined; but take them for all in a11, it would not
be easy to point out a hetter made, stouter, 01'
more hardy-Iooking body of soldiers in the service
of any nation in Europe. Of their appointments,
it is not possible to speak in the same terms of
commendation. There were, indeed, sorne hattalions
whose arms, accoutrements, and even clothing,
might he pronounced respectable; out in general
they were very deficient, particularly in shoes.
It was easy to perceive, likewise, from the attitude
in which they stood, as well as from the manner in
which they held their arms, that little or no disci-
pline prevailed among them; and hence that l~


/7.




384 N ARRATIV}2 OF THE


general they could not be regarded in any other
light than as raw levies. Sorne corpsthere doubt-
less were, such as the Irish brigades, abattalion
or two of marines from Cadiz, and the remnants of
their grenadier battalions, which deserved a higher
military character; but speaking of them in the
aggregate, they were little better than bold peasan-
try, armed partially like soldiers, but cómpletely
unacquainted with a soldier's duty. This remark
applied fully as much to the cavalry as to the
infantry. The horses were many of them good,
but theü' riders manifestly knew nothing of move-
ment or discipline; and they were, as well on this
account as on the score of a miserable equipment,
quite unfit for general service. The artillery,
again, was numerous, but totaIly unlike, both in
order and arrangement, to that of other armies;
aml the generals appeared to have been selected
according to one rule alone, namely, that of seni-
ority. They were almost all old men, and, except
O'Donaghoe and Largas, evidently incapable of
bearing the fatigues or surmounting the difficulties
of one hard campaign. It was not so with the
colonels and commanders of battalions, who ap-
peared to be young and active, and of whom we
had every reason to believe that many were ra-
pidly learning to become skilful officers.


The place at which we paid this visit, and wit-
nessed these events, was called Casa del Puerto;




PENINSULAR WA1L 385


where the head-qnarters of the Spanish army were
established in a wretchedhovel. We alighted
here after the réview had ended, aud as soou as
we entered, Cuesta, who seem:ed quite overpow-
ered by fatigue, retired to rest, but he returned
again at eleven o'c1ock to supper, and sat with us
till past midnight. He sat, however, as he al-
ways did under similar circumstances, in profound
silence, neither seeking to take a share in the con-
versation, nor, apparently at least, paying the
slightest attention to it. 1 was much struck by this


,singularity of manner, and inquired oftllose around
me whether it were assumed; but they aH repre-
sented it as being perfectly· natural, and gave
rather a curious account of the aged chief. Every-
thing, it appeared, went on throughout the army~
rather in his uame than by his'immediate orders';
forhe governed his followers wholly bya system
of silence and terror, of which aH stood wonder-
fuUy in awe. Cuesta was a person of no talent
whatever; but he was a brave, upright, and ho-
nourable man, fuU of prejudices, and obstinate to á
great degree, and abhorring th~ French with the
hatred of personal rancoUl'. On the latter account,
and because they knew that he would never willing~
Iy betray them, the Spaniards reposed unbounded
confidence in Cuesta; and they did so the more rea':'
dily, as he never failed to hang, 01' otherwiseput
to death, every traitor that feH into his hands.


VOL. I. 2 B




386 N AUUA TIVE Ol!' THE


Cuesta never gained a victory, yet he was con-
stantly eager to fight; and when the battle began,
he was always to be found in the post of greatest
danger. That, however, was a matter of very little
moment; for he gave no orders except to push
on; and as to arrangement, or the mode of execu·
ting manreuvres, they were things quite unknown
in his army. It was said that Brigadier·general
Quiske, Cuesta's military secretary, was aman of
talento 'Him, however, we did not see; but
O'Donaghoe struck me as being elever and sen·
sible, though, like other favourites who act for
their principal, an intriguer and a politician.
Respecting the rest of the generals, it was im-
possible to form anyopinion, as Cuesta seemed par-
ticularly unwilling that they should holda,ny se-
rious conversation with uso It is true that 'he pre-
sented them one by one to Sir Arthur Welles-
ley, the ceremony taking place after breakfast on
the 11 th; but no words were exchanged on the
occasion, and each retired after· he had ma~e his
bow.


This ceremony having be en gone through, Sir
Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta withdrew, at the
request of the former, to an inner apartment;
where they held a conference which lasted four
hours. What passed on the occasion 1 know not,
as 1 did not happen to be present; but 1 heard
that O'Donaghoe, who assisted his general, was




PENINSULAR \VAR. 387


the chief speaker, and that Cuesta was, as
usual, almost wholly siJent. When it carne to
a close, dinner was announced; and we sat down,
about three o'clock, to aboút forty dishes, the
principal ingredients in. which were garlic and
onions. Our meal did not occupy us long; and on
Cuesta retiring, as was his c~stom, to enjoy his
siesta, we mounted our horses, and rode out into
the campo By this means we were enabled to see
more of the regiments separately, than we had
seen during the torch-light review. We saw, how-
ever, nothing which served, in any degree, to raise
our opinion of the general efficiency of our aUies;
and we returned to our host at a latehour, more
than ever impressed with the persuasion, that if
the deliverance ofthe Peninsula was to be effected
at aH, it must be done, not by the Spaniards, but
by ourselves.


At an early hour next morning we took leave of
Cuesta, and set out on our return to Plasencia.
The old Spaniard brightened up as we bid him
fareweH, and embracing us after the manner of his
country, repeated over and over again that he was
fuUy satisfied with the result of the communication
with which Sir Arthur had honoured him. How
far the feeling of satisfaction was mutual, 1 take it
not upon me to determine; but that the journey
had not been performed absolutely in vain, tha
orders which were issued immediately on our a1'-




388 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


rival at head-quarters, for the troops to hold them-
selves in readiness to march at a moment's notice,
sufficient1y attested.


The object for which we were now in a state of
preparation, was nothing less than the advance
towards Victor's army in its position at Talavera.
To render this movement as decisive and as little
doubtful as need be, it was resolved that, whilst
Cuesta pushed him in front, both his flanks should
be threatened at the same time, the right, or prin-
cipal flank, by us, and the left by the Spanish
corps under Venegas, from the southward of Ma-
drid. The following dispositions were accordingly
understood to be in forwardness, and the following
marches definitely arranged.


The first corps appointed to move from its pre-
sent encampment was that of Venegas; and it was·
to march by way ofMadridejos, Tembleque, Oraca,
Fuente-Duena, and Arganda. As soon as it had
proceeded a day's journey on its route, a simul-
taneous movement was to be made by the corps at
present at Arzobispo, and by Cuesta; the former
crossing the Tagus, and hastening by Colira to
Salaveral, the latter breaking up from Almaraz,
and marching by N aval Moral and Oropesa, to the
same point. In the mean while, the British army
from Plasencia was to pass the Teitar, near Fuente
de Bargazagona, and moving by Toril, N aval Moral,
Oropesa, and Gamonal, to arrive near Escalona, at




PENINSULAR WAR. 389


the moment when the othercorps should reach
their several places of destination. Whilst these
things were going on, Sir Robert Wilson with the
Lusitanian Legion, a corps máinly formed by his
active exertions, sorne dragoons, and two Spanish
battalions, was to follow the right bank of the
Teitar as far as Arenas, and to secure the passes of
the Puerto del Río; and measures were at the
same time taken that those of A vila and Guadara-
ma should not be left open. Sir Robert Wilson's
corps was not, however, to confine its services to a
mereoccupation of the passes above referred too
Masters of the fruitful vale of Plasencia, they
would be able to furnish us, through the entire line
of our march, with aH the supplies of which we
were likely to stand in need; whilst they would
hinder so much as one foraging party of the ene-
mys army from committing havoc in that beautiful
country.


So far everything was settled with the nicest
attention to risks and advantages; but after all, it
seemed. something more than doubtful whether
Victor would give us an opportunity of proving the
excellency of oul' arl'angements. He who l'efused
battle at Merida and Truxillo, was not very likely
to accept it in the position of Talavel'a. On the
fol'mer ground he could not have been assailed,
except by a flank movementon oul' parts, thl'ough
Badajoz, which must of necessity have left the




390 N ARRATIVE OF THE


Spaniards exposed to an attack from his entire
force, whilst we were at a distance; and we knew
our allies too well to entertain any hope that the
attack would have been successfully resisted.
But even ifit had, or supposing that we had found
another opportunity of defeating him, his retreat
was perfectIy open; and we could have only fol-
lowed as far as the passage of the Tagus, in the
face of numerous and ve~y serious difficulties.
Situated as he now was, matters bore a widely
different aspecto The mountains of the Sierra de
Gata on the one hand, and those of Arganda on
the other, afforded to us numerous facilities for
detaching corps, absolutely without risk, round
his flanks; whilst no necessity whatever existed,
of supporting them by a direct attack upon his
centre. 1 confess that, bearing these things in
view, 1, for one, entertained but slender hopes
that he would wait to receive us in his present
position; nor could all ruy wishes to the contrary
succeed in removing the impression, that no good
would arise out of our judicious but somewhat
tardy determination at Plasencia. We remained
quietly in our camp till the 17th, giving the
Spaniards time to put their several columns in
motion; but on that day we began our march,
and passing the Teitar, occupied on the 18th
Talaguela, and tbe rivulet of Talamora. On the
19th we arrived at Castinello and Casa de Jos




PENINSULAR WAR. 391


Somas, pushing on oul' advanced-gual'd as fal' as
Sto Julien; and on the 20th we entered Oropesa,
where one day's halt was determined on. On
the 21st, Cuesta and his people passed through
the town; upon which occasion Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley took an opportunity of exhibitillg to the
Spaniard twenty-'thousand British troops under
arms. Cuesta expressed himself much gratified
by the spectacle; but the display was scarcely
concluded, when he hurried forward, and arrived
the same evening~ with that portion of his army


. which marched from the bridge of Almaraz, by
the great road through N aval Moral, at Villada.
The ¡;;everal corps had now assumed their re-
spective stations; and it was determined on the
22nd to drive in those divisions of the enemy
which occupied Talavera, to their position on the
left bank of the Alberche. That we might be
aware beforehand of the nature of the opposition
about to be offered, recognisances in the direction
of the town were made; and it was found. to be
filled by a considerable force of French troops,
particularly cavalry, of which there could not be
less than fifteen hundred in and round the place.
But to possess ourselves of that point was essen-
tial to all our future operations; and therefore on
the 22nd the columns moved forward with the de-
sign of seizing it.


On this occasion the Spaniards took the high-




392 NARRATIVE OF 'I'HE


road towards Talavera, whilst the British were
directed to move upon the enemy's left by a pa-
ralleI road through the motintains, in the direction
of San Roman. As soon as the former began their
advance~ the French showed their cavalry in the
pIain in front of the town; which not only checked
the Spaniards, but caused them very needlessly
and very clumsiIy to depIoy into lineo This done,
instead of endeavouring to drive them back, which,
with their very superior cavalry force, they might
have easiIy effected, our allies commenced a heavy
cannonade, which lasted, without producing any
visible effect, till our troops began to show them-
selves on the right. Then, indeed" the enemy
retired with precipitation; and abandoning Tala-
vera, and the ground immediatelyabout it, they
betook th~mselves to their principal position on
the opposite sirle of the stream. They were fol-
lowed· in this movement by the cavalry and artil-
lery of the Spanish army, and they lost a few men
in the suburbs of Talavera; but of severaI admi-




rabIe opportunities of making a charge, which
presented themselves to the Spanish cavalry, these
troops took no advantage. The truth is, that men
could not more carefuUy avoid coming to close
quarters with their adversaries, than the Spanish
troops did this day. To us it was quite annoying
to see with how much caution they hung back.
when everything invited them to advance; and to




PENINSULAR W AR. 393


confess the truth, we acquired for them a feeling
of distrust, of which, during sorne time-:-I might
have said during the remainder of the war-we
hardly sUcceeded in divesting ourselves.


On the 23rd, the enemy were seen in position
behind the AJberche, and occupied ground which,
had the Alberche been impassable, might have been
considered extremely formidable. As, however,
this was not the case, as there were several fords in
the stream, by which both the right and the centre
of their line could" be threatened, it seemed extra-
ordinary in Victor to remain where he was, with
twenty thousand men only; for twenty thousand
constituted the whole strength of the corps which
now lay in our front. lt is scarcely necessary to
add, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was exceedingly
anxious to take advantage of an occurrence on
which he could have hardly calculated. Yet was
he extremely unwilling to urge Cuesta to the
adoption of any measure : on the contrary, he was


. desirous, from particular ciréumstances, that what-


. ever- was done should, if possible, be undertaken
on the suggestion and at the entreaty of the Spa-
nish General. For this it is not difficult to assign
an adequate cause. From the day of our entrance
into Spain, up to the present moment, no care
whatever had been taken by the Spanish authori-
ties, to supply us with any one of the many arti-
eles of which we stood in need. Sir Arthur had




394 NARRATIVE OF THE


repeatedly complained to Cuesta, and had, on
every occasion, received the strongest assurances
that bis requests would be promptly attended to;
but day after day passed by without bringing about
the fultilment of the promise; and we were now
as far as ever from being satisfied. Thus circum-
stanced, Sir Arthur felt himself under the neces-
sity of informing Cuesta that be would see him
with his army across tbe Alberche; but tbat, in
justice to his own troops, and to the king whom he
served, he neither could nor would advance one
step further into the country, till aH the articles
for wbich .he had so tepeatedly made requisition,
should be supplied.


The discussions to which such a state of affairs
frequently' gave birth were again renewed, and
with increased acrimony, on the evening of the
22nd; but it was, 1 believe, finally determined by
Sir Arthur Wellesley, on tbe 23rd, that a general
attack should be made upon the enemy at dawn
on the following morning. On this occasion, two
divisions of British infantry, with one brigade of
cavalry, were to pass the fords of the Alberche, so
as to assault the heights on the enemy's right.
Whilst this was· going on, the Spanish cavalry,
supported by a column of infantry, rinder the
Duke of Albuquerque, was to pass a fordopposite
to the centre of the position, leaving to Cuesta in
person, assisted by Generals Zayas and Eguia, the




PENINSULAR WAR. 395


charge of carrying the bridgeand battery on the
]eft; and two divisions of British infantry, with
two brigades of cavaIry, were to remain on the
plain, in rear of AIbuquerque's' coIumn, as a sup-
port to the whole.


Cuesta received the suggestion with his accus-
tomed dry civility, but desired time to consider of
it and digest it. He spent the greater part of the
night in deliberation; and at last gave his assent
to the scheme. In the mean whiIe, we had not
been wholly idIe. Soon after dark sorne guns
were pushed across the bridge at TaIavera, fOl" the
purpose of assisting in the dislodgement of the
enemy from their batteries on the left, and in ad-
vance of their position. The different officers in
command 01' divisions and brigades, were likewise
instructed as to the duty which they would be
expécted to perform, and the general plans, liable
to be changed upon the spot according as events
might turn out, were matured. This done, we
lay down to snatch a few hours of sleep. But as
our troops had a circuitous mal'ch to execute, the
space granted for -repose was necessarily brief;
and at two o'dock in the morning we were again
under arms. We set off immediately in the di-
reetion agreed upon, and reached the Alberehe
without molestation; but it was only to ascertain
a faet which seriously mortified and ehagrined us
-namely, that the enemy had escaped. Not a




396 NARRATIVE OF THE


vestige of their troops, nor a morsel of their bag-
gage, remained; and their huts, or standing carnp,
alone bore testimony that they had been there.


It was but natural, that feeling, as every one
did, the fuU extent of our disappointment, a variety
of motives should be assigned as those which
actuated Victor on the present occasion. By sorne,
it was alleged that the expected reinforcements
not having come up, the enemy felt himself too
weak to hazard a battIe; by others his retreat was
attributed to fresh orders from Madrid, positively
requiring him to withdrawand concentrate upon
the capital. For my own part, it appeared to me
that the French had never entertained the slightest
idea of fighting, provided they could escape with
aIiy credit, and at the same time se cure their
plunder. They had kept their ground on the
Alberche during the 23rd, partIy because sorne
time was necessary for the removal of their bag-
gage, and partly because they probab1y conceived
that our whole force could not be assembled; and
they retired on the very first opportunity which
offered, after they had accomplished their own
designs, and saw reason to believe that we were
in a fit state to molest thern. It was, therefore,
ver y evident to me, that unless we followed them
up closely, no possibility ofbringing them to action
would occur; whereas by a rapid pursuit, there
was every prospect before us of even yet com-




PENINSULAR W AR. 397


pelling them to risk all upon the chances of a
battle.


Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, determined not
to deviate from the course which he had already
threatened to pursue, should Cuesta persist in his
system of procrastination and neglect. No one in
the army questioned the soundness of the policy
which dictated the measure-for of that there
could be no question; but it was mortifying to
reflect that a series of brilliant operations must
be interrupted, and perhap.s serious injury Ínflicted
'!Ipon the cause, through the ill-timed obstinacy of
a perverse old mano 1t seemed certain now, that
we were not to pursue at aH. But were the
Spaniards to follow single-handed, as it was high-
ly probable they might, it was an event quite
within the compass of possibility, that the enemy
would suddenly turn round upon them when they
least expected it, and destroy thero, when we
should be near enough to know of their fate, and
yet too distant to avert it .. There was something
more distressing in these considerations than an
ordinary reader may be able to conceive. It was
impossible for many not to put the question, why
might we not go on at all events? and if provi-
sions should be scarce, why not exist upon quarter
allowance, rather than permit an opening so pro-
pitious to be closed up?A few days' march
would drive the enemy beyond the capital, the




398 NARRA TIVE 01<' THE


passes,.and the mountains, and to effect more was
not required of uso We should then be in a
country where, in spite of Cuesta, we might sup-
port ourselves well,-it were better that we had
attempted nothing, than to stop short just at a
moment like the presento Our chief, however,
had made up his mind upon mature deliberation,
and doubtless formed his judgment upon grounds
satisfactory to himself; nothing, therefore, re-
mained to his followers, except to submit implicitly
to his decisions. Besides, there was one great
good of which no one could doubt, as likely to
arise out of these decisions. Cuesta would see
that we were in earnest, and he would then, per-
haps, exert himself to suppIy our wants, rather
than lose altogether the advantage of our co-opera-
tion.


On the morning of the 24th, it was rny fortune
to go on with two squadrons of cavalry, in front of
Cuesta's arrny, as far at St. OlaIla; we had there
a srnart skirrnish with the rear-guard of the enemy,
j ust as they were q uitting the· town; and 1 was
enabled to ascertain that the· rnain body ha.d fallen
back to Torrejos, on the Toledo road. From that
point, it would he easily in their power either to
double round towards Madrid, or to retire by
Aranjuez upon Arganda, and so to the southward
of Siguenza; froro whence, being joined by Sebas-
tiani, and in communication with Souchet, they




PENINSULAR W A R. 399


might continue their march towards Tudela. In
the latter case, Venegas' corps could hardly avoid
a defeat from the united armies of Victor and
Sebastiani; for he had moved· in the directioll
formerly described, and was supposed to be by
this time at Fuente-Duena,' or Arganda. We
learned, likewise, that Sir Robert Wilson's corps
had reached Escalona, and that the enemy,
alarmed for their right, had detached a division to
occupy the Guadarama pass. Besides these heads
of information, there were several others commu-
nicated to us here, on aH of which we were not
disposed to place implicit reliance. One went to
state that Joseph had evacuated Madrid, and was
concentrating all the force which he was able to
collect upon Burgos; another, ihat the French
nation was weary of the war, and that tbe French
troops would shortly be withdrawn from Spain.
The last rumour was more feasible than either of
the preceding, and we saw good reason to credit
it, namely-that Sebastiani's corps had never
formed a junction with Victor at an; and the
inference was not ah unfaÍr one, that he found
ample occupation in La Mancha.




400 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER XVI.


Cuesta follows the Frcnch, who turn upon and drive him back
in confusion--Battle of Talavera-Sutferings of the British
army after the action, and its consequent retreat towards
Portugal. .


WHILST Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Talavera,
sending two divisions under General Sherbrooke
to Casa Leguas, across the river, Cuesta followed
close upon the steps of the French army. The
latter, however, were not, as the old man fondly
believed them to be, in full retreat, but were
merely falling back upon a point, where they knew
that reinforcements would meet them; for an
our information respecting Sebastiani and J oseph
proved to be erroneous. Sebastiani was now in
Toledo, from whence, leaving three thousand men
to garrison the place, he set out to meet Victor ;
and Joseph and Jourdan, having formed a junction,
were also hastening to support him.




PENINSULA R W A IL 401


The junction of these several corps. d'armée took
place at Torrejos; and the total amount of the
force thus brought together, fell little, if at aH,
short of fifty thousand meno S'uch, at least, were
the statements of the prisoners who afterwards
carne into our hands. As soon as this was effected,
Victor wheeled round, and attacking Cuesta's ad-
vanee, whieh had proeeeded as far as Olalla, drove
it baek upon the main body, and eompelled the
whole to retreat with precipitation to the plain,
between the position which the Freneh had for-
merly oecupied, and the Alberche. The retreat
was condueted with extreme disorder, and must
have led to the total rout of the Spaniards, had not
General Sherbrooke, with the division on the left;
protected them. But this he did effectually, an.:)
then withdrew oVer the ford into the camp at
Talávera, leaving General Mackenzie's division to
keep possession of a convent and wood, on the
right bank of the Alberche.


Sueh was the state of our affairs on the evening
of the 26th, and itwas eertainly not of the most
promising nature; for Cuesta lay upon a river,
¡nto which, in ease of defeat, he must be driven ;
and he appeared to be making no arrangements
whatever to meet the attack, with which he eould
not doubt that he was threatened. By one of
those happy expedients, however, to which quick-
sighted mortal s can alone have recourse, both the


VOL. r. 2 e




402 NARRATIVE OF THE


Spanish and ·British divisions were extricatedfrom
their difficultieB" and placed, during the following
day, in an extremely advantageous position. Sir
Arthur Wellesley had, for sorne time,. been ex-
amining, with an eagle's glance, the countryabout
Talavera, and he suddenly selected ground, of
which no one except himself had taken notice, but
to the excell'ence of which future events bore
ample testimony. Bere he determined to draw
up the armies; and he took his measures with
su eh promptitude, and issued his orders with so
mueh coolness and perspicuity, that every' bat-
talion, Spanish as well as English, stepped into
the very spot which his admirable foresight had
marked out for it. The following is a sketch of
the dispositions which were thus effected :-


The town of Talavera is situated upon the
northern bank of the Tagus, and extends so cIosely
to the river's edge,. that there is hardly any space
left vacant between the buildings and the water.
In front, and lying slightly to the left, there is
a small but commanding height, upon which a
heavy Spanish battery was constructed, and which
constituted a point d'appui to the right of the
Spanish army; for the twó armies were drawn up
in ane continuous line, ofwhich the English held
the left, and the Spaniards the right. Our people
extended from the town to the mountains of Tala-
vera ~ which form part of the Sierra de Gata, and




PENINSULA R WAR 4<)3


running parallel to the Madrid road, enclose, on
one side, the vale of Plasencia. The extreme left
took post upon a bold height in thedirection of
Alataza de Segusella, protected in front qy a
ravine, and flanked by a deep valley, on the oppo~
site side of which the mountains rose again in
increased altitude, and swept away in one uniform
lineo The Spanish troops, on the other hand,
were arranged among sorne olive groves, and
along a road, the embankment of which supplíed
them with an excellent parapet, and rested their
left upon a little hill distant about two miles from
Talavera. A portion of their cavalry was sta~
tioned here, so as to support their left; and
Zara's van kept possession of the rising ground.


Upon that height our right likewlse leaned.
A strong redoubt had been begun, for the purpose
of increasing itsdefensibility; but it was not yet
sufficiently advanced to add much to the security
of the troops who happened to be in position there.
These consisted of the fourth division under Ge-
neral Campbell, next to whom carne the guards ;
which, again, ~ere succeeded in the alignment by
General Came"ron's brigade and the Germans, as
these were by General Mackenzie's and General
Hill's. The last-named division held the extreme
left of aH. Posted on a sharp rising but corn-
manding eminence, two brigades ofBritish ca~
valry, one heavy and oue líght, were in the valley




404 N A RItA TIVE OF TIlE


on the left of this height: one brigade, under
General Cotton, took post on the right, in rear
of Campbell's division; and the Duke of Albu-
querque, with a cloud ofSpanish horse, supported
our cavalry on the left. Such was the general
arrangement for the occupation of the defensive
position, which the allied armies were commanded
to take up; and at an early hour on the morning
of the 27th, they began to move into it.


The greater part of the movements had been
made without annoyance, and an appeareu -to be
going on as we could have wished, when about
noon General Mackenzie's division was suddenly
attacked at the convent and wood on the right
bank of the Alberche, by two strong columns of
the enemy. They carne on so suddenly, and with
such impetuosity, as to throw the 87th and 88th
regiments into sorne confusion; and when Sir
Arthur Wellesley reached the ground, they had
succeeded, to a certain extent, in penetrating be-
tween the two brigades of which Mackenzie's di-
vision was composed. The consequence was,
that, for sorne little time, we were unable to dis-
cover the position which one of these brigades had
taken up, and it-required great exertion, on the
part of every officer present, to restore order.
At last, however, the 31st and 45th, supported by
the 60th regiment, were got in hand, and they
covered the falling back of theother regiments in




PENINsULAR W AR. 405


fine style, from the wood into the plain. Here
the cavalry were in readiness to support them;
and frQm that moment a regular and well-con-
ducted retreat began, which was continued, lei-
surely and orderly along the heights, towards the
left of the position which the army had been
directed to seize.


The enemy, nothing daunted by the steadiness
of our people, continued to press on; and a par-
tial action ensued along the whole front of the
lineo Towards everüng it became more serious.
The enemy appearing then to observe the great
importance of the height upon which the left of
our army rested, made a desperate effort to pos-
sess himself of it. He formed his infantry into
close columns of battalions, and, covered by a
tremendous cannonade, advanced at doublequick
pace to the assault. General Mackenzie's divi-
sion having been withdrawn somewhat to the
rear, and forming at this moment in the second
line, the attack was met by part only of General
Hill's division; but they proved themselves quite
adequate to the task. The 48th, the 1st batta-
lion of detachments, and the 29th pouring in a
volley, rushed forward with the bayonet; and
three companies of the latter gallant corps Grove
the enemy from the very ridge to which they had
attained. - It was a splendid charge; and it was
one, upon the issues of which much might have




406 NARRATlVE 010' 'fUE


hung; for had the heíght in question been car-
ried, the strength of our position became at once
exposed. It was not, however r made without a
heavy 108s to the brave troops engaged; for the
enemy fought nobly; and we had to lament, when
darkness put an end to the contest, about eight
hundred i~ killed and wounded, among whom
were several very valuable officers.


We lay all night upon our arms in momentary
expectation of an attack, the cavalry resting beside
their horses, and the infantry on the ground which
they had occupied during the day; but no attack
was made. N o great while elapsed, however,
after the dawn appeared, ere the enemy once more
put themselves Ín motion. The height upon our
-left was still the grand object of their desire; and
that they prepared to storm with all the force
which they found it practicable to bring against it.


At five o'c!ock on the morning of the 28th, two
~trong columns of chosen troops, the grenadiers of
Lapisse's division~ were formed in front of the
height in question. The formation was marked
by a furious cannonade, under cover of which the
columns pressed forward; and desperate and nume-
rous were the efforts which they made to render
themselves masters of the summit. But nothing
could exceed the gallantry and steadiness of the
brave men who opposed them. The brigades of
General Tilson and R. Stewart were' here; they




l'ENINSULAlt W Alt. 407


permitted the enemy, again and again, to arrive
within a few paces of the ridge, and they drove
them back in admirable style with the bayonet,
ti11, disheartened by so many repulses, they at last
retreated altogether, leaving the ground covered
with their dead. Had our cavalry been at this
moment sufficiently forward in the p]ain and val-
ley, they might have produced a terrible impres-
siol1 upon these fugitives; for the enemy retired in
great confusion; and opportunities of making
charges occurred, such as could not have been by
any possibility overlooked; but, unfortunately,
they were too far in the rearo The broken mass~s
were thus enabled to reform themselves, and to
withdraw, in something like order, within their
lines.


The fighting had been mahItained, without any
intermission, from five in the morning till half-past
eight, and the slaughter on both sides was terrible;
but the enemy's loss in killed and wounded ex-
ceeded ours greatly; and, which was not less in
our favour, his troopsappeared dispirited and dis-
mayed. They made no further movement during
the next three hours, and the sound of firing ceased
to be_ heard throughout the field. At this juncture
it was a question with us whether we should ad-
vanee, and in our turn become the assailants, 01'
remain quietly where we were, and await the re-
sult of the enemy's deliberations. lt was a fortu-




408 NARHA'fIVE OF THJ;;


nate circumstance that Sil' Arthur Wellesley
determined on following the latter of these courses,
for about half-past eleven several heavyclouds of
dust were discerned,announcing the approach of
the French army to a renewed attack upon diffe-
rent points in our lineo They had now fully
ascertained the exact station which the English
army occupied, and rightly judging, that if it were
shaken, the Spaniards would· faH an easy prey,
they made ready to bear down upon us with the
whole weight of theír force. Four distinct columns,
each strongly supported by artillery and cavalry,
carne on;. the first against that part of the line
where the British and Spanish troops joined; the
second against the guards and Cameron's brigade ;
the third against the Germans and Mackenzie's
division; whilst the fourth, escorted by a mass of
cavalry, moved up the valley on the left of Gene-
ral Hill's station. It may be necessary to observe
here, that General Hill, having received asevere
wound in the early part of the morning, quitted
the field; and that the command of the troops
which occupied the often-contested height, had de-
volved, in consequence, upon General Tilson.


The advance of French columns is invariably
announced by a general fire of artillery throughout
the whole extent of their position; and the
ordinary custom was not omitted on the present
occaSlOn. A murderous. cannonade spread havoc




PENINSULAR WAIL 409


among our ranks, whilst the attacking parties,
covered as usual by clouds of tirailleurs, pressed
forward with the gi'eatest firmness and regularity.
Our people had received instructions to reserve
their fire till the enemy should have arrived within
a few yards of them, and giving it with effect, to
bring the bayonet immediately into play. They
obeyed these orders to the letter. The heads of
the enemy's columns were close upon our line
before a musket was discharged, and then one
volley was given with a degree of precision which
must have astonished those against whom it was
directed. A conflict now ensued, more desperate,
beca use more completely hand to hand, than pos-
sibly the annals of modern warfare ever recorded.
General Campbell's division, on the right, not
only repelled the attacking column, but rushing
on "them when broken by its fire, drove them be-
fore it in gaIlant style; and charging a battery,
from which it suffered severely, took, at the point
of the bayonet, thirteen pieces of cannon. The
enemy, however, were veteran troops, accustomed
to be broken, and to recover their ranks again;
and as our soldiers could not ven tu re very far in
pursuit, lest by so doing they should expose their
eomrades, the fugitives were enabled to rally, and
to resume the offensive. What might have been
the conseq uence of a renewed assault, it were a
hard matter to sayo The captured guns, at all




410 NARHATlVE Ol' THE


events, would have beenprobably recovered; but
just as the French were preparing to rush for-
ward, they were taken in flank by a regiment of
Spanish cavalry, and again overthrown.


In the mean while, the second and third of the
French columns, reckoning from their left, bore
their fuIl weight upon our centre, and made a
desperate effort to pierce it. They were met and
beaten back with the same gallantry which marked
the oppositioñ of General CampbelI's corps; but
the guards, eager to ernulate the example of the
7th and 53rd regiments, pushed on, unfortunately
sornewhat too far, in pursuit. The enemy were
not slow to take advantage of this. Observing a
chasm in our line, they threw in a trernendous
and most galling fire upon the Gerrnans, who, for
an instant, were in confusion. Here the battle
was, for sorne minutes, most obstinate, and victory
doubtful; for the enemy's right colurnn had with-
stood and repulsed a charge from Anson's light
brigade of cavalry; and had he prornptly availed
himself of the advantage thereby obtained, a
different result might, perhaps, have occurred
frorn that which crowned tbe operalÍons of this
glorious day. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, who
was everywhere, saw how matters stood. He
ordered up the 48th, which had be en in reserve,
to support the broken Germans, and to cover the
retrogade movernent of the guards; and that regi-




PENINSULAR WAIL 411


ment, by its steadiness and good conduct, re-
trieved the disorder in this part of the lineo The
Germans were speedily brought back to their
standards; General Sherbrooke succeeded in re-
forming the guards; and the French were beaten
back, with terrible slaughter, from every point
which they had assailed.


At this moment our troops were successful in all
parts of the field, and it needed but a forward·
movement on the part of the Spaniards, to render
the victory of 'l'alavera as decisive as any upon
record. Had it been possible to bring them up
from the right of their line, so as to have gained,
by a rapid march upon the Alberche, the enemy's
flanks, one-half of the French army must have
been sacrificed. But unfortunately this could not
be done. The Spaniards, miserably disciplined,
and totally unaccustomed to change their forma-
tion in the face of an enemy, were quite immove-
. able; there they stood, as they had been origi-
nally drawll up; alld to attempt any mallurevre,
however simple, would have served on]y to throw
them into confusion, without beillg productive of
any good effect. The cOllsequence was, that the
enemy were enabled to commence and to continue
their retreat in excellent order, carrying off with
them much of their artillery, the whole of their
wounded, and the greater part of their materieI.
We could not venture to follow far, because evell




412 NARRATIVE OF THE


yet they more than doubled us in numbers; and
they escaped in better plight than usually attends
an arrny which has suffered a repulse so decided
and so bloody.


The los s of the British army in this action was
very severe, and it was occasioned chiefly by the
murderous and overwhelming fire of the French
artillery. From that, several regiments, which
can hardly be said to have been personallyen-
gaged at aH, suffered nearly as much as others
which bore the brunt of the contesto Out of nine-
teen thousand men, which formed the whole of
our effective force when the battle began, upwards
of four thousand were either killed or wounded ;
and among them were many officers, whose ser-
vices, at a juncture like the present, could ill be
spared. Generals Mackenzie, Hill, and R. Camp-
bel1, were wounded, and placed ho1's de combato
Brigade-majo1' Beckett, an excellent officer, at-
tached to the guards, together with Majors For-
dyce and Gardiner, were among the killed. With
respect to the enemy, it was not easy to form an
accurate notion, but their 10ss must have exceeded
oursby at least one third. Many rated it higher ;
but none below this' amount. The Spaniards suf-
fered but little, as few of their corps chanced to be
engaged; but it is no more than justice to state,
that the little which they had to perform aere,
they performed well. Sorne artillery, which they




PENINSULAR WAR. 413


had upon our left, was excellently served; and
their cava1ry regiment, called the King's, charged
gallantly.' It is likewise but faír to record, that
they were in raptures with liS and our behaviour ;
and that they decIared, with all the cIamorous
eIoquenceof their country, that those who spoke
of the British as less capabIe of fighting by land
than at sea, lied in their throats!! !


We bivouacked that night upon the fieId of bat-
tle, having removed our wounded into Talavera,
and estabIished there an extensive hospital; and,
on the following morning, we were joined by Ge-
neral Crawford's brigade from I_isbon, consisting
of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. Had it
arrived only a few hours earlier, more might per-
haps have been done; but it came in at a moment
when our successes were not sufficient to reconcile
us to our position; for we were in a sta te bor-
dering on want. N othing had been done, and
nothing seemed about to be done, by Cuesta or
the Spanlsh government, to afford us supplies:
our bread was a11 expended; and cattle, which
hitherto had been found in abundance, were now
become scarce. Add to this, that the enemy still
showed troops upon the left of the Alberche; and
that the Spaniards, afraid to approach them unless
we were at their side, crowded still upon us, and
drained the country of everything. N or was this
aH. Whilst it was yet doubtful whether Venegas




414 NAHRATIVE OY 'filE


had reached Aranjuez, a corps of French troops
was reported to have advanced from Alba de Tor-
mes as far as the pass of Banios, on the road to
Plasencia, with the design of cutting us off from
our communications with Portugal. Sir Ro-
bert Wilsol1, also, had fallen back from Escalona,
and was close upon our 1eft. In a word, though
we had won a great victory, our situation was only
so far improved, that we were for the moment free
from an overwhelming force in our front; but we
were in the midst of difficulties, nevertheless, from
which nothing but some prompt and vigorous
movement . would deliver uso The mind of our
General was, however, as we well knew, full of
resources; and though most of us saw our embar-
rassments clearly enough, there was not an indivi-
dual in the army who entertained a doubt, that his
talent and decision would, in due time, overcome
and disperse them.


During the 30th and 31st, all things remained as
they had done, except that the enemy disappeared
entireIy from before us, and our wants became
every day more and more urgent. The utmos(
exertions of our cornrnissariat were unabIe to pro-
cure even a moderate suppIy of bread, and the
meat was hard1y in greater abundance. Rumours,
likewise, of SouIt's approach from the north, be-
carne every hour more and more frequent; nor
couId all the hopes which we persisted in cherish-




PENINSULAR WAR. 415


ing, that Venegas must have g'ot well round to the
right of Madrid, suffice to allay entirely the ap-
prehensions which that reported movement created.
At 1ast, on the 1st and 2nd óf August, authentic
intelligence reached us, that from Venegas we had
nothing to expect; for that Soult, having carried
the pass of Banios, which a corps of Spaniards
under the Marquis del Reyno had been appointed
to keep, but which they had deserted almost
without striking a b10w, was already jn, Plasencia.
He entered that town, in fact, on the 1st; and
having been reinforced from Salamanca, 01' during
his march from the northward, and supplied with
artilleryand stores from Madrid, he appeared there
at the head of fourteen thousand men, inferior, in
point of equipment, to no portion of the French
army. This was a startling piece of news, and
required that sorne measure should, on our parts,
be promptly devised; and Sir Arthur Wellesley
lost no time in seeking a conference with Cuesta,
for the purpose of determining of what nature that
measure ought to be.


On the present occasion, Cuestasuggested that
the British army should be divided; that one-half
should proceed with a portio n of his troops against
Soult; and the other haIf, with the remainder of
the Spaniards, goforward in pursuit of Victor.
To this proposition Sir Arthur Wellesley would on
no account agree, declaring that a11 idea of di..,




41G NARRATIVF. OF THE


viding the British force was preposterous; but he
proposed, in his turn, to· rnarch with the entire
British arrny against Soult, provided Cuesta would
rernain at Talavera, and secure his real'. Cuesta
consented to that arrangernent; and our troops, in
consequence, rnarched back upon the 3rd frorn Ta-
lavera to Oropesa. But we had hardly taken our
ground, when advices arrived frorn Cuesta, to state
that he had intercepted a friar who was carrying
despatches both frorn Marshal Jourdan and King
Joseph, addressed to Soult. In the former, an ex-
ceedingly accurate and precise detail was given,
not only of our force, but of all our previous inten-
tioos up to the 28th; a species of knowledge
which could have been obtained only by treachery
in sorne quarter 01' aoother; whilst a narrative of
the late battle was added, which, for the story of
a Frenchrnan, exhibited wonderfully few devia-
tions from the truth. The latter contained orders
to "Marshal Soult, to press forward with aH dili-
gene e upon us, assuring him that his rnovernent
must cause a separation of the British from the
Spanish forces; that he would be supported by
Mar!lhal N ey, who had be en directed to pursue his
line of march from Castile; and that, whilst they
marched upon our flank, Joseph would again act
on the offensive, and threaten our front. lt was
added that Joseph had, in the mean while, placed
his force in a central situation abont Barga, near




PENINSULAR WAR. 41,


Torrejos, so as at once to keep Venegas in check,
and to arrest any advance which we might ende a-
vour to make irnmediately from Talavera.


Frorn the tenor of these letters, it was easy to
perceive that what had formerIy been surmised
respecting Venegas was correct, and that, instead
of pushing briskly, as he had been directed to do,
upon Fuente-Duena and Arganda, he had become
alarmed for the safety of Seville, and had moved
towards Toledo and Aranjuez. By this injudicious
movement, he enabled the enemy, with their forces
united, to keep both Spanish corps in check. Cu-
esta was dreadfully alarmed at the information.
He gave orders for the irnrnediate evacuation of
Talavera, and made ready to follow our march tQ
Oropesa without a moment's del ay, though aware
that he must thereby sacrifice the whole of our
wounded, and that too when no enemy was in
sight. Tbis was a most galling arrangement to us,
and it cut us the more deeply, that the old Spa-
niard, though literally encumbered with cars and
waggons, refused to spare usmore than seven for
the transportation of the bI'ave men who had
fought and bled for his country. The abandon~
ment ofthe town was, as may be imagined, a most
heart-rending scene. Such of our poor soldiers as
we.re in a condition to move at aH, craw]ed after
us, some still bleeding, and many more with their
wounds open and undressed; whilst those wbose


VOL. T. 2 D




418 NAltRATIVE OF THE


hufts were too severe to permit of this, lay upon
their pallets, ~and implored their comrades not to
desert them. By indefatigable exertions, and by
sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, Sir Arthur
Wellesley got together forty cars, which enabled
lIS to bring forward in all about two thousand men ;
but there were still sorne hundreds left behind, aH
of whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity or ho-
nour, might have been preserved. The reader will
easily believe that such 'a scene, added to the ex-
treme distress which scarcity of provisions occa-
sioned, cast a damp upon our spirits which we had
not anticipated, and which certainly ought not to
have been the consequence ofa victory hardly won
indeed, but singularIy splendid.


As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley was rnade
acquainted with Cuesta's determinations, he re-
monstrated in strong terrns against the iro policy
and cruelty of the measure; but his remonstrances
were disregarded. During the night uf the 3rd,
the Spaniards carne pouring in upon us like a
flock of sheep; and a scene of noise and confu-
sion ensued, of which no words could conveyan
adequate conception. At the same moment intel-
ligence arrived, that Soult had passed the Teitar,
and that his advanced-guard was alreadyentering
N aval Moral. The bridge, of Almaraz . JIlust,
therefore, be either destroyed by the Spanish pea-
sants, or in the hands of the enemy; and hence




PENINSULAR WAR. 419


we were reduced to the alternative, either of
fighting our way through Soult's corps~ or of
returning over the bridge of Arzobispo, and taking
up the line of the Tagus. Sir Arthur Wellesley
gave to each aspect of affairs a due portion oi'
consideration. He felt, that should he determirie
to advance ágainst Soult, he might,. from the
nature of the country, and the facilities which the
line 'of the Teitar afforded to an army on the
defensive, be kept, in spite of his utmost exer-
!ions, in play, till Ney had arrived with his corps,
and J oseph and Victor were again able to come
on. Nor was this the on;ly risk which he rano
Should he not succeed in forcing his way to
Plasencia, his circumstances would become despe-
rate indeed; for the destruction of the bridge
at Almaraz, which was now fully ascertained to
have taken place, deprived him of all means oC
crossing the Tagus; and a retreat, in case of
disaster, became, in consequence, extr-emely pre-
carious. These were contingencies of grave and
serious aspectj but they were not the only consí-
derations whieh served to guide him. By suhse ..
quent accounts, it appeared that the enemy were
pushing by La Calzada upon the Arzobispo
bridge; there was, therefore, no room 1eft for
hesitation, nor a moment to spare in matúring and
acting upon sorne decision.


The greater part of the Spanish army arrived at




420 N A1UtAT1VE 01' THE


Oropesa during the night of the 3rd; but itwas
the rnorning of the 4 th before Cuesta hirnself carne
in. Sir Arthur Wellesley instantly waited. upon:
him, for the purpose of stating his views as to the
line of conduct which it behoved us to pursue.
He represented to hirn, that situated as the allies
now were, with a French force hurrying forward
to surround thern on every side, and destitute of
all rneans of subsistence,except the little which,
frorn day today, ffiight be collected in an ex-
hausted country, the only step which they could
venture, in cornrnon prudence, to take, was to
assurne the line of the Tagus, and to rernain there
in a defensive position, till stores could be col-
lected, and sorne prospect of acting on the offen-
sive, more attractive than was now before them,
could be discovered. Cuesta, however, whose
fears had driven hirn to evacuate Talavera, to
sacrifice our wounded, and to leave the way open
for Victor's arrny, was now stoutly opposed to
every proposal which had a retreat for its object.
He was satisfied that a second battle would end
quite as advantageously for us as the first ; and he
gave his voice decidedly for risking it. It was
useless to rernind . him that the physical strength
of men, to whom no provisions could be supplied,
would not suffice to carry thern through the toils
of a. long action; and that, if we did fight, we
should fight under all the disadvantages of a state




PENINSULAR WAR. 421


of utter· and deplorable exhaustion. He would
listen to no arguments of the kind, till at last,
perceiving that argument was thrown away, Sir
Arthur Wellesley assumed á higher tone. He
told him plainly, that whatever the Spaniards
might resol ve upon doing, he would not sacrifice
the arrny of which he was in command; and he
left him, to issue orders for an immediate march
towards Arzobispo. The orders were promptly
obeyed; and we· passed the bridge just as the
enemy's patrols began to appear in sight.


The path which leads from Arzobispo, through
.the pass of Mesa d'Ibor, into the great road from
Almaraz to Truxillo, Merida, and Badajoz, had
been represented to us as wholly impassable for
artillery. We found it extremely bad, no doubt;
but we nevertheless contri ved to drag our guns
alóng, and by dint of extraordinary exertions,
reaehed Toralida among the mountains, on the
5th. We remained there only during the night,
and resting at Mesa d'Ibor on the 6th, we carne
in, on the 7th, to Deleitosa. Here a halt took
place during two daJ s, of which the troops stood
greatly in need; for though our journeys had not
·been remarkable for their length, they had been
accomplished in the face of numerous and severe
difficulties. In the first place, no bread had been
issued out from the commencement to the close of
our march, and the men had tasted none for three




422 N ARRATIVE OF THE


whole days. This, of itself, was suffiCient to wear
out their strength; but, besides suffering from
hunger, they had a rough, and ofien precipitous
track to follow; and they travelled through a
district everywhere laid waste, and deficient in all
the necessary articles, either for sheIter or sup-
port. The season of the year was, indeed, in our
favour, the weather happening tú be remarkably
temperate; and it was well that the case proved
so; ror h~d winter overtaken us, circumstanced
as we then were, it would have been a hard task
to foretell the probable consequences. As if for-
tune, too,had determined to try our patience in
every possible way, we were scarcely settled in
Deleitosa, when intelligence of the overthrow of
Austria reached uso It was communicated from
Seville, through our ambassador Lord Wellesley,
and no doubts could be entertained as to its au-
thenticity. The reader will readily believe that
news so afHicting carne with doubIe weight upon
men already beginning to lose heart iñ conse;..
quen'ce of their own sufferings and reverses; and
that not a few of the most desponding amongst us
looked upon affairs as despeTate, and all chance
of successful resistan ce to French power as ab-
solutely taken away.


No such sentiments, however, found a home in
the breast of Sir Arthur Wellesley. He saw and
felt the' difficulties of his situation keenly enough ;




I'ENINSULAR '" AR; 423


perpIexed as he was by being kept a good deal in
the dark as to the steps which the enemy were
preparing to take~ and harassed and annoyed by
the continued supineness of ihe Spanish autho-
rities; but he was far from regarding the game as
lost. On the contrary, he spoke and actedon all
public occasions asif events were taking the very
Course whichhe had expected them to take; and
he satisfied every one~ either that he had providedt
or that he was perfectly competent to provide,
against any aecident or contingency which might
chance to occur. Our principal danger arose from
the. side of Plasencia. Were Soult, whose force
was now ascertained to faIl littleshort of twenty-
five or thirty thousand roen, and who was _ well
known to hold the Spaniards in soyereign con-
tempt, to push upon Portugal, by way of Coria,
andthe othef towns which we had passed in our
advance, then shQuld we hethrown into circum-
stances of great embarrassment; for his line of
march -would, in this case, be shorter than any
which we could take, and he might reach Lisbon
before uso Butwe eotertained sanguine hopes
that Marshal Beresford, of whose junction with
the puke de la Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo we
were informed, must, by this time, he sufficientIy
advanced to. intercept the movement; and Sir
Arthur invariably caused it to appear, that for such
hopes there were amplegrounds. Nevertheless, it




424 NARRATIVE OF THE


was gene rally felt, that ifhe intended to look ex-
c1usively to the defence of Portu'gal, the sooner he
took up a line for that purpose the better. On
Cuesta and the Spaniards, it was evident enough
that no further reliance could be placed; there
were around us, at present, no means of subsis-
tence; our' communications from every quarter
were either entirely interrupted, or at best very
uncertain; and, aboye all, sickness raged amongst
us. Our effective strength, including General
Cniwford's division, was reduced at this period to
seventeen thousand meno Where so many re a-
sons existed for the adoption of a defensive sys-
tem, there was little doubt that it would be adopt-
ed by him, who was so competent to judge of its
fitness; and they who entertained this expecta-
tion were not disappointed.


1 have alluded aboye to the supineness of the
Spanish authorities, and the unsatisfactory rela-
tions in which our intercourse with the civil go-
vernment at Seville stood, amply exemplified as it
was by the arduous task which Lord Wellesley had
to perform in the position in which he was placed,
and fully borne out by the voluminous and con-
stant correspondence that was kept up at this
time between the two brothers. Jt is not my
province, however, to enter further into those cir-
cumstances than to state that our chief was not
ony caBed upon to consider every military point




PENINSULAR WAR. 425


as connected with his arrny, but that every civil
arrangernent in the Peninsula was submitted to
him; and hence he cornmenced that early practice
of universality of reflection and decision, to which.
for reasons in the hands of Providence, he seerns
especiaI1y to have been designed.




426 NAItRA'l'IVE" OF THE


CHAPTER XVII.


Defeat of Cuesta's army at the bridge of Arzobispo-Victor
enters Talavera-Sir Robert Wilson's corps worsted at the
Puerto de Banios-Sir Arthur Wellesley takes up the line
of the Tagus--Cuesta is superscded, and General Eguia
succeeds to the command ofthe Spanish army-Distresses of
the British army, and extraordinary conduct of Eguia and
the Spanish government-Sir Artbur WeUesley retires upon
the Guadiana-General Arrezaga defeated at Ocana, and


, the Duke del Parque at Pamarue-Successes of the French
in Andalusia-FaU of Gerona and Astorga-Massena as·
sumes the command in the Peninsula-The British arIO y
moves towards Almeida, leaving General Hill's corps at
Abrantes-Comparative strength ofthe opposing armies, and
mutual preparatiolls for the campaign.


W E resumed our march on the morning of the
11th, and arrived that day at Jaraicejo, a place
distant about three leagues from the former posi-
tion. Here we paused for sorne time, sendingthe
cavalryas far to the rear as TruxilIo, and occu-
pying Almaraz and the Puerto de, Miravete with




PENINSULAR W AR. 427


two divisions; but the head-quarters \Vere- estah-
lished in J araicejo, and the main body of the army
cantoned in the villages round. To oprselves
nothing occurred, whilst we.reIhained here, deserv-
ing of particular notice; but a variety of events,
more or Iess important, were going on elsewhere;
and of these, as they were reported to US, and~
generalIy speaking, truly reported, it may not be
amlss if 1 subjoin a brief outline.


The . first rumour which reached US, was of a
defeat which the Spanish anny had sustained,
on the 8th, at the bridge of Arzobispo. It ap-
peared that Cuesta, having fortified the bridge,
alld leaving two divisions of infantry, withone of
cavalry, under the Duke of Albuquerque, to de-
fend it, returned, in the night of the 7th, to Para-
leda de Garben, where better facilities for housing
and covering his troops existed. He had scarcely
departed, when the enemy appeared in force UPO!!
the opposite bank, and employed themselves,
totálly disregarded by the garrison of ,Arzobispo,
in 8earching for a ford. This they 8ucceeded in
discovering, about two or three hundred· yardE!
aboye the barricade, and they sent over a column
of cavalry, supported by infantry, which, falJing
upon the Spaniards during the heat of the day,
took them wholly by surprise. They were put to
the rout in a- moment, with the 108s of twelve
pieces of cannon; and had the French füllowed




428 NARRATIVE OF THE


with the vigour 'which usually characterised thero,
the Spanish arroy musthave been entirely dis-
persed. Cuesta, however, finding that he was not
pursued, succeeded in rallying his men, and then
retreated into the pass of the Mesa d'Ibor, where,
upon ground partaking as much of the nature of


, impregnability as it is easy to conceive, he took
up a position.


With respect to the enerny, again, it was under-
stood that Victor had entered Talavera, where he
behaved with the utmost humanity and kindness
to our wounded; whilst the arroies from the north
were surmised, rather than accurately known, to


- have retrograded upon Plasencia. Of the exact
posture of the latter we were, however, ignorant.
We knew only that they had not appeared, at
least in force, in the vicinity of Coria, though seve-
ral plundering and foraging parties had arrived
there; whilst a corps of five or six thousand men
Was fulIy ascertained to keep its station still in
Plasencia. But we ascertained, at the same time,
that a division had moved back as far as the
Puerto de Banios, with a view to intercept Sir
Robert Wilson. This officer, it may be necessary
to state, had fallen in from Escalona, some time
ago, upon our left. When we began our retreat
towards Arzobispo, there were no opportunities of
cornmunicating with him, or drawing him off at
the inst-ant; and he had now penetrated in pursuit




PENINSULAR WAR. 429


of us, to the Puerto de Banios,whither the French
corps has tened to attack hirn. Sir Robert Wilson
could neither decline the battle, nor very success-
fully maintain it. In artillery he was quite defi-
cient, the whole of his guns having accompanied
our train, and his men were considerably harassed
by repeated marches; but they offered a stout re-
sistance, and when at length they were forced to
yield, made good their retreat upon Ciudad Ro-
drigo. This they did, not as armies usually retreat,
in compact bodies, and covered by their skir-
mishers, but by utterly dispersing, and again uni-
ting at the particular point of rendezvous which,
previous to their rout, had be en deterrnined upon.


In the mean whíle Marshal Beresford, with his
Portuguese arrny, was in position at Zarza, whither
General Crawford, at the head of four British
regiments, hastened from Castello Branco to join
hirn. The Marshal was confident that he was
capable of arresting upon the frontier any French
corps which might attempt to penetrate into Por-
tugal; and that he could easily contrive to keep
it in play till we should be able too arrive, by way
of Abrantes, to his assistance. This assurance,
together with the absence of all immediate maní-
festations on the part of the enemy of a desigil to
advance beyond Plasencia, induced Sir Arthur
Wellesley not to relinquish with precipitation his
defen~ive line of the Tagus, but to remain quietIy




430 NARRA1'IVE OF 1'HE


inhis present attitude, untilthe progress of things
in other parts of the country should furnish him
with better reasons, either to advance or retire.
By acting thus, we still retained command of the
great road to Seville; and by keeping theenemy
in doubt touching our future intentions, we hin-
dered him from directing his undivided attention
to other points; whilst, at the same time, our re~
treat was secure, and an escape to the Spaniards
as far as Monasterio, was by no means imprac-
ticable.
- Matters were thus circumstanced, when the
recall of Cuesta from the command of his army
was announced. N otwithstanding the general
. confidence which appeared to be entertained in
his honest integrity, and devotion to the cause of
hiscountry, he had exhibited, of late, too many
proofs of incapacity to direct a campaign, to be
permitted any longer to fill his high situation.
He was superseded-though not with any marks
of ignominy; and the guidance of the troops de-
volved,as a matter of course, on General Eguia, the
next senior in rank. An idea had prevailed
amongst us, sometimes, that the command would
be conferred on Albuquerque; at other times,
that ii would be offered to Sir Arthur Wellesley ;
hut the surprise of the former at Arzobispowas
supposed to have stood in the way of one of
these arrangements; and to the other, the national




'PENINSULAR WAR. 431


pride of the Spaniárds opposed insuperáble ob-
stacles. Had the case not been so, and had such
an offer been actually made, Sir Arthur Wellesley
must have experienced consÍderable embarrass-
ment either in accepting or declining it: it was
probably quite as advantageous to the general
cause, as it was certainly much more agreeable to
the private feelings of our leader, that no such
difficnlty of choice was submitted to him.


During the first few days of our sojourn atJa-
raicejo, we were tolerably well supplied with bread;
and cattle being pJenty, we had' no cause to com-
pIain; but as no regular system of furnishing the
army had been entered into with the Spaniards,
this state of comparative abundance was not oÍ'
long continuance. The country immediate1y round,
from which all our necessaries were drawn, socm
becameexhausted, and we were again' reduced
to subsist upon a very scanty and uncertaiÍl allow-
ance. The forage for the horses, likewise, became
scarce, and many of them died in consequence.
In the means of transport, too, for OUf sick, our
wounded, and even Cor our ammuilition, we were
deflcient. N o horses, mules, or cars, were sent to
us, notwithstanding repeated and earnest requi~
sitions, till it became, at last, a questioÍl, whether;
in the event of a compu]sory movemeht, we should
not be under the necessity of abandoning aIl to the
enemy. Our sickness, moreover. was not di-




432 NARRATIVE OF THE


minished. The hospitals received fresh occupants
as fast as those who had previously filled them
returned to their duty; nor could we, by any
exertion, muster on parad e more than 1 have al-
ready specified as our effective force, namely-
seventeen thousand meno With respect to Cuesta's
or rather Eguia's army, again, aIl accounts agreed
in representing it as reduced to twenty thousand
firelocks, . and these rather diminishing than in-
creasing, But it was not in our own imrnediate
neighbourhood alone, that affairs began to assume,
every day, a more unpromising aspecto InteIli-
gence reached us, upon authority which we could
not dispute, that Venegas had suffered two great
defeats from Sebastiani, strengthened by two di-
visions from Victor's arrny; that the first occurred
at Aranjuez, on the 5th; the second on the 11th,
at Almoriand. The truth is, that the enemy, as
soon as he found that we had escaped hirn, coun-
termarched, with accumulated force, upon Vene-
gas; who, taken in sorne degree by surprise, was
beaten with heavy 10ss, and compelled to retreat
to Santa Cruz, in the mountains.


These circumstances, coupled with a persuasion,
that in case Venegas should be closely followed,
Eguia would be ordered by the junta to move to
his support, created in the minds of aH a thorough
conviction that our stay in the position of the
Tagus could not be very protracted. The COIl-~




PENINSULAR W Alt •. 433


templation of a retreat was not, however, a very
enlivening one, accompanied as it was with fears
for the safety of our hospitals; whilst the smallest
mishap upon the occurrence of which it was pos-
sible to calculate, consisted in the abandonment of
two 01" three brigades of artillery, and many stores.
To Sir Arthur WelIesley, in particular, such a
necessity could not but appear in colours the most
distressing; for he had adventured upon great
things by his forward movement; he had achieved
a great victory; and it was mortifyillg in the ex-
treme, to relinquish the hold which these gave
him upon the confidence of Europe. Yet, with
his means, how could he act? The handful of
troops whom he now commanded, was composed
of second battalions-of many youths,both officers·
and men, made certainly of different stuff, andin-
ferior in stamína, to those whom Sir John Moore
had Jed; indeed, the guards, the buffs, the 48th;
and 61st, with the light division which had 18.tely
joined under Crawford, were the only portions of
the anny which,· at other periods, would have
been regarded as fit ror active service .. Oí ihe
cavalry, again, it is impossible to speakin higher
terms. . They were dropping off daily; and both
men and horses suffered from sickness, to adegree
even moreappalling than that which befen tlle in-
fantry. 1 consider it as no reproach upon any
officerin the service, when 1 here record my con-


VOL. I. 2 E




434 NARRATIVE OF 'fUE


viction, that there was but one who did not abso-"
Iutely despair at this juncture-and that one was
Sir Arthur Wellesley. But Sir Arthur was far
from despairing; he had already declared his
conviction, that even in the event of Spain's sub-
version, Portugal could be defended. Into Portu-
gal he accordingly prepared to remove, where, in
comfortable cantonments, the health of his sick
might be restored, and the strength of his weary
and convalescents re-established.


That this resolution wasnot taken upon trivial
grounds, the slightest survey of the occurrences,
both political and mUitary, which distinguished
the latter months of 1809, will suffice to proveo
With respect to poli tic al transactions, the supine-
nessor treachery of the SupremeJunta became
every day more and more conspicuous; --and the
duplicity of all the authorities" with whom "we
were necessitated to confer, rose, at last, to a
height which nothing could justify. General
Eguia, full of professions, dec1ared over andover
again, that, let happenwhat might to his own
soldiers, the wants of the English should be made
good; and on" the very day, perhaps,on which
these assurances 'Yere "penned, he would permit
parties of his troops to seize and appropriate to
their ownuse, stores ofbiscuit,or other articlesof
food,. which had" been collected forour use, and
were on their wayto our cantonments. In per-




PENINSULAR '" AR •.


fect keeping with these transáctions,' we were' day
after day urged, both by him and by the Supreme
Junta, to' resume the offensive, whenall parties
knew that we possessed no' means whatever' of
transport, and when they refused to suppIy us
with any portion of the mules or draft anima]s, of
which they possessed so large a quantity, as to be
able to employ inany in dragging emptycars,
merely that theymight bereadyin case of any
unlooked-for emergency. From all these circum'"
starices no ground remained, for us to doubt that
the Spanish government were either imable oÍ' un.;;
willing to support us; and thattheywere per<.
fectly indifferent as ,towhat OUT fate might be;
provided some paltry' benefit might accrue .indivi-
dually to themseIves.


In a 'military point oí view, again, our I¡ttIe
army wal3 at this moment· threatened on all sides
by a force of full seventy thousand French troops;
and there was 'not a Spanish or Portuguese corps,
with the exception of that of Eguia, with which
we, werein communication. U po~ Eguia, how.;
ever, we could not'count, even for a momento "In
the first place, his troopswere of the very worst
déscription, undisciplined, unfriendly, arid' dis-
heartened by repeated reverses; and in the next
place we were aware that orders had cven thus
early reached him, to march for the support of
Venegas, taking us alongwith him, could he pre-'
vail upon us to move, but, in the event of our re-




436 NARRATIVE OF THE


fusal, proceeding without uso The enemy, too;
were reported to be making preparations for an
incursion into Portugal, by way of Ciudad Ro-
drigo and Almeida; and although Beresford had re-
pres~nted his own force as sufficient to deJay, ifnot
to obstruct, their progress, such a report, coming
in at such a moment, was not to be neglected.
AH. these causes combined to induce Lord Wel-
lington (for hehad by this time been raised to the
peerage by that title) to fall back; and he díd so
with the less reluctance, that he felt himself bet-
ter able to give support, even to the Spaniards,
from a position which promised to furnish, at least,
necessaries to his troops, than he could pretend to
do whiJst enduring all the miseries of sickness and
want at J araicejo,


. In pursuance of this determination, the army
broke up from its position on the 20th, and not
being harassed by any portion of the enemy's
force, made good its retrogression, in five marches,
by Truxillo, Meajadas, Medellin, and Merida,
upon Badajoz. Here, for the present, Lord Wel·
lington proposed to halt; and fue troops were
disposed in cantonments along the line of the Gua-
diana, in a position which at once se.cured their
further retreat, should it become necessary, upon
Lisbon; renewed their communications with Beres·
ford, .left open to them the meaos of advancing
again, at will, into Spain, and furnished tbem
abundantly with forage and provisions. But the




PENINSULAR WAR. 437


sickness which had raged so long, instead of aba-
ting, increased in violence, till before many weekli
had passed away, there were computed to be not
fewer than eight or nine thousand men in the hos-
pital. Severa,l causes, each of thero, perhaps,
sufficient of itself to produce the effect, were as-
signed for this inerease of sickness. By sorne it
was attributed, in no slight degree, to a sudde,n
change from a state of violent exertion to a state of
perfeet repose; by others, to the unripe fruit, ,in
which the troops too freely indulged; and by ,a
third party, to the malaria, or unhealthy fogs,
which, during the dry season, hang over the coun-
try in the vicinity of the Guadiana. Probably the
last was more conducive than either of the others,
to the resu1ts which we had so much cause to
deplore; but there can be little doubt that all
exérted their baneful inHuence over men, to whom
such things were new,and who, in consequence,
were more liable to suffer from them than either
the natives of the country, or troops better sea ..
sonedagainst hardships and relaxation.


The army remained here, notwithstanding the
inconveniences to which' it was subjected, till to-
wards the middle of December. Though both its
own sufferings, and the condition of the Spanish
provinces, precluded all hope that a forward move-
ment could be attempted, ,Lord Wellington, was
extremely unwilling to withdraw entirely from the




438 . NAltRATIVE OF. THE


vicinity oí the- seat of war; and he was desirous,
at the sametime, that the resources ofthe district,
upon which he foresaw that in the end he must
needs retire, should not be wasted and impaired
by a . premature arrival of his army. But though
the troops continued without occupation aH this
while, the case was widely different with respect
to their commander. The entire season of rest
was' devoted by him to continual exertions, both
for the' advancement of the discipline and efficiency
of the Portuguese levies, and to infuse, if it were
possible, something like wisdom andvigour ¡nto
the councils of the Spanish government; whilst·he
wasquietly preparing, in his own rear, measures
for the construction of that stupendous lioe of
works, which :more than once baffied the efforts of
the French arrnies, and proved the salvation ofthe'
Peninsula .
. In the mean while the Spaniards, with their
accustomed want of prudence and discretion, were
rushing at all poiots into collision with the enemy,
and were in all paints suffering defeat. Eguia
had not filled his new office many days, when,
leaving Albuquerque with ten or twelve thousand
mén towatch the banks of the Tagus~ aod straiten
the French foraging parties there, he hurried
away to the support of Venegas, of whose reverses
llotice. has already be en taken. Venegas, how-
ever, was already superseded. and General Arre-




:PENINSULAR WAR. 439


zaga comrnanded in his stead. He was an im-
petuous and rash officer; who finding himself, on
the :arrival of Eguia, at the head of fifty thousand
men, weakly conceived. that . no French. army
would. be able to make head against him. In the
misplaced confidence which anirnated their leader,
the Spanish troops largely partook; they required
to be led immediately to battle, and they spoke of
bririging back the junta, in a few days to hold its
sittings in Madrid. . Arrezaga hastened to comply
with their wishes. He led his columns forward
to, the plains of Ocana, near Aranjuez, where he
was attackedby Marshal Mortier, at the head of
his own and Sebastiani's corps, and defeated with
terrible 10ss. . The enemy boasted of having taken
twenty thousa~d prisoners, and represented the
number of slain at four thousand: probably these
were exaggerations; .but that the Spanish army
was annihilated, admitted of no doubt.
_ This disaster took place upon the 17th of N 0-
vember; it was succeeded by another hardly less
ruinous; which occurred in a different part of the
country, on the 28th of the same month.· The
Duke del Parque, at the head of a corps of sorne
twenty thousand rnen, had. for sorne time back
kept his ground in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo;
where,. being joined by Sir Robert Wilson, he
endeavoured, in a desultory war of posts, to harass
and confound the projects of the enerny. His




440 NAURATIVE OF THE


immediate opponent had been N ey ; . but tbat
officer, indignant at the appointment of Soult t<;>
the chief command of the French armies, which,
on the recall of Jourdan, had taken place, requested
and obtained permission to return to Paris. He
was succeeded in his trust by Marshal Marchand,
who, holding the Spaniards in utter contempt,
hastened to bring the Duke to action. A battle
was accordingly fought on the 18th of October,
upon the heights of Tomames; which,owing to
the improvident impetuosity of the French leader,
ended in favour of the Spaniards. The enemy
fled to Salamanca, whither the Duke instantIy
followed, and he entered the place on the very
morning of that night, in which General Marchand
found himself under the necessity of precipitately
abandoning it.


It was the disposition of the Spaniards to ex-
perience so much elevation at the occurrence of
every little instance of success, that they forgot
not only how to improve it, but how to preserve
the superiority which they had for the moment
obtained. The Duke del Parque differed little in
this respect from his fellow-patriots. Delighted
.with the applauses of the people of Salamanca,
and regarding his victorious followers as invincible,
he remained inactive in his advanced position, till
the corps which he had beaten received reinforce-
ments from Valladolid, when it, in its turn, be-




PENINSULAR W AR. 441


came the assailant, and moved towards him. A
triRing affair took place at Carpio, where, upon
sorne rising ground, he ventured to abide the as-
sault-and it was not unfavolirable to the Duke;
but the enemy only retired upon their strength;
and it soon becarne evident that a force was op-
posed to him, which he could not hope success-
fulIy to withstand. He accordingly retreated, with
all haste, towards Alba de Tormes, where he took
up a position, and where, on the morning of the
28th, he was attacked with great impetuosity.
The Spaniards were worsted, and compelled to
abandon their strong ground; and they retired
for a while upon Tomames in tolerable order; but
just as the scene of their former victory began to
open upon them, abody of French cavalry
charged their rear, and threw them into utter con-
fusiono '{hey thought no more of resistan ce, but
casting away their arms, Red in all directions into
the mountains.


By these two victories, the last remnants of the
Spatiish army were destroyed; and the French
were left at liberty both to push theirconquests
into thesouthern parts of Spain, and to threaten
Portugal through the province of Beira. Of the
former of these opportunities they hastened irnme-
diately to avail themselves. Joseph put himself
at the head of the arrny w hich was destined to
overrun the kingdom of Andalusia; and having


/~. 1;.;
j .~




442 NARRATIVE OF THE


under him Soult, as his major-general, with Vic-
tor, Mortier, and Sebastiani, each in command of
his own corps, he moved towards the passes of the
Sierra Morena. _ Hither the fugitives from the
battle ofOcana had Red. But neither they nor
their leader had recovered from the dismay which
that defeat occasioned, and neither offered, nor
pretended to offer, any obstinate resistance to the
invaders. _ The passes were carried, without the
necessity once occurring of halting the columns,
or forming in order of attack; and on the 21st of
January, 1810, the intruders' head-quarters were
established in the town of Baylen.


Though .. in- following the progre ss of this army 1
shaILneces~arily.anticipateevents, which, in order
of time, occurred later than others that yet remain
to be narrated, it may not be amiss if~in the pre-
sent stage of my. narrative, 1 remind the reader of
the fortune which befell both it, and that portion
of the Spanish nation against which it carried on
operations.


As 'soon as the junta became aware that Anda-
lusia _ was on· the point of being invaded, they
began to think of securing, not the manysteep and
rugged defilesby which the approach to that pro-
vince is guarded, but the safety of their own per-
sons,and thepreservation of their own property.
They issued decrees and proclamations, it is true,
by which they at once'endeavoured to deceive the




· PENINSULAR WAR. ."443


people into a notion of their.· own security, and
professed to rouse the little energy of which they
seemed to be possessed, into action; but they
neither exerted themselves Oto re-organise their
routed armies, nor took any steps to bring to the
post of danger Albuquerque's corps, though it was
the only one upon which, reliance could now· be
placed. On the contrary, they directed the latter
to act u pon such a plan, as promised most effectu-
ally to render its operations unprofitable; and
they :paid to the repeated and urgent entreaties
forsupplies,· which poured in from the com-
maIiders, of the' former, no more regard than the
worst 'enemies ofthe country would have desired
tbero to pay. But wbilst they were thus heedless
of other matters~ they.passed a resolution, in w hich
the Islé of Leon was declared to be the fittest and
most convenient spot at which to hold their. future
sittings; and they decreed that, on the 1st of
February, the members should assemble there for
the despatch of business.
- Thoúgh the junta: hado by this time lost, and
deservédly 10st, thegeneral confidence' of the
nation, the idea that they were about to be
abandoned by their Tulers, not unnaturally excited
among the p"eople of Sevill~ both indignation and
despondency. This, was not long in exhibiting
itself, by numerous movements among the popu-
lace; and when the ,members of the junta pre-




444 NARRATIVE OF THE


pared tó withdraw in' accordance with this decree,
they were arrested. A cry was raised, that Se-
ville shoúld be defended to the last, and that th~
chief command should be assumed by Don Fran-
cisco Saavedra, at that time minister oC finance,
and president of the junta. A scene of indescri-
bable confusion ensued. Saavedra exerted him-
self to the utmost, in arder to les sen it, and rea-
dily assumed the power which the people had
thrust upon him; but it was only to secure his
own escape, and the escape of his partners in the
government. The junta fled; and Romana, whom
the people sought to detain by violence, that he
might assume once more the command of his own
army, eluded their notice, and retired to Badajoz;
and . Seville was left, without magistrates. or rulers
of any class, to make its own terms with the con-
queror. It opened its gates to Joseph as soon as
he presented himself, and received him, not only
without resistance, but with acclamations.


Whilst these things were going on, and whilst
the different towns and eities of Andahisia were
vieing with one another in their expressions of
loyalty to King Joseph, and satisfactionat bis
arrival amongst the.m, Soult on the one hand, and
Albuquerque mi the other, were making the. most
strenuous efforts, the one to reach Cadiz before it
could be put in a posture of defence, the other to
throw himself and his army into that important




PENINSULAR WAR. 445


city, and to secure ¡t. 1 t has been observed that
Albuquerque had received, from time to time,
such orders from the junta as must have brought
about, had he chosen to obey.them, the destruc,"
tion of the only Spanish corps to which Spain
eould now look for defence. He had been direeted,
in the first instance, to move from Truxillo, and
the posts which he was left to defend along the
Tagus, upon La Plata, for the purpose, as it was
stated, of frustrating the enemy's intention of
penetrating in that direction into Andalusia. He
had hardly begun his preparations for obeying that


. order, when a second arrived, to require that he
would merely hold himself in readiness to aet on
the offensive, should such a coursebe deemed
advisable. Albuquerque, most fórtunately· for
Spain, and highly to his own honour, was not a
man to stand iu fear of responsibility, and he paid
to the last order no regard. He pushed forward
as he had previously intended to do, and took
post, with his infantry at Guadalcunal, and his
eavalry and artillery at St. Olalla and Ronquillo,
in readiness to move in any direction where· his
presence might seem to be needed.


He was thus situated, when further instructions
reached him, requiring that he should withdraw
the' greater part of the garrison from Bad~joz,
and, with all the force which he could eolleet, act
vigorously against the enemy. Albuquerque




446 NARRATIVE OF THE


knew that, even if he were to obey this absurd
order, and leave the important city of Badajoz
unguarded, he would not be able to muster such a
force as would authorise his entry upon any course
of active operations, against an enemy whose
strength, at the most moderate computation,
tripled his own. He therefore not only set the
order of the junta at· defiance, but strengthened
thevery garrison which he had been req uired to
weaken. This was hardly done, when fresh
instructions reached him. One day he was com-
manded to march upon Cordova, because the
enemy had made themselves masters of the pass
of Puerto· del Rey. On the· next he was sum-
moned to Seville, with al1 speed, for the purpose
of covering it. The last order reached him in the
morning ;. before night another arrived, by which.
the command of thepreceding day, to hurry on
towards Cordova, wasrenewed. Albuquerque was
thoroughly disgusted, as he had good reason to be,
with conduct so disgraceful and so extraordinary.
AH the while that thejuuta was thus misdirecting
him, he was in the habit of receiving authentic
information respecting the movements and desig ns
of the French; and he knew perfectly, that nei-
ther Cordova nor 'Seville were with them object!i
of the slightest importance, but that their designs
were upon Cadiz. He knew, moreover, that at
the very moment when the junta were recom-




PENINSULAR WAR.· 447


mending to him a rapid marehuponCordova,'
they were themselvespreparing to make good
their.Hight to the Isle of Leon ; and he was but too
well aware, that if thatisland~ and the important
eity whieh eovered it, were left to their guidanee,
and' to the protection of the weak garrison which
at present held them, a very few weeks would
suffiee to put both' into the possession of the
French. Albuquerque loved his country and its
independenee; and among all the Spanish gene.:.
raIs, there were few whose talents and fine feel-
ings hetter. qualified them to direet the ·means
which were to proteet the one, and seeure the
other; hut he was an object of e~eessive jealousy
to the paltry party whieh at this moment guided
the destinies of Spain, and to that jealousy he at
lasLfell a martyr. On the present oecasion .he
det-ermined to aet for him~élf. As 800n· as he
had aeeurately ascertainedhow matters stood, he
broke up from his position, and marched with
rapid strides, not upon Cordova or SevilIe,' but
upon Cadiz .. · By dint of the most praiseworthy
exertions, . he reached it just two days before
Marshal SouIt and his· army appeared under the
walls; . and he regulated its means of defence
with so mueh judgment and energy, that not aU
the exertionsof the Freneh Marshal, unremitting
as these were, proved adequate to its reduction.


Whilst these;successesattended the Freneh arms




448 NARRATIVE OF THE


in the south, their operations were hardly less
propitious to them either in the east or in the
north. In the east, Gerona, after enduring the
miseries of a protracted siege, was reduced, .and
the army of Blake, defeated in more than one
encounter, found itself in no condition to keep the
field, and was fain to retire into the fastnesses with
which Catalonia abounds, leaving all the towns
and level country in possession of the F.rench. In
the north again, Astorga, after a gallant resistance,
was compelled to capitulate; and the French were
understood to be in full preparation for a fresh in-
vasion of Portugal. To render· this the more
decisive, reinforcements were poured in fr<hn Ba-
yonne in great numbers; and Marshal Massena
was stated to be on his way from the Danube, for
the purpose of taking upon himself the chief com-
mand of the troops by which the conquest of the
Peninsula was to be effected. Towards the close
of 1809, therefore, and in the beginning of 1810,
Spain, regarded in a military point of view, was
almost entirely reduced. Her fortresses were~
with few exceptions, in the enemy's handsj her
eities, open towns and villages, had almost . all
submitted; there was no army in existenee to
which the patrio·ts could.look; and Joseph was
once more established, with perfeet authority, in
the capital. But that which, at the present june-
ture, gave to the general aspect of affairs 1ts darkest




PENINSULAR "WAR. 449


hue, was the submÍssion of Austria, and the con-
sequent deliverance of N apoleon froID aH appre-
hension in the north of Europe. The battle of
Wagram, in deciding the fate" of Germany, was
supposed by most men to have decided the fate oí
the Península likewise; for no one could doubt
that an the strength of the empire would now be
directed to the attainment of one object, namely,
the expulsion of the English fr.om the continent,
and the consequent subjugation of Spain and Por-
tugal.


Affairs were in this sta te, when Lord Welling-
ton, alaimed for the safety of Lisbon, threatened
as it was in the only quarter from whence danger
lllight be seriously apprehended, determined upon
abandoning his position on the Guadiana, and
taking up another, which might enable him to
watchthe progress .{)f any force that might Bit
down before Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. With
this view, the troops were put in motion on the
1Mh of December, and after a march which, with
occasional halts, occupied twenty-one days, estab-
lished themselves on a new line, which; in a some-
what extended and not wholly connected manner,
covered the frontier between the two rivers, the
Tagus and the Douro. The advance, under Ge-
neral Crawford, consisting of the first baUalions
43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. the 1st and 2nd
r{lgiments of Portuguese ca~adores, detachments


VOL. 1. 2F




450 NARRATIVE OF 1'HE


from the 15th and 16th light dragoons, the 1st
hussars King's German Legion, and one brigade
of horse artillery, took post in front of Almeida,
and sent patrols as far as Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst
General Hill, with one division, remained on the
south of the Tagus, to watch the motions of any
French force which might be disposed to act
againt Badajoz, and threaten Lisbon through the
Alentejo. Head-quarters were fixed first at Vizeu,
from whence they were afterwards removed to
Celerico; the cavalry, with the exception of those
already specified, and a few squadrons necessary
for relieving the outposts, found cantonments at
Abrantes, Santarem, Thomar, &c.; and the park
of artillery was established at Vizeu. With res-
pect to the Portuguese troops, they had their head-
q t:tarters at Thomar; and they were stationed
partly in that town, and partIy in the villages
near, as convenience or necessity pointed out.


The first good effect resulting from this change
of situation showed itself in the rapid recovery of
the sick, and the no less rapid restoration to fuH
strength of such as were already convalescent.
The country into which the troops were now
moved, is as salubrious as any in the Peninsula ;
and as they contrived, for the most part, to obtain
comfortable. quarters, neither the cold of winter,
nor the variable temperature of the spring, were
felt by them. Provisions, likewise, proved abun-




PENINSULAR "'AH. 451
dant; and forage, if not so plentiful as could have
been desired, was at least less scanty than it had
been, either at J araicejo or Badajoz. On all these
accounts, both Lord Wellington and his followers
had ample reason to congratulate themselves on
the movement which had been made; whilst the
condition both of the French and S panish armies-
the former too formidable to be attacked with any
prospect of success--the latter dispersed and
broken, if not absolutely añnihilated-Ieft no
ground to regret the state of temporary inactivity
to which they were compelled to submit.


1 have said that, whilst Lord Wellington, with
the main body of his army, too k post between the
Douro and the Tagus, General Hill was left on
the southern side of the latter river, to keep open
a communication with Badajoz, and to watch the
movements of the enemy on the side of Alentejo.
This latter arrangement was the more necessary,
as Mortier and Regnier, at the head of nineteen or
twenty thousand men, threatened the southeru
frontier from Merida; and though Romana was in
Badajoz,and Elvas was understood to be held by
a respectable garrison, it would have been unrea-
sonable to expect that either the one or the other
could arrest the progress of the enemy, should
they see tit to advance by this road upan Lisbon.
General Hill's main position was at Abrantes. and
it was of a nature to render him perfectIy secure,




452 "A IWA TIVE OF THE


as long as the waters of the Tagus should continue
full; buthe stationed himself usually at Porta-
legre, and he even marched, from time to time,
forward to Campo Major, as often as Romana saw,
or fancied that he saw, reason to believe that he
was about to be attacked in force. There was, in
this manner, a good de al of inexplicable, and, as
it appeared, profitless manreuvring between the
French and English corps. Mortier, whenever
the humour took him, would advance, as if with
the design of investing Badajoz; certain, that by
so doing, he would draw Hill from his quarters ;
whilst Hill no sooner showed himself,than Mor-
tier would again retire, and take up his former
positions.


In the mean while, though both Lord Welling-
ton and the French generals might have appeared
to' an ordinary observer to be passing the first
months of the yearin a state of inaction, neither
the one nor the other suffered a single day to
escape without turriing it to sorne account,
and causing it to exert a greater or less degree
of influence over the final issues of the cam-
paign. Lord Wellington, contented to keep the
enemy as long as' possible in check, was devoting
a' large share of his attention to the fortification
and proper armament ofthe lines at Torres Vedras;
whilst the greatest exertions were made both by
him and Beresford, to put the regular army and




PEi\INSULAlt WAR. 453


the militia of Portugal into a state of effieiency.
Reinforeements accordingly eame in to him every
hour, respeetable, not froro their numbers alone,
but from their discipline, til}" he saw hiinself at
last at the head of twenty-seven thóusand British,
and fun thirty-one thousand Portuguese, troops of
the lineo The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon
which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much re-
lianee was placed for bafRing and retarding the
advanee of the French army, let it begin when it
might, was put ina state of excellent defenee.
The old walls were repaired, and fresh outworks
added to it; and a garrison of five thousand men
being thrown in, with ample stores of every de-
scription, and a British officer, Brigadier-general
Cox, at their head, no doubt was entertained that
it would make a very obstinate resistanee. That
Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of
time, no one in the present stage of affairs ven-
tured to hopeo The Spaniards were, indeed, full
of protestations; they spoke of burying them-
selves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling
the glory of Saragoza and Gerona; but as yet
they were not invested; and to boast of what
they would do, doing in the end nothing, was no
uncommon practice among our allies. Still we
might, in the present instance, be deceived; they
miglit, by some accident or another, fulfil their
promises; and if so, we had but littIe cause to




454 N ARRATIVE OF THE


rear ror our own safety, or that of the Portuguese
capital, for sorne time to come.


The army remained in this situation till the sum-
mer of 1810 was far advanced, holding completely
in command the main approaches through Beira,
and carefully watchíng the others. It occupied aIl
this while the position of Guarda, of which Lord
Galway has spoken as presenting the only defen-
sible line between Lisbon and the frontier; and
though Lord Galway lived in an age when the
military science had not arrived at the perfection
which it has since attained, he cannot be said
greatly to have overrated the excellence of that
lineo We were now distributed over the ridges.
and along the deseent of the Sierra de Estrella;
a range of rugged mountains, which extend froro
Coimbra to Guarda, and end at last in the exten-
sive plains of Castile. By this means we cut off all
approach by the two great roads which run to the
north and south of the Sierra, and which alone are
passable to an army w hich moves with its roate-
r~el of stores and guns. Our advanced posts, as has
already been stated, were pushed beyond Almeida,
and covered by the rivers Aquida and Coa; both
of which are in winter formidable from their depth
of water and rapidity of current, and in summer;
not easy of passage, in consequence of the accli-
vity and ruggedness of their banks. Our right, in
the mean while, was protected by the Tagus,




PENINSULAR WAH. 455


watched and rendered impassable by the presence
of Hill's corps at Abrantes; whilst our left could
be threatened only from the side of Oporto, where
we had no reason to apprehend that the enemy
meditated any inroad. Thus were we justified in
considering ourselves secure, as long as the Tagus
should continue unfordable; and as this chanced
to be the case up to a period quite unprecedented,
we held our ground even beyond the season, when
we might have fairly anticipated either a volun-
tary advance. or a compulsory retreat.


In the mean while there were co1lected, so early
as the month 'of May, in our front, no fewer than
three corps d'armée; one, under Ney, composed
of three divisions, one under Kellerman, of two
divisions,and one, containing a like number of di-
visions, under J unot. Besides these, General
Montiniere was understood to be in Valladolid
with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of
cavalry; and last, though not least, Massena ar-
rived, and took upon himself the command of the
whole. If the several divisions be estimated at
ten thousand each-and no accounts which we
received rated them at less-then would the
total of the force immediately opposed to us amount
to fuU seventy-nine or eighty thousand meno To


. this we could oppose no more than twenty-seven
or twenty-eight thousand British, and abont thirty
thousand Portuguese troops; and the latter being,




456 NARHATlVE OF THE


for the most part, as yet untried, an absolute con-
fidence could not be reposed in them. Yet, in
spite of odds so tremendous, the best spirits and
the highest hopes pervaded all ranks. The num-
ber of our sick had diminished from nine to less
than two thousand, and we were daily and hourly
increasing in efficiency. A few skirmishes, more-
over, at the outposts, in most of which o.ur peo.ple
were eminently successful, tended to keep alive
that confidence in themselves and in their leaders,
which is so. essential to. the welfare o.f an army;
and it was no matter of trifling congratulation to
find that Qur Portuguese allies, in all such affairs,
behaved with a gallantry not inferior to. that exhi-
bited by. our own troops. There were, indeed,
many perso.ns in the army, who. saw so.mething of
risk in our advanced situatio.n. It was no.t to be
supposed that Lord Wellington, with a fo.rce so.
inferior, would attempt any o.ffensive operatio.ns,
o.r that he would even risk a battle, in case he
sho.uld himself be attacked; why then, it was
asked, remain in the immediate presence of an
enemy, before whom, whenever he mo.ved, we
must of necessity faH back? It is needless to an-
swer this 01' any other of the numero.us questio.ns
which about that time began to. make the ro.und of
the canto.nments. Lo.rd Wellingto.n was not afraid
to manamvre even the Portuguese tro.ops, tho.ugh
the enemy might hang upon their rear; he saw




PENINSULAR WAR. 457


no necessity for falling backupon Coimbra, till
the measure should become indispensable; he was
desjrous of protracting the war as long as possible
upon the frontier, anrl therefore'he remained where
he was. That he had not judged erroneously,
future events sufficiently proved; it would there-
fore serve no good end to enter here into any ela-
borate defence of a policy which requires none.


During the early months of spring, though the
enemy were in considerable force in the vicinity of
Ciudad Rodrigo, they made no serious attempt
to besiege the place. Occasionally, indeed, they
did here what Mortier was in the habit of doing at
Badajoz; that is to' say, they put themselves in
motion, from time to time, as if with a view to
commence operations; but our advanced corps
was no sooner reported to be in march, than they
again retired. lt was at such times, and under
such circumstances, that parties found an occa-
sional opportunity of exchanging a few shots with
the enemy; and that the ca~adores were enabled
to satisfy their comrades in the British ranks, that
when tbe hour of tbe grand push came, they would
not be deserted.




458 NARRATIVE. OF THE


CHAPTER XVIII.


Low state of the finances of the Briti5h army, and apprehen-
sions entertained by many respecting the issne of the war-
Massena opens the campaign by investing Ciudad Rodrigo
-Skirmishes at the outposts, and retreat of the light division
on Almeida-Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which surrenders-
Affair of cavalry in front of the British outposts-Rumours
of the enemy's intended operations, and dispositions to meet
him.


W HILST these things were going on, events daily
occurred, sorne of thern calculated to excite our·
spirits, and increase our hopes ofultirnate success;
others, as might be expected, having a tendency
widely the reverse. Arnong the agreeable inei-
dents just referred to, rnay be noticed the arrival
at head-quarters of Lieutenant-general Sir Brent
Speneer, an officer to whose merits every one
bore testimony. In addition to this, assurances
poured in upon us, that large reinforcements, both
from Sicily and N orth Arnerica, were 011 their
way ; whilst nurnerous desertions from the French




PENINSULAR WAR. 45U


army served to convince us. that the enemy's
troops, in spite of the proclamations and profes-
sions of the generals, were far from finding them-
selves comfortable in their· present situation.
From the month of January to the month of May,
J 810, there carne in near]y 500 men, all of them
fulIy armed, and not a few bringing along with
them their horses and appointments; and as they
were principally Germans and Italians, the cir-
cumstance led to a persuasion, that the foreigners
in the French service were beginning to grow
tired, either of the particular war in which they
were engaged, or of French supremacy in the ab-
stract. It is true that we could not boast of the
total absence of this military vice from among the
mercenaries who took rank under our own stand-
ards. A German dragoon would, from time to


. time, pass over from us as well as from the enemy ;
but the 10ss which we sustained by desertion was
trifling indeed, and carne not up, by one hun-
dredth part, to that endured by the enemy.
Among the sources of uneasiness, again, to which
we were subject, none affected us more seriously
than the low state of our finances, and the dif-
ficu1ty which we felt in recruiting them. The
army was universally in arrear for subsisten ce ;
many regiments had received nothing during seve-
ral months; and at one period there were but a
few thousand dollars in the military chest. Now,




460 NARRATIVE OF THE


ina country where nothing was, or could be taken,
without being paid for, and wheré the people,
accustomed to look with suspicion upon the paper-
money issued by their own government, serupled
greatly in reeeiving our bills and promissory-notes,
the absence of bullion was felt as an evil which
hardly any ingenuity or attention could ameliorate.
Our expenditureamounted on an average to
30,000l. monthly, and we drew daily rations for
forty thousand men and twelve thousand animals ;
yet at no time were we able to colleet in our own
neighbourhoodmore than 150,0001.; and the re-
mainder was consequently brought, at a heavy
los s and with immense labour, from Cadiz and
Gibraltar. But when the funds of these places
were at length declared to be exhausted, as to-
wards the middle of May proved to be the case,
our prospects became melancholy. By great ex-
ertions, however, on the part of Lord Wellington,
the credit of the army was so far preserved, that
it never suffered from an absolute deficiency in
articles essential to its existence; but individuals
unde:rwent numerous privations, and it was at one
moment apprehended that, unless large supplies
of gold and sil ver should speedily arrive froro
England, our movements might be cramped at a
moment when, aboye aH others sinee the com-
mencement of hostilities, it was of consequence
that they should be free and unfettered.




l'EXl~SULAR \\":\. R. 461


The reader, after this dénouement, will not be
surprised to learn that, a1tbough the very best
spirit prevailed, in general, throughout our ranks,
speculations, not of the most cheering or consola-
tory nature, were at this period entered into here
and there, as to the ultimate destiny which awaited
uso It is part of the English character to look,
under all circumstances, at events in the darkest
colours of which they are susceptible; and the na-
tional disposition was not slow in being brought into
play on the present occasion. By many it was
esteemed a project utterly hopeless to attempt
keeping possession of Portugal for any length of
time after the enemy should have fairly entered
upon his course of operations for its subjugation.
Men accordingly began to inquire respecting the
tonnage and capacity of the fleet, whether it,were
capable of"removing, when the moment ofretreat
should arrive, the troops and stores now in the
Península; and a question was even taised,
whether an effort would not be made to withdraw,
not our own soldiers only, but the Portuguese
army likewise. By such as started these ques-
tions, it was satisfactorily ascertained that, ex-
clusively of four ships of the líne andtwenty-three
frigates, there lay at anchor in the Tagus, trans-
ports possessed of ample stowage for forty thousand
meno This, it was concluded, would suffice for
the removal of the whole of the British army, with




462 :'Il"ATtRATIVE OF THE


its women and followers; and it was sagaciously
enough surmised that the vessels of war would
not be permitted to sail, occupied by their own
crews only; but that they would be given up, as
far as might be practicable, to the accommodation
of our faithful allies.


Whilst sorne were thus amusing themselves, in
speculating about events which were not destined
ever to receive their accomplishment, the enemy
was vigorously collecting their means, and pre-
paring to open the campaign with a force which
might bear down all opposition on the part of Lord
Wellington and bis army. Massena, who had paid
a short visit to Salamanca, returned again to Val-
ladolid, for the purpose of hurrying forward to
the frontier every battalion and company which
could be spared froro the internal management of
the country. Columns were accordingly reported
to be on the advance, both froro· the Asturias and
Gallicia, whilst the Estremadura corps, strength-


. ened by a fresh division of five thousand men from
before Cadiz, was stated to be approaching Bada-
joz in force. As yet, however, the only direct
indications of active operations being at hand,
were found in tho freq uent movement of cava1ry
patroIs along our front, and their daily atternpts to
discover sorne fords by which the rivers might be
crossed. With these, when they became too da-
ring in their approaches, our outposts would from




PENINSUI,AR W AR. 463


time to time skirmish; but nothing was done upon
a great scale, nor had we any good ground to sur-
mise upon what plan, after his arrangements should
be =complete, Massena intended to acto That he
would hazard all upon a direct attack in front, the
nature of our own position, as wel1 3S the opinion
which we entertained of his military skill and
talents, forbade us to believe; it was rather to be
expected that he would support his movement in
this direction, by corresponding movements upon
our flanks; but of any dispositions so to do which
he might be making, we were ignorant. The truth
is, that in spite of all secret intelligence, Il:nd the
expense incurred in securing it, our information
was still far frorn being accurate. This aros e, not
from any want of energy on our parts, but from
the natural disposition of the Spaniards, who never
dream of hazarding conjectures, or enteringupon
speculations, beyond the occurrences of the day.
When a French force was actualIy in motion, or
rather when it had already arrived within a short
distance of its point of destination, we seldom failed
to hear of it; but the mere assembling of troops in
the interior, they rarely took the trouble to report;
and hence we were not unfrequently left to guess
at the enemy's probable intentions, from consider-
ing how we ourselves would act, in case their and
our situations were reversed.


In themean time~ a few changes took place in




464 XARRATIVE OF THE


the disposi~ion and management of portions of our
troops; that is to say, Lieutenant-general Payne,
to whom the cavalry had hitherto been intrusted,
returned home, and Lieutenant-general Cotton
succeeded to the command. The first di vis ion of
infantry likewise, which had previously acted
under the orders of General eotton, was trans-
ferred to General Spencer; but the position of
the army continued unaltered up to a late date in
the summer; nor was it till the month of May had
been considerably advanced, that the enemy
showed any disposition to molest it.


His arrangements being at length. complete,
Massena prepared, at the head of the 2nd, 6th,
and 8th corps, to invest the fortress of Ciudad
Rodrigo. For this purpose he pushed on several
strong divisions, which, driving in our patrols and .
flying posts, established two bridges across the
Agueda, and took possession of sorne commanding
heights that lay between our position and the
town. It ~as not without the deepest reluctance
that Lord Wellington carne to the conclusion,
that any attempt on his part to interrupt the
progress of the siege, could be productive of no
good. In point of numbers alone, the enemy
surpassed us by at least one-third; and their
troops were aH admirably disciplined, ably com-
manded, and inured to war. Of our force, on
the other hand, the larger proportion were new




PENINSULAR W AR. 465


Ievies, which looked well, nodoubt, upon parade,
but which never having as yetcome under fire,
could not be expected to behave like veterans.
Besides, were the enemy' to suffer a defeat,
though he would doubtless be compelled to aban-
don his designs for the present, his retreat was
perfectIy secure; and there were ample resources
at hand .from which to 1ill up the gaps which the
fortune of a battle might have produced in his
ranks. The case' was widely different with re-
spect tous. Were we defeated, our ruin was
irretrievable; and were we even to succeed,
the success couJd not be purchased except at
an expense of life, which must cripple our
means during the remainder of the season, and
prove in the end more injurious to ourselves than
to the enemy. U nder these circumstances it was
determined, to the great grief both of our General
and his followers, that our attitude of watchfulness
must still be preserved; and to render it the more
imposing, head-quarters were transferred to the
town of Almeida.


N o great while elapsed, however, before the
inconveniences attending this latter arrangement
were found to overbalance any b~nefit which
could arise out of it. By taking post a:t Almeida,
LordWellington was doubtIess at hand to direct
every manreuvre which the advance might be re-
quired to make, and to observe with greater facility


VOL.!. 2 G




466 NARRATIVE OF THE


the movements and operations of the enemy; but,
on the other hand, he was in continual and immi-
nent danger. Should our pickets, by accident,
suffer a surprise, and their supports be over-
thrown, he might, before sufficient warning had
been given, find himself shut up within the walls
of Almeida, and exposed, along with the fortress
itself, to the risk of capture. These were serious
considerations; and they induced him, after
having spent a few days onIy in his advanced
situation, to withdraw as far as Alverca, six
Ieagues in the rear.


1 have· said that a corps of French troops,
having driven in our patrols and flying posts,
threw two bridges over the Agueda, and esta-
blished itself between Ciudad Rodrigo and the
British arroyo The movement in question was
effected earIy in June, and it completed the in-
vestment of the place, which had been begun as
far back as the 26th of April. At first, indeed,
the several divisions which closed around the city
attempted nothing more than an occasional and
irregular bombardment; whilst they intermitted
from time to time in the strictness of their block-
ade, as often as the appearance of an advance on
our parts led to the belief that we had determined
upon raising the siege. Now, however. matters
assumed a different aspecto The corps aboye
alluded to consisted of thirty-one thousand men :




PENINSULAR \VAR. 461
it was cornmanded by Marshal¡ Ney, and taking
post upon some high and advantageous ground,
appeared determined to cover with effect opera-
tions which were conducted' both with firmness
and science; and as it was supported by fuU thir-
ty-eight thousand, under the irnmediate orders of
Junot, to whom the prosecution of the siege was
more immediately intrusted, it could not but feel
itself secure. N othing, therefore, remained for
either party to perforrn, except to watch, with
equal earnestness, the progre ss of an undertaking
in which both were equalIy interested.


That the reader may the more easily enter into
the detaiIs which must by and by be laid before
him, it may not be amiss if 1 here make him ac-
quainted-even though, in so doing, 1 may be
compelled to recapitulate a little-with the exact
situation in which the allied and French armies at
present found themselves.


There were, in the position ofGuarda-that is to
say, on the right of the Tagus, and on the left of
the Douro-four divisions of British infantry, the
greater part of the British cavalry, with the mass
of the Portuguese troops, horse, and foot, under
the irnmediate orders of Lord Wellington. Head-
quarters being established at Alverca, the out-
posts, which were principally supplied from the
light division, extended along the Azava; a sman
stl'earn which, rising among the hills near Alber-




468 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


garia, falls into the Agueda, at a líttle distance
from Cesmiro. In rear of the light division, which
lay chiefly in and about Gallegos, though con-
siderably to its right and left, were the divisions
of General Cole and General Picton, the former
of which occupied Guarda, whilst the latter was
in cantonments at Pinhel. There were detach-
ments at Sabugal, on the right, and for a time, at
Sto Felices, on the left; though the latter was
soon withdrawn, and the place occupied by a por-
tion of J unot's corps. Guarda, however, ando the
stupendous heights around it, formed the key of
the position from which the retreat lay, either
towards the left, and so by Mondego, or to the
right, and so by the Zezere, to Marcello, Thomar,
Santarem, and ultimately to Torres Yedras.


Whílst the maín bod y retained this situation,
General HilI, at the head of the second division,
sorne cavalry, and a corps ofPortuguese, making
up, in aH, abont thirteen thousand men, was on
the left of the Tagus, employed, as has already
been hinted, in guarding the approach to Lisbon
by way of Alentejo. His position was more
moveable, and necessarily so, than that of Lord
Wellington; but the majn point to be defended
was Abrantes, in case the enerny should make
any desperate attempt to pass the river, and
threaten our communications. In like manner
General Leith, with a corps of ten thousand men,




PENINSULAR WAR. 46.9
of whom not more than two thousand were British,
was behind the Zezere, ready to support either
Hill or Lord Wellington, according as circum-
stances might require; whilst Romana, with his
division of infantry, strengthened by a few squa-
drons of Portuguese cavalry, kept post at Badajoz,
and in the country round.


On the side of the enemy,again, the 2nd, 6th,
and 8th corps, otherwise known by the appella-
tion of the army of Portugal, were oceupied, partIy
in eondueting the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and
partIy in showing a front towards the four British
divisions at Almeida, Pinhel, Alverea, and Guarda.
On the other side of the Tagus, thel'e were the
corps of Regnier and Mortier, formerly estimated
at nineteen thousand men, but since increased by
a reinforeement of five thousand. The latter di-
vision, leaving seventeen thousand men to eontinue
the bloekade of Cadiz, had hastened to take part
in the subjugation of Portugal; and the whole
were now manreuvring, so as to threaten Badajoz,
and ultimately to aet against Hil1. Besides these
there was a divis~on, estimated at eight thousand
men, whieh, under General Bonnet, threatened
the province of Entre Douro e Minho; whilst de-
taehments were quartered here and there, between
the frontier and Burgos; and from Burgos to the
Pyrenees, fol' the purpose of keeping up the com-
munication between Massena and France. On aU




4'70 ~ARRATIV1l: OF THE


these heads'Qur information was fu1l, and as the
event proved, tolerably accurate; whilst there
were other rumours afioat, wbich, though sorne of
them rested upon no sure ground, exerted consi-
derable infiuence over the feelings of the troops,
and on the p1ans of their leader.


We learned about this time, first, that the Ma-
tagorda fort before Cadiz had fallen into the hands
oi' the enemy, and that the city itself, crowded
with inhabitants, was not expected to hold out for
any length of time. This was alarming enough ;
but it was hardly more alarming to us, situated as
we then were, than a second report which came
in, that the French, wearied with the resistance al-
ready offered, and harassed by sickness brought on
by the exhalations from the Isle of Leon, had de4
termined to raise the siege, and bring the whole of
their force to bear against Portugal. N ext we
were assured, upon what appeared to be good aU4
thority, that the Emperor N apoleon was in fuIl
march towards Spain; that large divisions of his
guard had already entered Madrid; and that he
himself was expected to arrive there in a few days
at the farthest. Then carne an assurance, that
Souchet's corps likewise, which had been directed
upon Valencia, was stopped, and that it was hur-
rying on to join the arrny destined for the conquest
of Portugal. AH· the communications at present
made were, however, not of a nature so discoura-




PENINS ULA U W A R. 471


gmg. To counterbalance these recorded aboye,
we were told that General Bal1asteros was on the
banks of the Guadalquivir at the head often thou-
sand men, and that he was conducting himself
with so much spirit and judgment, as seriously to
impede the projects of Massena, by compelling
him to detach Regnier for the purpose of keeping
him in check. In like manner the mountains and
forests of Spain were represented as full of gueril-
las, who cut off every small detachment of French
troops that carne in their way, plundered the con-
voys, interrupted the communications, and kept
the whole of the enemy's post on the alerto These
bands were made up chiefly of Spaniards, into
whose hands Joseph saw fit to put arms, and who
never failed, as often as a favourable opportunity
came in the way, to deserto Then again Castile
was said to be in a state of extreme commotion;
insurrections breaking out in every quarter, and
adventurous bodies of armed peasants destroying
the garrisons of all the villages and open towns in
the province. So bold, indeed, had the insurgents
become, that aI\ aide-de-camp of General Keller-
man was fairly carried off from the gates of Val-
ladolid; and no man could consider himself safe
in the open country, unless attended by a powerful
escort. In a word, Spain, though overrun, was re-
presented as far from being subdued; and it ap-
peared to us that thegeneral who should attempt




472 NARRATIVE OF THE


to conquer Portugal, leaving a country so deci-
dedly hostile in his rear, must either advance with
a force so overwhelming as to carry everything
before him, or he must be in danger of having his
resources cut off, and of being himself placed in a
situation as perilous as that experienced by the
troops against whom he was preparing to acto


In the mean while, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
was proceeding with a languor which gratified not
less than it surprised uso The enemy broke
ground before the place on the 11th of June, and
on the 25th their batteries opened. Though the
means of the assailants were known to be ample,
and though littIe hope of being relieved existed,
the resistan ce offered by the garrison was such, as
to place them on a level with the brave defenders
of Saragoza and Gerona. They obstinately dis-
puted every inch of ground, making frequent
sorties, and attacking the covering and working
parties in the trenches; whilst they kept up from
the ramparts an unceasing fire, which occasioned
a heavy los s both of life and materiel to the be-
siegers. It was a galling thing to us, that we were
compelled to be mere spectators of so much bra-
very. The sound of their very musketry couldbe
heard within our lines, yet could we not venture
to aid them; we could only admire their heroism,
as we sincerely did, and lament that no ability
rested with us to second it. And it is but fair to




PENINSULAR WAR. 473


acknowledge that the gallantry of General Her-
vasti and his brave garrison excited our admiration
the more decidedly, as we h~d looked for no such
exertions at their hands. Of the former we had
be en led to thínk as of a weak old man, who
would rather anticípate the wishes of Massena,
than disregard hís surnrnons; whilst frorn the lat-
ter, more especially when under such a chief, we
expected nothing. Both the one and the other
showed by their conduct that we had done them
injustice; and they gained upon om: respect and
esteern, in exact proportion to the unworthy no-
tions which we had be en induced to form of
them. _


That the reader rnay affix its true value to the
obsttnacy of this defence, it is necessary to inform
him that Ciudad Rodrigo was far from being
either a very regular or a strong fortification. It
was surrounded by a wall, and the wall was made
up, in rnany parts, not of embankments or ma-
sonry, but of rubbish. An arrny of not less than
sixty thousand men lay around it, largely pro-
vided with arnmunition, stores, battering train,
and intrenching tools; and the works were pushed
on by thousands of men in each relief, all of them
Well skilled in the business in which they were
employed. The garrison, on the other hand, was
composed of less than four thousand soldiers; and
the inhabitants, including women and children,




474 NARRATIVE OF THE


barelyamounted to five thousand. The odds were
tremendous; but the Spaniards were true to the
cause of their country; and even women and
children took their turns in the labours of the
siege. At last, however, in spite of the most stre-
nuous exertions of the defenders, a practicable
breach was made, and the enemy advanced to the
assault, in the nlght between the 30th of J une and
the 1st of July. They were mel olÍ this occasion
with the same devoted bravery which had so
often fOlled them in the trenches. Blue-lights,
hand-grenades, and missiles of every description,
were showered down upon them when covering
the glacis, and crowding the ditch; and they were
finally repulsed with a 10s8 more heavy than many
general actions might have occasioned. But the
enemy were not to be foiled. They renewed their
attack, causing science and skill to perform the
work which bare bravery had failed in effecting;
and it soon became apparent that not all the gal-
lantry of Hervasti and his troops would be able
to continue the defence of the place many days.


The British army, all this while, was resting
in its position, and watching, with deep anxiety
and bitter regret, the gradual but sure destruction
of the city and its defenders. lt happened, how-
ever, that in proportion as the siege drew towards
a conclusion, the enemy became every day more
and more pressing; and encounters at the out-




PENINSULAR WAR. 475


posts were events of constant recurrence. Of
these the greater number produced no other effect,
than merely to enable a few individuals on both
sides to display their gallantry; but sorne were
more important in their consequence; and it may
not be arniss if 1 make the reader acquainted with
the circurnstances which attended one of thern.


On the 3rd of July, General Crawford reviewed
his division; and· for the purpose, no doubt, of
impressing the enemy with serious notions of its
strength, he caused the regiments to be forrned
and drawn up in rank entire. The spectacle was
not lost upon the French Marshal, who, with the
view of ascertaining exactIy the arnount of our force
between the Agueda and the Coa, and perhaps to
convince the besieged that thE'y had nothing to
expect from us, ordered a recognisance to be
made. - It took place on the following day, and
it brought on an affair which, under aH cir-
cumstances, possibly, might have been as well
avoided.


At an early hour on the morning of the 4th,
the enemy were seen to be in rnotion; with. five
regiments of cavalry, sorne battalions of infan-
try, and several guns. They passed the Azava at
sun-rise, and their cavalry, driving in our advanced
videttes, carne on with great rapidity, three regí·
rnents on the direct road frorn Gallegos to AI-
meida, and t wo by a path to the left, with the




476 NARRATIVE OF THE


view of turning our right flank. Thel'e Wel'e two
pieces of cannon, of the horse-artillery, stationed
at a small brook, about half a miIe to the rear of
Gallegos. These instantly opened upon the French
column; but though the tire was well directed,
and evidently galled them, it did not succeed in
stopping them. Our cavalry, in the mean while,
formed in real' of the guns, sending out three or
four squadrons, with the hussars, to skirmish; and
rather a sharp contest took place near a bridge
which crossed the brook .. The French made a
dash to secure it, and passed sorne officers, with
about thirty 01' forty men, to the other side; in
accomplishing which, however, as the bridge was
extremely narrow, they were 90mpelled to defile
from column. An opportunity was thus afforded
of attacking them to advantage, which was not
permitted to escape. Captain Crackenbourg, of
the German hussars, an officer of gallantry and
high character, saw in a moment the predicament
into which they had thrust themselves. He in-
stantly drew out two divisions of the hussars, and
eharging the body which had passed the bridge,
cut down their officer, and drove the rest, with the
loss of several killed and wounded, back upon the
column. The affair was accomplished in an in-
stant, but the promptitude and vigour which eha-
racterised its execution, both merited and received
the approbation of all presento The brave men,




PENINSULAR. W AR. 477


were saluted by the cheers of their comrades as
they returned, and the officer's name was justly
and honourably mentioned a~ head-quarters.


N otwithstanding this momentary success, the
enemy's force, especially in cavalry, was too great
to be successful1y resisted, and the light division
retired. It was with sorne difficulty, indeed, that
the troops contrived to carry off the guns; for the
French, having discovered other parts by wlÍich
the brook could be crossed, pressed upon them in
overwhelming numbers; but both artilIery and
cavalry fell back in good order; and being sup-
ported by the infantry, whose fire from among the
rocks and woods told heavily, they suffered but
little. By this movement, however, Gallegos,
Almeida, and the ground occupied on the preced-
ing day, were given up; and a new position was
assumed immediately in front of the town of AI-
meida, and in rear of Port Conception.


From this date up to the 1st, no event occurred
of any momento The fire from the fortress having
destroyed sorne of the enemy's magazines~ they
were compelled to intermit the siege till fresh sup~
plies could be brought up; and the garrison were
not slow in turning the breathing space· to good
account, by repairing, as fast as t~eir means would
allow, the injuries sustained by their walls. AH
this was prodigiously in our favoun~Could the
opening of the campaign be delayed till autumn




478 NARRATIVE OF THE


was drawing to a close, little doubt could exist
that it would produce no results capable of seri-
ously affecting our tenure of the country; for then
the fields would all be bare, the roads would be-
come impassable, and everything would be against
the invader, as it would be advantageous to the
invaded. It was to delay, indeed, that we mainly
looked for our best prospects of success;. and
should Almeida hold out as Ciudad Rodrigo had
done, our fondest wishes would be accomplished.
Then might we retire with perfect confidence,
either to Ponte de Marcella, or by a different
route to the intrenched position at Torres Vedras;
and from either of these strong-holds we might
look down in perfect security upon the French
troops perishing in- our front. How different might
have been the fate of tbe war, had Massena suc-
ceeded in commencing vigorous operations, whilst
yet the entire summer was before him !


In that case, though we might have repelIed,
even with the lines as yet imperfect, any direct
attempt to drive us back upon Lisbon, or ¡nto the
sea, our means of holding the country would have
been at least not greater than tbey afterwards
became; whilst the subsistence to be procured
by the enemy being abundant, tbe issue of the
struggle must, to say the least of it, have been
doubtful. But now there was not an individual in
the army who appeared not to feel, that, let the




PENINSULAR WAR. 479


enemy be delayed only one month longer, and the
chances were all in our favour; for Lord Wel ..
lington had taken tbe wisest and most prompt
precautions to render tbe sojourn of tbe French in
Portugal more inj urious to tbem tban a sanguinary
engagement. It is well known tbat the French
armies moved unattended by convoys, and un'"
provided witb stores of forage or provisions. They
depended, in all cases, upon the resources of the
country through wbieh tbey passed; and wben
these became exhausted, they could no longer
keep thefield. Lord Wellington had issued striet
injuilctions to the inhabitants to withdraw, with
aIl their effects, as soon as his troops should begin
to march upon their positions in the rear; and
could the peasantry but succeed in carrying along
with them the corn now growing in the fields, the
case of the enemy would be desperate.


Before matters came to this, however, many
chances were yet to be run; and these proved, .in
more than one instance, less favourable than we
had cause to expect. Ciudad, Rodrigo, ¡ndeed,
did its duty nobly. It held out a full month
against open trenches; and its governor capitu-
lated only when it would have been an act of in-
sanityto resist any longer. But the faH of Ciudad
Rodrigo came not unaccompanied by other evils,
nor was it the most severe calamity which befen
us at this time.




480 N ARRATIVE OF THE


The enemy having supplied the ammunition,
which had been expended, resumed their efforts
against the place; and on the 10th of J uly, a
second and more formidable breach was effected.
The columns of attack were already formed-they
had even taken their stations in the tren ches, and
were waiting for the word to advance, when
General Hervasti, seeing that all hope of relief was
at an end, hung out a white flag, and proposed a
capitulation. It is said that Ney, by whom the
force actually employed in the siege was com-
manded, refused to grant any other terms than
those of unconditional surrender; but that Mas-
sena, more generous, or more poli tic, consented
that the troops should march out with the honours
of war, and that the officers should retain their
swords and baggage. Be this as it may, the place
surrendered, and one obstacle to the advance of
the French army into Portugal was removed.


On the morning after Ciudad Rodrigo fell, an
affair took place between a portion of our light
division and a party ofthe enemy, which gave rise,
at the time, to a good deal of speculation. The
enemy's patrols were in the daily habit of visiting
the several villages and hamlets in our front, and
of committing in them acts of barbarity and griev-
ous plunder. General Crawford determined, if
possible, to put a stop to this; and he made ar-
rangements, on the rright of the 10th, for cutting




l'ENIJ:\SULAR WAR. 481


off the next party which should show itself near
his pickets.. With this view he took with him six
squadrons of cavalry, amounting to upwards of six
hundred men; and set off, soo~ after midnight, in
the direction by which he expected that they
would advance. General Crawford's object was to
arrive before daylight with a portion of his cavalry
in their rear, and to attack them in front with the
main body, which should be drawn up for the
purpose. Unfortunately for the success of his en-
terprise, he lost his way, and instead of pushing
sufficiently to· the left, fell in with the French
patrol at a moment when he was least prepared to
take advantage of the meeting. The enemy's
force did not exceed thirty cavalry and two hun-
dred infantry; but they were advantageously
posted in an open space, just beyond a narrow
defile; and to reach them it was necessary to
thread that-defile in a loug lineo The consequence
was, that though the hussars, who led, formed up
in succession as they got through, and charged their
opponents with great gallantry, they effected no-
thing m~re than the dispersion of the handful of
horse; for the infantry had time to form a square,
and not all the efforts of our people succeeded in
breaking it. The hussars rode brave]y up to the
bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely
thrown in, which killed or wounded upwards of a
dozen meno The remainder wheeled off, and pur-


VOL. 1. 2 H




482 NARRATIVE Ol<' THE


suing the French cavalry, made way for a sq uadron
of the 16th. These galloped forward, but al so
took to the left, and leaving the infantry unin-
jured, joined in pursuit of the cavall'y. When the
last charge was made, the French square were
without fire, every man having discharged his
piece, and none having be en able to load again ;
but when a third attempt was made, they were .
better prepared to receive it. It feH to the lot of
Colonel Talbot of the 14th to lead this attack. It
was made with daring intrepidity; but the enemy
remained perfectly steady, and reserving their fire
tiU the bridles of the horseR touched their bayonets,
gave it with such effect, that Colonel Talbot and
several of his men were killed on the spot. The
rest drew off, upon. which General Crawford,
despairing of success by the exertions of cavall'y
alone, despatched an orderly to bring up a detach-
ment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no great
distance.


Whilst this was doing, the enemy's littIe coIumn
began its retreat, which it conducted withslnguIar
steadiness and great order. The 14th dragoons
seeing this, prepared to Iaunch another squadron
against it; and it was already in speed for the
purpose, when ColoneI Arenschild, of the hussars,
observed cavalry advancing both in front and flank,
and checked the movement. It was much to be
regretted afterwards that he took this step, for the




PENINSULAR \V AIt. 483


horse which alarmed him, proved to be detach-
ments from our own peopIe, on their return f.-om
pursuing the enemy's dragoons, the whole ofwhom
they had captured. The French infantry lost no
time in availing themse]ves of the indecision of our
cavalry. They marched on, and returned to
their main body, without having lost a single pri-
soner, or suffered in killed or wounded.


It is probably needless to ndd, that when intel-
lígence of this affair reached head-quarters, a feel-
ing of extreme vexation pervaded the bosoms of
all to whom it was communicated. That six hu n-
dred British dragoons should have been baffied by
two hundred French infantry, was a circumstance
for which no one appeared able to account. But
the chagrin arising out of this little defeat, though
abl.!-ndantly palpable at the moment, soon ceased
to exert an influence over uso Events of much
greater moment were at hand; and rumours
poured in, one after another, each calculated to
engross our deepest attention, and to excite our
liveliest ¡nterest.


The fate of Ciudad Rodrigo was hardly authen-
ticated, when we heard that Regniel' had been
ordered to cross the Tagus, and that he was in
full march to form a junction with Massena, by
way of Almaraz and D'Alameta. General Hill im-
mediately adopted a policy correspondent with that
of the enerny, by moving upon Villa Velha. These




484 N ARRATIVE OF TIIE


manreuvres, it lS scarceIy necessary to add, Ied to
conjectures amongst us, as to the course which
the enemy proposed to pursue, as soon as he
should be freed from his remaining difficulties by
the capture of AImeida. My humbIe opinion led
me to believe that Massena would di vide his
army into three or four columns; and that with
the first and strongest he would march direct
upon Guarda, from whence he could push by
Cavilhao and Sevo]a, for Pampelhoza. In the
mean while, it was probable that the second ,co-
lumn would penetrate by Belmonte to Turdao,
and along the miIitary road to Cardejes and
Abrantes; for though orders had been issued to
render it impassable, it was far from being certain
that they had been properly obeyed. By the
march of these two, columns, the strong country
about Castello Branco would be avoided, and the
still stronger defences of the Zezere turned; whilst
a communication would be immediatelyopened
with Regnier, and a junction formed at Thomar.
The third column, again, would, in all probability,
push direct upon Castello Branco and Abrantes;
whilst the fourth, if a fourth were employed, might
be expected to follow US, in the event .of .our re-
tiring by the Ponte de Marcella road, communi-
cating' all the whiIe with the troops directed upon
Pampelhoza, and uniting with the rest at Thomar.
Were this plan adopted, it appeared to me that




PENINSULAR WAIL 485


we should be. driven back as far as Villa Franca
and Torres Ved ras ; for there were no impedi-
ments in the way to check the enemy, and as we
had such a position in our rear, it would not be
judicious to risk an action on any other ground,
from which, e\ren if we should be successful in it,
no permanent advantage could be expected.


1 have said that, in -case the enemy should de-
termine to advance in the order abo ve specified,
there was but slender proba9ility of our" being able
to arrest thei1' progress, or offer to them any steady
front, till we should have taken up the fortified
line at Torres Yedras. Of that line, and of the
state of defensibility in which it now stood, it may
be necessary to take a little notice.


The position of Torres Yedras forms the gorge,
or neck of a peninsula, at the extremity of which
the city of Lisbon is placed. It measures in ex-
tent, from the mouth of the Zezandra on the sea to
Alhandra on the Tagus, about twenty-five English
miles; and it embraces in its profile every species
of ground calculated to assist the operations of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Along tbis line
were erected, at convenient distan ces, no fewer
than one hundred and eight redoubts, differing in
dimensions according to the extent of the ground
allotted for them, and the purposes which they
were severaIIy in tended to serve; and the whole
were armed with a train of four hundred and




486 NARRATIYE 01" THE


twenty pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre.
To protect these redoubts, and to give to their
occupants ample space for offensive as well
as defensive operations, mountains were per-
pendicularly scarped, rivers were dammed up,
and inundations formed; whilst of the roads
which once crossed the isthmus, many were
cut up and destroyed ; and many more, adapted to
the movements of troops, were rnade. The truth
is, that art, in the present instance, only filled up
the outlines, which nature had already drawn, of a
battle field, as formidable as ever was occupied by
troops. But the strongest positions must always
have their weak points; and even the lines of
Torres Vedras, though approaching as nearly to
tbe ímpregnable as it is possible for lines to do,
were not without their assailable corners. In
sorne place s the redoubts were unavoidably placed
at íntervals from one another so considerable, that
should there not be powerful reserves at hand,
and moveable columns to block up the chasms, the
enemy might, without 10ss 01' difficulty, penetrate
between them. This was peculiarly the case on
the flanks~ in the space between Mafra and the
sea on the one hand, and between Torres Yedras
and the Tagus 011 the other; and as illluck would
have it, these very spaces were, aboye aU others,
the most favourable to the operations of au" attack-
lng force. The froní" of the centre was completely




P~NINSULAR WAR. 487


covered by Monte Junto, which, extending its ra-
mifications to the very works, would necessarily
render the enemy's movements in that direction
both tedious and difficult; but the two flanks were
without such shelter, and must therefore depend
much upon the valoUl' of those who occupied them.
Of that, however, no doubt could be entertained ;
and hence we felt that, in falling back thither, we
were withdrawing to a stupendous fortification,
which nothing but a regular siege, of which the
duration was incalculable, could possibly reduce.
The sole risk, indeed, which we ran, was from
want of supplies. Were the French themselves
amply provisioned, and were the Alentejo to be
occupied, as it was probable that it would, by
Mortier's corps from Valencia, then indeed an
army of 60,000 men, thrown back upon a city
cémtaining at least 250,000 inhabitants, could not,
it was to be apprehended, hold out many months ;
but on these heads we saw no reason to be appre-
hensive. The enemy, we were well aware, car-
ried few supplies with him. We had either taken
care already, or were busily exerting ourselves, to
hinder any from being provided by the country
into which he was about to enter; and aboye ~1l,
the sea was open to uso Though, therefore, there
was something not flattering in the idea of retreat-
ing to the most remote corner of the Peninsula, we
prepared to retire thither with the feeling that it


.




488 NARRATIVE OF THE


was " reculer pour mieux sauter ;" and we already
looked forward with confidence to the moment
which should enable us once more to resume the
offensive.




PENINSULAR WAH.


CHAPTER XIX.


Preparations proceed, and plaos are formed-The light divisiou
attaeked at Alrneida, ami falls baek towards 1\ ¡verca-Ge·
Ileral movement of the British army towards the rear-Inde-
cision of .M assena-DiffieuIties ag'ainst whieh Lord 'VeIling-
ton is called upon to struggle-Almeida besieged and takell
- The garrison enter the French serviee""':" The enemy ad-
vanee, and the British army retires towards Busaeo.


THE intervening period between the 11th and
18th of July, 1810, was spent chiefly in receiving
reports touching the further movements of the
army, and in making such dispositions as the turn
which afi'airs were threatening to take appeared
to demando We learned at this time that tlle
rumour already mentioned, as to the march of
Regnier's corps, for the purpose of forming a
junction with Massena, and acting in connexion
with him, was correct. Regnier had arrived at
Coria and Moraliga, and had unavoidably opened




490 NARHATlVE OF THE


a communication with _ the General-in-chief, by
Abego and the pass of Perales. To render it the
more secure, Massena turned to his left, whilst at
the same time he threwa corps to his right, which,
under J unot, established itself at San Felice.
Regnier's movement naturally drew our attention
chiefiy to that quarter, and General Hill was, in
conseq uence, ordered from Villa Velha to Castello
Branco, where he arrived on the 20th. But this
was not the only effect which it produced. It
led us into further surmises respecting the ene-
my's future plans; and it induced us to make
such arrangements, as promised most effectually
to baffle him, should they be carried jnto effect.


From the. system which he had lately ádopted
in distributing his force, it appeared that Massena
was about to attempt one of two momentous
undertakings. He would either strengthen Reg-
nier so much as to render him superior to Hill,
with the view of moving him immediateIy upon
Castello Branco, and so forcing round our right;
or he was manceuvringto join him, by the pass of
Perales, to his own troops, and then, with very
superior numbers, to attack us on the Coa. There
was little ground f9r doubt as to which of these
arrangements would prove mo~t advantageous to
uso In case he should adopt the former plan,
there was a risk of Hill being disabled, in which
case our situation in the position of Guarda would




PEKH\SULAlt WAlt. 491


become extremely precarious; whilst in the event
of any disaster befalling us here, Hill must retreat
upon the Zezere, and we foll<;>w, with all the speed
of which we were capable. Were he, on the other
hand, to collect his whole force in our front, Hill
might be brought up to our line in three or four
marches, and other benefits might arise out of a
battle on the Coa, such as would not probably
attend a similar operation at a point nearer to the
capital. In the first place, the enemy must ap-
proach to the attack across the rivers in our front,
of which the banks were extremely rugged, and
in sorne places quite inaccessible; so that, if he
failed, his annihilation was almost unavoidable.
In the next place, it was probable that the Portu-
guese troops would fight with greater spirit on the
frontier, than after they had re ti red a considerable
way through the country. In their present situa-
tion, they felt that they were posted to protect
their wives, their families, their homes, and their
possessions ;-carry them further to the rear, and
they would see that, all these were already com-
promised. Whilst in the last place, it was not
going too far to believe that an action fought upon
the Coa would be entered upon, even by British
soldiers, with greater spirit and livelier zeal, than
one forced upon them when arrived within view of
their shipping. AH these consideratiol1s com-
bined tú- produce a hope that Massena would




492 NAltRATIYl'; OF THE


choose the bolder and more perilous course of as-
saulting- us in our position aboye the Coa. But to
counterbalance this, there was the knowledge
which we possessed, of the great sagacity and
experience of the officer opposed to us; who had
been taught, moreover, in more instances than
one, that it was not by open force that he could
ever hope to overthrow a British al'my of not very
inferior numbel's. The prcbability, thel'efore, was,
that he would not 9azard the attack in question;
but that moving round us, and accumulating
forces upon us in all directions, he would endea-
vour to wear us out by constant watchfulness,
and so make a pl'ey of us 3.t last, with líttle hazard
to himself. N 01' was it a thing impossible, that he
would, by a false attack upon our fl'ont, endea-
vour to draw off Hill fl'om the defence of Castello
Bl'anco, whilst he moved, at the same time, stl'ong
columns by his real', and thl'ew himself between
us and oul' line of retl'eat. These several schemes
wel'e aH, to a certain degree, feasible; and aH,
therefore, required attention. But we were headed
by one who was not behind Massena either in
clearness of foresight, 01' multiplicity of resources ;
and we well knew that he would direct no move-
ment which the circumstances of the case might
not demando


1 have said that the light dívision under Ge-
neral Crawford, to which the care of furnishing




PENINSULAR WAR. 493


the pickets was assigned, feH back, after the af-
fair of the 4th, to a new position between Almeida
and Fort Conception, where it fixed its head-
quarters, and established the rnass of its infantry
at a little village caBed Valdelamula. Our people
rernained here in quiet for some days, the enerny
rnaking no dernonstrations bf a move; but, on the
morning of the 16th, the infantry were ,still further
witbdrawn, ,and took shelter under the guns of
Almeida. It is worthy ofremark that Lord Wel-
lington had positively prohibited all fighting on'
points further in advance than the Coa. His or-
dersto General Crawford, which, that they might
not be misllnderstood, had been twice distinctIy
repeated, were, that he should by every possible
rneans ayo.id an action; and that as soon as he
becarne aware of the approach of an enemy, he
should retire, with ample space between, to the
opposite bank of the river. Crawford, however,
conceived that the French would respect the for-
tress of Almeida, that they would not push him
very rapidly, and hence that he would be able to
rnake a regular retreat at any momento He ac-
cordingly made up his mind not to retire on the
first intelligence of a movement, but to wait the
arrival of the French columns, and then to fall
back, slowly, orderly, and with some resistance,
in their presence. N o great wbile elapsed ere




494 NARRATIVE OF THE


the prudence of his determination was put to the
test.


On the 21st, the enemy put themselves in mo-
tion, and entered, without opposition, Valdela-
mula, Sto Pedro, and Villa Formosa; upon which
the garrison was withdrawn from Fort Conception,
and the fort itself blown up. Another pause of
three days now ensued, after which a force com-
posed of twenty-five squadrons of cavalry, ten
thousand infantry, and a correspondent train of
artillery, pushed forward in the direction of AI-
meida. General Crawford was advertised of this
movement at an early hour on the morning of the
24th. The resolution which he had formed, how-
ever, of holding as long as it should be defensible,
his present position, remained unshaken, and in-
stead of retiring, he drew up his division in line,
resting his left upon Almeida, and having his right,
as well as his rear, covered by the Coa. Here he
prepared to give battle; and here, before many
hours elapsed, he was attacked in force.


There were three British pickets, t\yo ofinfantry
and one of cavalry, about half-way between Villa-
mula and Almeida. The sun had not yet risen
on the 24th, when they found themselves assailed
by the enemy's skirmishers, which in whole swarms
covered the advance ofthe columns of cavalry and
infantry. Our people retired, but they re ti red




PENINSULAR WAR. 495


slowly and in good order, disputing every inch of
ground; and both suffering themselves, and caus-
ing their assailants to suffer, no inconsiderable 10ss.
The skirmish was the more interesting, as it is
impossible to conceive any piece of ground better
adapted for a rencontre of the kind,-an extensive
plain, intersected continually by hedges, stone
walls, and ellclosures, stretching all the way from
Villamula to the Coa; and it was through this
that our soldiers feH back, retaining with obstinacy
each successive fence, till the superior numbers of
the enemy compelled them to abandon it. Dur-
ing the continuance of this skirmish, the French
cavalry made more than one attempt to cut off
portions of the British infantry, and they were not
always unsuccessful. A division of hussars dash-
ing forward into a part of the plain more open
than the rest, threw themselves between the inter-
vals in a company of the 52nd, and in spite of a
heavy tire with which they were saluted, suc-
ceeded in making prisoners of an officer and about
fourteen meno


The skirmishers being now driven in, the French
prepared to follow up their successes, by vigorous-
ly assaulting Crawford's position. They bore down,
with a dense column, upon his centre, where
the 95th, with two Portuguese regiments, were
posted; and in spite of a desperate resistance,
particularly from the 95th, and one of the foreign




496 NARRATIYE OF THE


battalions, pierced it. By this time our cavalry
had witbdrawn to the opposite side of the Coa,
and our infantry being in sorne disorder, affairs
assumed rather an unpromising aspect; Crawford,
accordingly, determined upon a retreat; but it
was undertaken under trying and ticklish circum-
stances; and it wa" not executed without a heavy
10ss, both in killed and prisoners. The only route
open to General Crawford's division, was by a
bridge across the stream; which, as it 1ay upon a
leve1 considerably beneath the ground now occu-
pied by the enemy, was unavoidab1y exposed to a
heavy tire from most of their guns. Thither, how-
ever, it was necessary to proceed, and thither regi-
ment after regiment was moved, covered in suc-
cession by the corps in the rear, and 1ast of a11 by
a body of skirmishers. The French made severa1
brave attempts to force the bridge; they charged
towards it repeated1y, as our peopIe were descend-
ing, and endeavoured to push a body of their ca-
valry across in our rear; but the opposite bank
rising abruptly, and being covered both with arti1-
1ery and infantry, they were on each occasion
stopped. At length the firing ceased; and Craw-
ford, having halted ou his new ground till evening,
retreated, under cover of the darkness, to a posi-
tion within four leagues of Alverca.


There can be no doubt that in this skirmish
the British troops fuUy supported their character




PENINSULAR WAR. 497


for gallantry and coolness; but it was to be re-
gretted that the action had taken place at aH. It
was not our wisdom to waste our strength in par-
tial encounters, particularly when these must be
followed, as in the present instance, by a retrograde
movement; and of this Lord Wellington was, 1
believe, fully satisfied, as he had cautioned any
such to be wantonly incurred. Yetwas Crawford
an officer of singular ability and bravery, and cer-
tainly one of the best in the army, as all his pro-


. ceedingsshowed; and even here he did as much,
or perhaps more, than most men in a similar
situation could have performed. But 1 doubt if he
was strictly within his orders; and certainly con-
siderable dissatisfaction was felt at head-quarters
when the report of Jhe affair carne in.


The enemy having thus begun to move, our
attEmtion was powerfully called to the next steps
which they should take; because it was concluded
that from these a tolerably accurate judgment
might be formed, as to the plan upon which they
proposed to conduct the campaign. AH eyes were
consequently turned upon them; but though they
showed themselves during both the 25th and 26th
on our side of the Coa, it was not in force sufficient
to authorise our coming to any conc1usion as to
their future proceedings. The question which
interested us most deeply at present was, whether
they would halt to besiege Almeida in force; or,


VOL. J. 2 1




498 ,~AIlRA'fIVE OF 't'IlE


leaving a corps to mask it, would push on with
the strength of their army into Portugal. In case
they should adopt the former lineof policy, then
might we continue where we were, watching their
progress, and striving perhaps, as opportunities
offered, to impede it ;-were they to pursue the
latter course, then must we remove elsewhere.
Lord Wellington, however, was desirous of obtain-
ing fuU information on these heads befóre he
moved his arrny, 01' !ook any other decided step;
and the 25th and 26th were, in consequence, spent
by us in a state of quieto


On the 27th the French pushed forward several
strong patrols as far as the river Pinhel. Though
there was nothing in this absolutely decisive of the
question at issue, still it gave rise to a belief that
they might perhaps' advance in force; in which
case Lord Wellington appeared to feel that the
army, situated as it now was, would fill rather a
precarious situatioll. As it was not illtended to
risk a general action here, we should, of course,
fall back to avoid it; but were we hurried in that
movement, sorne 10ss and much confusion would
be the consequence. It was accordingly resolved
to march some leagues to the rear, and having
opened free space for the British troops, by sending
on the Portuguese brigades in front, to establish the
head-quarters at Celerico. This place, situated at
the head of the gorges of the Estrella, presented a




PE:\fINSULA R W A R. 499


post of much greater strength and importance to
an arrny threatened by superior numbers, than the
extended line on which it had hitherto acted;
where it was liable to be forced at aH points,
should it attempt to defend itself throughout, or
where, should it concentrate, it could only assume
a position exposed to a fhousand haza~ds by turn-
ing. Nor was this aH. By falling back, in good
order, upon Celerico, we had it in our power to
despatch the whole of our divisions, which must
necessarily retire by the same road at perfect lei-
sure, and with proper intervals between thern;



because having the start ofthe enemy byseveral
marches, they would find it a hard rnatter to over-
take Dr annoy uso


As soon as this determination was formed, no
time was permitted to elapse before it was carried
i'nto effect. The cava:lry, amounting in aH to
twenty-four squadrons, were moved up to Alverca,
where they held themselves in readiness to cover
the retreat. The light division marched to Cele-
rico; the first to Penhancas; the third to Cara-
pentra, Fares, and the vi'llages near. With re-
speet to the fourth division, it continued to occupY
Guarda, because it was deemed essential to retain
that place for sorne time longer, in order to keep
open the eommunication with General HiIl, whose
corps was still in position at Alalay; but General
Cole received instruetions, in the event of our re-




500 NARRATIVE OF THE


trog-rading- beyond Celerico, to retire by a moun-
tain road and rejoin uso Of the enemy's inten-
tions, however, we were still ignorant. It was
confidently asserted, indeed, that all design of
acting- upon our right had been abandoned, and
that Regnier had attached himself to Massena,
merely for the sake of adding- to his weigbt, and
enabling- hirn to move with greater effect upon our
front; but the arrang-ement appeared in itself so
improbable, that we were scarcely disposed to
believe it. We were, however, equally prepa,red
for either emergency; and as our marches to the
rear were conducted without any interference on
the part of the enerny, we soon found ourselves
in a position from which it was in our power to
move, either forward or still further back, in com-
parative safety, and at our own convenience.


When we began our retrog-ression, it was with a
fun assurance on our minds, that a few days, at
the furthest, would suffice to throw sorne certain
lig-ht upon the enemy's plan s and intentions. To
our g-reat surprise, however, day after day and
week after week elapsed, and they still continued
as inert an:d undecided as ever. A1meida, tbough
invested, was not threatened with a siege, neitber
were corps in movement against us; though a full
fortnight had passed since the affair with Craw-
ford's division on the Coa, and a month since
Ciudad Rodrigo submitted. There was, of course,




PENINSULAR W AR. 501


but one line of poliey for us to pursue; we eould
only wait, with patienee, till Massena should see
fit to do something; whereas it appeared as if the
f'rench Marshal were either completely at a 10ss
how to proceed, or that his means and resources
were inadequate to the objects in contemplation.
The reader will easily believe that so great an
appearance of diffidence on the part of the French,
tended not a little to inspire us with sentiments
diametrically the reverse. Lord Wellington, in
particular, augured the best results írom a eonsi-
deration of matters around him; and if there were
any who still continued to harbour apprehensions
touching the final issue of the campaigo, these ap-
prehensions had eertainly lost mueh of their
strength and plausibility. No doubt there were
moments when a consideration of the existing
state of Europe-everywhere in submission to the
influence of France, and everywhere in arms
agaiost us - would renew those ~larms which
present events had a tendency to smooth down;
but with such speculations we felt that we had
nothing to do, and therefore we resolutely looked
forward with a hope, which we were willing to
believe rested on no insecure foundation.


Whilst our bodies were kept at rest, our minds
were from time to time occupied by rumours
which came in, in great numbers, from different
parts of the country. We heard one day that




502 NARRATIVE OF TRE


Regnier' had advanced as far as Castello Branco,
and that Hill hOO fallen back upon his strong po-
sition at Largedas. There had been a little skir-
mishing on this occasion; and it gave us satisfaction
to be told that the Portuguese cavalry had been
brought into play, and had acquitted itself well.
N ext we were informed that the peasantry were
furming t;hemselves into bands of guerillas, and
that they had already taken and killed several
straggling parties of the enemy in the vicinity of
Guarda. But the most pleasing intelligence of all
which reached us at this time, reported the suc-
cess which Silveira's followers had obtained over a
body of Fl'ench troops at Parba de Sanatrice. A
Swiss bat&lion in the French service fiad, it ap-
peared, attacked a Spanish post at the above
}place. The Spaniards gave' way, and fled; but a
body of Portuguese mili tia belonging to Silveira's
eorps, adva~eed against the enemy, and shut them
up in the town .. Having sustained a blockade
for sorne days, the enemy were glad to surrender
llpon terms; and they were sent, to the number of
four hundred, to their own eountry, on eondition
that they woufd not serve again in the Peninsula.
Considered in itself" su eh a vietory, followed by
such eonsequences, was not, indeed, an event
very highly to be spoken of; but it promised to
be produetive of effeets more important than the
mere removal of a few hundred of the enemy from




PE!\'IXSULAR W AR. 503


{he scene of operations. It gave the militia con-
fidence in themselves and in their leaders; and it
would doubtless induce others to emulate the deeds
of their fellow-countrymen, whenever fitting op-
portunities might come in the way.


AH our rumours were not, however, of a de-
scription so cheering. It was stated, upon autho-
rity which appeared to be good, that Mortier had
broken up from the neighbourhood of Seville, and
that he was in full march to replace Regnier's
corps on the left bank of the Tagus. That su eh a
movernent had been in contemplation, we were
well aware, and the chief source of astonishment
on our side was, that it had not long ago taken
place; but we.understood now, that sorne differ-
ences between Joseph and Victor onthe one hand,
and Massena on the other, had hitherto prevented
it. The former chiefs were unwilling to spare
Mortier from the support of the force employed
before Cadiz; whilst the latter insisted upon his
being despatched into Portugal, as essential to the
great operations in progress. The dispute, it
appeared, had been referred to Paris, and now
the Emperor's decision having arrived, Massena's
wishes were preferred to those of the King of
Spain and his lieutenant. To us this was rather
an alarming piece of news. We were already op-
posed by numbers so great, as to keep our utmost
vigilance and skill in action, for the purpose of




504 NARRATIVE OF 'rRE


effectual1y watching them; there was no need of
an addition to the sources of aJarm by which we
were surrounded; nor was it a cause of inconsi-
derable annoyance to reflect, that a large portion
of our nominal army was placed in a situation
where it could prove of no real service. The
reader is doubtless aware that under the common
head of the Peninsular army were included, not
onIy the divisions immediately commanded by
Lord Wellington, with such detached corps as
might be employed in operations along the coast
of Alicant, but the garrison of British troops shut
up in Cadiz, to the number of eight thousand meno
Unquestionably it was a wise precaution to intro-
duce so me British regiments into that important
place; without them it is at least problematical
whether Cadiz would have sustained, as itdid, a
tedious blockade of many months. But the ques-
tion is, whether two thousand men would have
sufficed for that service, whilst the remaining six
thousand could have. been employed to unspeak-
able advantage elsewhere. As yet, however, the
tact of conducting a continental war with the spirit
which was necessary, was new in England. Not
only were we deprived of this large portion of our
own force, and that, too, for a purpose which ap-
peared nugatory,-but of the reinforcements which
had been promised from Halifax and Sicily, one
regiment alone arrived; and even the vacancies oc-




PENINSULAR WAR. 505


casioned in the ranks of the different battalions in
Portugal, by death, sickness, and other casualties
of war, were either not filled up at all, or were
filled up very imperfectly. . This was doubly dis-
tressing, at the present moment" when the uu-
healthy season having returned, our sick began
daily to increase in numbers, and when, 1 regret
to say, instances of desertion, particularly from the
German cavalry, became frequent. Lord Wel-
lington, 1 apprehend, felt, though he carefully
strove to conceal it, tha-! he was not supported, as
he ought to have been, from home; and there
were few officers in his army, possessed of pene-
tration, who did not likewise feel it.


Though it falls not in with the plan of the pre-
sent narrative to enter minutely iuto the order of
affairs purely political, 1 may be permitted to ob-
serve that Lord Wellington found himself, at this
critical juncture, beset with many other difficulties
besides those which originated in the insufficiency
of his own force, and the tremendous superiority
of the enemy. AH responsibility was thrown upon
him. The instructions which he received were
generally so expressed, as to leave him ground for
doubt respecting the course which would be mos!
agreeable to his employers; whilst hints were
thrown out, that he ought to look aboye all things
to the preservation of the force intrusted to him.
In few words, the ministers were alarmed at the
crisis to which affairs had arrived, and their con-




506 NARllATlVE üF THE


duct partook of their fears. N or was the govern-
ment of Portugal to be depended upon. A variety
of intrigues were going on there, augmented and
renewed from time to time by arrivals from the
Brazils; and a thousand impedimenfs were thrown
in the way of every useful suggestion, provided it
ñappened to come from the English General or his
friends. At last a new form of government was
invented, in which both the British minister
ando Lord Wellesley were included; and by
which Admiral Berkeley was advanced to the
chief command of the fleet, as Lord Wellington
had been to the chief command of the army.
Yet even then,-even at a moment when Lord
'Vellington was enabled to mark out, as it were,
a situation for himseIf, he was far from being
emancipated from trouble. Continual referen-
ces were made to him on the subject of civil
arrangements, and he found himself almost una-
voidably involved in the many petty cabals and
jealousies, ofwhich he had so lIluch reason to com-
plain. lt is not going too far to affirm, that a
Britisn commander has seldom, if ever, stood in
a predicament more harassing and more un-
satisfactory than that occupied by the Duke of
WeIlington during the summer of 1810; and that
probably not a single individual in the service of
the crown could have carried himself through the
difficulties arising out of it, except the man who
stntggled with and overcame them.




PENINSULAR WAR.· 507


The indecision which had marked the enemy's
movements, ceased at length to exert its· influence ;
and on the 14th of August, 1810, they sat down
in force before the fortress· of Almeida. On the
following day, ground ,,'as broken; but the works
proceeded so slowly, that the 25th arrived before
the first batteries were constructed. At one point,
however, owing to the faulty nature of the fortifi-
cation, the approaches had been pushed, without
rnuch interruption from the fire of the place, to the
foot af the glacis; but the batteries just spoken of
were erected at a prodigious distan ce, and carne in
only with the line of the first parafIel, far beyond
the proper range of battering cannon. Almeida,
regarded by the Portuguese as one of the principal
bulwarks of their country, was garrisone.d at tbis
time by two regiments of militia, and one of the
Hne, which were placed under the orders of Briga-
dier-General Cox, an officerofmerit and resolution;
and it was confidently expected that the resistan ce
made by it would not at least faH short. however
much it might exceed the resistance offered by the
feebler fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.


Lord Wellington, as soon as he learned that the
enemy had begun the siege, once more moved his
arrny to the position w hich it had occu pied pre-
vious to the late retrogression.· His object in this
was not only to encourage tbe garrison to a des-
perate defence, by creating in it tbe hope of a




508 NARRATIVE OF THE


speedy relief, but to draw off the troops whenever
the place should become untenable, avoiding, at
the same time, a general action; and had the
garrison acted with even moderate determination,
there is every reason to believe that he would
have effected the latter objeet, even though he
should have failed in the former. But the garri-
son did not do its duty. lt yielded on the :first
appearance of ealamity, and aceompanied its sur-
render with proeeedings which left no room to
doubt that the aceident alluded to was not the sole
cause of a sllbmission so unlooked-for and so ill-
timed.


The enemy's batteries opened at a long range
on the 26th; and in the evening of that day a
magazine, in whieh was deposited the ehief part
of the powder in the place, unfortunately blew up.
lt happened that sorne cars were in the act of
couveying ammunitiou from the building, when a
shell exploded at the door, and the loose powder
having ignited, the :fire was communieated to the
whole depot, aud it instantIy exploded. This was
indeed a heavy calamity; and Lord Wellingtou
and Marshal Beresford, iu their publie despatches,
attributed to it, aud to it alone, all the events
whieh followed; but the conduct of the garrisou
was sueh as to couvinee every unprejlldieed 'ob-
server, that iu so doing they spoke, uot from feel-
ing, but from poliey; and that, even had uo su eh




PENINSULAR W AR. 509


misfortune befallen, little was to be expected at
their hands. It was no sooner known in the town
that the principal magazine had been destroyed,
than the whole of the office"rs, with the Tenente
Rey, or second in command, at their head, pro-
ceeded to Governor Cox in a body, and insisted
upon his instantly surrendering. General Cox
warmly remonstrated against the measure, and
ordering them to repair to their several posts, in-
formed them that he ¡ntended, as soon as affairs
should become desperate, to cut his way through
the enemy's lines, and join Lord Wellington. The


"officers withdrew in evident displeasure; but
when the Governor came forth to instruct the
soldiers in the duty expected from them, he found
that aUhad laid down their arms, and that there
was not aman willing to obey his commands, or
follow his footsteps. U nder such circumstances,
but one measure remained for him to adopto He
accepted the terms offered by the French through
the Marquis D'Alorna; and on the following day,
being formally summoned, he most reluctantly
surrendered.


This was bad enough: it was sufficiently mor-
tifying to find that our allies, when left to them-
selves, could not be depended upon as friends; it
was a thousand times more mortifying to be con-
vinced that with unaccountable fickleness they
were prepared, on suitable occasions, to becom~




51'0 NARHATIVE OF THE


0urenemies. The Freneh army entered Almeida
on the 26th, and the garrison being paraded be-
fore him, Massena behaved towards them with a
degree of good poliey, not gene rally pursued either
by him or his brother marshals. From the militia
he exacted nothing more than a solemn assurance
that they would 110t again take arms against the
French, and tben dismissed them tu~their homes;
whilst to the soldiers of the line he offered various
advantages, provided they would ·consent to take
service under the banners of N apoleon. To the
eternal disgrace of the persons thus tampered
with, aH, both officers and men, embraced the
proposal, and all passed over, without the slightest
apparent reluetanee, to the ranks of the enemy.
True, it was industriously given out that the mea-
sure in question had been adopted with Que -view
only-namely, that they might be preserved from
certain captivity in France, and find opportunities
of again desertiug to their countrymen; but it is
hardly neeessary to observe that no 0Ile dreamed
of again plaeing relianee on men who could thus
set all honourable and proper feeling at defiance.
For my own parto 1 looked upon the ci-devant
garrison of Almeida as a band of contemptible
cowards, or barefaced tn¿itors; and 1 believe ~that
the sentiments which 1 entertained towards them,
were, without a single exception, entertained by
every man and officer in the British_army.




PENINSCLAR WAR. 511


1 have rnentioned the Marquis D'Alorna as
taking part in this negociation, so little creditable
to the persons who were the subjects of it.
D'Alorna was a Portuguese of talent, though a
deterrnined and uncomprornising partisan of the
French. When they entered the country before,
under Junot, he declared warrnly in their favour;
and having been governor of the province of Beira,
was enabled to render them sorne important ser-
VIces. It is but fair to state, however, that
D'Alorna's treaehery arose, not frorn any motives
of personal arnbition, but out of an hereditary
abhorrenee of the reigning farnily, from whorn his
ancestors, for rnany generations baek, had suffered
great oppression. Many of them, indeed, had
been beheaded as traitors, when, according to his
statement at least, they had committed nodeeds
deserving of the punishment; and the hatred
stirred up by sueh cruelties descended, like an
he ir-100m, frorn father to son, till it broke out, at
length, in the person of the present Marquis.
D'Alorna was, as 1 have said, a ruan of ability";
but he was something more than this. He knew
intimately all the parties wrueh existed in his
native country, and all the seeret springs by which
they were severally guided; and he was more,
perhaps, than any other individual, competent to
direet the Freneh in the operations which they
might desire to undertake for its subjugation.




512 NARRATIVE OF THE


Such aman, actuated by such feelings, was not
overlooked by the politic N apoleon, who gave him
the ral1k of general of division in the French
armies, and sent him, in this capacity, against the
land of his fathers.


As 800n as the faH of Almeida becarne kl1own,
Lord Wellington lost no time in retracing his
steps, and again placing his divisions in the posi-
tion which hé had assurned previous to the late
advance. They had not, however, long resumed
their station, when they were called upon once
more to abandon it; for the enerny advancing on
the 1st, with a few squadrons of cavalry and sorne
infantry, attacked our outposts at Alverca, and
drove thern in. Lord Wellington was not willing
to risk a general action here, if it could be avoided.
He was desirous, on the contrary, of stretching
further to the rear, in order to bring his divisions
into closer communication with General Hill, to
be nearer to the position of the Ponte de Marcella,
and, if the case should require it, to take it up;
and all this he was anxious to effect for the pur-
pose of hindering the enerny frorn pressing be-
tween our corps, or pushing hard upon our right,
which, as 1 have already hinted, we looked upon
. as his probable course of operations. He accord-
ingly issued orders for the whole army to faH
back, and fixed his head-quarters on the following
day at Gouvea. By this· movement he kept in




PENINSULAR WAlt. 513


check any troops which n1ight endeavour to
advance from Sabugal by way of Covilhos, and he
threw an insurmountable obstacle in the way of
all attempt to alarm both Hill's and our corps, by
turning the fortified position of the Zezere.


It soon appeared, however, that in the plan of
operations which sorne had drawn out for the
enemy, they had fallen into many errors. In-
stead of manreuvring upon our right, Massena
moved the whole of his force, no( excepting the
corps of General Regnier, towards our left, and
drew us off, almost as soon as we had taken up
our new position, to fresh ground, and more active
undertakings. How this was effected, it will be
necessary to state at length.


The reader has been already iriformed that
Massena, instead of employing Regnier on the left
of the Tagus, called him in, and united him to
himself. The surrender of Almeida no sooner set
him free from the last remaining encumbrance in
his front, than he prepared to enter upon his
grand undertaking-the invasion of Portugal; and
contrary to all surmises, he resolved to commence
his campaign as follows :-Whilst Regnier moved
by the route which we had taken, with a view of
threatening the position of Ponte de Marcella in
front, two other corps, one under the command of
N ey, another headed by Junot, marched in par al-


VOL. I. 2 K




514 NARRATIVE OF THE


lel columns to the right, and directed their steps,
the former by the upper road from San Felices,
through Trancoso, tbe latter by Celerico, and
across the Mondego, near that town, upon Vizeu.
His object in these movements evidently was, to
turn the position of tbe Ponte de Marcella, and to
compel us to abandon a line, wbich, had we been
followed by the main body instead of by a single
corps, would have afforded an éxtremely desirable
situation for a general action. How it came about
that Massena determined upon tbis plan, 1 confess
myselfunable to form even a conjecture. Perhaps
he entertained, an idea that tbe passage of the Ze-
zere would be difficult, that Abrantes would pre-
sent to him a formidable obstacle, and that the
country between Castello Branco and tbe Tagus
would suppIy his troops with nothing requisite for
their subsistence; or perhaps he apprehended
serious obstructions from Romana's army, as well
as from the garrisons of Badajoz and Elvas in h'is
rearo Whether any or all of tbese motives had
weight with him, 1 know not; but there can be
little doubt that, in relinquishing the line of tbe
Tagus, he gave up some advantages; such, for ex-
ample, as a close .communication with Mortier,
and the army before Cadiz; for which, nothing to
be obtained by his new plan of operations would
seem to compensate. Be this however as it may,




PENINSULAR W AR. 515


we were soon informed that he had actualIy
moved in the order aboye described; and we
instantly prepared, by marching upon Cortico,
near the Ponte de Marcella, to meet him upon
the fresh arena which he had chosen to mark
out.


In former parts of this narrative, 1 have taken
occasion to particularise the amount both of our
own force and of that of the enemy. Our esti-
mates respecting the French were generally drawn
froro the reports of deserters, who are invariably
disposed rather to overrate than underrate the
strength of the party whom they have abandoned ;
but at this time we discovered, from certain
intercepted retums, that the effective strength of
the three columns aboye specified amounted, in
the whole, to rather more than 70,000 meno Our
numbers, again, were as follows: of British infan-
try there were in the field 23,868; of British
cavalry 2870; of British artillery 2000; making
a total of 28,738 British soldiers: of Portuguese
there were infantry 21,712, cavalry 1696, and
artillery 1000. The grand total of the allied
army accordingly carne up to 53,136. But of
these full 25,000 were at a distance, so me under
Hill, others under Leith, so that we too k up our
ground at Ponte de Marcella with littIe more than
28,000 meno We took it up, however, in such
time as to authorise a well-grounded expectation,




516 N ARRATIVE OF THE


tbat before any serious attack could be made, they
would be enabled to join; yet were we far from
being at our ease, especially when intelligence
arrived, that the whole of Ma~sena's ariny bad
crossed the Mondego. The truth, indeed, ¡s, that
against odds so tremendous, more particularly
when it was considered that one-half of our troops
had never seen an enemy, no man could be very
sanguine of success. Had all within our camp
been Britons, then, indeed, tbough the victory
would have doubtless cost us dear, we should
have still, counted upon it as certain; but with
every disposition to think well of the Portuguese,
we were unable to persuade ourselves, that when
the moment of triál carne, they would be found
equal, 1 say not to their allies, but to their ene-
mies. Our object therefore, was to avoid a ren-
contre, unless upon ground so favourableas almost
to insure success; and for the attainment of that
object, all Lord Wellington's movements were
henceforth directed.


As soon as he had positively ascertained that
the French were passing the Mondego with their
third column, Lord Wellington threw two divi-
sions, the líght and the fourth, to the north bank
of that river. In the mean while, the first divi-
sion, consisting of six British and two Portuguese
brigades, advanced from Coimbra, where it had
latterIy been stationed, as far as Mealhada, on the




l'ENINSULAH W AR. 517


great road to Oporto. The third division, Ge-
neral Picton's, with the cavalry under Cotton,
were thus the only force left on the southern side
of the Mondego; and they posted themselves,
the one behind the Alva, the other in front of the
Ponte de Marcella. It is, perhaps, unnecessary
to add, that the Iatter corps were left in these
situations, merely to keep open the communica-
tion with Generals Hill and Leith; and that they
received orders, as soon as these üfficers should
have formed their junction, to follow the rest of
the army across the river. From these various ar-
rangements, it became sufficientIy manifest that
Lord WeHington was even now Iooking out for a
convenient field on which to offer his adversary
battle; and we were not slow inarriving at the
conclusion, that the first great struggle would
take place at a point not very remote from the
position now occupied by the left of the British
arrny.


As 1t will be necessary for me, in giving a de·
tai! of future operations, to describe minutely the
nature of the ground just referred to, 1 will not
detain the reader by laying before hirn any pre-
mature or imperfect sketch of the position of Bu-
saco. It will be better, perhaps, to close the pre-
sent chapter with a recapitulation of certain un-
propitious rurnours, which, at this critical moment,
carne upon us with even more than their usual




518 NARRATIVE OF THE


exaggeration. We heard, to our extreme rnor-
tification, that Romana, having improvidently
quitted his strong-hold, and advanced as far as
Puente de Castro, haIf way between Seville and
Badajoz, had risked an action with Mortier, and
suffered asevere defeat. So complete,· indeed,
was the ront represented to have been, that
nothing except the distinguished gallantry of a
corps of Portuguese cavaIry, which Lord Wel-
lington had lent to Romana sorne time before,
saved the Spanish army frorn utter annihilation ;
but a11 the bravery of these rnen was unáble to
restore the fortune of the day; and the whole had
retreated in disorder to Badajoz. The battle was
stated to have been fought on the 15th; and as
Mortier was represented as fo11owing up the fugi-
tives with great vigour, it became with us a ques-
tion of some moment, whether he rnight not arrive
in time materially to assist Massena, by threaten-
ing our right from Alcantara, or even from
Abrantes. This was an idea pregnant with alarm
to many, and productive, as a11 ideas in these
times were, of a thousand idle conjectures and
specuIations. But our chief seemed entirely to
disregard' it. Whether he doubted the authen-
ticity of the report, or calculated upon the igno-
rance of his adversary, or upon his want of ability
to takeproper advantage of the circumstance,
should it be real, 1 know not. This, however, 1




PENINSULAR WAR. 519


do know, that he continued to issue his commands,
and to arrange his plan s, with the same unbend-
ing firmness; and that all things went on as cooUy.
as orderly, and with as much deliberation, as if no
such rumour had reached uso


END OF VOL. r.


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