NARRATIVE OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, FROM 1808 TO 1813. BY LIEUT.·GENERAL CHARLES...
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NARRATIVE


OF THE


PENINSULAR WAR,


FROM 1808 TO 1813.


BY LIEUT.·GENERAL CHARLES WILLIAM VANE,


MARQUES S OF LONDONDERRY, G.e.B. G.e.H.
COLONEL OF THE TENTH ROYAL HUSSARS.


THIRD EDITION,


,¡; •.


HENRY COLBURN, NEW BURLINGTON STREE'r.


1829.




PRINTED BY A. J. VALPV, llEll LION COtJRT, FLEET 3TREEY".




TO


MIS MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY


GEORGE IV.
SIRE,


Al\-IONGST the many distinguished honours
your Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer
on one of your most devoted subjects, none was
more deeply appreciated than your appointment of
him to the colonelcy of that regiment which your
Majesty so long commanded in persono It is from
a constant and everlasting sense of this military
distínction, that he has ventured most humbly to
lay at your Majesty's feet a short narrative of
those campaigns in the Península in which he
had the honour and good fortune to be engaged.


With the profoundest respect and devotion, the
writer begs permission to subscribe himself,


y our Majesty's
Most dutiful Subject and Servant,


VANE LONDONDERRY, Lieut.-Genl.
COL. lOTII ROyL. HUSSARS.






ADVERTISEMENT.


TliESE Reminiscences of some years of an active
professional life were never íntended to meet the
public eye. They were written alwáys in great


. has te, sometimes at long intervals, ahd sometimes
when fatigue entirely oppressed the· body, and
when the frame courted sleep rather than the
most trifling occupation. But the great motive
which prorripted the first committal to paper of
the imperfect details which these sheets embrace,
was the affectionate and indulgent spirit with
which they were received by him to whom they
were addressed. They would probably have
remairted buried with the object of that unbounded
aUachment and devotion which gave them birth,
had not the circumstances attending the late events




Vl ADVER'fISEMEN'f.


m Portugal recalled the former scenes passed
m that country, where British soldiers had en-
joyed so many triumphs, and where the deepest
¡nterest had been blended with their career, by
their Iearning, practically, under the greatest
Master of this or any former age, tha! profession
in which their destinies were involved.


When a new force was equipped, and, launched
under new auspices, was about to sail for that
quarter, it occurred to me that these hasty
sketches of a former period, however light and
imperfect, might, not be wholly uninteresting to
those l1rave brother soldiers, who were embarking
again for that land where so many laurels had
been already gathered.


1 therefore determined to a:range, with a friend,
my letters a~d memoranda in the form of a narra-
tive. Their deficiency, in many respects, is
frankly acknowledged; and it is hoped that, being
composed under the circumstances of const~nt
fatigue and activity, the Author may meet with
indulgence. On another _point also he has to
claim consideration from his' brother officers.
They know, as well as himself, how impossible it




ADVERTISEMENT. VIl


IS for any individual to render justice to the
meritorious deeds of every division and corps in a
long campaign; to describe all parts of a field of
batt1e; to enter into the various views tbat are
taken; or lastly, to detail the heroism 01' the
several officers in tbe performance of their duties
and exploits. Happily, the task of a eulogist or a
critic belongs to higher powers. The following
sheets have been compiled for other purposes;
1f they stimulate young officers to record the
events ofthe moment as it fiies, and the interesting
scenes they may engage in, for the Ínformation of
parents and friends at a distance, their publication
will accomplish one useful purpose ;and if they
enlivenone leisure hour, in camp or quarters.
of the brother soldiers of tbe author, bis object js
more than gained.


V, L.




MAPS AND PLANS.


Map of Spain and Portugal, showing the seat of war,


lo Jace page l. Vol. l.


The following six plans to be placed at the end of the Ap-


pendix of Correspondence, Vol. 11., preceding tbe 'tables:-


l. Plan of tbe action near Corunna, Jan. 16th, 1809,


Ueutenant-generalSir John Moore, commander-in-chief.


n. Passage of the river Douro, on the 12th May, 1809, by
the British arm~ under tbe command of Lieutenant-general
Sir Artbur Wellesley, K. B. in face of tbe French army, com-


manded by Matsbal Soult.


lB. Plan of the battle of Talavera.


IV. Sketch of part oí the ground about Fuentes and Villa


Formosa, occupied by the amed army on the 5tb and 6th May,


1811.


V. Plan of Badajoz and its environs, invested March 17th,
1812, and carried by storm on the night of April6th, by the


allied army, commanded by General the Earl of Wellington.


VI. Plan of Ciudad Rodrigo, describing its siege by tbe


allied army, 1812, General tbe Earl of Wellington, commander-


in-cbief.




CONTENTS


OF


THE FIRST VOLUME.


CHAPTER l.


The English army previous to 1808-DisinclinatiOIl of the
ministry to commit it.fairly against the armies of }'rance-
Causes which Ied to a change of policy-State of Europe in
consequence of the peace of Tilsit-Abject submission of Spain
to the will of Buonaparte, and ruinous consequences of the
war with England-The war of 1801 between Spain and
Portugal-Terms of peace-Miserable state of the Peninsular
nations-Mad,attempt of Godoy to excite them against France
-Secret treaty of Fontainbleau-Assembly of the corps of
observation of the Gironde-Protest of the French and Spanish
ministers ~t the court of Lisbon-They quit Lisbon Page 1


CHAPtER n.


March of Junot's army arross thc frontier-It arrives at
Salamanca, passes Alcantara, and enters Portugal-Hs suffer-




x CONTENTS.


ings by the way-Alarm of the court of Lisbon-Proposal to
emigrate to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and
Sir Sydney Smith-The court gives its consent, appoints a
regency, and embarks-Junot ~eaches Lisbon-His measures
for the preservation of public tranquillity-His behaviour, at
first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical-The tri-coloured
flag hoisted-The regency abolished-Junot assumes supreme
power--The Portuguese army disbanded, and a heavy fine im-
posed upon the people-General discontent of aH classes-
N umerous broils and arbitrary punishments - The Spanish
troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection- Exertions of Junot
to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against the
English 29


CHAPTER IIl.


Entrance of fresh armies into Spain-Seizure of the frontier
fortresses, and advance of Murat upon Madrid- Consternation
of Charles and Godoy - Preparations for escape to Sonth
America defeated by the mob-Godoy dragged to prison--
Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king-Murat
arrives in tbe capital-Departure of the royal family for Ba-
youne.-Tumult of the 2nd of May-Resig'nation of the rights
of the house of Bourbon-Secret instructions of Ferdinand to
the regency-Measures adopted by Murat to preserve public
tranquillity M


CHAPTER IV.


Gf'nt!ral insurrection ofthe Spanish provinces, and formation
of juntas-The junta of Seville peculiarly vigorous and orderly .
- It assumes the title of Supreme Junta of Spain and the
Indies-Reduction of the French fleet in the harbour of Cadiz
-Expeditions against Seville' and Valencia onder Dupont and




CONTENTS. xi


M{lncey- Actíons at Alcolia and Baylen, and surrender of
Dupont's corps-Moncey repulsed from before Valencia-
Proceedings at Bayonne, and proclamatioll of King Joseph-
He enters Spain-Battle of Medino del Río Seco; and arrival
of Joseph in Madrid-His flight in consequence of Dupont's
capture-An expedition fitted out at Cork sails for the Penin-
sula-Sir Arthur Wellesley arrives -at Corunna, and directs his
course towards Portugal-Proceedings in that country-Mu-
tiny of the Spanish garrison of Oporto-Seizure of General
Quesnel, 'and the standard of independence raised - Junot's
measures to suppress the revolt 80


CHAPTER V.


Arrival of Sir Arthur WelIesley at Oporto-Hisconference
with the junta-The transports assemble off Mondego, and
the troops are landed- Strange conduct of General Freire and
the Portuguese army-Junot t~llleasures to oppose the pro-
gress of the English, and calls in his detachmeIJts-Delaborde
retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley-Battle ofLorip-Arrival
of General Anstruther on the coast-March of the British army
to Vimiero-Sir Harry BlIrrard arrives in the offing-Is visited
by General Wellesley; but refuses to sanction an advance-
The British attacked by Junot's army-Battle of Vimiero 122


CHAPTER VI.


Inactivity of the British army under Sir Harry Burrard-
Arrival of General Kellerman at Vimiero, with proposals--Sir
Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters ¡nto a treaty
with Kellerman-Difficlllties as to the disposal of the Russian
fieet, and preparations for a renewal of hostilities--Arrival of
Sir John Moore's corps--Junot consents that the two Ad-
mirals shall arrange the point at isslIe between themselves-The




XII CON1'EN1'S.


convention of Cintra condemned by lrotb Portuguese and
Spaniards-Almeida and Elvas given up-The Briti!\h troops
enter Lisbon~Joy of the inbabitants-Clltaffa's corps restored
to liberty, and re-arlned-The French army sllils fot France,
and the Russian fleet is cOllveyed to England 146


CHAPTER VII.


Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir Arthnr Wellesley
returns to England on leave-Sir Harry Burrard resigns the
command to Sir John Moore-Preparations for an advance
into Spain-March tbrough Alentejo-Villa Vicosa-March
to Elvas-Elvas, Badajoz-Difference of character between
the Spaniards and Portuguese-Colonel Lopez recei ves de-
spatches from Castanos - Merida - Its antiquities-State of
agriculture in its vicinity 176


CHAPTER VIII.


Advañce wwards Madrid~Rumours of Blake's defeat-
Anival at Nil.val·cárhero~Madrid: the state of public feeling
there-W ant of energy in the Spanish government, exhausted
state of the treasury. aRd miserable plight of the armies-
MoverneIi.t of General Hope's corps upon Salamanca-Fears
lest it should be cut off-Causes of them-Overthrow of the
Spanish armies, commanded by Blake, Belvedere, and Castanos
-A French corps at Valladolid-Skirmish at Amvola-Ru-
mour of General Baird's retreat---Retlections on the conduct
oí the war 194


CHAPTER IX.'


Visit to heád-quartel'S, and interview with Sir John Moore-
A retreat determined upon - General dissatisfaction of the




CONTENTS. XIII


army-The idea of retreatiog abandoned, and orders issued to
advance-Movement upon Tordesillas - Skirrnish at Rueda.
-Sir John Moore resolves to attack 80ult on the Carrion
- The arrny advances for that purpose-Brilliant affair of ca-
valry. at Sahagun-Preparations for a battle suddenly coun-
terrnanded 219


CHAPTER X.


Dissatisfaction of the arrny-Sir John lVloore prepares to re-
treat-The infantry and artillery retire in two columns, covered
by the cavalry-Movements of t11e FreÍlch armies~Affair of
cavalry at Majorga--Sufferings of the troops on their march
-Alarrn at Benevellte, alld brilliant cavalry action-Destruc-
tion of 8tores at Astorga-'V retched plight of Romana 's troops
-Disorganisation of the English army-March from Astorga
to Villa Franca-Serious skirmisb at Villa Franca-Retreat
to Liego, where battle is offered, but declined by the French-
The armies in position three days-Retreat upon Corunna-
The fleet arrives, and the embl,lrkation is begun-Battle of
Corunna, and death ol' Sir .John Moore - The army is
withdra.wn 247


CHAPTER XI.


Consequences of Sir John Moore's campaign-Departure of
Napoleon for Germany-Military condition of Spain and Por-
tugal previous to 1Ihe arrival of ¡¡jir Arthur ""' ellesley-Invasion
0,( Portugal by Soult-He passes the Minho at Orense, defeats
the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey, and enters Chaves
-Oporto carried by assault-Lupisse fails to reduce Ciudad
Rodrigo, and goes to join Victor-Battle of Medelin, and
overthrow of Cuesta's army-Sir John Cradock and Marshal


. Beresford make preparatioDs to oppose Soult - Sir ~O\ rthur




xiv CONTENTS.


Wellesley embarks at 'Portsmouth; reaches Lisbon; is re~
ceived with enthusiasm-He makes arrangements to take the
field 292


CHAPTER XII.


Dispositions of the allied troops-They assemble at Coimbra,


and are reviewed-State of the French army beco mes some-


what changed by the defeat of General Lefevre-Rumours of


a mutiny among the enemy-Sir Arthur Wellesley arranges


his plaus, and the brigades are commanded to move 310


CHAPTER XIII.


The armyadvanees towards tbe _ 1)ouro-A 'D(ifi~ ~\ ~~
enemy attacked and driven from Albergaria N ova-Affair of


Grijon-Passage of the Douro, and defeat of Soult 327


CHAPTER XIV.


Sir Arthur WeUesley foUows the French army-Skirmish


at Salamonde-Soult makes for Orense, and the. pursuit is


abandoned-The allies eountermareh upon Coim,bra, where a


reinforeement of five thousand men reaehes them-Movement


towards the south-Communieations opened with Cuesta.."..His


plans for the eampaign opposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley-


The army beeomes sickly, and is distressed for money and


stores 346


CHAPTER XV.


The British army moves nearer to Victor, and threatens hi:l


flanks-The latter withdraws across the Tagus-Sir Arthur




CONTEN'IS. xv


Wellesley fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia - He visits
Cuesta at Casa del Puerto, and is shown the Spanish army by
torch-light-He returns to his OWIl troops, which are put in
motion, and Victor's posts driven from Talavera across the·
Alberche-Preparations for attacking ~im there, but he effects
his escape-Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur ,,y ellesley with the
conduct of the Spaniards-lIe is compelled, by the ,1lI!gligence
of Cuesta, to remain inactive 371


CHAPTER XVI.


Cuesta fol\ows the Frcnch, who turn upon and drive him back
in confusion--Battle of Talavera - Sutferings of tile British
army after the action, and its consequent retreat towards Por-
tugal 400


CHAPTER XVII.


Defeat of Cuesta's army at the bridge of Arzobispo-Victor
enters Talavera-Sir Robert WilsoJ;l's corps w.orsted at the
Puerto de Banios-Sir Arthur 1Vellesley takes up the line of
the Tagus-=-'Cuesta is superseded, and General Eguia succeeds
to the command of the Spanish army-Distresses of the British
army, and extraordinary conduct of Eguia and the Spanish
government-Sir Arthur Wellesley retires upon the Guadiana
":""General A rrezaga defeated at Ocana, and the Duke del
Parque at Pamarue-Successes of the French in Andalusia-
Fall of Gerona and Astorga-Massena assumes the command
in the Peninsula-The British army moves towards Almeida,
leaving General Hill's corps at Abrantes-Comparative strength
of the opposing armies, and mutual preparatiolls for the cam-
paign


'.
426




xvi CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XVIII.


Low state of the finánces of the British army, and appfeben-


sions entertained by many respecting the issue of the war-


Massena opens the campaign by investing Ciudad Rodrigo-


Skirmishes at the outposts, and retreat of the light division on


Almeida-Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which surrenders-Affair


of cavalry in front of the British outposts-Rumours of the


enemy's intended operations, and dispositions to meet him 458


CHAPTER XIX.


Preparations proceed, and plans are formed-The light di-


vision attackjld at Almeida, and falls back towards Alverca-
General movement of the British army towards the rear~In~
decision of Massena-Difficulties against which Lord 'Velling-


ton is called upon to struggle-Almeida besieged and taken-


The garrison enter the French service-The enemy advance,


and the Britisb army retires towards Busaco 489




NARRATIVE


OF THE


PENINSULAR WAR.


CHAPTER 1.


The English army previous to 1808-DisinclinatiOIl of the
ministry to. commit it fairly against the armies of }'rance-
Causes which led to a change of policy-State of Europe in
consequence of the peace of Tilsit-Abject submission of
Spain to the will of Buonaparte, and ruinous consequences
of the war with England-The war of 1801 between Spain
and Portugal-Terms of peace-Miserable state of the Pe-
ninsular nations-Mad attempt of Godoy to excite them
against France-Secret treaty of Fontainbleau-Assembly
of the corps of observation of. the Gironde-Protest of the
French and Spanish ministers at the court ofLisbon-They
quit Lisbon.


THE memorable struggle in which, during fifteen .
or sixteen years, England had been engaged,
may be said, up to the year 1807, orráther 1808,
to have be en a mere war of defence. Whilst her


VOL. I. A




2 ,NARRATIVE OF THE


fleets swept the seas in each quarter of the globe,
crushing, wherever they came in contact with it,
the naval strength ofthe enemy, her armies either
rested idly upon har own. shotes, or were scattered
in detachments among her colonies, or at best
found themselves from time to time called upon
to bear a part in some petty expedition, the object
of which was usually as unprofitable, as the means
employed for its attainment were insignificant. If
we except the short campaign of Egypt, and the
still shorter though hardly less brilliant affair of
Maida, the entire period, from 1793 down to the
commencement of the Peninsular war, presents us
with no single record of deeds performed, worthy
of the ancient rrÍilitary renown of Great Britain;
for neither the capture of a few islands in the W.€st
Indies, nor the seizure aild súbseqtient abandon-
ttiertt of Tóulon, llor ihe coíitests in Flanders and
at the Texel, nor even the reduction of Copen-
hagen, can with any justice or propriety be referred
to, as adding much to the lasting reputation of this
country.


But though the case \vas so, abd government
appeared aH ihis while unaccountablyanxious to
avoid bringing its l.and forces fairly into contact
with those of France, it was by no means indif ..
ferent either as to tlie numencal strength or to the
internal discipEne and organisation of the atmy.
The threat of ah invasion, followeu up as it was by




PENINSULAR W A R. 3


the assembIy ofn~merou,s bodies oftroops aIong the
French ~oast, infuse<\ \fttq \lIe peopIe of EngIand
a military spirit, ol which, for many generations
hack, they had known nothing; and the minister
of the day was far tooprudent not to turn it to a
right account. Every encourageII1ent was given
to the enrolment of corps of vol~nteers; and these
corps ofvolunteel's. as well as the regiments of mi-
litia, all served as ~o many nurseries fQr the lineo
Men who had Qnc~bQr!W ~rm~, ~ve,n though they
carried them in sport, pegan to feel their objections
to the Jife of a soldier graduaIly abate; and many
an individual who put on a uniform with no other
design than that of protecting the peace of the
country, b~came, before long, a member of the
regular army. The vi<;tory of Trafalgar, likewise,
as it left us !lO epem.ief:¡ with whom ~ C9I!teU(~ at
sea, naturally enough tqme<\ tll~ views of the brave
and the enterprising to the land sel'vice. From
an these causes, recruits, both in officers and men,
presented themselves as rapidly as thlJ; most warlik~
administration could have desired ; insoJlluch, that
on t4e 1st of ,J"aPlJa.ry, ¡SQS, t~fe w~re en~oll~<!
under the British stand~.f(l, of regul~ infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, exclusive offoreign mercena-
ries, little shart of three hundred tllOusand J.ll~ll.


Of the discipline which perva.ded thjs Pf{)q.j-
gious mass, it is not necessary to sa, mnch;
even oul' enemies-those !tt least who were our




4 NAURATlVE OF THE


enemies, and who still entertain towards us a
degree of rancorous jealousy for which no good
cause can be, assigned-allow that the discipline of
the British army was, and is superior to that of
any other army in Europe. Under the wise and
paternal management of the late venerated Com-
mander~in-Chief, acode, stern enough in theory,.
but mild though firm in practice, had been esta-
blished. ~ ·Promotion too, which in former times
had proceeded without any regard whatever to
the fitness of individuals, was rendered as equita-
ole as it ever can be, under a system which adinits
of advancement by purchase. Boys were no
longer permitted to hold commissions, w hilst they
were yet acquiring the first elements of educa-
tion; nor was it any more in the power of the mi-
nister of the day, to reward the favourite who had
proved in any manner useful to himself, by bestow-
ing 'upon him the command of a regimento A re-
gular scale was drawn up, in accordance with
which no man was permitted to hold an ensign's
commission till he had attained the age of sixteen.
Three years' service was requisite to qualify him
for the 'rank of captain, seven years for that of
major. Nor were, other and equalIy important
matters left in the condition in which they once
stood. In former times, each colonel or command-
ing officer of a regiment was in the habit of ma-
nreuvring his corps in any way or upon any plan




PENINSULAR WAR. 5


which to himself inight appear most convenient.
The consequence was, that in the British army
there were almost as many systems of fieId move·
ment as there were regiments of cavalry and infan-
try; and, that hardly any two could, when called
upon to act together, act to any purpose. This
disadvantageous mode of proceeding was abolished.
Oneuniform and consistent system was drawn up
for the infantry; another for the cavalry; and aH
regiments were expected to. render themselves
perfect in these, before they attempted to learn
any thing besides. Such changes, together with
the establishment of hospitals for the wounded and
disabled soldiers, and for the education of children
whose parents had fallen in the defence of their
country, cou1d not fail of producing the most be-
neficialeffect upon the morale of the British army ;
which, from being an object of something Iike
abhorrence to ¡ts own countrymen, and of con-
tempt to the troops of other nations, rose to com-
mand, as well as to deserve, the esteem of the
former, and the respect and aclmiration of the
Iatter.


There were, however, one or two considerations,
which, notwithstanding these acknowledged im-
.provements, longcontinued to keep alive a disincli-
nation on the part of the ministry, to commit the
British army on the great freId of continental
warfare. In the frrst place it was doubtcd whe-




6 N ARRATIVE OF THE


ther, among out own generaIs, !líeré could be
found any, capable of opposing the experienced
and skilful warriors of France. We had never
been accustomed to carry on war upona large
scal~ except in India; and in India, it was be-
lieved that, for the successful conduct ofa .cam-
.paign, talents of the first order "\Vere hardly
'required. In the next place, itwas not'considered
either prudtmt or just topus'h a handful of British
troops into theheart of Europe; where, at a dis-
tance from the sea, and cut off from an communi-
eation with their own country, they might be com-
promised at, any moment, either through the im-
'becility or treachery of OUl' aUy. EngIand, it was
imagined, ought not to take part in a continental
war, unless she could do so on somepoint not very
remote fromher, own shores, and covered by an
extensive line of coast; because, in spite of the
magnitude of her army in the mass, she could
never, it was asserted, pretend to bring more
than thirty or fotty thousand men into the field.
These considerations, it ishardly necessary to add,
prevented a British army from appearing in lthe
neld at Austerlitz and Jena,or taking ashare in
any of the 'previous armaments which from time
-to time rendered' Germany ,the theatre of war.
'Butthelatter objection to the employment-of our
own troops, 'the mad ambition of:theFrallch ruler
at length removed; whilst it only requiredthe ex~




PENINSULAR WAR. ¡


perience of ·~single c~paign \0 demonstrate, that
in the for~er th~r~ had never ,been any solid
grounds oI c~~>son.


By the treaty of rilsit, N apoleon BUOllfl,parte
was left ma~:1;er of the cOl~tinent of Ellrope; tp,e
greater part being actually in \lis possession, :;lnd
the rest entirely lInder his controL Over t4e Ger-
manic body he exercised an ~ut,hprity mqre l."eal
and mOre absolute' tha.n JIad ev;~r been. e~eI:Ciliied
by ihe tnqstpo~eI~l of ~W ~~l'Qts. ',Switzer-
l~d sub~tted to call him h~r prQtector, obeyed
his edicts, andfil1ed up his ranks with meno
Holding France, Flanders, and Italy forhimself,
l1e had placed one brother upqn the throne ofNa-
pIes, another upon t}:lat of Holla)1d, whilst Jor a
third a kingdoOl waserected in theheart of
Germ:,¡;ny, withterritories ~aken indis,crimin,ately
froID frien,d and (oe. Joa~mMurat,the hus-
band of his sister, possessed a principality, with
the title of Grand Duke of Berg; Eugene Beall-
harnois, his wife's son, was, married to a princess
of the b,o,l,lse ,OfJ3,avaria, ~nd governed I,taly as his
vicer.oy ; ,;Whil~~ .. l+e :wasprepare,d, upon ~he 1;lext
vacancy, to place ~~uncle, 9f!-rWllal ~~sche, upon
t,he papal tbrone. N ot s~t~sfied with thus enrich-
ing and loading with honours the mewbers of .his
.own faroily, ~e ¡port,ioned out. ClIlloug hi~ marshals
and compa1).ions. in arUlS, ,kiJlgdQms and princi-
palities w~rn by the sword; and D.ukes Qf Istria,




8 NARRATIVE OF THE


and Dalmatia, and Ragusa, and Dantzic, were
numbered among the new nobility of France. His
own reputation moreover, political as well as mili-
tary, had risen to a height quite unprecedented;
for it is not going too far to affirm that the whole
civilised world, dazzled by the splendour of his
achievements, lay, with the solitary exception of
Great Britain, at his feet.


An empire acquired as had be en that of Napo-
leon, can nevereven for a moment be said to rest
upon asure foundation. ' One error in poIitics,
one failure in war, may suddenly excite a storm
which all the vigour of its chief will not be able to
surmount; and of this trúth the Emperor of the
French was doomed to furnish a memorable exam-
pIe. N ór will it readily cease to afford matter of
astonishment tó the reflecting mind, that thefirst
and most decisive blow to his power, should have
come froID a quarter where, aboye all others, he
believed himself, and had just ground to believe
himself, the most secure.


When the sovereigns of Europe deemed it
expedient to arm for the purpose of opposing the
progre ss Df the French Revolution, the courts both
of Madrid and Lisbon entered, with apparent cor-
diality, into the general league. Spain sent an
army across the Pyrenees, to which a few batta-
lions of Portuguese attached themselves; whilst
Portugal despatched nine sail of the line to follow




PENINSULAR WAIl. 9


the fortunes of the British Heet. The war in the
south of France was not conducted either with
skill or vigour. For a time indeed, that is to say,
as long as the Directory found· itself too busy to
pay much attention to the state of affairs in that
quarter, the allies obtained a few successes, but
they in no instance followed them up with the
slightest intrepidity; and they had hardly been
opposed by moderate forces, when the ti de of for-
tune turned against them. They not only lost
the little ground which they had gained, but
their be aten coJumns were pursued across the
frontier; Catalonia was overrun, and Madrid itself
threatened. An imbecile prince, and no less im;.
becile fa~ourite, alarmed by the progress which the
victorious republicans were making, hastened to
put an end to a disastrous war, by a disgraceful
peace. lt was concluded in 1795, by the treaty
of Basle, which, at the distance of ayear after,
was succeeded by a league offensive and defen,..
-sive, entered into at St. Ildefonso. .


From that moment Spain became, in point of
faet, nothing more than a mere appendage to
France. The family compaet, as it was nowab-
surdly termed, having been renewed with the
Directory, it was not to be expected that it would
cease to operate when the democratical form of
government gave place to the imperial; or that the
Emperor of the Freneh would be les s ready to avail




10 NARRATlVE QF THE


himsélf of it. !han had been the rulen; of the re-
publico .Al ~he i~tigation oC Buonaparte, Spain
declared war against England; am;l acontest be-
g!ln" which could hardly fail of bringing upon her
tM ~aviest disasters. During ita progtess, her
marine, which Charles III had taken .the utmost
care to fOlSt~r, was destroyed; her coU!merce re·
ceived a ~tQ.l blow; the iI?-tercourse with her Souta
AD;lerican <!pIonies was interrupted, and the way
"paved fOl' ibat ijepa,rati()fi whi~b. h1'U! since occur-
.red; her finan~.s bec.ame every day morea1;ld more
embarrassed; and public credit sank to the Iowest
ebb. HerarJUY, likewise, w~s drafted away to
1ight the b&,ttl#s of her 1wd.ly ally in the most
distant partsofEurope; and she was left in a
situation as helpless and pitiable as has eN'er
heen filled by a nation.


ltis hardly necesaary:to state that, at this
period, and forsome time previous, Spain was
governed by an individual on whose head fortune
appeared t~ ha~e taken delight in :showering the
rich{\~t of her favours. Manuel Godoy,aman
.4.oosc,"re bir$, who or.ig~nally~Ued no higher
.station th~n tbat qf~ pr·iv:ate in the royal body-
guards, having attracted the notice of the Queen,
,was by her influence raiaed to th~highest dignities
in the state ;andcaIlle at last to possess an au:-
thority more <;lecid~d-:j¡\lan thatofthe weak master
whom he professed to serve. Godoy was, at the




PENINSULAR WAR. 11


breaking out of the French Revolution4 commallder-
ill-chief of the armies, and lord high admiral
of the Heets of Spain; and at the close of 1792,
he was appointed to the important 0ffice which
Florida Blanca had filIed under Charles 111, that
of President of the Councils. He it was, who,
after conducting the war with so little abrlity,
accepted peace, upon terms which laid Spain at
the feet of her neighbour; and he received, as the
reward of his 'sernces on that OCcasiÓlll, the title
of Prince of thePeace. Godoy appears to have
been a strange compound of weakness with genius,
and of numerous vices, with a few virtues. That he
willingly and knowingly betrayed his country, there
is no reason for supposing; but like all upstarts,
he considered thegeneral good as a matter to
be postponed on every occasion.to .his private be-
nefit; and heun-questionably broughtabout the
downfall of the Spanish monarchy in the vain
attempt to uphold his own power. Godoy was
not disposed to favour the 'Prench, for heboth
feared and hated their ruler; but, like ,his sove-
,reign,he fearedthatextraordinary man more than
he hatedhim, and .therefore sttbmitted to receive
his yoke. When the peace of Amiens was broken,
N apoleon, in virtue of the treaty of Sto Ildefonso,
called upon Spain to join ;11im with herlleets and
armies; hut Godoy was desirous of ,evading the
request; and he even succeeded, for a short time,




12 NARRATIVE OF THE


in purchasing an insecure neutrality, by the pay-
ment of forty. thousand pounds per month into
the imperial treasury. At last, however, Spain
was hurried into the war, which brought so many
.and sueh severe calamities upon her; from the
effects of which she has not yet recovered, and
probably never will recover.


Whilst Spain was thus acting the part of a
province of Franee, Portugal, faithful to the terms
of her aneient allianee with England, eontinued to
maintain a hostile attitude towards the eommon
.enemy. N ot that she aeted thus either willingly
or eonfidentIy. DepFived by the treaty of St.
Ildefonso of a barrier against French invasion, upon
which she had been accustomed to count, Portu-
gal could .not but feel that, in striving, even with
the aid of England, to assert her independence,
she was attempting that which neither the con-
dition of her defences, nor the numerical strength
of her population, authorised her to attempt. But
she was well aware that no peace would be granted
to her on any other terms besides the shutting of
her ports against English vessels; and she felt
that a rupture with England must speedily reduce
her to the lowest extremities of distress. Under


. these circumstances, the eourt of Lisbon issued
orders for the enrolment of large bodies oftroops.
The arsenals were filled with warlike instru-
ments; the forts and towns on the frontier were




PENINSULAR WAlto 13


put in a state of repair; and the Qrdinances, or
levies en masse, received instructions to repair,
each company to its accustomed place of rendez.;.
vous, on the first alarm of an enemy.


It is not necessary to detail at length the parti-
culars of the war which ensued. For a time no
event occurred of greater importance than the
occasional capture of a Portuguese merchant-man
by one of the French privateers, which, in great
numbers, found shelter in· the ports of Spain.
An invasion was indeed threatened; Buonaparte,
when in Egypt, declared to his troops, that .. a
time would come, when the Portuguese nation
should pay with tears ofblood for the insult which
it had offered to the republic," by despatching a
squadron to act in conjunction with· the British
fleet in the Mediterranean. But the continental


. ,var which broke out in 1799, delayed the execution
ofthat threat; nor was it till1801, that any serious
movements were made for carrying it into effect.
Then, however, the fate of Germany being de~
cided, and peace dictated to the rest of Europe,
the FirstConsul began seriously to turn his atten-
tion towards the accomplishment ofhis prophecy;
under the persuasion that, in detaching Portugal
from England, he would be striking· a blow at
the power of the latter empire, in what he was
pleased to term the most accessible part of her
~dominions.




14 NARRATIVE OF THE


A convéntion was, accordingly entered into at
Madrid, between the French republic and his
Catholic Majesty,. which had for its object the
forcible deliverance of Portugal froro the alliance of
EngIand. It was foUoweds 00 the 27th of Fe-
bruary, by a declar,ation of war by Spain, for
the prosecution of which her troops were already
in motion; whilst a Freneh corps of fifteen thou-
sand men pa.ssed tbe Pyrenees, and took up its
quarters in tha vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, for
the purpose of supporting the Spanish army, to
which the task of invading Portugal was assigned.


To oppose this attack, tbe Duk.e de Lafoes,
prime minister of Portugal, oceupied both sides
of theTagus with a eorps of thirty thousand meno
They were miserably armed, wretchedly equipped,
and neithet· paid nor fed; and the only British
force at hand to support tbem, eonsisted of a bri- -
gade of foreign regiments, a detachment of the 20th
light dragoons, and a few can non, under General
Fraser. The campaign was, as might be ex-
pected, unfavourable to the Portuguese, tbough by
neither side was much aetivity or talent displayed ;
and before the middle of J une, peace was signed
between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz. But
.with the terms of that peace, though they in-
cIuded the shutting of the Portuguese ports against
all intercourse with England, the First Consul
was not satisfied; nor was it till the 29th ()f the




PENINSULAR WAR. 15


following, Septembet that the court of Lisbon
succeeded in obtaininghis approbation. of the
treaty. To secure this, Portugal was content to
pay one million sterling to the French govern-
ment; besides consenting to other arrangemen.ts,
both commereial and territorial, all of them in the
highestdegree prejudieial to her own interests.


The peace of Amiens suspended for a while
the operation of that article in tha treaty which
closed tha pom of Lisbon ,and oporto against
English merchandise, and the old commercial
intercourse between the two nations was re-
newed; but the rupture, whieh so soon followed,
again placed Portugal in a diffieult situation.
At fil'st, Buonaparte insisted upon the necessity
of reeurring to the prohibitory system, and ap-
peared bent upon allowing no modification of ¡ts
operations; but a variety of considerations Ied him
at last to change his tone. The war in which
Spain by his dictation had engaged, unavoidably
produced an interruption in the arrival of those
treasures from South Ameriea whieh he fOUlld so
useful to himself in the prosecution of his schemes
of eonquest: it was necessary thatsome harbour
should be left open for their reeeption. On this
aceount, and on condition of securing,. during the
continuanee of the maritime war, a monthly tri-
bute of forty or fifty thousand pounds, Buonaparte
consented that Portu al should continue to main-




16 NARRATIVE OF THE


tain a íriendly intercourse with Great Britain; and
she became, in consequence, the only neutral state
in the south of Europe.


In this condition both Spain and Portugal re-
mained, from 1803 up to 1807; the one suffering
a1l the misery attendant upon a compuIsory alliance
with a power which exhausted her revenues, and
ruined her commerce; the other writhing under
too pain of aheavy contribution, and exposed every
day to fresh vexations, which she possessed not the
means oí resisting. N or were the internal affairs
of either kingdom in a more prosperous state than
their external connexions. In Spain, the nobility
were suilk to the lowest pitch of degradation; the
clergy, avaricious and domineering, ruled the peo-
pIe with a rod of iron; and the King, was not
ashamed to appear as a tool' in the hands oí the
very man, who, to an appearance, was living in a
state of adultery with his wife. Every depart-
ment of the state was mismanaged. The towns,
deserted by their inhabitants, presented a melan-
cboIy picture of what a nation must come to,
whose rulers are possessed' neither of energy of
mind nor honesty of character ; and the very fields
were in many place s left uncultivated, for want
of sufficient hands to till tbem. In like manner,
the Spanish army, which, under the Emperors
Charles V and Philip, had been the admiration
of Europe, was nowa thing of no name,--a very




· PENINSULAR WAR. 17


by-word of derision and contempt to the troops of
other nations. The few soldiers that remained in
the country were without ray, 01' clothing, or even
arms; tlle officers, taken from the lowest dasses,
were not ashamed to wait, as servants, in their
uniforms, behind the chairs of the grandees. AH
the arsenal s were empty. There were not provi-
sions or stores of any kind, in any of the fortresses,
s~fficient for a month' s consumption of the wretched:
garrisons which held them; and the very foun-
dries had ceased to work, except at remote inter-
vals.


Yet wasthe spirit of Spain far from beingwholly
broken. Driven from the higher and prouder
circles, it took refuge among the peasantry; nor
would it be easy to point out, in any quarter ofthe
world, a nobler or finer race of men than those
who cultivated the vine on the banks of the Ebro, .
or led their long lines of mules from one q uarter oí
the kingdom to another. These men had partaken
in no degree of the degeneracy of their superiors.
The memory of their country's former greatness
was kept alive in them by those traditionary bal ..
lads whichSpaniards, more tha~ the inhabitants
of any othe1' European state, delight in repeating;
and they never failed to contrast it with the humi-
liating attitude which the imbecility of their pre-
sent g'overnment condemned them to aSSllme. Had
there been in Charles sufficient firmness to desire ~


VOL. I. BiÍ;." ji!' '
:J, .




]8 NARRATIVE OF THE


an emancipation from foreign thraldom, he might
have foused, in one day, the whole male popula-
tion of Spain abouthim. But there was no- such
fj.rmness in that weak monareh. The dupe of
Godoy on the one hand, and of his own fears on
the other, he eontinued to hug the chain which
bound him, as long as i1 was possible so to do;
nor, when that ehain was burst at last, did the
sDlallest credit attach either to him or to his
worthless minis"ter.


In Portugal, the sarue, or nearly the same,order
of things prevailed. The Regent, a weak and-su-
perstitious prinee, was not, indeed, like his father-
in-Iaw, under the influenee of a favourite minister,
but he was as eompletely theslave of his eon-
fessor, as, Charles was the slave of Godoy. As
long as it was permitted him to attend religious
processions; as long as the ehurch seemed to
flourish in its primitive grandeur; he cared not
how other departments of his kingdom were guid-
ed, or in what plight his people dragged on exis-
tenee. N or were the nobles who surro~nded him
more patriotie or more respectable than those who
surrounded the tbrone oí Spain. In Portugal, as
in tbe neigbbouring country, all tbat bad ever be en
admirable in the mitional character could be found
only among the peasantry; who, in spite of the
corrupting influence oftheir superiors, eontinued to
the last a high.;.spirited, brave, and obedient race.




PENINSULAR \VAR. 19


It has been said that Godoy cannot with truth
be aecused of submitting wilfully and knowingly
to the yoke which France had placed upon the
neck of his country. Like the ;roass of the people,
he writhed painfully under ii; and as it afterwards
appeared, nothing but an overwhe1ming dread of
the consequences had deterred him from making a
vigorous attempt to cast it off. At last, however,
the general feeling on that subject became so
strong, that he determined to do something for the
purpOse of indulging it. The plan which he de-
vised, and the method which he pursued in matur-
ing it, are already well knownto the public; but
since to these the whole series of events which
followed may be traced back, as to their immediate
canses, it may not be amiss to offer here a brief
recapitulation of the .leading circumstances which
attended them.


The overthrow of tbe Bourbon dynasty in N a-
pIes. had sensibly alarmed the court of Madrid;
and the prospect of that rupture with Prussia
which ended in the peace of Tilsit, struck Godoy
as fumishing a favourable opportunity of stil'ring up
all Eurape against aman· whose ambition seemed
to be without bounds. A secret alTangement was
accotdingly entered into between him and the
ambassador Strogonoff, into which the Portuguese
Envoy was admitted, that the two kingdoms of
Spain and Portugal should iustantly arm, for the




20 NARRA'l'IVE OF THE


purpose of attacking France at a moment when
her troops should be called away to oppose the
;Emperor of Russia in the n01'th. These prepara-
tions were to begin in Portugal; with the ostensi-
ble view of overawing which, Spain was next to
increase her armies; whilst expeditions being
fitted out in the English ports, a combined force
was to invade the south of Franee, which, it was
pelieved, would not be in a fit state to offer any
efficient opposition. ~uch were the plans of Go-
doy, in proposing which so much secreey wa~
preserved, that no other agent of the government
either at home or abroad was made aequainted
with what was pending; but they were destined
neyer to be carried into effect. Before a single
step had been taken either in Spain or Portugal;
before any direct c()mmunication had been opened
with England, there suddenly appearad a procla-
mation of the Prince of the Peace, ealling upon all
good Spaniards to arm, and to assist in delivering
their eountry froro the perils whieh roenaeed it.
This proc1amation was given to the world at a time
when Buonaparte was absent on the Prussian
campaign ;and its tenor was sueh as no person
could possibly misunderstand. 1t produced a very
powerful effect; but the effect was directly the
reverse in kind from that which it was intended to
produce.


Baron Strogonoff and the Portuguese Ambassa-




PENINSULAR WAR. 21


dor, equally startled at the great imprudence of
the step which had been taken, lost no time in
disavowing all participation in a· project which
they now equally pretended to condemn~ So
fearful, indeed, was the court of Lisbon of being
supposed to be a partner in the conspiracy, that it
compelled Ear! Sto Vincent to withdraw, with his
fleet, from the Tagus. Godoy instaritly . saw the
folly of the act into which his natural precipitanéy
had hurried him. He hastened. to bifer snch ex'"
planations to tbe French Ambassador as he judged
most likely to aIlay the anger of N apoleon~ and he
instructed his private agent, Don Eugenio Izquier-
do, to make the most abject submissions in his
name to N apoleon in persono Paragraphs like-
wise appeared in the Madrid newspapers, sorne of
tbem ascribing late events to an apprehensiOll of
an invasionby .the Emperor~of Moroe~o; :otbers
oifering rewards for thedetection of the miscreant
who had forged a circular letter to the intendants
of provinces in the name of the Prince of the
Peace; whilst the motives of the proclamation, of
which tbe authenticity could notbe denied, .were
industriously pronounced to be a sense of duty
towards Franee, and an over-anxiety to oppose the
projects of England. .


Buonaparte received the documents aboye al-
luded to subsequent to the battle of Jena;· and he
read in the palace of the King of Prussia a corres-




22 NARRATIVE OF THEo


pondence which placed the íntended revoltofSpain
beyond a doubt. He vowed at the moment to
take revenge, but it suited his policy to utter the
vow in secret; and he affected to have cordially
forgiven the fauIt Ínto which his aliy, the King of
Spain, had been drawn. Itis now, however, per-
fectIy ascertained that this disclosure of the feel;;.
ings of the Peninsular nations towards him, opened
his eyes fully to the danger to which his power
must always be exposed whilst these nations con-
tinued to be governed by their present royal fami-
lies. He determined, on the instant, that ihe
houses both of Bourbon and Braganza should
cease to reign, and that their places should be
supplied by those upon whose subserviency to his
own views and wishes he IDight have better reason
to dependo


Had Buonaparte, al!! 800n as the designs ofSpain
became known to him, directed his viCtorious ]e~
gíons upon Madrid, the dethronement of Charles
would have been viewed by the rest of Europe as
an arrangement dictated by self-defence; whilst it
is not improbable that the war never would have
assumed the character whicl1 his future proceed-
ings gave to it. But it was not in the nature of
the Freneh Emperor to aet, in any case, either
with openness {)f candour. Though a passionate
lover of war, he never effected that by force of
arms, which he bélieved it practicable to effect by




PENINSULAR W AR. 23


diplomacy; and the principIe which guided him
in other cases failed not to operate heteo There
were, however, other reasons for the system which
he pursued, and these deserve to. be recorded.


There are few states in which the favourite of
the reigning monarch becomes not, sooner or later,
an object of hatred to the heir apparent, and, as a
necessary consequence, to aU who are disposed to
worship the risingwn rather than the sun in its
meridian. This was peculiarl y the case at· the
court of Madrid. Godoy was, and had long been,
at variance with Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias;
and so bitter was the feeling of animosity which
subsisted between them, that the bare adoption by
Godoy of one line of policy, was sufficient to guide
Ferdinand to the adoption of its opposite. As
soon, therefore, as GOdoy'lil hostility to the French
hecame known, Ferdinand made hMte toO declare
himself a suppórter of the French interests. He
even went so far as to address a private letter to
N apoleon, in which he entreated him to deliver his
father and mother from the influence of an artful
favourite; to free Spain from the thraldom of an
upstart; and to honour himselfby granting him an
allianee with a princess of the imperial blood.
Whether Buonaparte e\'er entertailled ally serious
intention of complyillg with these requests, it wei'e
diffieult to determine; but this much is known,
that he answered Ferdinand's letter kindly, and




24 N ARRATfVB OF ,'fHE


that he readily consented to become the arbiter in
the disputes which divided the royal family of
Spain. -Howhis arbitration was conducted, Spain
and Europe will not soon cease to remember.


In the mean while however, under the pretext
of standing in need of their services, Buonaparte
required that a corps of sixteen thousand Spa-
niards under Romana should proceed to join his
armies on the shores of the Baltic. To these were
added a division of six thousand men, which, with
General O'Farrel at their head, had previously
served in Tus~any; and thus almost all the regu-
lar troops on which the government could depend,
wereremoved to so great a distance from Spain as
to be perfectIy useless. But N apoleon's duplicity
ended not here. At the very moment when he
was giving Ferdinand assurances of his regard and
protectiQn, he induced the weak Charles to heap
upon Godoy án additional10ad of favours, till both
the king and his favourite beca me intoxicated, the
one with joy, the other with vanity. By this
means,by appearing to each party inc1ined to
countenance it in its projectsand wishes, he not only
kept alive, but widened the breach which already
existed withinthe court of Madrid, and put mat-
ters in a train for that issue which, in all probabi-
lit y , he had already determined to bring about.


Thepeace of Tilsit having restored him victori-
ous to his capital, Buonaparte began to make im-




PENINSULAR W AR. 25
mediate preparations to support a war of diplomacy
by one of vi?lence. Withoutany reasonable ex-
cuse having been assigned for the measure, a rorps


·of twenty-fh·e thousand infantry and three 1ho\.\-
sand cavalry was seen to asseroble in the month
of August, 1807, at the base of the Pyrenees,
which assumed the somewhat enigmatical appel-
lation of the Corps of Observa:tion of the Gironde.
Whilst this force was organising itself under th~
directions of Marshal Junot, the Spanish roinister
at Paris was entering into a secret treaty; tlle
object of wllicll was nothing less than tlle erasure
of Portugal froro the list of nations. By the terms
of that tre.aty, since become illustrious as the "se-
cret treaty of Fontainbleau," it was agreed tllat
J unot's army should enter Portugal at once, aided
by three divisions of Spanish troops; that a se-
cond army, of forty thousand French soldiers,
should assemble in Gascony, ready to support the
first, should it meet with any serious opposition;
and that Portugal, being subdued, should be di-
. vided into tllree parts, of wllicll the following dis-
tribution was to be made. The province of Entre
Minho e Douro, with :the city of Oporto as its
capital, was to be erected into a kingdom, under
tlle title of N orthern Lusitania, and· given to the
King of Etruria, in exchange for his Italian pos.;...
sessions, which he ceded iIi full and entire sove:-
reignty to Buonaparte. In like manner, Alentejq




26 NARRATIVE OE' THE


and Algarve were to be given to Godoy, who was to
assume the style and title of Prince of the Algarves;
and the remaining Portuguese provinces wer~ to
be held by Napoleon himself, till a general pacifica-
tion should enable him to restore them to the house
of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad,
and the other Spanish colonies which the English
had conquered. These three sovereignties were,
however, to be held by investiture from the King
of Spain; and their princes were to owe to him
the same sort of obedience which, in the feudal
times, the holder of a fief owed to his sovereign
lord. The colonial possessions of Portugal, again,
were to be equally divided between the crowns of
Franee and Spain; and the Emperor of the French
was, as soon as it should be convenient, to acknow-
ledge his Catholic Majesty as emperor of the two
Americas.


Though nothing officially transpired indicative
of the object which the army of observation was
intended to effect, Europe was not so short-sighted
as to remain for one instant in doubt as to the ulti-
mate field of its operations. In the ftrst place, the
officer who wasplaced atits head had long filled,
and still continued in name at least to fill, the sta-
tion of ambassador·at the court of Lisbon from the
imperial cabinet. It is true that, on the opening
of the Austrian campaign, Junot had quitted the
seat of his diplomatic c;luties, that he might exe-




PENINSULAR WAlt. 27


cute the more congenial offices whicn devolved
upon him as aide-de-camp to tbe Emperor; but
he had done so by tbe express permission of his
master; and instead of his place being supplied by
anotber commissioned representative, the business
of the miss ion was intrusted, as in the case of
other temporary absences of tbe principal, to the
chief secretary, M. de Rayneval. This circum-
stance was of itself sufficient to create a suspicion
that something prejudicial to the interests of Por-
tugal was'intended; and if tbere were any who at
first appeared wiIling to doubt on tbe subJect,
their doubts were not permitted long to existo
The treaty of Fontainbleau was hardly. signed,
when the ministers, both of France and Spain,
presented a strong remonstrance to the Prince
Regent, requiring that the Berlín and Milan de-
crees should be strictly enforced at every harbour
of Portugal; and it was further required, on threat
of the immediate commencement of hostilities,
that all the British subjects then resident in the
kingdom sbould be seízed, and all tbe British pro-
,perty connscated.


Tbe conduct of theRegent of Portugal under
circumstances so trying, was not very different
from that which might ha ve been expected at bis
hands. He dared not refuse obedience to the first
mandate, and he remonstrated against the second
only in the mildest and most submissive terms.




28 N ARRA TIVE OF. THE


But tbe powers with whom he had to deal enter-
tainedno wish.that he should pay to tbeir relJlon-
stranees a. prompt attention; they were pleased,
rather tban the reverse, at every appearance of
~issatisfaction wbich he happened toexhibit. Find-
ing that "his sense of religion, and. the regard
which he had for existing treaties," would not per-
mit bim at once to commit so flagrant an act of
jnjUs~ice, the French and Spanish ministers de-
manded theirpasspofts; and before either these
could be given, or the unhappy Prince was ena-
bled to appeal through his own ambassadors to the
generosity of his neighbours, the troops destined
to overrun Portugal were .in motion.




PENINSULAR WAR. 29


CHAPTÉR Il.


March of Junot's armyacross the frontier~i:t p.rriveil at Sala~
tnanca,passes Alcantara, ana enters Portugal-Itssufferings
by the way-Alarm of the court of Lisbon-,-Proposal toeúlÍ~
grata to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and
Sir Sydney Smith-The court gives its consent, appoints a
regency, and emharks-Junot reaches Lisbon-His measures
for the preservation of puhlic tranquillity-Hishehaviour, at
first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical-The tri.coloured
flag hoisted-The regeney abolished-Junot assumes su-
preme power--The Portuguese army disbatíded, and a heavy
fine imposed upon the people-General diseontent of aH
c1asses-Numerous broils and arbitrary punishments-The
Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection~Exertions
of Junot to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against
the English.


THE treaty of Fontainbleau was not yet signed¡
when on the 17th of October, 1807, Junot received
orders to put his troops in motion within twenty-
four hours. At daybreak on the 18th the first
division of the ármy of observation of the Gironde
crossed the Bidassoa; it was followed on the 19th




30 NARRATIV.E OF THE


by the second; and the whole army, marching in
six columns, each at the interval of one day from
that whicn had preceded it, entered Spain. About
the same time, three corps of Spanish troops be-
gan to take the road towards Portugal, by diffe-
rent routes. One of these, which was appointed
to act under the immediate orders of the French
Marshal, was directed to assemble at Alcantara,
on the Tagus. . It consisted of eight battalions of
infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, one troop of
horse artillery, and two companies of sappers and
miners; and it was commanded by Don Juan Ca-
raffa, captain-general of the province of Estrema-
dura. Another, destined to act by itself, for the
occupation of N orthern Lusitania, mustered four-
teen battalions, six squadrons, and one company
offoot artillery, and was placed under the direc-
tion of Don FranciBcu TaTanco y Plano, captain-
general of Gallicia: its point of rendezvous was
Tuy, on the borders of Minho. A third, at the
head of which was Don Francisco Solano, marquis
del Socorro, and captain-general of Andalusia,
was composed of eight battalions, five squadrons,
ahd a troop oí hone artillery,and received instruc-
tions to collect in the vicinity of Badajoz. In
order to complete these corpa, it is scarcely neces-
S3Ty to !ltate that everydis:posable soIdier in the
Spanisb army was put in requisition; thateven
the King's body-guard furnished its quota; and




PENINSULAR W AR. 31


that in the capital itself there remained, after their
departure, a garrison made up of skeletons only,
and the depots of regiments.


The French army was every where received,
during its progress through Spain, with the utmost
cordiality; it was supported at the expenseof the
government, and it reached Salamanca, where the
General expected to winter, before the middle of
November. But the last division had not come in
when a courier arrived at head-quarters, bringing
the most urgent amI imperative directions that
no halt should be made between the Bidassoa and
Lisbon. Junot had accordingly no alternative sub-
mitted to him. Without having had time to make
the slightest preparation forsuch a march, he set
forward in the dead of winter, to pursue a route
along which no depots of provisions or stores of
any kind were established; where it was at least
doubtful whether he would not meet with a formi-
dable opposition from a peasantry brave to a pro-
verb, and proverbially jéalous of the appearance of
foreigners among them; and where, at aU events,
he was quite sure of having the serious obstacles
to overcome, which a mountainous district, lntel'-
sected in every direction by rapid rivers and moun-
tain streams, would not fail to throw in his way.
The apprehension, however, that an English army
migh.t arrive at Lisbon before him, was quite suf-
ficient to make aH these' difficulties appear light.




32 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


He pushed on, and with the leading brigade of his
army, reached Alcantara on the 15th.


In this place he found General Caraffa with his
corps of Spaniards; but there was a woful scarcity
of means by which to recrui t the vigour of his own
battalions, worn out by long marches through a
difficult country, and in tremendous weather. It
was with the utrnost difficulty that the French
sóldiers could be supplied, each with rations for
twó days. Still the Ernperor's orders rnust be
obeyed; and on the 19th; after having circulated
proclarnations in which the Portuguese were 'as-
sured of protection froni insult in the event of their
reinaining <i uiet, and threatened with the rnost
terrible puníshmerit if they should in any way irn-
pede the progress of ttoops which carne only to
deliver them froro the yoke of England., the allied
arroies were mice niore put in motion.


It is not necessary tó follow the movel.llents of
Junot's corps very minutely. It is sufficient to
observe that, though the peasantry in general
either rested peaceably in their cottages, 01' at the
most fied toO the mountains and left their hornes
desolate,"thé routa of the invaders rnight be traced,
by gard.ens devastated, houses ruined, and whole
villages burned to' the ground. Notwithstanding
this was the case, and though not á. gun was fired
from the day whén the head of the first French
colurnn passed the front¡er, till the ar1'ival of its




PENINSULAR WAlto 33


rear-guard in Lisbon, the march was far from
being a tour of pleasure to those who performed it.
The seasonchanced to be particularly stormy and
inclemenL The rain feH in torrents, cutting up
the indistinct paths which traversed the moun-
tains, and swelling into formidable rivers, streams
whichmight usually be crossed without apprehen-
sion, either by man or beast. The reader is doubt-
less aware that the road, if such it deserves to be
termed, which leads from Alcantara to Lisbon, by
way of Castello Brarico and Abrantes, passes over
the summits of a ridge of rocks, and through a
coulltry as desert and unfruitful as any which tl}e
European traveller is in the habit of visiting. 1 t
was by this track that J unot thought fit to pro-
ceed; and the fatigue and privations which his
troops were in consequence condemned to endure,
are represented to have been more terrible than
generaIly fall to thelot of a retreating army. As
a matter of course, neither wintry torrents nor per-
manent rivers were, in that wild district, supplied
with bridges; the soldiers were consequently ob-
liged to cross as they best could, whenever such
obstacles carne in their' way; 'and such was the
rapidity of the streams in many places, that whole
companies of men, and whole troops oí horses,
were swept away and destroyed.A march throúgh
defiles like these could not long- be conducted
with order or regularity.· The artillery was soon


VOL. J. e




34 NARHATIVE Ol>' TIIE


left behind; of the cava1ry, only the best mounted
were enabled to keep up; and even the infantry
lost its ranks, and straggled, for many miles, over
the face of the country. Long before the towers
of Abrantes rose upon their view, the French co-
lumns may . be said to have dissolved themselves ;
for there were not aboye five thousand men who
followed the General that were in any condition,
either from bodily strength or local situation, to
oppose an enemy.


But though fully aware of this, and of the risk
which he'ran by disregarding it, Junot feltthat
other and still stronger reasons forbade his paus-
ing, even though a pause of a few days might bring
back to their standards the thousands whom wea-
riness and famine had left by the wayside. At
Abrantes, intelligence reached him of the line of
conduet which thePortuguese government was
preparing to pursue; and it was with him an
object of the first importance to reach the capi-
tal, if possible, in time to interpose for its pre-
vention.


The treaty of Fontainbleau had not been kept
so secret, but that the English government obtained
information of its object; and that information it
lost no time in communicating to the cabinet of
Lisbon. England had given her assent to the pro-
position made by the Regent of Portugal, of shut-
ting· the ports of his kingdom against· her mer-




PENINSULAR W A H. 35


chants; she was aware that her aneient ally, in so
doing, aeted only by compulsion; and she there-
fore connived at the transaction. But it was im-
possible for her to forgive the next step which his
timid poliey indueed him to take; and when he
proceeded, in obedienee to the mandate of Franee,
to arrest all British subjeets, and confiseate all
British property, Lord Strangford, the ambassador,
could do no otherwise tban retire on board of one
of the. ships of tbe squadron, which,under the com-
mand·of SirSidney Smith, lay at that time at
anchor in tbe Tagus. As soon, however, as the
details ofthe secret treachery reached them, both
the Ambassador and the Admiral requested and
obtained an audience of the Prince Regent. In
this they laid before him the particulars ·of the ae-
counts which they had received; and in the mast
foreible terms urged him to adopt sorne means for
the preservation of his own persan, and the safety
of the royal family. The great question, however,
was, of what nature these means were to be. He
had hesitated too long to permit any idea of open
resistance being entertained; besides, neither the
army, nor tbe fortresses, nor the: general state of
the nation, was such as to inspire any hope of
resisting successfulIy. It was then that the Bri-
tisb functionaries pressed upon him the wisdom of
removing with his court and family to the Brazils,
and fixing there tbe seat of his government, till




36 N AURATIVE OF THE


the troubles of the present times should pass away.
This was a terrible alternative; nor can it surprise
any one, that the Regent of Portugal should have
wavered long, and frequently changed his de ter-
niinations, before he could muster sufficient cou-
rage to adopt it. But, at last, the famousarticle in
the Moniteur was shown to him, in which it was
openly announced that the house of Braganza had
ceased to reign. AH ground of hesitation was now
removed. The British subjects who had been ar-
rested were set at liberty; the British property
which had been seized was restored to ¡ts rightful
owners; and the royal family of Portugal made
every preparation for quitting the ancient seat of
its sovereignty under the protection of the British
flag. These resolutions had been formed, and
these preparations were in a state of forwardness,
when Junot reached Abrantes; and it was the no-
tice which he received of the intended emigration,
which induced him, without pausing to refresh his
followers, or collect those who lagged behind, to
press on towards the capital.


The consterriation and anxiety which were
evinced by the inhabitants of Lisbon, as soon as a
rumour of the intended departure of the Prince
got abroad, beggar all attempt at description.
Devotedly attached both by nature and habit to
the persons of their sovereigns, the Iower orders
beheld, in the proposed ellligration, a certain pre-




PENINSULAR WAR. 37


lude to national ruin and individual misery; whilst
the higher classes, such at least as r,easoned at aH,
carne to the conclusion that, as surely as the royal
family shouId abandon the paIace of their ances-
tors, so surely would the prophetic declaration in
the Moniteur receive its accomplishment. N or
was this the only circumstance which tended to
excite general alarm, independently of the im-
pending approach of the French troops. As if he
had come thither, by appointment, Junot's army
hadhardly crossed the frontier, when the Russian
admiraI Siniavin entered the Tagus, with nine
ships of the line and two frigates. Such a coinci-
dence could not fail deeply to affect men already
agitated by a thousand fears and doubts; ror
though his 'arrival was purely accidental, ít ap-
peared to the ill-fated Portuguese tha! a plan of
ca· operation between the French General and the
Russian Admiral had been laid; and that the lat-
ter had come, at thís critical juncture, to render
assistance to the former in the subjugation of the
kingdom.
, _ In the mean while, great preparations were
making by the court for its' iritended emigration.
The royal treasury was emptied;' much of the
pIate, both ofthe Prince and of the courtiers who
designed to follow him, was packed up and made
ready for removal on board of ship ;and fillaIly, a
proclamation appeared, assigning as the motive for




38 NARHATIV.E OF THE


a step so decisive, the conviction which rested
upon the mind of the Regent, that his person, and
not the oppression of tbe Portuguese people, was
the desjgn of the p:resent invasion. A regency
was likewise nominated, to consist of four indivi-
duals; namely, the Marquess de Abrantes; Lieu-
tenant-general Francisco da Cunba de' Menezes~
regidor das justi~as, principal castro of tbe royal
conncil; Don Pedro de Millo Breyner, likewise of
the council; and Don Francisco de N oronha, lieu-
tenant-general, and president of the board of con-
science. In case any of these should refuse to act r
the Conde Monteiro Mor was nominated to take
his place; and the same nobleman was appointed
president of the Senado da Camara, having the
Conde Sampaio, or Don Miguel Periera Forjaz,
and Joam Anthonio Salter de Mendon~a, as his
secretaries. These functionaries were instructed
to use every exertion for the. preservation of the
general peace of the kingdom; they were to admi-
nister the laws in every respect as if the Regent
bimself were present; and aboye aH, they were
themselves to receive, and to instruct aU good
Portuguese to receive~ the French troops as friends.
Upon tbis point the proclamation was the nlore
explicit, inasmuch as both the English Admiral,
and the inhabitants of Lisbon, had manifested a
strong desire to defend the city to the last; and
as the Regent was satisfied that aH resistan ce




PENINSULARW AR. 39


must be fruitless, he positively forbade any to be
offered.


Whilst matters were in this train on the banks
of the Tagus, J unot was moving, as rapidly as the
state of the weather and the disordered condition
of his troops would allow, upon the capital. He
had assembled together as many soldiers of every
corps and division as appeared capable of bearing
the fatigue of a renewed march, and he caused
large vessels to beconstructed for the conveyance,
down the stream, of those multitudes whom disease
or weariness rendered incapable of proceeding
further. General Caraffa, with a portion of the
Spanish corps, was. detached to Thomar for the
purpose of collecting provisions, and keeping that
part of thecountry in awe. The Teserve of artil-
lery and the heavy baggage, which had been left
behind, received instructions to follow by the road
which passes Alcantara and Badajoz; whilst the
guns attached to the divisions in advance, were
most of them conveyed by water carriage. Having
. completed these arrangements, he found that it
was possible for him tomove forward at the head
of six or eight thousand men; and he 10st no time
in putting them in motion.


On the 26th of N ovember, the advanced guard,
consisting of four chosen battalions and a regiment
of Spanish hussars, reached Punhete. On the
following morning it pas~ed the Zezere in boats;




40 N A RRATIVE OF THE


and J unot, who accompanied it, was met on the
opposite bank by Jose Oliveira de Barreto, com-
mandant of Aranjo. This officer was desirous that
the march· of the French troops should be sus-
pended; and that sorne confidential person should
be sent forward, for the purpose of arranging all
the details of oécupation with the proper authori-
tieso But as .he accompanied his request with an
enunciation of the proposed departure of the royal
family, Junot would on no acc()unt accede to it.
The troops continued their marcho .


The rains had fallen so heavi1y, that the whole
plain of Golega was inundated, and the advanced
guard which traversed it found the water· cover
their knees; the rest of the troops, by turning
off in the direction ofTorres Novas and Pernes,
escaped ·that inconvenience. Buí no obstacles
impedéd them. They reached Santarem in due
time, and found ít in a state of great order and
prosperity. N one of the inhabitants had aban-
doned their homes, and all received the invaders
with kiridn-ess; they were repaid for this conduct
by the sack and ruin of the town.


At last Sacavem, a· vi-llage situated abont two
leagues from Lisbon, was gained; the head of the
colurnn reaching it at an early hour on the 29th.
Here the French general was met by deputations
fl'om the supreme council, from the city, and from
the mel'chants ofLisbon, who carne to congratulate




PENINSULAR WAR. 41


him on his arrival, in the names of these bodies;
and here he was informed of too embarkation and
actual departure of the royal famny. At the same
time the representatives of the .regency~ Lieute-
nant-general Martinho de Souza e Albuquerque,
and Brigadier-general Francisco de Borga Gar~ao
Stockler, warned him of the state of violent ex-
citation into which the inhabitants of the capital
were thrown. They assured him that an English
fleet was at the mouth of the rivet, evidentIy
waiting for a falr wind to carry it up; and that,
unless the greatest pl'ecautions were used, it would
be a hard matter to preserve that amity between
the French and the Portuguese, which not pru-
dence only, but the express orders of the Prince
Regent, required them to preserve. Junot heard
them to an end, and then dismissed thein with
a declaration, that he would hold the regencyre-
sponsible for the peace of the city: To the other
deputations, again, he recommended diligenee and
zeal in calming the spirits of their fellow-citizens ;
and he sent forward numerous copies of a proc1a-
mation, to be posted in the most conspicuous parts
of Lisbon, declaratory of the good-will of the Em-
peror towards the Portuguese natioll. This done,
he made ready to pursue his journey.


But though he thus affected to hold the perils of
his situation in contempt, it was not possible for
J unot to feel himself really at his ease. Of the




42 .NA,ltRATIVE OF 'l'liE


twenty-eight thousand men whom he had led
across tlle Pyrenees, scarcely six thousand were at
this moment !n a condition to acto The rest were
se.attered over the line "ofmarch in one long column,
.dividedhere and there by impassable torrents, or no
less impassable inundations. The division nearest
to his advanced guard was that of General Dela-
borde, which had as yet penetrated no further
than t-o Santarem. Of the cavalry and artillery
which had fallli!n into the rear soon after the army
began to move from Alcantara, no intelligence had
reached him; and he was quite ignorant whether
or not the Spanish corps, which had been directed
to move by Alentejo and Entre-Douro-e-Minho,
had yet begun their march. Thus situated, and
with a large and populous city before him, in which
at least ten thousand regular. troops were in gar-
rison, JunotcoulQ. not but look forward to the
event with serious apprehension. But he was
aware that any appearance of doubt or misgiving
would now prove fatal to him. He accordingly
got together as many men as could be collected,
and on the following day entered Lisbon.


It is hardly necessary to remind the reader,
that whilst the French Marshal was thus per-
forming his painful journey, the royal family of
Portugal were hurrying their arrangements for
the abandonment of their country. The morning
of the 27th had been fixed upon for their embar-




PESINSULAH. W AR. 43


kation; and on that day, amidst the tears and
regrets of many thousand spectators, they as-
cended the vesseIs appointed to convey them.
But the wind proved not only adverse. but bois-
terous: it blewa perfect hurricane, and the fleet
was unable to move. At last, however, a favour-
able breeze sprang up, and at daybreak on the
29th the anchors were lifted. It was well that
the storm ceased when it did; for the ships were
scarcely across the bar when the French entered
the city.


For sorne little time after the arrival of Junot,.
all things went on, or appeared to go on, in the
Portuguese capital, as they had be en accustomed
to do. The French soldiers coming in by small
detachments, were conducted by the native ma-
gistracy, and by the native troops, to their quar-
ters; -and both they and their officers possessed
sufficient prudence to conduct themselves with
decency and decorum. But the stragglers were
scarcely collected, and the strength of the weary
restored, when French domination began to show
itself in its . true colours; and a blow was struck
at the national pride of the Portuguese, such as
they found it difficuIt even at the moment to
bear.


As soon as he found himself sufficiently strong
to act with a high hand, J unot gave orders that
Lisbon and all the ports in the Tagus should




44 NARRATIVE OF THE


be evacuated by the Portuguese troops; whose
pIaces were to be supplied by French divisions.
Delaborde was nominated governor of the capital;
and his soldiers were quartered~ not in barracks
or .public-houses, but in the convents. General
Loison with his division occupied Cintra, Mafra,
and the sea·coast as far as the mouth of the Mon-
dego; one brigade, under General Thomieres,
being q uartered in .the castle and península of
Penniche. . To the third division, at the head of
which was General Travot, was intrusted the
defence of the entrance of the Tagus. Its héad-
quarters were at Ocyras, and it had garri~ons in
the forts St. Julien and Cascaes on the right
bank; whilst on the left, two battalions were
encamped upon the heights of Mafarem. The
cavalry and artillery were kept éntire in Lisbon;
there were detachments of infantry in Santarem
and Abrantes; and a Swiss battalion had the
garrison of Almeida. Such was the disposition
of theFrench troops; the Spaniards were ar-
ranged as follows ;-
. The division ofGeneral Caraffa having recalled
its detachmentfrom Thomar, took up its quarters
in Lisbon, and was intermixed with the French
corps; Solano, again, w ho had presented himself
before . Elvas on the 2nd of December, and to
whom that important place opened its gates,
having disposed three battalions in the fort, es-




PENINSULAR WATL 45


tablished his own head-quarters at Setubal. From
that point he sent out parties, which occupied the
casUes and towers of the Alentejo and Algarve,
and completed the subjugation of the new prin-
cipality; whilst Taranco was in like manner
spreading his force over the northern provinces.
The last officer having secured Valen~a, a place
of considerable importance as commanding the
passages of Minho and the Lima, threw a garrison
into the chateaux oí Sant lago j and on the 13th
took possession of Oporto, where he fixed his
head -q uarters.


Having ascertained that, of the arrangements
just described, sorne were already complete, and
the rest hurrying to their completion, Junot pro-
~eeded to impress upon the minds· of the Por-
tuguese by decided proofs that they were a con.,.
quered people. 011 the 13th of December, a grand
review of all the troops in the capital was an-
nounced. The soldiers assembled in the principal
streets and squares, the infantry in battalion~, the
cavalry in squadrons, and the artillery limbered
up and in order for service; and the whole popu-
lation of the place flócked from their houses in
order to witness the spectacle. They were gazing
with deep interest at the scene before them, when
a salute of artillery from the walls of the Moorish
fort attracted their attention. AH eyes. were.
instanUy turned thither, and they beheld the .




4G N ARRA TIVE OF THE


aneient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon
which the tri-coloured standard of France was
mounted. It was a sight which seemed to affect
them with emotions too deep for utterance. At
first a solemn silence prevailed, broken onIy by
the rattle of the soIdiers' arms, or the voices of
their commanders; but by and by a murmur arose,
l'esembling rather the roar of the ocean upon its
bed of sand, than any other sound in nature. The
people were grievously agitated. Cries of "Por-
tugal for ever! Death to the French !" were heard
on every side; and it appeared that sorne mighty
popular convulsion was inevitable. But Junot
had taken care to secure the persons of the re-
gency, and of the principal men of the city, whose
heads might pay the forfeit of any act of insurrec-
tion; and the mob, without leaders and without·
arms, gradually" melted away. The rest of that
day, and the whole of the night, were spent in a
state of feverish agitation, which, without leading
to any immediate results, gave sure indication of
a spirit of discontent abroad; and which, sooner or
later, must bring about sorne dangerous convul-
SIOn.


In spite, however, of this flagrant attack upon
their dignity as an independent nation, the Portu-
guese continued for some time to bear their fate,
if not in absolute quiet, at all events without giving
vent to their feelings in a way calculated to excite




PENINSULAR "'A R. 47


the senous alarm of their conqueror. Private
quarrels, ending even in bloodshed, between indi-
viduals of the garrison and the inhabitants, were
by no means unfrequent; but in public, that is to
say, on a great scale, events appeared to flow on
in their usual channel. Junot made no other
change in the form of the government, than by ad-
ding to the list of regency one or two creatures of
his own; and the laws continued to be adminis-
tered in the name oí the legitimáte sovereign as
heretofore. Above an things, J unot was extremely
cautious in concealing, as far as he could, the terms
ofthe treaty ofFontainbleau. So far fromdivulging
these, he took care .on all occasions to make it
known that the Emperor was particularIy desirous
of preserving the integrity of the kingdom of Por-
tugal; till at last the idea began to be entertained,
that at the worst the Portuguese might apprehend
only a change of dynasty.


The same line of conduct which he pursued
himself, the general s in eommand of the Spanish
corps had been pointedly requested to adopt; but
to the wishes of their chief they paid, in this
respect, very Httle attention. Taranco, indeed~
went no further than to insinuate to the authori-
ties of Oporto, that they ought from thenceforth to
regard their city as attached to the monarchy of
Spain; but Solano, the personal friend of Godoy,
went mueh further. He appointed a grand judge,




48 N ARHATIVE OF TIIE


anda superintendent of finan ces, in . the na me of
Emmanuel, prince of the AIgarves; and he caused
certain pieces of money to be coined, bearing upan
them the arms of that minion, with a suitable in-
scription. Except in these particulars, however,
Solano did nothing very offensive to the prej ud ices
of the Portuguese, by whom, on the contrary, he
seems to have been highly, and not undeservedly,
esteemed.


Matters continued in this state, Junot directing
the principal share of his attention to the sea-side,
and making every exertion to oppose anyatterripts
which might be made by the English against him,
up to tJ1e 1st of February, 1808. On that day,
however, he published a decree, which had issued
from his master whilst at Milan, and bore date
the 23rd of the preceding December. It dissolved .


. for ever the· council of regencyappointed by the
Prince of the 'Brazils, and directed Marshal J unot,
duke of Abrantes, to govern Portugal alone, in the
name of the Emperor· N apoleon. It required that
a chosen body ofPortuguese troops should be sent,
with as little delay as possible, into Franee. It
éhaIíged the appella.tion of the corps now stationed
about Lisbon, from that of the army of observation
of the Gironde, to· that of the army of Portugal;
and it condemned the Portuguesenation to pay,
as the price of the protection of their private pro-
perty, a fine of one hundred millions of francs~




PENINSULAR WAR. 49


Such were the orders of N apoloon; and these the
Duke of Abrantes proceeded, without the slightest
compunction, to enforce.


The effect produced by the promulgation of this
decree, and by the changes in every department of
the state which arose out of it, was such as it
were no easy matter to pourtray. It was felt, not
in the capital only, but through every part of the
mosi' remo te provinces. The army, already in
a state of disorganisation, disbaiided itself, and
those who had carried arms as soldiers, continued
to bear them as robbers and plunderers. The pea-
santry, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow
their fields with corno The higher classes, whose
usual place of residence was Lisbon, fled in dismay
from their homes, till the city presented the ap-
pearance of a place lately visited by the plague.
True, indeed, there were traitors to their country,
who continued to surround the throne of the in-
truder, and to flatter his vanity, or that of his
master, by addresses the most fulsome and degra-
ding; but the mass of the nation felt keenly the
insults and wrongs to which they were subjected,
and seemed to wait only for the proper momen!" to
take revenge. .


It was not long before the offended pride of the
Portuguese began to vent itself in acts of violence,
for which the growing insolence of the French fur-
nished ample grounds, but which were invariably


YOL. 1. D




50 N ARRATIVE OF TI-lE


followed by punishments the most terrible and the
most arbitrary. At Mafra, because the popuIace
had uttered cries indicative of the state of their
feelings,one citizen was condemned to death by
sentence of a military commission, and publicly
executed. A few days afterwards, a quarrel arose
at the village of Caldas de Ranha, between certain
of the French troops quartered there, and sorne
soldiers of the 2nd regiment of Oporto. The affair
was represented to Junot as a seditious commo-
tion; upon which not only was the regimentbroke
unde.r circumstances to it the most ignominious,
but six peaceable inhabitants of theplace, who
had taken no part in the disturbance, were shot.
Similar scenes occurred in almost every city,
townJ village, and hamlet in Portugal, tiU the
minds of the people were wrought up to dare as
well as to endure every thing.


As soon as J unot perceived the state of feeling
to which the Portuguese in general were brought,
he 10st no time in fulfilling another of N apoleon's
directions, by disbanding the whole of the army,
except those regiments onIy which he had ap-
pointed to proceed into France. Previous to the
present invasion, .the standing army of Portugal
amounted to thirty-seven regiments of horse and
foot.' Junot permitted no more than six regiments
of infantry and three of cavalry to remain. with
their colourso The rest were dismissed to their




PENINSULAlt WAR. 51


homes; al1d even this paltry force reeeived posi-
tive orders to mareh, under the guidal1ce of the
Marquis de Alorna, towards Bayonne. The militia
had long ago been relieved from the fatigues of
military serviee; and now to complete his mea-
sures, an ediet was given out, requiring every
Portuguese to surrel1der up to eertain constituted
authorities his fire-arms; and prohibiting even
swords from being worn in the streets or public
ways.


Things continued in this state from the month
of February till summer had considerably ad-
vanced. In every part of the eountry. sueh pie-
tures, carved devices, or emblems of any sort, as
had a tendency to keep alive a recollection of past
national independence, were removed or defaced.
The royal arms were pulled down from over the
gateways of the palaces; the Quinas, or old 'Por-
tuguese standard, was universally displaced, to
make way for the imperial eagle; and even
justice was now administered according to the
French code, and in the name of the French Em-
peror. Yet were there occurring froID time to
time events which might have served to satisfy
any reasonable person that matters had been
pushed too faro Not to dweIl at Iength upon the
tumults and massacres which here and there took
place, it soon became evident that the Spanish
troops who had accompanied the French, were




52 NARRATIVE OF TUE


allies only in name. The chiefs, disgusted
and


dissatisfied with so flagrant a violation of
the


treáty of Fontainbleau as the recent acts of Ju
not


presented, hardly affected to eoneeal their e
ha,..


grin; whilst pieces of information began gradu
ally


to circulate among the eommon soldiers, wh
ich


stirred up in thero a disposition the reverse
of


friendly towards their nominal comrades. At
last,


an order arrived froro Madrid, aeeoropanied by
an


humble request on the part of Godoy, addres
sed


personally to Marshal J unot, for the return o
f the


several corps into their OWll eountry. Aeq
uies-


eehce with it was of course refused, where
ver


J unot possessed the power oí refusal; and
the


divisions of Caraffa and Taranco remained at t
heir


stations. But Solano's corps actually took
its


départure, with the exeeption of four battali
ons,


which continued to garrison Setubal. Junot
was


alarmed by this movement, and despatehed K
el-


lerman with his brigade to Elvas, for the purp
ose.


of watching its results. In the same disposit
ion,


he ordered General Quesnel, a Freneh officer, to
proceed to Oporto, and take the cornmand of


the


Spanish troops there, whoro the death of Tara
nco


had deprived of a leader; and he particul
arly


directed him to overawe the Portuguese by
the


presence of the Spaniards, and to keep the S
pa-


niards to their duty by exciting in them a dr
ead


of the Portuguese. N 01' was he reroiss in
the




53


adoption of other expedients for tne preservation
of public peace. Whilst his emissaries were
busily employed in all quarters collecting a
tribute oppressive beyond endurance, he gave
every encouragement to those worthless Portu-
guese, who judged it a ·prudent measure to ap-
proach the imperial throne with their petitions,
and to draw up the forms of a new constitution,
to be administered by sorne prince of the Em-
peror's choice. To the state of the marine, like-
wise, he paid considerable attention. Through
the exertions of M. Majendie, a captain in the
French navy, he fitted out and armed two ships
of the line, 'of74 guns each, three frigates, and
seven smaller vessels; besides several hulks, in
which it had be en customary to confine prisoners.
It is true that none of these were rendered effec-
tive; ·but they at all events served the purposes
of floating batteries; and they promised to prove
of considerable utility in case an English squadron
should endeavour to force the passage of the bar.
AH Junot's dispositions, however, were of no avail.
A doud had already collected in another part of
thehorizon, which there was no reason to expect
would dissolve without a storm; and the storm no
suoner began to rage, than it extended its influ':'
ence to every part of his insecure vice-royalty.




54 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER III.


Entrance of fresh armies into Spain-Seizure of the frontier
fortresses, and advance of Murat upon Madrid- Conster-
nation of Charles and Godoy- Preparations for escape to
South America defeated by the mob-Godoy draggéd to
prison-Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king
-Murat alTives in the capital-Departure of the royal family
for Bayonne-Tumult of thc 2nd of May~Resignation of
the rights of the house of Bourbon-Secret instructions of
Ferdinand to the regency-Measures adopted by Murat to
preserve public tranquillity.


THE sixth article of the treaty of Fontainbleau
had stipulated, "that a corps of forty thousand
French troops should assemble at Bayonne, on or
about the 20th of N ovember, for the purpose of
supporting the force previously sentinto Portugal,
in case the English should oppose its progress, or
menace it with an attack;" but it was expressly
specified that the latter corps should make no
movement in advance until the two high Contract-
ing parties had come to a perfect understanding
on the subject.




PENINSULAR W AR. 55


In accordance with the tenorof this arrange-
ment, Junot's corps had hardly commenced its
march, when the army destined to aupport it be-
gan to be formed. Earl y in N ovem ber there were
twenty-four thousand infantry, between three and
four thousand cava1ry, and thirty-eight pieces of
artillery, in the camp; and by the 22nd of the
same month, the whole, under the orders of Ge-
neral Dupont, crossed the Pyrenees. For this
movement the assent of the Spanish comt was
neither obtained nor requested. Buonaparte felt
himself already too strong to stand in need of it ;
and the corps pressed forward without opposition
of any sortto Valladolid. Here the head-quarters
were established; the troops being cantoned in
the villages along the COUfse of the Douro, whilst
detachments were pushed on as far as.Salamanca,
in order that a persuasion might be generaUy
created that its ultimate destination was Lisbon.


N ot satisfied with having thus introduced two
armies into the hcart of nations professedly in a
state of profound peace with his government, N a-
poleon caused a third to form itself where the two
former had been stationed, and a fourth· to be
organised at Perpignan, in the very opposite ex-
tremity of the Pyrenees. N o great while elapsed
before both the one and the other penetrated into
Spain. The former, under Marshal Moncey, con-
sisting of twenty-five thousand infantry, three




56 N4.RRATIVE OF THE


thousand cavalry, and forty pie ces of cannon,
passed the Bidassoa on the 9th of January, OCCU""
pying the th~ee provinces of Biscay, and extending
as far as Castile; the latter, which amounted in
all to about fifteen thousand men, and was headed
by Duhesme, made its movement about a month
latero The progress of both was marked by deeds
oftreachery, ofwhich a few words will suffice to re-
call the particulars to the recollection of the reader.


As soon as N apoleon had fully determined upon
the proceedings which he afterwards adopted with
respect to Spain, it became to him a matter of the
first importan ce to be put in possession of the dif-
ferent fortresses and strong-holds which covered
its .northern frontier, and protected it against
French. invasion. These, it is probably needless
to add, are St. Sebastiari, in Biscay; Pampeluna,
in N avarre; and San Fernando de Figueres, and
Barcelona, in Catalonia. Whoever may happen
to command these four cities, may be said to com-
mand the four great passes of the Pyrenees; and
to obtain the command of them at any cost and
by any means, was the last and most urgent order
given by their chief to the French generals.


The methods which these severally adopted. to
carry their master's projects into effect, are too well
known to require a very minute repetition. San
Fernando, feebly garrisoned, and more feebly go-
verned, opened its gates to the brigade of General




PENINSULAlt WAR. 57


Nicolas, as soon as that officer demanded permis-
sion to lodge his soldiers in the citadel for the
night; and the troops which thus obtained an en-
trance, rewarded the hospitality of tbeir allies,
by turning them out of the place, and keeping pos-
session of it themselves. At Barcelona, a little
more of cunning was requisite by the general-in-
chief Duhesme. Having obtained quarters for his
men in the town, be feH upon the fol1owing strata-
gem, for the purposeof introducing them into the
two castles,-the Citadel, and Fort Mon Jouich,
.:-which, at opposite extremities, hold the city in
subjection. On the 16th of February, the troops
were ordered to assemble on the glacis of the cita-
del~ under the pretext of being reviewed previous
to their departure. Lecchi, an Italian officer,
commanded on that occasion; and the soldiers
who acted their part in the busines's so cleverly,
were aH Italians. Whilst the Spanish garrison-
the guard upon duty at the gate not excepted-
were intently occupied in watching the progress
of the inspection, two companies upon the right of
the line suddenly feH to the rear, and throwing off
their knapsacks, ran with great speed towards
the drawbridge. This they covered, before there
was time given to raise it; and General Lecchi
following with the whole of his staff, and exclaim-
ing that he only came to pay La visit to the Go-
verno~, two battalions were enabled to make




58 NARRATIVE OF THE


good their entrance, whilst the Spaniards were
yet wondering at the cause of the sudden tumulto
As soon as his object had been so far effected,
Duhesme proceeded to attempt the reduction of
Fort Mon Jouich by a process somewhat different.
He boldly demanded, in the name of N apoleon,
that it should be surrendered to him, threatening,
in . case of refusal, an instant declaration of war ;
and the Governor was too timid, or too faithless,
to resist such an appeal.


The most important, however, of an the frontier
towns is Pampeluna; and the task of obtaining
possession of it devolved upon General Darmagnac.
Pampeluna, like the other places already occu-
pied, lies wholly at the merey of its citadel; and
though Darmagnac's troops were very readily ad-
mitted into the town, the Governor, an old and
faithful Spaniard, took every precaution to hinder
them from making a lodgment in the castle. With
this view he would admit no greater number than
sixty or seventy French soldiers within the walIs
at a time, who carne only to receive their daily
rations; and behind whom, as soon as they had
entered, the draw-bridge was carefully drawn up.
1t required some management to deceive an officer
possessed of so great a degree of caution; but Dar-
magnac's mind was fruitful in resources, and he
contri ved at last tooutwit his wary antagonist.


The French General had taken up his abode in




PENINSULAR WAR. 59


a house which stood upon the esplanade, midway
between the town and the castle;, into which,
during the night of the 15th February, he intro-
duced a hundred grenadiers, well armed, and
amply supplied with ammunition, one by one, and
in profound silence. On the morning of the 16th,
a fatigue party of sixty men proceeded, according
to custom, to receive their rations in the citad el ;
but they were aH rnen of tried courage, and at
their head was an officer of valour and known
judgment, M. Robert, chef de battalion of the
70th regiment. Under the pretext of being be-
fore theirtime, and of waiting for the arrival of
lhe quarter-master, sorne of them remained stand-
ing upon the draw-bridge, whilst the rest took
shelter against;; a passing shower, in the guard-
room. At a given signal they rose upon the
Spanish guardo The sentinels were disarmed,
and the rnuskets of those who were not on duty,
and with which the French soldiers had pre-
tended to arnuse thernselves, were suddenly
turned against their owners. The hundred grena-
diers now advanced at a run; and two battalions,
which had been for sorne time formed in expecta-
tion of the event, showed themselves on the glacis.
In spite of all his vigilance, Don Francisco Cer-
nero saw that his post was carried, and he sub-
rnitted.


The manner in which Sto Sebastian, again,




60 NARRATIVE OF THE


changed its masters, was even more simple than
any of the preceding. General Thouvenot having
been sent thither with the ostensible view of
forming a depot, for the assembling of stragglers
from different regiments in advance, and forward-
ing them to their respective stations, took care to
increase the number of his detachments so largely,
that they becarne at last too many for the Spanish
garrison; and the garrison was in consequence
marched out, t6 make way for a corps of French
troops.


Having thus succeeded, almost beyond his ex-
pectations, in opening a way into the very heart of
Spain, Napoleon no longer deemed it necessary to
affect concealment as to his ultimate purposes.
Column after coiumn poured across the Pyrenees,
till the whole line of road from the Bidassoa to the
Douro was covered with French soldiers. In
Catalonia again, fresh reinforcements daily ar-
rived, ti11 Marshal Bessieres, to whom the chief
command in that district was assigned, found
hirnself at the head of twenty-five thousand men,
including six thousand of the infantry, cavalry,
and artillery, of the imperial guardo But it was
to Murat, grand duke of Berg, that the important
task of subjugating' Spaill was committed. He
was recalled from Madrid, where for sorne time
back he had acted ostensibly as arnbassador,
though in reality as the promoter of internal dis-




PENINSULAR WAR. 61
,


cord in the bosom of the court; and being ap-
pointed lieutenant to the Emperor, proceeded to
take command of the grand army.


In the mean while, events hado occurred in the
Spanish capital, such as to draw upon the actors
in them the attention, not o.f Spain only, but ofthe
whole of Europe. First of aH, the inhabitants of
Madrid were astonished by the sudden appearance
of a royal' proclamation; in which it was an-
nounced that Ferdinand, prince of Asturias, had
been detected in a conspiracy to. dethrone and
murder his father, and was arrested. This was
folIowed in a few days by a second proclama-
tion, which informed the public that the Prince,
having confessed his guilt, and given up the names
of his associates, had been pardoned, " the voiee
of nature prevailing over that of strict justiee," and
admitted once more into the royal favour. The
surprise excited by proceedings so extraordinary
had not subsided, when intelligence ofthe opera-


. tions of the French armies on the frontier, and
their rapid advance. into the heart of the country,
excited in a much more forcible and natural
degree the consternation of all classes. Godoy,
alarmed not so much for the probable fate of the
nation, as for the destiny which might befall him-
self, thought at one moment of recalling the Spa-
nish troops from Portugal, and keeping them in
readiness to act as circumstances might require;




62 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


and an order wa,s actually issued to that effect.
At other times he urged the King to forward a
scheme, to whích he had formerly opposed himself
with all his influence, namely, the procuring a
wife for Ferdinand from among the princesses of
the imperial blood. ;N ext, he threw out hints
as to the propriety of abdicating the crown, as
soon as the proposed marriage should be com-
pleted; whilst for himself, an asylumsomewhere
in the heart of France appeared to 1101d out the
best hopes of protection against the violence of his
enemies.


J n the midst of these deliberations arrived two
announcements, of which it would be difficult to
determine whether the former or the latter struck
th is imbecile court wi th the greater degre'e of horror.
A letter from N apoleon himself, accompanying
certain presents of beautiful horses, informed the
King of Spain that it was the Emperor's intention
to visit Madrid, and there to settle with him,
upon a solid foundation, the affairs both of Spain
and Portugal. Such an arrival was by no means
desired either by Charles or his favourite; but
whilst they were yet hesitating how to act, Don
Eugenio Izquierdo, who had long resided at París
as the tool of Godoy, suddenly made his appear-
ance in the Escurial, and communicated the fol-
lowing details. The Emperor, he said, had
determined to seize Portugal for himself, and to




PENINSULAR WAR. 63


exchange it with the crown of Spain for the pro-
vinces north of the Ebro. N ew treaties of COffi-
merce and of alliance, offensive and defensive,
such as tbe safety of his empire required, were
about to be drawn up. Tbe title of Emperor of
the Indies would be assigned to the King of Spain,
whose son, the Prince of Asturias, should receive
the hand of the Emperor's niece; but the marriage
must be the subject of an especial negociation,
an.d might be deferred till other arrangements were
complete. In addition to this oflicial intelligence,
Izquierdo took care to inform his master of the
suspicions which he himself entertained touching
the Emperor's real designs; and the statement
threw all parties affected by it into the most se-
rious alarmo


lt was now that the wisdom of following the
example set by the Regent of Portugal, and re-
moving the court to its South American posses-
sions, suggested itself to the mind of Godoy. His
dreams of sovereignty were by this time wholly
dispelled, and his highest ambition was to secure a
place of retreat for himself, whatever might be the
fate of Spain; nor did he find Charles in a mood
at all different [rom his own. The plan was no
sooner proposed than it was agreed too The King
and Queen both professed their willingness to fly;
and preparations were instantIy set on foot fol' se-
curing a safe embarkation.




64 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


With this view the corps of General Solano was
recalled from Alentejo, and ordered to occupy the
mountains of Guadarrama. Detachments of infan-
try, cavalry, and artillery, were directed to cover
the road from Madrid to Seville ; whilst the body-
guard, nine squadrons of the royal carabiniers, the
battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and
the regiments of national infantry and cavalry
which composed the ordinary garrison of Madrid,
were marched from the capital to Aranjuez, where
thecourt was then resident. AH things,.in short,
were already in a state of forwardness, when an
unexpected tumult frustrated at once the inten-
tions both of Godoy and the King.


Though - the greatest precautions had been
adopted. to keep secret the object of these prepa-
rations, it .waf? not possible to hinder a rumour of
the intended emigration from spreading abroad.
The Spaniards were deeply affiicted at the pros-
pect of being abandoned by their King; and as it
was understood that Ferdinand had expressed the
strongest aversion to the measure, the whole was
attributed to the selfish and wicked councils of the
Prince of the Peace. The consequence was, that
the hatred which had long been harboured towards
Godoy, now increased with tenfold violence; and
in this general feeling the soldiers fully partici-
pated with the multitude. To such a height, in-
deed, was this universal discontent carried, that




PENINSULAR WAH. 65


Charles found himselfunder the necessity of aban-
doning his design jand he issued a proclamation,
in which he as,sured his belovedsubjects that no
consideration whatever should ,induce him to
leave them. This appeared on the 16th, and on
the . 17th the preparations for departurewere
ágain renewed. But popular indignation was now
excited to its highest pitch. A mob hastening to
Aranjuez, found a cavalcade of carriages ready,to
proceed. They instantly cut the traces, andthén
turning their fury against Godoy, ran, in a tumul-
tuous manner, to assault his house. Of the sol-
diers whom he called in to his assistance, aH, ex-
cept his own body-guard, deserted him j and he
with difficultyescaped to a place of concea,lment
for the night.
- N ext day Ferdinal1d shoWed himself to the peo-
pIe, and the tumult was appeased. The .houses,
indeed, of Godoy, and of his nearest relatives and
most abject dependents, were levelled to the
ground; whilst he himself, dragged from his hi-
ding-place, was with difficu1ty conveyed toa
public pl'ison ; but this done, the mob immediately
returned to their duty. Charles, however, ha~
learned a lesson, such as he had no desire tÍ> Jearn
again. The burden of sovereignty, he said, had
become too heavy for him; aQd it was, in the
existing circumstances of the country, highly im- .
proper that an old and infirm man should endea;~;'


E. /%:>'t' \'OL. J.
I ó_




66 NARRATIVE OF THE


vour to bear it any longer. He therefore, of his
own free will, abdicated the throne, and named as
his successor his eldest and beloved son, Ferdi-
nand, prince of Asturias.


The joy of the people of Madrid, when this re-
solution was made known to them, is represented to
have known no bounds. AH ranks and degrees of
men partook in it. The houses were decorated du-
ringthe day with flowers and green boughs; and at
night, one vast illumination extended from sq uare
to square, and from street to street. Ferdinand
was hailed, wherever he appeared, as the' pre-
server of his country; and for the moment, at
least, both the advance of the French troops,and
the fears which their approach had so lately occa·
sioned, were forgotten. But this state of general
satisfaction was not destined to be of long conti:-
nuance.


It has be en stated that Ferdinand, instigated
perhaps by personal hatred towards Godoy as much
as byany other motive, aH along dec1ared him-
self friendly to the wishes of France; and the line
ofpolitics which'he had pursued whilst a subject,
he did not think it necessary to abandon after he
became a sovereign. Though aware of the ap-
proach of Murafs army, the first use which he
made of power, was to order 801ano's corps back
to its former quarters in Portugal; to countermand
the return of the divisions of Caraffa and Taranco;·




PENINSULAH. W A ¡lo 67


and to dismiss the whole body oftroops which late
events had drawn around the capital, to their
original stations. Madrid was thus left almost
without a garrison, and the very heart of the
kingdom laid open to the will of the Frencn
MarshaI.


In the mean while the Grand Duke of Berg
was leading his numerous armies, by columns of
brigades and divisions, towards Madrid. The
columns marched as through an enemy's country,
bivouacking every night, and taking all the pre-
cautions to secure themselves which are usually
taken in a .state of war, until they made them-
selves masters of the chain of mountains which
separate Old froID N ew Ca~tile. The officers in
eommand, likewise, having received instructions
to that effect, delayed the posts at all the stations.
and arrested su eh bodies of Spanish soldiers as
they anywhere met by the way; whilst they in-
dustriously gave out, at every town or village
through which they passed, that their final des-
tination was the camp of Saint Roche, before
Gibraltar.


Proceeding in this order, the advanced.,.guard
. reached Boytrajo, where intelligence of the late
commotions in the Spanish capital met them.
Murat instantly set forward. He took with him
only a numerous and brilliant staff, besides one
division of the imperial guard, and arrived just in




68 NARRATIYE OF THE


time to be an eye-witness of Ferdinand's trillm~
phal entry into Madrid. The spectacle was not
without its effect upon the mind of the French
Marshal. He saw that the feelings of the peopIe
were all in favour of their new prince; and he
probably anticipated, even then, the occurrence of
sorne such events as in a few days afterwards
carne to pass.


Beauharnois. filled, at this time, the office of
ambassadorto the court of Spain. It was but
natural that Ferdinand should appeaI both to him
and to the Ernperor's lieutenant for a recognítion
of his new title; but neither Beauharnois nor
Murat had received any instructions on the sub-
ject. No sooner, however, was a sufficient body
of French troops at hand, than both the one and
the other began to give evidence that their master.
was by no means prepared to view with a friendly
eye the revolution which had just occurred. Fer-
dinand was neither visited nor alluded to by them
under any other title than that of Prince of As-
turias. A correspondence in the country was
opened with his father and mother, whose per-
sonal safety was provided for by die substitution
of a French guard at Aranjuez, in lieu of the
Spanish troops which had hitherto done duty
there. These proceedings on the part of the
French . diplomatists could not but alarm Ferdi-
lland; but his alal'm was grievously augmented,




PENINSULAR WAlt. 69


when day after day passed by, and no answer
arrived to the letters whieh he had addressed to
N apoleon, informing him of the ehanges which
had placed him upon the thron,e of Spain. At
last it was eommunicated to him that the Em,.
peror in person was on his way to ,Madrid, for the
purpose of aetillg as an arbiter in the divisions
whiéh unhappily reigned within the bosom of his
family; and the eommunieation was aceomp~nied
by sug'gestions, a too ready compliance witlI which
broughí. matters to an issue.


The sword of Franeis 1, whieh had hung in the
.armoria real sinee the date of the battle of Pavia,
was demanded by Murat, in the name of the Em-
peror his master. Ferdinand was not sorry to
have found so good an opportunity of evincing his
deferenee to the wishes of the man on whose pro-
teetio,n he relied; and he gave up the weapon at
once, with a suitable compliment, to its new owner.
Then followed a recommendation that the Infant
Don Carlos, his brother, should proceed a few
days' journey towards the frontier, to meet the
Emperor. To that hint, likewise, the most prompt
attention was paid. But the next implied a
measure, of whieh even Ferdinand doubted the
wisdom; ana it required more than an. ordinary
degree ofpersuasion to ove reo me his reluetance to
its adoption. The ambassador B~auharnois repre-
sented that it would be particularIy agreeable to




70 NARRATIVE OF THB


his master, if Ferdinand would consent to go as
far as Burgos lo receive him. Ferdinand wavered
long, between the dictates of his hopes and his
fears; and it was only when the arrival of a new
actor on the stage turnoo the balancey that he gave
a reluctant consent. Assured by General Savary,
who professed to be little else than an avant cou-
rier to the Emperor, that N apoleon was actually
on the road ; that he had left him so near Bayonne
as to render his arrival at Burgos by this time
certain; and, that if Ferdinand entertained any
hopes of being recognised as King of Spain, he
must take care to give the most satisfaetory proofs
of his desire to obey the wishes of the man in
whose hands his destiny lay ;-assured of aH this,
he judged it imprudent any longer to hesitate;
and inspite of the remonstrances and entreaties of
his own most faithful counsellorsy the memorable
journey was determined upon. It began on the
10th of April, and it ended ón the 20th; leaving
this ill-fated prince a prisoner in Bayonne.


Previous to his departure, Ferdinand had ap-
pointed a supreme junta, to direet the affairs of
the nation during his absence; at the head of
which was his uncle, the Infant Don Antonio. He
was hardly gone~ when Murat addressed to this
body a requisition, that the Prinee of the Peace
should be set at liberty. The junta, afraid either
to refuse or grant the request, referred him to the




PENINSULAR WAR. 71


sovereign. Murat was indignant at the reply. He
threatened to force the prison, and to put the
troops who guarded it to the sword, in case they
should presume to offer any opposition to his will ;
and the junta felt that they possessed no means of
hindering that threat from being carried into exe-
cution. Godoy was given up to the French, and,
like his rival Ferdinand, conveyed to Bayonne.


The next removals which took place were of the
old sovereigns, whom it required no very urgent
entreaties, nor any depth of policy, to expatriate.
Charles had already protested against his abdica-
tion, as having been effected by compulsion; and
thrown himself upon the justice and honour of
Napoleon for redress. He was advised to seek
the Emperor himself, and to plead his cause be-
fore him in person; and he readily adopted the
suggestion. Charles and the Queen arrived at
Bayonne exactly ten days later than their son.


Of the extraordinary and disgraceful scenes
which followed these extraordinary movements,
it is not necessary in this place to enter into a par-
ticular account. The world will not readily forget
transactions which were marked by the most
shameless violation of all laws, human and divine,
in every individual who took a part in them. A
mother demanding the death of her own son, and
proclaiming her own infamy in hatred to her-child,
is a spectacle which has not often been presented




72 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


before the eyes of the public; nor has it frequently
be en called uPQn to witness duplicity carried to
the length to which it was carried by N apoleon
and his agents. Such things stand in no need of
being detailed frequently.


In the mean while, affairs were every day as-
suming a more alarming aspect in Spain. Though
there was not, as yet, open insurrection in any
quarter, cases of individual quarrels were very
frequent between the inhabitants and the French
soldiery; and no trifling q uantity of blood was
shed on the one side as well as on the other. The
French, no longer caring to coneeal that the claims
of Ferdinand would never be recognised by their
master, only provoked the Spaniards to indulge
the more frequently in cries of "Ferdinand for
ever!" till the adherents of that prince carne to re-
gard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as
the personal enemies of the intruders. To so great
lengths were these feelings earried at Toledo, that
a general commotion seemed at hand, and nothing
but the prompt arrival of Dupont, with a strong
division of troops from Aranjuez, preserved the
public tranquillity. But events were by this time
in rapid progress, which brought in their train
that universal opposition to French influence,
which no efforts were ever afterwards able to over-
come.


There remained iü Madrid, towards the end of




PENINSULAR WAR. 73


April, no other members of the royal fatnily, ex-
cept the Queen of Etruria, her children, her bro-
ther the lnfant Don Francisco de PauIo, and Don
Antonio, the head of regency;. and the Grand
Due of Bel'g received a letter from Charles IV,
desiring that they likewise should be forwiuded to
Bayonne. When this letter arrived, the people of
Madrid were in a state of the most violent excite-
ment, brought on by certain rumours of the pro'-
ceedings of the congress at Bayonne, which not
aU' the vigilance of N apoleon or his servants could
hinder from getting abroad. Men, women, and
children, might daily be seen in crowds about the
post-office, anxiously waiting for so me fresh intel:-
ligence; and ir the courier chanced, on any occa-
sion, to be delayed, the symptoms of dissatisfac-
tion exhibited on all sides were of the most appal-
lingkind. The inhabitants of Madrid were in this
frame of mind, when the determination of Murat
with respect to the Regent and his relatives ·was
cornmunicated to thern. The people protested
that Don Antonio should not be taken from them;
but in spite of these appearances the preparations
for his departure continued to go on.. lt was now
the 1st of May, and for the last two days no post
had arrived. On the 2nd, a similar reply met
those who again assembled at the post-office; whilst
it was rumoured that the royal carriages were
already harnessed, and that the princes were rre.-




74 NARHATIVE OF THE


paring to set out. The people ran to the palace,
cut the traces by which the horses were fastened,
and forced back the carriages into the stable-yard ;
and an aide-de-camp of Murat happening to pass
at the moment, they loaded him with insults and
execrations. The aide-de- camp resented this treat-
ment, and words were instantly followed by blows.
And now began a tragedy which Spain willlong
retain in her recollection, not onIy because of the
blood of her citizens which was shed, but because
of the results which sprang out of it, and the ar-
duous struggle of which it was the forerunner.
But this, like the transactions at Bayonne, is too
generalIy known to stand in need of minute rela-
tion. Jt is sufficient to observe that the firing
{!ontinued for nearly three hours, with considera-
ble slaughter on both sides; that it was not till
after the most strenuous exertions of the authori-
tíes, both Spanish and French, that order was re-
stored; and that it proved by no means the least
distressing thing to the people of Madrid, that a
combat which had aIread y cost thus dear, should
be followed by a multitude of indiscriminate mili-
tary executions.


The imlllediate effect of the operations of this
bloody day was tó strike with a momentary terror
the inmates of the 'capital; a sensation of which
the French failed not to make the most, by circu-
lating proclamations that spoke a language of




PENINSULAR WAR: 75


mingled threatening and conciliation. The Jnfant
Don Francisco departed, as soon as order was
restored, for Bayonne; and he was followed within
four-and-twenty hours by Don Antonio. The lat-
ter, indeed, voluntarily expressed a wish to share
the fortvnes oI tbe King .bjs nep.bew; beca use he
felt that, for the management of affair~ so perilous
as those which were around him, he was totally
unfitted. His departure was followed by the ad-
mission of the Grand Duke of Berg as a member
into the councíl of regency; and a few days after-
wards the same Grand Duke was, by a decree of
Charles IV, nominated to fill the office of presi-
dento


The news of the insurrection at Madrid reached
Bayonne, at a moment when the Emperor ap-
peared to be busily engaged in an attempt to
reconcile Ferdinand to his parents, and his parents
to him. He gladly availed himself of it, for the
purpose of precipitating the designs which he had
long ago formed. As might be expected, the
amount of lives sacrificed was magnified greatly,
as well by the terror of the Spaniards, as by the
policy of the French; and to these exaggerated
accounts N apoleon offered no contradiction. On
the contrary, he made ofthem a handle for loading
Ferdinand with maledictions. He accused him of
being the cause of all this bloodshed, and insisted
that he should instantly restore the crown to hfS




76 NARRA'l'lVE 01<' 'CHE


father, from whom he had impiously usurped it.
Ferainand, who at first had displayed sorne symp-
toms oC courage, sank at last under the invectives
of N apoleon. He not only obeyed the mandate,
but, in his capacity of Prince of Asturias, affixed
his signature to the deed by which Charles IV in his
own name, and in the name of his family, resigned
the sovereignty of Spain into the hands of the
Emperor of the French. A similar proceeding
was followed by the rest of the princes. They
gave up their rights for ever, and declared, in a
published document, that the Spanish nation could
not evince its affection for their race in a manller
more satisfactory, than by paying a ready obedience
to the sovereign, whoever he might be, that should
be appointed to succeed them.


Whether Ferdinand had foreseen the lengths to
which matters would be carried, or whether he
only expected to be detained for a time in cap-
tivity in Franee, does not appear; but imme-
diately previous to the grand catastrophe, he
wrote; and despatched by a trust y messenger, a
letter of instructions to the council of regency~
In it he declared that his actions ",ere no longer
free, and that it was impossible for him, situated
as he was, to atteJ1.d to the honour of the throne,
or the welfare of the country; He therefore
granted to the junta unlimited powers, permIttmg
it to remove whithersoever it would, and in his




PENINSULAR WAR. 77


name to exerciseall the authority of the sove-
reign. He recommended that a general cortes
should assemble ,,,ith as little delay as possible,
for the purpose of adopting su eh measures as
might appear most eondueive to the publie good;
and he positively required that the removal of his
person into the interior of France, should be the
signal for the commencement of hostilities. That
letter was conveyed by one who, for greater se-
curity, performed the bulk of his journey on foot.
It was faithfully delivered to the junta; but as it
reached its destination two days later than the
official account of Ferdinand's resignation, the
junta decreed that :they were not a~thorised in
paying' to it any obedienee. On the contrary,
they showed themselves to be the ready and
willing tools of the Emperor's lieutenant, who ae-
cordingly proeeeded to order all things in the
kingdom as he judged most conducive to his mas-
ter's interests.


The first and great object to be attained in his
view of affairs was, to seatter the Spanish army
so as to render it ineffeetive, and to seeure the
fidelity of the great and important cities of Ca~i~
and Valencia. For this purpose, the two Swiss regi-
ments eantoned near Madrid, were ineorporated
with the eorps of General Dupont; the body.
guards, with four battalions of Spanish and Wal-




78 NARRATlVE OF THE


loon guards, were placed under the orders of
Marshal Moncey; directions were given to pre-
pare an expedition of three thousand men, which
might embark without delay for Buenos Ayres;
and the Mediterranean fleet, at that time laid up
in Port Mahon, was required to proceed at once to
Toulon, for the purpose of joining the French squa-
dron. Many changes were likewise ordcred in the
different garrisons scattered through Catalonia and
elsewhere. General Solano, for example, was
enjoined to proceed 10 Cadiz, there to execute his
original functions as captain-general of Andalusia;
whilst the most strenuous exertions were made to
attach to the new order of things General Casta-
nos, whose situation as commandant of the camp
at San Roche, furnished him with powerful means
either of advancing or thwarting the views of the .
French Émperor. Nor were other andhardly
less important matters neglected. Every maga-
zine of arms and stores throughout the country-
every magazine at least which lay within their
reach,was seized and appropriated by tbe French
authorities. Preparations were made to fortify
and victual the heights of the Retiro~ that they
might serve as a citadel, to keep the inhabitants
of the capital in order; whilst a regular chain of
posts between it and the frontier was established.
N othing, in short. was left undone, which ap-




PENINSULAR WAR. 79


peared in the most remote degree calculated to
secure the ahsolute subjection of Spain; and it
was even hinted that, as 800n as that great end
should have been attained, other and equalIy
gigantic projects would be undertaken.




80 NARRATTVE Ol<' THE


CHAPTER IV.


Gf'neral insurrection of tIte Spanish provinces, and forroation of
juntas-The junta of Seville peculiarly vigorous alld or-
derly-It assumes tbe title of Supreme Junta of Spain and
the Indies-Reduction of the French Heet in the haroour of
Cadiz-Expeditions against Seville and V álencia under
Dupont and Moncey-Actions at Alcolia and Baylen, and
surrender of Dupont's corps-Moncey repulsed froro before
Valencia-Proceedings at Bayonne, and procIaroation of
King Joseph-He enters Spain-Battle of Medino del Rio·
Seco; and arrival of Joseph in Madrid-His flight in conse-
quence of Dupont's capture-A n expedition fitted out at
Cork sails for the Peninsula-Sir Arthur WelIesley arrives
at Cornnna, and directs his course towards Portugal-Pro-
ceedings in that country-Mutiny of the Spanish garrison of
Oporto-Seizure of General Quesnel, and the standard ofin-
dependence raised-Junot's mea¡¡ures to suppress the revolt.


1 T has been stated that the details of the event-
fuI 2nd of May reached Bayonne on the 10th;
they were not more tardy in making their way
through all parts of Spain; and the effect pro-
duced by them, from one end of the kingdol11 to




1'ENINSULAR WAR. 81


another, was the same. From the mountains of
Arragon to the pillars of Hercules, and from Va-
lencia to Cape Finisterre, t~ere arose one loud and
simultaneous shout, "Long live King Ferdinand-
Death to the French!" The people thought not of
the defenceless state of the country, its frontier
towns in the occupation of the enemy, its soldiers
dispersed, and its arsenals and treasures plun-
dered. They saw only the degradation to which
they were reduced; and they ran to arms with
the alacrity of men determined to regain their
freedom, or to perish.


Whilst in other provinces a general rising took
place, distinguished more by the zeal of those who
followed, than by the prudence of, its leaders,
a regular form of government, such at least as the
state of the times would admit of, was almost in-
stantaneously organized at Seville. On the very
dayafter the insurrection broke out, a junta con-
sisting of twenty-three members, chosen from the
principal men of the province, from the nobility,
the higher clergy, the general officers and me m-
bers of the .municipal body, met together, and
assumed the title of Junta, and Supreme Govern-
ment of Spain and the Indies. Acti:p.g in this
capacity, the Supreme Junta proceeded to give
directions, that in every town or village which
should contain two thousand householders, juntas
of six persons should be formed, whose business


VOL J. F




82 N ARRATIVE OF THE


it should be to enlist under the national standard
aH males between the ages of sixteen and forty-
five. Messengers were líkewise despatched to the
captain-general of Cadiz, to General Castanos,
commandant of the camps at San Roche; to the
eities of Cordova, Grenada, and Jaen; and to all
the towns and villages near, to acquaint them with
the resolution which had been formed of deliver-
ing Spain, and to entreat their best assistance in
so just a cause. Light vessels were fitted out and
sailed both for the Canaries and South America;
eommissioners has tened to AIgarves and Alentejo.
to request the co-operation of the Portuguese;
and war, an interminable war, was solemnly
declared against France and N apoleon. At the
same time, proclamations were circulated, inviting
aH· Italians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, andother fo-.
reigners, to abandon tbe French standard, and
promising tbem the best treatment in the event of
their taking service in the armies of Spain. In
a word, every thing was done promptIy, actively.
and vigorously, whilst the most perfect order was
preserved; and tbe new government showed itself
not unworthy of the style which it employed, and
which by the juntas it was permitted to employ.


Wherever the emissaries of the Supreme Junta
appeared, they failed not to stir up among the
people a spirit in. every respect accordant to that
which animated themselves. In Cadiz, the niul-




l'ENINSULAIt W AR. 83


titude rose upon Solano, whose attachment 1'0
Godoy and the French continued unabated; and
having dragged bim from tbe bouse ofMr. Strange,
an Irish banker, with whom he had taken shelter,
they put him to death in a manner the most igno-
minious and cruel. Similar scenes were acted in
different towns of Spain, whilst as yet the fervour
of patriotism was too violent to be guided by rea-
son; and not a few, both of Frenchmen and tbeir
adberents, fell a sacrifice to popular fury. But to
tbe bonour of Spain be it remembered, tbat sbe
had suffered long and grievously under her op-
pressors; and that tbose wbo feH the effects of
tbe first effervescence of her wrath, were tewer by
far in number, tban fell in one day under the re-
gulated fusilade of tbe Frencb garrison of Madrid.


It was, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for
Spain, that the first great operations in which ber
patriot forces embarked, proved most of them suc-
cessfuL At Cadiz, a French fleet of five sail of
tbe line and three frigates, was compelled, after
a lengtbened cannonade, to surrender atdiscretion.
Two expeditions, simultaneously undertaken-one
under General Dupont, for the purpose of securing
the obedience of Andalusia; another under Marshal
Moncey, designed to establish the new govern-
ment in Valencia-were defeated; the latter with
the 10ss of a .large proportion, the former at the
expense of the wbole body of troops engaged in it.




84 NARRATIVE OF THE


As these were among the most brilliant services
performed by the Spaniards during the whole of
the war, and as they operated powerfullyupon its
results in other quarters, and in after campaigns, it
may not be ami ss to give a brief and conuected
sketch, both of the oue and the other.


N othing had as yet occurred to attract the at-
tention of the conquerors, beyond the murmurs
and complaints'which resounded from one end of
Spain to the other, when General Dupont, at the
head of six thousand infantry of the line, five
hundred marines of the imperial guard, two S\viss
regiments in the service of Spain, about three
thousand cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of can-
non, all well appointed and equipped, set out
from Toledo, where, for a month back, he had
established his head-quarters. He was directed
to rally under his standard as many Spanish troops
as he should chance to meet by the way; and he
was to be joined at Seville by a brigade of three
thousand men detached from the army ofPortugal.
General Dupont knew of no reason why he should
entertain a doubt of the final success of his enter-
prise: he was ignorant that he was about to enter
a country everywhere hostile to him; he there-
fore moved on WitilOut much circumspection, and
had no scruple about encumbering hiscolumns
with a long train of waggons and cars.


The road from Toledo to Cadiz, the extreme




PENINSULAR WAR. 85


point which Dupont had been. commanded to
reach, runs through the plains of La Mancha, over
the ridges of. the Sierra Morena. There is a
bridge upon the Guadalquivir at Andujar, which
the traveller passes, and then keeping close, to the
stream for a considerable distance, he recrosses
the same stream at Venta de Alcolia. Abont a
day's journey from this point lies the town of
Cordova, on the same side of the river as Andujar;
and at a sÍmilar distance from it, on the other
side, is the town of Jaen. Cordova is built upon
the direct road, as well as Cremona and Seville;
but as the French army never succeeded in pene-
trating beyond' the first of these places, it will not
be necessary to describe, with great minuteness,
the topography of the others.


Dupont traversed the plains, and reached the
vilIage of Carolina in the mountains, before any
symptoms of the kind of reception which awaited
him were exhibited. Carolina was almost en-
til'ely deserted; and from the reports üf the few
stragglers who still clung to their houses, it ap-
peared that the men had withdrawn with arms in
their hands. Dupont, however, contihued his
journey: he arrived at Andujar on the second
day; and there his doubts, if indeed he enter-
tained any, as to the accuracy of the report which
had been made to him, were dispelled. The
spirited resolutions of the junta of Seville were




86 NARHA'fIVE OF 'fHE


here made known to him; and he was given to
understand that his entrance into Cordova would
be disputed by the whole of the mal e population
of the province.


Startled, but not intimidated by this intelli-
gence, Dupont held his course; causing the sol-
diers to march with greater circumspection, and
covering his front and tlanks with skirmishers. He
crossed the Guadalquivir without opposition; but
as he approached Alcolia, the point where it be-
hoved him to cross again; he found it occupied in
considerable force by the Spaniards. A levy en
masse had . been formed, of which the command
was intrusted to Don Pedro Agostino de Echever-
ria, lieutenant-colonel, and president of the mili-
tary council of Cordova, for the suppression of
smuggling and other crimes in the Sietra Morena;
and supported by three or four thousand soldiers
of the line, it was now prepared to dispute with
Dupont's army the passage of the river.


The main body ofthe Spaniards was drawn up
along the right bank, so as to cover the bridge,
which they had neglected to break down; but a
considerable division, of which sorne part was
cavalry, remained .on the left bank for· the purpose
of taking the enemy in reverse. 1 t is hardly ne-
cessary to state that these dispositions, neither
justifiable in themselves, nor at all such as the
nature of the force employed might have sug-




PENINSULAR W AR. 87


gested, proved useless. The isolated corps twice
attempted to charge, but it was each time re-
pulsed with 10ss ;whilst the bridge and village
were . both carried at a rush, and the undisciplined
peasantry dispersed in every direction. Echever-
ria, however, rallied his regular troops as soon as
they had cleared the village, and began his retreat
in tolerable order; but the French cavalry speed,..
ily broke in upon them, and the rout became
general.


Dupont lost no time in following up the success
which he had obtained. He reached Cordova that
night; and finding the gates shut, and prepara-
tions apparentIy making for defence, he gave or-
ders that it should be carried by assault. These
orders were promptly obeyed. One round from
the artillery sufficed to burst the gates, and th.e
troops rushing in pell-mell, swept the streets with
a fire of musketry. This was,"perhaps, one of the
most wantonly cruel acts of violence committed
during the war; for the people offered no resis-
tance, only a few random shots having been fired
from sorne of the windows. But it was deemed
prudent, in the present condition of affairs, to
excite, as far as might be, the terror of the Spa;-
niards; and on this principIe Cordova was given
up to pillage.


Though he had so far succeeded in his under-
taking, Dupont was by no means disposed tú con-




88 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


sider his present situation as an enviable one.
Bands of armed peasantry soon began to gather
together, till they hemmed him in on every side ;
and such was their audacity, that it became im-
possible for individuals or even smaH parties to
stray to a moderate distance from the camp, with-
out running the risk of being killed or taken. On
endeavouring likewise to open a correspondence
with Madrid, he found that all means of communi-
cation between himself and that city were cut off.
1 t is true that his patrols of cavaIry, though pushed
as far as Carlota on the road to Seville, encoun-
tered no enemy; but rumours of numerous masses
in motion, of the advance of one corps from the
camp of San Roche, of another from Grenada, and
of a third already forming at Ecija, taught him
that one such victory as that of AlcoJia, was not
sufficient to secure the submission of a large and
populous province. Under these circumstances
he determined, at least for the present, to give up
aH idea of further conquest, and to establish him-
se1f at some point which should at once enable
him to re-open his communications with his rear,
and place him in a situation to renew, at his own
pleasure, offensive .operations.


With this view he evacuated Cordova at an
early hour on the morning of the 16th of June, and
reached Andujar without molestation on the 19th.
His next measure was to attempt the dispersion of




PENINSULAR WAR. 89


a band of armed peasants, who had assembled at
Jaen; and who, more than any others, pressed
upon his out-posts, and harassed his foraging par-
tieso The troops employed upon that service
found no great difficulty in accomplishing it; for
the insurgents were poorly organised, and gave
way as soon as attacked; but the conquerors went
much further than their chief intended them to go,
in punishing what they chose to designate as re-
bellion. General Dupont was desirous that the
town of Jaen should pay dearly for its patriotism;
but he was still more desirous that it should be
left uninjured as a place ofshelter, in case of need,
to his own army. The victorious detachment
committed in it the most horrible excesses, wan-
tonly destroying every morsel of food and every
cask of wine, which ought to have gone towards
the -sustenance of themselyes and their comrades.


Bythese movements Dupont so far bettered his
condition, that he was enabled to receive a strong
reinforcement under Generals Videl and Gobert,
and, to a certain extent, to re-open his communica-
tions with the capital; but he was still as far as
ever from being safe. The rumours which had
alarmed him whilst at Cordova were repeated,
with even greater semblance of truth, till he
reac~ed Andujar. It was soon ascertained that
levies were assembling in every direction around
him; and that, unless the passes of the Sierra Mo-




90 ~ARRATIVE OF THE


reria were occupied in force, he would be entirély
separated from every other corps of French troops
in the Peninsula. To occupy these passes, how-
ever, by detachments from his own army, was a
me asure upon which he was afraid to venture; he
considered himself barel y strong enough to main-
tain his present pqsition-to divide his strength
would be ruinous; but he despatched message
after message to Madrid, entreating that he might
not be abandoned, and stating, in the plainest lan-
guage, both the difficulties under which he then
Iaboured, and his apprehensions respecting the
future. Of these despatches a few only reached
the place of their destination, the remainder being
intercepted and carried to the Spanish generals ;
and as an opinion widely different from bis own
prevailed at head-quarters respecting the means
alreadyat his disposa1, no efforts were made to
comply with his wishes. It was, at the same
time, broadly hinted to him, that to abandon the
enterprise on which he had set out, would prove
extremely mischievous to the cause, and,as
a necessary consequence, bring down upon him-
self the displeasure of his master.


Dupont had acquired considerable reputation in
the wars of Italy and Germany, as a general of
division; but never acted before as commander-in-
chief of an army. Though the junction of Videl's
division increased the strength of his corps to full




PENINSULAR WAR. 91


sixteen thousand men, he persisted in keeping it
in a state of unaccountable inactivity. Ha:d he
moved at once either to the front or to the rear, it is
probable he would have carried.every thing before
him; for it was not till towards the middle of July,
that the junta of Seville succeeded in bringing to-
gether a force capable of opposing him; but he
was unwilling to advance' before a furthe;r rein-
forcement, for which he had applied to Marshal
J unot, should have come in; whilst to retreat,
would be to íncur the censure of which he had
been already forewarned, and of which he enter-


. tained at least an adequate degree of apprehen-
SlOn. He accordingly contented himself with the
destruction of the . bridges over the Guadalquivir,
and the erectionof a redoubt here and there along
its banks; whilst by occupying Baylen in his rear,.
ando keeping a garrison in the tete-du-pont at
Mengibar, he persuaded himself that his position
would be amply secured against any attempts
which the insurgents could make against i1:.


Whilst he was thus 'Yasting time, the Spanish
government strained every nerve for the purpose
of bringing into the field a force adequate, both by
its numbers and its discipline, to act on the offen-
sive. EarIy in July, about thirty thousand..men,
the greater part of w hom were old soldiers,
moved towards Andujar. They were commanded
by Castanos, who had been recalled for the pur-




92 NARRATIVE OF THE


pose from the camp at San Roche; and they num-
bered among their generals of division two of the
most distinguished officers in the Spanish service,"
General Reding and the Marquis de la Coupigny.
Part of this force encountered at Jaen a French
brigade under General Cassagne, which had pro-
ceeded thither as a sort of advanced-guard from
the main army, and after a sanguinary conflict,
compelled it to retire. A position was next taken
up within cannon-shot of Dupont's lines; and
there a plan was ente red into, of which the success
proved to be even more complete than the most
sanguine could have possibly anticipated.


It was agreed that Castanos with one division
should temain where he was, to keep the attention
of Dupont, as far as might be practicable, fixed
upon a single point. In the mean while General
Reding, at the head of eight thousand men, was to
force the tete-du-pont at Mengibar, to march upon
Baylen, and attack the enemy there; and he was
to be supported by the Marquis de la Coupigny,
who, from La Heguerita and Villaneuva, -was to
straighten the left of the French army; whilst a
corps of two thousand men, under Don Juan de la
Cruz, was to push for the Sierra Morena, and
block up every line of retreat in that direction.


The plan was carried into execution on the 16th
of July. Reding assaulted and reduced the re-
doubt at Mengibar, crossed the Guadalquivir, and




PENINSULAR WAR. 93


drove in the French posts upon Baylen; but find-
ing that Coupigny had not come up, he fell back
again after dark, and repassed the river. As soon
as Baylen 'was known to be in danger, General
Videl, with six thousand men, hastened to cover
it. He arrived there that night, but he found in
it neither friend nor foe; because the Spaniards
had already executed their retrograde movement,
and General Dufour, who on the fall of Gohert suc-
ceeded to the command of the French, had evacu-
ated the place as no longer tenahle. Videl was
naturally a good deal alarmed at this; and his
alarm hecame greatIy increased when it was re-
ported to him that the sound of firing had been
heard in the direction of the Sierra Morena.
He made up his mind in a moment that Dufour
had be en driven back upon Carolina, and that,
unless he hastened to support him, the retreat
upon Madrid would he entirely cut off. Under
this persuasion he lost no time in despatching a
messenger to Dupont, informing him of what he
meant to do, and then proceeded, without allowing
his troops a moment to rest, in search of Dufour.


General Vid el reached Carolina on the 17th;
and on the same day Reding and Coupigny hav-
ing formed their junction, returned to Baylen.
They took peaceable possession of it, and instantly
sending to make Castanos aware of their success,
desired to be instructedas to their future move..,




94 NARRATIVE OF THE


ments. They were ordered to march forthwith
upon Andujar, against which the united efforts of
the whole Spanish army were now about to be
turned.


The troops had hardly taken their stations on
the morning of the 19th, preparatory to this move-
ment, when they found themselves in presence of
the advanced-guard of Dupont's corps, which was
now in full retreat towards the Sierra Morena.
The arrival of Videl's despatch had at length
opened the eyes of the French General to the real
perils of his situation. He saw that the póint
from which he had hitherto apprehended an attack,
was, comparatively speaking, one of slight impor-
tance, and that it was from the rear that danger,
if it came at all, was to be apprehended; and he
reluctantly determined to abandon Andujar, and
to retreat as fir at least as La Carolina, from
whence other operations could at his leisure be
undertaken, either offensively or defensively, as
circumstances might point out.


With this design he moved from the town soon
after night-fall on the 18th; but as he carried
alon~ with him vast multitudes of carriages and
waggons, his march was necessarily rendered both
slow andstraggling. Though the head of his co-
lumn quitted its ground aboutten o'clock, dawn
was beginning to appear before the last sections
moved off; and when the momerit of trial carne,




PENINSULAR W AR. 95


the former were found to be at the distance of
nearly three leagues from the latter. It was well
for the Spaniards under Reding, that Dupont had
deemed it expedient to bestow so much care upon
the preservation of his plunder. Had the French
moved in compact order, so as to bring the whole
of their force into action at once, their enemies,
however brave and resolute, could have hardly
withstood the shock; for there was no great dis-
parity in point of numbers between them, andthe
advantages of discipline and experience were aH
in favour of the French; but this they were not
able to effect. On the contrary, regiment after
regiment, and gun after gun, were hurried into fire
as fast as they carne up; the French fought as an
army always fights which is taken in detail; and
one part was utterly and irretrievably destroyed
before another could render it the smal1est as-
sistance.


It might be about three o'c1ock on the morning
of the 19th, when the scouts of the French army
suddenly feIl in with the advance of General Re-
ding's corps. By neither party was thé meeting
anticipated; but both sides made every disposi-
tion which their relative situation and the exigen-
ces of the moment seemed to require •. Dupont
felt that, unless he made good his passage at once
through the force opposed to him, his rear would
he assailed by Castanos; and he therefore directed




96 NARRATIVE 01< THE


the leading division to charge the Spaniards, with-·
out waiting for the arrival of their comrades. The
attack was bravely made, but it was no less bravely
resisted; and the affair, after a warm and deter-
mined struggle, ended in thé repulse of the assail-
ants on aH points. Very shortly, fresh troops ar-
rived, inc1uding a battalion of the marines of the
imperial guard, who renewed the contest with the
utmost gallantry; but neither their numbers nor
their pbysical strengh, worn down by a night-
march, and still further diminished by the rapidity
of their advance to the front, were competent to
carry them successfully through. The Spaniards
were superior to them in every respect, in num-
bers, in position, and in the quantity and weight
of their cannon; and though the French performed
prodigies of valour, they were foiled in every effort.
At last it was felt by all the officers present that
their case was a hopeless one; and just as Casta-
nos arrived upon their rear, and Don Juan de la
Cruz took his ground upon their flank, it was de-
termined to request a suspension of arms. The
request was immediately complied with. In spite
of the arrival of General Videl's corps, which, as
soon as the firing was heard, had hastened from
Carolina to the assistance of their comrades, the
negociation continued; and it ended in the sur-
render of the whole French army, to the amount
of fourteen thousand men, as prisoners of war.




I'ENINSU'LAR WA'R. 97


The entire course of the Spanish campaigns
produced novictory so decisive, or so ,influential
in its con sequen ces, as this. Not only was An-
dalusia freed frOln the presence -of the enemy, but
a degree of confidence was communicated to the
patriots in other quarters, such as they had not
previously experienced; and many an individual,
who up t~ that moment had wavered between his
duty and his interests, ceased to waver any
longer. At ,Madrid, again, the newsof the vic-
tory produced a verypowerfuleffect, as well upon
the French as upon the patriot party. The latter,
who for some time backh-ad dissembled their
sentiments, began again to give them vent in na-
tional cries and acts of petty disturban ce ; whilst
the former exhibited the líveliest symptoms of
alarrn, lest the conquerors 'should follow up thar
success by marching at once upon thecapital.
At this time Joseph Napoleon was resid,ent in the
eity; he had entered it only two days previously,
and had scarcely begun to exereÍse the functions
of royalty, when. the intelligence carne \1pon him
like a thunderb01t; and ,though eom:;cious of the
evils which' must necessarily attend the step, he


. determined t@ retire for thepresent upon hi8 re-
sources. He quitted Madrid on the 3Jst, and
issulng orders that all his scattered divisions'
should follow him, that the siege ,o{ Saragoza,


. then in progress, should he raised~ and further
VOL. J~




98 NARRATIVE OF THE


attempts upon Valencia abandoned, he fell back,
with the utmostprecipitation, beyond the Ebro.


In the mean while the expedition against Va.,.
leneia was conducted by Marshal Moncey under
circumstances not very dissimilar to those which
attended the progress of Dupont's operations.
When he quitted Madrid on the 4th of lune,
Moncey was indeed aware that his object was
not likely to be accomplished without opposition;
and he took his measures, as an able officer might
be expected to do when setting out upon an un-
dertaking of doubtfulissue. The force which im-
mediately followed his own, amounted to sorne
eight or nine thousand men of all arms; there
were in quarters,along his line of march, two
battalions of Spanish and Walloon guards, and
three companies of the king's body-gUards, whom
he ordered to join him; and he requested, and
obtained a promise, that General Chabran's divi-
sion, which consisted of five thousand men, and
which was then stationed at Barcelona, should be
erdered round to Tortosa, and placed at his dis-
posal. With sueh a force he naturally concluded
that any resistance 'Y hich an armed peasantry
€ould offer, would. be easily overcome; and per-
haps, had the whole of the force assembled undet
his standard, these expectations would not have
proved groundless.·


Moncey reached Cuenca on the . 11th, where>




l'E"NINSULA R W A R. 99


instead of a strong brigade of Spanish troops, 'he
found only the skeletons of a few companies, the
rest having deserted to join ,the cause of the in-
surgents. He was; as might be expected, both
alarmed and disappointed at the event; and he
wrote instantly to Madrid, to request that a
column might move from that place upon Albacete,
in order to cover his right. N ot satisfied with
this, he despatched an aide-de-camp to General
Chabran, to request that he would'instantly proceed
to Castellar de la Plana, that he would there take
under his orders the corps of General Requena,
and hurry forward to reinforce his own corps. This
done, he halted for eight days, not more to collect
his own resources, than to enable his messengers
to reach their several points of destination; aod
thenhe renewed his march, which was conducted
throughout with the utmostcaution and circlim-
spection.


Theinsurrection at Valencia had been attended
by ciréumstances of fearful crue1ty, hundreds oC
innoeent French inhabitants falling a sacrifice tJ
the fury of tbe mOD. 'But it wa-s not in this casé
as in most others, that they who exhibit the
greatest ferocity against people uilable to defend
themselves, are the fitst to turn their backs,upen
danger. The Valencians entered zealously irito
the national cause; insomuch tlíat, not content to
await the approach of the Prehch, they marched




100 N ARRATIVE.0.F TUE


forwarq to meet them. The first encounter took
place at the bridge of Pajazo over the Cabriel, and
it ended, as might have been antiéipated, in the
defeat of the patriots. A second stand was. made
among the mountains, in the gorge of the principal
defile between Siete Aguas and Venta de Bunol.
This position was occupied by two thousand regu-
lar infantry, six or seven thousand armed peasants;
and twelve pieces of cannon; who did not give
way without offering a resolute and lengthened
resistance; nor was it till after he had a third
time beaten his enemies in the field, that Marshal
Moncey found himself in a situation to summon
Valencia. Bu! his summons was disregarded.
Thepeople were determined to bury themselves
';1nder the ruins' of their city; and it consequently
Decame' necessary to carry the place by assault. '
, Valencia contained, at that time, a population


little short of one hundred thousand souIs. It
was ,surrounded by a low stone wall, well flanked
by towers and angles, and covered with a ditch,
into which, fromacanal hanL 'Qy. water couldat
any moment be admitted. There was an arsenal
in it filled with muskets, swords, and other wea-
pons; and there were a considerable number of
heavy cannon mounted upon the. ramparts. The
easy rate at which Moncey had advanced, enabled
the authorities to turn these advantages to a good
account; and when' theFrench appeared,' the




PENINSULAR WAR. 101


city was in aÍl excellent condition to receive arid
repelan assault. Of aH this the French were, oí
course, ignorant; and expeéting that no serious
ópposition would be attempted, they advanced, at
three o'cIock in the afterÍloon of the 28th, in
columns of attack.


The Spaniards were now in that sítuation which
they have invariably shown themselves best calcu-
lated to tm. Coveredby their walls, and amply
supplied with ammuriition, they poured upon the
assailants an incessant and heavy shower ofmusket
and cannon balls, which swept down whole com~
panies of rilen, and disabled the few light pieces'
which were opposed to it. The French dashed
boldly up to the edge of the ditch; some of them
even forced their way within the gates; butthe
fire was so tremendous, and the obstacles th,rown
in their way so insurmoun"table, that their disci-
pliried valour availed them nothing. Having kept
their ground, under shelter of the houses in the"
suburbs, till dark, they fell back to their camp,
leaving behind them upwards of two thousand men,
in killed, wounded, and missing.


The result of this day's operations was sufficient
to convince Marshal Moncey that any further
attempts, with his present force, upon Valencia,
would end only in his own destruction. He ac-
cordingly determined on a retreat; which, after
having manreuvl'ed during the 29th so as to keep




102 NARUATIVE OF THE


the Spaniards in doubt as to his inteniions, Ile
caTried, on the 30th, into effect. lt was high time
for him to. adopt this measure. Several corps,
composed partIy of regular troops, partly of .armed
peasantry, were forming in his rear; nor was it
tiU he had overthrown sorne of these, first on the
han ks of the Xucar, and afterwards in the vicinity
ofAlmanza, that he made good his entrance inta
Albacéte.


N ot less gratifying· to the friends of freedom was
the defence which, much about the same time, th.e
eity of Saragoza offered to the attempts of General
Le Febvre ;and ha,d tt not beeu for the fatal dis-
eomfiture at Medina del Rio Seco, the Spaniards
would have had no cause to speak with regret oí
the issues of theÍr first campaign. But that defeat
was asevere hlowupon the patriot cause; not
only because it opened 3; way to Madrid to the
sovereign whom Buonaparte had appointed, but
because it contributed to prevent a British army
from appearing in the field at a moment ahd
uuder eircumstanees whieh would have rendered
. its appearance peculiarly fortunate. It will be
nccessary, however, before enteriJilg at all inta the
narrative of that battle, to give, in few words,. an
abstract of the transactions which, both iu Eng-
]und and at Bayonne,. wel'e going on with reference
to the mighty con test.


The Spaniards had no 800ner raised the standard




PENINSULAR W AR. 103


of independence, than they felt the necessity of
applying to England for aid. The first deputies
who arrived for that purpose,. were desp(i.tched by
the. principality of the Asturias; and they-were
followed by a successíon of envoys from other
provinces, including -that of Seville, where the
Supreme Junta had established itself. Their re-
ception was such as the nature of the business on
w hich they came, and the disposition of the people
to whom they weresuitors, might have authorised
them to expect. AH ranks and classes of men
appeared eager to evince their respect for the
representatives of a nation engaged in a struggle,
sacred, in the eyes of Englishmen, as the object
which it sought to attain; and not the government
only, but corporate bodies and private individuals,
made haste to mark the sense which they enter-
tainéd of the gallantry and devotion already dis-.
played in the contesto


Subscriptions were opened in most of the large
towns in the kingdom, from which considerable
sums were realised, and applied to the service
oí the patriots. AH the Spanish prisoners taken
during the late war were set at liberty; and
being armed, clothed, and equipped, they were
transported to their native shores, that they might
assist in the great work of liberating their count~y.
Nor did the efforts of Great Britain end there.




104 NARRATIVJ:<: OF 'l'HE


"Large quantities of inuskéts, of cannon;balls, -p6w-
der, and othe}; military stores, were- conveyed to
different ports of the Peninsula, for the purpose oí
at:m'ing a population which professed to stand in
need only of arms to instue success; whilst the
admirals on the station, as well as the Governor of
Gibraltar, received orders to comrnunicate with
the Spanish autlÍorities as often as need be, and tó
lend every assistance which the latter might re-
quire,. or the former might be able to afford.


The Spanish deputies, acting in accordance with
their instructions,.. had taken care to assure the
British. government that Spain required no troops
trpm this country> because every Spálliard capable
9f wielding a musket was anxious" to take the field
against the invaders. N otwithstanding these de-
clarations, the British government was too much
alive to the important results which hung upon the
issues of the struggle, to leavethe maintenance of
it altogether to the undisciplined valor of the
patriots; it determined to support them with an
army ofBEitish soldiers;and it resolvedthat the
force employed $hould be such as, without alarm-
ing the jealousy or wounding the pride of the pa-
triots, IDight constitute an efficient nucleus round
which larger armies might gather.


The first British force which showed itself UpOIl--
t)le theatre of war; consiBted of a small diviBion óf




PENINSULAR WAR. 105


infantry and artillery, detached, rinder the ordeÍ's
ofMajor-g.eneraISpencer, from the fortress of
Gibraltar.


It has been stated that the authorities at horne;
as soon as they were made aware of the state of
public feeling in the nations of the Peninsula,
issued orders for the cordial co-operation of the
governor of that place, as well as the British ad~
mirals on the station, in any movernents against
the French force s which might hold out.a P!o"spéct
of success. Neithel' Admiral Collingwood, how-
ever, nor Sir Hew Dalrymple, had judged it ne-
cessary to wait the arrival of these orders. From
the first cornmencement of disturbances iti the
province of Seville, a constant intercourse had
been kept up by both, with the chiefs and leaders
of the Spanish mSllrgents; and as soon as the
disposition rnanifested on the part of thé people
of Cadiz became known, an armament both of
ships and troops was prepared to support it.
Major-general Spencer, with several English and
two Sicilian regirnents, arnounting in aH.to about
five thousand men, embarked on, board of a fleet
of transports, and covered 'by the squadron of Lord
Collingwood, set sail for Cadiz. The jointpropo..;
sal of these officers to assist in the subjúgation of
the French Heet was indeed declined, the Spa-
niards being confident in their (>wn resources, and
perhaps entertaining sorne apprehension· lest the




106 NARRATIVE OE THE


views of the allies might extendfurther than to the
aid proposed; but General Morla gladly av~iled
himself of the presence of the British corps to
cover the rear of Castanos's 'army, and to secure it
against any attack from the side of Alentejo, whilst
prosecuting the plan of operations on which it had
embarked. General Spencer accordingly landed
his division at Ayamonte, on the Guadiana. By
this movement he caused certain reinforcements,
which pupont had earnestly requested froro Junot,
and which had begun their march for the pur-
pose of joining him, to fall back with precipi-
tation upoQ Lisbon; and. though he steadily re-
fu sed to' commit himselfwith the Spanish columns,
which were gradualIy enclosing the French troops
at Baylen, he nevertheless gave aH the additional
vigour to theircouncils, which arose froro the'
knowledge that, in case of any reverse, there was
a point behind them on which they could safe)y
faH back.


Whilst the naval and military commanders in
the Mediterranean were thus exerting themselves,
an effort was made in the north, and made with
the most complete success, to restore to the ser-
vice of his country one of the ablest officers of
which Spain could at that time boast.One oí
Buonaparte's first measures, when meditating the
subjugation ofthe Peninsula, was to demand from
S pain a corps of sixteen thousand veteran troops,




PEN~NSULAR W AR. 107


whom, under the Marquess de la Romana, he em-
ployed for a time upon the banks of the Vistula,
and 'afterwards removed to tbe shores of the Great
Belt; They were distributed at different points in
that district, when the standard of independence
was raised; and one of tbe earliest rneasures of
the Supreme Junta was to issue a proclamation,
calling upon them, in the name of their country,.
to return to its defence. This was necessarily
consigned to the care of the British cruisers'; and
it was not given to thern in vain. A scherne for its
delivery, as well as for the removal of the soldiers,.
should they, as it was believed they would, desire
to cornply with its terms, was immediately devised
in London ; and the execution of it was committed
to Vice-admiral Keats,. an officer· well worthy of
t\le trust. lt succeeded to admiration; and seven
tho1J$3.nd ,men, with Romana at their head,wert}
transferred from the ranks of the enemy, and
éldded, at a moment of peculiar interest, to those-
oí the patriot army.


It wasnot, however, by such assistance alone,.
that the cause of Spain and of Europe could be;
effectually forwarded ; and to such a$sÍsta,nce. the
Britü;h government was not disposed to limit itself.
The wÜldom, or rather the necessity under which
England lay, of striking a great blow, now that the-
very field of action which she had so long desired
was opened to her, could not escape the penetra-




108 NARRA TIVE OF THE


tion of the most obtuse-minded; and preparations-
begari to be made for carrying on hostilities by
land, on a"scale which had never beforebeen at-
témpted since the commericement of tbe war.


lri tbe eiuly part óf the summer, and before any
expectation had arisen of the events which after-
wards occurred, a corps of nine thousand men had
assembled at Cork, under the orders of Lieutenant-
ge"neral Sir Arthmi Wellesley. Of General Wel-
lesley' s ear]y services, and of the reputation which
he had already earned fo"r himself, it is not neces':
sary in this place to take any notice. It is suffi-
cient to observe that there was not an officer in the
ármy, to whom both the profession and the nation
at large would have more readily intrusted the"
~om!lland of a force which required courage of the
highest order, and ability in the most extensive
sen se of the tern:, in its direction; and that his
past conduct, both in Europe and in India," fully
justified all classes in the opinion which they had
formed; whilst his nomination and selection im..,
mortalised the judgment ofthat minister whó laid
his name before the King for~ tlle cornmand.
With what view the corps in question began to
concentrate itself, was not, at the moment, accu-
rately known. By some, an attack upon" Cuba
was spoken of as in meditation; by others, a fresh-
attempt upon Buenos Ayres was represented as
more probable; but whatever the object might




PENINSU LA R W A R. 109


be which the armament was originalIy intended to
serve, of that object the recént events in Spain
caused an immediate abandonlI1ent. General
Wellesley was directed t{) proeeed without 'delay
to the assistanee of England's new ally; and as the
northern provinces held out, in m~ny respects, the
greatest facilities for a British force to aet with ~f­
fect, the port of Corunna was specified as a conve-
niElOt point from which to commence his opera-
tions.


In the mean while, N apoleon was following up,
with all the vigour of mind which so peculiarly
distinguished him, the first steps which he had
taken towards the, establishment of a princeof his
own blood upon the throne of Spain. The abdi-
cation of Charles IV, and the résignation of the
rights' of his family, weré speedily proclaimed to
Spain, and to the world; and it was further ao-
nounced that the Emperor, anxious to iusure the
glory and integrity of the Spanish monarchy, had
determined to waive his own pretensions in favoÜi.
of Joseph. King of Naples. But Napoleon was
desirous. not only that his, brother should reig'n,
but that he should have the appearance of reigúirig"
over a free aÍld a conteRted people; and the cortes
w'as, in consequence, invited to assemble. for the
purpose of framing a constitution which might
mSure to lhe Spaniards the' blessing' of just laws




110 NARRATIVE OF THE


and an equitable administration of thero, among all
ranks and classes of meno


The proeeedings of the body which, under the
appellation of an Assembly of Notables, met toge-
tUer' in obedienee to the summons of Buonaparte,
have been so often laid before the poblie, that to


. repeat them here would be to waste time for very
little putpose. Let it suffice to state that, towards
the éndof May, and during the first days of June,
there arrived in Bayonne upwards of ninety per-
sons, all that eould be eollected together out of
ane hundred and sixty who had been deputed;
that they were, with few exeeptions, men distin-
guished for their rank, their talents, or for the
stake whieh they held in the eountry; and that,


. llfter many moek sittings and delibel'ations, they
aeeepted Joseph as their sovereign, and dtew up
the charter whiehwas to form the basis of his sys-
tem of government. This done, Joseph was pro-
claimed King of Spain and the lndies in due formo
He nominated his ministers, appointing tooffiee
110t only those Upon whose fidelity 11e felt that he
might depend,but· many' oIi whose aequiescenee
in the new arrangements he tiad no right to caI-
eulate, but whom he trusted, by this show~ of
clemency and eonsideration to gain over to his
party; and on the 10th of JuIy, surrounded by the
members of his eouneil, he passed the Bidassoa.




PENINSULAR WAR. 111


At the moment when Joseph. eommenced his
journey towards Madrid, the' armies of Marshal
Bessieres on the one hand, andofCuesta and Blake
on the other, were executing that series of move-
ments and manreuvres which ended in the dis-
astrous battIe of Medina del Río SeGo. For some
time previous, the northern provinces of Spain
had been the scene of numerous skirmishes and
encounters, to enter into arninute detail of which
would be altogether foreign to the design of the
present work. In the course of these, the usual
quantity of enormities were comrnitted on both
sides. As' often as a fewstragglers frorn the
French army, or the French inhabitants of a
Spanish town, feH into the hands of an enraged
peasantry, they were put to death with circum-
stances of peculiar cruelty.; whilst tbe French
failed' not to avenge these excesses, by giving up
to plunder, and levelling with tbe ground, every
town or village which ventured to oppose their
progress. On the Iatter principIe, because a few
hundred half-armed men presumed to defend it,
Logrono' was severely visited; Torquemada was
destroyed; and Palencia escaped a similar fate,
only by.tbe haste of its dignitaries in giving 1ft
their submission. The focus of the insurrection,
however, was kno",n to be Valladolid, a city
which contained upwards of twenty-five thousand
inhabitants; and .against it Bessieres, whose head-




112 NARRATIVE al' TH'E


quarters were established at Burgos, gave orders
that an expedition sftould be fOl'med,


Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, an old, brave, but
headstrong officer,commanded, at this time, an
assemblage of undisciplined peasantry, with whom
he seemed determined to make a stand in defence
of Valladolid, He was one of those who, at the
commencement of the troubles, not only gave no
éncouragenient to the feelings of the people, but
exerted himself to allay them ; eitber pecause he
was satisfied that successful resistan ce would be
impracticable, or that in the changes which a re-
volution could not fail to bring about, many sub-
stantial benefits would accrue to the nation ¡¡.t
large. As soon, bowever, as he became satisfied
that it was the nation which had risen in. arms, he
hasteried to make amends fol' his former back-
~ardness, a,nd entered heartily into the cause,
which he now regarded as thatof his country. It
was somewhat remarkable that Cuesta was among
the number of those who held office both under
Ferdinand and under Joseph. By the former he
had been appointed captain-general of Castile and
Leon, an authority which he actually exercised;
whilst by the lattel' hewas nominated to the vice-
royalty of Mexieo, at the very moment w,hen his
~ettel' judgment led him to draw the sword against
the power which desired to promote him.


General Cuesta, with bis half-armed rabble.




PEKINSULAR WAR. ]13


took up a position at Cabezon, about two leagues
from Valladolid. He was attacked there on the
12th of JUlle by two divisions of the Frencharmy,
011e under General Lassalle, the' other under Ge-
neral MerIe; and after a short but warm con test,
was dislodged and overthrown, with the loss of an
his cannon, and nearly one thousand meno The
immediate consequences of this victory were, not
only the submission of Valladolid to the conque-
rors, but the occupation of Santander; the latter
being a place of which they were peculiarly jea-
IDus, because of its excellent harbour. But
Cuesta,thóugh defeated, was far from heing dis-
couraged. He withdrew with the remains of his
force to Benevente; where he employed himself
in raising new levies, and in giving sorne appear~
ance of organisation to tllose which were already
enroI¡ed under his standard.


It was not long before intelligence reached
Bessieres, not only that Cuesta's troops were re-
assembling, but that a considerable army which
had been formed under Blake, in the province of
Gallicia, was about to advance against him. Bes.;.
sieres issued orders for the concentration of an his
forces at Palencia, with the exception of three
battalions, which were left to protect Santander,
and a like number af Vittoriá, to keep open the
communication with France. . He himself, like-
wise, prepared to take the field; and having


VOL. l. H




114 NARRATIYE OF 'CHE


learned that Cuesta and Blake were actua11y in
conjunction, and that they had taken up a posi-
tion at Medina del Rio Seco, he set out, on the
13th of July, for· the purpose of bringing them to
action.


The battle of Medina del Río Seco was fought
on tbe 14th of July. It ended, as the reader
knows, in the utter rout of the Spaniards; over
whom, however, the victory was not won, till all
the energies of the conquerors had be en brought
into play, and a heavy 1088 sustained, in killed and
wounded, on both sides. Tbe Spaniards appear,
even by the confession of their enem}es, to have
fought well on, tbat day; and their defeat may be .
attributed, rather to a want of judgment in their
1eaders, than to any absence of courage among the
troops. Yet were the issues of the struggle of
the most disastrous nature. Fifteen pieces of
cannon, and upwards of six thousand men, were
1eft upon the fie1d; wbilst the road was coro-
plete1y laid open to the invaders as far as the capital.
But even these, though heavy calamities, were not
a11 which may be traced back to the defeat at Rio
Seco. It was at this unlucky moment that the
British army, destined to support the patriot cause,
set sail froro the harbour of Cork; and its General
reached Corunna only in time to be told that there
was no longer a fleld fol' its operations in the north
of Spain.




PENINSULAR WAlt. 11;


The army in q uestion having completed its ar
rangements, put to sea on the 12th of July. Afte
continuing with the fleet only a few hours, Si
Arthur Wellesley, who was embarked in a fast
sailing frigate, hastened on, and arrived at Co·
runna on the 20th. He lost no time in opening !
correspondence wíth the junta of Gallicia, fron
whom he reeeived the distressing intelligence o
the overthrow of their army; and by whom hf
was assured that, the enemy being now in pos·
session of the course of the' Douro, all communica·
tion between that provine e and those to thE:
south and east, was cut off. There is reason te
believe that in this dilemma, and because the~
still persisted in believing that Spain stood in n<J
need of men, but of arms and money only, they
recommended to him the propriety of effeeting a
debarkation somewhere in Portugal, and aeting in
conjunction with the insurgents there against the
corps of Marshal Junot; and as the advice ac-
corded perfectIy with the tenor of his instructions j
as well perhaps as with his own views, Sir Arthur
prepared to adopt it. Having supplied the Galli·
cians with 200,000l. in money, and assured thero
of the speedyarrival of a large quantity of military
stores, he once more put to sea; and directing hi~
own fleet to follow him thither, made at once fOl
the harbour of Oporto.


Of the polítical condition in which Portugal




116 NARRATIVE OF THE


then stood, a few words will suffice to convey to
the mind of the readei- a tolerably accurate idea.
The discontent which has been represented in a
former'chapter, as prevailing among aH ranks of
men, increased in violence every day, till it be-
carne manifest to every observer that a general
insurrection was at hand. It was not, however,
till the whole of Spain was in arms, nor indeed
till the Spanishtroops which accompanied Junot's
army had set them the example, thatthe Portu-
gu~se ventured to raise the standard ofrevolt; but
when it was raised, the same spirit of persevérance
-the same determination to live or die in free-
dorri, which was already in the full exercise of its
energies among their neighbours, appeared every-
where to animate them.


N otwithstanding the numerous .private quarrels
which arose in parts of the kingdom, and the' occa-
sional bursts of hatred against the intruders which
from time to time showed themselves both in the
capital and elsewhere, J unot persisted in repre-
seriting-perhaps in believing-that the Portu-
guese were brought completely into subjection,
till the delusion became suddenly dispelled ina
manner which w~s far from being satisfactory.
In the' month of June two detachments, to consist
of four thousand men each, were demanded from
the army of Portugal; one for the purpose of
supporting Bessieres by the occupation of Ciudad




PENINSULAlt W AR. 117


Rodrigo; the other to co-op~rate with Dupont in
taking possession of Andalúsia. The first of these,
under Loison, having advanced as far as Rodrigo,
and finding the whole country in arms, and the
gates of the place shut, suspended its operations,
and fell back; the second under Avril, was not
more fortunate in its undertakings. Badajoz had
declared for King Ferdinand; the whole of the
frontier was in arms; and the Spaniards and Por-
tuguese, ofwhom a considerable number were at~
tached to his division, deserted by ",hole compa-
nies. Besides, General Spencer, with his five
thousand English, lay between him and the point
which he had been ordered to reach, and General
Avril abandoned his enterprise. Bufsuch misfor-
tunes were trifling when compared to others which
shortIy followed.


N () great while ehipsed before the agents of the
Supreme Junta found means to communicate both
to the Spanish corps, which, Ululer Quesnel, occu-
pied Oporto, and to Caraffa'sdivision in Lisbon,
the course which events had taken both at Ba-
yonne and Madrid. The intelligence was received
by the troops with the utmost indignation. In
Oporto, they rose at once upon the General; ar-
rested him with his staff and his escort; and hav-
ing given up the city into the hands of the munici-
pal authorities, marched away to join their coun-
trymen in Gallicia. ,In Lisbon they were only




118 N AltRA'fIVE OF THE


prevented from adopting a similar course by the
promptitude and decision of J unot. InstantIy on
the news froro Oporto being reported tohim, he
caused the whole of Caraffa's corps to be arrested
and disarmed; and putting them on board of cer-


. tain hulks which lay at anchor in the· Tagus, he
kept them there as prisoners. But the ímpetus
to a general revolt was given; the match was al-
ready laid to the train, and no exertions on the
part of the French functionaries could hinder it
from exploding.


On the first impulse of the moment, the autho-
rities at Oporto cast Quesnel into prison, tore
down the French flag, and hoisted the national
standard in ¡ts place. By degrees, however, they
became alarmed at. the boldness of their own pro-
ceedings; and seeing themselves deserted by the
Spaniards, they began to devise schemes for avert-
ing the vengeance of the French General. Don
Luiz d'Oliveira, ¡nto whose hands the temporary
power had been intrusted, betrayed that trust so
far as to write, in terms unworthy of a Portuguese,
to Junot, and to· restore the tri-coloured flag to its
former position; whilst he endeavoured, by various
acts of kindness . towards the French, to make
amends for the violence which they had suffered
a few days before. But a spirit had gone abroad
in other quarters, which soon renewed in the in-
habitants of Oporto that hatred of their oppressors




PENINSULAR WAH. 119


of which they had already given sorne proof; and
the cry of " Death to the French-Long live the
Regent!" resounded through the streets. These
cries were speedily followed by a second decla-
ration ofindependence. Oliveira was put to death;
and a junta having formed itself, in imitation of
ihat of Seville, proceeded, with the venerable
bishop at its head, to issue proclamations, and to
call upon all good Portuguese to unite against the
common enemy.


The appeal of the junta was heard through ...
out the whole kingdom; and it was everywhere
obeyed. The students at the University of Coim-
bra were among" the first to take up arms; the
peasantry of Tras os Montes were not less on the
alert; Algarves was in open revolt, and the Alen-
tejo ripe for insurrection. That which he had long
apprehended, Junot saw at length in progress, and
proceeding with a violence and energy which
threatened to set all endeavours to suppress it at
defiance; but Junot was not aman to succumb
under difficulties, however imminent. He set
himself vigorously to the task of allaying the
. general ferment; and he applied to that object
not force alone, but all the expedients of flattering
harangues and conciliatory measures.


Bis first act ",as to remit what had not heen
paid of the contribution formerly imposed upon
the people. He next affected to take the Portu-




120 N ARRA TIVE OF 'CHE


guese troops under his especial care, augmenting
thcir pay, discharging their arrears, and appearing
to place the utmost reliance upon their fidelity
andvalour; and hedid his best to amuse the in-
habitantsof Lisbon," by a renewal of the proces-
sions and religious festivals to which they had in
former tim€s be en accUstomed. Butwhilst he
pursued this course in h:is more general measures,
he was not.· unmindful .of the policy of striking
terror by particular examples; and he set on foot
a rnultitude of separate expeditions, with the view
of crushing the rebeHion in each of the towns or
districts where it rnjght appear to rage with the
greatest violence. On that errand Loison, who
had returned to Lisbon, was despatched against
Oporto, at the head of three battalions of infantry
and several squadrons of horse; Thornieres was .
directed to reduce Fort N azareth; whilst Keller-
man . was sent to insure the obedience of Villa
Franca, Alcoentre, and Alcoba~a. These are but
a few of the expeditions which the Duke of Abran-
tes found it necessary to fit out,.of which sorne
were áttended with mornentary. success, whilst
others entirely failed. But even the successes of
the French proved of little solid utility to thero.
As long as an arrned force was at hand, to oppose
which no rneans existed, a town, or village, or
even a district, would remain quiet,-the ver y
next instant aner the troops were withdrawn, aH




PENINSULAR W AR. 121


became again tumult and commotion. Junot saw
and felt his embarrassments keenly; but the
moment was now rapidly approaching which pro-
mised to bring these difficulties to a head. Ru-
rnours were in hourly circulation of the coming of
a British arrny, and at last it was officially corn- .
municated that a British arrny had landed.




122 NARRATIVE O}' 'fHB


CHAPTER V.


ArrivaI of Sir Arthúr Wellesley at Oporto-His cOllferencc
with the junta-The transports assemble off Mondego,and
the troops are landed- Strange conduct of General Freire
and the Portuguese army-Junot takes measures to oppose
the progress of the English, and calls in his detachments-
Delaborde retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley-Battle of
Loris:a-Arrival of General Anstruther on the coast-March
of the British army toVimiero-Sir Harry Burrard arrives
in the offing-Is visited by General Wellesley; but refuses
to sanction an advance~The British attacked by Junot's
army-Bat~le of Vimiero.


SIR AR'fHUR W ELLESLEY, as soon as he had c1osE'd.
his corresponden ce with the junta of Gallicia, and
directed the transports which conveyed his troops
to rendezvous at the rnouth of the Mondego, pro-
ceeded in person to Oporto, for the purpose of
arranging sorne plan of campaign with the govern-
ment of that place, or, as it then termed itself, the
Suprerne Junta of Portugal. He was received by
the bishop, as head of the body, with every ap-




PENINSULAR W AU. 123


pearance of cordiality; and all the supplies of dif-
ferent kinds of which he stood in need, including
draft cattle of various descriptions, were readily
promised to him; but when he proposed to effect
a landing there, and to co-operate with the gar-
rison in a movement upon the capital, a variety of
objections were started to the measure. lt was
suggested that, by landing on sorne part of the
coast nearer to Lisbon, Junot might be attacked
beforeall or even most of his detachments, at that
moment scattered through the country, could be
called in; whilst the Portuguese in Oporto would
be ready to intercept his retreat, in case .he should
endeavour to make any movement towards Gal-
licia. How far Sir Arthur was swayed by this
reasoning, it would be presuming to pronounce; a
communication from Admiral Sir Charles Cotton,
it is' believed, determined him to seek a point of
landing elsewhere; and he followed his transports
to the appointed place of meeting in Mondego
Bay.


On his arrival there, he found that important
despatches from England were waiting for him.
By these, he was informed that fresh troops
might be expected to join bis army every moment;
one division being aIread y embarked at Ramsgate
under Brigadier-general Anstruther, whilst ano-
ther was assembling at Harwich; but it was at
the same time intimated to him that Sir Hew




124 NAltRATIVE OF THE


Dalrymple had received orders to proceed from
Gibraltar in the character of commander-in-chief ;
Sir Harry Burrard had been nominated as second ;
and Sir Jobn Moore, who had just returned" from
the Baltic with a corps of ten thousand men, was
likewise to serve in Portugal. In spite of these
arrangements, however, Sir Arthur was enjoined
to make good his landing, whenever a favourable
opportunity should offei-, and to enter at once
upon any series of operations, for the successful
accomplishment of which he might judge himself
sufficiently strong.


In obedience to these instructions; and having
conferred with Sir Charles Cotton, General Wel-
les ley issued orders for the immediate disembark-
ation of his "corps at the mouth of the Mondego.
A fast-sailingvessel was" at the same time des-
patched, to require the immediate junction of
General Spencer and his division;" and every
arrangement háving been made, the landing
began. A strong west wind and a violent surf
rendered this both a tedious aúd "a perilous opera-
tion, several boats being swamped, and sorne men,
both sailors and soldiers~ perishing among the
breakers; but after fourdays of severe fatigue,
the force was diseníbarked', incIuding the" division
of General Spencer, which arrived just as thelast
divisit)U began to"leave their" transports. The
whol€ British ar"niy, amounting; to rather more




PENINSULAR WAR. J25


than thirteen thousand men, bivouacked on the
8th of August on the beach.


Whilst the British force was thus employed,
General Bernardin Freire arrived. at Coimbra with
about seven thousand infantry and six hundred
cavalry of the Portuguese army, for the purpose
of joining and co-operating with Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley. These were, for the most part, wretchedly
armed, and their discipline had attained to no
higher degree of excellence, than usually attends
raw levies suddenly called out, and as snddenly
embodied; they were not therefore likely to add
much to the real strength, whilst they would draw
heavily upon the supplies of the invaders. N e-
vertheless, as it was advisable upon political
grounds that the Portuguese should accompany
the English in their present undertaking, it was
arranged between the Generals, that both .corps
should move in the direction of the capital, and
that they should form a junction on the 11th or
12th at the town of I. .. eira.


In ¡lccordance with this arrangement, the ad-
vanced-guard of Sir Arthur's army began its
march on the 9th of August. It consisted of
some companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th
regiments, supported by the brigades of Major-
general Hill and Major-general Ferguson; and it
was followed on the day after by the ",hole of the
corps. The men marched with sixty rounds of




126 NARRATIVE OF THE


arnmunition in their cartouch-boxes, and provi-
sions of meat, biscuit, &c. in their haversacks,
sufficient for the consumption of three days; and
the column was followed by a string of mules,
bearing stOl'es of every kind. N o troops ever took
the field in higher spirits, or in a state of moré
perfect discipline. Confident in their leader,
likewise, and no less confident in thernselves,
th~y desired nothing more ardently than to behold
their enemy: for even thus early in the war, it
was the custom of a British soldier to admit of no
apprehensions as to the issue of a battle. The
entire strength of the corps made up barely thir-
teen thousand three hundred men; there were
attached to it two hundred cavalry of the 20th"
1ight dragoons; and -its artillery muste red in aH
eighteen pieces.


The troops arrived in Leira, without having met
with any opposition, on the 11th and 12th, and
they were received by the inhabitants with enthu-
siastic rapture, as by persons who had long groaned
under oppression, and at last beheld their de-
liverers. On the same day, General Freire's corps
made its appearance; but the General himself had
lost that zeal for sharing in the glorious enterprise
before them, which seemed to animate him during
his late conference with Sir Arthur Wellesley;
He begao by doubting whether it would be prac-
ticable to find supplies for both armies 00 the same




PENINSULAR WAR. 127


1ine of march; and he ended by requiring, as the
pl'ice of his adherence to the British standard, that
Sir Arthur Wellesley should subsist hiro ando his
troops from the stores of the English commissary.
This was a dernand with which the English Gene-
ral could not, of course, comply. He represented
that his army, fresh from a voyage, and Hable to
be separated at any moment from its ships, instead
of being able to furnish provisions to the troops
of the country, ,would, in all probability, be com-
pelled to draw upon the country for its own sup-
pIies; and he expressed his astonishment that any
such unreasonable expectation should have be en
formed. The discussion was maintained for sorne
time with much forbearance on the side of Sir
Arthur Wellesley, and with a degree oí obstinacy
on that of Freire, for which it was not very easy to
account; and it ended at length in the latter de-
cIaring his determination to withdraw himself en-
tirely from all share in the intended series of
operations. With sorne difficulty he was prevailed
upon to leave a brigade of infantry and two hun-
dred and fifty horse with the British army; but
the remainder he positively prohibited froro moving.


N otwithstanding this exhibition of the kind of
aid which he roight expect from his allies, Sir Ar-
thur determined to lose no time in prosecuting the
undertaking which he had begun. From all ap-
prehensions on the side of Spain, the inteIligence




128 NAURATIVE OF 'fUE


of the vietory of Baylen, and of the consequent
flight of Joseph from Madrid, completely freed
him; and he still hoped, notwithstanding the well-
known activity of the Freneh generals, that he
might be enabled to engage J unot before Loison
should have had time to join him. U nder this
persuasion, he renewed his march on the 13th, and
on the 14th reached Alcoba~a, the enemy having
evacuated it during the preceding night; and on
the 15th his head-quarters were established at
Caldas.


It has be en said that, at the moment when in-
telligence of the landing of the British army
reaehed Marshal J unot, his troops were scattered
o'Ver many districts of Portugal. with the view of
extin"guishing, as fast as they appeared, the first
spal."ks of rebellion, and putting in a state of de-
fence such fortified posts as remained in the hands
of the Freneh. Among other generals, Loison and
ThomieresJ each with his division, had departed
from Lisbon-the former, for the purpose of quiet-
ing the Alentejo, and relieving Elvas, already
blockaded by the Spaniards; the latter, to over-
a'Ve Coimbra, and reduce Fort Nazareth. Of
these, Thomieres was illstantly recalled; and his
brigade being added to that of General Delaborde,
the latter officer was directed to ad vanee towards
Mondego, that he might watch the movements of
the English, and, as far as he was able, retard




PENINSULAR WAlt. 129


their progress. General Loison was likewise
called in, Junot urging him by letter, when pro-
posing to bombard Badajoz, " to abandon all
his projects, and to hasten, without delay, to
Abrantes." But though he made every possible
exertion, leaving behind him multitudes of sick
and weary' whom he found it impossible to drago
along, he failed in joining Delaborde in sufficient
time to prove of any essential service; for Dela-
borde, in obedience to the orders of his chíef,
marched down at the head of five or six thousand
men towards the coast. As the English advanced,
he gradually feH back, manifesting, however, no
disinc1ination to risk an action, whenever the
nature of the ground should authorise the measure;
and it was not long before a fitting opportunity
presented itself. lt was the rear-guard of his
coluinn which retired from Caldas on the evening
preceding the day of Sir Arthur Wellesley's al':"
rival; and on the following morning the two
armies were in sight of one another.


A trifling skirmish had occurred at Obidos on
the 15th, between four companies of British rifle-
men and the French outposts, in which sorne lives
were lost on both sides, and no very deeided ad-
vantage obtained on either. On the 16th, again,
all was quiet; Sir Arthur devoting that day to thé
arrangement of his own plans, and to the institu-
tion of striet and aeeurate inquiries as to the


,"OL. I. I




130 NAltltATIVE 01' 'l'I-IE


situatioll of General Loison. He likewise recon·
noitred the position which General Delaborde had
assumed, and found it to be one of extraordinary
strength and diffieu1ty; indeed, its seleetion re-
Hected the highest eredit upon the military talents
ofthat officer, as the following tolerably ac(mrate
deseription of its-loeality may serve to proveo


The villages of Caldas and Rolj~a are built
110rth and south from eaeh other, at the opposite
extremities of an immense valley, which opens out
largely towards the west; and midway betweeu
them stand s the littJe town of Obidos, with its
splendid aqueduct and its Moorish castle. Rolip
itself erowns an eminenee, which again is Hanked
on the oue hand by a range of hilIs, on the other
by rugged mountains; by the very mountains,. in-
deed, which bend round to girdle in the vale 01'
basin, of which notice has just been taken. lm-
mediately in front of it there is a sandy plain, not,
perhaps, in the strictest meaning of the term,
woody, but studded with low firs and other
shrubs; and in its real' are four 01' five passes,
which lead through the mountains. This was the
situation in which Delaborde saw fit to await
the approaeh of th~ English army. His outposts,
driven in from Obid08, extended now along the
plain to the hi118 on both sides of the valley; and
bis line was Cormed on the high ground in front of
the village, so as that both its flanks might rest,




]'ENIXSllLAlt \\' AR.


one upon the mountains, the. other upon a steep
eminence. Of his force it is not easy to speak
with confidence, the writers of different nations
having made different estimates.of it; but by Sir
Arthur Wellesley it was computed at six thousand
men; and there i8 no reasan to believe that his
judgment was formed on mistaken grounds. Be
this, however, as it may, there it stood presenting
a bold front to its enemies; and' covering the


" passes by which, in· case of a reverse, its retreat
might at any moment be made good, or a new
position seized in the mountains.


Every necessary ordér having been iEsued, and
every man made aware on the evening of the 16th
of the business in which he was about to be em-
ployed, the troops on the following morning stood
to their arms; and just as day began to dawn,
marched from the bivouac in three columns of
attack. 'rhe !'ight column, which consisted of
twelve hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Por-
tuguese horse, was directed to make a considera-
ble detour, and to penetrate into the mountain8~
for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; it was
then to wheel up, and bear down with all its
weight upon the real' of Delaborde's lineo The


. left column again, consisting of two brigades of
British infantry-those of Major.general Ferguson
and Brigadier-general Bowes; three companies
of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, twenty




132 NARIL\TIYE OF 'l'HE


B,ritísh and twenty Portuguese horse, reeeived
orders to ascend the hilIs at Obidos, to drive in all
the enemy's posts on that side of the valley, and to
turn his right to Roli~a. It was at the same time
directed to watch the motions of General Loison,
of whose arrival at Rio Major, on the preceding
nÍght, intelligence had been obtained; and in. case
he should come up, to engage him before he should
have had an opportunity of communicatíng with
Delaborde. The centre colurnn again, which was
composed of four brigades, namely, Major-general
Hill's, Brigadier-general Crawford's, Brigadier-
general Nightingale's, and Brigadier-general Fane's,
together with four hUlldred Portuguese light infan-
try, the remainder of the British and Portuguese
cavalry, a brigade of nine and a brigade of six-
pounders, had it in charge to attack the enemy in
front.


As the distance between Caldas and Roli~a falls
not short of three leagues, the morning was consi-
tlerably advanced before the troops arrived witbin
musket-shot of the French outposts. N othing
could exceed the orderly and gallant style in
which they traversed the intervening space. The
day chanced to be .remarkabl y fine, and the scenery
through which the columns passed was varied and
striking; but they were themselves by fat the
most striking feature in tbe whole panorama.
'Whcl'ever any broken piece of ground 01' other




YENINSCLAR WAIt. 133


natural obstacle carne in the way, the head of the
column having passed it, would pause till the rear
had recovered its order, and resumed its station ;
and then the whole would press forward with the
same attention to distances, and the same orderly
silence, which are usually preserved at a review.
At last, however, the enemy's line became visible,
and in a few minutes afterwards the skirmishers
were engaged. The centre divisioll now broke
into different eolumns of battalions; that on the
left pressed on with a quick pace, whilst the rifle-
men on the fight drove in, with great gallantryand
in rapid style, the tirailleurs who were opposed to
them. At this moment General Ferguson's column
was seen descending the hills, and moving rapídly
in a directioll to cut off the enemy's retreat. But
Delaborde was not !'lO incautious as to permit that.
The"posts which covered his position 011 the plain
beiug all carried, he lost no time in abandoning it,
and withdrew his troops, in excellent order, and
with great celerity, into the passes. It was
evident, indeed, that to the gorges of these passes
he had an along looked, as furnishing him with
the most advantageous battle-ground; for he in-
stantly assumed a new position there, and pre-
sented a front more formidable than ever, because
more than ever protected by the inequalities of the
ground froro the approach of the assailants.


U nder these circurnstances, it became nece"s-




NAItRATTYE 01" TtlE


sary, in some degree, to alter the plan of attack.
Five separate columns were now formed, to each
of which was committed the task of carrying a
pass; but as the ground was peculiarly difficult,
and the openings extremely narrow, no more than
five British battalions, a few companies of British
1ight infantry, and the brigade of Portuguese,
could be brought into play. The following lS
the order in which this second assault was ar-
ranged :-


The Portuguese infantry were directed to move
up a pass on the right of the whole line, through
the pass next on the right to which the light com-
panies of General Hill's brigade, supported by the
5th regiment, were commanded to penetrate. The
office of forcing the third pass was committed to
the 29th- and 9th regiments; the fourth became
the province of the 45th regiment; aud the fifth
fell to the lot of the 82nd. Than these passes, it
is not easy to imagine any ground capable of pre-
senting more serious obstacles to an assault, ol'
more easy of a desperate defence. They were not
only overhung on either hand by rocks and groves,.
among which skirmishers might lie secure, and do
terrible execution with their fire; but as the troops
advanced, they carne upon spaces rough with myr-
tles and other shrubs; which unavoidably .de-
ranged . their order, at the same time that they fur-
nlshed admirable cover to the enemy. This was




PENINSULAR ."'AR. 135


particularly the case in that pass which the 29th
and 9th regiments had been directed to carry; and
the enemy were not remiss in making the most of
their advantages. Having permitted the column
to go on, almost unmolested, till the leading com-
panies wel'e within a few yards of the myrtle grove,
the French suddenly opened a fire~ both from the
front and flanks, which nothing but the most de-
termined bravery on the partof .the British troops
could have resisted. As may be imagined, the
advanceofthe column was for a moment checked;
but it was only for a momento Colonel Lake, who
led the attack, waving his 'hat in his hand, called ·on
the men to follow; they answered the call with a
spirit-stirring cheer, and dashed on. But the
enemy were full ofconfidence in themsel ves and
in their position, andthey disputed every inch,of
grotind; nor was it till after a considerable los8
had been sustained, ineluding the gallant officer
who had so far conducted them to victory, that the
29th succeeded in crowning the plateau.


Thei were not yet formed in line, and the 9th
was still entangled in the pass, when a French
battalion advanced boldly tocharg'e them. The
enemy were met with the same spirit which they
themselves exhibited, and the slaughter was ver y
reat . on both sides; but the charge was re-


pulsed. It was renewed in a few minutes after
hy' increased numbers; fol' the columns which




130 NARItATIYE OF THE


were ascending the other passes being fal' in the
rear, the Fr~nch were enabled to bring the great
mass of their force to bear upon this point; but the
gallant 9th was now at hand to aid their com-
rades; and the enemy were again driven back
with much slaughter. Nor was an opportunity
afforded them of repeating their efforts; for the
heads of different columns began to show them-
selves, and tbe position was carried at an points.
The enemy accordingly drew off his troops, and
began to retire, though in excellent order. Se~'e­
ral efforts were made to harass him as he feH
back, as well by the ligbt infantry as by the
cavalry; but his superiority in the latter arm, as
well as the nature of the country, rendered these
of little avail. He made good his retreat, leaving
behind him three pieces of cannon, and about a
thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing.


Sir Arthur Wellesley having followed the ene-
rny as fal' as Villa Verde, on the road to Torres
Vedras, halted for the night. On the following
morning the pursuit was about to be renewed,
and it seemed as if no check would be given to
the ardour of the troops, ti11 they should have won
a second victory, and established themselves in
Lisbon, when the arrival of a messenger at head-


,


quarters caused a suspension of the orders already
issued. This person was the bearer of despatches
from Brigadier-general Anstruther, who, with a




PENINSULAR WAH. 137


Iarge fleet of store-ships, and a reinforcement of
troops, was now at anchor off the townof Pe-
niche. As it was no doubt a matter of the first
importance to bring these reinforcements into the
line without delay, Sir Arthur resolved to move
in such a direction as would at 'once insure their
landing, and facilitate their ready junction with
his corps. With this view he directed the head
of his column towards Lourinho, which· place he
reached that evening, and on the following day
took up a position near the village of Vimiero.


The point at which General Anstruther's bri-
gade was directed to land, was on a sandy beach
at the mou th of the' Maceira. There the disem-
barkation accordingly took place, but amidst dif.
ficuIties of 110 ordinary 11ature; for the surf ran
tremendously high; and flying bocEes of the ene-
my's' cavalry hove red about, as if with the design
of cutting off each detachment as it stepped on
shore. The skill and perseverance of the seamen,
however, triumphed over the former of these dan-
gers; one or two boats only being swamped, and
about half a dozen men losing their lives; and
against the latter, the vigila11ce and good order of
the troops themselves offered defence e11ough.
The whole were got 011 shore at an early hour on
the 20th; and 110011 had barely passed when they
took their station along with part of Generar
Spencer's brigade, in the advance.




138 N ARRATIVE OF 'l'RE


On the very day which saw this division joiri.
bis army, 1t was announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley
that General A ucland was in the offing; and before
dark, Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira Roads.
Sir Arthur 10st no time in opening a communication
with that officer. He went on board of thefrigate
in which he was embarked the same night, laid be-
fore him a statement of affairs as they then stood,
and ente red into a minute detail of the plans which
he had himself formed, and which he was already
prepared to carry into effect. He represented to
him the wisdom of resuming the offensive, whilst
the British troops were yet flushed with their recent
victory, and the enemy. distracted and disheart-
ened; and he proposed to move on the following
morning tooccupy Mafra, and to turn the position
whichhe understood that the French had taken up
along the heights of Torres Yedras. Whatever
were real1y the objections to a plan so bold, and
yet so judicious, Sir Harry Burrard saw many. He
urged, in the first place, tha~ since Sir John Moore's
corps might be reasonably expected on the coast in
the course ora few days at the farthest, it would
'be more prudent to remain quietIy where they
were tillit shouldhave actually arrived; in the
next place, that the army was sadly in want of
cavalry, and that the horses which dragged the
guns were represented as being of the 'worst de-
scription. Then again there was a risk 'of losing




PENINSULAR WAH, 13D


thei¡' f3upplies, in case they should diverge far froro
the shipping. It was in vain that Sir Atthur
pointed out, in reply to aH this, the irnpossibility
of remaining quiet; beeause, if they did not ad-
vanee to attack the enemy, the enemy would
surely advance to attaek them. It was in vain
that he represented the great advantage which
would al'ise, were Sir John Moore's ~orps to land
in the Mondego, and rnarch upon Santarem, thus
cutting off the enemy's retreat both by Alrneida
and Elvas, Sir Harry Burrard's mind was made
up. He would sanction no rash rnovement with a
force as yetineornplete in every one of its branches;
and as the senior offieer, his will eould not be dis-
puted, Sir Arthur returned to theeamp that
night, and the very next day gave arnple proof.~
that he had not erred in one,· at least, of bis antiei-
pations,


Whilst Delaborde was executing the ordel's
which he had received, and watehing and retard-
ing the progress of the English in a style worthy of
his well-earned reputation, Junot was straining
every nerve to bring into the field a force eapáble
of sustaining, with sorne prospeet of success,a
general action with the British arrny. With this
view, the garrisons of Lisbon, and of the forts in its
neighbourhood, were drained of every rnan WhOlll
it was deemed prudent to withdraw ;and the
corps of Loison, Thornieres, aneI Kellerman, and




140 NA'RR'A TIV1l:. OF THJJ:


latterly of Delaborde himself, received orders to
concentrate, withou"t delay, in the position of Torres
Yedras. The concentration too k place during the
18th and 19th, and on the 20th the army was ar·
ranged into divisions and brigades. Of the former
there were two; one of which was given to Dela-
borde, the other to Loison; whilst Kellerman took
charge of the reserve, composed entirely of grena-
diers.


These arrangements being complete, Junot im-
mediately advanced towards Vi mi ero, where he
had heard that the British army was encamped.
The village of Vimiero stand s in themidst of a
beautiful valley, through which the Maceira flows,
at the distance of about three miles, or something
less, from the sea. On either side the hilIs rise to
a considerable altitude, particularly towards the
north, where a chain of detached heights rear
themselves, with striking abruptness, out of the
pIain. Over the ridges of these runs the high-
road, through the hamlets of Fontanel and Ven toza
to Lourinho; and on the eastern side is a deep
ravine, at the bottom of which stands the village of
Toledo. On the north-east of Vimiero, again.
there is a sort of table-Iand, covered in part with
shrubs, and in part bare, which commands all the
approaches from the side of Torres Ved ras ; and
which is itself commanded in rear, and towards
the west, by a mass of mountains that occupY the "




l'E~INSULAR WAH. 141


whole space between the left bank of the Maceira
and the sea. Such was the nature of the ground
along which the British army now lay in bivouac ;
its arrangements in detail were these ;-


The greater part of the infantry, including the
1 st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, with
eight pieces ofartillery, were posted upon the mass
of mountains just described; on the south-eastern
hill, again, or table-Iand, Brigadier-general Fane
and Brigadier-general Anstruther took their sta-
tions; the former with his riflemen and the 50th
regiment, the latter with his whoIe brigade; and
they were supported by half a brigade of nine-
pounders and half a brigade of sixes, which had
been sent to them during the night. The high
road to Lourinho, however, and the heights which
it crosses,can hardly be said to have be en occu-
pied' at all, only a single picket keeping guard
there; because no water being in the neighbour-
hood, and Sir Arthur not intending to continue OH
his ground longer than till daylight should enable
him to quit it, he did not esteem it necessary to
place anynumber of troops in a situation where
so many inconveniences must attend them. But
the village itself was fulIy occupied; the reserve~
both of artiIlery and cavalry, being stationed
there.


Marshal J unot quitted his position at Torres
Ved ras soon after nightfall on the 20th;- and hav-




142 NAHItATIVE Ol<" 'fUE


ing executed a tedious and difficuIt march, throug'h
narrow defiles, arrived, about seven o'dock in the
¡norning, within a league and a half of theBritish
outposts. The ground which he occupied was,
however, complctely hidden from the view of the
English. He was accordingly enabIed to form his
coIumns of attack unseen; nor was it ti11 a con-
siderable mass of cavalry had deployed immedi-
ately in front of the picket which observed the
Lourinho road, that on the part of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley an action was anticipated. But Sir Arthur,
who was never taken by surprise, perceived -in a
moment that the principal attack would be di-
rected where he had most cause to apprehendit,
and where his line' was most unq uestionably the
weakest: he ordered the brigades of Generals
Ferguson, Nightingale, Aucland, and Bowes, suc-
cessively to cross the ravine, and long before the
first shot had been fired at the outposts, his left
was secure.


The enemy carne on in two powerful columns,
supported and flanked by weaker bodies; the
right, which consisted of about six thousand men,
moving, upon the Lourinho road; the left, of about
-Q.ve thousand, directing its efforts against the table
land. The first onset of both was, as the first
onset of Fre~ch troops always is, extrcmely impe-
tuous; insomuch that, on the left of the table
land, the skirmislters .were fairly driven in, and




PENINSULAR WAR. 143


the head of the advancing column presented itself¡
almost without a check, in front of the 50th regi ...
mento The 50th, which was drawn up in line~
permitted the enemy to approach till scarcely
twenty yards divided them; and then pouring in
a well-directed volley" made ready to charge. The
enemy stood, for a moment, as if determined to
await the shock; but the bayonets of the British
corps were hardly crossed, when they began to
waver; and befare the rush was made, they broke
and Hed. Almost at the saine instant, the 2nd
battalion of the 43rd found itself vigorously at-
tacked in the town of Vimiero by a lesser column,
which Hanked the greater. The 43rd had thrown
part of its body into the church-yard> whilst part
filled the houses, and covered the road ""hich led
to it; and it firmly met and bravely repel1ed every
effort which was made to dislodge it. A similar
result attended the attack which took place upon
the extreme left of the British line, which was
condueted with eonspicUDUS gallantry by General
Delaborde .. It was repelled with immense slaugh-
ter, chieHy by the exertions of the 97th and 52nd
regiments.


In the mean while a tremendous eontest was
going on among the hilIs, on the British right, and
in the direction of the Lourinho road. The enemy
forced their way in thisquarter as they had don~
on the other flank, through the body of skirmishers




144 NARRATIVE 01<' 'fHE


which covered the British line; nor did they make
the slightest pause, till they beheld the 36th, the
40th, and 71st regiments in close array before
them. Their line was likewise formed in a mo-
ment; and severa) terrible discharges of musketry
were exchanged at a distance which hardly al-
lowed of a single bullet passing wide of its mark.
At length, the 82nd and 29th regiments carne up
to the support of their cororades, and the word
was given to charge. One cheer, loud, regular,
and appalling, warned the French of what they
had to expect; but the French were roen of tried
valour, and they stood to the lasto That was
a treroendous onset. The entire front rank of the
enemy perished; and the men who composed it
were found, at the close ofthe action, lying on the
very spots where each, during its continuance, had
stood. Instantly the line gave way; and being
pursued with great impetuosity, six pieces of can-
non were captured on the field. An attempt was,
indeed, roade to recover these, at a moment when
the 71st and 82nd, who had halted in the valley,
were lying down to rest after their labours; but it
was made to no purpose. These regiroents only
fell back to a little rising gronnd, from whence
thelr fire could be gi ven with greater effect; they
gave it, and once more bringing the bayonet into
play, carried every thingbefore thero.


The French fought well in this action. They




PENINSULAR WAR. 145


fought like men who had been accustomed to con-
quer, and had not yet learned to suffer defeat.
The grenadiers oftheir reserve, in particular, per-
formed prodigies ofvalour, advancing under a cross
fire of musketry and cannon, and never giving way
till the bayonets of the British troops drove them
down the deseent. But they were routed at all
points, and that with a slaughter far greater than
usually occurs to armies of a similar magnitude.
Out of twelve or thirteen thousand men whom
they brought into the field, three or four thousand
feH; besides a large proportion of prisoners, of
whom several were officers of rank. On the si de
of the British, the total los s amounted to 783, in
killed, wounded, and missing; among the former
of whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, com-
manding the 20th light dragoons. He was 8hot
through the heart whilst leading a brilliant charge
which his detachment made; and in which, after
committing terrible havoc among the enemy's in-
fantry, it suddenly found itself beset by a whole
brigade of French cavalry.


The battle had hardly begun, when Sir Harry
Burrard, followed by his staff, arrived upon the
field. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as a matter of
course, proposed to resign to him all further
responsibility; but Sir Harry possessed too much
judgment not to ,perceive that the execution of
plans could not be left in safer hands than in


VOL. I. K




146 NARHATIVE 01<' THE


those of the man who had formed them. He
accordingly declined interfering in any way till
thé result of the struggle should be known, and
took upon himself the direction of future ope-
rations only when the defeat of the enemy was
ascertained. At that critical juncture, Sir Arthur
Wellesley represented to him, in the strongest
terms, that this was the moment for advancing; that
whilst part of the army followed up the be aten
enemy, part should push on by the nearest road
to Torres Yedras. . He pointed out that snch a
movement must inevitably cut off the French from
Lisbon, and either place them between twofires,
or compel them to begin a ruinous retreat, by the
route of Alenquer and Villa Franca : he reminded
himt~at there was no deficiency either of ammu-
nition or provisions in the camp; that the British
soldiers were in high spirits and admirable dis-
cipline ; . theirenemiesdisheartened, wearied with
their late marches, and almost disorganised. AH
this he urged upon the field with the warmth and
earnestness of a successful officer, and the clear-
ness and perspicuity for which he is remarkable.
But Sir Rarry was not to be moved from his de-
termination. Re had made up his mind already
not to quit Vimiero till Sir John Moore should ar-
rive; and he saw nothing in the events of theday
to cause a change in his sentiments. The cavalry,
he said, were certainly notstrengthened, nor the




PENINSULAR WAR. 147


artillery horses improved, by the exertions which
they had undergone. In a word, he was resolved
not to act with precipitation; and the British
troops were accordingly commanded to rest upon
their arms.




148 NARRATIVE O:E' THE


CHAI~TER VI.


Inactivity of the British army under Sir Harry Burrard-Ar-


rival of General Kellerman at Vimiero, with proposals-Sir


Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters into a


treaty with KelIerman-Difficulties as to the disposal of tite


Russian fleet, and preparations for a renewal of hostilities-


Arrival of Sir John Moore's corps-Junot consents that the


two Admirals shall arrange the point at issue between thern-


selves-The convention of Cintra condemned by both Por-


tuguese and Spaniards-Almeida and Elvas given up-The


Bdtish troops enter Lisbon-Joy of the inhabitants-Ca-


raffa's corps restored to liberty, and re-armed.-The French


army sails for France, and the Russian fleet is conveyed. tI} .
England.


lT has be en stated, in the preceding chapter, that
among the variety of motives which induced Sir
Harry Burrard, bbth before and after the victory
of Vimiero, to cheGk the advance of the British
army upon Lisbon, one, and certainly not the
least influential, was the expectation which he
entertained, that every day would bring into his
camp a re-inforcement often thousand men, under




PENINS ULA H. ''''A R. 149


the· command of Lieutenant-general Sir John
Moore. The corps in question (to which it was
the writer's good fortune to be attached) had em-
barked at Portsmouth so early as the 3] st of July;
but owing to a continuance ofbaffiing and adverse
wÍnds, it was the 19th of August before it arrived
in Mondego Bay. It arrived, too, at a moment
when the leaders of the divisions which had pre-
ceded it were too much occupied with other
matters to pay to its movements any particular
attention; and it became, in consequence, essen-
tial to open an immediate communication with
them, and to ascertain how, and upon what
service, it should prepare to empIoy itself.


Having Iearned from sorne of the coasting ves-
seIs that fue right of the British army was in
position at Sto Martinho, Sir John Moore did me
the honour to desire that 1 should proceed at once
to that point, and communicate. to Sir Arthur
Wellesley, or Sir Harry Burrard,or the officer,
whoeyer he might be, in command, the fact of his
arrival. In obedience to these instructions I set
sail in a light frigate, hoping, and indeed expect-
ing, that I should be able to reach my destination
on the following day; but at an early hour on the
20th the breeze died away, and what was still
more distressing, the appearance of the sky and
the state of the atmosphere, indicated a long con-
tinuance of calm weather. Under these circum-




150 NARRATIVE OF THE


stances 1 did not consider it prudent to remain
any longer bn board of ship; a boat was therefore
manned, which conveyed me twelve leagues by
rowing, and landed me soon after sunset at the
village of Sto N azareth.


lt was not without great difficulty, and the loss
of several precious hours, that 1 bere succeeded in
procuring either a guide to direct my steps, or the
means of'conveyance; indeed, of my journey from
thence to head-quarters no iriconside~able portion
was performed on foot. On this account 1 failed,
unfortunately for myself, in reaching Vimiero' till
the 24th, three days after the battle had been
fought, and the campaign was, to all intents and
purposes, at an end ; for the heads of departments
)"ere, 1 perceived; all busily occupied in conduct-
ing a negociation, of the origin and end of which
the following is a brief account :-


Sir Harry Burrard, in pursuance of his system
of procrastination, continued inactive in the po-
sition of Vimiero, when, at an early hour on the
22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar
to take upon himself the chief command. Sir
Hew was of course ignorant, as well of the condi-
tion of his own army, and the state of the country,
as of the means and resources of the enemy; and
he could form no other judgment respecting the
line of conduct which it behoved him to pursue,
than that which his predecessors in cornmand




PENINSULAR \VAR. ltj]


might happen to suggest. But for the attainment of
sufficient informatioll sorne time was necessary; and
before any definite COurse had been determined on,
an event occurred which gave a .new turn to the
General's deliberations.


In the evening of the same day on which Sir
Hew reached the camp, a body of cavalry was
espied advancing by the road which the enemy
had taken in their retreat. The pickets instantly
stood to their arrns ;but the alarm, 'if such it de-
serves to be called, which had momental'ily seized
them, was at once allayed, when it was observed
that the body in question were the bearers of a
flag of truce. They were stopped, as is usual in
such cases, at the out-posts, till a report of their
corning should be made at head-quarters, and an
officer sent down to ascertain their business.
They proved tobe the escort in attendance upon
General Kellerman, who had been despatched by
Marshal J unot, in consequence of the resolution
to which he and his principal officers had that
morning come, in a council of wal'; and who
was the bearer of proposals for the conclusion of a
suspension of arms, as the prelude to a more de-
finitive treaty respecting the evacuation ofPortugal.


Various rumours pr€!vailed in the camp, as to
the reception which General Kellerman's propo~
sitionreceived in different quarters. By sorne it
was asserted that it gave singular satisfaction to




152 NARRATIVEOF THE


all ;and that even Sir Arthur W ellesley, feeling
that the moment for action. had passed away,
offered no objection to the measure; by others
his opposition to it was represented as having
been both strenuous and persevering. Be this,
however, as it may, Kellerman was c~nducted,
with every mark of respect, to the house where
Sir Hew Dalrymple resided; and after a con-
ference of some duration, his first request was
granted. An armistice, to continue during forty-
eight hours, was entered into; and then began
the more important negociation, to the eonducf of
which the armistice was hut a fore-runner.


With admirable tact Kéllerman opened his part
in this transaction by magnifying, in every possible
form, the strength of tile French army, and the
amount of its resources. He spoke of his General
as determined to aecept no terms whieh should
not be to the most minute tittle honourable to the
French arms; and represented him as prepared,
in ease matters should be driven to an extremity,
to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon. This
done, he proceeded to lay before the British eom-
manders a string of propositions, rather as if they
had be en suggestions from himself, than official
communications; for he earnest1y desired it to be
understood that he had no powers to eondude a
tre aty , and that his. present business was simply
to ascertain the faet, whether any desire to treat




PE!\'I~SUJ,AR "'AlL 153


existed on the part of the English. The conver-
satíon had not, however, proceeded far, when
either his memory, or his regard to consistency,
forsook him; for he produeed a .written doeument,
which authorised him to act at his own discretion,
and pJedged the honour of the Commander-in-
chief to fulfil any agreement into which he might
be induced to entero


1t is hardly necessary to repeat he re that the
evacuation of the whole of Portugal, including the
forts of Elvas and Almeida, in whieh the French
had garrisons, formed the basis of the present ne-
goelatIOn. To thís the enemy would consent only
on the following eonditions :-first, that the French
arrny should, on no aceount, be considered as pri-
soners of war; seeondly, that the troops should be
transported with their arms, baggage, and private
property to Franee, and be at liberty to serve
again, either in the Peninsula or elsewhere, as
soon as they should re-assemble; thirdly, that no
individual, whether Frenchman, Portuguese, or
foreigner, in alliance with Franee, who chanced to
remain in Portugal after the departure of the.
Freneh, should be molested in any way, onac-
count of the sentiments which he might have ex-
pressed, or the line of conduct which he might
have pursued, during the late oecupation; and
that all sueh persons, if they desired it, should
be at liberty ta withdraw from Portugal, with all




154 N ARRATIYE OF THE


their effects, within ayear; fourthly, that the port
of Lisbon should be recognised 'as a neutral port,
and the Russian fleet which lay there treated as
enemies' vessels are usually treated when in the
harbours of a neutral power; and lastly, that aH
the horses attached to the Frency army, as well
those belonging to the cavalry and artillery as
those of the staff, should be conveyed to France
together with the meno ,


When the su bstanceof these proposals began to
be generally l.mderstood, and a rumour got afioat
that they had be en conditionally agreed to, the
indignation of aH ranks and classes in the army
rose to a great height. There was not an indivi-
dual who appeared to entertain a doubt that Junot
felt his situation to be a desperate one; and that
nothing 8hort ofsucha feeling would have tempted
him to treat about an evacuation at all; whilst the
terms which he sought to obtain fOf himselfwere,
as if by one consent, pronounced to be absolutely
and totally inadmissible. But that which most
powerfully stirred up the wrath at least of the
junior dépaitments, was the impudent endeavour,
on' the partof the French leader, to stipulate for
the unmolestéd departure of the Russian fleet. Jt
was' seeIÍ at once that his object in. introducing
that artiCle was of a twofold nature ;-that he
wished both to reconcile his own master to the
disgrace which his arms had suffered; and tocon·




PENINSULAR WAR. 155


ciliate the good will of the Russian autocrat,
whose squadron he hoped to preserve; and it was
earnestIy trusted that the British Admiral, to
whom reference must of course be made, would
not give his consent to an arrangement so deroga-
tory to the dignity of the British flag. N or was
the general discontent directed altogether against
the details of the convention. Murmurs might
here and tb."ere be heard, all of them condemnatory
of that'excess of caution which hadch~cked a victo-
rious army in the midst of its career ; whilst a thou-
sand wishes were expressed, that the new chief's
arrival had been delayed till the campaign, so pros-
perously begun, had been brought to a conclusion.


Whilst one part of the army, and that by far the
most numerous, thus expressed themselves, there
were others, who, equally regretJing that ad-
vant~ge had not been taken of the victory of
the 21st, were nevertheless disposed to view the
pending arrangement as, under existing circum-
stances, an extremely prudent one. In their eyes
it was a matter of the firstmoment to deliver
Portugal Emtirely from the presence of French
troops, even though the troops thus expelled
should be immediately brought into play at sorne
other point on -the theatre of war. These persons
no more doubted, than their more sanguine com-
rades, as to the ultimate results of the campaign,
were it renewed; but they saw. in the loss. of




15G NARRATIVE OF TIIE


time which a recommencement of hostilities would
occasion, evils which not the most absolute suc-
ces s would be sufficient to compensate. Besides,
it was by no means impossible that the French, in
possession of the commanding position of Torres
Ved ras, masters of Lisbon, and having garrisons in
Elvas and Almeida, might protract the war till
reinforcements should reach them from Spain;
fol' though at the present moment their prospects
in Spain appeared clouded, no one dreamed that
the cloud would not soonel' or later be dispelled.
Then, again, winter was hard at hand; the re-
sources of the country were exhausted; and to
obtain supplies from home might not be at all
times practicable. Under aH these circumstances,
they gave their ready assent to the terms of
the convention, with this solitary exception, that
they saw no wisdom in treating with the Russian
Admiral through the medium of a French Marshal.


During the period which intervened between
the conclusion of the armistice, and the return of
the messenger who had carried a copy of the
convention to Sir Charles Cotton, an things re-
mained in a state of perfect quieto Officers of
every rank met together, indeed, in coteries, to
indulge in an occu'pation to which soldiers upon
active service are peculiarly prone, namely, spe-
culation as to the future; and couriers carne in
from time to time with despatches of greater or




PENINSULAR WA IL 157


less moment from different parts of the country.
But neither the speculations on the one hand, nor
the despatches on the other, proved worthy of
being recorded at length, though they were not
without interest at the moment, and that. too of
the highest order. Among other topics of con ver-
sation which chanced to be occasionally intro-
duced at head-quarters, it was but natural that
the probable plans of the French, after they had
cantoned their troops about Burgos, should prove
not the least attractive. On this head the gene-
ral opinion seemed to be, that they would attempt
nothing further than to keep their own ground,
till powerful reinforcements should have been sent
to them from France. Then, again, there arose
another question, namely, by the adoption of what
line of operations the British army would be best
able· to render effectual aid in their expulsion.
That we should not continue inactive in Portugal,
after it was evacuated by the French, was well
knowri; how then was it probable that we should
proceed? It was answered to this, that whatever
might be the plan s actually carried into effect,
Catalonia and the south of Spain held out nume-
rous advantages to a British force, which it could
not expect to enjoy in the Asturias or Gallicia.
The latter provinces, naturally barren and moun-
tainous, had alreadyendured the mi series of wal'
for some time; theil' forage was therefore con-




]58 N ARRATIVE 01' 'l'Hl!:


surned, and their resources exhausted. It was not
SO with Catalonia, where supplies of every kind
were represented to be abundant. and where the
people were spoken of as brave even to a proverb.
To Catalonia, therefore, it was hoped that a sepa-
rate corps rnight be despatched, even if it should
be deerned unwise to choose it for the scene
of our principal operations. N or were the present
and future condition of Portugal left unnóticed in
these social discussions. The desire of the junta
of Oporto, to transfer thither the seat of the exe-
cutive, was well known; and it was equallywell
known that the Bishop had received sorne encou-
ragernent, . even frarn British functionaries, to de-
clare hirnself the head of the governrnent; but to
thatarrangernent Sir Hew Dalryrnple .appéared
strongly opposed. He decIared hisdeterrnination
to re-establish thé regency as it had.been ap-
pointed by lhe . Prince previous to his' departure
for .the ~razils; and he expressed hirnself dissa-
tisfied with the coñduct of those persons who had
ventured, on their own responsibility, to excite a
cóntrary expectation. Then, again, there carne
despatches frorn. Castanos, stating his design of
marching direct upon Madrid, and his great an-
xiety to be inforrn~d of the expulsion of the enerny
from Portugal, and the advance ofthe British army
to co-operate withhim. But an these matters, as
has been already hinted, though full of interest at




PENINSULAR WAR. 159


the moment, possess no claim upon the attention
of the general reader now; they need not there-
for be enlarged upon.


Men's minds were wound up. to a pitch of very
considerable anxietr., when on the 26th a 1etter
from Sir Charles Cotton arrived, in which he de-
clared his decided disapprobation of that article in
the treaty, which had reference to the neutrality
of the Tagus, and the treatment of the Russian
Heet. No words can conveyan adequate idea of
the satisfaction which universally prevailed, as
soon as this most acceptable piece of intelligence
spread abroad. The French were understood,
with reference to this point, to have assumed
a tone so high, that no one entertained a doubt of
the immediate renewal of hostilities; and the ex-
pectation was certainly not diminished, when the
troops received orders to take their ground· in
marching order, at an early hom next morning.
In forty-eight hours the armistice would expire;
then would operations recommence; and so. con-
fident were all ranks that they would be resumed
in real earnest, that the following plan was openly
spoken of as on the eve of being carried into exe:-
cution.


It so happened that the Heet which contained
Sir John l\lüore and his division appeared at tbis
critical juncture in the offing.· N othing could
have occurred more opportunely; for though the




160 NARRATLVE OF THE


state of the weather was such as to render a dis-
embarkation at the instant impracticable, there
was little reason, in the month of August, to ap-
prehend a very long continuance of the gale. As
soon as the surf became moderate, the troops
would of course land; when it was understood
that they would press forward to Torres Vedras,
and occupy that important post, from which the
enemy had lately withdrawn to a fortified position
at Cabeza. In unison with this movement, Sir
Arthur Wellesley, at the head of his own corps,
was to advance by his left from Ramalhal to "Bu-
ceUas, for the purpose of turning the heights of
Cabeza, and threatening Lisbon; whilst the Por-
tuguese army would take the coast-road, and
straiten the enemy there by the occupation of
Mafra. By these arrangements, the French, it
was anticipated, would either be compelled to
fight on their strong ground, un del' the disadvan-
tage ofbeing assailed from three quarters at once;
or, in the event of their retiring upon Lisbon,
would probably be shut up there, and thell driven
at last to the necessity of surrendering at dis-
cretion. AH, however, must depend upon the
decision at which" J unot might arrive, whenever
he should be made aware of the Admiral's deter-
minatiolls; and that time might"not be needlessly
wasted, Colonel Murray, assistant quarter-master-
general, and Captain Dalrymple, military secretary




PENIl'\SULAlt WAR. 161


to the Commander-in-chief, were instantly de~
spatched to lay these determinations before him.


The hope which this sudden obstacle to the
conclusion of a treaty had for a moment excited,
was destined not to be of long continuance. Mar-
shal Junot was too well acquainted both with his
own weakness and the strength of his enemy, to
break off a negociation so favourable to- himself,
because orthe rejection of a single article; on the
contrary, he soon consented that the two admirals
should settle every question relative to the ship-
ping between thernselves, and th"e definitive treaty
was signed with as little apparent reluctance as if
no Russian fleet had lain in the Tagus. Thus, in
the short space of seventeen days, was the cam-
paign brought to a conclusion; and a kingdorn,
which previous to its cornmencernent lay, as it
were, at the feet of a conqueror, was restored most
unexpectedly to independence, and to its former
rank among the nations.


The excitement produced by these arrange-
rnents had hardly begun to subside, when new
sources of uneasiness arose. and that too in quar-
ters from which no causes of uneasiness had been
anticipated. The Portuguese, though they took
care to keep as much as possible aloof from their
allies whilst perilous attempts were to be made,
and great interests placed at issue, no sooner per-
ceived the turn which affairs had taken, than they


VOL. I. L




162 N ARRA TIVE OF TliE


chose to interfere in a manner as Httle agreeable
as, to say the trutb, it was unexpected. General
Freire, who had refused to co-operate witb Sir
Arthur Wellesley, but who, as soon as victory de~
clared for tbe English, had marcbed his trqops
towards Lisbon, visited Sir Hew Dalrymple on tbe
dayafter tbe conclusion of tbe armistiee, and de-
clared his dissatisfaction with every article in the
definitive treaty. He complained grievously of the
disrespeet shown to the Portuguese nation, as
well in the stipulation, that persons should not be
held amenable for their conduct during the recent
usurpation, as because no reference whatever was
made to tbe junta of Oporto, or to any other legis-
lative body. To tbis Sir Hew replied, tbat tbe
convention was in all its parts a military treaty, in
which no mentíon was or could be made eitber of
the Portuguese or of tbe British government; and
he further reminded Freire, that in point of faet no
government of Portugal existed. Tbe junta of
Oporto had, indeed, assumed to itself a superiority
over other juntas, and it had been, to a certain
extent, obeyed by the people of Portugal; but if
any legitimate government existed anywhere, it
must be sought for in the regeney whieh the
Prinee had appoirtted; and he took it for gTanted
that General Freire would not aeknowledge it,
adulterated as it was with Frenehmen and French
agents. He nevertheless requested tbat General




PENINSULAR WAR. '163


Freire would commit to writing all the observa-
tions which he might desire to make on the treaty
in question; and he pledged himself that the ut-
most attention would be paid to them, when the
terms of the treaty were in process of execution ..


This difficu1ty had scarcely be en got over, when
other and no less serious objections to the conven-
tion were started by the leaders of the two S pa-
nish and Portuguese corps, which at this time
blockaded the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida.
Elvas had long been kept in a state of irregular
investment by bands of armed peasants, whose
utmost exertions never went further than to poison
a well or two, where the cattle of the garrison were
accustomed to drink, and to cut off straggling par-
ties, as often as they issued from the town. Be-
fore Elvas, again, the Spanish General Galluza,
provisi<mal commandant of the army of Estrema-
dura, had seen fit to sit down; in ignorance, per-
haps, that a treaty was going on at the moment
for its surrender; but in positive contempt of or-
ders from his own superiors, which required him
to begin his march, without delay, for Castile.
The Portuguese, though, like their comrades
nearer to the capital, far from being satisfied with
the tone of the convention, were easily persuaded
to subdue their own feelings; and Almeida being
given up, the French garrison was quietly marched
under a British eseort, to Oporto. It was not




164 NAltRATIVE OE' THE


so at Elvas. When a British regiment which had
been appointed to take charge of the works ar-
rived in his camp, General Galluza positively re-
fused to permit its passing further. He insisted
that the Spanish corps under his command was
entitled to, all the privileges of a besieging army;
and he protested that the Freneh garrison should
Rot pass the ditch on any other terms, than as
prisoners of war prepared to lay down their arms.
Neither Colonel Ross, the commissioner, nor the
battalion which aUended him, coulel, of course,
compel an alteration in Galluza's sentiments; but
advice was instantly despatched to Sir Hew Dal-
rymple, who was justly incensed; and at first
declared his determination to withhold all suc-
cours from the Spaniards, and to cease aH corres-
pondence with them, if his wishes, in the present
mstance" w;ere not promptly attended to; but
being reasoned out of this resolution, Sir Hew con- '
sented that Colonel Graham should repair to EI-
vas, with fuIl powers to, coneiliate the Spanish
General. The Colonel, was, moreover, furnished
with 10,000 dollars, as a means of eaforcing his
arguments, should they be violently opposed ; and
as a last resource, he was required to proceed to
Madrid, and to lay before the Spanish government
a statement of the case. AH this was as it ought to
have been; but Sir Hew's feelings were too VIO-
lently, excited to permit him to stop here. Sir




PENINSULAR WAR. 165


John Hope's division of infantry, with two squa-
drons of cavalry, were ordered to cross the Tagus.
He was directed to move, in a rnenacing attitude,
upon Elvas; and in case things carne to the worst,
to compel, by force of arms, an adherence to the
terms of the treaty. Fortunately, for all parties;
this species of interference was not needed. The
Spaniards, convinced by Colonel Graham's weigh-
ty arguments, that no good, hut rnuch evil, must
arise, out of a breach of any compact, however
rashly or improvidently entered into, at last con- ,
sented to a:How thedeparture of the garrison with
its arms and baggage; and' the garrison accord-
ingly proceeded, as the garrison of Almeida had
done, undel' a British escort, to its place of em-
barkation.


It may not be amiss ifI recordhere the fate which
uItimately befell these detachmeúts. Wherever
they passed, on their journey from the Jorts to the
place of embarkation, they were met with the
revilings and hootings of an enraged peasantry;
nor was it without the utmost difficulty that they
were preserved from fue violence with which they
were threatened. By great exertions, however,
on the part of the escort, they were at length con~
ducted to their vessels; but the troops from AI-
meida, ordered to take shipping at Oporto, had
not yet weighed anchor, when an accident occurred,
which had well nigh pro ved fatal to them. In




166 N ARRA TIVE Ol!' TI-lE


moving a military chest on board one·of the trans·
ports, it fell to the ground, and búrsting open,
sorne church.plate rolled out. There was now no
arresting the fury of the populace. The ships
were instantly boarded, the French disarmed, theír
baggage taken on shore, examined, and plundered;
and when it became apparent that, under the head
of prívate property, the pillage of the most sacred
edifices in the kingdom was about to be conveyed
away, the lives of the whole detachment were
placed in irnrninent danger. At last, however, the
native authorities, aided by such British officers as
happened to be at hand, prevailed upon the people
to abstain from personal violence; but to tal k any
longer of the safe departure of these detachments,
would have been useless. They were disarmed,
to the number of fourteen hundred, and treated as.
prisoners of war.


In the mean while, one division of the British
army, under the command of Lieutenant-general
Sir John Rope, moved into Lisbon, and took pos-
session oí the different barracks, and of the castle.
Shouts and blessings greeted them as they passed
along; whilst persons of every rank, from the
fidalgo down to the beggar, vied with one another
in protestations of gratitude and affection. The
windows were filled with females, who showered
down flowers upon the soldiers' heads, and waved
their handkerchiefs in token oí amity; whilst the




PEN1NSULAR W AR. 167


men thronged the sides of the streets, and made
the air ring with their cries, "Long live the Eng-
lish!" "Death to the FreÍlch!" But the most
gratifying spectade of aH, whic.h met us on the
present occasion, was exhibited on the following
morning; when to the Spanish corps, which had
hitherto be en detained' as prisoners in the hulks,
not their liberty only. but their arms and accou-
trements were restored.


To render the ceremony as imposing as pos-
sible, it was determined that' it should take place
in public, and announcements of what was about
to be done were everywhere circulated. Great
crowds were accordingly drawn together on the
morning appointed, when the Spaniards, in num-
ber about four thousand, assembled in a large
open spa.ce· called the Campo d 'Ourique, and
forming a hollow square, with their generals and
other officers in the centre, awaited the result.·
They were not kept long in suspense, ere General
Beresford, to whom the arrangement of the cere-
mony had been intrusted, followed by a large con-
course of Britishofficers, made his appearance.
Instantly General Beresford, having passed along
the line, and saluted first the General and after-
wards the whole corps, presented to the former,
with gr-eat grace and dignity an elegant sword,
and in an animated speech requested that the
latter would again accept their arms from the




168 NAltRATlVf: OF THE


King of England, never to lay them down till the
cause of Ferdinand VII., of Europe, and of hu-
manity, had triumphed. This address;which was
forcibly and well delivered, had not yet come to
a close, when it was drowned in the reiterated
vivas of soldiers and inhabitants; whilst the roar
of cannon, and the braying of trumpets, echoed
from oneend of Lisbon to another. When the
tumult had in part subsided, the Spanish General
hastened to make his reply. He spoke evidently
under the influence of strong feeling, and every
sentence which fell from him gave testimony, that
what he did speak, was spoken without premedi-
tation; buí his speech possessed all the fire which
the circumstances under which it was delivered
were calculated to excite. He then addressed his
men in the language of genuine patriotism; ex-
horted them never to forget the events of this
glorious day; ahd ended by declaring that, when-
ever the people of the Peninsula should cease to
bear towards England the love and reverence
which were due froID the oppressed to their de-
liverers, they would prove themselves unworthy
of a better fate than that which, but for English
interference, would have befaUen them. Finally,
the troopsmarched past, and the business of the
morning was concluded by a grand dijeúné a la


Jou,rchette, at which the Spanish officers became so
intoxicated with wine and joy, as to dance waltzes,




PEKI~SULAR "'AIt. 169


fandangos, &c. in their boots, swords, and com-
plete field-equipment.


The rejoicings having ended, it became a ques-
tion of considerable moment how these troops
were to be disposed of. Destitute as they were
of money, and of almost every article necessary to
their efficiency, it was quite evident that they
could proceed nowhere in a body, nor act to any
purpose, unless the means of moving and acting
were advanced from the funds of the British
army; and the Commander-in-chief seemed to
entertain serious doubts, whether his instructions
authorised him to make such advance. After a
good deal of discussion, however, he was at length
prevailed upon to &upply them with 20,000 dol-
lars, in addition to a certain number of days' pay,
and complete supplies oí arms, ammunition, and
hor~es; and then thequestion as to their ultimate
disposal was resumed. The first idea on that
head was, tbat it would be advisable to march
them off in the direction of Badajoz; because,
being composed principally of detachments froro
different regiments, O) which the main bodies
were understood to be in the neighbourhood of
that place, they might be enabled, when there, to
join each its respective battalion. Preparations
were accordingly begun with this view; but be-
fore they were completed, there arrived from
Catalonia two deputies, whose representations




170 NARRATIVE OF THE


caused an immediate change in the plans. These
strongly pressed upon Sir Hew the necessity of
sending troops of all arms, but more particularly
cavalry, into their province. They stated that
the Catalonian arrny amounted to forty thousand
men, which, though miserably supplied with
eq uiprnents of every kind, were, nevertheless,
able to cope with the enemy arnong the moun-
tains; but that in the plains and level country,
owing to the presence of five or six hundred
French cavalry, they could not venture to show
themselves. Under these circurnstances, they
besought the British General to send round by
sea a corps of one thousand horse and ten thou-
sand foot, the arriva! of which would, they were
assured, occasion· an immediate rising throughout
the whole province, particularly in Barcelona and
other large towns, where nothing but the presence
of an overwhelming force kept the people in sub-
jection to the French yoke. There was a good
deal of justice in the remarks of these deputies;
nor, perhaps, would it have been an unwise thing,
had Sir Hew Dalrymple obeyed their councils;
but to do this he hárdly felt himself authorised.
The Spanish corps, however, being absolutely at
his own disposal, he could employ it at any point,
and on any service, which to hirnself might ap-
pear most desirable; and he instanUy placed it in
the hands of theCatalonian deputies. It was




PENINSULAR W AIt. 171


embarked in a few hours afterwards, and set sail
for Catalonia.


AH this while arrangements were busily making
for the transportation of the Fre.nch troops to their
own country. Whilst the few garrisons which
they had scattered through the interior, received
instructions to march upon Oporto, the main body,
including the corps which had occupied the castle
of Lisbon, and the forts at tbe moutb of tbe Tagus,
assembled in one Gamp, and made ready to em-
bark as soon as tbe sbips were cleared out for
tbem. Much discussion, however, and many dif-
ficulties arose, as to the construction whích each
party desired to put upon those articles in the con-
vention of Cintra, which had reference to the pri-
vate baggage of the army. The Portuguese were
naturaIly anxious that the men who had plun-
dered their churches, museums, and even their
dweIlings, should not be permítted to carry away
that plunder under the head of prívate property;
whilst the French protested violently against any
search being made, or any inquiríes instituted into
the contents of their trunks or store-rooms. It
was no easy matter for the British General to steer
a proper course in such circumstances, keeping, as
he desired, a striet regard to the sacredness of his
own promises. On the one hand, he could not but
feel, that wbatever might, be the words of the




-172 NARRATIVE OF 'rHE


treaty, its spirit was not such as to sanction the
numerous acts of peculationand robbery of which
the French might have been guilty; and he took
care to state this with great distinctness to Mar-
shal J unot. On the other hand, he saw that in
many cases of alleged plunder it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to iden-
tify the property said to have beeo stolen. Thus
embarrassed, he took the only judicious step which
it was in his power to take. A committee of ill-
quiry was appointed, before which all claims might
be brought; and the quantity of goods restored
by its decisions to the rightful owners was im-
mense.


Before dismissing the subject of Cintra alto-
gether, 1 consider it right, without at all desiring
to discuss the wisdom or impolicy of the arrange-
ment in question, to lay before the readeran out-
line of the impression produced in England by the
first intelligence of the convention, which was
communicated to me in the following extraet of a
letter :-


" The tumult of our joy on Wellesley's glorious
eonduct and successes has been cruelIy disturbed
by a communication of a supposed conventioo, the
operations of which instrument would, if carried
iato effect, secure to the French advantages be-
yond their reach, under the most brilliant success;




PENINSULAR WAR. 173


whilst their ten thousand men are now pressed
upon by. not less than thirty to forty thousand
men, British and Portuguese.


"In the first place, it is a .recognition, on the
face of the instrument, of Buonaparte as emperor
of the French.


"2ndly. It provides for the safe' retreat of an
enemy's corps, destitute of all other means of
escape.


o< 3rdly. It give.s France the entire. grace of
saving for Russia her Heet, whilst in truth she had
not a remnant of power left to pratect it.


"4thly. It makes a gratuitous sacrifice oí the
Heet of an enemy, and in the manner of doing it,
recognises rights of neutrality on the part of Por-
tugal towards Russia, which, if they could have
ever subsisted for a moment in a port occupied by
a French army, were destroyed, even in pretence,
by the formal appointment of J unot as Buona-
parte's Lieutenant of Portugal, andentails upon
us all the encumbrance of watching, witb a Heet,
a port of our own~ whilst we must give the enemy
forty-eight hours' start of us, lest we should catch
him.


"5thly. It gives France not only the immediate
use of her army, which, without an active assist-
ance, she could not have, but givesher also the
plunder of Portugal, under the mask of private
property.




174 NARRATIVE OF THE


" 6thly. Jt gives Franee all the graee of having
protected those Portuguese who have betrayed
their sovereign, whilst it entails upon us th~ dis-
graee of exposing our alIies to be attaeked here-
after by a fleet whieh Franee has had the authority
and means to proteet. Will Spain or Europe
believe that this was preceded by triumphs on our
part? and will not Franee be convineed of the
reverse?


"7thly. It lastly appears in its general result to
be a happy eontrivanee, by which England shall
have made a mighty effort, for no other purpose
than making a dependent state the protector of
one of its enemies, whilst it beeomes itself the in.,.
strument by which the other shall remove an arrny
from a position in which it is tost to one in which it
may recommenee ita operations with advantage."


At length the provisioning and storing of the
transports being complete, the Freneh army began
its embarkation. It took place in three divisions;
the first being protected by the two last, as they
again were covered by the British troops; and
before the middle oí September the whole had
c1eared the Tagus. The Russian fleet, likewise,
in accordance with the arrangernent entered into
between Sir Charles 'Cotton and Admiral Siniavin,
was taken possession of by the British navy; and
the seamen being sent baek to their own shores, the
ships were forthwith removed to England.They




PENINSULAR W.AR. 175


were conveyed thither, however, not as prizes, in
the strict sense of that term, but rather as a depo-
sit, the British government engaging to restore
them within six months after a. general pacifiea-
tion. Still it was a matter of no little moment to
render them for the time innoeuous ; and as Russia
already began to manifest symptoms of a desire to
break off her connexion with Franee, it would not,
perhaps, have been produetive of any additional
benefit, had they been absolutely and entirely
transferred to the English service.




176 NARHATIVE 0.1<' THL


CHAPTER VII.


Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir A rthur Wellesley re-
turns to EDgland on leave-Sir Rarry Burrard resigns' the
command to Sir John Moore-Preparations for an advance
into Spain-March through A lentejo-Villa Vicosa -March
to Elvas-Elvas, Badajoz-Difference of character between
the Spaniards and Portuguese-Colonel Lopez recei ves de-
spatches from Castanos-Merida-Its antiquities-State of
agriculture in its vicinity.


THE events which 1 have endeavo.ured to. reco.rd in
the last chapter were still in pro.gress, when a Ya-
riety o.f changes in the arrangement o.f the British
army to.o.k place, so.me o.f which were o.f the
greatest mo.ment. In the first place, Sir Hew
Dalrymple was recalled, and under circumstances
which sufficieI?-tIy implied that the co.untry was
no.t satisfied with the resuIt o.f the two. late victo.-
ries. Sir Arthur Wellesley, likewise, to. the sin-
cere regret o.f every Englishman in Po.rtugal,
departed upon leave o.f absence; and his example




PENINSULAR '" AR. 177


'was foJJowed by many other officers of all ranks.
The command accordingly devolved upon Sir
Harry Burrard; but to what use it would be
turned, no one appeared to know.. AH at on~e our
preparations and warlike declarations ceased:
there was no longer the fa¡ntest whisper of a move-
ment; and we gave ourselves up entirely, or at
least we appeared to give ourselves up, to the
amusements and dissipation of Lisboa.


A state of things such as this could not, how-
ever, be of long continv.ance. Rumours began
gradually to spread themselves, that Sir Harry's
sojourn with the army would be brief, and that,
as 500n as he saw fit to return to England, an
active campaign WQuld be opened. These ru-
mours werenot raised upon false grounds. Sir
Harry's constitution Was incapable of bearing up
against the fatigues and privations of active ser-
vice; he therefore applied for leave of absence.
and obtaiJ.?ed it; and the command then devolved
upon one, whom, next to Sir Arthur Wellesley.
the troops most respected and loved-Lieutenant-
general Sir J ohn Moore. It would be no easy
matter to describe, either the satisfaction which
all appeared to experience when these arrange-
ments became known, or the state of bustle and
activity which every department at once assumed.
An advance into Spain was now openly talkedof;


VOL. 1. 1II




178 N ARRATIVE OF TIiE


and everything seemed to imply that it would com-
menee ímmediately,


1 have stated, in one of the introductory chap-
ters, that assoon as intelligence of Dupont's cap-
ture reached Madrid, JoseplÍ made ready for a
hastyabandonment of his new capital. He had
enacted the part ~f royalty only two short days,
when he found it necessary to lay his power aside,
and to fall back from the stage on which he had
begun to perform it. The whole of the detach-
ments scattered through the northern and eastern
provinces were caBed in. Garrisons were, indeed,
thrown into some of the strong-holds, sufficiently
nJ.lmerous to man the works, and a post was here
and there established, merely for the purpose of
watching the Spaniards, and giving notice of their
movements; but the main body, amounting in
aH to about forty-five or fifty thousand men, con-
centrated in N avarre and Biscay. Here a position
was taken up, with the right resting upon Sto
Sebastian, the centre at Vittoria, and the left thrown
back as far as Pampluna; and here they seemed
disposed to await the arrival of those :ceinforce-
ments, which in great numbers were stated to be
moving through France.


Whilst the aboye was pretty accurately known
to be the disposition of the enemy, we were given
to understand that there were in arms, il} the As-




"PENINSULAR WAR. 179


turias and in Gallicia, sixty thousand Spaniards
undel' Blake and Romana. Two large armies,
independently of this, were stated to have formed ;
one, in the immediate front oC the French, the
other upon their left flank; at the head of the last
of which was Castanos. The very best spirit was
said to prevail inall quarters of Spain; every
Spaniard was, 01' was disposed tobe, a soldier;
there was therefore nothing to be apprehended by
US, let us enter the country when we might. It
was even asserted that, unless we made good
haste, there would be nothing left for us to effect;
since it seemed in the highest degree probable,
that before we should be able to arrive at the scene
of action, the French would be everywhere driven
across the Pyrenees. Such were the· cheering
communjcations which poured iti upon us, not
only 'from the Spaniards themselves, but from
sorne of our OWll functionaries; andit was with
hopes naturally elated to the highest pitch that
we looked forward to the prospect before uso


We were not left long in astate of uncertainty.
On the 6th of October, General Moore received an.
oflicial despatch, informing him that bis Majesty
had been graciously pleased to intrust him with
the chief command of an arrny, in tended to eo-
operate with the forces of S pain in the expulsion
of the French from the Peninsula. The army in
question was to consist of not less than forty




180 N ARRA TIVB OF THE


thousand men, namely, of thirty thousand in-
fantry, five thousand cavalry, and artillery and
engineers in proportion. Towards making up this
force, the army in Portugal was to furnish twenty
thousand men, including two regiments of cavalry,
the 18th, and King's German regiment of hussars;
whilst a corps of fifteen thousand men, under
Lieutenant-general Sir David Baird, was to em-
bark immediately at Falmouth for the harbour of
Corunna. Sir John Moore was further informed
that a scene of action had been already planned
out for him in the north of Spain, though it was
left to his own judgt11ent to name a point of ren-
dezvous on this side of it for the assembling of his
troops. He was likewise expressly enjoined to
move the cavalry by land; but his infantry and
artillery he might either despatch by sea, or
march across the country, as should to himself
appear most expediento Finally, he was in-
structed to pay to the feelings and prejudices of
his allies every attention; to preserve the strictest
discipline among his men; and to keep his divi-
sions, as fal' as might be practicable, together,
that they might act, at aU times, in one body, and
as a field army .. It was added that, from the
Spanish authorities and people, he might expect
the most friendly reception, and the l'eadiest com-
pliance with his wishes; whilst, in case of any
unlooked-for difficulties which it might be essen-




PENINSULAR W AR. 181


tial to remove, he was recommended to commu-
nicate directly both with the government at home,
and with the English minister resident at the 8eat
of the central junta.


Immediately on the receipt of this communica-
tion, Sir John Moore set himself actively and
seriously to prepare for a fuIl accomplishment of
the wishes of his government. After mature de-
liberation, he determined that it would not be
advisable to move any part of the army by sea,
but that the whole, infantry and artillery as well
as cavalry, should proceed by land. As, however,
the roads through Portugal were represented to
be extremely bad, and as no magazines or depots
of provisions had be en established, he resolved to
advance, not by one route, but by three; and to
unite his columns with that of Sir David Baird
at Salamanca. But to move beyond the frontiers
of Portugal, unprovided as we were with draft
cattle, and having no depots of any kind, was im-
possible. Though, therefore, the troops were put
in motion so early as the 13th, it was fully under-
stood that the campaign would not be opened
before November; and even then, from the aspect
of things immediately about us, from the inex-
perience of our own commissariat, and the supine-
ness of the Portuguese, it was extremely doubt-
fuI whether anything could be done to the purpose.


The hussar brigade, of which 1 was put in com-




182 ~ARRATlVE 01' TUE


mand, received instructions to assemble at Vill~
Vicosa, a- town distant twenty-eight leagues from
Lisbon, and consequently at no great distance
from the frontier. We began our march far this
purpose on the 18th of October, and taking it by
easy stages, arrived at our mustering place on the
24th. Here the information was communicated
to us, that whenever the moment of further ad-
vance should arrive, the whole army was to pro-
ceed in four columns; one under the command of
General Paget, by Elvas and Alcantara; one
under Beresford, by Coimbra and Almeida; one
under Frazer, by Abrantes and Almeida; and a
fourth under Hope, by Elvas, Badajoz, Merida,
Med'ellin, Truxillo, Almanza, Oropesa, and Tala-
vera de la Reyna,_ towa-rds Madrid. To the latter
column, which was to consist chiefiy-of artillery,
with four regiments of infantry to escort it, we
were attached.


In passing through the Alentejo, nothing oc-
curre€! to ourselves particularIy deserving of re-
cord. We found the country, indeed, in a state
of miserable destitu tion ;.~ flelds unsown, and ham-
lets ruined and deserted; whilst it was not with-
out great exer.tion~ and a serious waste of time,
that with all the previous arrangements which had
been entered into, we found it practicable to pro-
eure sufficient food either for men or horses; but
we met with no adventures, by the way, nor be-




PENINSULAR WAR • 183


. held any objects which had a peculiar claim upon
our attention. With such spectacles constantly
before the eye, it was impossible not to indulge in
a few idle surmises, as to what must have been the
fate ofthe French army, had it attempted to make
good its retreat in this direction. The French are,
unquestionably, a hardy and enduring race of
men; they exceJ, moreover, in the art of disco-
vering and bringing to account every morsel of
nutritious matter which may liein the direction of
their movements; but it appeared as if all their
ingenuity, and aJ] their patience, would have farled
in carrying thero safely through the Alentejo.
There was literally nothing left for them to con-
sume. But the difficulty of procuring subsistence
would not have been the only obstacle against
which they must have contended. The very
name of a Frenchman was, in that part of the


, country, a thing to be abhorred; the peasantry
were all ready to faH upon their stragglers;
whilst the Spanish army before Elvas, formidable
at least in numbers, would have stood seriously in
the way of troops disheartened bydefeat, and
broken down with fatigue and hunger. How
sincerely we all regretted that the convention
should have interfered to prevent a consummation
so devoutly to be wished!


Though our marches had been short, and nei-
ther men nor horses seemed at all distressed on




184 NAltR~'rrYE 01' THE


their arrival, we had not occupied Villa Vicosa
two days, when symptoms of dysentery began to
show themselves amongst uso The weather, too,
soon began to break, and the rain carne down with
such violence, as to induce an apprehension that
the wet season had actually set in. These would
not have be en very gratifying occurrences at any
moment; but at a moment like the present they
were peculiarIy distressing. N othing, however,
remained, except to make the best of them. To
the sick every possible attention was paid; and as
the disease proved, by good fortune, not to be
violent of its kind, the labours of the medical
officers were rewarded by their speedy convales-
cence. N or did the weather continue, as we had
begun to apprehend that it would, obstinately
unpropitious. On the contrary, after two days of
incessant rain, the clouds dispersed; and by the
3rd of N ovem ber every appearance in the sky
promised a long continuance of sunshine and
drought.


The whole of Sir John Hope's corps having by
this time assembled, and every other arrangement
being complete, on the 5th of N ovember we began
our march towards Spain. At first, neither the


. aspect of the country, nor the manners of the
natives, differed very materially from those which
had met us in our way hither; for we were still a
couple of days' march from the frontier, and the




PENINSULAR WAR. ]85


Portuguese, more than perhaps any other people,
carry their own peculiar manners to the extreme
line of their country. But the close of our journey
presented us with much both to interest and
amuse. We halted on the 5th at Elvas; and as
we carne in at an early hour of the day, such as
felt disposed were enabled to take an accurate sur-
vey of that highly-striking place.


The first object which here attracts the notice
of a stranger, is a magnificent aqueduct, measur-


. ing in altitude no less than one thousand feet. It
rests upon three or four arches, raised one aboye
the other, and is composed entirely of a rernark-
ably fine and polished stone. In length it mea-
sures about three miles, and it conveys aH the
water which is used in tbe place, to a. cistern of
such dimensions, as to be capable of contaiping a
suffieient supply for the inhabitants during six
rnonths. Of tbe town itself, it may be sufficient to
state that the streets are generally handsome,-
the houses being an built with stone, and ex-
tremely neat in their appearance; but though sur-
rounded by a wall, it is nota place of .any great
strength .. It lies, indeed, atthe foot of Fort La
Lippe, and consequently at its mercy; and it is
commandedby other heights, which overlook it
from various quarters.


Of Fort La Lippe, it would be no easy task to
convey to. the mind of the reader an accurate no-




186 NARRATlVE OF 'fHE


tion, unless some exact plan or drawing were sub-
mitted to him. It stand s upon the very summit
of a steep and commanding eminence, and over-
hangs the left ofthe town; the military occupation
of which is thus rendered totally impracticable,
llnless the fort shall have been previously reduced.
It appeared to me to be a chef-d'reuvre in the
science of fortification; and to consist of five
principal angles, or rather bastions, each covered by
batteries formed into smaller bastions, in tiers,
one aboye another, which gradually recede towards
the centre of the fort. From the highest of these
you command a view of the whole country for
many miles round, and they aH commul1icate with
oue another,-all, at least, which possess the same
degree of elevation by strongly casemated pas-
sages. The fo1't is abundantIy supplied with
reservoirs for water; and furnaces for heating shot
are erected in all the most convenient places; in a
word, nothing appears to have been omitted which
the knowledge of its founder could suggest as cal-
culated to place it beyond the reach of insulto


The only height, within a moderate distance of
the place, upon which, in case of a siege, it would
be possible to construct a breaching battery, stands
in a line almost di1'ectly opposite to the angle
which faces the north. It was upon this hill that
the Spaniards threw up works during the late in-
vestment, whell they were so unwilling to permit




PENINSULAR W AR. 187


the carrying into execution of OUt convention ; and
from it they contrived to throw a few shells into
the fort. But little or no damage was done;
nothing, at least, in any degree likely to affect the
issues of the siege. Yet, trifling as the damage
was, the Portuguese had not taken the trouble to
repair it: indeed, it was melancholy to see how
completely the nrttional indolence prevailed here.
Everything was, as far as it could be, out of order;
and it seemed as if the weather alone would shortly
lay in ruins. a work, which, if there were no other
or more powerful motives to preserve it, deserved
to be kept up as a mere specimenof the arto


Having halted at Elvas during the night, we
marched next morning soon after dawn; and
passing through a plaiu of considerable extent,
crossed the Guadiana at Badajoz, the capital of
Estremadura. This movement introduced us at
once into Spain; and the contrast which was in-
stantly presented to us, both in personal appear-
ance and in manners, between the people of the
two nations, 1 shall not readily forget. Generally
speaking, the natives 'of frontier districts partake
almost as much of the character of one nation as
of another; the distinctions between them become,
as it were, gradually blended, till they totally dis-
appear. It is not so on the borders of Spain and
Portugal. The peasant who cultivates his little
field, or tends his flock on the right bank of the




188 NARRATIVE OF 'I'HE


Guadiana, is, in aH his habits and notions, a differ-
ent beillg from the peasant who pursues similar
occupations on its left bank; the first is a genuine
Portuguese, the last a genuine Spaniard. N or are
they more alike to each other in their amities
than in their manners. They cordially detest one
another; insomuch, that their common wrongs,
and their cornmon enmity to the French, were
not sufficient, even at this time, to eradicate the
feeling.


It was not, however, by the striking diversity of
private character alone which subsisted between
them, that we were made sensible, as soou as we had
passed the Guadiana, that a new nation was before
us. The Spaniards received us with a degree ofin-
difference to which we had not hitherto been ac-
customed. They were certainly not uncivil ; they
poured no execrations upon us, nor did they
hoot or rudely annoy us; but they gave t.hemselves
no trouble to evince to US, in any way, their sa-
tisfaction at our arriva!. Whatever we required
they gave us, in return for our money; but as to
enthusiasm, or a desire to anticipate our wants,
there was not the shadow of an appearance of any-
thing of the kind about them. How differeilt all
this from the poor Portuguese, who never failed to
rend the air with their vivas, and were at aH times
fuU of promises and protestations, no ma.tter how
illcapable they might be of fulfilling the one, or




PENINSULAR WAR. 189


authenticating the other! The truth is, that tbe
Spaniard is a proud, independent, and grave per-
sonage; possessing many excellent qualities, but
quite conscious of their existente, and not unapt
to overrate them. On the present occasion, too,
they seemed to be more than or~inarily self-im-
portant, in eonsequence of their late achievements ;
they were quick to take offence, even where none
was intended, and not indisposed to provoke, or
engage in broils with our soldiers. Not that any
serious disturbance oecurred during our stay; the
discipline preserved in our own ránks was too


- good to permit it; but numberless little ineidents
were continual1y taking place, which served stlffi·
eiently to make us aware of the spirit wmch ae-
tuated the natives. Yet with all this. there was
much about the air and manner of the Spaniards
to deserve and eommand our regard. The Portu-
guese are a people that require rousing; theyare
¡ndolent, ]azy, and generally helpless: we may
value these our faithful allies, and render íhem
useful; but it ls impossible highly to respeet
them. In the Spanish eharacter, on the contrary,
there is mixed up with a great deal of haughtiness,
a sort of manIy independence of spirit, which you
eannot but admire, even though aware that it will
render them by many degrees less favorable to
your wishes than their neighbours.


Badajoz is a fine old town, situated on a lofty




190 NARRATIVE OF THE


eminence, which overhangs the Guadiana on its
southern bank. The fortifications were then in
a state oí tolerable r.epair;. and a tete-de-pont,
and a fort on the opposite side of the river, gave
indication that, in the wars between Spain and
Portugal, it ha~ been regarded as a place of sorne
importance. During my sojourn here, 1 met an
old acquaintance, in the person of Colonel Lopez,
an officer who had been sent forward by the
Spanish government, to assist in clearing the way
for our entrance into the country; and who had
delayed his journey back, that he might with
his own eyes see that proper accommodations
were furnished to the troops in their passage.
Colonel Lopez had just received despatches from
the army of General Castanos, which bore date
the 30th of Odober. He declined submitting
them for my perusal; but he acquainted me that
Castanos had narrowly escaped being made pri-
soner when executing a recognizance into the dis-
position of the French corps. His head-quarters
being at Logrono, he had ridden into Lodosa,
where a Spanish light battalion was stationed;
when the French, by a sudden movement across
the Ebro, contrived to surround both him and his
escort. Castanos himself escaped; but the bat-
talion, after a brave resistance of two days, during
which their ammunition became wholly exhausted,
were obliged to surrender. The same officer




PENINSULAR WAR. 191


described the position of the French, army, in the
terms in which 1 have detailed it at the beginning
of this chapter. He stated that it was Castanos's
intention to cross the Ebro at Tudela, to form a
junction with Palafox, and to penetrate into the
rear of the enemy; whilst Blake's corps should
hang upon their left, and observe Vittoria. These
were highly interesting and gratifying communi-
cations; unhappily a very few days sufficed to
bring proof that they rested upon no solid founda-
tion.


From Badajoz the column departed on the 7th,
reaching Talavera la Real that night; and on the
following day it carne into Merida. Between
these two extreme points the country is almost
entirely one continued plain; clear and open, and
admirable for the operations of cavalry. The ac-
commodations which we met with by thé way
were moreover such as we had no cause to com-
plain of. In the different towns, aH persons who
happened to possess stables, freely threw them
open, and took in both men and horses in num-
bers proportioned to the extent of these and of
their dweHings; whilst the alcaldes had invariably
men in readiness to eonduct the soldiers to their
quarters, and to colleet, at convenient points,
forage, bread, meat, and wine, ready for delivery.
Everything was done with the most perfeet regard
to order and precision; and though the marches




192 NARRATIVE OF THE


were gene rally severe, varying from twenty-eight
to thirty English miles per day, still, as the horses
were well fed upon barley and straw, there ap-
peared no reason to apprehend that they would
not be brought ¡nto the fleld in as good condition
as could be wished., And at Merida it may with
truth be asserted, that the hussars were in no
respect less efficient than when they first landed
at Cascais.


Merida is a handsome old town, full of relics,
not a few of which it owes to the skill and in-
dustry of the Romans. There are the remains of
what must have been a splendid triumpbal arch,
an amphitheatre, several statues, columns, and
old walls, all well worth the attention of the anti-
quary; and there is a bridge across tbe Guadiana,
which the inhabitants allege to have been built by .
direction of the emperor Trajan. Nor is it the
antiquary only who would find much to ¡nterest
and amuse him here. The agriculturist might see
in the province, generally, much which he has
never seen before-ploughs at work, each of them
drawn by a single ass or mule, and guided by a
single hand; and yet, in spite of the lightness of
the soil, crops produced, such as neither Kent nor
N orfolk will exceed. Then again there is the
breed of sheep, so justly celebrated for ¡ts wool, to
be found hefe in perfection, with pigs of the most
beautiful and perfect breed. There are no milch




PENINSULAR W AR. 193


COWS here, goat's milk being alone In use, and
that extremely scarce and difficuit to be had; but
the breed of draft cattle is remarkably fine. The
beef, likewise, is excellent; bU,t that which an
Englishman enjoys aboye all the other produc-
tions of the country, is the bread. The poorest
peasants here eat bread of the purest and whitest
flour, which they generally twist up into a sort of
ring, and knead and bake with the utmost careo
lt is really delicious, and it appeared doubly 80 to
us, who for so many weeks back had eaten nothing
but the sour and unwholesome loaves of Portugal.


VOL. J. N




194 NARHATIVE 01" 'fHE


CHAPTER VIII.


Advance towards Madrid-Rumours of Blake's defeat-Ar-
rival at N aval-camero-Madrid; the state of public feeling
there-)Vant of energy in the 8p'mish government, exhausted
state of the treasury, aRd miserable plight of the armies-
Movementof General Hope's corps upon 8alamanca-
Fears lest it should be cut off-Causes of them-Overthrow
of the 8panish armies, commanded by Blake, Belvedere,
andCastanos-A French corps at Valladolid-8kirmish at
Amvola-Rumour of General Baird's retreat-Refiections
on the conduct of the war.


HA VING passed the night in Merida, with very
considerable comfort to ourselves, we prepared to
renew our journey on the following morning.Pre-
vious to our setting out, however, two pieces of
intelligence reached us, neither of which had any
tendency to increase the feeling of satisfaction that
attended us on our' arriva1. In the first place, we
were given to understand that, as we proceeded
onwards, though we should find at least as good,
if not a better, disposition among the people, the




PENINSULAR WAR. 195


fare and general accommodations furnished, would
greatIy deteriorate. The country was represented
as naturally more sterile, and its rneans, scanty at
the best, were said to be quite ,exhausted during
the recent struggle. In the next place, and this
was a piece of news much more alarming, a report
got into circulation, that Blake had sustained a
serious defeat in Bi~cay, and had retreated, no one
knew whither, with the 10ss of three thqusand
rnen.The reinforcernents, likewise, to the French
army, of which we had heard somethirig previous
to our advance from Portugal, were stated to have
arrived; and their numbers were estimated at
sixty thousand infantry, and from five to seven thou-
sand cavalry. AH this was startling enough, but as
yet there were no authentic sources to which it
could be traced back; and as evils are usually
exaggerated, we , willingly believed that rnuch
exaggeration might have been employed on the
present occasion. At all events, our course was a
very simple one; we had only to follow our in-
structions, and move in the direction' of Madrid.


In the expectations which we had been led to
form respecting the receptionand entertainment
that awaited us, we were not disappointed. The
people, though supine, were remarkably civil;
whilst the treatment which we received from them,
if in sorne respects less agreeable than that which
we had hitherto experienced, was still as generous




196 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


as we had any reason to 100k for at their hands.
They gave us freely whatever they themselves
possessed, and we had no right to demand more.
We accordingly pllshed on in good order and in
excellent spirits, and passing through Medellin,
Miajadas, Truxillo, J araicejo, Almaraz, N avalmo-
ral, Talavera del Reyno, and St. Ollalo, at each of
which a night was spent, we reached, at last, a
temporary halting place, in the town of N aval-
carnero. As this place was distant from Madrid
not more than twenty miles, 1 determined to quit
the brigade for a couple of days, for the purpose
of visiting that city; and it may not, perhaps,
prove uninteresting to the reader if 1 lay before
him a sketch of the condition, military and poli-
tical, in which 1 found it.


The first person whom 1 made it my business to
see was Lord William Bentinck, at that time offi-
cially resident in Madrid, and in attendance upon
the supreme government. 1 found him discon-
certed, in no ordinary degree, at the manner in
which all things were conducted. The junta, it
appeared, did nothing, or rather it was doing
everything which Buonaparte could have desired.
There was neither energy nor decision in the
councils of the government-there was no money
in the treasury-stores of every kind were want-
ing; and anarchy and misrule seemed to prevail
in every department. Morla was at this time




PENINSULAR WAIL 197


secretary to the committee for the management of
military affairs; and MorIa was known to be an
able, as he was then believed to be an honourable
man; but the managing committee itself was
made up of men, as ignorant as they were credu-
lous. In their meetings there was abundance of
cabal and party spirit, but neither talent nor infor-
mation. Such were the accounts which Lord
William gave of the Spaniards; whilst of our own
situation he drew no more flattering picture. He
was himself totally in the dark, and he beIieved
that others were equally so, touching the amount
and situation of the French army; he knew onIy
that they were rapidly advancing, and in great
force; but where they were now, or whither they
might move hereafter, he was completely ignorant.
So much, indeed, was he struck with the absence
of aU vigour in the conduct of the Spanish autho-
rities, that he already appeared to regard the
game as desperate. Our columns might, he con-
ceived, effect their junction at Salamanca; it was
evenprobable, from the accounts which had re-
cently reached him, ihat they would; but it was
by no means impossible that the enemy might
succeed in throwing a strong corps in the way of
that junction; for there were no Spaniards up in
a state to oppose them.


These were certainly not the most acceptable
communications which might have been made,




198 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


particularly to one who was already aware of the
somewhat sombre temperament of his own leader.
Sir J ohn Moore was a most excellent but cautious
man; too much so perhaps to give his own abili-
ties a free scope, or to do himself justice in the
cause in which he had embarked : he had set
out with the avowed determination of acting -only
in conjunction with the Spanish armies; and he
would not move at all tiU the whole of his force
should beassembled. Now, if there could be
one truth more self-evident than another in the
existing state of affairs, it was this, that to look·
for any adequate support from the Spaniards till
he should have more decidedlyentered upon his
great enterprise, was useless; the q uestion there-
fore was, would he, when at the head of thirty
thousand British troops, including a brilliant,
fresh, and most efficient cavalry, abstain from
striking a bJow? There was too much reason to
apprehend that he would; though the army ap-
peared to feel that now was the time to strike, or
nevero It is true that Buonaparte in person was
stated to be either at Burgos or Vittoria, and that
large masses, bothof infantry and cavalry, were on
their march to join him; but the force imme-
diately up was represented as not exceeding that
under Sir John: why not endeavour to bring him
to action ?


On the other hand, the junta appeared to be in




PENINSULAR W A R. 199


a state of the most pitiable alarm, lest Madri.d
should again faH into the hands of the enemy.
They peste red General Moore with daily requests,
that, in case of any reverse, he should fall back, not
upon Portugal, or towards the north, but upon the
capital; and they were particularly desirous that
General Hope's corps might be detac~ed altoge-
ther; and assist in the defence of the city. For
they declared their determination to accept of no
terms; and to' make'no submission to the 'invaders.
Madrid, they affirmed, should be' a second Sara-
goza; and if any judgment could be formed from
the display of enthusiasm exhibited by the lowf>f
orders, it required but a moderate share of ability
and good faith on the partof their chiefs to realise
the boast.


1 have said that the situation of affairs in gene-
ral, as these' at least were represented, deIIlanded
a decisive line' of conduct from Sir John Moore;
and that, upon every principIe ofwarfare, a prompt
commencement . of offensive operationswas re-
quired at his hands. Of the jústiceof this remark
the reade(will be thé better able to judge, whén 1
inforrri him, that upon our first line of operations,
there' were computed to be in arms, of Spanish
and English troops, 116,000 infantry,and about
2700 cavalry. These were miserably scattered, it
is true. There were the remains of Blake's corps
at Reynosa, estimatedat 20,000 men; General




200 NARRATIVE OF THE


Baird's corps of J 2,000, including 1400 cavalry,
was on its march from Astorga to Benevente;
Moore himself had collected full 15,000 at Sala-
manca; and Hope's division, of five thousand men,
was at the Escurial, already under orders to move
upon Salamanca. There was also General St.
Juan's corps, estimated at twenty thousand men,
which occupied the passes of the Somosierra and
Guadarama; whilst the armies of Arragon, com-
manded by Palafox, Omel, and Doyle, and that of
Castanos united, could not amount to less than
forty thousand. No doubt the latter force was far
removed from any ofthe former, for its head-quar-
ters were said to be at Saragoza, and its right to-
wards the Pyrenees; it was likewise in the most
imminent danger; for Blake being overthrown,
the enemy seemed to be' collecting all their
strength, for the purpose of surrounding. and over-
whelming Castanos;' yet the probabilities were,
that a forward movement, executed with prompti-
tude, might defeat that design; and there would
be no very serious risk in advanc}ilg, at aH events,
to Valladolid. Nor was this the only circum-
stance which seemed to point out the propriety of
adopting decisive measures. The French, though
extremely formidable, were not as yet equal to
the allies in point of numbers; their army, in-
creased sorne time, ago to eighty thousand men,
hall received an additional reinforcement of thirty




PENlNSULAR WAR. 201


thousand only; the odds were therefore on our
side. But it was not' probable that we should
long enjoy this superiority, as fresh troops were
understood to be in progress from aH parts of
France towards the Spanish frontier.


But whilst thus arguing, let me not forget, in
justice to the memory of a most excellent, in-
trepid, and able officer, to state one or two reasons
why heshould not rush, as it were headlong, into
unseen dangers. Bis information, like that of the
Supreme Junta itself, was most defective. Upon


. public and official reports, no confidence whatever
could be placed; and from private sources of in-
telligence he seemed to be even carefulIy cut off;
lt was from his own officers alone, from Colonel
Graham, Gaptain Whittingham, and others, whom
he from time to time employed in coHecting such
facts as might faH in their way, that he received any
communications on which he considered himself
justified in relying; and these all united in repre-
senting the Spanish armies as not only half-armed,
and otherwise w~tchedly equipped, but inefficient
also in respect ofji.umbers. Corps put down by the
juntas at twenty or thirty thousand men, proved,
when inspected by these officers, to mus ter eight
or ten; and of these eight or ten thousand, per-
haps one-half, or nearly one-half, might be un pro-
vided with muskets. Then, of the position of the
enemy, no one knew anything. That they were




202 NARRATIVE OF THE


concentrating, seemert to he generally understood ;
and that their object was to overwhelm Castanos,
most men apprehended; but no one could speak
with' confidence, because no one spoke on other
grounds than those of common rumour. N or was
this aH. Dissensions and quarrels were said to
have arisen, both in the juntas and in the armies;
at this most critical momento Castanos was said
to be harassed in his' command by the presence of
the commissiciner Palafox ; and to be on bad terms
with those' under him. Romana was true and
able, but he was at a distance, and had hishands
fuIl; whilst Sir John Moore's own positiori, half-
way between us and Baird, rendered any 'im.:
mediate movement extremely hazardous, either to
the one flank or the other. That ,thesecircum-
stances 'carried great weight in the mind of our
chief, his future proceedings proved; but it is now
high time to resume this detaiL
. 1 have said that the central junta was ex-
tremely anxious that sorne British troops should
be detachedfrom the main army, for the express
púrpose of covering Madrid; and as General
Hope's division chanced to be nearest at hand, the
nÍost urgent entreaties were pressed upon him, to
corrie "into this plan at his own discretion. It was
strongly úrged upon him, that were his corps to
unite itseif to that of General Sto Juan, the passes
of Somosierra and of the Guadarama would be




PENINSUJ.AR WAR. 203


perfectly secured. General Hope, however, whose
head-quarters were now at the Escurial, could
not listen to any suggestion' of the kind. The
orders from his superior were abundantly explicit
to join him, unless something extraordinary carne
in the way, at Salamanca; and General Hope saw
nothing, either in the immediate situation or fu-
ture prospects of the Spanish capital, to lead him
into a neglect of these orders. Having, therefore,
halted a few days, for the purpose of collecting
his stragglers, and closing up the cavalry, which
had rnarched at sorne distance frorn the rear of
his colurnn, he made preparations for pushing
on, with as little delay as possible, upon Sala-
manca. ; .


On the 27th, the whole division passed the
Guadarama mO,unt~ins; and the 18th hussars, with
the 71st infantry, reached Villa Castrin; on the
opposite side of the Sierra. N ext day, the rest
of the infantry, together with three brigades of
guriS and the whole park of ammunition-waggons,
reached the same point; whilst the hussars pushed
on to Adanero, where they took the duty . of the
olltpostS. But though our movernents had been
so far abundantIy satisfactory, certain intelligence
carne in that day, which caused considerable un-
easiness, as well to General Hope as to all who
happened to be iritrusted with it. Ir was in sub-
stance as follows :-




204 NARRATIVE OF THE


Lord Proby had been sent forward by Sir John
Moore on the road to Valladolid, with the view, if
possible, of ascertaining whereabouts the enemy
were, and how they might appear disposed to
acto Lord Proby had proceeded as far as Tor-
desillas, when a patrol of the French cavalry
entered the town, and he with great difficulty
escaped being made prisoner. In spite of this
interruption, however, he so far effected his ob-
ject as to be able to report that six hundred
French cavalry, with two field-pieces and two
howitzers, were actually in Tordesillas, and that
they were supported by six hundred more who
occupied Valladolid. The former force, he stated,
had advanced their posts as far as Puerto del
Do~ro and Arnajo, and detachments from both
were scouring the country, levying contributions, .
and acting exactly as if no troops were in tbe field
against tbem. But this was no! all the intelli-
gence which his despatch contained. It ap-
peared that tbe magistrates of the towns and
villages near, had received requisitions, accom-
panied by proclamations, from Marshal Bessieres,
indicating that he was on his march from Palencia,
at the head of ten thousand men; that he ex-
pected to be in Valladolid on the 24th; and that
he should look to find rations prepared for· his
men, as well as forage for his horses, along the
whole line of his marcho




PENINSULAR WAR. 205


The reader will easy believe that such informa-
cion, coming fram such a quarter, produced no
little stir among the principal functionaries of our
little corps. Whoever will take the trouble to
consult the map, may see that the distance from
Valladolid to Salamanca is at least not greater
than from Villa Castine to the latter place; and
hence that, supposing the two corps to have ar-
rived at their several destinations on the same
day, there was every probability. that Bessieres,
unencumbered as he doubtless was with waggons,
and even with artillery, would be able to throw
himself between us and our point of rendezvous,
should he feel so disposed. But if such were the
case on the supposition of our arriving si multa-
neously at Valladolid and Villa Castine, the danger
of being intercepted was doubled, provided the
French Marshal should have acted up to the pur-
port of his manifestos, and entered Valladolid on
the 24th. Bad, however, as this was, it was not
the worst news that met us here; for on the very
same night a courier carne in with accounts of the
disastrous battle of Tudela. That the reader may
the better understand how this misfortune threat-
ened to affect us, it wilI be necessary for me to
draw off his attention, for a few moments, from
the details of our own proceedings, and to make
him acquainted with the operations of the different




206 NARRATIVE OF THE .


Spanish corps, upon whose efficiency we had been
all along led to calculate.


Previous to 'our entrance into Spain, we had
been given to understand that three large armies,
oneunder Blake and Romana, another under
Castanos, and a third, which kept up the com-
munication between these two, under the Conde
de Belvidere, were all manceuvring in the front
and on the flanks of the French line, and would
probably overwhelm it erewe should be able to
join them. The manceuvring of the three corps
proved to be nothing more than a mere retention
of their separate positions, in which they watched
the French, with extreme caution no doubt, but
from which they never dreamed of attempting any-
thing offensive. In this state things continued till
the enemy's reinforcements arrived; arid then it
was lefttothem to form' their own plan, and to
choose their own field of operations. The first
Spanish General who felt the weight of their
prowess was Blake; he was attacked in his posi-
tion in the debouches of Villarcayo, Orduna, and
Munjuca; from which, after a very spirited and
obstínate resistan ce, he retired upon Espinosa.
No time, however, was granted him for breathing.
On the very day after his arrival there, he was
again assailed by an overwhelming force; andhis
army, worn out with fatigue, and destitute of pro-




PENINSULAR WAR. 207


visions and clothing, was utterly dispersed. It fled
in all directions, and . the magazines at Reynosa,
as well as the harbour of Sto Andero, were both
taken possession of by the enemy.


Whilst the operations which led to this victory
were going on, Buonaparte himself entered Spain,
and fixed his head-quarters, on the 8th of Novem-
ber, at Vittoria. His first act was to send forward
a corps, under the orders,ofMarshalSoult, against
the • Estremadura army, which, headed' by the
Conde Belvidere~ lay in his front. Belvidere was
a young man of great bravery, but said to be defi-
cient in military talent; he took up a defensive
position near Burgos, and awaited the approach of
the enemy. The consequence was, that, attacked
in an open . country by veteran troops, of which a
large proportion was cavalry, he suffered a com":
plete'. defeat, upwards of thre'e . thousand dead
being left upon the field, and the rest scattered,
beyond the possibility of immediate reunion:
Thus ,were two of the three' armies, of which so
much notice had been taken,' summarily disposed
of; it 'remained now only to dispose of the' third
in a like manner; nor did any great while elapse
ere it also was made to succumb under superior
discipline and numbers.


Castanos was at this time posted in the vicinity
of Calahorra, and had undel' his orders the united
al'mies of Andalusia and Arragon. Of the num-




208 NARRATlVE OF THE


bers which composed that army, it is impossible
even now to speak with accuracy; for the records
of Spanish historyare so overrun with exaggera-
tion, that it would be extremely unsafe, in almost
any case, to rely upon them; but from every cre-
dible rumour, it could not exceed forty thousand
men; and of these, perhaps, one half only were
adequately armed. As soon as Castanos heard of
the fate of Blake's and Belvidere's armies, he de-
clared his determination to retreat, and to avoid,
as long as he possibly could, bringing matters to
the issue of a battle. But Castanos was not left to
the guidance of his own judgment. He was beset
by spies from the central junta, which, on all
occasions, appeared to distrust its generals, in
exact proportion to their abilities; and he was by
them urged and importuned to take a step, of the
folly of which his better reason had long convinced
him. He fell back from Calahorra upon Tudela,
and there risked an action. As he had antici-
pated, his raw army was beaten; and it was with
the utmost difficulty that the General could keep
together,after the defeat, a force sufficient to
form the nucleus of another. With this he fled,
rather than retreated, to Calatayud, where his
troops endured ali the miseries of destitution, and
even famine to the utmost.


1 t soon became known that the enemy were
moving in force upon Segovia; and though Segovia




PENINSULAR WAR. 209


was occupied by a division of St. Juan's army,
amounting to six thousand men, under General
Aradia, no great confidence could be cherished,
that such an impediment would long deIay him.
The resistance to be offered by Segovia had
already been measured, by the faciIity with which
St. Juan might be able to ~efend himself in the
Somosierra pass. In case he shonld succeed in
holding that, then was General Aradia to keep his
post to the last ex trcmi t y ; but if the Somosierra
were carried, then was Aradia to fall back at once
upon the Guadarama pass. N ow the' Guadarama
pass was the only road left open for our retreat, in
the event of our junction with Sir John Moore
being cut off by troops from Valladolid; should
it likewise -be forced, our situation would become
a desperate one. N othing indeed remained, ex-
cept to throw ourselves into A vila; where, as it
was a fortified place, we must needs maintain
ourseIves, till Sir John Moore should be. able to
advance to our reIief.


When General Hope began his mareh from the
Escurial, he intended to proceed by Adanero to
Arrivola, and from thence to Madrigal, Penaranda,
Huerto, and so onwards to Salamanca. As soon,
however, as the aboye intelligence reached him,
he prudently determined to alter his route, alld to
move by a road considerabIy to the left, and of
course further from the direct line of the enemy's


VOI •• l. ()




210 NARRA'l'IVE OF 'l'HE


probable operations. The cavalry accordingly re-
ceived orders to ,march on the 30th to Fontiveros,
~nd to occupy posts for the protection of the co-
lumnof artillery and infantry, which moved on
the same day to Avila. On the follQwing morning
the march was resumed, and the road to Pena-
randa taken, where the column arrived without
molestation on the 2nd of December; but the
p¡ain body of the cav.alry was still kept at Fonti-
veros, whilst its outposts were extended as far as
Adanero, Arrivola, Villa N ova de Aroud, Madrigal,
Royama, and even to Penaranda itself. Thus
were the rear and the right flanks of the division
perfectly secured; and it was rendered quite im-
practicable for the enemy to harass its movements,
without at least sufficient time being gaine<J. to
provide against any,emergency.


It is hardly necessary to say, that my own posi-
tion was with the cavalry. While thus employed,
1 instituted various in quiries as to the nature and
strength of the French troops which had shown
themselves in this quarter; and 1 heard that they
consisted only of portions of a partisan corps, de-
tached at a great distan ce from their main body,
and intended to effect no other end, than merely
to spread alarm ayer the country, and distract
people's attention. In this they had certainly
succeeded; whilst the chief part of thei.r force was
moving all the while towards their left, with the




l'ENINSULA R W AR. 211


design, after the defeat of Castanos, of ovel'whelm-
ing St. Juan, and taking possession of Madrid.
How it carne about, that they made no attempt
to penetrate between our columns; whether the
possibility of succeeding in the effort had not oc-
curred to them, 01' that they considered the other
an object of much greater importance, 1 had of
course no means of ascertaining. But 1 did as-
certain that they had not, from the first, made any
movement, either partially 01' generally, which
could lead to the supposition, that such an un-
dertaking had ever entered into their contempla-
tion.


We had traversed a large portion of Spain, and
during the last few weeks had been almost con-
stantly in the immediate presence of the enemy ;
yet, strange to say, we had never exchanged shots.
On the 29th, at night, that event occurred for the
first time. It Ihight be about midnight, when the
videttes, furnished by the picket at Arrivola, gave
an alarm that the French were coming on. The
troopers mounted and made ready, and in a few
minutes found themselves attacked by a strong
party of cavalry; concerning the nature of which,
whether it were the advanced-guard of a corps, 01'
a mere patrol, they were unavoidably ignorant.
As nothing was to be gained by keeping possession
of Arrivola, our people, after skirmishing fDr a few
minutes, feH back; but they were not pursued,




212 NARRATIVE OF THE


and they halted for the. night at a house upon
the road-side, distant about half a mile from the
village. At daylight they once more advanced
upon Arrivola. The movement was, of course,
made with extreme caution; though for caution,
as the event proved, there was no necessity; for
the enemy had abandoned the place several hours
before, having taken time merely to plunder the
post-office. This was the only event which befell
uso from the hour of our quitting Lisbon, up to the
day ofour junction with the main body of the army
at Salamanca.


During the Srd of December, no change took
place in the position of the cavalry; its main body
stillcontinuing at Fontiveros, whilst iís posts were
extended, as before, along the f!ank of the column
of infantry: littIe, therefore, occurred calculated
to amuse or excite; for the enemy made no move-
ments, and we were left entirely to ourselves.
Whilst thus situated, every little piece of intelli-.
gence which happened to come in, attracteda de-
gree of attention far deeper and more lasting than,
in aH probability, would have be en the case had
our minds and bodies been more actively employed.
AH the rumours which reached us were not, how-
ever, in themselves uninter,esting; at least there
was one, which, under any circumstances, would
have driven us, in spite of ourselves, into a train of
speculation and inquiry. .




PENINSULAlt WAU. 213


We were given to understand that Sir David
Baird's column, which had landed at Corunna
on the 13th of the preceding month, and had ad·
vanced on the road to Salamanca as far as Astorga,
had suddenly received orders to fall back agáin
upon eorunna. Such intelligenceexcited in us
great surprise; nor could we see either the motive
which should lead to such a measure, or the ne-
cessity which could compel ¡t. Was it that a
retreat had been determined upon, in order to save
Portugal, by abandoning Spain altogether? or
were we to take shipping, and proceeding south-
wards to Cadiz, to make the south instead of the
north of Spain the theatre of our operations? These
were questioIÍs which,' at the outposts, it was im-
possible to answer; yet was it equaUy impossible
not to perceive the unhappy results which would
cert~inly. follow out of the one as well as the other.
This was not the moment for retracting, unless we
should be fairly driven to it by a force overwhel-
mingly superior; and of such we certainly saw
nothing, at least in our immediate front. Our
business, on the contrary, was to advance; and
the late disasters, so far from taking away froro
that necessity, only increased it.


In order to carry on operations with at least a
fair prospect of Sl1ccess, several modes of acting
were before uso In the first place, supposing the
Somosierra and the Guadarama passes to be de-




214 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


fcnsible by Sto JUan's army, and that the remains
of Castanos's troops should have arrived, as they
were said to have arrived, at Siguenza, on the 30th,
aH immediate apprehension as to the fate of Madrid
might safely be la id aside. lil this case, Moore's
column might endeavour to unite itself with that
of Blake, either at Leon or at any other conve-
nient spot in that quarter, Sir David Baird's corps
directing its march upon the same point; and as
Blake was represented to have still twenty thou-
sand men under his orders, the junction of the two
would make up a formidable force, fit either for
offensive or defensive undertakings. U pon this
centre, the scattered battalions from the other
armies might easily rally; and then, or even
earlier, should it be deemed advisable, an advance
upon Valladolid might be undertaken, and a cam-
paign opened, upon a grand scale, with the com-
bined strength of the whole.


In the next place, and still taking it for granted
that the passes could be maintained for sorne timey
the British army would run but littIe risk, were it,
unconnected witlÍ any Spanish force whatever, to
advance froro Salamanca, by Abba de Tormes,
upon Madrid. There was no force between these
two points capable of resisting it; and the very
knowledge tIlat it was in motíon to the front,
would call off the attention of the enemy from
their present plans, and give time to the broken




PENINSULAR W AR. 215


Spaniards to collect and recover their order. And
lastly, should matters fall out in every respect
contrary to our wishes and interests; should the
Somosierra pass becarried, and all communication
between St. Juan's army and the army at Sigu-
enza be cut off; should Blake's corps be so Cotn-
pletely broken up, as to be rendered incapable of
rallying or re-assembling; and Portugal be fallen
into a state of helpless inactivity,-even in the
event of all these misfortunes hefalling us, we
were not without a resource. There was nothing
to prevent St. Juan's and Castanos's troops from
retreating with all speed upon Cuenca or Va-
lencia, and to unite themselves there with the
Catalonians; orpassing the Sierra Morena, to
collect everything around them under the walls of
Cadiz; whilst we also, with a good grace, might
change our ground froro the north to the south ;


,whither our shipping could convey us' from any
ports between Corunna and Lisbon. At all events,
a precipitate retreat, at a moment like the present,
was unpopular. Our arroy had suffered no dis-
asters; it had never come into contact with the
enemy; it was now inthe very centre of SpttÍn,
and tite eyes not of Spain only, but of all Europe,
were upon it ;-what would be the consequence
were it.to abandon the capital without striking a
blow, and quit tite field before a single encounter
had taken place r N o doubt the game was a deep




216 NAHRATIVE OF THE


one; but it was the last which Eng1and had ta
play, and it appeared desirable in the eyes of the
army to play it boldly.


Such wete the ideas which occurred at the mo-
ment, and which, in spite of very dispiriting intel-
ligence from other quarters, continued to remain
uppermost in our minus. The supineness and
inactivity of the Portuguese, excessive as these
were repl'esented to be, in no respect led to a
change of opinion. It is true that, from these.
little efficient eo-operation was to be expected;
the energies of the people being appliedwhoUy-to
the arrangement of religious processions; and the
government, either froID the absence of power or
of ability, making no attempt whateverto support
us; for even a line of dragoons, between Sir John
Moore's army and thatof the British cornmander
in Lisbon, though requested in the joint names of
these two functionaries, was refused. Yet in Spain
the case was certainly differel1t. There the com-
_ mon people, with sorne remarkable exceptions.
were all enthusiastic in the cause; in Madrid
this was particularly the case,_ as their expressions
of joy, at beholding a British uniform, abundantly
testified. Why should men thU8 actuated be
abandoned? It was- no good reason to urge, that
the inhabitants of Estremadura and Toledo had
exhibited symptoms of a self-confidence sadly
misplaced, and.of a hauteur and irritability of tem-




PENINSULAR W AR. 217


per highly disagreeable to their allies. Among
them the French had not yet appeared; they
knew nothing, therefore, either of the sufferiIigsor
of the defeats of their fellow-countrymen, except
by reporto Withas little justice might it be urged,
that the people of Old Castile deserved no support,
because they were either unwiliing or unable to
defend themselves. The people of Old Castile
present doubtless a poor specimenof the Spanish
character; and resernble, in indolence and sloth,
the natives of Portugal rather than those of Spain ;
but the people ofOld Castile constituted but a small
portion of the Spanish nation. Spain itself was
not to be abandoned, because sorne Spaniards
were spiritless or uncivil.


But N apoleon himself was in the freId, his head~
quarters being already' at Aranda. Itwas to ·be


_ regretted that the case shouldbe so, and that
Alexander had not detained him somewhat longer
at Erfurth; for hehad, beyond question, appeared
upon our stage too soon. Still, even Napóleon
was not invincibIe. And, lastly, there wasno
unanimity, no vigour, no energy, in thé proceed-
ings either of the Spanish government or the Spa-
nish generals. Instead of nominating some ·one
person as commander-in-chief, to whom all the
other generals might pay obedience, each leader
of an army was left to act according to the sug-
gestions of his own faney; and all were, or claim-




218 NARRATIVE OF THE


ed to be, on a footing of the most perfect equality.
PaJafox, Blake, and Cuesta, were continually in-
triguirig and caballing against one another; Cas-
tanos had been ruined by the presence of spies,
and Blake sacrificed to a similar interference.
As to Romana, his place of sojourn was quite un-
known, though r~mours were in circulation, both
that he was about to be placed at the head of the
Spanish armies, and that he might be daily ex-
pected at Salamanca, to consult with Moore. N o
doubt these were terrible evils; so terrible, as to
bring upon Spain greater danger and greater cala-
mities, than she ran the smalIest risk of incurring
from the efforts of th~ enemy. Yet were they. not
such as to authorise our withdrawal from the scene
of action, at a time when upon our presence the very
existence of the country might be said todepend.
Besides, there was something so galling to the
mind of a British soldier in the prospect of flight
before he was beaten, that no one could think oÍ,
it with patience. The very common troopers
seemed indignant at the suggestion; and it cer-
tainly did appear strange, that whilst the women
of Madrid were labouring night' and day to put
their city in a posture of defence, we should be
preparing to abandon them.




PENINSULAR WAR. 219


CHAPTER IX.


Visit to head-qua,rters, and interview with Sir John Moore-


A retreat determined upon-General dissatisfactioIÍ of the
army-The idea of retreating abandoned, and orders issued


to advance -Movement upon Tordesillas - Skirmish at


Rueda-Sir John Moore resol ves to attack Soult on the


Carrion-The army advances for that purpose-Brilliant


affair of cavalry at Sahagun-Preparations for a battle sud-


denly countermanded.


HA VING good reason to believe that the French
were aH moving upon Madrid, and that there was
no probahility of any attack heing made upon our
posts for sorne time to come, 1 set off at an early
hour on the morning of the 4th, and reached Sala-
manca about noon on theday following. 1 was
induced to take this step~ not from mere curiosity
alone, hut in consequence of certain letters which
1 had received from Sir John Moore, concerning
the contents of which 1 was desirous of personally
consulting him. 1 entered the place full of doubts




220 N'ARRATIVE OF THE


and apprehensions; and 1 certainly did not quit it
with apprehensions allayed, or doubts removed.


Having waited upon the General, and the com-
pliments usual on such occasions having passed,
our conversation naturally took the turn into which
the present situation of affairs, and the position of
the army, were calculated to guide it. lt was then
that Sir John explicitly stated to me, that he had
come to a final determination ta retreat. He had
caBed the general.officers together, he added, for
the purpose of acquainting 'them with his decision,
as well as with the reasons which led to it; but
he had neither requested their opinions, nor de-
manded their judgment. He next entered, at
great length, into the motives ,which swayed him,
reasoning, in conversation, as he reasoned in his
letters, with a decided leaning to the gloomy side
of the picture. He spoke warmly in condemna-
tion of the Spanish government, and.of the nation
generally; and enlarged upon the absence of all
right understanding among the general s, as well
as upon the abs~rdity of their military movements,
which had subjected them all to be beaten in de-
taiL . He expressed his sincere regret that they
had not marched, as theyought to have done, when
he first began to enter the country, so as to unite
themselves with him; and declared that, with a
fOTce as yet uncollected, and having nQthing but
the remains of defeated corps on his flanks, a




PENINSULAR WAR. 221


choice of evils alone remained for him. The de-
termination to which he. had at last come, was
not formed without extreme pain to hims~lf; but
the duty ofpreserving his army"situated as it now
was, presented to his mind a consideration para-
mount to every otber; he was, therefore, resolved
to retreat.


Though 1 could not but feel deeply on hearing
such a declaration, 1 deemed it my respectful
duty to say little in reply. further than by ex-
pressing my regret that so strong a necessity for
the measure should exist, and my apprehension of
its consequences 10 the cause. The slightest in-
dication of a retrograde movement, exhibited at
such a moment as this, would, 1 feared, produce
fatal effects; for, Spain would fall, Portugal would
fall, and the whole of Europe be once moreat the
feet .of the enemy. Then what would become of
Madrid, ,whose inhabitants were enduríng the
severest privations, chiefly with the hope of re-
ceiving aid from us; and of Castanos, and Pa-
lafox, and Blake, aH oí whom, OH the same ex-
plicit understanding, were labouring to re-as-'
semble their scattered troops. No doubt, 1 added,
the General's information was more likely to be
correet than mine; but 1 dreaded the heavy dis-
appointment which his proposed s~ep would
occasion to the people of Epgland, whose very
bearts seemed set upon the success .of his under-,




222 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


taking; and whose mortification at his failure
would be biiter, in proportion to the degree of
hope with which they saw him embark upon it.
1 then retired, with the painful conviction on my
mind, that the army would begin its backward
journey in the course of a day or two at the
furthest.


The feelings of regret under which 1 laboured
were not, 1 soon fonnd, confined to my own
breast; they were shared by many in the army.
Even the General's personal 8taff sought not to
conceal their chagrin at tbe adoption of a system
which seemed so unsatisfactory. General Hope
having by this time joined, there were at Sala-
manca and in the neighbourhooq full twenty
thousand British troops, in a state, both from
their equipment and discipline, to oppose any
French force of almost double the number. Ge-
neral Baird, with a strong reinforcement, particu-
larly in cavalry, was at Astorga; nor were there
any impediments whatever in his way, which
should hinder him from arriving within six days at
fue furthest. But if it should be deemed unsafe
to wait so long here, why not move towards him,
and concentrate the divisions behind the Douro,
from whence ofi'ensive operations might be under-
taken? Any thing, in short, was pronounced
preferable toa retreat, which, independently of
the disgrace which it would bring upon the Bri-




PENINSULAR W AR. 223


tish arms, must expose Madrid to destruction,
and cause the certain annihilation of Castanos and
Palafox's armies. Seldom did men, situated as
we were, venture to speak out, so boldly against
the measures of their chief. But murmurings and'
remonstrances were useless; the die was cast,
and it could not be recalled.


In the midst of these discussions, news carne in
from tha capital, which served to produce an effect
upon the mind of our General. The Spaniards
were represented as prepared to bury themselves
under the ruins of the city, and to perish to a
man, before the French should entero In the
short space of forty-eight hours they had unpaved
the streets, and loaded the balconies and flat roofs
of their houses with the stones, in readiness to be
burled on the heads of the assailants. A huge
trench was already drawn round the entire cir-
cumference of the city; numerous outworks were
begun, and men and women of aH ranks and
classes were labouring incessantly for their com-
pletion. Morla had assumed the chief command
of the place; and all were united in one enthusias-
tic resolutioI} to conquer or perish. It is pro-
bably needless to add that the annunciation of
these tidings served but to increase our disconten t.
Men were no longer contented to express gene-
rally tbeir disapprobation of the retreat, but each




224 NAURATIVE OF THE


wasready with his own plan, from the adoption of .
which he was perfectly convinced that the most
advantageous results might arise. Why not move
to. the right, cried one, and endeavour to unite
with Castanos? Should matters come to the
worst, there will always be a retreat aeross the
Sierra Morena, upon Cadiz. Why not make a
forward movement at once, exclaimed another, or
else close up our own troops in. the rear of the
Douro? this will at least retard the enemy's
operations, if it do not absolutely defeat them?
Was it tobe expeeted that Buonaparte, having
gone so far, would relinquish Spain, till bis whole
strength shóuld have been brought against it? or
that . the raw Spanish levies would not suffer de-
feats? Were .there no provine es whither, in the
event of being overpowered, the British army
could withdraw, still warm in the cause, and stiU
capable of .exertion? W ould not a British force
in the north of Spain, ev.en though driven to act
on the defensive; or the same force retiring gra-
dually towards the. south, and gathering round it,
as it went, the remnants of the different Spanish
,corps, cast prodigious difficulties in tbe way of the
enemYI alld give prodigiolls ellcouragement to our
allies? AH these questions were asked with the
tone which men will assume, when matters are in
progress of which they disapprove; and it was




PENINSULAR \VAR. 225


answered, as if with one voice, tbat balf the army
had better be sacrificed, tban the cause tbus
abandoned.


N otwithstandlÍlg these murmurs, of which be
was not left in ignorance, General Moore exlií-
bited no signs of any alteration in his previolfS
resolutions. On the contrary, Lord Paget, who
had been previol1lsIy commanded to close up from
Astorga with the whole of the cava1ry, reeeived
<>rders nQt to march; and it was given. out that
the retrograde movement would commence on the
day after the morrow ; one cavalry regiment only
was summoned, but it was called in for tbe
avowed purpose of strengthening the hussar bri-
gade, and enabling it to cover more effectualIy tbe
retreat of the column. Thus, on the night of tbe
5th, the troops retired to rest, in the unshaken be-
lief th~t the proud hopes with which they had
entered thiscountry, were aH doomed. to suffer
overthrow.


Having remained during the night in Salamanca,
1 departed on the following morning to the out-
posts, whieh had been drawn in, and now oceu-
pied stations in the immediate front of this city.
1 had not resumed my ordinary toutine of duty
many hours, when, to my in,expressible satisfac-
tion, intelligence was communicated to me that
the General had altered his plans. Sir David
Baird, who had actually begun his retrogade


VOL. J. l'




226 NARRATIVE OF THE


movement from Astorga, was ordered to retrace
his . steps; and an advance, instead of a retreat,
was u~derstood to be in contemplation. N ever


,has a condemned criminal rejoiced more heartily
at the receipt of a reprieve, than did the British
army when these tidings got abroad among them.
But a few hours ago, and every face looked blank
and woe-begone; men did their duty, indeed, at~
tended to their horses and accoutrements, and
performed all the other offices which their stations
required; but they set about every thing with the
air of people who took no manner of interest in
what they were doing. Now all was life and
activity, insomuch, that even occupations, which
but a few hours ago would have cost many a com-
plaint whilst in process of execution, were exe-
cuted, not only without murmur, but withapparent .
satisfaction.


It was but natural that the curiosity of all
should be powerfully excited respecting the causes
which, in so short a space of time, had produced
effects so remarkable. Whilst by sorne it was
surmised that the disapprobation of the general
officers to his proposed measures, had of itself
induced Sir John Moore to take them into further
and more serious consideration; others, with per-
haps more reason, attributed the circumstance
.mainly to the receipt of fresh information from
Madrid, and letters which were known to have




PENINSULAR W AR. 227


come in from Mr. Frere. From the formerofthese
it was collected, that the inhabitants of the capital
had abated nothing of their ardour; that the
French had made oneassault, ~n which they were
repulsed with loss; and that, from the temper 'of
the people andthe zeal of their leaders, it was
anticipated that no better suécess wouJd attend
them in others. Such were the news from
Madrid; whilst Mr. Frere's letter was understood
to contain little el se than one tissue of cogent
reasons ag'ainst any movement to the rear. Mr.
Frere was doubtless fully justified in writing in
this strain; as minister from the court ofEngland.
he was perfectly authorised to give advice respect ..
ing the course to be pursued by the English
General, even if that officer had abstained froID
requesting it; but Sir John Moore having re ..
peatedly soIicited his opinion, as to the p'rudence
or imprudence of schemes in agitation, his right
to speak or write stl'Ongly became increased four~
fold. Mr. Frere, however, in my humble judg.:.
ment, erred, in desiring that Colonel Charmilly
should be examined before acouncil of war prior
to any movement being made. Respecting ~olonel
Charmilly's trust-worthiness, 1 beg to be under-
stood as offering no opinion; he might have been
a very good and a very prudent man, or he might
have been the reverse; but in either case it would
have beeri not onIy insulting to the Commander of




228 NARRATIVE OI-' TIlE


the forces, to have the judgment of an unofficial
emigrant set up in opposition to his own; but the
consequences might have been in every way
ruinous. Sir John Moore dismissed that person
with marks of dissatisfaction ; and I think I should
have done the same.


In spite of all this, however, and in spite of the
excessive timidity of the Supreme Junta, which
on the first alarm of danger had fled to Badajoz,
at the very extremity of the kiugdom, only oue
opinion can, I conceive, be formed, as to the sound-
ness of the views taken by Mr. Frere on the presént
occaSlOn. No doubt we should have had serious
difficulties to contend against, not the least serious
of which was presented by the disorganised and
disjointed state of the Spanish armies; but of the
evils arising from. that system, even the imbecile
government seemed to be aware; and there was a
prospect that the separate corps would be shortly
brought together under sorne single chief. Romana.
too, was generaIly spoken of·as the man; and in
Romana we had all great confidence. N ow should
thisplan beacted upon, as we had good reason to
believe it would, the absence of the junta, so far
from beiug a subject of regret, ought rather to be
viewed as one of cordial congratulation; inasmuch
as the intrigues, cabals~ and absurdities, whích at-
tended constantly upon its deliberations, were
likely to produce less mischiefwhen the body itself




PENINSULAR WAR. 229


was at a dístance, than if it were near at hand.
But to return to our own movements.


It was on the evening of the 5th,-on the even-
ing.of the very day on which 1 'had my last inter-
view with him, that Sir John Moore's sentiments
began to waver .. A courier was accordingly de-
spatched that night, with directions to General
Baird not to persist in his movement upon Corunna;
ánd on the following morning a second courier set
off, bearing orders for him to retrace his steps upon
the Astorga road. At the same time Colonel Gra-
ham was despatched to Madrid, for the purpose of
ascertaining the real condition of the city, and of
bringing back such accounts as might be worthy of
confidence. This officer, who throughout the war
peculiarly distinguished himself by his activity and
diligence, had come in, only a few days before,
with tidings of the defeat of Sto Juan's' army, and
the forcing of the Somosierra pass by a corps of
French cavalry. It was then that men began to
inquire why measures had not been adopted to
secure that pass more effectualIy, than by leaving
it to thecare of a Spanish levy of half-armed
peasants; and many were of opinion, that had
General Hope's corps taken a position there, much
time might have be en gained; whilst Baird's
column joining Sir John Moore's, the whole might
have advanced togcther, or, in case of reverses,
fallen back in a body upon Madrid. That advan·




230 ),[ARRA'flVE OF THE


tage, however, was lost; and hence not only would
any movement of troops upon the capital he made
at a double risk, hut even a single messenger-
such as Colonel Graham-was compelled to make
a long detour, in order to reach it in safety. By a
circuitous route, however, Colonel Graham pro-
ceeded; and upon the results of his mission, and
the report which he might happen to hring back,
the future operations of the army were understood
to dependo


In these uncertain measures, and still more. in
the general tenor of his conversation, it Was easy
to perceive marks of the gloom which at this time
overshadowed the mind of General Moore. That
he was an officer of great distinction, every
one acknowledged during his life, and posterity
will never deny it; hut it was too manifest that a
fear of responsibility, a dread of doing that which
was wrong, of runnirig himself and his troops into
difficulties from which they might not be able to
extricate themselves, were a great deal too active
lo permit either his talents or his· judgment pro-
perly to exert their influence. Sir John Moore
had earned the highest reputation as a general of
division; he was aware of this; and perhaps he
felt no inclination to risk if--at alI events, he was
clearly incapahle of despising partial ohstacles in
the, pursllit of some great ultiinate advantage; in
one worcl, he war-; not a Wellington. Of this no




PENINSULAR WAR. 231


more convincing proof need be given, than the fact
that, even at the moment when preparations for
an advance were going on, his whole heart and
soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese fron-
tier. Did any one talk to him of the possibility
of gaining Valladolid, and then, in case of the
worst, of retiring into the northern provinces, and
acting on the defensive, he would answer by a
declaration that in the north there were no sup-
plies; and that it was a country, in every point of
view, most unfavourable for military evolutions.
Perhaps this might be true. The northern pro-
vinces are certainly barren enough; and we should
have doubtless be en met by a variety of inconve-
niences, had we made them the theatre of our
operations; but with the sea open to us, what had
we to apprehend? Besides, even upon the suppo-
sition that our first and greatest object was to de-
fend Portugal, it was by no means certain that we
mig'ht not cover it as effectually by taking up posi-
tions in the north of Spain, as by falling back at
once upon the frontier. Unless the French pos-
sessed a disposable force much greater than we
had reason to believe they díd, it was extremely
improbable that they would venture to pass us by;
whereas, were we to retire, they would of course
pursue, and t11U8 the whole of the Península would
be gradually overrun.


But though our leader seemed in no way dis-




232 Nil.RRA'fIVE OFTHE


posed toembark upon any hazardous undertaking,
he showed himself well inelined, in the event of a
favourable communication froID Colonel Graham,
to attempt something. Ofthe motions and strength
(9f the enemy, no tidings had of late beenreceived;
but our own torce was in the highest spirits, and
in the best possible order. The' hospitals were
almost entirely tenantless, and the regiments of
infantry were complete, not only in mumbers, bui
in their equipments and clotbing, and everything
necessary for taking the fleld. The cavalry, again,
were in admirable ease; whilst of the artillery it
is necessary to say no more, than that it never
IJresented a more imposing appearance. How sin-
cerely did aH regret that the unhappy delay, oc-
casioned by Baird's retrogression, should keep
such an anny idle, even for a single da.y !


From this period up to the return of Colonel
Graham, only one event occurred of sufficient im-
portance tú< be narrated. It was this: A couríer,
who was carrying despatches fmm Bayonne ad-
dressed to N apoleon at Aranda, having fallen into
thehands of some armoo peasantry, was by them:


. sent in to the head-quarters of our army. Whe-
ther the rnail contained any very interesting in-
telligence 1 cannot say, not having personally
examined it; but 1 learned that sorne of its
contents were at least arnusing, if not instructive.
They were of old date; for they spoke of the army




PENINSULAR WAll. 233


of Portugal as on its march through Bourdeaux,
under the orders of J unot, whose letters were a11
written in a style of humility Huite unprecedented.
Their purport, however, accounted for their tone
pretty effectualIy; for tbey were chiefly devoted
to entreaties that some increase of pay might be
granted; the writer being but badly provided for,
now tbat his Portuguese resourbes had failed him.
lt will easily be believed that the perusal of these
piteous petitions created no little merriment among
the men, to whose exertions the Marshal was in-
debted ror bis present poverty.


On tbe 9th of December, Colonel Graham
returned from his mission. He bad taken the
route by Talavera, at wbich place he arrived on
the 7th, in time to be told of the surrender oí
Madrid, and of the murder of General Sto Juan by
his mutinous troops; and not judging it either
prudent OF necessary to proceed further, he in-
stantly retraced his steps. According to his report,.
though many· reverses had been sustained, still,
from the attitude which the country continued to
maintain, and the divided state of the French
army, something might yet be done. The chiefs
in the capital bad indeed betrayed their trust;
and tbe enemy were in possession of tbe Retiro;
but tbe indignant populace bad refused to Iay
down their arms; and tbere was Httle probability
that they would 800n be induced to change tbeir




~34 NARRATIVE OF THE


sentirnents. There were about thirty thousand
French troops thus kept in ernployment. Of the
rest, sorne had proceeded against Saragoza, sorne
against Toledo; sorne liad taken the road to Valen-
cia, and othel's had bent their steps towards Cadiz.
AH this appeared to Sir John Moore as inviting a
forward movernent on his part; and the army were
too much gratified at the prospect of advancing
at all, to question very minutely the grounds or
motives upon which our General acted, or changed
his opinions.


The l110vement began on the 12th frorn various
points. On that day Lord Paget, with the prin-
cipal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro,
whither he had moved up in the course of the
week, to Tordesillas; whi1st the hussar hrigade,
under my own orders, proceeded froID its ground
at Arrivola. The divisions likewise defiled from
Alba de Tormes, Salamanca, and Ludesrna, and on
the 14th a new position was taken up, the right
resting on Tordesillas, the centre at Alayoz, and
the left at Toro. In order to render it as secure as
possible, the whole ofthe cavalry was placed upon
the right of the stream, part occupying posts on
<me side of the river, and part upon the other.
Lord Paget's corps crossed the stream; whilst that
of which 1 was at the head, distributed itself
throúgh Patricios, Rubios, Madrigal, Nava del
Rey, and Pollos, on the Domo. Thus we had




PENINSULAR \VAR. 235


completely reversed the order in which, but a few
days ago, we stood. Then our real' was to the
Guadarama, that pass being in the hands of our
friends, and opposed to the enero.y; now we were
facing the Gúadarama, and expecting the enemy
to debouch from the very places which we our·
selves had formerIy occupied.


lt was the good fortune of a squadron of the
18th hussars to cOIne, at this time, into contact
with the enemy. There is a large viUage, 01'
rather a small· town, called Rueda, situated about
half-way between Nava and Tordesillas; in which,
we had been given to un.derstand that detach-
ments of the enemy's cavalry, with sorne infantry,
were quartered. Having caused it to be re con-
noitred, and finding that the Frenc4 seemed quite
ignorant of our proximity, 1 determined to sur~
prIse thern, ir possible; at all events to bring them
to action. With this intention a squadron pro-
ceeded against them on the night of the 12th;
and having happily rnade good our entrance un-
observed, we soon tJ1rew thern into corifusion.
The greater number were sabred on the spot,
rnany were taken, and only a few escaped to in-
forrn General Franceschi, who occupied Valladolid
with a body of two 01' three thousand horse, that
the British arrny had not retreated.


When he began his movernents, it was, 1 believe,
General Moore's intention to advance by Valla-




236 NARRATIVE OF THE


dolid, to unite himself with Romana's army, and
to threaten the communieations between Madrid
and Franee. With this view he had taken up his
position at Tordesillas, and haddespatehed a mes-
senger with a letter to Romana, making him ac-
quainted with his plains. But on the 14th a
French offieer having been intereepted by the
peasantry, the despatches of whieh he was the
bearer were brought in to me; and seeing that
they were of the firstmoment, 1 lost no time in
forwarding them to head-quarters. An imfi?c-
diate change of plan was the eonsequenee. 1'he
army, it was understood, would move to its left,
for the purpose of effeeting a junetion at once with
Sir David Baird's column; and then, either in
connexion with Romana, if he could be found, or in-
dependently of him, should hekeep out ofthe way,
attaek Marshal Soult, who, at the head of sixteen
or eighteen thousand men, was in position about Va-
lencia and Saldanha. The plan seemed to be both
a wise and a spirited one; and it deserved sueeess.


Whilst the eolumns of infantry were filíng off
in the direction of Toro and Benevente, the
cavalry enjoyed several opportunities of again try-
ing its strength with that of the enemy. In every
instance the superiodty of British soldiers was
well asserted; and in a variety of skirmishes we
succeeded in making prisoners of one lieutenant-
colonel, one major, with upwards of a hundred




PENINSULAR W AR. 231


privates, and sixty horses. It was in truth a glo-
fious spectacle . to see with what perfect con-
.fidence of success the smallest patrol of British
horse would charge bodies,often doubling them..:
selves in number; and it was no less gratifying to
find that a mere numerical superiority in no
single instance availed the enemy anything.


In the mean time intelligence carne in from
Romana, that he had actually commenced his
retreat from Leon, in consequence, as it was sur-
mised, of the arrangements into which Sir John
Moore had entered a few days ago, for retiring
upon PortugaL Such information, at a moment
like the present, could not fail of causing con-
siderable vexation to our leader. He blamed
Romana severely, and despatched another courier,
with a letter eouched in terms even more pressing
than any which he had employed before, to re-
quest that the Spanish General would re trace his
steps without a moment's delay. It was added
that, should he find it impossible to act upon this
suggestion at once, General Moore could not wait
any longer for his convenience; beca use an op-
portunity of striking a blow was now before him,
such as had never previously come in his· way,
and which the smallest 10ss of time might remove.
In due course Romana's answer arrived; and it
was to the effect, that he would eo-operate, to the




238 NARRATIVÉ OF THE


utmost of his power, in any enterprise III which
the British General might see fit to embark.


So far all was satisfactory enough; but the
same thing could certainly not be said with refe-
rence to the information which we derived from
our prisoners, touching the amount of French
troops employed in the Peninsula. From one of
these, Colon el Arvignac, we learned that there
either were, or shortly would be, opposed to lIS
ten corps d'armie, each consisting of two di vi .
sions, or nearly twenty thousand men; and the
following is the list of generals in command, with
their stations, as he enumerated them :-:-Ney and
Moncey, in the neighbourhood of Saragoza; Le .
Fevre and Ma~elliny moving on Salamanca; Bes~
sieres, at I Madrid; Soult and Lassalle, near Pla-
cencia; J un~t.. I;1dvancing to Burgos; Gouvion
SÍ; Cyr, in the direction of Barcelona; Milhaud,
in communication with Le Fevre; and Marmont,
whose exact province 1 have forgotten. The
cavalry attached to this mass he represented as
embracing no fewer thl;1n thirty-six regiments;
and he affirmed that there were full seven thou-
~alid of the imperial guards then quartered in
Madrid. How far these statements wére to be re-
lied upon, it was o(course impossible to say; but
of one truth no man could be ignorant,-namely,
th~t t~e enemy's force in the country was enor-




PENINSULAR W AIt. 239


mous, and that our only chance of success lay in
beating him in detail. But was it probable that
we should succeed in this? The most sanguine
amongst us could not but experience doubts, when
it was recollected that, of all tbe Spanish armies
wbich but a month ago had kept the field, Ro-
mana's alone remained; and that it could hardly
be counted upon, inasmuch as it was as yet only
in the act. of forming. Then, again, the French
generals were as. prudent as tbey werebrave.
Should any one of them be made aware of our
approacb, he would doubtless fallback, with tbe
view of drawing us after him, till we should' be
thrown into the midst of as many corps as the
Emperor might deem it advisable to employ in
our destruction. Still, much was to be effected
by promptitude and boldness; and though we
heard of nothing except immense ma,sses ofFrench
moving in every direction; though the people
undeniably began to exhibit symptoms of abated
zeal and decaying patriotism; and thougb, aboye
aH, our own General was not aman to attempt
anything, unless he saw before him a sort of moral
certainty of success, such as others wouldsCárCély
look for; in spite of an these considerations, not a
man in the army desponded, but all felt their
spirits rise in proportion as tbe prospect of meet-
ing the enemy became more decided.


With this feeling uppermost in our minds,every




240 NARRATIVE OF THE


march which brought us nearer to the position of
Marshal Soult was performed, not only without a
murmur, but with an excess of good-will. On
the 16th, the head-quarters had beenestablished
at Toro; on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, it passed
Villapondo and Valderosa, and on the 20th we
were established at Majorga. Here Sir David
Baird's column joined us; and here we could
lnuster no fewer than 23,000 infantry, 2,300 ca-
valry, and nearly fifty pieces of cannon of different
calibres.


Whilst head-quarters were established at Ma-
jorga, the cavalry and horse-artillery having ad-
vanced as far as Monastero Melgar Abaxo, suc-
ceeded, on more than one occasion, in measuring
tbeir strength with the enemy's outposts. Of the
skirmishes which took place at this time, few were
productive of any very serious effects; though all
tended, in a greater 01' less degree, to increase the
confidence of oul' people in themselves, and so fal'
to prepare them for the grand stl'uggle which
was supposed to be pending. ,But there was one
exploit which deserves lasting remembrance, not
onIy because of the gallantry which the troops
displayed in its performance, but because of the
complete knowledge' of his profes8ion which was
exhibited by Lord Paget in cDnducting it.


The Monastero Melgar Abaxo i8 distant about
three leagues from Sahagun ;in which place a




PENINSULAR W AR. 241


corps of seven hundred French cavalry were re-
ported to be 10dged. As they were at some dis-
tance from the main body of the French army, it
was deemed practicable to cut .them off, and Lord
Paget determined, at aH events, to make the at-
tempt. He accordingly put himself at the head
of the 10th and 15th hussars; and, in the middle
of a cold wintry nigbt, when the ground was
covered with snow, set off for that purpose.


When they had ridden about two-thirds of the
way, Lord Paget divided his force, and desiring Ge-
peral Slade, with the 10th, to pursue the course of
the Cea, and to enter the town by that side, he him-
self, followed by the 15th, wheeled off to approach
it by a different route. Jt was not long before his
Lordship's party fell in with a picket oí the enemy.
The picket was instantly charged; and aH, except
one man, were either cut down or made prisonersó
But the escape of one was as injurious, under
existing circumstances, as the escape of the whole;
for the alarm was given, and before the 15th could
approach the place, r, the enemy were ready to
receive them. 1t was now broad daylight; and
as our troops drew near, the French were seen
formed in what appeared to be an open plain, at.
no great distance from the town. The 15th were
~heeled into line in a moment; and as there was
no time to be lost, they followed their leader at a
prisk trot, with the intention of charging; but


VOL. I. Q




242 NARRATIVE OI<' 'fHE


when they were yet fifty yards from the enemy;
they fúund that a wideditch divided them, and
that the French had availed themselves of other
inequálities in the ground7 of which, when sorne
way off y they had not been aware. A pause was
now necessarily made, but one instant served to
put the whole again. in motion. The regiment,
wheeling to its left, soon found out a convenient
spot for. crossing; and though the enemy manreu~
vred actively to hinder the formation, they were
again in line and advancing to the charge, within
five minutes from the commencement of the check.
A few changes of ground now took place,. as each
corps strove to gain the flank of another; but they
were only a few. The British cavalry effected ¡ts
object; and then coming down at fuIl speed upon
theír opponents, who stood to receive the shock,
they overthrew them in an instant. Many were
killed upon the spot, many more unhorsed, and
one hundred and fifty-seven were made prisoners,
including two lieutenant-colonek On this oc-
casion the English cavalry amounted only to four
hundred men, whilst that of the French feH not
short of seven hnndred.


This brilliant rencontre took place on the 20th;
and on the 21st the head-quarters of the army
were advanced to the spot where it occurred.
The weather wasat this time remarkably inc1e-
ment, a succession of frost and snow .having been




PENINSULAR W AR. 243


followed by heavy rains; and the troops, who had
performed of late many severe forced marshes,
were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Under
these circumstances, though fulIy conscious that
every hour which passed was so much time lost to
him and gained by the enemy, Sir John Moore
determined to halt for a day; and he devoted it
to a careful suppIy of all the necessaries of which
the menseemed to be in need, as well as in pre-
paring against t11e events of the trial which he felt
to be at hand.


Whilst resting here, the corresponden ce be-
tween General Moore and the Marquis de la Ro-
mana was renewed. The latter made no secret of
the general inefficiency of his army, but he
agreed to co-operate with us in our attack upon
Soult, with an whom he could bring into the tieId
in a fit state to meet the enemy. He sent more-
over, from time to time, such pieces of information
as he was enabled, by means of spies, or the vigi-
lance of the peasantry, to collect. At first he re-
presented the French force as amounting to no
more than ten thousand infantry and one thousand
cavalry, with eight or ten piecesof cannon, whom
it would be perfectly practicable to surround and
destroy before any reinforcements could reach
them from other q uarters; but by and by he be-
gan to discover that these reinforcements had
actuallyarrived, and that there-werefulleighteen




244- NARRATIVE OF THE


ornineteen thousand men in position álong the
Carrion. Sir John Moore had b~en aH aIong
aware that SouIt's corps amounted to this force;
he 'was not therefore disconcerted by the inteHi-
ge11ce; but he neglected no means which pre-
sented itself, of obtaining fresh communications;
and his channels were, at this time, both nume-
rous and sure. Hour after ,hour however passed
on; without the occurrence oí anything caIculated
tO prod uce an alteration in his plans; hour after
hour, therefore, was believed by the troops to
bring nearer and nearer to them the opportunity.
fol' which they had long panted, of forcing upon
the enemy the issue of a battle.


So passed the whole of the 21st, and the greater
part of the 22nd of December. Respecting the
French it was understood that, out of the eighteen
thousand men of which Soult's army was com-
poscd, seven thousand were státloned at Saldanha,
and five thousand at the town of Carrion; whilst
the rernainder either lined the banks of the river
in files of communicatiol1, or covered, in force, the
different fords and bridges by which it could be
passed. On our part, again, no definite position
-fione at least deserving of the name in a mili-
tary paint of view-had been taken up. We
were 011 the eve of moving, and therefore our
regimellts were kept as much togetber, as a regard
to shelter would allow; but we had selected no




l'E);I.N'S\lLAR W A.R, '2.45


points d'appui, nor were we particularly prepared
to reeeive an attack, should such be made upon
us, to advantage; yet were we ready to aet in
almost any manner which circumstances might
require; though our object was manifestly to act
offensively ratber tban on tlle defensive; and to
this end a1l our other and minor preparations were
turned. Hospitals were established in every con-
vent near, and arrangements marle for the safe
and speedy removal· of the wounded to the rear;
whilst nothing was spoken of except the approach~
ing contest, and the probable consequenees of a
victory, which all anticipated.


The evening of the 22nd was now approaching,
and orders had actually be en issued, for an im-
mediate advanee against the enemy.The army
was commanded to march at eight o'cloek at night~
in twocolumns, for the purpose of forcing the
bridge at Carrion, and so penetrating to Saldanha ;
and the right column, to which this .charge had
been peculiarly intrusted, was making ready to
get under arms, when two couriers, one from the
head-quarters of the Marquis de la Romana, and
the other from Los Santos, arrived. They we.re
bearers of intelligence, of which it is no figure of
speech to affirm, that none could have been re-
ceived more replete with sources of mortification
to every member of the army. The enemy, it ap-
peared, were moving in all directions upon uso




246 NARRATIVE OF THE


The eorps which had begun its march towards the
south, had halted at Talavera; severa] strong di-
visions had moved froID Palencia, and were already
in the vicinity of Carrion; the Badajoz army had
wheeled round, and was in full march towards Sa-
lamanca; whilst N apoleon himself had set out
from Madrid, with the avowed intention of making
Benevente his next halting place. Sir John Moore
felt, or imagined, that this was not the moment,
nor these the circumstances, under which to risk
a battle. He believed that Soult would retire
before him, for the express purpose of allowing
time to these different divisions to get into. his
rear; and he was persuaded that the passage of
a few days would, in all probability, expose him
\0 the risk of being surrounded by sixty or seventy
thousand troops, of the flower of the French army.
With this prospect before his eyes, he instantIy
countermanded the orders which had be en issued
in the earlier part of the evening. The regiments
which had begun tomuster,were dismissed to their
quarters; and it was understood, throughout the
ranks, that all idea of áttacking, at least for this
night, was abandoned.




247


CHAPTERX.


Dissatisfaction of the army-.SirJohn Moore prepares to re-


treat-The infantry and artillery retire in two columns,


covered by the cavalry-Movements of th? French armies-


Affair of cavalry at Majorga-Sutferings of the troops 01\
their march-Alarm at Benevente, and brilliant cavalryac-


tion-Destruction of stores at Astorga-Wretched pligbt of


Romana's troops-Disorganization of tbe English army-


March from Astorga to Villa. Franca-::---Seriou,s skirmish at


Villa Franca.~Retrea.t to Liego, where battle is otfered, but
declined by the French-The armies in position three days


-Retreat upon Corunna-The fleet arrives, and the embar-


kation is begnn-Battle of Cornuua, and death of Sir Joho


Moore-The army is withdrawn.


I T would be no easy matter to describe the effect
which this unlooked-for event produced upon
every roan and officer in the arroyo The troops
who had long panted to roeet the ellemy, and who
'but an hour ago were full of life and confidence.
suddenly appeared like men whose brightest hopes
.were withered, and their favourite expectations




248 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


overthrown. Few gave vent to their feelings,
either by complaint or murmur; but aH retired to
their quarters in a state of sullen silence, which
indicated, more powerfully perhaps than any
words could have done, the extent of the mortifi-
cation under which they laboured.


We rose next morning perfectly ignorant, and
to a certain degree quite indifferent, as to the
fate which awaited us; norwere our spirits
greatly heightened, when we saw hour after hotir
pass away without the occurrence of any move-
ment either to the front or rearo There is good
reason to believe that Sir John Moore himself had '
hardly determined on the course which it behoved
him to follow. He was still imperfectIy informed
as to the amount of the different corps which were
advancing against him; though the natural tem-
perament of his disposition induced hiÍn to rate
these at the highest; and he was extremely un-
willing to commence a rapid retreat, tilI it should
have become indispensable. Besides, despatches
carne in this day from Romana, announcing that
he had advanced with all the disposable part of
his army, amounting in the whole to seven thou-
sand men, for the I>urpose of co-operating in the
projected attack upon Soult. 1t was necessary to
countermand this movement, as weH as to make
such arrangements with the Spanish General as
should prevent the two armies from incommoding




PENINSULAR WAR. 249


or commg into collision with each other during
the retreat: In settling this point, as well as in
preparing the hospitals and stores for a speedy
removal, the whole of the 23-rd was spent; and
the following is the order in which it was finally
determined that the two corps should be with- .
drawn.


As the defence of the Gallicias was esteemed
by no means impracticable, Sir John Moore was
desirous of retiring in such a direction as would
enable him, should circumstances authorise the
measure, to take up positions in these provinces;
whilst, at the same time, in case of the worst, á
retreat should be open to him towards the coasL
To effect this, it was necessary, i.n the first place,-
to cross the Eslar; which, from our present situa-:
tion, might be done by three ·routes. We might
proceedby Mansilla, at which point the river is
crossed by a bridg~; or by Valencia, where there
was on1y a ferry; 01' we might take the route by~
Castro Gonsalo, where there is likewise a bridge,
and from whence a road passes directto Bene-
vente. At Mansilla, however, the Spanish troops
were already posted; they had exhausted the
country of aH its. supplies; it was therefore vain
to think of going thither; but the roads by Va-
lencia and Castro Gonsalo were both open, and
ti: was resolved to make use of them; This was
the more necessary, as well ~ecause it would have




250 NAHRATIVE OF THE


been extremely inconvenient to lead the whole
column in the same direction; as because, were
such a measure attempted, the magazines which
had been established both at Benevente and Za-
mora, must, one or other of them, be exposed to
capture by the enemy. Astorga was named as the
place of meeting for the two columns, where it
was understood that a determined stand would be
made;' whilst the Spaniards were requested to
faH back upon Leon, from whence, in the event of
our offering battle, they might harass the rear and
Hank of the French. In the mean while, however,
Romana was to keep possession of the bridge of
Mansilla as long as possible; and the city of Leon
was not to be surrendered, till it should be re-
duced to the last extremity; Every preliminary ar-
rangement being complete, the armybegan, on
the 24th, to retire in the order whichhad been
assigned to it. General Hope, with his own divi-
sion, and that of General Fraser, fell back upon
Majorga, on the road to Castro Gonsalo; whilst
Sir David Baird, at the head of the other éolumn,
took the direction of Valencia. To cover these
ÍIlovements, the cavalry received directions to push
strong patrols toward.s Carrion, as far as the enemy's
pickets, and not to q uit the position till night-fall
on the 25th, -sorne hours after the reserve and light
infantry had been withdrawn. Everything was
~one with the most perfect regularity. Tbe ca-




PENINSULAR WAR. 251


lumns made good their march, the one to Valen-
cia, the other to Castro Gonsalo, without molesta-
tion, and the rear-guard withdrew, at the appoint-
ed hour, leaving the enemy in apparent ignoran ce
that a retreat was in contemplation.


In the mean while, however, Buonaparte was
advancing with rapid strides, from the Escurial.
On the 24th, he had reached Tordesillas with the
advance of his cavalry; sending strong detach-
ments on as far as Villalpando and Majorga; and
at the latter of these place s our troops were again
enabled to try the strength oftheir opponents. 1t
was on the 26th that a considerable force of the
enemy were seen drawn up upon the brow of
some rising ground, and apparently making ready
to cut off any stragglers which might lag behind,
or wander far from the ranks. Lord Paget, who
was present at Majorga, instantly directed Colonel
Leigh, at the head of two squadrons of the 10th
hussars, to dislodge them. Colonel Leigh, forming
his little band into two lines, rode briskly forward,
one squadron leading, and the other supporting,
till he had gained the top of the hill. Here the
roen were commanded to reÍn up, for tbe purpose
of refreshing the horses after the ascent; and they
díd so, under a heavy but not very destructive fire
froro the French. But the horses had no sooner
recovered their wind, than the word was given to
.charge. aild in five minutes tbe French were over-




252 NARRA'fIVE o.F THE


thro.wn. Many were killed, many mo.re wo.und-
ed, and upwards úf o.ne hundred taken priso.ners.


The 10th, ho.wever, was no.t the o.nly cavalry
corps which succeeded in distinguishing itself. 1 t
was remarked by aH, that as o.ften as the French
and o.ur peo.ple carne into. co.ntact, the superio.rity
o.f the British cavalry was shown to. a degree far
beyo.nd anything which had been anticipated.
They seemed to. set all o.dds at defiance; and in no.
single instance was their temerity punished by
defeat, o.r even by repulse. Matters went so. far
at last, that Captain Jo.nes, o.f the 18th, ventured,
with no. mo.re than thirty men o.f his regiment, to.
attack o.ne hundred French cavalry; and he put
them to. the ro.ut, killing fo.urteen, and making six
priso.ners.


Whilst the cavalry were thus co.ming into. almo.st
daily co.ntact with the enemy, and kept in excel-:
lent spirits by their repeated successes, the infan-
try, co.vered by two. o.r three light regiments, were
marching o.ver miserable ro.ads, and thro.ugh an
exhausted co.untry, expo.sed to. hardships mo.re
terrible than it has frequently fallen to. the lo.t o.f
British so.ldiers to. endure. The weather was no.w
more severe than it. had been since we entered
Spain; co.ld winds blowing, and heavy sho.wers o.f
sleet and rain falling; and it was no.t always that
the tro.o.ps co.uld findshelter, even at night, against
their influence. The Ulules and o.ther animals em ..




PENINSULAR WAR. 253


ployed to carry the baggage, soon began to foun-
der; 6r the muleteers, terrified at the prospect of
being overtaken by the French, left them and Hed.
In such cases it was found quite impracticable to
get the animals along, for they would obey no
voice but that of their master, and they were COll-
sequently abandoned, and their loads given up to
plunder. N or were these the only evils to which
qur men saw themselvesexposed. The Spaniards,
whether they were men in authority or not, either
abandoned their houses as the British army ap-
proached, locking their doors, and concealing, as
far as they were able, the little stock of provisions
of which they might chance to be possessed; or
they met our. requisitions for food and wine with
murmurs and complaints, suéh as they would not
have ventured to utter before French soldiers.
These things not unnaturally inéreased the irri-
tation under which the troops already laboured.
They began to view the S paniards as their worst
enemies, alld to treat them as people unworthy of
any consideration whatever. This was severely
retaliated upon them by an enraged peasantry;
and scenes of violence and bloodshed, in which
these allies were the actors, proved by no means
uncommon.


On the 27th of December the coIllmn reached
Benevente. Benevente is remarkable for an oId
baroníaI casUe, which for many generations has




254 NARRATIVE OF THE


been the property of the dukes-of Ossuna; and to
whieh, in point either of splendour or extent, it
would be diffieult to find in E urope a fellow. N ear
it runs the litt]e river Eslar, aeross whíeh, at soroe
distanee froro the town, a bridge was thrown, but
whieh was eommanded by some hilIs, that rise
rather abruptly from the opposite bank of the
stream. Our people had seareely entered the
place, when an alarro was raised that the enemy
were approaehing; and it proved to be so far not
without foundation, that troops were seen, as if in
the aet of forming, on the heights beyond. Pre-
parations were instantly made to reeeive thero.
The regiments assembled at their several points of
mm¡ter, and the cavalry rushing through the gates,
descended to the level country, where they could
most eonveniently aet; but neither the one nor the
other were called into play. ' The enemy, satisfied
with thus disturbing our repose, melted away, and
we returned again to our former quarters and our
original oecupations. The best precautions were,
however, taken, to provide against surprise; the
bridge over the Eslar. was broken down; and
piekets of eavalry were extended all along the
bank, so as to watch the fords, and give timely
notiee of any movem'ent.


The night of the 27th passed by in quiet; and
as soon as day-light carne in, the retreat was re-
newed. The cavalry, however, had not been




PEN INSULAR W AR. 255


withdrawn, when certain movements on the part
of the enemy appeared to indicate that we should
not be permitted to escape thus easily. A body of
flve or six hundred horse were observed, about
nine o'clock, to try a ford not far from the ruins of
the bridge; and in a few moments afterwards they
crossed, and bega~ to form on our side ofthe river.
Instantly t4e pickets, which had been appointed
10 do the duty of a rear-guard, made ready 10 op-
pose them. Though they mustered little more tban
two hundred men, they boldly advanced, under
the command of Colonel Otway, against the mass,
repeatedly charging its leading squadrons, and
keeping it fairly in check, till Lord Paget and the
writer of these pages arrived; wben the former
made haste to bring up the 10th hussars, whilst
the Iatter put himself at the head of tbe detach-
ments aIread y in tbe fleld. Many charges were
now made on both sides, and the squadrons were
repeatedly intermingled; whilst the pickets still
continued to give ground, as it was intended that
they sbould. But the 10th were now ready: tbe
pickets saw that tbey had support; and they re-
quired no entreaty to dash against the enemy.
One cheer was given, and the horses being pressed
to their speed, the enemy's line was broken in an
instant. They fled in great disorder to the river,
and repassed it much more actively than tbey had
passed it before; leaving in our hands General Le




256 NARRATIVE 01<' THE


Fevre, their colonel, with upwards of seventy otheI
officers and meno This was, however, the most
seriQus affair in which we had yet be en engaged.
The cavalry opposed to us formed part of the im-
perial guard; they were all tried soldiers, and they
fought in a manner not unworthy of the reputation
which they had earned in the north of Europe.
They lost in killed and wounded, independently oí
prisoners, about sixty men; our casualties fen
$omewhat short of fifty.
" It has been said that N apoleon himself was an
eye-witness of this rencontre, from the opposite
heights on which he stood. Whether there be any
truth iD: the rumour, 1 know not; but one thing is
quite certain, that the enemy did not venture, for
sorne days after; again to oppose themselves hand
to hand to oureavalry. The column accordingly
reached Astorga on the 30th, having heen very
little harassed by its pursuers. It arrived, how-
ever, in a state of great disorganisation; and it
carne to a place, where pictures of want and misery
were already too" frequent, in the persons of Ro-
mana's soldiers. For Romana, in spite of General
Moore's entreaty to the contrary, had seen fit to
fall back, not upon Leon, or the difficult country
near, but in the same direction with ourselves.
The conseq uence was, that all the houses were
filled with his peopIe, among whom a malignant
typhus rever was raging; and the roads were lite-




PENINSULAR \VAR. 257


rally covered and encumbered with men, horses,
cars, and aH the other accompaniments of an army,
which had foundered or broken down on their
marcho It is hardly possible to conceive any set
of men bearing less resemblance to soldiers, or
having a stronger claim upon the compassion of
those who beheld them, than these wretched crea-
tures. They were almostall in a state bordering
upon lludity. They had no provisions; their afms
were, for the most part, useless; and of ammuni-
tion, either for musketry or cannon, they were
wholly destiti.Ite. N or, to say, the truth, were our
own people in a plight by,many degrees superior.
With us, as w~th them, provisions had long been
scanty; and our shoes, that most essential article
in a soldier's wardrobe, were, in most instances,
worn out. Many officers had, indeed, brought
with. them from England considerable quantities
of apparel; and depots of stol'es had been
formed at various points, one of which chanced to
be Astorga; but the rnuleswhich carried the bag-
gage of individuals had almost all knocked up, and
of the stores deposited in the town liUle use could
be made. The Spaniards were, indeed, supplied
with muskets-for of muskets, a large quantity
had been collected here-and they received as
much ammunition as they were able to carry; but
as to c10thing and provisions, these we possessed
not in sufficient quantities to supply ourselves ;we


VOL. I. R




258 NARRATIVE OF THE


cotlld not, therefore, supply the wants of others.
Rornana's troops accordingly departed on the fol-
lowing morning, to follow the road by Fonubadon
into Gallicia, having derived frorn us none of the
refreshrnent of which they stood so rnuch in necd,
and in the hope of obtaining which they had, per-
haps, deserted their post at Mansilla l11any days
earlier than they needed to have done.


The arl11y had hitherto fallen back under the
persuasion that it would not be required to retreat
beyond its present position at Astorga; but that
here, or hereabouts, l11atters wOtlrd be brought tó the
issue of a battle. Though their conduct, in rnany
respects, cannot certainly be spoken of in high
terms, it is probable that this prospect, and this
alolle, had hitherto kept the l11en in sornething
like a state of subordination. They had com-
mitted various excesses, it is true; l11any had
individually robbed and plundered, and got drunk
by the way, and sorne had thus fallen into the
hands of the enemy, 01' perished from the incle-
l11ency of the weather; yet the army, considered
as a body, was still efficient, and required nothing
more than a few hours of rest, and a moderate
supply of provisions, to restore it to the state of
high ord~r in which it was at Salamanca. From
the moment when preparations began to be made
fol' a continued retreat from Astorga, all this l11ay
be said to have been at an end. In Astorga, the




P-ENINSULAR WAR. 259


blowing up of ammunition-waggons, the destruc-
tion of intl'enching tools, and the committal to the
flames of field-equipments for a whole division,
gave the signal, as it were, fór all the bad pas-
sions of those who witnessed them, to be let
loose; and mortifying as it is to confess it, the
faet eannot be denied, that from that hour we no
Jonger resetnbled a British arrny. There was still
the same bravery in our ranks; bat it wasonly
at moments when the enemy were expeeted to
come on, that our order and regularity returned;
and except in that single point, we resembled
rather a erowd of insubordinate rebels, in full
flight before the victorious soldiers of their sove-
reign, than a corps of British troops executing a
series of military movements in the presence of
their enemy.


When he began hisretreat in real earnest" it
was, 1 apprehend, Sir John Moore's intention to
fall back upon Vigo, and there to embarkJlis army
in. the transports which had be en ordered round
to receive them. With this view he had, when at .
Benevente, despatched General Crawford, at the
head of three thousand men, along the nearer but
steeper road by Orense, in order that ~ny at-
tempt on the part of the enerny to gain ground
upon him with a light eolumn might be prevented;
whiIst he himself took the more circuitous but
beUer route, by Astorga and Villa Franca. At




260 NARRATIVE OF THE


the former place he was joined by Sir David
Baird's division; and here everything, no matter
whether it might be private or public property,
for the removal of which means were wanting,
was destroyed; and the army began its march on
the following morning, in worse plight, and under
more trying circumstances, than ever.


The road from Astorga to Villa Franca leads
through the villages of Torre, Benivedre, Pin-
ferrade, and over a country as much diversified,
and as striking, as will be seen perhaps in ~ny
part of Europe. The first four or five leagues
carry the traveller up one continued aseent, and
along the face of a hill, steep, bare, and open; on
gaining the summit of whieh, he arrives at the
entrance of sorne tremendous passes, such as a
thousand resolute '!llen might easily maintain
against ten times their number. These extend as
far as the village of Torre, a distan ce of nearly
three leagues; after which the landscape becomes
as magnificent as the intermingling of hill and
valley:, rock and mountain, wood and pasture, can
render it. We, of course, beheld it under all the
disadvantages of a season remarkably inclement.
when the ridges ~ere covered with deep snow,
and the fields and roads little better than mere
heaps of mud; yet even thus it was impossible to
pass it by without feelings of the liveliest admira-
tion, and a strong regret that it had not been our




PENINSUJ"AR WAR. 261


fortune to wander here when the forests were in
fuIl leaf, and the green hills in their glory. But
it was not froID its temporary bleakness alone,
that a scene like that around us stirred up a
strange commingling of pleasurable and painful
sensatians. The candition of the army was at this
time a most melancholy one; the rain carne down
upan us in torrents; men and horses were foun-
dering at every step; the former fairly worn out
through fatigue and want of nutriment, the latter
sinking under their loads, and dying upan the
spot. N 01' was it only among the baggage ani-
mals that an absolute inability to proceed further
began to show itself; the shoes of the cavalry
horses dropped off, and the horses themselves
soon became useless. It was asad spectacle to
behold these fine creatures urged and goaded on
till their strength utterly failed them, and then
shot to death by their riders, in order to prevent
them from falling into the hands of the enemy.
Then, again, the few ammunition-waggons which
had hitherto kept up, fell one by one tó the rear;
the ammunition was immediately destroyed, and
the waggons abandoned. Thus were misfortunes
accumulating upon us as we proceeded; and it
appeared e:xtremely improbable, should our pre-
sent system of forced marches be persisted in,
that one half of the army would ever l'each the
coast.




262 N AHIlATIVE OF THE


The reader is doubtless aware that the spirit of
insubordination of which 1 have already s.poken,
as exhibiting itself in a variety of particular in-
stances, became now almost general. There was
no possibility of keeping the men in their ranks.
Some under one pretext, and sorne under another,
whole regiments strayed from their colours; and
as often as a wine-house or store carne in the way,
scenes of the most shocking descnption ensued.
The army moved, as is customary in such cases,
by divisions, the main body keeping a day's march
ahead of the - reserve and the rear-guard. The
former reached Benivedre on the 31st, and at an
early hour on the 1st of January was ordered to
leave it; but when the latter arrived, the place
was fuU of stragg1ers, aH, or almost aH, in a state
of desperate intoxication. At this time the ene-
my's cavalry, though they seldom sought an
opportunity of coming to blows with us, pressed
closely and incessantly upon our rear: we rode
frequently many miles in sight of each other; and
from ti~ne to time, our rearmost dragoons would
exchange pistol shots with their Ieading files.
Under such circumstances, no pause could, of
course, be made, for the meré purpose of closing
up such as lagged; and hence every one who
proved unable, either from intoxication or weari-
ness, to push on, was of necessity left behind.
But the multitudes who lingered in Benivedre




PENINSL'LAR WAR. 26.'3


were so great, that the utmost repugnance was
experienced at the idea of abandoning them; and
it was not till every effort to rouse them had been
made in vain, that they were left to their fate.
Even after the rear-guard hadmarched, a small
detachment of horse still endeavoured to cover
them; nor 'was it till the enemy, in great force,
were seen approaching, that it retired. Then
followed that scene which has been so frequently
described already; but of the horrors of which
none can form an adequate conception who were
no! eye-witnesses of it; when the French dra-
goons, pursuing our patrol, galloped through the
midst of a crowd of men, women, and children,
and wantonly slashed to the right and left, with-
out regard to the age or sex of the object of their
fury. Of thé numbers who thus fell a sacrifice to
their own intemperance, 1 cannot pretend to
sreak with certainty; but 1 know them to llave
been very considerable; and 1 am sure that Bri-
tish troops never looked upon a spectacle more
appalling than those few presented, who, having
come up with the col~mn, bIeeding and cut in nu-
merous pIaces, were, by order of the General,
paraded through the ranks as a warning to their
comrades.


We reached Villa Franca on the 2nd, having
performed a distance of upwards of sixty miles in
two days, where the greater part of the cavalry




264 NARHATIVE OF 'l'HE


took up its quarters, only a small detachment
remaining with the reserve at Caeabelos. Like
Benivedre, it was filled with drunken and dis-
orderly men, belonging to the divisions whieh had
preceded us; by whom the most violent outrages
bad been committed, not upon the natives only,
but upon our own magazines. A store of wine
bad been broken open, and the wine either drunk
or wantonly spílt; and a considerable quantity of
forage, of which we stood sorely in need, des-
troyed. One man was executed here, being
detected in the act of marauding; but the disci-
pline of the army was by this time too much
impaired to be very seriously affeeted even by
su eh an example. Similar deeds were performed
wherever opportunities occurred, and that with
the openness of men, who saw, 01' faneied,that
their case was desperate.


The enemy, who since the affair of the 28th had
kept generally out of reach, showed a disposition
on the 3rd to renew their system of attacking. A
large force of eavalry was se en about oue o'clock
in the afternoon, advancing at a leisurely . pace,
and with IDuch apparent caution, on Cacabelos.
Through the middle of the town the~e runs a small
stream, along the bank of which part of the re-
serve was drawn up; whilst the 95th rifle corps,
supparted by a picket of hussars, occupied a rising
graund about half a league in advance. The rifle-




PENINSULAR W AR. 265


men were eommanded to faH back, and retreat
through the town over a bridge. The greater
number had alreadyeffected this rnovernent, when
the French eavalry corning on in overwhelrning
nurnbers, our picket was forced to give way; and
the French getting in among the two rear com-
panies of the 95th, sueeeeded in rnaking some
pl'isoners. The riflemen had hardly reeovered
their surprise, and were barely able to spread in
skirrnishing order,· when a eloud of disrnounted
chasseurs dashed forward, and crossing the stream
in every part, cornmenced a sharp onset upon the
village. They were met with great gallantry by
the 95th, who retiring slowly up the hill in rear of
the town, took post among sorne vineyards, and
galled them terribly from behind that shelter.
From these the eavalry attempted to dislodge
them: they eharged boldly up the road, and
threatened to take the skirmishers in rear; but
they were almost immediately driven back by the
steady and well-directed fire of our troops; and
they retreated, leaving General Colbert, with many
other officers and men, dead upon the field.


The alarm had by this time spread to Villa
Franca, and Sir John Moore appeared at the se ene
of action. He had scareely done so, 'when a heavy
eolumn of infantry showed itself over the opposite
hills, in fun march upon our position. The artil-
lel'y attached to the reserve instantly opened upon




266 NARHATIVE OF 'fHE


it; and such was the excellence of the practice,
that the enemy, having suffered severely in killed
and wounded, was fain to withdraw his corps
before it had been able to fire a musket. N evel'-
theless, Sir John Moore was not desirous of bring-
ing on a general action here. He had heard of a
position near Lugo, of which he proposed to take
advantage by fighting there, should it be neces-
sary to 6ght at all previous to his' embarkation ;
he was not, therefore, willing to waste time, or
sacrifice lives, in the obstinate maintenance" of
ground to which he attached no value. Whilst,
therefore, the reserve was ordered to Villa Franca,
the main body took the road to Herrieras; and "jt
was foHowed, about ten o'clock, by the rear-guard,
which reached its halting-place soon after mid-
night.


The country became, from this point, such as to
render cavalry of no avail. It was universally
steep, rocky, precipitous, and covered with wood,
and, where in the few spots it was otherwise, too
much enclosed with vineyards and mulberry plan-
tations, to allow even a sq uadron of horse to form
up or acto The cavalry were accol'dingly sent on
at once to Lugo, whi.ther the infantry and arti11ery
followed, as fast as extreme exhaustion, and the
nature of the road by which they travelled, wOllld
allow. But they followed both painfully and
slowly; fOf though as many as forty miles were




.t>E!'JINSULAlt WAR. 267


performed in one march, that march compre-
hended, not the day onIy, but the night also.
This was more than men, reduced to the low ebb
to which our solctiers had fallen, could endure.
They dropped down by whole sections, on the
way-side, and died, sorne with curses, others with
the voice of prayer, in their mouths. lt was
dreadful, likewise, to know that not rnen onIy, but
women and children, were subject to this misera-
ble fate. By sorne strange neglect, 01' by the
indulgence of a rnistaken humanity, Sir John


. Moore's arrny had carried along with it more than
the too large proportion of women allotted by the
rules of our service too arrnies in the fieId; and
these pOOl' wretches were now heighten-ing the
horror of passing events by a display of suffering,
even more acute than that endured by their hus-
bands. Sorne were taken in Iabour on the road ;
and in the open air, arnidst showers of sleet and
snow, gave birth to infants, which, with their
rnothers, perished as soon as they had seen the
light. Others, carrying perhaps each of thern two;
chiIdren on their backs, would toil on, and wheTh
they carne to look to the condition of their precious'
burdens, they would find one or both frozen to·
death. Then the depth of moral degradation to!
which they sank, their oaths and críes, uttered;
under the influence of intoxication, were hardly'
less appalling than the groans which burst froID




268 N ARRA'fIVE OF 'fHE


them, as an hope of aid abandoned them, and they
sat dówn to die. 1 am well aware that the
horrors of this retreat have been again and again
described in terms calculated to freeze the blood
of such as read them; but 1 have no hesitation in
saying that the most harrowing accouIits which
have yet been laid before the public, fall short of
the reality.


The journey from Villa Franca to Lugo occupied
one night and two days, the army reaching the
latter place on the 5th of January. It was one
continued skirmish between the rear of the British
and the advanced-guard of the French, in which
the latter were invariably repulsed with considera-
ble loss. But, in spite of these advantages, the
Britis~ army became· every hour more and more
unfit for service. Its resources wasted away at
every mile. First, whole waggon-loads of clothing,
afms, shoes, and other necessaries, which had
just arrived from England for the purpose of re-
fitting Romana's army, were met, and after the
men had helped themselves to those articles of
which they stood most in need, the residue was
destroyed. Next, two bullock-cars, loaded wit.h
dollars to the amount of 25,0001. were found to be
immoveable. The casks which contained the
money were stove in, and the treasure thrown
from the road over a precipice. This was a most
unwise as well as uselcss measure. Had it been




PENINSULAR WAR. 269


distributed among the soldiers, there is little
doubt that they would have contrived to carry it
along; whereas the knowledge that it lay among
the cliffs, tempted many men to lag behind, who
aH feH into the hands of the enemy, or perished
from cold. But every thing was now done as if
our case was absolutely desp~rate, and as ifthe llt-
most that could be expected, or even desired, was
to escape with our p.ersons, at the expense of the
whole of our materiel. Even guns were now
abandoned, as fast as the horses which dragged
them knocked up ; and the very sick and wound-
ed were left behind in the waggons, of w hich the
bullocks or mules could proceed no further.


1 have said that the march from Herrieras tú
Lugo produced one continlJed series of skirmishes
between the rear of one army, and the head .of
tha other. For the most part, these were pro-
ductive of very trifiing results, and seldom pro-
mi sed to produce more than actually arose out of
them; but there was one occasion on which the
spirits of the troops became powerfully excited,
and when nothing but a degree of caution on the
part of Marshal SouIt. for which no one was pre-
pared, kept off asevere, if not a general action.
It was this : .


. The village of Constantino stands upon the edge
of a small stream, which runs along a deep and
rockychannel, forming the bottom of a ravine,




270 N ARRATIVE OF 'rilE


which, on either hand, is closed in by hilIs. The
hill on the left of the villag-e i8 ascended from the
south by an exposed and winding road, tolerably
steep and uneven; whilst on the opposite side ls
a long gradual slope, till you arrive at the head of
the bridge aIread y spoken of. Sir John Moore
was naturally apprehensive that, should he permit
the enemy to take possession of the summit, whilst
his own eolull'ln was yet withingun-shot, the troops .
wou'Id be terribly annoyed during their open and
g-radual deseent; he therefore determined to dis-
pute the further advance of his pursuers, and to
give time to all the regiments which should be
thus employed to make good the passage of the
river, and gain the village.


Withthis view ther.ifle corps, supported by a
brigade of horse artillery, halted on the brow of
the hill. The enemy perceiving the disposition,
and presuming that his troops, should they at-
tempt to carry the ridg-e by assault, would be
exposed to a murderous fire from the guns op-
posed to them, halted on the declivity of a range
of hilIs opposite, and continued for more than half
an hour to look at our people without attempting
anything. By this time· the column had gained
the head of the bridge, and the principal daúger
was past; the riflemen and artillery wereaecord-
ingly directed to retreat also, in good order, but
with all possible celerity. They obeyed these in-




PENINSULA R "r A R. 271


junctions faithfully; but they were soon followed
by the French, who carne poul'ing down the hill,
just as the rearmost companies had effected the
passage of the stream. Arrangements were in-
stantly made to receive the attack which seemed
now to be threatened. The 28th and rifle corps
formed so as to defend the bridge; w hilst the
20th, 52nd, and 91st, under Sir John Moore in
person, assumed a position on the summit of a hill
in the real'. Here, likewise, the _ horse artillery
took post; and now all was expectation and anx-
iety. The enemy carne on with great apparent
boldness. His cavalry and tirailleurs attempted
to pass the bridge; they were met, not only by
the fire of the riflemen, but by a heavy and well-
directed cannonade from the high grounds, and
they feH back. In a few mornents they renewed
their efforts on the same point, and with similar
want of success; and again, after a short pause,
for the third time. But they were be aten back
in every attempt; till at last darkness put an end
to the skirmish, and they withdrew. At eleven
o'clock at night, -however, our people abandoned
their post. The troops were dreadfully harassed
by their exertions, but not a roan sank under
them; and before rnorning they reached Lugo,
where they found the whole arrny concentrated.


At Lugo, as has been already stated, General
Moore had resolved, should the enemy press hard




272 NARHATIVE OF THE


upon him, to halt and offer battle. With this de-
sign, orders were sent forward to Villa Franca,
that General Crawford should re trace his steps,
and that General Hope's column, which moved a
days' march in advance, should rest at Lugo till
the divisions in the real' had arrived. These 01'-
ders were, 1 believe, transmitted by the hands of
Sir John's aide-de-camp, Captain Napier, and
were enclosed under cover to Sir David Baird,
who was req uested to forward them to their
several places of destination. Captain N apier
delivered his packet at N agaIes, and Sir Da\,jd
Baird instantly despatched an orderly dragoon,
with written instructions for General Hope and
General Frazer. It unhappily fell out that the
dragoon got drunk, and the pácket miscarried.
The misfortune was not discovered till the fo11ow-
ing morning, when fresh orders were instantly
sent off; but the loss of time nothing could repair.
General Hope, with his division, was already a
full day's march beyond Lugo; and though he
wheeled about immediately Oil the receipt of Sir
David's communication, he did not arrive at Lugo
till after the rear-guard had come in; and even
then his troopswere so fatigued, that their fitness
for immediate service of any kind seemed to be
extremely problematical. Many of the horses
aUached to this division dropped down dead in
the streets; many more were destroyed as usc-




PENINSULAR WAR. 273


less; and even of the men, more than one were
known to have perished of absolute exhaustion.
N evertheless, as the General had now determined
tofall back, not u'pon Vigo, but upon Corunna, it
was well that the detached columns had be en
called in. General Orawford, indeed. was too
far on his way to be overtaken, and he reached
Vigo without molestation, embarking there in good
order, and at his leisure; but had the rest of the
army endeavouredto follow him, the probability
is, that half its numbers must have fallen by the
way.


The ground upon which Sir John Moore pro-
posed to await the arrival of the enemy, was dis-
tant about a league, or a "league and a haH: from
Lugo. It offered, upon the whole, a tolerably ad-
vantageous position, along the summit of a range
ofIow hills, and eovered on both flanks by roeks
and precipices. Here the reserve, under General
Paget, took ¡ts station; whilst the rest of the
army found quarters for the night in the town, and
among su eh houses and cottages as were near.


About noon on the 6th, the French columns
made their appearance, and deployed, as it had
been antieipated that they would, upon the heights
opposite. Immediately the army got under arms,
and everything was in readiness, in case of an
attack, to be moved to its proper station. But no
offensive operations ensued. The lines looked at


VOL. 1. s




274 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


one another for sorne hours, as if each expected
the first movement to be made by its opponents;
till at last, as evening began to. close in, an. idea of
a battle was laid aside. Those who had it in
charge to keep possession of the position, piled
their arms, and prepared to bivouac; whilst the
rest retired, each brigade and regiment, to its own
quarters.


The morning of the 7th had scarcely dawned,
when the enemy showed a disposition, either to
attack us in real earnest, or to provoke us into a
forward movement against themselves. They
opened upon our line with four pieces of cannon ;
which, though they did little serious damage,
served to irritate and annoy the soldiers a good
deal. The fire was, however, speedily returned
by the British artillery, and with sucheffect, that
in a few minutes one of the French guns was dis-
mounted, and the remainder silenced. These
were the only hostilities which passed between
the two armies during the earlier part of the day;
but towards sunset columns were observed to de-
file, in considerable force, towards our left, at the
same time that a cloud of tirailleurs began an ac-
tive skirmish with the pickets. Sir John Moore
natural1y conceivecl. that he was about to sustain
a serious attack, and that it would be principally
made upon the point which was threatened. He
flew to the spot, and arrived just as a heavy co-




I'ENINSULAR WAR. 275


lumn of French troops began to ascend the rising
ground, and to press upon a wing of the 76th,
which held it. The 76th gradually retired till it
was joined by the 51st; a regirnent in which Sir
John had served as an ensign, and to which he
addressed a few words calculated to remind thern
of the fact, and expressive of his confidence in
their valour. The short address was not thrown
away. After exchanging a few discharges of
musketry, our people rushed forward with the
bayonet; the enemy scarcely stoOO tú receive the
shock, but fled in much confusion down the hill,
leaving a good many killed and wounded behind
them. This was the last operation on either side;
and the two armies again spent the night in
anxious expectation of what the morrow rnight
bring forth.


Sir John Moore no longer entertained a doubt
that the honr of trial was at hand. He sincerely
rejoiced in the conviction; f(}r the prospect of a
battle had restored to the army the whole of its
confidence, and much of its discipline; and the
General saw that it was only by beating his pur-
suers, and beating them efl'ectnally, that he could
hope to free himself from their presence, or secure
a safe and orderIy embarkation. The greater part
of the night mlS accordingly spent in bringing
gnng into the position, and making every arrange-
Qlent which the circuIÍlstances of the case seemed




276 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


to require; and men's hopes were excited to the
highest: but aH our preparations had been made
for no purpose. We were in position during the
entire day, anxiously desiring that an attack would
take place; but hour after hour passed away, and
the enemy made no movement. On our part it
was deemed unRafe to advance, because the French
were understood to surpass us greatly in numbers;
and they occupied ground extremely difficult of
approach, though furnishing. numerous facilities for
a retreat; whilst another corps. under Victor,
was known to have halted at Villa Franca, and
therefore to be within reach. Under these cir-
cumstances,' nothing remained for us, except to
make the most of the impression which our de-
monstration might have produced upon the ene-
my's confidence. The troops remained at their
arms till dark; and then large fires having been
lighted along the heights, the retreat was recom-
menced.


We marched all night, both men and horses
suffering dreadfully from cold, fatigue, and hun-
ger; and passing th~ough Lugo, we arrived at
Valenuda about ten o'cIock next morning. Here
the positive inability of the troops to proceed
further compelled á halt; and we lay upon the
ground, and under a pelting rain, totally devoid of
shelter, for several hours. But even this space of
time was not granted to undisturbed repose. A




PENINSULAR WAR. 277


cry arose, from time to time, that the enemy were
advancing; and at each alarm the regiments were
ordered to faH in. It is needless to say, how se-
verely this constant call to arms told upon men
already worn down by a night-march; indeed, it
is not going too far to affirm that many of the
corps which had be en most frequently roused from
their sleep, made ready to renew their march in
the eveIiing, as little refreshed as if they had not
halted at aH.


From this time ti11 it reached Corunna, the arrny
saw little more of the French. We had gained by
the late night-march twelve full hours upon Mar-
shal Soult, and he was never able to overtake us ;
yet was our journey, at least for a time, little less
harassing, and little less disorderly, than it had
been before. When we came in to Betanzos, in-
deed, at a late hour in the night, so many were
found to have fallen behind, not only from the
leading divisions, but from the reserve itself, that
to have pursued our progress on the following
morning, would have be en to sacrifice a large por-
tion of the army; and the 10th was accordingly
given up as a day of resto By this- means, mul-
titudes of stragglers were permitted to overtake
their corps; and though the enemy were certainly
enabled to recover part of the ground which they
had lost, that was a matter not to be put in com-
petition with the preservation of so many British




278 N ARRA TIV1: OF THB


soldiers. BesideF:, the only French force which
succeeded in corning up with us, was a small patro}
of cavalry, which our rear-guard had no difficulty
in keeping in check. The advantages resulting
from tbe day of rest were therefore very great.


At length the coast began to appear, and Corun-
na, with its citad el and towers, rose upon our view ;
but the harbour, in which we had expected to find
a large fleet. at anchor, was occupied only by the
few coasters and fishing-boats which usually find
shelter there. Though intelligence of the aIte-
ration in our plans had been sent off sorne days
previously, and the Admiral used every exertion
to bring. the shipping round, a continuance of ad-
verse winds had rendered the effort abortive; and
it was only after an interval of sorne days that the
fleet arrived. Most sincereIy did every one now re-
gret that a battle had not been fought long ago; for
it was quite manifest, that to embark without fight-
ing was entirely out of the question. But where
to fight, was a question which few felt disposed to
answer. \Ve had left behind us positions innu-
merable; in any one of which an arrny such as
ours illight have maintained itself against twice its
numbers; at all events till reinforcernents should
reach US, or sorne diversion in other parts of Spain


. call off part of the enemy's attention from uso In
the vicinity of Corunna, no such favourable ground
existed. There were, indeed, p~sitions here-




PENINSULAR WAR. 279


severa} of them very respectable, and one po-
sitively cornrnanding; but to oceupy these as they
ought to be oceupied, would require a force rnuch
greater than ours; whilst to oeeupy thern irnper-
fectly, would be to expose ourselves to prodigious
risk. Still there was no he]p for it. That we had
fallen into difficulties, every one seemed to be
aware; but there was no disposition anywhere to
magnifythem; and our General insta~tly set about
su eh arrangernents as appeared to hirn best eal-
culated to render them productive of no serious
results.


The Jeading brigades arrived in Corunna on the
afternoon of the 11 th; and the night was passed
by one division in the town, by another in the
suburbs, and by the reserve, partly at the villages
on the Sto Jago road, and partly in El Burgo, near
the bridge over the Mero. That bridge was of
course destroyed, as well as another sorne little
distanee further up the river; and strong pickets
were posted beside their ruins, in order to check
any atternpt on the part of the enerny to repair
them. But the ground whicb, in case of a battle,
the troops were to occupy, was not marked out till
the rnorning of the 12th, when the following final
arrangements were rnade :-
- There is a range of heights, or rather of swelling
knolls, which forrn a sort of arnphitheatre round
the village of Elvina, at the distance of perhaps a




280 NARHATlVE O.F 'fHE


mile, or rather more, from the town of Corunna.
Upon these Sir John Moore resolved to draw up
his army ; for though there was a much more formi-
dable range a mile or two further in advance, his
numbers were not adequate· to its occupation.
He accordingly stationed General Hope's division
upon the left,. posting it along a ridge which com-
manded the Betanzos road, and which sloped away
gradually, with a rearward inclination, towards
Elvina. At this place Sir David Baird's division
took up the line, covering the hilIs which still
continued to bend in, and extending to a valley
which divided this range from another on the op-
posite side of the Vigo road. Across that valley
the rifle corps threw itself in extended order; and
it was supported by General Frazer's division,
which covered the road to Vigo, and protected a
principal approach to Corunna; whilst the reserve,
under General Paget, took post at a village, about
half a mile in rear of General Hope.


These arrangements were still incomplete, when
the enemy made their appearance, moving in
force along the opposite bank of the Mero; but
there was no exchange of shots, nor any design
manifested on their parts to try the strength of our
posItlOn. The sanie state of inaction continued
during the 14th, except that on that day the artil-.
lery which was attached to General Hope's co-
lumn, maintained a short but warm contest with




}'ENINSULAR WAR. 281


so me of the enemy's pieces; and that a maga-
zine, containing four thousand barreIs of gunpow-
der, which had been lately brought from England,
was blown up. It expIoded with a force which
shook the ground like an earthquake, and threw
the inhabitants of Corunna into the utmost con-
sternation. On the 15th, the fleet began to ap-
pear in the offing ;whilst the enemy moved for-
ward a body of troops, for the purpose of occupy-
ing the height on which the magazine had been
constructed. A littIe skirmishing was the conse-
quence; but as the height in question was in no
degree valuable to us, the riflemen who had held
it, and who seemed disposed not to yield it up at
an easy price, were withdrawn. About the same
time some companies of the 5th regiment made
an attempt, under their commanding oflicer, Co-
louel Mackenzie, to possess themselves of a couple
of field-pieces, which the enemy had advanced
somewhat too far upon our left. - The attempt,
though boldIy made, failed; and Colonel Macken-
zie, who conducted it, was killed. Thus were the
two armies in sight of one another, during three
whole days, without any serious disposition being
exhibited, to bring matters to the issue of a
battle.


In the mean while, Sir John Moore was busily
employed embarking the sick, the woul1ded, the
womel1 and childrel1, and all such stores of am-




~82 N AlutATIVE OF THE


munition as yet remained, and could be spared .
from immediate use. This was effected with
great regularity during the afternoon and night of
the 14th; and on the following day, the bulk of
the artillery, for which our ground was no!
adapted, was likewise withdrawn. The cavalty,
after destroying the remainder of their horses, had
gone on board Soffie time before; so that nothing
now remained ex"Cept the most efficient of thein-
fantry in position. On the 16th, therefore, as all
appeared to be quiet in the French lines, orders
were issued for the gradual retreat of the different
divisions; and the boats of the Heet were col-
lected in the harbour, and along the beach~ to re-
ceive the regiments on board as fast as they should
arrive at the water's edge. But about noon, just
as the General had given his final directions, and
had mounted his horse for the purpose of visiting
the outposts, an alarm was spread that the ene-
my were in motion. Sir John Hew to the front,
expressing his high satisfaction at the intelligence;
and arrived just as our pickets were beginning to
skirrnish with the tirailleurs, which, in great mul-
titudes, covered the advance of the French army.


The enemy carne on in four strong columns,
two of which threatened the right of our position;
whilst a third bore down upon the centre, and a
fourth manreuvred so as to occupy the attention of
the left. It soon became apparent tbat his main




PENINSULAR ,\rAR. 283


object was to tum our right, which was decidedly
tbe weakest point in our púsition. It was de-
fended by Lord Wi1líam Bentinck's brigade, COll-
sisting of the 4th, 42nd, and 50th regiments;
having the brigade of guards in their rear, under
Major-general Warde. In order to secure these
against being turned, General Paget was ordered
to advance ínstantly with the reserve, and throw-
ing himself upon the right of Lord William, 10
take post in the foremost line; whilst General
Baird rnade ready, after he should have checked
the force which threatened his own position, to
succour both by a flank rnovernent of General
Manningharn's brigade against the enemy. The
left colurnn, again, needed only to keep its ground,
and to resist any effort which might be made to
force it.


The first attack of the French troops has long
be en noted for its impetuosity; nor was it less im-
petuous on the present day than on other occa-
sions. Our advanced post s were a11 driven in;
and the columns of attack moved forward with
every demonstration of courage, covered by a
cloud of skirmishers, and supported by a conti,nued
and well-directed fire from eleven pieces of artil-
lery. As they drew near, these columns deployed
partIy into 1ine; and it soon became apparent
that tbey extended far beyond tbe extreme rigbt
of the British position. But our troops seemed




284 NARRATIVE 01' THE


totally to despise this disadvantage; instead of
waiting upon their own ground to receive the
shock, they advanced to meet the enemy; the 4th
regiment, with admirable celerity, wheeling back
its right wing, and presenting a front in two direc-
tions. N or was the slightest impression made
upon them, either by the cannonade, which carne
fast and murderously, or by the appearance of
whole coi'ps of infantry, which seemed as if they
must make their way between our people and
Coruuna. Sir John Moore was near the 4th when
it executed this movement. He was highly de-
lighted with it, and cried aloud, "This is exactly
what J wished to be done 1" And feeling that
men who could act with so much coolness in the
presence of a superior force were not likely to give
way merely because the General quitted them, he
rode off to see that in other parts of the field a
similar spirit was in operation.


The French a~d English armies were separated
from each other by a number ofwalls and hedges,
and other enclosures; to pass which both parties
seemed equally anxious. A few moments sufficed
to bring them into contact; and though the onset
was spirited in no ordinary degree, it failed in pro-
ducing the slightest impression upon our lineo The
village of Elvina, which had been occupied by a
few light troops, was indeed carried, and the
enemy pressed on with high courage, and in great




PENINSULAR WAR. 285


f'Úrce; but their advance was soon checked by the
50th regiment, which not only drove them down
the slope, but pursued them through Elvina, and
to a considerable distance beyond it. It was on
this occasion that the generals," two majors,"
Napier and Stanhope, were both lost to the ser-
vice; the former being severely wounded and
made prisoner, whilst the latter was killed 'Ún the
spot.


The action became now extremely warrn along
the whole front of our lineo The 42nd, after re-
ceiving and returning several volleys, crossed its


. bayonets, and, supported by a battalion of g"uards,
repulsed a strong body of the enemy, which had
endeavoured to possess itself of the heights on the
left. The. charge was an exceedingly brilliant
one; and Sir John Moore was in the act of watch-
ing .and applauding it, when a cannon-bal1 struck
hirn on the left shoulder, and beat him to the
ground. Sorne time previous to this, Sir David
Baird had been cornpelled, by asevere wound in
the arm, to quit the fleld: the regirnents were
therefore left, in a great measure, to the guidance
of their own courage, and the rnanagement of their
respective commanding officers. But, to use the
words of the gallant soldier who succeeded to the
command, " the troops, though not unacquainted
with the irreparable 10ss they had sustained, were
not dismayed; but by the rnost determined bra-




286 N ARRATIVE OF THE


very, not only repelled everyattempt of the enemy
to gain ground, but aetually foreed him to retire,
although he had brought up fresh troops in sup-
port ofthose originally engaged."


His efforts to force our right being thus foiled,
Marshal Soult endeavoured to turn it, and to ad-
vanee a eolumn into the rear of our people un-
observed. His design was discovered at once;
and General Paget, moving forward with the re-
serve, met thecolumn in the most gallant style,
and drove it back with 10ss upon its original position.
N ot contented with this, General Paget pressed
on; and instead of filling the situation of men who
desired no more than merely to maintain them-
selves, and to repel assaults, the right of the Bri-
tish army became the assailants. The ellemy were
broken and dispersed; they not only desisted .
froro all further attempts in this quarter, but were
fain to alter, in so me degree, their own disposi-
tions, and to take ground considerably to their
right. N or were they more successful_ in the ef-
furts. which they made to penetrate our centre,
and; ln:e«k through 001' left. At these points the
ground was greatly in our favour; and as our
tr(;)Ops· showed' the same firmnes..c; which distin-
gnished: their comrades to the right, the issue was
neverfor a moment doubtful. For about half an
hoor; indeed,. they were in possession ofBetanzos.
from whieh their tire carne in heavily upon the




PENINSULAR W AR. 287


14th regiment; but from that point they were
speedily dislodged; and when darkness put an
end to the fighting,. they had been repulsed, with
terrible slaughter, in an their attacks. Ourloss in
this affair amounted to about eight hundred in
killed and wounded: that of the enemy is uncer-
tain; but it has been computed, and not, 1 should
conceive, without reason, at double. Some priso-
ners were taken on both sides; hut they were not
numerous, nor were there any officers of rank among
them.


1 have said that Sir John Moore received a se-
vere wound whilst animating the 42nd regiment to
the charge, in an early stage of the action; it is
hardly necessary to add, that the wound proved
mortal; nor is it more necessary to enter into any
minute deíailof the last moments of that illustrious
soldier's life, orof the melancholy solemnity with
which his funeral obsequies were performed. The
tale has been told already, with greater eloquence
than 1 could employ; nor is it probable that it will
soon cease to retain a place in the memory of the
people of this country. 1 t is sufficimlt for me to
observe, that not all the consciousness of vi€tory,
cheering and gratifying as that ¡s, was capable of
al1eviating, in the slightest degree, the grief of the
army for the 108s of ¡ts chief. Perhaps the British
army has produced sorne abIer men than Sir John
Moore; it has certainly produced many who, in




288 NAURATIVEOF THE


point of military talent, ~ere and are quite his
equals; but it cannot, and perhaps never could,
boast of one more beloved, not by his own perso-
nal friends alone, but by every individual tbat
served under him. It would be affectation to deny
that Sir John Moore, during his disastrous retreat,
issued many orders in the bighest degree painful to
the feelings of honourable men, who felt that their
conduct had not merited them. Mis warmest ad-
mirers have acknowledged this, and his best
friends have lamented it; but, in all probability,
no one would have lamented it more heartily than
himself, had he lived to review, in a moment of
calmness, the general conduet of this campaign;
because there never lived aman possessed of a
better heart, nor, in ordinary cases, of a clearer
judgment.


It would be superfluous in me to enter, at this
place, into anything like a review of the merits of
this our first military effort in the Peninsula.
From the observations which 1 have taken the
liberty to make here and there in the course of the
narrative, the reader will have doubtless arrived at
a knowledge of my opinion on the subject; andto
the justice of that opinion, given as it was on the
spot, and amidst the progress of the events re-
corded, everything which has since occurred in
Spain bears testimony. The truth is, that Sir


. John Moore, with many of the qualities requisite




PENINSULAH tv Alt. 289


to eonstitute a general, was deficient in that upon
which, more perhaps than any other, sueeess in
war must ever dependo He wanted eonfidenee in
himself-he was afraid of responsibility-he un·
derrated the qualities of bis own troops, and greatIy
overrated those of his adv~rsary. Yet let justice
be done. He acted under circumstances .at once
difficult and trying. He was harassed by being
made, in sorne degree, dependent upon the opi.
nions of others; whilst he was from the first abso-
lutely destitute of support from the authorities in
the country, as well military as civil. Sir John
Moore was, moreover, a brave and high-spirited
soldier. Of this the most satisfaetory proof was
furnished, by his refusal to aet upon a suggestion
made to him by sorne of the oldest- and most ex·
perieneed -generals in his army, and his declining
to enter into any convention for the quiét em·
barkation of his troops. He preferred the honour
of his army to its safety; and by preserving the
oue, he provided for the other also.


On the faH of Sir J ohn Moore, and the removal
.of Sir David Baird from the field, the command
devolved upon General Hope; who conducted
everytbing with that judgment and coolness which
peculiarly distinguished him. Though successful
in the battle, he did not consider himself autho·
rised to depart from the plan upon which he knew
that the late commander of the forces had intended


VOL. I. T




290 NARRATIVE OF THE


to acto The enemy no sooner retired than he re-
newed the preparations for embarking the troóps,
which their attack had interrupted; and the boats
being aH in readiness at ten o'c1ock that night,
brigade after brigade filed silently down to the
beach. The embarkation was covered by Major-
general Beresford, at the head of two thousand
men, who occupied the land-front of Corunna ;
and by Major-genCeral Hill's brigade, which took
post on, the promontory, in rear of the town. It
went on during the night with great celerity, and
without any interruption from the French; but on
the following morning they pushed forward a corps
of light troops towards the town, and seized the
heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour.
No attempt was, however, made to molest the
covering brigades. The situation of General Be-
l'esfol'd, undel' the walls of the place, was indeed
such, as to place it in a great ,degree beyond the
l'each of danger ; . and the Spaniards, to do them
justice, seemed resolved to protect our mov,e-
ments to the utmost. General Hill's brigade was
accordingly withdrawn at thl'ee o'c1ock on that
afternoon; and finally, as soon as darkness set in,
the last division quitted, its ground, and was re-
ceived in perfect safety on board of ship.


Thus" withO:ut any other interruption than arose
from a feeble cannonade, directed against our
shipping, froIn the heights of St. Lucia, was the




PENINSUI,Alt W AR. 291


whole of the British army, including its sick, it8
wounded, its artillery, its stores, and even its
prisoners, conveyed from the coast; and the first
regular campaign of our soldiers in lhe Peninsula
came to a close.


In the course of the preceding details, I am
aware much may be said and recorded of the par-
ticular exploits of different corps, and the conduct
of officers. The just view of everything cannot be
collected, nor individual merit marked out, by one
in my humble position; my desire therefore has
heen limited to give fairly my own general impres-
sions, without offence to any,and to apologise to
al1, whose corps, names, and actions, ought to be
recorded in militar y history by an abler pen than
mme.




292 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER XI.


Consequences of Sir Jobn Moore's campaign-Departure of
N apoleon for Germany-Military condition of Spain .and
Portugal previous to the arrival of Sir Arthur WellesJey-
Invasion of Portugal by Soult-He passes the Minho at
Orense, defeats the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey,
and enters Chaves-Oporto carried by assault-Lupisse fails
to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo, and goes to join Victor-Battle
of Medelin, and overthrow of Cuesta's army-SirJohn Cra-
dock and Marshal Beresford make preparations to oppose
Soult-Sir Arthur WelIesley embarks at Portsmouth;
reaches Lisboll; is received with enthusiasm-He makes
arrangements to take the field.


IN spite of its' disastrous and somewhat humi-
liating termination, the first campaign of the'
Brítish troops in Spain cannot be said to have
been wholly unproductive of benefit to the general
cause. The attentíon of the enemy being turned
mainly towards the north, an opportunity was
given to the southern provinces of repairing, at
least in part, the inj uries sustained by the defeats




PENINSULAR WAR. 293


of BIake, Castanos, and Bel videre; and of that
opportunity they were not altogether neglectful.
The remains of the beaten armies were collected
and re-organised, and fresh levies were indus-
triously set on foot. Palafox, Cuesta, the Duke
del Infantado, and the Marquis de Palacia, ap-
peared each at the head of a corps; whilst Ro-
mana, retreating towards the Portuguese frolltier,
did his best to rouse the energies of Gallicia; and
Saragoza, though too fatally for its brave garrison,
again made itself i1lustrious by the length and ob-
stinacy of its defence. But the event to which,
aboye an others, the Peninsula owed its escape
from immediate conquest, was the unlooked-for
arming of Austria, and the consequent departure
of Buonaparte towards another scene ofoperations;
He had scarcely returned to Madrid from his
movement against Sir John Moore's army, when
intelligence of the rising storm in the north reached
him; and he found himself under the necessity of
leaving to his marshaIs the compIetion of that tri-
umph, of which he persuaded himself that he had
laid the foundation. Having once more seated his
brother on the throne, 'and amused himself and his
adherents by the promulgation of a few de crees,
he took the road to France; whither he was fol-
lowed,on the 22nd of January, by the division of
imperial guards, amounting in all tofifteen thou-
sand meno




294 NARRA'fIVE OF 'fHE


Of the proceedings which took place, both in
Spain and Portugal, from this date up to thé
return of Sir Arthur Wellesley 'to Lisbon, it falls
not within the plan of the present imperfect narra":
tive to attempt any minute relation. Enough is
done, when the reader is reminded that the Spa':
nish armies, of whose re-organisation notice has
been taken, suffered, one after another, signal
defeats; and that before the mO~lth of March had
expired, the principal matter of which the French
generals had cause to complain, was their igno-
ra'nce upon what point it behoved them to bear,
for the purpose of cómpleting theirconquests.
In Portugal, again, an was alarm and dismay.
There remained in or about Lisbon, a corps of ten
or twelve thousand British soldiers, under the
command of Sir John Cradock, upon which alone'
the smallestconfidence could bereposed; fOÍ"
though the Portuguese ,were still as far as ever from
being reconciled to a foreign yoke, they were with-
out officers, without discipline, and without confi-
dence in themselves~ General Beresfordhad in-
deed, with the activity and zeal for which he is re-
markable, begun to exert himselffor the removal of
these evils. As soon as he received his appoint-
ment as commander-in-chief, he set steadily to t~e
task of re-modelling the Portuguese army in all its
parts, by introducing. into each battalion a system
both of drill and internal arrangement, similar to




PENINSULAR \VAH. 295


that which exists iIiBritish regiments; but a re-
volution so complete coüldnot be effected in a
moment, nor were its beneficial consequences
fullyfelt till a later period in the war. Tbe sole
means of defence, independently oE Sir John Crá-
dock's division, tberefore, which Portugal could
hope to oppose to a fresh invasion, consisted of a
corps under Silveira, mustering in an about six
thousand men, of which one-half only were fE;gu~
lal's; of the Lusitanian legion, organised by Sir
Robert Wilson; of Bel'esford's levies, then in pro-
cess of organization, of the gal'rison óf Oporto;
made upalmost entirely of volunteers; and oí
bands of ill-armed peasants, whose want of order
would necessarily incapacitate tbem from acting
with effect in the freId, though theirindividual
courage might render them tl'uly. formidable as
guerillas and partisans. . ,


Such was the state of Portugal, when three
corps d'armée from the French army prepal'ed to
inváde it. Having reduced Corunna and Ferrol,
and otherwise secured the tranquillity of Gallicia,
Soult set forward in the direction of Tuy, with the
design of penetrating through the province of Tl;as
os Montes, seizing Oporto, and so' advancing upon
Lisbon. To aid him ~n this attempt~ Vic'tor was
commanded to manreuvre on the side of Badajoz;
and to send on a strong' cQlumn, which should
unite itself with Soult's army in the capital. As




296 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


these two points of attack were, however, at a
great distance from one another, General Lapisse
was directed to strengthen them by occupying the
country between the Douro and Almeida, and by
the reduction of the important fortress of Ciudad
Rodrigo. Here he was to remain tilI the fall of
Oporto should be communicated to him; after
which he was to unite himself to Victor; when
both having covered Soult's movement to Lisbon,
and seen the imperial eagles once more hoisted
there, were to countermarch upon Andalusia, and
complete its subjugation :-This was the general
intelligence received, though for accuracy in all ils
parts it is impossible to vouch.


In accordance with these data Soult began his
journey; his place in Gallicia being supplied by
Marshal N ey at the head of a fourth corps. He
reached the Minho without encountering any
othe'r obstacles besides those which a wasted
district necessarily threw in his way; and he
made ready to pass the river in a flotilla of fishing-
boats, which had been collected together for the
purpose. But the river was wide and rapid; his
sailors were unskilful; and the opposite banks
being in possession of sorne armed peasants under
General Freire, wiih a couple of six-pounders, his
flotilla was either sunk or swept away. He gave
up the attémpt as, impracticable, and turning to
bis left, marched at a quick pace upon Orense,




PENINSULAR \VAR. 297


where there is a bridge. Here his passage was
made good; and here information reached him
that Romana, with a body of Spaniards,. and Sil-
veira, at the head of his Portuguese, were drawn
up near Monterrey, for the purpos'e of opposing his
advance upon Chaves. He hastened to give them
battle, defeated them with considerable slaughter,
and removed to Chaves the hospital and magazines
whichhe had pteviously established at Orense.
His next movement was upon Oporto; where
the spirit of discord, and even mutiny, which pre-
vailed among the garrison, not less than the ab-
sence ofjudgment exhibited by the authorities in
putting the place in a position of defence, gave
promise that no very obstínate or bloody contest
awaited him.


The resistance offered by the garrison of Oporto
was not more serious than Soult hadantici-
pated. Having overthrown a tumultuary force,
which ventured to oppose him at Braga, he ar-
rived before Oporto on the 23rd of March, and
on the same day sent in to demand its surrender.
The summons was rejected, and dispositions were
made for an assault. A long line of open out-
works covered the place, so extensive as to be
perfectly indefensible, except by a very numerous
army. These were attacked at three o'clock in
the afternoon of the 24th; they were carried al-
most at a rnsh; and before fourthe French soldiers




298 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


were in possession of the streets. Three or four
thousand regulars and rnilitia eitherescaped or
surrendered; the Bishop fled across the Douro,
never pausing till he had reached Lisbon; and the
town was given' up, during three whole days, to
indiscrirninate plunder. Several ships _were in
the harbour, laden with the property of indivi-
duals, which they had hoped to rernove; but the
north winds happening to blow, they could not
put to sea, and becarne, of course, a prey to the
conquerors.


Established here, Soult proceeded to make the
people of Portugal acquainted with the nature of
the cornmission which he bore, and the extent of
the powers with which he was intrusted. He
issued proclarnations, calling upon the peasantry
to return everywhere to their hornes, and threat-
ening with the severest punishrnents all such per-
sons as should be found with arms in their hands.
He assured the inhabitants oí Lisbon that the
hour oftheir deliverance frorn the bondage of Eng-
land had arrived, and invited them to placethem-
selves and their city under the protection of an
officer who had the honour to appear among them
as the Emperor's representative; and who, in his
capacity of governor-in-chief, would pay the strie-
test attention to their prejudices, and se cure to
thern the elljoyrnent oí just laws and personal
liberty. Finally ~ he denounced a terrible ven ..




PENINSULAR WAR. 299


geance against aU who should presume in any way
to offer to his progress an opposition as perverse as
it must be hopeless, and assumed generally the
style of a monarch returning, o at the head of a
powerful party, to the throne of his ancestors.


In the mean while, Victor and Lapisse were
each carrying on a series of operations, though not
exactly in accordance with the supposed general
plan which had been laid dewn for the conduct of
the campaign. o Lapisse, indeed, appeared before
Ciudad Rodrigo with a corps of six thousand men,
and endeavoured, by a coup-de-main, to make
himself master of it; but he was repulsed, and
being wholly unprovided with battering cannon,
he did not renew the attempt. On the contrary~
he marched to his left in search of Victor, leaving
nothing behind for the purpose of keeping open
theo communication with Soult; who became, in
consequence, cornpletely isolated in his new posi-
tion at Oporto. With respect to Victor, again, he
found employrnent enough in pursuing, from place
to place, the army of Cuesta; which led him first
froro Talavera upon Truxillo, and afterwards, by a
variety of circuitous routes, upon Merida and Me-
delin. Here,Oat last, the Spanish General, appre-
hensive for the fate of Badajoz, determined to
offer battle. An acfion was accordiugly fought in
an open plain, which surrounds the latter town, on
the left bank of the Guadiana; ánd it ended in the




300 NARRATIVE OF THE


total rout of the patriot army. In this affair the
Spanish infantry behaved well; they had even
gained ground upon the enemy at several points,
and were pressing forward with great gallantry,
when a sudden panic seized the cavalry, and it
fled froID the field without striking a blow. Cuesta
díd his best to rally the fugitives; but to no pur-
pose. The French broke in upon the Spanish
left, exposed by the flight of the cavalry, and
turned it, at the moment when Cuesta was thrown
from his horse, and severely bruised. AH now
became confusion and dismay. The Duke of AI-
buquerque, who commanded on the right, endea-
voured to form his division into columns, and to
retire in good order; but the columns were not
yet formed, when a heavy fire ofartillery dispersed
them, and the men could not again be recalled to
their standards. The rout was complete; and the
10ss, in killed, wounded, and taken, was greater
by far than a Spanish army had yet sustained from


, the commencement of the war.
It was not, however, a bloodless victory. The


Spaniards, particularly in the commencement of
the day, fought with determined gallantry, and to
great advantage; and the ,French suffered more
than their General had at aH calculated upon.
This was distinctly proved from the disinclination
which he exhibited to follow up, with alacrity, the
success which he had obtained. Though Cuesta




PENINSULA'R WAR. 301


retired towards Llerena overplains of immense
extent, with scarcely any cavalry to protect him,
Victor, who was particularly strong, in that arm,
attempted no pursuit. On the contrary, he re-
sumed his former position at Medelin and Merida,
from whence he sent to call in Lapisse; and where
he continued inactive, till the operations of the
British army at last compelled him to move.


Things were in this state, the designs of the
French having been temporarily frustrated, when
the British government carne to the wise determi-
nation of making another great effort for the deli-


, veranee of the Peninsula. For this purpose, large
bodies of troops were collected, here and tlIere,
along the coast, consisting partly of the regiments
which had returned from Corunna, and partly of
others which had not yet seen service; and these,
as they became severally complete, were sent off,
under able oflicers, to Lisbon. Among the first .
who arrived at the scene of action, was Major-
general Hill. He reached Lumias on the 6& of
April, where Sir John Cradock had fixed his
head-quarters; and found him making such dis-
positions as did not indicate offensive measures.
General Hill, it was said, at this time suggested
holder measures, and he was aided by Beres-
ford's council; and it was agreed that, instead of
continuing preparations for a retreat, the combined
British and Portuguese armies -should move for-




302


ward. The enemy were, at tliis time, in a state
of perfect inaction. The fe~ demonstrations of a
further advance, which, on first entering Oporto,
they had made, were at an end; and they con-
tented themselves now with pushing on their oút-
posts as far as the banks of the Vouga, whilst the
main body took post between that river and the
Douro. It was resolved to threaten them there ;
and it was confidently hoped that Soult, already
alarmed by transactions in his real', would not only
evacuate Oporto, but retire from the whole north
of Portugal. The latter was an event for the at-
tainment of which no exertions, it was believed,
ought to be spared; because a conviction every-
where prevailed, that the occupation by a French
army of th:e provinces ofTras os Montes and Entre
Douro e Minho, was an injury to the cause second
only to the faH of Lisbon itself.


These resolutions had been formed, and some
movementswere actually made towards their ac-
complishment, when Sir Arthur Wellesley. to
whom the chief command in Portugal hadbeen
intrusted, by an extraordinary effort of the wal'
minister of the day, embarked with his staff for
the seat of war. To that staff it was the writer's
fortune to be attached, in the capacity ofadjutant-
general. We set sail from Portsmouth on Satur-
day~ the 16th of April, with a stift' breez~ blowing
ahead, and had nctt proceeded beyond the Isle of




PE~INSULAlt WAR. 303


Wight, when an event occurréd which had well
nigh proved fatal to uso Itmight be about mid-
night, or rather Jater, when Captain Collier of H.
M. ship -- burst into the cabin, entreating us to
rise without deJay, for that we were on the eve of
shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time
in Jeaping from our cots, and mounting the deck ;
when a very awful as well as alarming spectacJe
presented itseJf. In striving to pass a bank which
runs out from S1. Gatherine's point into the sea,
the ship missed stays; this occurred again and
again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer
to danger; and now when we looked· abroad, the
breakers were to be se en at about a stone's-throw
froID the bow. There was not an indiyidual
amongst us who anticipated any other xesult than
that in a few minutes, at the furthest, the vessel
would strike; but we were deceived. The wind;
which had hitherto been blowing on shore, sud-
denly changed, and we were at once relieved
from a situation, than which the whole progress of
our lives had not before brought us into any more
uncomfortable. But it was the only adventure
which befell us by the way. The fair wind which
sprang up at a moment so critical, did Iiot desert
us during the remainder of our voyage; and we
anchored in the Tagus, after a: passage of only six
days, on the 22nd of April.


N o words would be adeq uate to convey the fainh




304 NARRATIVE OF TÍlE


est idea of the delight exhibited by all dasses of
persons, as 800n as the arrival of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley at Lisbon became known. AH day long
the streets were crowded with men and women,
eongratulating one another on the happyevent¡
and at night the city was illuminated even in the
most obscure and meanest of its lanes ana alIeys.
In the theatres, pieces were hastily got up, some-
what after the fashion of the masks anciently ex-
hibited among ourselves, in whieh Victory was
made to crown the representative of the hero
with laurels, and to address him in language as
far removed from the terms of ordinary conver-
sation, as might be expeeted from an allegorieal
personage. But it was not by sueh exhibitions
alone that the Portuguese nation sought to evinee
its confidenee in its former deliverer, and its
satisfaetÍon at his return. Sir Arthur Welles-
ley was immediately nominated Marshal-gene-
fal of the armies of Portugal; by which means,
whilst the eare oftraining and managing the whole
of the interior economy rested still with Beresford,
the fuUest authority to move the troops whither-
soever he would, and to employ them in any series
of operations in w~ieh he might desire to embark,
devolved upon him.


It wiU easily be believed that no time was lost,
either by the' commander of the forces, or by those
immediately attached to him. in endeavouring to




PENiNSULAR WAR. 305


make themselves thoroughiy aequainted, as well
with thesituation and amount of our own resourees,
as with the arrangements and designs of the enemy.
With respeet to our own resourccs, we found that
the whole of the British eorps had moved in tbree
eolumns, and that it was to assemble, on the 24th,
at Leiria. Of the Portuguese, again, two battalions
only remained at Abrantes, whilst the remainder,
with Marsbal Beresford, were colleeted at Tho-
mar; and so strenuous and unremitting had been
his exertions, that they were already estimated at
or about fifteen thousand meno But it was not
from their numbers only tbat the Portuguese troops
promised to prove formidable. Warmly attaehed
to their English officers, and reposing unbounded
confidenee in them, they had applied of late with
so mueh ardour to their military education, that
some were already in fit state to take the field ;
and it required only a litt]e experienc€, as well
as a more extensive intermingling of Englishmen
in their ranks, to put them on a leveJ with the best
troops of Europe. The battalions which gave way
so easilyat Oporto, entertained no respeet for their
leaders; there was not an officer of rank among
them to whom they conlel at alllook up. It was
not so in Beresforel's army. There the men were,
what the lower orders of Portugal always are, per-
fectly -brave; they were officcred, at least in part,
by persons for whom they entertainec1 the highest


VOL. I. U




306 NARRATIVE OF THE


respect; and had a few more English generals
taken rank among them, they would have been,
even now, not unworthy to take their places by
the side of British soldiers. There was one bri-
gade in particular, commanded by Colonel Camp-
bell, which struck me as being in the finest possible
order. It consisted of two battalions, each mus-
tering about six hundred bayonets; and it stood
under arms. and went through a variety of evo-
lutions with a precision and correctness which
would have done no discredit to many of the
brigades in our own army. N or was it less satis-
factory to find that the interior economy of these
battalions had been brought to a state of perfection
altogether in keeping with their external appear-
ance. Both men and officers had learned to mess
as themen and officers in the English service; the
pay of the common soldiers was increased; and
the mischievous system which heretofore had en-
abled the captains of companies to defraud their
troops, was abolished. Everything went on, in
short, as it ought to do; and the fairest prospect
was given, that with a little additional help on the
part of their allies, the Portuguese army would
soon become not only efficient in the field, but
orderly and well reglllated in its cantonments.


With respect to the enemy, a variety of rllmours
were afloat, out of which it was not very easy to
select one more plausible, or having a greater ap-




PENINSULAR W AR. 307


pearance of probability, than the rest. That their
armies, on both sides of the country, remained
stationary, was well known; but the causes of the
halt were differently reptesented, according to the
taste or faney of our informants. By sorne, it was
asserted that the war in Germany had eompelled
N apoleon not only to omit sending reinforcements
into the Peninsula, but even to draín off part of the
force which he had formerly kept there; and that
the French generals found themselves, in conse-
quence, ehecked in the midst of their career, and
ineapaeitated from bringing to a eonclusion the
work whieh they had begun. By others, their
inaetivity was attributed solely to the effeets of the
battIe of Medelin, on the one hand, and on the
other, to the intelligence which had reached them
of the arrival of our reinforcements; whilst, by a
third party, the French marshals were represented
as at variance among themselves, and not more un-
able than unwilling, to act up to the plans which
they had formed. As the event proved, there was
not one of all these sur mises which díd not possess
sorne truth, though we of course could not at the
moment aseertain this; but we did-ascertain that
their corps were far from. being efficient, and that
we might fairly calculate upon three or four months
of absolute freedom from attack. In this case,
little doubt could exist of our ultimate success, at
all events, in delivering and keeping possession of




308 NARRATIVE OF THE


Portugal; whilst it was by no means improbable
ihat we should take advantage of whatever suc-
cess might attend us, and carry the war into
8pain.


The reports incirculation as to the strength of
80ult's and VictQr's corps; were hardly less varied
than those which spread abroad respecting other
matters; but the opinion at head-quarters was,
that the former could not have at his disposal aboye
twelve thousand effectives, nor· the latter more
than double that amount. lt became, therefore,
rather a nice question to determine, w hethe1' an
attempt upon Victor would not be preferable to
an operation in the north. On the one hand, it
was quite evident that, were we strong enough t-o
destroy Victor, the great game would be played
at once; for, in this case, Sou1t could not venture
to remain at Oporto; and even Madrid would, in
alI probability, be evacuated. On the other hand,
it might be attended with hazardous consequences,
to Ieave the capital open, and Soult with his army
in our rear.These were matters which required
mature ,corisideration; and though few men pos-
sess the faculty of arriving, with promptitude, at
judicious determinations in the degree in which
it was possessed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he
could not pretend to make up his mind tillhe
should huye seen and advised with Beresford and
Cradock. In the mean while, however, that




:PENINSULAR WAR. 309


time might not be wasted, the lIlost active prepa-
rations were set on foot, to render the troops
moveable in any direction, and at the shortest no-
tice. Our commissariat arrangements, which had
fallen into miserable confusion, were once more
placed in train; mules, bullocks, and such cars as
seemed likely to be wanted, were put in requisi-
tion; and fIying' depots of hospital and other
stores were disposed in order for immediate trans-
portation. AH these matters served to satisfy the
troops that they would not be long kept inactive ;
and the promise which they held out, received, in
due time, its fulfilment.




310 NARRATlVE OF 'fHE


CHAPTER XII.


Dispositious of the allied troops - They assernble at Coinibra,
aud are reviewed-State of the French army becornes sorne-
what changed by the defeat of General Lefevte-Rumours
of a mutiny arnong the enemy-Sir Arthur \Vellesley ar-
ranges his plaus, aud the brigades are commauded to rnove.


SIR JOHN CRADOCI{ being at this time affiicted
with asevere illness, failed in reaching Lisbon as
early as he wished; but Marshal Beresford, on
whose report of rnatters great reliance deserved to
be placed, carne in without the 10ss of an hour.
He spoke in high terms of tbe Portuguese troops,
and exp~essed himself sanguine as to the result of
any operations wbich rnight be undertaken. Un-
der these circumstances, Sir Arthur Wellesley
deterrnined to take the field at once; and the fol-
10wing is a brief outline of the arrangements which
were entered into in consequence of that determi-
nation.




PENINSULAR WAlt. 311


The British troops, with the exception of one
infantry and one cavalry brigade, under General
Mackenzie, were directed to assemble, with as
little delay as possible, at Coirobra, and to take
up, in the mean time, the line of the Mon-
dego. They amounted in all, including two bri-
gades of Germans, to 17,000 effectives, the de-
tached corps mustering 2,700 men, about one-
half of which was cavalry; and they were to be
joined there by a portion of the Portuguese army,
which was so distributed, as that in each brigade
one Portuguese might take its place between two
British battalions. By this disposition, the fide-
lit y, and to a certain extent, the gallantry of our
allies, would, it was presumed, be secured; if
they should exhibit the slightest disposition to
desert their colours, or to turn their, backs upon
the French, they might at any moment be annihi-
Jated by the corps which hemmed them in. The
army, thus arranged, would amount in all to about
twenty thousand men, six thousand of which were
allotted to act as a separate corps under Beres-
ford; and it was understood that its undivide<\
attention would, in the first place, be turned
against Soult and the French force in Oporto.


In the mean while, a division of twe]ve thou-
sand men, composed entirely of Portuguese, with
the exception of the two British brigades already
aUuded to, was to take post. under General Mac-




312 :N ARRATIVE 01" THE


kenzie, at Santarem and Abrantes. The object
of this distribution was an exceedingly important
one, for a due comprehension of which it may be
necessary . to advert to other matters, of which
sorne notice has already becn taken.


1 have said that, according to the plan original!y
devised for the second invasion of Portugal by the
French, Victor was on no account to rnove into
Andalusia, till after he should have ascertained
the fact of Soult's success, and been joined by the
division of General Lapisse. Of this, certain . in-
tercepted letters frorn King Joseph and Marshal
Jourdan informed uso But Victor had been already
drawn into sorne deviation frorn these arrange-
ments, in consequence of the movements of Cues-
ta; and it was not improbable that the comse
which events had lately taken, would draw him
into still wider deviations. Though he knew no·
thing of Soult-nothing at least calculated to give
him satisfaction-he had been aIread y joined by
Lapisse; it accordingly became a matter of doubt,
whether he should proceed into Andalusia, Ol
march upon Lisbon by way of Alentejo. 1 t was
to provide against the latter contingency, that
General Mackenzie's corps too k post as aboye
described. In that position he cornpletely COffi-
manded the fords over the Tagus; and he occupied
ground, where twelve thousand men might, under
any circumstances, offer a successful resistan ce to




PENINSULAR WAR. 313


at least twice their O'wn numbers. 1t is true that
a nO'tiO'n prevailed, that if the French endeavO'ured
tO' crO'ss the Tagus at aH, they wO'uld rnake the at-
tempt atSalvatierra; from whence, shO'uld they
make good their passage, the strO'ng ground cO'uld
be turned; but that idea in nO' degree disturbed
the eq uanilllity O'f any O'ue whO' bore in mind, that
at the present seasO'n O'f the yeal' the Tagus, sO' lO'w
at least as Salvatierra, cO'uld nO't be passed except
in bO'ats. Effectual care wO'uld, hO'wever, be taken,
that with such means O'f passing the enemy should


. J-
not be supplied; and hence the occupatIO'n O'fr!
Abrantes, and Santarem, and the neighbouring _;',,-
villages O'f Golegam, &c. might be said to place ~ '¡
LisbO'n in perfect security frO'm all insult in that
quarter.


It was, hO'wever, extremely improbable that
VictO'r wO'uld embark in an undertaking sO' hazar-
dO'us as an advance upon Lisboll. He knew that
Cuesta was again in force; he could not, there-
fO're, tum his back upO'n him withO'ut leaving a
strO'ng cO'rps behind for the purpose of watching
his mO'tions; and this wO'uld necessarily expO'se
him tO' the risk·O'f being attacked and destrO'yed in
detail. It was mO're probable that, being strength-
ened by the junctiO'n O'f Lapisse, he wO'uld leave
SO'ult tO' his fate, and mO've, with all his force, upO'n
Andalusia. In this case, Sir Arthur Wellesley
repeatedly urged upO'n Cuesta the wisdO'm of


~.'. \




314 NARRATIVE OF THE


retiring to the mountains, and keeping wholly
upon the defensive; whilst the garrisons of Elvas
and Badajoz should march upon the enemy's rear,
and harass his convoys. This would give us an
opportunity of completing our projects in the
north; after which, by a rapid march to the eas-
tero frontier, we might come up to his aid, and by
a combined attack, overwhelm Victor's army.


Having put these matters as far in train as it
was possible to do at this stage ·of the business,
the head-quarters of the British army quitted
Lisbon; and halting at Pombal on the 1st, arrived
at Coimbra on the 2nd of May. Here, as in the
capital, General Wellesley was received with a
degree of enthusiasm which strongly marked the
confidence of all classes in his abilities. But
affairs were in too critical a posture to authorise
the waste of time, even in the agl'eeable occu-
pation of giving and receiving compliments; and
Sir Arthur was not aman to gratify his own va-
nityat the expense of the public good. He ac-
cordingly cut short many of the dispositions which
the Portuguese authorities had made, for the pur-
pose of manifesting their good-will, and set him-
self, on the very .day of his arrival, to the task of
arranging and distributing his army for irnmediate
operations.


It has been already stated that one brigade of
infantry, and another of cavalry, \Vere placed




l)ENINSULAlt WAH. 315


under the orders of Major-general Mackenzie, and
detached on a particular service. The regiments
composing the latter, were the 3rd and 4th heavy
dragoons brigaded together under General Fane,
and the 2nd and 24th regiments of footcomposed
the former. The 1'emainder were distributed into
seven brigades of infantry of the line, two bri-
gades of German infantry,one brigade of guards,
and one brigade oflight cavalry. Of the cavalry,
which consisted of the 14th, 16th, and 20th Bri-
tish, and the 3rd light dragoons of the King's
German Legion, the command was given to Major-
general Cotton; whilst a: brigade of guards, com-
posed of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream, and
1st ofthe 3rd guards, and additionally strengthened
by one company of riflemen from the 5th batta-
!ion of the 60th, was commanded by Brigadier-
general H. Campbell. Major-general Hill was at
the head of the fi1'st brigade, consisting of the
Buffs, tbe 66th, the 48th, and one company 5th
battalion 60th. Major-general Tilson had the
third brigade, composed of five companies 5th bat-
talion 60th, the 88th, and 1st battalion Portuguese
grenadiers, and the 87th. The fith brigade, made
up of the 7th, 1st battalion 10th Portuguese, the
53rd and 1st company 5th battalion60th, was
headed by Brigadier-general A. Campbell. Bri-
gadier-general Cameron commanded the 7th bri.
gade, which consisted of the 9th, 2nd battalion




316 NARRATIVE OF THE


10th Portuguese, the 83rd y and one rifle company.
The sixth brigade, composed of the 1st battalion
detachments, 1st battalion 16th Portuguese, and
the 29th, was under the orders of Brigadier-general
R. Stewart. The 4th brigadey consisting of the
2nd battalion detachments, 2nd battalion, 16th
Portuguese, the 97th, and a rifle company, was
headed by Brigadier-general Sontag; whilstthe
2nd brigade, madeup of the 27th, 45th, and 3Íst,
acted under the orders of Major-general Mac-
kenzie. With respect to the Germans, again,
they were divided into two brigades, under the
respective orders of Brigadier-generals Longthwert
and Drieberg; the whole being commanded by
Major-general Murray.


Inaddition to these ar-rangements, four major>-
generals,-namely, Sherbrooke, Payne, Lord Wil-
liam Bentinck, and Paget,-received local rank as
lieutenant-generals during the· continlJance of the
service, that they might severally take command
of such divisions as the General-in-chief should
from time to time see fit to consolidate. At the
head of the adjutant-generals' department was
the writer of these sheets, then Brigadier-general
Stewart; and Colonel Murray, 3rd guards, acted
as quarter-master-g~neral.


His troops being thus distributed, and placed,
each corps under ¡ts own leader, Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley proceeded to consider his plan of the cam-




PENINSULAR WA~L 317


paign which he was so soon about to open. That
the reader may the better comprehend the nature
of that plan, as well as the purposes of .the diffe~
rent movements which subsequently took place, it
will be necessary to remind him of the exact
situation in which Marshal Soult stood,or, to -speak
more eorrectly, in which he was believed to stand,
when the plan in question was formed.


It has be en stated that Soult made his way
with very little difficulty to Oporto, and that he
remained there for sorne time, with his advanced
posts on the bank of the V ouga, in a state of per-
fect inaction. In the mean while, the Spanish and
Portuguese troops, which he had wirb so much
ease dispersad, were again assembling, and gra-
dually closing in upon his communications. Sil-
veira, who had retired, first to the mountains of
Oura' and Reigaz, and afterwards to Villa Pouca,
no sooner became aware that the enemy were
moving upon the Braga road, than he quitted his
new position, and advanced again upon Chaves.
He entered that place without opposition, and after
blockading the castle for four days,compelled it,
with -a garrison of 1300 men, to surrender. En-
couraged by this success, he proposed to follow tbc
steps of the French army, and,' if possible, to cut
off their detachment at Braga, as he had done
at Chaves; but intelligence of the fan of Oporto
caused him to relínquish that determination;




318 NARltATIVE OF THE


whilst a rumour of· an intended movement
through the province of Tras os Montes, by way
either of Canavezas or Entre Ambos Ríos, induced
him to act upon another. He immediately occu-
pied the villages above-named; repulsed the énemy
in two attempts upon the former; and reaching
Amarante just as a body of Frerich troops were
advancing upon it, compelled them to retire to
Peñafiel, and himself took possession of the city.


Whilst Silvei.ra was thus straitening the left of
the enemy's position, and interposing himself in
that direction between the corps of Soult and
Victor, Romana was not id le in the rearo In spite
of his defeat at Monterrey, the Spanish General,
who had retreated upon La Puebla de Sanabria,
soon found himselfat the head of four or five thou-
sand men, with whom he resolved to strike a blow
upon the line of French posts between Astorga and
Villa Franca. The former city was, indeed, too
strong for him; it could not be won without artil-
lery, and in artillery he was deficient; but the
latter, after a trifling resistance, he contrived to
reduce, making prisoners of a colonel and eigbt
húndred meno This victory, trifling as it was,
roused, once more, tbe dormant energies of Ga-
licia into exertion. The French were attacked in
every point where appeared the slightest prospect
of success. Vigo was closely invested, on the
hnÜ ~)Ü~, b-:y G~n~l'O.\ 'M.\)l\\\\)·, \~(j\\"\ tn.e \;ea, b'Y




PENINSULAR WAH. 319


Captain Mackenley of the Lively frigate; and it
capitulated just as a force from Tuy, destined for
its relief, arrived under the walls. The retiring
force was attacked and routed, and Tuy itself
placed in a state of blockade; but in Tuy, Soult
had established considerable magazilles, and both
the garrison and the sick in the hospital were
numerous; he could not, therefore, permit it to
fall as Vigo had fallen. Generals Gramdorges
and Heudelet were sent, at the head óf a tight
corps, to its relief; and their force was such as
the half-armed and undisciplined levies employed
in the siege coidd not successfully oppose. They
entered Tuy, after having sustained sorne resist-
ance, particularly at Ponte de Lima. But there
was no designentertained of keeping· permanent
possession of Tuy, important as the place unde-
niably was. The orders of these generals instr.uct-
ed them only to withdraw the magazines and the
garrison; and this, as well as the removal of the
sick and wounded from Braga, they successfully
accomplished. That done, they returned to Oporto,
where Soult found himself fairIy hemmed in ;_.
in front by the British army, on the left by Sil-
veira, in the rear by bands of armed Spaniards,
and on the tight by the sea.


Aware that such had lately been the enemy's
situation, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to ma-
nreuvre, for the purpose of surrounding them in




· 320 NARRATIVE OF TITE
-'


Oporto, and compelling them to surrender. \Vith
this view, Beresford received instructions to pl'O-
ceed from Coimbra with his own corps, and sorne
Portuguese troops, which, under Sir Robert Wil-
son, occupied Vizeu, as far as Lamego; to cross
the Douro there, and to join General Silveira in
Amarante. As soon as this movernent should
have been effected, and the detached column es-
tablished in the provine e of Entre Douro e Minho,
the force from Coimbra was to advance, and rnake,
by the great roadsof V ouga and A vouros, upon
Oporto. In the mean while, Beresford's corps
descending the Douro, was to seize every boat
which lay along its shore, and so to arrange them,
as that the means of erossing might be at our dis-
posal, as soon as we should reach the banks of the
river. The probabilities were, that Soult, finding
himself beset on all hands, would not attempt a
resistance which he must pereeive to be in vain;
but in case his obstinacy should get the better of
his prudence, we \Vere instantly to pass the
stream; and nobody eould for one moment doubt
as to the r.esults of the struggle.


Everything was in readiness for carrying these
arrangernents into force, when, on the evening of
the 4th, a despatch from Silveira arrived, to in-
form us of asevere defeat which he had sus-
tained at the town of Amarante. The enemy, it
appeared, favoured by a dense fog, attacked him




PENINSU-LAR W AR. 32l


there on tbe 2nd, foreed tbe bridge over the Ta-
mega, and took fromhim eight or nine pieces of
cannon; and hewas now falling back, with the
remains of his corps, upon Lamego, in presence of
several bodies of French trüops which had crossed.
the Douro. In addition to this intelligence, a ru-
mour reached us, thatthe enemy had evacuated
Viana, Villa de Conde, and other places on the
.coast ;it was reported, moroover, that he was
busily employed in- the destruction oí stores and
magazines in Oporto, and numerou;s preparatíon¡;
were said to be going on for the immediate aban-
donmentof the city. AH tlús information coming
at once, could not but occasion sorne change in
our plans. It was now manifest enough that
Soult would not submit quietly to be surrounded;
on the contrary, no oue could doubt that he me-
ditated either the removal of the seat of war. by
circuitous marches 10 tbe Tagus, there 10 be sup-
ported by sorne movements on the side of Victor,
or designed to attempt an escape out of Portugal
by way of tha Tras os Montes. Tbe latterscheme
was justly regarded as by many degrees more
probable than the former; because, to bril'l.g bis
army 3.efOSS the Dóuro, and advance by Lunego,
would be to leave us upon his flank; and it was
r-esolved that no time shonld be lost in striving to
defeat it.


TI:e reader is probably awar.e, that at· tbe
VOL. L x




322 NAURATIVE OF THE


perlod concerning which 1 now write. the most
serious discontent was understood to prevail in the
ranks of the French army. There existed there a
secret society, the members of which, under the
title of Philadelphes, bound themselves by oath
to attempt, whenever a favourable opportunity
should occur, the abolition of the imperial dynasty,
and the restoration of a democracy in France.
Soult's corps was not free from men of this de-
scription, at the head of whom was an adjutant-
major. This personage was in constant commu-
nication with Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom he
proposed á. scheme for seducing the soldiers from
their duty, and arresting his general; and though
he was received with aH the caution, and treated
with the reserve which prudence required; still
there was that in his maimer and mode of acting.
which commanded attention. Frol11 him we
learned that a spirit, almost mutinous, was 30t
work in Oporto; that the hospital s were crowded
with sick; and that but one feeling prevailed among
all ranks, that of unmitigated dislike of the parti-
cular service in which they were employed. It
will readily be believed that su eh information
only increased our anxiety to be beforehand with
the enemy, of whose· design to evacuate Portugal
it was impossible any longer to entertain a doubt.
Preparations were accordingly made to lead the
army, in two divisions~ direct)y upon the Douro,




PENINSULAR WAR. 323


-one proceeding by Aveira, and the other by
Vouga; whilst Beresford, preceding it with his
advanced-guard a single day, should rnove by
Vizeu upon Lamego.


Sorne time was, however, required to bring upthe
various regiments and brigades from their detached
stations; and this interval was spent, partIy in
putting the commissariat into a state of greater
efticiency, and partly in smoothing down certain
awkward feellngs which had unhappily arisen
among ourselves, on the score of rank. There
was a considerable jealousy, on the part of sorne
of our senior ofticers, with respect to the stations
to which the Portuguese commission might ad-
vance their juniors, whilst acting with the com-
bined armies. General Beresford furnished a
case in point, who. though inferior in the date of
his British appointment to several locallieutenant-
génerals, took rank as a n.eld-marshal in Portugal,
and commanded, as such, the advance of the
allied forces. To obviate this, it was necessary to
explain, that Portuguese rank could be permitted
to have weight onlyas long as both British and
Portuguese troops were under their present leader;
but that, in case of any vacancy in the supreme
command, hewould of course succeed, whose Bri.,.
tish rank happened to be the most elevated. N or
was it ever in tended that a senior British officer
should act immediately under his junior, notwith-




324 NARRA'fIVE OF THE


standing the station which the latter might tero-
porally fill; and hence care was taken that no
man should be appointed to a command in Beres-
ford's corps, who was not, in point of faCt, his
junior in the British service. These were unplea-
sant discussions; and they were not the less so,
on account of the necessity which all acknow-
ledged for the employment of British officers in
the Portuguese service. But they came not aIone.
Other difficulties arose as fast as these ceased. to
operate, touching the mode of paying the officers
attached to Portuguese battalions; and it wasonly
by an exercise of that clear judgment and firmness
of mind w'hich so peculiarly belong to him, that
our chief was at last enabled to set them all at resto


As the troops began to arrive in and around
Coimbra, the difficulty of finding forage for the
horses and mules attached to them, became very
great. The markets were, however, good, the
inhabitants freely supplying us with everyarticle
of provision at a moderate priee; but the expense
of supporting the army here was enormoua. It
was calculated that the British troops aIone cireu·
lated through Coimbra a sum of not less than
10,0001. per day; and that the whole money
spent by the allies exceeded 100,0001. per week.
With respeet to our own employments, again, they
may be related in few words. Part of almost
every day was spent in inspecting the several




PENINSULAR W AR. 325


corps as they came up, and in seeing that their
arms, necessal'ies, and general equipments, were
in a serviceable condition; whilst the remainder
was consumed, either in the office, or in riding
over the country. When reviewing the different
brigades, it was impossible not to be forcibly
struck with the superiority of the EngIish over
the Portuguese soldiers in external appearance.
The latter either were, or seemed to be, by far the
worst description ofmen in the country, infmitely
inferior in every respect to the peasantry. They
were diminutive and narrow-chested in the ex-
treme, yet were they extremely steady under
arms; and, as the event proved, fully equal to
their allies in the endnrance of fatigues and priva-
tions, and in several instances not greatly inferior
to them even in the freId.


On the 5th of May, the army being at length
assembled, a. grand review took place; and
a most imposing and magnificent spectacle it pre-
sented. To some of the troops which stood that
day under arms, it is not going too far to affirm,
that the whole world can produce none superior.
Of this description were the brigade of guards, the
29th, the S3rd, and the four battalions of the
King's German Legion; and the rest, if in a few
minor points they fell short, were. such as any
general might be proud to command. The whole
were, indeed, in the highest state of discipline and




326 NARltATIVE OF THE


. efficiency; and all appeared animated by one
spirit-an ardent desire to meet the enemy. Nor
were they kept long in a state of suspense. On
that very evening the definitive pIans were ar-
ranged; and on the following morning it was un-
derstood that the columns would begin to moye.


As the intention of turning Soult's left by way
of Lamego and Amarante still he Id good, Beres-
ford, to whom that office was intrusted, received
orders to march at day-break on the 6th. He was
to be followed on the morning of the 7th, as pre-
viously arranged, by the brigades of General Til-
son and Fane. On the same day, Cotton, at the
head of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, sup- .
ported by General Stewart's brigade of infantry,
wasto March upon Mullanda, and to arrive at
Adigal on the 8th, followed by the King's German
l,egion. General Hill's brigade was likewise to
march on the 6th, so as to reach Aveira on the
8th; and the head-quarters were to move on the
latter of these days towards Adego and the Vouga.
Such were the orders issued on the evening of the
6th; and these the several divisions specified
made ready to obey.




PENINSULAR W AH. 321


CHAPTER XIII.


The army advances towards the Douro-A body of the enemy
attacked arid dríven from Albergaría Nova::-Affair of
Grijon - Passage of the Douro, and defeat of Soult.


THE dawn of the 7th of May was beginning to
appear, when the advanced-guard of. the army,
accompanied by General Cotton'-s brigade of caval-


. ry, began its march in the direction of Oporto. It
proceeded leisurely, and it was followed by the
whole of the arrny, divided into two columns, of
three divisions; two of which, under Generals
Paget and Payne, moved by the Vouga road,
whilst the third advanced upon Aveira, under the
orders of General Hin. The latter movements did .
not, however, take place till the 9th, the main
body halting during the 8th, in order that Beres-
ford, who set out on the 6th for Vizeu and La-
mego, . might be enabled to reach his place of
destination in good time, and take possession of




328 NARRATIVI<: OF THE


Amarante at the moment most desirable, when we
should begin to show ourselves in front of Oporto.
It was intended that, on the evening of the 9th,
Hill should embark at Aveira, where boats were
prepared for the purpose, and make good his land-
ing at Ovar, at an early hour on the morning of
the 10th. On the latter day, Cotton was directed
to beat up aH the enemy's posts between the
Vouga and Oliveira, opening a communication, by
this means, with General Hin; and he was to be
supported in the undertaking by Generals Stewart
and Murray, who, with their respective corps, re-
ceived directions to pass the Vouga, and move
upon Albergaria N ova. In the mean while, Sher-
btooke and Cameron ,vcre to follow, so as that the
latter; embarking at Oveiro on the evening of the
10th, might reach Ovar on the 11th. Then Cot-
ton and Hill, who~e junction, it was calculated,
lnight by that time be effected, were to march
rapidly upon Villa N ova; and it was confidently
hoped that the celerity of the movements would
be such as to secure the bridge, at aH events, even
if they should faH in cutting off the rear-guard· of
the enemy. This was the more necessary, as the
bridge at Villa N ova formed the only visible means
by which we should be enabled to pass the Douro ;
and were it to be broken down, a very serious ob-
stacle to the ultimate success of the expedition
would, ít was apprehended, be raised.




· PENINSULAR WAU. 329


Such were the general outlines of tbe plan as
far as 1 could colleet, which was of course liable to
change according as circumstances migbt direct,
but for which, were it to provemoderately suc-
cessfut in its main points, the following advantages
might be expected to resulto We had reason to
believe that the enemy's force was pretty equally
divided, one half being at Oporto, and the other at
Amarante. N ow by throwing Beresford across
the Douro, fun occupation wouId be given to· tbe
troops in Amarante; and hence our main attack,
which was directed upon Oporto, wouIa be mate-
rially forwarded. Again, by sending Hill and
Cameron by water, we shouId seriously facilitate
our line of march, and perhaps give an opportunity
to Cotton, on the arrival of the former at Oveiro,
to drive in part of the enemy's cavalry upon him.
But· the preceding arrangements were further cún-
firrned by a report 'which had Iately reached us,
that Soult was collecting his whole disposable
strength in front of Villa N ova, with the intention
of sustaining an attack upon some high ground in
the vicinity, which he had carefully fortified. We
were extremelyanxious that he should adhere to
this determination, inasrnuch as he could not pos-
Bibly do us a greater favour; yet it was hardly tú
be expected that he wouId so far cornmit himself.
On the contrary, it seemed more probable that he
wouId rnove off with his whole army towards




330 NARRATIVE OF TRE


Amarante, and endeavour to strike a blow at
Beresford before we should be able to come up.
In this case Beresford must needs keep the Douro
betweén him and the enemy; and thus a road
would be opened for the latter through Tras os
Montes into Spain. These were, of course, the
chances of war. Should the die' turn up in one
way, the enemy would escape us; should allother
cast be thrown, and his reported resolution of
fighting between Tidrusa and Villa N ova hold
good,-th~n was the game more likely to be our
own. Hill's c.orps might, indeed, be for a moment
in danger; but it would only be for a moment;
because there was nothillg to hinder the whole
a.rmy from reaching the field ofaction by the 11th
at the latest. In a word, the plan seemed the best
which, under existing circumstances, could be
Jormed; and it was vigorously carried into exe-
cution.


I have stated sorne reasons why Sir Arthur
Wellesley was anxious to bring Soult to action at
once, an of them originating in an apprehension,
lest the enemy should make good his retreat un-
harmed. There was another motive at work be-
sides these. It was confidently rumoured that
ten thousand men' from the armies of Spain, "'ere
ordered to reinforce the corps in Portugal; that
they had quitted Arragon sorne time ago, and might
be expected to reach Tudela on the 16th at the




PENINSULAR WAR. ·331


latest. Now, though no account of their passage
through Madrid or Burgos had come in, the rumour
possessed too much of probability about it to be dis-
regarded; and it mattered little to us, in the end,
whether Soult or Victor was to receive the addition
to his strength. Our business was to be before-
hand with them, and to despatch one, if not both
the French generals, before the reinforcements
could reach them. Even if Soult alone should be
destroyed, our prospects wouldbecome brilliant;
for the accounts of the Spaniards, sent in by
Colonel Doyle, were in the highest degree flatter-
ing; and nothing but the presence of the enemy
in Portugal stood in the way of our co-operating
with thero. AH these reasons had full weight in
precipitating our measures against Sonlt; and as
the army was well provided in every respect, and
provisions and other nece&saries were abundant,
little doubt could be entertained, that a few days
at the furthest would see the first part of our pro-
ject fully realised.


It has been said that the advanced-guard, ac-
companied by General Cotton's division of cavalry,
began its march on the morning of the 7th. The
corps in question consisted óf two brigades of
infantry, one British and one German-the former
commanded by Brigadier-general R. Stewart;
with two brigades of artillery-one of sixes, the
other of threes. It reached the village of Andeja




332 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


on the evening of the 8th; and finding that a body
ef the enerny, consisting of two regiments of
cavalry. with sorne infantry and guns, were can-
toned in Albergaria Nova and the villages near,
a scheme was devised for surprising thern. With
this design, the troops passed the Vouga soon after
it becarne dark, when General Cotton, diverging
from the be aten track. sef off with the cavalry, by
a road which led round the villages to the right.
Whilst he was executing this m overnent, the in-
fantry and artillery. led on by General Paget,
prepared to rnake their way over sorne very diffi-
cult ground, in what is called the pass of Vouga.
Having halted for about two hours, in order that
Cotton rnight have time to get well up, and to
niake his dispositions, they too began their
march, Colonel Trant, with his Portuguese,
undertaking to transport the guns through the
most rugged parts of the pass. It unfortunately
feH out, however, that the obstacles· opposed to
the progress of the artilIery, were greater than
had been anticipated; and the morning of the 9th
broke long before the pass was cleared. This
necessarily retarded both the infantry and the
cavalry; in addition to which, the guides on whorn
Cotton had relied, mistook, in the darkness of the
night, the proper road. The consequence was,
that when our cavalry arrived, not in the rear, nor
on the flank of Albergaria, but in its front, they




PENINSULAH WAR. 333


found the enemy dl'awn up to .receive them, their
horse being in line upon an open plain, covered by
a body of l'iflemen; whilst a party of infantry oc-
cupied a pine-wood on their flank. Cotton had
not antieipated su eh reception; he halted his
people, and remained stationary; and was thus
situated when Sir Arthur Wellesley arl'ived with
the infantry. The latter were instantly directed
to advance; the British,. under Paget, passing
through Albergaria; . and the Portuguese, under
Trant, through sorne hamlets on the left; whilst
the cavalry, forming the centre, pressed upon the
open space between the two villages. Both the
British and Portuguese infantry pushed on with-
out a halt, under an exceedingly brisk fire, which
they as briskly returned; but the eavalry were not
so fortunate. They found no convenient oppor-
tunity to act, and they were somewhat left behind
by their dismounted comrades; but the position was
carried with little 10ss on either side. The enemy
retreated hastily, and our advanced-guard passed
the night at Oliveira; the guards and the remain-
der of the column taking quarters in Albergaria.


At an early houron the 11th, the march was
renewed ; but we had notproceeded far, when a
strong bodyof the enemy, amounting to perhaps
fOUT or five thousand infantry, with four regiments
of cavalry, appeared in our front .. They occupied
a commanding position upon sorne hilIs beyondthe




334 NARRATIVE OF THE


village of Grijon, and seemed determined to de-
fend it. Sir Arthur Wellesley saw, in a moment,
that the height upon which the enemy rested his
left could be turned, and he took his measures ac·
cordingly. Without once halting his column, he
ordered General Murray, from thé rear of the ad-
vanced-guard, to move round by the right, throw-
ing, at the same time, the 16th Portuguese into a
pine-wood on the left. The latter were intended
rather to distract- the enemy's attention, than them-
selves to attempt anything serious; whilst General
Paget, supported by two battalions in reserve,
manreuvred upon their front. A very heavy firing
immediately began; but the enemy no SOOller ob-
served the judicious movement round their left,
than they abandoned their strong ground, and
Hed. U pon this, our troops were again thrown
¡nto column, and the march resumed as if nothing
had happened; every movement being made with
the same coolness, and in as perfect order, as if at
lit field-day.


It would be difficult to conceive any little piece
of manreuvring more beautiful than that which had
just been executed; but the business of the day
was by no means overo As soon as we mounted
the heights from which the French had just be en
driven, the rear was observed retiring in great
confusion; and it occurred to me that a good op..,
portunity was furnished, of making a successful




"PENINSULAR WAR. 335


charge with a few troops of cavalry. Sir Arthur
Wellesley instantly acceded to my proposal, and
two squadrons being intrusted to me, we galloped
forward in sections along the road, and overthrew,
by repeated attacks, everything which stood in
our way. Our prisoners alone amounted to up-
wards of one hundred meno The enemy, upon
this, halted, and forrned their infantry on the
heights of Carvalhos, whieh eornmanded the road
to a great distance,and checked the pursuit ofthe
two squadrons. A rnessenger was immediately


. despatched to the rear, to request that greater
force might be sent up; and in the mean while,
the squadrons wheeling offto the right, threatened,
by a road which ran in that direction, the enemy's
left. This movement, alone, had the. desired ef-
feet. Before the additional troops could arrive,
they were once more in full retreat, and the heights
ofCarvalhos were abandoned.


In this ma!1ner we continued our journey, march-
ing and fighting without any intermission, frorn
nine in the morning till five in the afternoon; for
the march of the column was never for an instant
delayed, because the advanced-guard happened to
be engaged. At last, however, we halted for the
night; the advance bivouacking on ·the ground
where it stood, and the guards oceupying Grijon
aud Carvalhos; and the head-quarters ofthe arrny
establishing itself in the eonvent of Grijon, where




336 NARRA TIVE OF THE


tbe French generals breakfasted tbat morning.
Respeeting these, we were given to understand,
that Marmet, Thomieres, Delaborde, and Fran-
cesehi, were this day opposed to us; and sorne
hopes were entertained, that even Soult himself
might be on this side of the Douro. N or was it
less satisfactory- to learn, that Hill'g landing at
Ovar sueeeeded to our utrnost wL'Shes. He Wa!3
followed by Cameron; and both were already
communicating with uso


Our casualties during the morning were consi-
derable, a good many roen having been killed, a
still greater number wounded; but they were not
more serious than might have be en e2lpected, for
the enemy's force opposed to us greatIy outnum-
bered the ~ivisibn of our army which was alone
engaged. Their ground, too, was generally ad-
vantageous to them; and in opposition to aU as-
suranees previously received, they fought like men
who were not willing to be beaten. . The result of
the affair~ however, tended greatly to elevate the
spirits ofall who had taken part in it. Once more
had English troops be en brought into contact with
French, and once more had they proved theif
superiority; they wanted but a wider and better
field, to prove 1t still more satisfactorily.


We rose next moming with frames considerably
refreshed, and began our march in the highest
possible spirits. As we proceeded, cottages un-




PENINSULAR WAR. 337


roofed and in ruins; gardens and enclosures laid
waste; and the most wanton destruction of every-
thing destructible, marked the rout which the
enemy had taken. But we fell in with non e of
his parties. Soult had withdrawn his whole force
across the Douro in the night, and breaking down
the bridge, was already congratulating himself on
his escape from, at least, immediate molestation.


It might be about ten o'clock in the motning,
when the advanced-guard, consisting of two bri-
gades of infantry, those of General Stewart and
General Murray, with two squadrons of the 14th
dragoons, under Paget, arrived at the village, 01
tath6"f suburb, oí Villa N ova. It was joined here
by General Hill's corps, which, marching from
Ovar along the sea-shore, overtook usat the en-
trance of the place. We found, as we had ex-
pected to find, that the bridge was destroyed; and
we discovered, likewise, that Soult had taken the
precaution to remove every boat and barge from
this to the opposite side of the river. Under these
circumstances, it became no easy matter to sur-
mise how the passage was to be effected; though
every one felt that effected it must be, and that
speedily. We were yet hesitating what course to
pursue, when Colonel Waters of the Portuguese
servíce, by whom the destruction of the bridge had
been reported, was ordered to gallop forward, arid
to secure the means of transport at any risk. That


VOL. 1. y




338 NARRA'fIVE OF THE


intelligent officer instantly proceeded to the river's
bank, at a spot where it forms a curve, opposite to
the Convento da Cerra~ and where, at the distance
of a mile and a half from Oporto, its course is con-
cealed by a thick wood.· He found here a small
boat, hid among the bushes; and standing near it
were the prior of the convent, and three 01' four
peasants. The latter, partly at his entreaty. aIid
partly by the exhottations of the prior, were per-
suaded to leap withhim into the little skiff, and
they made directly to the opposite bank, where·
there lay among the mud four large barges~ of
which they made themselves masters. The deed
was a daring one, because patrols of the enemy
passed to and fro continually; but it was produc-
tive of the very bestresults. They returned with
their prizes unobserved, into which General Pa-
get, with three companies of the Buffs, instantly
threw themselves; ann crossing the river without
a moment's delay, too k possession of sorne houses
on the opposite bank, before the enemy were at
an aware of their intentions. They had not, how-
ever, taken their ground many minutes, when the
French. awaking as it were from a trance, ad-
vanced to dislodKe them. Asevere action now
ensued, in which our troops resolutely main-
tained themselves, in spite of odds the most over-
whelming; nor was the slightest impression made·
upon them, till fresh companies arrived to their




PENINSULAR WAR. 339


support, and all chance of a defeat had been
averted.


In the mean while, our people on the opposite
side were busily employed in planting guns upon
the height of Sto Convento, from which a plunging
fire was speedily opened upon the enemy's co-
lumns. General MQrray too, who had been de-
tached with his division to a ferry higher up, was
fortunate enough to gain possession of ai many
boats as enabled him to pass over two battalions
ofGermans, with two squadrons of the 14th; and
these showing themselves upon the enemy's left,
the latter immediately retreated from the bank of
the river. In an instant the Douro was covered
with boats, which the inhabitants hastened to con-
vey across for our accommodation; and the 29th,
the two remaining battalions of Germans, and the
guards, were all passed over from Villa Nova.
We were now in complete possession of the town,
theenemy fleeing in aH directions. Their prin-
cipal retreat was, however, upon the road to Ama-'
rante, which they covered with infantry, cavalry,
ando artillery, all in the greatest confusion; and
thither they were pursued by the dragoons from
General Murray's corps, under my orders, with
the gallant Colonel Hervey of the 14th, who un-
fortunately lost his arm in this skirmis~. The
slaughter was very great,' for a panic had evidently
fallen upon them; and as we followed them a




340 NARRATIVE OF THE


considerable way, repeated opportunities were
furnished of charging to advantage. But at last
we were recalled; and the whole army assembled
to recover from its fatigues, in the city.


The affair which 1 have thus, 1 fear imperfectly,
attempted to describe, has be en considered, alld
deserves to be considered by all military men, as
not less brilliant than ally action of its magnitude,
either in the Peninsular or any other modern war.
To pass a wide, deep, and rapid river, in the face
of a formidable enemy, even with the assistance
of an adequate supply of boats and pontoons, re-
requires no trifling degree either of courage or
management; but on the present occasion the
passage was made good in spite of difficulties,
under which, perhaps, any other officer, except
the -roan who effected it, would have sunk. So
little, indeed, did Soult anticipate an attempt of
the kind, that he directed his undivided attention.
to the sea; and when reports were brought to him,
that the British trops were crossing from Villa
N ova, he refused at first to give them credit. But
Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the very boldness
of his plan went far towards securing its success;
he feIt, inoreover,. that upon the promptitude of
his movements, the safety of Marshal Beresford's
corps in a great degree depended, and he made
up his mind to hazard something, rather than.
permit such an opportunity of striking a blow to




PENINSULAR WAR. 341


escape him altogether. Had he adópted the re-
solutioR for which Sonlt gave himcredit, of
embarking his army, and so passing the mouth of
the Douro with the boats of the Heet, the French
must have escaped in good order; for a delay
would have arisen of at least two days, and two
days were aH that Soult required to insure his
safety. He therefore chose the more gallant
course, of crossing his troops by detachments;
and as he knew of what materials his troops were
formed, he entertained no apprehension as to the
results. His bravery and exceHent arrangements
were rewarded by a victory, which would alone
immortalise any other individual, had another been
so fortunate as to obtain it.


The evening was not far advanced, when the
sound of firing ceased, and the most perfect order,
consistent with a scene of universal rejoicing
among the people, prevailed in Oporto. Our
head-quarters being established in the house
which Soult had occupied, we found every prepa-
ration for a comfortable dinner in progress; for
the French Marshal quitted the place so lately as
two in the aftemoon, long after his sumptuous
me al had been ordered. It will be reádily ima-
gined that we were not backward in doing ample
justice to it. But ours was not a situation which
sanctioned the loss of a single hour in relaxation.
Orders were issned, and arrangements made, for




342 NARRA TIVE OF 'rHE


putting the army in a condition to resume the
pursuit with as little delay as possible; and On
the morrow the columns were again in motion.
Of the night advantage had been taken to bring
up and pass along the whole of the artillery, wag-
gons, and commissariat stores; and when the
dawn of the 13th carne in, General Murray's bri-
gade were in a condition to marcho They set out
accordingly on the road to Amarante; and the
guards, with the rest of the infantry, prepared to
follow in the evening. .


Whilst we were thus carrying everything before
us on the banks of the Douro~ Marshal Beresford,
with his detached corps, was not idle. Arriving
at Villa Real on the 9th, and being there strength-
ened by the junction of Silveira's troops, he began
bis march on the following morning, in the direc-
tion of Amarante. On the 11 th, his advance,
under Silveira, reached that place, where a slight
skirmish occurred with the division of General
Loison ; but the latter retreated almost imme-
diately, taking, as it was believed, the road to
Oporto. Of these events Beresford took care to
inform us; whilst he himself marched rapidly in
pursuit of Loison,. fearful lest his junction with


. Soult should render the latter too strong for USo
By this time, however, Soult was overthrown, and
in full retreat: the consequence was, that his
corps feH in with that of Loison, at Peñafiel, on




PENINSULAR "\VAH. 343


the evening .of the 12th; and they both prepared
to continue, in conjunction with one another, their
confused and disastrous flight upon Spain.


There were two routes b€fore Soult, by one or
otherof which he must necessarily move, if he
desired to preserve any of the materiel of his army
in its retreat. Either he would make for Galicia;
by Ponte de Lima, Valencia, and Tuy; or, as was
more probable, he would endeavour to reach Val-
ladolid by Chaves.. It was réquisite, on our part,
to provide against both emergencies. For this
purpose, instructions were forwarded to Beresford,
on the ] 3th, directing him,in case the enemy
should abandon Amarante, to move upon Chaves,
and to make himself master of that line of opera-
tions. In the mean while, our corps were to
march in such order, as would at once press upon
the. rear of the fugitives, supposing them to hold
sti11 to the Amarante road, and seize the communi:.
cations along the other rout~, towards Tuy. Ge-
neral Murray accordingly pressed forward in the
direction of Peñafiel, followed by the Hanoverian
Legion and a squadron of. cavalry. Thismove-
ment took place on the morning of the 13th. On
the 14th again, the rest of the army, consisting of
the guards, the cavalry, Generals Stewart's,
Campbell's, and Hill's corps, followed the lower
road towards Barcelos and· Valencia. On the
15th, authentic intelligence reached us, that the .




344 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


whole of the French force was retiring upon
Chaves, after it had burned and destroyed the
great bulk of its stores, and even its artillery, in
Peñafiel. An immediate alteration of plan was
the consequence. Whilst the cavalry, the guards,
and General Cameron's brigade, advanced as far
as Braga, the remainder stopped short at Villanova
de Famelicao; and the lower road being entirely
abandoned, all were instructed to move towards
Chaves. Thither, therefore, the whole strength
of the army directed itself; and it was confidently
anticipated that great events must follow; foÍ' no
one could doubt that the French army would suf-
fer here cOmplete defeat, provided Beresford's
corps should have succeeded in occupying Chaves
in their front.


In the mean while a variety of rumours respect-
ing the present and future uudertakings of the
enemy in Spain, were hourly pouring in upon uso
or N ey it was reported thathe had withdrawn
from Lugo, and was verging gradually in the direc-
tion of the frontier; whilst Bessieres was stated to
have detached from Valladolid a strong force, for
the purpose of acting against uso Then came cer-
tain letters from Victor to N ey, which our flying
parties had intercepted, bearing date at Merida,
on the 29th of April. From these; it appeared
that Victor had, by King Joseph's orders, opened
a communication with the junta of Seville, froID




PENINSULAH W AH. 345


which he expected the most favourable results;
and he accordingly informed his co.rrespondent
that he had withdrawn his advance frorh Medellin;
and should not, for the present, enter upon any
forward operations. It is probably needless to
add, that the latter piece of information afforded
great satisfaction to us, inasmuch as it freed us
from all immediate apprehensions on the side of
the Tagus, and gave us assurance of being enabled
to prosecute our designs against Soult without in-
terruption~ These completed, other and no less
splendid undertakings were before us~ We might
march rapidly to Alcantara, by way of Ciudad
Rodrigo, desiring Mackenzie to join us at the for-
mer place; when the whole concentrating at
Truxillo, might threaten Victor's right, and, in
connexion with Cuesta, force him to give battle, or
retire from his present position. For all this, how-
ever, more troops were wanting. At present we
could not muster, even with the addition of Mac·
kenzie's corps, twenty thousand effective infantry
and cavalry; and twenty thousand men were con-
fessedly not adequate to the undertaking. In
cavalry, especially, we were extremely wéak; and
it was unreasonable to expect that the successes
already obtained could be followed up with any
vigour, unless that arm in particular were ren-
dered perfectly efficient.




346 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER XIV.


Sir -Arthur Wellesley follows the Freneh army-Skirmish at
Salamonde-SouIt makes for Orense, and the pursui-t is
abandoned-The allies eountermareh upon Coimbra, where
a reinforeement of five thousand men reaehes them-Move-
ment towards the south-Communieations opened with
Cuesta-His pIans for the eampaign opposed by Sir Arthur
WeIlesIey-The army becomes sickIy, and is distressed for
money and stores.


THOUGH no man could feel more acutely than
our gallant leader, that his energies were sadly
cramped for want of means; and though the arri-
val of at least ten thóusand fresh troops was an,
event for which he, in common with his followers,
rather wished than hoped, he determined that no-
thing should be wanting on his part to make the
most of the victorious little band already at his
disposa!.


Having ascertained, on the night of the 15th, by
a report from General Murray, who, with the Ha-




PENINSULAR WAR. 347


noverians, had followed the enemy frorn Peñafiel
to Guirnaraens, and was now in comrnunication
with us frorn that place, that Soult was destroying
his artillery and stores, and that the utmost dis-
tress prevailed in the French ranks, Sir Arthur
Wellesley carne to the concIusion, that to 'pursue
any further with the whoIe of his force, would be
to harass the rnen for very Iittle purpose. It was
evident, frorn these preparations, that Soult had
made up his mind to retreat in a directión where
no 'army could pretend to follow him, unIess its
leader were willing to disorganise his own means
to the full as effectualIy as the enemy had disor-
ganised h!s. WhiIst, therefore, he directed M ur-
ray to fall from Guimaraens into our liné of
march, under the impression that menin a despe.:.
rate situation might even yet rnake a desperate
attempt, he commanded General Hill, with the
four brigades of which he was at the head, to haIt
at Braga; and he did so, bóth because he still
Iooked to a countermarch upon the Tagus, and
because he entertained no intention of wasting his
resources arnong the barren mountains of Galicia;
for, that Soult would make for the mountains; no
one could Ionger doubt. He had disencumbered
himself of everything calculated in the slightest
degree to retard his progress, not excepting even
the plunder of Oporto, or the caissons which con-
tained the spare rnusket-ammunition for his 801-




348 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


diers; and he was in fuIl march towards the rugged
pass of the Sierra de Montalegre.


In consequenee of these arrangernents, the ad-
vanee of our arrny began its mareh at an early
hour on the morning of the 16th, and carne up
towards evening with the enemy's rear-guard near
the village of Salamonde, about four leagues from
Braga, on the road to Chaves. The enerny were
posted upon strong heights in front of the village,
having the river Cavade in their rear~ over which
are thrown two small bridges. These conduct to
two roads, one of which passes through Ruevaens,
and along the tops of sorne lofty mountains be-
yond; whilst the other leads only to a sort of by-
path, which, after penetrating by a shorter cut
through the valley, ultimately winds into the main
road, over the hilIs. Though the brigade of guards
was the only portion of our force at hand, the Ge-
neral resolved to attack; and one mornent spent
in reconnoitring, served to satisfy hirn as to the
best mean s of proceeding. There was an exceed-
ingly high and steep hill upon the enemy's left,
which they oeeupied in sorne force; their right
being likewise upon a hill, but covered in front by
a deep ravine.. The latter point could not, of
eourse, be assailed; but the former appearing to
Sir Arthur Wellesley to be eapable of being
turned, he instantIy despatched the riflemen, sup-
ported by three companies, to rnake the atternpt.




PENINSULAH W AR. 349


The guards were then formed in column upon the
road, covered by two three-pounders, conveniently
placed for the purpose; .and they were directed,
as soon as the light troops should show themselves
on the brow of the hill, to charge.


As the ground over which the light troops were
compelled to pass, chanced to be peculiarly broken,
a considerable detour was necessary, and so me
time elapsed before they reached their point of
destination; but their arrival there was no sooner
known than the guards advanced. The enemy
made no attempt to offer them any serious resist-
ance. They gave their fire, indeed, as soon as
the head of the column came within range; but
having done so~ they immediately abandoned their
ranks, and. fled in the greatest confusion. We
pursued them through the village with al1 the
eagerness of men who had barely seen an object
which they were eager to overtake; but the dark-
ness carne on so fast, that no one was able to
determine exactIy by which of the two roads they
had retreated. At last, a large mass were descried
upon the lower bridge, passing in a state of abso-
lute disorganisation, and with much haste. Upon
these we got the guns to bear; and before they
couJd clear the defile, considerable execution was
done among them. Our infantry, however, were
soon obliged to abandon the pursuit; and we
returned to the village, where, in a few miserable




350 NAHRATIVE OF THE


hovels, stripped and plundered of everything porta-
ble, we passed the night.


At the first break of dawn, on the following
morning, we again made ready to advance; and
as day-light broke, we were able to discover
that terrible havoc had been made at the lower
bridge. The bodies of four or five hundred rnen
and horses lay there; sorne killed by cannon-shot ;
others precipitated, in· the confusion, headlong
into the river; whilst baggage of every desérip-
tion, cars, waggons, and even knapsacks, aH loaded
with plunder, blocked up the bridges, and ·ren-
dered thern quite impassable. The same species
of encumbrances filled the little streets. Articles
of the greatest value, such as silver cups, rich
tapestry, and cloth of gold, lay strewed about in
the mud; indeed, it seemed as if the enemy had
now, at length, lost heart, and were willing to
relinquish every thing in order to. preserve their
own persons. One advantage they certainly ob-
tained by this hasty abandonment oí the last
re:rimants of their property; for the roads were so
completely encumbered, as to render our passage
both disorderly and slow; and we were, in con-
sequence, obliged to halt that night at Ruevaens.


During the three last days the rain had come
down in torrents; and our men, who were con-
tinuaHy exposed to it by night as well as by day,
began to exhibit syrnptoms of suffering from their




l'ENINSULAlt WAR. 351


hardships. On this account, as well as becausé
it was now ascertained that Soult, instead of
moving upon Chaves, had turned off from Mon-
talegre to Orense, Sir Arthur' Wellesley deter-
mined to. relinquish the pursuit. Beresford, it
appeared, had anticipated the instructions sent to
him, and was already in possession of Chaves; so
that all which could be done to intercept the fly-
ing enemy, had been effected; but, as the General
expressed himself, "if anarmy throws away aH
its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and every-
thing whieh can strengthen it, and can enable it
to act together as a body, and abandons all those
who are entitled to its protection, but arld to its
weight and impede its progress, it must be able to
march by roads through which it cannot be fol-
lowed with any prospect of being overtaken by an
armywhich has not made the same sacrifices;"
and that such had been the case with Soult's
army, the most convincing proofs were before our
eyes. The whole extent of their route was
strewed with the careases of mules, horses, and
even nien, who, unableto keep up, had been left
behind; the horses and mules being either killed'
or hamstrung, and the men either dead, or in a
state of the most pitiable exhaustion. Broken
carriages, tumbrils, guns, and everything capable
of rendering an army efficient; met us at every
step. N or was it by such marks alone that their




352 NARUATIVE OF THE


Hne of march could be pointed out. Every vil~
lage, hamlet, or cottage, which they passed, was
wantonly set on fire, till the sky became obscured
during the day by volumes of smoke, and illu-
minated at night by the blaze of burning dwell-
ings. On the inhabitants, likewise, they exer-
cised the most wanton cruelty. But these out-
rages went not wholly unpunished. Such of the
peasimtry as escaped, collected together in groups,
and hung upon the rear and flanks of the retreat-
ing army, and every straggler who fell into their
hands was put to death under circumstances oftbe
most terrible atrocity. It was no uncommon thing
to come upon French soldiers lying by the road-
side, not dead, but fearfuIly mutilated; whilst
such corpses as bore marks of violence, seemed to
have died under lingering torture. Our retreat
from Sahagun was bad enough, - few retreats,
perhaps, in modern times, have been more harass-
ing; but the retreat of Soult through the moun-
tains of Galicia must have been fully as disastrous.
His loss in men alone could not faH short of four
or five thousand, whilst his whole materiel was
destroyed; and even of the troops who escaped, the
probability was, that more than one-half would be-
come denizens of the hospital. Yet is SouIt deserving
of the highest praise for the celerity and talent
with which his flight was conducted. True, the
army, after it should reach a place of safety, must,




PENINSULAR WAR. 353


like the Spanish armies, be entirely re-organised
before it could pretend again to take the fie1d;
but even thus, it was no easy matter to escape;
and the French Marsha1 was fully entitled to all
the applause ·which we liberally bestowed upon
him, for having, at the expense of any sacrifices,
extricated himse1f from his difficulties.


1 have said that Sir Arthur Welles1ey, as soon as
he had positively ascertained the route which the
enemy were pursuing, determined not to follow
them any further. He carne to this reso1ution
when the advance was already within a short dis-
tance of Montalegre, and he was confirined in it
by a report from General Mackenzie, which
reached him on the night of the 17th, that a corps
from Victor's army was moving· on Alcantara.
The four brigades, which had been 1eft behindat
Braga, were ordered instantly to return to Oporto;
and those which accompanied the head-quarters,
prepared to follow in the same direction. At the
same time advice was forwarded to Marshal Be-
resford, desiring him to meet us in Braga, for the
purpose ofarl'anging a defensive plan for this part
of the country; and Silveira with his Portuguesé
being left to pursue Soult, we an bent our steps
once more towards the -Tagus.


It will nO~;¡ge necessary to record with much
minuteness, the progress of the army during· its
retrograde movement. Enough is done when 1


VOL. r. z




354 NARRATIVE OF THE


state that, passing once more over the scene of its
late triumphs, it arrived at Coimbra on the 28th,
where head-quarters were established during a few
days, and a short respite granted to the weary 801-
diers. The latter was an arrangement of which
they stood much in need. Their sufferings in the
mountains, though cheerfully borne at the mo-
ment, began, as soon as the immediate excitement
abated, to take effect upon them; and not a few,
particularly of the younger and les s seasoned
among them, feH sick. Rest was therefore de-
sirable. N or was it a matter of indifference to us
to learn that a reinforcement of five thousand men
had landed, and that they might be expected to
join us in the course of the week, so as to take
part in the series of operations in which the army
might next embark. We should, indeed, have
felt greater satisfaction, had the numbers of our
recruits been doubled; but five thousand British
soldiers were not to be spoken of lightly, and we
were all extremely pleased at the prospect oftheir
arrival.


Whilst this brief period of relaxation lasted, we
found occupation enough, partIy in considering the
reports which were from time to time sent in re-
specting Cuesta, and partIy in striving to compose
those unhappy differences on th~ score of rank, of
which 1 have already said something, and which
now again began to show themselves. Much um-




PEXINstrLAR \VAR. 355


htage was taken, because the oflicers attached to
Portuguese 'corps received, not only an additional
step in the British armY1 but a second advance, as
soon as they took their places· in the ranks of our
allies. By this arrangement a British captain,
who might happen to volunteer into the Portu-
guese army, was promoted to a British majority;
and was still further pushed on, by receiving the
Portuguese rank oflieutenant-coloneI, immediately
on his attaching hiinself to a POrtuguese battalion.
As such, he necessarily took precedence of the
tnajors in the British army, no matter ofwhat date
their commissions might be. It was hardly to be
expected that such an arrangement should not
give serious offence to aH who thus found them-
selves commanded by men whom they persisted
in regarding as their juniors. Yet was the circum~
stance in a great measure unavoidable. To render
British oflicers of real utility in the Portuguese ser-
vice, it was necessary that they should enter it, not
as subalterns, but as persons of rank; and they
were generally the younger men who accepted
commissions in that service at all. The difficulties
respecting majors and lieutenant-colonels could,
however, be overcome. It rarely happened, and
it rarely could happen, that they would be brought
into coHision with one another; but the case was
widely different with respect to the generals,
Tilson, Murray, Hill, and eotton, were all the se ..




356 . N ARRA TIVE OF THE


niors of Beresford; though Beresford, in virtue of
his commission as commander-in-chief of the Por-
tuguese troops, necessarily took precedency ofthem,
as often as the two armies acted together. There
was, at least in one instan ce, no surmounting this ;
and General Murray gave up his command in con-
sequence, and returned to England.


With respect, again, to other matters, we learned
that Victor, as soon as he discovered that his
movement to save Soult was made too late, feH
back again from Alcantara, and that he. was
now retiring to his former position. He had not,
however, quitted it unobserved or disregarded by
Cuesta: on the contrary, the Spanish General
had followed him in his advance; had directed a
corps, under Zayas, to attack Merida, where four
or five hundred sick were left; and it was even
rumoured, and apparently upon plausible grounds,
that Merida had actually fallen. In the mean
while, the main body ofthe Spaniards were under-
stood to be at Caceres; from which it was ex-
pected that they would march upon Truxillo and
Almaraz, for the jmrpose of securing the bridge.
It was stated, moreover, that the Portuguese, who
defended the bridge at Alcantara, fought nobly;
and it seemed to be gene rally believed that, with
a due proportion of British officers to direct them,
the Portuguese troops would soou beco me exceed-
ingly efficient.




PENINSULAR W AR. 357


Of our own future movements, no one, except
the Cornmander-in-chief, knew anything; nor had
he, as far as I could learn, as yet determinately
fixed upon them. Officers were, indeed, sent to
Cuesta, with intelligence that Sir Arthur Welles-
ley was ready to co-operate with him in an attack
upon any Freneh corps whieh might be situated
between Lisbon and Seville; but, at the same
time, to make the Spaniards aware that any
promise beyond this could not be given. Portugal
was our field; and to mové from it altogether would
be to abandon the post which the British army
was required peculiarly to proteet. Still, our
chief was willing to attempt as much as his nu-
merical strength and the nature of his instructions
would permit; and if Victor would but remain
where he was, a great blow might possibly be
struck at him. In this case we should mareh to
Thomar and Abrantes, throw a corps on the left
bank of the Tagus, communicating on its right
with Cuesta's left; and detaching a division along
the right bank, to destroy the bridge, it was not
impossible that Victor might be surrollnded.


It so happened that, at the moment when these
dispositions were talked of, news reachedus, not
only from the north ofSpain, but from the Danube.
We read of the tuinous defeat of the Austrians in
a papel' printed at Madrid, and read it with the
feelings of deep regret which it was calculated to




358 NARRATIVE OF TH)!:


excite. Yet tbere was a good deal to cheer us in
tbe rumours wbich carne in from Galicia. It was
said tbat, whilst Kellerman had united his corps
to tbat of Ney, and both were marching against
Romana into tbe Asturias, four thousand French
troops out of the seven thousand wbich had be en
left to secure Galicia, bad surrendered, at Lugo,
to one of Romana's generals. Sto Jago, likewise,
was reported to have fallen; and hence a sanguine
expectation prevailed. that if these victorious
Spaniards would but fall upon Soult whilst he was
yet in disorder, and return again to 8upport Ro.
mana before Kellerman and N ey should bave be en
able to annihilate him, tbe affairs both of Galicia
and the Asturias might do well. But these were
httle better than ordinary rumours, and, like the
reporta of the evacuation of Saragoza, and of the
assembling of a strong force at Burgos, hardly de-
served to be relied upon.


At length the troops having been well refreshed,
and many of the sick restored to a serviceable
condition, the army renewed its march on the
6th of June, and fixed its head-quarters at Tho-
mar. Nothing occurred here, calculated in any
lively degree to. excite our interest. We were
again amused, indeed, by rumours respecting the
movements of Victor, most of which represented
hím as in full retreat upon Madrid; and under the
impression that these might be wcll fonnded, we




PENINSULAR W AR. 359


experienced something like a feeling of regret,
that our advance towards him had not be en con-


ducted from the Tras os Montes, by way of Ciu-
dad Rodrigo. Yet it was far from being too late
to follow up, with vigour, that plan of operations
which appeared to hold out prospects of ultimate
success. It was the policy of the French marshals
to unite their several corps, and to act in a body ;
it was ours to prevent their junction, to cut off
their communications, and to fight them in detail.
To effect this, nothing appeared more advisable
than that we should bring our army, in conjunc-
tion with that of Cuesta, to the north of the Tagus,
and advance from thence upon Plasencia, Sala.
manca, and Valladolid. By taking that step, the
probabilities were, that we should be able to over-
take one or other of the French armies, and des-
troy it before it could be succoured by the rest;
whilst we should certainly reduce Victor to the
necessity, either of abandoning the capital, or of
being cut off frorn the great road to the Pyrenees,
by our cavalry in Castile. Should we, however,
fail in this, and should N ey and Kellerrnan, and
Soult and Victor, succeed in uniting within their
lines on the Ebro, then, indeed, with our present
force, the chances of success would be rnaterially
dirninished. On Cuesta's arrny we were not in
the habit of greatIy counting; sorne service it
rnight doubtIess render us; that is to say, it would




360 NARRA TIVE OF 'fHE


probably enable us to cope to advantage with any
force which might be found between the Portu-
guese frontier and the Ebro; but it would not
render an army of twenty thousand Englishmen,
-and the sum total of our effectives at this time
barelycame up to twenty thousand,-competent
to the overthrow of the united corps of four French
marshals.


On the 7th, the army resumed its march, and
took up its head-quarters on the same evening at
Abrantes. Here other, and, as far as we could
judge, more correct reports relative to the motions
of Victor, reached uso He had not withdrawn, as
had formerly been represented, to the north of the
Tagus, but was busily concentrating in the neig'h-
bourhood of Merida, as if with the design of pass-
ing the Guadiana, and attacking Cuesta previous
to our arrival; and this was considered the more
likely, because the news of N ey's successes in the
Asturias must, by tbis time, have reached him.
But there were other and more interesting matters
laid before us than even this, and of these a few
words will suffice to give an account.


Lieutenant-colonel Bourke, of the Quarter-mas-
ter-general's department, had be en sent, sorne
time before, to General Cuesta's head-quarters at
Fuente del Maestro, for the purpose of concerting
with him a joint plan of operations against the
enemy in Estremaclura. The day after our arrival




PENINSULAR WAR. :361


at Abrantes, letters carne in from Colonel Bourke,
bearing date the 4th and 6th of J une, in whieh he
informed us that Cuesta was afHieted with a se-
vere ague, and henee that an his eommunieations
had been made through Major-general O'Dona-
ghoe, ehief of the staff. These, however, proved
so far satisfaetory, that tbe Spanish General was
willing to negociate with us on our own terms.
For it had been his original wish that our army
should divide; that part should keep possession
of the bridge at Aleantara, whilst part exeeuted
a movement on the enemy's right; and it was
chiefiy to impress upon his mind the utter impos-
sibility of acceding to that proposal, that Colonel
Bourke's mission was undertaken. After a good
deal of discussion, the point was conceded; and
now three propositions were submitted for Sir
Arthur Wellesley's eonsideration, eoncerning whieh
it was at the same time stated that Cuesta gave a
decided preference to the first.


In the first place, it was suggested that the
whole British force might move from Abrantes
upon Elvas and Badajoz, and uniting itself with
the Spanish troops, make a joint attack upon
Victor; whilst Cuesta should detach General .
Venegas, with a corps of seven thousartd men, by
Llerena, through the mountains towards Talavera,
which, turning the enemy's left, and heading them
in their retreat, would enable the combined armies




362 NAltRATIVE OF THE


toannihilate them by falling on their rear. At
the same time, Cuesta would detach a second
corps from Badajoz towards Plasencia, so as to
threaten their right; and he professed to be capa-
ble of sparing both detachments, and yet bringing
eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand
cavalry, to the assistance of the British near Me-
rida. In case this plan should not be adopted, it
was proposed, in the second place, that the Eng-
lish army should move, en masse, to Alcantara,
and press from thence upon the enemy; whilst
the Spaniards following them closely, should take
Merida by assault, and make themselves masters
of aH the artillery and stores which might yet
be laid up in that place. Lastly, it was submitted
that we should' march upon the Teitar and Alma-
raz, and equaHy threaten the enemy's right and
rearo AH these proposals, it is necessary to ob-
serve, were made on the supposition that the
enemy's head-quarters were at Caceres, and that
their troops were cantoned partly there, and partly
at Merida and the villages near. With respect to
the movements towards the rear, no opinion could
be formed, because they managed effectually to
conceal these, by. keeping strong patroIs of cavalry
continually in their front.


The force immediately under Victor was esti-
mated at twenty-six thousand meno In addition
to thes.e, there was at Ciudad Rodrigo a corps of




PENINSULAR W AR. 363


thirteen thousand infantry and three thousand ca-
valry, under Sebastiani; but the roads of commu-
nÍcation between these were either extremelyincon-
venient or fatally circuitous. Should theyattempt
to unite, with artillery and baggage, Sebastiani must
of necessity march round by Madrid; should they
choose the mountain path, the junction might no
doubt be effected, but it would be at the expense
of all the mate riel of one, if not of both corps.
Besides these, a body of four thousand men in
Madrid, and about one thousand in other garrisons
between the capital and the frontier, there was
represented to be no French force capable of being
brought immediately against us, or interrupting
the plan of operations, be it what it might, on
which our Commander-in-chief should determine.


In pressing upon our consideration the first of
his propositions, Cuesta strongly represented that
we might expect ample supplies of every descrip-
tion at Badajoz; and th~t, should more be re-
quired than Badajoz was able to furnish, the
deficiency could be promptly and sufficiently made
up from Alentejo. The case would be very dif-
ferent, were we to proceed by Alcantara.The
whole of that country was exhausted by the
enemy, who ravaged it in all directions; and we
should find it extremely difficult, as well as incon".
venient, to carry along with us both provisions for
the men, and forage for the horses. Besides, if it




364 NARRATIVE OF THE


were our design, as he was satisfied that it was
our wisest course, to bring the eneroy to action
with as líttle delay as possible, we should certainIy
enjoy a better chance of attaining that end, by
following the one route rather than the other.
Were we to advance by Badajoz and Elvas, we
should threaten the eneroy's front, who would
probably not abandon his position without a
strugg'le; whereas by moving froro AIcantara or
Almaraz, we should instantly alarro him for his
flank, and he would withdraw at once. For
Victor, he continued, was particularly jealous of
his right; and therefore the roost prudent policy
would be to turn his left by a corps pushed from
Llerena.


To each and all of these pIans Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, 1 believe, saw serious objections, and he
immediately wrote to Cuesta, pointing out, in
forcible terms, his own sentiments. With respect
to the first proposition, an opinion generally pre-
vailed, that by marching first to Badajoz, and
afterwards towards Cuesta, we should effect· no
other end than merely to throw ourselves in the
enemy's rear; whereas our object clearly was, to
cut him off entirely from all sources of communi-
cation with any other corps in the country. Then
again, as to the detached Spanish corps, it could
not for a moment be doubted that it would either
be defeated by Victor in his retreat, or, which was




PENINSULAR WAR. 365


not less likely to occur, find itself suddenly placed
between the troops of Victor on the one hand,
and of Sebastiani on the other. Besides, it was
not on the left at all that an aftempt ought to be
made, becau.se the right of the enemy offered to
us the readiest puint of attack. Of the three
plans, 1 conceive that our commander considered
the last less open to objection than either of the
others, though even in it there were too many'and
too serious difficulties for him to sanction its adop-
tion. The British army, therefore, it was consi-
dered, ought to direct itself upon Plasencia at
once, so as to compel Victor to fall back, if not to
receive battle; and whilst this was doing, Cuesta
might move upon Sebastiani, so that both the
French corps might be brought to action sepa-
rately, and at the same momento


It is probably needless to add, that the Spanish
and British generals differed on the present oc-
casion, not more in their views touching the sub-
ject immediately before them, than with reference
to the series of operations which they expected to
follow. Whilst Cuesta desired, aboye all things,
that the armies of the two nations should be united,
that they should fight side by side, and follow up
to the utmost any advantages which they might
obtain, Sir Arthur Wellesley was guidedby other
motives, and restricted his designs to a narrower,
but a much safer and surer field. The Spaniard




366 NARRATIVE OF THE


was eager to see his allies fairly committed, and
his native country made the theatre of their glo-
ries ;-the Englishman felt that, by the tenor oí
his present instructions, so bold a policy was not
authorised. The deliverance of Portugal, and the
repulse of the enemy from Estremadura, were
the two objects which he was required to keep in
view; and he limited his present designs to the
furtherance of these by the destruction of Victor's
army. No doubt Sir Arthur Wellesley judged
right; but it was said that, could we but succeed
in getting between Victor and his supplies, and
forcing him to give us battle before fresh troops
should reach him, a wide door to future enterprise
would be opened~ Yet we had many disadvan-
tages to overcome. In the first place, we were,
single-handed at least, innumbers greatIy inferior
to the enemy; in the next place, on our allies we
could not count, not only because of the want of
discipline among the men, but because of the ex-
treme obstinacy of their leader; and lastly, Victor
was strongly posted. Under all these circum-
stances, it seemed doubtful whether anything
could with prudence be attempted, till our own
long-promised reinforcements should arrive.


In this state of uncertainty we remained during
sorne days, no event occurring which at all merits
repetition. Letters, indeed, and despatches ar-
rived from England, the tone of which gave, in




PENINSULAR WAR. 367


sorne respects, general satisfaction to the army;
wbilst in others it was as generally condemned.
We were well pleased to find tbat, instead of ex-
citing public expectation too bighly, government
was exerting itself to keep' men's bopes within
bounds; because we felt that our game was not
yet won; and we were willing to receÍve credit
in the end for having done more, rather than re-
proach for having done less, than had been anti-
cipated.But we were not satisfied that sorne
higher and more decided proofs of the sense en-
tertained by h~s sovereign of our leader's merits,
had not been given. On Sir Arthur Wellesley
himself that circumstance produced no visible
effect; but his soldiers had looked for other re-
sults, and they were far from being reconciled to
the overthrow of their expectations. They ima-
gined that the passage of the Douro entitled him
who had effected it, to sorne striking acknowledg-
ment of gratitud e from his country; and tbey
were surprised to find that none such had been be-
stowed. These, however, were transient feelings ;
nor were others, which a somewhat unprecedented
promotion of a few individuals excited, more
lasting. But on one head an felt particularly
anxious.. The long-promised reinforcements were
not yet arrived, and the despatches contained no
information as to the period when they might be
expected. This was the more vexatious, as almost




368 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


every day brought in sorne fresh rumour respecting
Victor and the French army. At one time we
heard that he had actually quitted his position.
and that he was in full retreat towards the capital;
at another, it was confidentIy asserted that he
was preparing to pass the Guadiana, for the pur-
pose of attacking Cuesta. That the latter appre-
hended such an event, all his communications
made us aware; but for our own parts, we felt
perfectIy assured that he would not move till we
commenced our operations, and that, as soon as
we should approach Vera de Placencia, he would
begin his retreat. In this case it was vain to ex-
pect that any serious stand would be made till
after he should have been joined by Joseph's
guards from Madrid; and then at Segovia, 01'
somewhere in that vicinity, we anticipated that a
mighty struggle awaited us, in which we should
be opposed to an the force which it would be pos-
sible fol' Victor to bring together upon one field.


In the mean while, news carne from the north,
that N ey and Soult, having united their corps,
were employed in the siege of Vigo; and that, as
soon as it should fall, an event of which every one
appeared to anticipate the speedy accomplishment,
they were preparing once more to cross the Min-
ho, and carry the war into the north of Portugal.
Such an occurrence would naturally lead to
changes in our arrangements. In the first place,




PENINSULAR WAR. 36D


it would become absolutely necessary for Marshal
Beresford, who had accompanied us SO far with
three Portuguese brigades, to return for the de~
fence of the provinces, and to relinquish the in-
tention, which at present he entertained, of pene~
trating along with us into Spain. The fact indeed
is, that he was best placed at Oporto. There was
no second under him capable of carrying on the
organising system as he had begun it; and though
his services with us were doubtless highly impor-
tant, his presence among his own levies was infi-
nitely more so. N o doubt it would be extremely
galling to him, to quit the scene of active opera~
tions for the sake of training recruits, and watching
a distant enemy; but upon his vigilan ce our future
successes in a great measure depended; and there-
fore he was prevailed upon, in case untoward
events should occur in the north, to sacrifice his
own wishes to the public good.


1 have said that our effectives never exceeded,
at this period of the war, twenty thousand men'.
Even now, with the addition of the five thousand
lately joined, we barely carne up to that number ;
for our men had become extremely sickly of late,
and as the summer advanced, and the heat in-
creased in intensity, sickness daily, and even
hourly, accumulated upon uso It was not, how-
ever, the number of our sick alone which rendered
us, in a great measure, inefficient: we were des-


VOL, l. 2 A




NARRATIYE OF THE


titute of a variety of articles absolutely necessary;
in order to tit us for a campaign. Our shoes were
generally worn out, and no supply had reached
liS; and our military chest was quite exhausted.
There was not a regiment in the army, to which
many months' pay was not due; ando what was
infinitely more distressing, therc were no funds in
the country from which to supply what was want-
ing. Yet, in spite of an this, not a murmur or
complaint could be heard, from the highe'st to the
lowest. Generally speaking, our imrnediate sup-
plies were ample; that is to say, the men received,
for the most part, their full allowance of provi-
sions; and they were too thoroughly satisfied with
the honour of the government which they served,
to entertain any doubts as to the ultimate settle-
ment of their balances. On t1}e contrary, the
very best spirit prevailed everywhere; nor is it
going too far to affirm tbat, under their present
leader, the troops would have borne any pnva-
tians, and undertaken any services~




l'ENINSUI,AR WAllo 371


CHAPTER XV.


The British army moves nearer to Victor, and threatens hí3f
flanks-The latter withdraws across the Tagus-Sir Arthur
)Vellesley fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia-He visits
Cuesta at Casa del Puerto, and is shown the Spanish army
by torch-light-He returns to his own troops, which are put
in motion, and Victor's posts driven from Talavera across the
Alberche-Preparations for attacking him there, but he
effec1s his eseape-Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur WeIlesley
with the conduct of the Spaniards-He is compelled, by the
negligence of Cuesta, to remain inactive.


IN the last chapter it has been stated that Cuesta
sent in three proposals for the consideration of Sir
Arthur Wellesley, and that an opioion generalIy
prevailed that Sir Arthur had objected to the
whole of them, laying before him at the same time
sorne project of his owo. N o great while elapsed
ere we were given to understand, by Ietters from
Colonel Bourke, that the Spaniard remained bi-
gotedly attached to his own opinians. On no




372 NAHHATIVE Ol!' THE


account whatever would he agree to act as Sir
Arthur Wellesley suggested; and the only altera-
tion to which he would at aH consent was, that
after having joined him at Badajoz, we should di-
rect our march upon Caceres, in order to threaten
the enemy's right; whilst he moved by Merida
to Talavera. Whoever will take the trouble to
consult the map, must see that by this scheme
Cuesta proposed, first to form a junction between
the two armies, and afterwards to divide them by
a chain of almost impassable mountains. It is
scarcely necessary to observe that neither Sir
Arthur, nor any person of inteHigence in his army,
could approve of such an arrangement. We were
aH, indeed, well assured that the movement upon
Badajoz, and the combination of the armies there,
would compel Victor to cross the Tagus; but we
knew a180 that it would only drive him back upon
his resources, prevent our striking- a blow, and
enable him to escape with his army entire. Under
such circuqlstances nothing remained for us, except
to continue quietIy where we were, and watch
the evento Care was, indeed, taken to secure
every point which seemed at all in danger of an
attack from the enemy; and a few movements
were made, calculated, in the event of any un-
looked-for piece of good fortune occurring, to for-
ward our enterprises on the offensive. Marshal
Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the




PE~INSULAR WAR


north, was ordered to proceed, with one British
arrd two Portuguese brigades, by Castello Branco
to the Teitar, so as to menace Victor's flank, in
case his retreat should be delayed; whilst the rest
of the Portuguese troops were commanded to con-
centrate at Braga, for the defence of the northern
provinces. But the strength of the army remained
stationary; and as forage and provisions were suf-
ficiently abundant, it suffered nothing in conse-
quence. On the contrary, the cavalry horses
improved every day in condition, and fresh regi-
ments of infantry were continually brought up
from the coast; so that, in the course of three
weeks, we found ourselves, if not greatly more
numerous, at all events more efficient in every
respect, than we had yet been since our arrival in
Portugal.


In the mean while, however, Victor had taken
the alarm, and commenced his retreat towards the
Spanish capital. His whole army was withdrawn
across the Tagus; and Cuesta, as soon as he began
to move in pursuit, saw the wisdom of Sir Arthur
Wellesley's proposal, and agreed to it. Prepara-
tions were accordingly made for advancing upon
Plasencia; but whilst these were in progress, ad-
vice came in that the French armies in the north
had occupied Orense; and Beresford was, in con-
seq uence, compelled to resign his cornmand here,
and to hurry off where his presence was more




374 N ARRATIYE Oli THE


wanted, between the Douro and the Minbo. Of
course the departure of that officer produced no
alteration in our plans, which, on the contrary,
were brought at once to maturity; and it was
determined to enter Spain, without a moment's
delay, in two columns. Of these, one, consisting
of three divisions of infantry, and the whole of the
cavalry, was directed to move upon Plasencia, by
way of Coria; the other was to proceed across the
Gata, near Moraza, and to rendezvous at the same
point. 'Vith respect, however, to any future un-
dertakings, there seemed to be considerable mis-
givings. On Cuesta no reliance could be placed ;
his opinion of the English \Vas not a generous one;
and every body seemed to be aware that on the
fi~st favourable opportunity he would )eave us to
our fate, and follow up any desig~ wbich to him-
self might appear most advisable. N ow, from
intercepted letters addressed by Joseph to his
generals, which, one after another, fell ¡nto our
hands, it was evident that the. enemy designed to
draw their corps gradually towards one point, and
to ·act entirely upon the defensive. This would
of ,course lead to an evacuation of Madrid, and a
retreat to the north of the Ebro; and how far, and
with what prospect of success, the campaign could
be carried into these distant regions, were ques-
tions which no one could answer. But with
matters so contingent we were not, in the present




'PE:'Ii"INSULAR WAR. 375


instance, very deeply concerned. 1t was our bu-
siness to follow up the enemy with aH the energies
of which we were masters; and we lost no time in
,bringing these effectually into play.


'Ve had so far acted upon these plans, as to
reach Castello Branco with the head-quarters of
the army, when accounts carne in, that Joseph
had marched from Madrid at the head of five
thousand men to join Victor, and that the latter
had taken up a strong position at Talavera.
Sebastiani, likewise, was reported to be in motion
towards the same point; whilst Cuesta had sud-
denlyehecked bis advance, and leaving a corps at
Argaterem, had fallen back upon the Tagus at
Almaraz. To counterbalance these rumours, it
was stated that General Venegas was in close
pursuit of Sebastiani, and tbat he migbt be confi-
dently expected to form a junction with Cuesta
from the opposite side of the river. Then again
we were given to understand, tbat several corps
fmm tbe north were marching towards Salamanca
or Valladolid, and that their patrols had appeared
at Lenares and San Estevan, places as near to
Plasencia as Castello Branco. This was not a
matter of surprise to us; for we saw tbat, if Victor
should entertain serious notions of risking a battle
on. this side of Madrid, the Jatter movements were
absolutely necessary to secure him against being
turned. But thegrand question was, wbetber be




376 NAHRATIYE OF THE


would risk a battle at all; and in case he were
willing so to do, whethet we would accept the
ehallenge. It was surmised that, on the arrival in
camp of all t11e battalions and detachments, of
whose landing reports had within the last few
days reached us, our force in the field could not
fall greatly short of thirty thousand meno Cuesta,
again, had under his orders fun thirty-eight thou-
sand; but they were, for the most part, raw levies,
and could not in any respect be counted upon.
Of the French force, on the other hand, all reports
agreed in stating that it amourited to at least
forty-five or fifty thousand men; would it be pru-
dent, under such circumstances, to stake the issues
of the campaign upon one battle? The point
was, to say the least of it, an extremely delieate
one to determine; but we a11 felt that our desti-
nies were in the hands of one who was quite com-
petent to guide them; and hence we were all
ready either to fight 01' to manreuvre, according as
he should direet, with the fullest conviction on our
minds, that we were doing that which our circum-
stances required us to do, and which, sooner or
later, would bring about the most beneficial re-
sults.


1 have said that our plans were no sooner
matured, than they were so far carried into execu-
tion, that the army began its. march, and, on the
last day in June, fixed its head-quarters at




PENINSULAR "'AR. 377


CastelIo Branco. No greatspac'e of time was
wasted here; but entering Spain by way of
Zarza la Major, we arrived at the town of Coria
on the 5th of July. Intelligence reached lIS here,
that General Crawford, with his brigade from
England, had quitted Lisbon on the 28th, and
hence, that their arrival in the camp might daily
be expected. Some regiments, likewise, from
Ireland, and the islands, were stated to have
landed, respecting whom orders wcre sent back
req uiring them to encamp at Belem ; from whence,
as soon as they should have got into proper order
for field service, they were to push forward. But
it was not concerning our own people only that
rumours crowded in upon uso A great deal was
said both of the French and S panish armies-of
their strength and their position; and though we
we"re not disposed to place in these rumours impli-
cit confidence, it may not be amiss if I give here a
brief outline of their general strain and character.


Victor's corps, amounting in the whole to about
twenty-seven thmisand effectives, had taken post,
as was formerly stated, at Talavera, and occupied
ground so formidable, that any attempt at turning
could be made only by moving in force upon
Avila. On the other hand, Cuesta, who at first
had pursued at a quick pace, but who became
alarmed when he found that we were not imme-
diately inhis rear, and that he was in danger of




378 NARltATIVE OF 'fIlE


getting' entangled between the two rivers, returned
to his old p08ition on the left bank of the Tagus,
from whence, kecping possession of Almaraz with
his advance alone, he scoured the country in an
directions with his cavalry. He was not, how-
ever, regardless eithcr of us or of the means by
which our communÍcations might he rendered most
direct and secare; for he had alrea,!ly established
a bridge over the Teitar, and was busily engaged
in the construction of two more across the Ta-
gus; one in the vicinity of Almaraz, the other
below tlle point where the waters of the Teitar
and the Tagus meet. Whilst these movements
were going on, Sebastiani had advanced from To-
ledo, with the design, as it \Vas surmised, of at-
tacking Venegas; but the latter feH back to Vil-
lanova de la Fuente, anu drew Scbastiani after
him as fal' as Consuegra. Thus ,vere Victor and
Sebastiani as complctc1y separated from one ano-
ther, as Venegas was separated frorn Cuesta, and
Cuesta fram Venegas.


With respect to other points, again, the corps
of N ey and Soult were reported to have assembled
at Zamora, to the number of twenty-three 01'
twenty-follr thous;:md men; whilst Marshal Mor-
tier was represented to be with his force at Valla-
dolid. The latter piece of intelligence we acquired
fram General Franceschi, the officer to whorn our
hussars hau been so frcqnently opposed during Sir




'f'ENDíSULAR W A 11. 379


John Moore's campaign, and who, till he feH into
our hands, had been in command of the light ca-
valry and advance of the northern army. He was
proceeding from his quarters -at Toro, by way of
Tordesillas, for the purpose of visiting his friend
Marshal Mortier, when he was attackcd near the
ferry by a fríar and ten Spaniards, and himself
ll.nd his aide-de-camp made prisoners. The gallant
friar was in the act of conveying him across the
mountains, in order to present him to the Supreme
Junta at Seville, when the head-quarters of our
armychanced to be at Zarza la Major, by whích
means we were enabled to hold sorne conversation
with him. He appeared dreadfully out of humour
with his evil fortune, repeatedly ejaculating, "O!
comme e'est pitoyable pOOl' un général d'hussars
d'Hre pris par un capuchin!" Yet, Frenchman-.
like, he met an our ad\'ances with the greatest
frankness and candour. Upon his person were
found Ietters, which gave a very deplorable ac-
count of Soult's present situation and future pros-
pects. His army was stated to be perfectly di s-
organised; and the whole COlll1try round to be in
a state of the most alarming revolt.


The news from the south-east, which arrived
abont tile same time, were 110t, however, so fa.:.
vourable. There Blake, pushing forward \vith his
accustomed rashness, hacl suffered a great defeat,
and the French were said to be gaining ground, in




380 NARRATIVE OF THE


consequence, in every corner both of Catalonia
and Arragon. But, in the present state of affairs,
the south was infinitely less a source of anxiety to
us than the central and northern provinces. Could
we but contrive to destroy Victor, and afterwards
press on through Gallicia and the Asturias, carry-
ing with us Cuesta's and the Portuguese armies,
and picking up, as we went along, the different
corps which, und-er Romana and his compatriots,
were in arms there, it was at least within the
verge of possibility, that we might succeed in pe-
netrating to Burgos and Vittoria, and so act upon
the line of the enemy's communications. AH,
however, must depend upon circumstances, of the
exact bearing of which no one could, as yet, form
a judgment; for it was far from being a matter
absolutely decided upon, that a battle ought to be
risked at aH. But to return to my nal'rative.


On the morning of the 6th, the head-quarters of
. the, army moved from Coria to Galesto; and on
the 8th they were established in Plasencia. From
this point Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to
open a personal communication with General
Cuesta; and the 10th was selected as a conve-
nient day for the. purpose. As the events arising
immediately out of this detennination had in them
a great deal of interest at the time, and as its more
remote consequences bore powerfully upon the
issues of the war, 1 shall take the liberty of re-




PENINSULAR WAll. 381


cording, at length, most of the particulars attend-
ing our remarkable journey.


As soon as the official business of the morning'
was disch~lrged, and things put in a proper train,
we set out from Plasencia, on the day above-
named, for Cuesta's head-quarters, and were met
at a flying bridge, of which 1 have ·already spoken
as thrown across the Teitar, by a squadron of
Spanish hussars. The hussars, who belonged to
the regiment of Villa Viciosa, were, upon the
whole, well mounted and equipped; indeed, we
were not long in discovering that they had been
selected to do the duty of an escort to us, simply
because their appearance was superior to that of
any other corps in the Spanish army. Unfortu-
nately, however, in conducting us tówards the
bridge of boats upon the Tagus, our guides lost
their way, and darkness had, in consequence, set
in before we began to approach the campo This
was the more to be regretted, .as Cuesta had
drawn out his whole force for Sir Arthur Welles-
ley's inspection. The troQPs had been under arms
during four hours, in momentary expectation of
our arrival; whilst the poor old man himself,
though still lame from the effects of his bruises at
Medelin, sat on horseback at their headduring the
greater part of that time.


Our arrival at the camp was announced by a
general discharge of artillery, upon which an im-




382 X A lWATIVE OF THE


mense number of torches were made to blaze up,
and we passed the entire Spanish line in review
by their light. The effect produced by these ar-
rangements was one of no ordinary character. As
the torches were beld aJoft, at mOdel'áte intervals
from one another, they threw a red and wavering
light oyer the whole scene, permitting, at the same
time, its minute]' parts to be here anJ there cast
into shade; whilst the grim and swarthy visages
of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uni-
forms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as
the Rashes feH upon them. Then there was the
frequent roar of cannon, the shouldering of fire-
locks, mingled with the briefword of command,
and rattling of accoutrements and arms, as we
passed from battalion to battalion; an these
served to interest the sense of hearing to the fu1l
as much as the spectacle attracted the sense of
sight.Nor was old Cuesta himself an object to
be passed by without notice, even at such a mo-
ment and under such circumstances as these. The
old man preceded us,-not so much sitting on his
horse as held upon it by two pages,-at the im-
minent hazard of being overthrown whenever a
cannon was discharged, 01' a torch Rared out with
peculiar brightness; indeed his physical debility
was so observable, as clearly to mark his total
ullfitness for the situation which he then held.
As to his mental powers, he gave us little oppor-




PE~INSUL.AR WAR. :383


tunity of judging; inasmuchas he scarcely ut-
tered five words during the continuance of our
visit; hut his corporal infirmities alone were at
absolute variance with all a general's d uties, and
showed that he was llOW fit only for the retire-
ment of prívate life.


In this manner we passed abüut six thousand
cavalry, drawn up in rank entire, and not less than
twenty battalions of infantry, eaeh consisting of
perhaps from scven to eight hundred meno These
formcd but one portion of the army, the rest being
either at the bridge of Arzobispo, or in position
along the Tagus; and tbey were all, with a few
exceptions, remarkably fine meno Some, indeed,
were extremely young-too young for service-
particularly among the recruits which had lately
joined; but take them for all in a11, it would not
be easy to point out a hetter made, stouter, 01'
more hardy-Iooking body of soldiers in the service
of any nation in Europe. Of their appointments,
it is not possible to speak in the same terms of
commendation. There were, indeed, sorne hattalions
whose arms, accoutrements, and even clothing,
might he pronounced respectable; out in general
they were very deficient, particularly in shoes.
It was easy to perceive, likewise, from the attitude
in which they stood, as well as from the manner in
which they held their arms, that little or no disci-
pline prevailed among them; and hence that l~


/7.




384 N ARRATIV}2 OF THE


general they could not be regarded in any other
light than as raw levies. Sorne corpsthere doubt-
less were, such as the Irish brigades, abattalion
or two of marines from Cadiz, and the remnants of
their grenadier battalions, which deserved a higher
military character; but speaking of them in the
aggregate, they were little better than bold peasan-
try, armed partially like soldiers, but cómpletely
unacquainted with a soldier's duty. This remark
applied fully as much to the cavalry as to the
infantry. The horses were many of them good,
but theü' riders manifestly knew nothing of move-
ment or discipline; and they were, as well on this
account as on the score of a miserable equipment,
quite unfit for general service. The artillery,
again, was numerous, but totaIly unlike, both in
order and arrangement, to that of other armies;
aml the generals appeared to have been selected
according to one rule alone, namely, that of seni-
ority. They were almost all old men, and, except
O'Donaghoe and Largas, evidently incapable of
bearing the fatigues or surmounting the difficulties
of one hard campaign. It was not so with the
colonels and commanders of battalions, who ap-
peared to be young and active, and of whom we
had every reason to believe that many were ra-
pidly learning to become skilful officers.


The place at which we paid this visit, and wit-
nessed these events, was called Casa del Puerto;




PENINSULAR WA1L 385


where the head-qnarters of the Spanish army were
established in a wretchedhovel. We alighted
here after the réview had ended, aud as soou as
we entered, Cuesta, who seem:ed quite overpow-
ered by fatigue, retired to rest, but he returned
again at eleven o'c1ock to supper, and sat with us
till past midnight. He sat, however, as he al-
ways did under similar circumstances, in profound
silence, neither seeking to take a share in the con-
versation, nor, apparently at least, paying the
slightest attention to it. 1 was much struck by this


,singularity of manner, and inquired oftllose around
me whether it were assumed; but they aH repre-
sented it as being perfectly· natural, and gave
rather a curious account of the aged chief. Every-
thing, it appeared, went on throughout the army~
rather in his uame than by his'immediate orders';
forhe governed his followers wholly bya system
of silence and terror, of which aH stood wonder-
fuUy in awe. Cuesta was a person of no talent
whatever; but he was a brave, upright, and ho-
nourable man, fuU of prejudices, and obstinate to á
great degree, and abhorring th~ French with the
hatred of personal rancoUl'. On the latter account,
and because they knew that he would never willing~
Iy betray them, the Spaniards reposed unbounded
confidence in Cuesta; and they did so the more rea':'
dily, as he never failed to hang, 01' otherwiseput
to death, every traitor that feH into his hands.


VOL. I. 2 B




386 N AUUA TIVE Ol!' THE


Cuesta never gained a victory, yet he was con-
stantly eager to fight; and when the battle began,
he was always to be found in the post of greatest
danger. That, however, was a matter of very little
moment; for he gave no orders except to push
on; and as to arrangement, or the mode of execu·
ting manreuvres, they were things quite unknown
in his army. It was said that Brigadier·general
Quiske, Cuesta's military secretary, was aman of
talento 'Him, however, we did not see; but
O'Donaghoe struck me as being elever and sen·
sible, though, like other favourites who act for
their principal, an intriguer and a politician.
Respecting the rest of the generals, it was im-
possible to form anyopinion, as Cuesta seemed par-
ticularly unwilling that they should holda,ny se-
rious conversation with uso It is true that 'he pre-
sented them one by one to Sir Arthur Welles-
ley, the ceremony taking place after breakfast on
the 11 th; but no words were exchanged on the
occasion, and each retired after· he had ma~e his
bow.


This ceremony having be en gone through, Sir
Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta withdrew, at the
request of the former, to an inner apartment;
where they held a conference which lasted four
hours. What passed on the occasion 1 know not,
as 1 did not happen to be present; but 1 heard
that O'Donaghoe, who assisted his general, was




PENINSULAR \VAR. 387


the chief speaker, and that Cuesta was, as
usual, almost wholly siJent. When it carne to
a close, dinner was announced; and we sat down,
about three o'clock, to aboút forty dishes, the
principal ingredients in. which were garlic and
onions. Our meal did not occupy us long; and on
Cuesta retiring, as was his c~stom, to enjoy his
siesta, we mounted our horses, and rode out into
the campo By this means we were enabled to see
more of the regiments separately, than we had
seen during the torch-light review. We saw, how-
ever, nothing which served, in any degree, to raise
our opinion of the general efficiency of our aUies;
and we returned to our host at a latehour, more
than ever impressed with the persuasion, that if
the deliverance ofthe Peninsula was to be effected
at aH, it must be done, not by the Spaniards, but
by ourselves.


At an early hour next morning we took leave of
Cuesta, and set out on our return to Plasencia.
The old Spaniard brightened up as we bid him
fareweH, and embracing us after the manner of his
country, repeated over and over again that he was
fuUy satisfied with the result of the communication
with which Sir Arthur had honoured him. How
far the feeling of satisfaction was mutual, 1 take it
not upon me to determine; but that the journey
had not been performed absolutely in vain, tha
orders which were issued immediately on our a1'-




388 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


rival at head-quarters, for the troops to hold them-
selves in readiness to march at a moment's notice,
sufficient1y attested.


The object for which we were now in a state of
preparation, was nothing less than the advance
towards Victor's army in its position at Talavera.
To render this movement as decisive and as little
doubtful as need be, it was resolved that, whilst
Cuesta pushed him in front, both his flanks should
be threatened at the same time, the right, or prin-
cipal flank, by us, and the left by the Spanish
corps under Venegas, from the southward of Ma-
drid. The following dispositions were accordingly
understood to be in forwardness, and the following
marches definitely arranged.


The first corps appointed to move from its pre-
sent encampment was that of Venegas; and it was·
to march by way ofMadridejos, Tembleque, Oraca,
Fuente-Duena, and Arganda. As soon as it had
proceeded a day's journey on its route, a simul-
taneous movement was to be made by the corps at
present at Arzobispo, and by Cuesta; the former
crossing the Tagus, and hastening by Colira to
Salaveral, the latter breaking up from Almaraz,
and marching by N aval Moral and Oropesa, to the
same point. In the mean while, the British army
from Plasencia was to pass the Teitar, near Fuente
de Bargazagona, and moving by Toril, N aval Moral,
Oropesa, and Gamonal, to arrive near Escalona, at




PENINSULAR WAR. 389


the moment when the othercorps should reach
their several places of destination. Whilst these
things were going on, Sir Robert Wilson with the
Lusitanian Legion, a corps máinly formed by his
active exertions, sorne dragoons, and two Spanish
battalions, was to follow the right bank of the
Teitar as far as Arenas, and to secure the passes of
the Puerto del Río; and measures were at the
same time taken that those of A vila and Guadara-
ma should not be left open. Sir Robert Wilson's
corps was not, however, to confine its services to a
mereoccupation of the passes above referred too
Masters of the fruitful vale of Plasencia, they
would be able to furnish us, through the entire line
of our march, with aH the supplies of which we
were likely to stand in need; whilst they would
hinder so much as one foraging party of the ene-
mys army from committing havoc in that beautiful
country.


So far everything was settled with the nicest
attention to risks and advantages; but after all, it
seemed. something more than doubtful whether
Victor would give us an opportunity of proving the
excellency of oul' arl'angements. He who l'efused
battle at Merida and Truxillo, was not very likely
to accept it in the position of Talavel'a. On the
fol'mer ground he could not have been assailed,
except by a flank movementon oul' parts, thl'ough
Badajoz, which must of necessity have left the




390 N ARRATIVE OF THE


Spaniards exposed to an attack from his entire
force, whilst we were at a distance; and we knew
our allies too well to entertain any hope that the
attack would have been successfully resisted.
But even ifit had, or supposing that we had found
another opportunity of defeating him, his retreat
was perfectIy open; and we could have only fol-
lowed as far as the passage of the Tagus, in the
face of numerous and ve~y serious difficulties.
Situated as he now was, matters bore a widely
different aspecto The mountains of the Sierra de
Gata on the one hand, and those of Arganda on
the other, afforded to us numerous facilities for
detaching corps, absolutely without risk, round
his flanks; whilst no necessity whatever existed,
of supporting them by a direct attack upon his
centre. 1 confess that, bearing these things in
view, 1, for one, entertained but slender hopes
that he would wait to receive us in his present
position; nor could all ruy wishes to the contrary
succeed in removing the impression, that no good
would arise out of our judicious but somewhat
tardy determination at Plasencia. We remained
quietly in our camp till the 17th, giving the
Spaniards time to put their several columns in
motion; but on that day we began our march,
and passing the Teitar, occupied on the 18th
Talaguela, and tbe rivulet of Talamora. On the
19th we arrived at Castinello and Casa de Jos




PENINSULAR WAR. 391


Somas, pushing on oul' advanced-gual'd as fal' as
Sto Julien; and on the 20th we entered Oropesa,
where one day's halt was determined on. On
the 21st, Cuesta and his people passed through
the town; upon which occasion Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley took an opportunity of exhibitillg to the
Spaniard twenty-'thousand British troops under
arms. Cuesta expressed himself much gratified
by the spectacle; but the display was scarcely
concluded, when he hurried forward, and arrived
the same evening~ with that portion of his army


. which marched from the bridge of Almaraz, by
the great road through N aval Moral, at Villada.
The ¡;;everal corps had now assumed their re-
spective stations; and it was determined on the
22nd to drive in those divisions of the enemy
which occupied Talavera, to their position on the
left bank of the Alberche. That we might be
aware beforehand of the nature of the opposition
about to be offered, recognisances in the direction
of the town were made; and it was found. to be
filled by a considerable force of French troops,
particularly cavalry, of which there could not be
less than fifteen hundred in and round the place.
But to possess ourselves of that point was essen-
tial to all our future operations; and therefore on
the 22nd the columns moved forward with the de-
sign of seizing it.


On this occasion the Spaniards took the high-




392 NARRATIVE OF 'I'HE


road towards Talavera, whilst the British were
directed to move upon the enemy's left by a pa-
ralleI road through the motintains, in the direction
of San Roman. As soon as the former began their
advance~ the French showed their cavalry in the
pIain in front of the town; which not only checked
the Spaniards, but caused them very needlessly
and very clumsiIy to depIoy into lineo This done,
instead of endeavouring to drive them back, which,
with their very superior cavalry force, they might
have easiIy effected, our allies commenced a heavy
cannonade, which lasted, without producing any
visible effect, till our troops began to show them-
selves on the right. Then, indeed" the enemy
retired with precipitation; and abandoning Tala-
vera, and the ground immediatelyabout it, they
betook th~mselves to their principal position on
the opposite sirle of the stream. They were fol-
lowed· in this movement by the cavalry and artil-
lery of the Spanish army, and they lost a few men
in the suburbs of Talavera; but of severaI admi-




rabIe opportunities of making a charge, which
presented themselves to the Spanish cavalry, these
troops took no advantage. The truth is, that men
could not more carefuUy avoid coming to close
quarters with their adversaries, than the Spanish
troops did this day. To us it was quite annoying
to see with how much caution they hung back.
when everything invited them to advance; and to




PENINSULAR W AR. 393


confess the truth, we acquired for them a feeling
of distrust, of which, during sorne time-:-I might
have said during the remainder of the war-we
hardly sUcceeded in divesting ourselves.


On the 23rd, the enemy were seen in position
behind the AJberche, and occupied ground which,
had the Alberche been impassable, might have been
considered extremely formidable. As, however,
this was not the case, as there were several fords in
the stream, by which both the right and the centre
of their line could" be threatened, it seemed extra-
ordinary in Victor to remain where he was, with
twenty thousand men only; for twenty thousand
constituted the whole strength of the corps which
now lay in our front. lt is scarcely necessary to
add, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was exceedingly
anxious to take advantage of an occurrence on
which he could have hardly calculated. Yet was
he extremely unwilling to urge Cuesta to the
adoption of any measure : on the contrary, he was


. desirous, from particular ciréumstances, that what-


. ever- was done should, if possible, be undertaken
on the suggestion and at the entreaty of the Spa-
nish General. For this it is not difficult to assign
an adequate cause. From the day of our entrance
into Spain, up to the present moment, no care
whatever had been taken by the Spanish authori-
ties, to supply us with any one of the many arti-
eles of which we stood in need. Sir Arthur had




394 NARRATIVE OF THE


repeatedly complained to Cuesta, and had, on
every occasion, received the strongest assurances
that bis requests would be promptly attended to;
but day after day passed by without bringing about
the fultilment of the promise; and we were now
as far as ever from being satisfied. Thus circum-
stanced, Sir Arthur felt himself under the neces-
sity of informing Cuesta that be would see him
with his army across tbe Alberche; but tbat, in
justice to his own troops, and to the king whom he
served, he neither could nor would advance one
step further into the country, till aH the articles
for wbich .he had so tepeatedly made requisition,
should be supplied.


The discussions to which such a state of affairs
frequently' gave birth were again renewed, and
with increased acrimony, on the evening of the
22nd; but it was, 1 believe, finally determined by
Sir Arthur Wellesley, on tbe 23rd, that a general
attack should be made upon the enemy at dawn
on the following morning. On this occasion, two
divisions of British infantry, with one brigade of
cavalry, were to pass the fords of the Alberche, so
as to assault the heights on the enemy's right.
Whilst this was· going on, the Spanish cavalry,
supported by a column of infantry, rinder the
Duke of Albuquerque, was to pass a fordopposite
to the centre of the position, leaving to Cuesta in
person, assisted by Generals Zayas and Eguia, the




PENINSULAR WAR. 395


charge of carrying the bridgeand battery on the
]eft; and two divisions of British infantry, with
two brigades of cavaIry, were to remain on the
plain, in rear of AIbuquerque's' coIumn, as a sup-
port to the whole.


Cuesta received the suggestion with his accus-
tomed dry civility, but desired time to consider of
it and digest it. He spent the greater part of the
night in deliberation; and at last gave his assent
to the scheme. In the mean whiIe, we had not
been wholly idIe. Soon after dark sorne guns
were pushed across the bridge at TaIavera, fOl" the
purpose of assisting in the dislodgement of the
enemy from their batteries on the left, and in ad-
vance of their position. The different officers in
command 01' divisions and brigades, were likewise
instructed as to the duty which they would be
expécted to perform, and the general plans, liable
to be changed upon the spot according as events
might turn out, were matured. This done, we
lay down to snatch a few hours of sleep. But as
our troops had a circuitous mal'ch to execute, the
space granted for -repose was necessarily brief;
and at two o'dock in the morning we were again
under arms. We set off immediately in the di-
reetion agreed upon, and reached the Alberehe
without molestation; but it was only to ascertain
a faet which seriously mortified and ehagrined us
-namely, that the enemy had escaped. Not a




396 NARRATIVE OF THE


vestige of their troops, nor a morsel of their bag-
gage, remained; and their huts, or standing carnp,
alone bore testimony that they had been there.


It was but natural, that feeling, as every one
did, the fuU extent of our disappointment, a variety
of motives should be assigned as those which
actuated Victor on the present occasion. By sorne,
it was alleged that the expected reinforcements
not having come up, the enemy felt himself too
weak to hazard a battIe; by others his retreat was
attributed to fresh orders from Madrid, positively
requiring him to withdrawand concentrate upon
the capital. For my own part, it appeared to me
that the French had never entertained the slightest
idea of fighting, provided they could escape with
aIiy credit, and at the same time se cure their
plunder. They had kept their ground on the
Alberche during the 23rd, partIy because sorne
time was necessary for the removal of their bag-
gage, and partly because they probab1y conceived
that our whole force could not be assembled; and
they retired on the very first opportunity which
offered, after they had accomplished their own
designs, and saw reason to believe that we were
in a fit state to molest thern. It was, therefore,
ver y evident to me, that unless we followed them
up closely, no possibility ofbringing them to action
would occur; whereas by a rapid pursuit, there
was every prospect before us of even yet com-




PENINSULAR W AR. 397


pelling them to risk all upon the chances of a
battle.


Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, determined not
to deviate from the course which he had already
threatened to pursue, should Cuesta persist in his
system of procrastination and neglect. No one in
the army questioned the soundness of the policy
which dictated the measure-for of that there
could be no question; but it was mortifying to
reflect that a series of brilliant operations must
be interrupted, and perhap.s serious injury Ínflicted
'!Ipon the cause, through the ill-timed obstinacy of
a perverse old mano 1t seemed certain now, that
we were not to pursue at aH. But were the
Spaniards to follow single-handed, as it was high-
ly probable they might, it was an event quite
within the compass of possibility, that the enemy
would suddenly turn round upon them when they
least expected it, and destroy thero, when we
should be near enough to know of their fate, and
yet too distant to avert it .. There was something
more distressing in these considerations than an
ordinary reader may be able to conceive. It was
impossible for many not to put the question, why
might we not go on at all events? and if provi-
sions should be scarce, why not exist upon quarter
allowance, rather than permit an opening so pro-
pitious to be closed up?A few days' march
would drive the enemy beyond the capital, the




398 NARRA TIVE 01<' THE


passes,.and the mountains, and to effect more was
not required of uso We should then be in a
country where, in spite of Cuesta, we might sup-
port ourselves well,-it were better that we had
attempted nothing, than to stop short just at a
moment like the presento Our chief, however,
had made up his mind upon mature deliberation,
and doubtless formed his judgment upon grounds
satisfactory to himself; nothing, therefore, re-
mained to his followers, except to submit implicitly
to his decisions. Besides, there was one great
good of which no one could doubt, as likely to
arise out of these decisions. Cuesta would see
that we were in earnest, and he would then, per-
haps, exert himself to suppIy our wants, rather
than lose altogether the advantage of our co-opera-
tion.


On the morning of the 24th, it was rny fortune
to go on with two squadrons of cavalry, in front of
Cuesta's arrny, as far at St. OlaIla; we had there
a srnart skirrnish with the rear-guard of the enemy,
j ust as they were q uitting the· town; and 1 was
enabled to ascertain that the· rnain body ha.d fallen
back to Torrejos, on the Toledo road. From that
point, it would he easily in their power either to
double round towards Madrid, or to retire by
Aranjuez upon Arganda, and so to the southward
of Siguenza; froro whence, being joined by Sebas-
tiani, and in communication with Souchet, they




PENINSULAR W A R. 399


might continue their march towards Tudela. In
the latter case, Venegas' corps could hardly avoid
a defeat from the united armies of Victor and
Sebastiani; for he had moved· in the directioll
formerly described, and was supposed to be by
this time at Fuente-Duena,' or Arganda. We
learned, likewise, that Sir Robert Wilson's corps
had reached Escalona, and that the enemy,
alarmed for their right, had detached a division to
occupy the Guadarama pass. Besides these heads
of information, there were several others commu-
nicated to us here, on aH of which we were not
disposed to place implicit reliance. One went to
state that Joseph had evacuated Madrid, and was
concentrating all the force which he was able to
collect upon Burgos; another, ihat the French
nation was weary of the war, and that tbe French
troops would shortly be withdrawn from Spain.
The last rumour was more feasible than either of
the preceding, and we saw good reason to credit
it, namely-that Sebastiani's corps had never
formed a junction with Victor at an; and the
inference was not ah unfaÍr one, that he found
ample occupation in La Mancha.




400 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER XVI.


Cuesta follows the Frcnch, who turn upon and drive him back
in confusion--Battle of Talavera-Sutferings of the British
army after the action, and its consequent retreat towards
Portugal. .


WHILST Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Talavera,
sending two divisions under General Sherbrooke
to Casa Leguas, across the river, Cuesta followed
close upon the steps of the French army. The
latter, however, were not, as the old man fondly
believed them to be, in full retreat, but were
merely falling back upon a point, where they knew
that reinforcements would meet them; for an
our information respecting Sebastiani and J oseph
proved to be erroneous. Sebastiani was now in
Toledo, from whence, leaving three thousand men
to garrison the place, he set out to meet Victor ;
and Joseph and Jourdan, having formed a junction,
were also hastening to support him.




PENINSULA R W A IL 401


The junction of these several corps. d'armée took
place at Torrejos; and the total amount of the
force thus brought together, fell little, if at aH,
short of fifty thousand meno S'uch, at least, were
the statements of the prisoners who afterwards
carne into our hands. As soon as this was effected,
Victor wheeled round, and attacking Cuesta's ad-
vanee, whieh had proeeeded as far as Olalla, drove
it baek upon the main body, and eompelled the
whole to retreat with precipitation to the plain,
between the position which the Freneh had for-
merly oecupied, and the Alberche. The retreat
was condueted with extreme disorder, and must
have led to the total rout of the Spaniards, had not
General Sherbrooke, with the division on the left;
protected them. But this he did effectually, an.:)
then withdrew oVer the ford into the camp at
Talávera, leaving General Mackenzie's division to
keep possession of a convent and wood, on the
right bank of the Alberche.


Sueh was the state of our affairs on the evening
of the 26th, and itwas eertainly not of the most
promising nature; for Cuesta lay upon a river,
¡nto which, in ease of defeat, he must be driven ;
and he appeared to be making no arrangements
whatever to meet the attack, with which he eould
not doubt that he was threatened. By one of
those happy expedients, however, to which quick-
sighted mortal s can alone have recourse, both the


VOL. r. 2 e




402 NARRATIVE OF THE


Spanish and ·British divisions were extricatedfrom
their difficultieB" and placed, during the following
day, in an extremely advantageous position. Sir
Arthur Wellesley had, for sorne time,. been ex-
amining, with an eagle's glance, the countryabout
Talavera, and he suddenly selected ground, of
which no one except himself had taken notice, but
to the excell'ence of which future events bore
ample testimony. Bere he determined to draw
up the armies; and he took his measures with
su eh promptitude, and issued his orders with so
mueh coolness and perspicuity, that every' bat-
talion, Spanish as well as English, stepped into
the very spot which his admirable foresight had
marked out for it. The following is a sketch of
the dispositions which were thus effected :-


The town of Talavera is situated upon the
northern bank of the Tagus, and extends so cIosely
to the river's edge,. that there is hardly any space
left vacant between the buildings and the water.
In front, and lying slightly to the left, there is
a small but commanding height, upon which a
heavy Spanish battery was constructed, and which
constituted a point d'appui to the right of the
Spanish army; for the twó armies were drawn up
in ane continuous line, ofwhich the English held
the left, and the Spaniards the right. Our people
extended from the town to the mountains of Tala-
vera ~ which form part of the Sierra de Gata, and




PENINSULA R WAR 4<)3


running parallel to the Madrid road, enclose, on
one side, the vale of Plasencia. The extreme left
took post upon a bold height in thedirection of
Alataza de Segusella, protected in front qy a
ravine, and flanked by a deep valley, on the oppo~
site side of which the mountains rose again in
increased altitude, and swept away in one uniform
lineo The Spanish troops, on the other hand,
were arranged among sorne olive groves, and
along a road, the embankment of which supplíed
them with an excellent parapet, and rested their
left upon a little hill distant about two miles from
Talavera. A portion of their cavalry was sta~
tioned here, so as to support their left; and
Zara's van kept possession of the rising ground.


Upon that height our right likewlse leaned.
A strong redoubt had been begun, for the purpose
of increasing itsdefensibility; but it was not yet
sufficiently advanced to add much to the security
of the troops who happened to be in position there.
These consisted of the fourth division under Ge-
neral Campbell, next to whom carne the guards ;
which, again, ~ere succeeded in the alignment by
General Came"ron's brigade and the Germans, as
these were by General Mackenzie's and General
Hill's. The last-named division held the extreme
left of aH. Posted on a sharp rising but corn-
manding eminence, two brigades ofBritish ca~
valry, one heavy and oue líght, were in the valley




404 N A RItA TIVE OF TIlE


on the left of this height: one brigade, under
General Cotton, took post on the right, in rear
of Campbell's division; and the Duke of Albu-
querque, with a cloud ofSpanish horse, supported
our cavalry on the left. Such was the general
arrangement for the occupation of the defensive
position, which the allied armies were commanded
to take up; and at an early hour on the morning
of the 27th, they began to move into it.


The greater part of the movements had been
made without annoyance, and an appeareu -to be
going on as we could have wished, when about
noon General Mackenzie's division was suddenly
attacked at the convent and wood on the right
bank of the Alberche, by two strong columns of
the enemy. They carne on so suddenly, and with
such impetuosity, as to throw the 87th and 88th
regiments into sorne confusion; and when Sir
Arthur Wellesley reached the ground, they had
succeeded, to a certain extent, in penetrating be-
tween the two brigades of which Mackenzie's di-
vision was composed. The consequence was,
that, for sorne little time, we were unable to dis-
cover the position which one of these brigades had
taken up, and it-required great exertion, on the
part of every officer present, to restore order.
At last, however, the 31st and 45th, supported by
the 60th regiment, were got in hand, and they
covered the falling back of theother regiments in




PENINsULAR W AR. 405


fine style, from the wood into the plain. Here
the cavalry were in readiness to support them;
and frQm that moment a regular and well-con-
ducted retreat began, which was continued, lei-
surely and orderly along the heights, towards the
left of the position which the army had been
directed to seize.


The enemy, nothing daunted by the steadiness
of our people, continued to press on; and a par-
tial action ensued along the whole front of the
lineo Towards everüng it became more serious.
The enemy appearing then to observe the great
importance of the height upon which the left of
our army rested, made a desperate effort to pos-
sess himself of it. He formed his infantry into
close columns of battalions, and, covered by a
tremendous cannonade, advanced at doublequick
pace to the assault. General Mackenzie's divi-
sion having been withdrawn somewhat to the
rear, and forming at this moment in the second
line, the attack was met by part only of General
Hill's division; but they proved themselves quite
adequate to the task. The 48th, the 1st batta-
lion of detachments, and the 29th pouring in a
volley, rushed forward with the bayonet; and
three companies of the latter gallant corps Grove
the enemy from the very ridge to which they had
attained. - It was a splendid charge; and it was
one, upon the issues of which much might have




406 NARRATlVE 010' 'fUE


hung; for had the heíght in question been car-
ried, the strength of our position became at once
exposed. It was not, however r made without a
heavy 108s to the brave troops engaged; for the
enemy fought nobly; and we had to lament, when
darkness put an end to the contest, about eight
hundred i~ killed and wounded, among whom
were several very valuable officers.


We lay all night upon our arms in momentary
expectation of an attack, the cavalry resting beside
their horses, and the infantry on the ground which
they had occupied during the day; but no attack
was made. N o great while elapsed, however,
after the dawn appeared, ere the enemy once more
put themselves Ín motion. The height upon our
-left was still the grand object of their desire; and
that they prepared to storm with all the force
which they found it practicable to bring against it.


At five o'c!ock on the morning of the 28th, two
~trong columns of chosen troops, the grenadiers of
Lapisse's division~ were formed in front of the
height in question. The formation was marked
by a furious cannonade, under cover of which the
columns pressed forward; and desperate and nume-
rous were the efforts which they made to render
themselves masters of the summit. But nothing
could exceed the gallantry and steadiness of the
brave men who opposed them. The brigades of
General Tilson and R. Stewart were' here; they




l'ENINSULAlt W Alt. 407


permitted the enemy, again and again, to arrive
within a few paces of the ridge, and they drove
them back in admirable style with the bayonet,
ti11, disheartened by so many repulses, they at last
retreated altogether, leaving the ground covered
with their dead. Had our cavalry been at this
moment sufficiently forward in the p]ain and val-
ley, they might have produced a terrible impres-
siol1 upon these fugitives; for the enemy retired in
great confusion; and opportunities of making
charges occurred, such as could not have been by
any possibility overlooked; but, unfortunately,
they were too far in the rearo The broken mass~s
were thus enabled to reform themselves, and to
withdraw, in something like order, within their
lines.


The fighting had been mahItained, without any
intermission, from five in the morning till half-past
eight, and the slaughter on both sides was terrible;
but the enemy's loss in killed and wounded ex-
ceeded ours greatly; and, which was not less in
our favour, his troopsappeared dispirited and dis-
mayed. They made no further movement during
the next three hours, and the sound of firing ceased
to be_ heard throughout the field. At this juncture
it was a question with us whether we should ad-
vanee, and in our turn become the assailants, 01'
remain quietly where we were, and await the re-
sult of the enemy's deliberations. lt was a fortu-




408 NARHA'fIVE OF THJ;;


nate circumstance that Sil' Arthur Wellesley
determined on following the latter of these courses,
for about half-past eleven several heavyclouds of
dust were discerned,announcing the approach of
the French army to a renewed attack upon diffe-
rent points in our lineo They had now fully
ascertained the exact station which the English
army occupied, and rightly judging, that if it were
shaken, the Spaniards would· faH an easy prey,
they made ready to bear down upon us with the
whole weight of theír force. Four distinct columns,
each strongly supported by artillery and cavalry,
carne on;. the first against that part of the line
where the British and Spanish troops joined; the
second against the guards and Cameron's brigade ;
the third against the Germans and Mackenzie's
division; whilst the fourth, escorted by a mass of
cavalry, moved up the valley on the left of Gene-
ral Hill's station. It may be necessary to observe
here, that General Hill, having received asevere
wound in the early part of the morning, quitted
the field; and that the command of the troops
which occupied the often-contested height, had de-
volved, in consequence, upon General Tilson.


The advance of French columns is invariably
announced by a general fire of artillery throughout
the whole extent of their position; and the
ordinary custom was not omitted on the present
occaSlOn. A murderous. cannonade spread havoc




PENINSULAR WAIL 409


among our ranks, whilst the attacking parties,
covered as usual by clouds of tirailleurs, pressed
forward with the gi'eatest firmness and regularity.
Our people had received instructions to reserve
their fire till the enemy should have arrived within
a few yards of them, and giving it with effect, to
bring the bayonet immediately into play. They
obeyed these orders to the letter. The heads of
the enemy's columns were close upon our line
before a musket was discharged, and then one
volley was given with a degree of precision which
must have astonished those against whom it was
directed. A conflict now ensued, more desperate,
beca use more completely hand to hand, than pos-
sibly the annals of modern warfare ever recorded.
General Campbell's division, on the right, not
only repelled the attacking column, but rushing
on "them when broken by its fire, drove them be-
fore it in gaIlant style; and charging a battery,
from which it suffered severely, took, at the point
of the bayonet, thirteen pieces of cannon. The
enemy, however, were veteran troops, accustomed
to be broken, and to recover their ranks again;
and as our soldiers could not ven tu re very far in
pursuit, lest by so doing they should expose their
eomrades, the fugitives were enabled to rally, and
to resume the offensive. What might have been
the conseq uence of a renewed assault, it were a
hard matter to sayo The captured guns, at all




410 NARHATlVE Ol' THE


events, would have beenprobably recovered; but
just as the French were preparing to rush for-
ward, they were taken in flank by a regiment of
Spanish cavalry, and again overthrown.


In the mean while, the second and third of the
French columns, reckoning from their left, bore
their fuIl weight upon our centre, and made a
desperate effort to pierce it. They were met and
beaten back with the same gallantry which marked
the oppositioñ of General CampbelI's corps; but
the guards, eager to ernulate the example of the
7th and 53rd regiments, pushed on, unfortunately
sornewhat too far, in pursuit. The enemy were
not slow to take advantage of this. Observing a
chasm in our line, they threw in a trernendous
and most galling fire upon the Gerrnans, who, for
an instant, were in confusion. Here the battle
was, for sorne minutes, most obstinate, and victory
doubtful; for the enemy's right colurnn had with-
stood and repulsed a charge from Anson's light
brigade of cavalry; and had he prornptly availed
himself of the advantage thereby obtained, a
different result might, perhaps, have occurred
frorn that which crowned tbe operalÍons of this
glorious day. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, who
was everywhere, saw how matters stood. He
ordered up the 48th, which had be en in reserve,
to support the broken Germans, and to cover the
retrogade movernent of the guards; and that regi-




PENINSULAR WAIL 411


ment, by its steadiness and good conduct, re-
trieved the disorder in this part of the lineo The
Germans were speedily brought back to their
standards; General Sherbrooke succeeded in re-
forming the guards; and the French were beaten
back, with terrible slaughter, from every point
which they had assailed.


At this moment our troops were successful in all
parts of the field, and it needed but a forward·
movement on the part of the Spaniards, to render
the victory of 'l'alavera as decisive as any upon
record. Had it been possible to bring them up
from the right of their line, so as to have gained,
by a rapid march upon the Alberche, the enemy's
flanks, one-half of the French army must have
been sacrificed. But unfortunately this could not
be done. The Spaniards, miserably disciplined,
and totally unaccustomed to change their forma-
tion in the face of an enemy, were quite immove-
. able; there they stood, as they had been origi-
nally drawll up; alld to attempt any mallurevre,
however simple, would have served on]y to throw
them into confusion, without beillg productive of
any good effect. The cOllsequence was, that the
enemy were enabled to commence and to continue
their retreat in excellent order, carrying off with
them much of their artillery, the whole of their
wounded, and the greater part of their materieI.
We could not venture to follow far, because evell




412 NARRATIVE OF THE


yet they more than doubled us in numbers; and
they escaped in better plight than usually attends
an arrny which has suffered a repulse so decided
and so bloody.


The los s of the British army in this action was
very severe, and it was occasioned chiefly by the
murderous and overwhelming fire of the French
artillery. From that, several regiments, which
can hardly be said to have been personallyen-
gaged at aH, suffered nearly as much as others
which bore the brunt of the contesto Out of nine-
teen thousand men, which formed the whole of
our effective force when the battle began, upwards
of four thousand were either killed or wounded ;
and among them were many officers, whose ser-
vices, at a juncture like the present, could ill be
spared. Generals Mackenzie, Hill, and R. Camp-
bel1, were wounded, and placed ho1's de combato
Brigade-majo1' Beckett, an excellent officer, at-
tached to the guards, together with Majors For-
dyce and Gardiner, were among the killed. With
respect to the enemy, it was not easy to form an
accurate notion, but their 10ss must have exceeded
oursby at least one third. Many rated it higher ;
but none below this' amount. The Spaniards suf-
fered but little, as few of their corps chanced to be
engaged; but it is no more than justice to state,
that the little which they had to perform aere,
they performed well. Sorne artillery, which they




PENINSULAR WAR. 413


had upon our left, was excellently served; and
their cava1ry regiment, called the King's, charged
gallantly.' It is likewise but faír to record, that
they were in raptures with liS and our behaviour ;
and that they decIared, with all the cIamorous
eIoquenceof their country, that those who spoke
of the British as less capabIe of fighting by land
than at sea, lied in their throats!! !


We bivouacked that night upon the fieId of bat-
tle, having removed our wounded into Talavera,
and estabIished there an extensive hospital; and,
on the following morning, we were joined by Ge-
neral Crawford's brigade from I_isbon, consisting
of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. Had it
arrived only a few hours earlier, more might per-
haps have been done; but it came in at a moment
when our successes were not sufficient to reconcile
us to our position; for we were in a sta te bor-
dering on want. N othing had been done, and
nothing seemed about to be done, by Cuesta or
the Spanlsh government, to afford us supplies:
our bread was a11 expended; and cattle, which
hitherto had been found in abundance, were now
become scarce. Add to this, that the enemy still
showed troops upon the left of the Alberche; and
that the Spaniards, afraid to approach them unless
we were at their side, crowded still upon us, and
drained the country of everything. N or was this
aH. Whilst it was yet doubtful whether Venegas




414 NAHRATIVE OY 'filE


had reached Aranjuez, a corps of French troops
was reported to have advanced from Alba de Tor-
mes as far as the pass of Banios, on the road to
Plasencia, with the design of cutting us off from
our communications with Portugal. Sir Ro-
bert Wilsol1, also, had fallen back from Escalona,
and was close upon our 1eft. In a word, though
we had won a great victory, our situation was only
so far improved, that we were for the moment free
from an overwhelming force in our front; but we
were in the midst of difficulties, nevertheless, from
which nothing but some prompt and vigorous
movement . would deliver uso The mind of our
General was, however, as we well knew, full of
resources; and though most of us saw our embar-
rassments clearly enough, there was not an indivi-
dual in the army who entertained a doubt, that his
talent and decision would, in due time, overcome
and disperse them.


During the 30th and 31st, all things remained as
they had done, except that the enemy disappeared
entireIy from before us, and our wants became
every day more and more urgent. The utmos(
exertions of our cornrnissariat were unabIe to pro-
cure even a moderate suppIy of bread, and the
meat was hard1y in greater abundance. Rumours,
likewise, of SouIt's approach from the north, be-
carne every hour more and more frequent; nor
couId all the hopes which we persisted in cherish-




PENINSULAR WAR. 415


ing, that Venegas must have g'ot well round to the
right of Madrid, suffice to allay entirely the ap-
prehensions which that reported movement created.
At 1ast, on the 1st and 2nd óf August, authentic
intelligence reached us, that from Venegas we had
nothing to expect; for that Soult, having carried
the pass of Banios, which a corps of Spaniards
under the Marquis del Reyno had been appointed
to keep, but which they had deserted almost
without striking a b10w, was already jn, Plasencia.
He entered that town, in fact, on the 1st; and
having been reinforced from Salamanca, 01' during
his march from the northward, and supplied with
artilleryand stores from Madrid, he appeared there
at the head of fourteen thousand men, inferior, in
point of equipment, to no portion of the French
army. This was a startling piece of news, and
required that sorne measure should, on our parts,
be promptly devised; and Sir Arthur Wellesley
lost no time in seeking a conference with Cuesta,
for the purpose of determining of what nature that
measure ought to be.


On the present occasion, Cuestasuggested that
the British army should be divided; that one-half
should proceed with a portio n of his troops against
Soult; and the other haIf, with the remainder of
the Spaniards, goforward in pursuit of Victor.
To this proposition Sir Arthur Wellesley would on
no account agree, declaring that a11 idea of di..,




41G NARRATIVF. OF THE


viding the British force was preposterous; but he
proposed, in his turn, to· rnarch with the entire
British arrny against Soult, provided Cuesta would
rernain at Talavera, and secure his real'. Cuesta
consented to that arrangernent; and our troops, in
consequence, rnarched back upon the 3rd frorn Ta-
lavera to Oropesa. But we had hardly taken our
ground, when advices arrived frorn Cuesta, to state
that he had intercepted a friar who was carrying
despatches both frorn Marshal Jourdan and King
Joseph, addressed to Soult. In the former, an ex-
ceedingly accurate and precise detail was given,
not only of our force, but of all our previous inten-
tioos up to the 28th; a species of knowledge
which could have been obtained only by treachery
in sorne quarter 01' aoother; whilst a narrative of
the late battle was added, which, for the story of
a Frenchrnan, exhibited wonderfully few devia-
tions from the truth. The latter contained orders
to "Marshal Soult, to press forward with aH dili-
gene e upon us, assuring him that his rnovernent
must cause a separation of the British from the
Spanish forces; that he would be supported by
Mar!lhal N ey, who had be en directed to pursue his
line of march from Castile; and that, whilst they
marched upon our flank, Joseph would again act
on the offensive, and threaten our front. lt was
added that Joseph had, in the mean while, placed
his force in a central situation abont Barga, near




PENINSULAR WAR. 41,


Torrejos, so as at once to keep Venegas in check,
and to arrest any advance which we might ende a-
vour to make irnmediately from Talavera.


Frorn the tenor of these letters, it was easy to
perceive that what had formerIy been surmised
respecting Venegas was correct, and that, instead
of pushing briskly, as he had been directed to do,
upon Fuente-Duena and Arganda, he had become
alarmed for the safety of Seville, and had moved
towards Toledo and Aranjuez. By this injudicious
movement, he enabled the enemy, with their forces
united, to keep both Spanish corps in check. Cu-
esta was dreadfully alarmed at the information.
He gave orders for the irnrnediate evacuation of
Talavera, and made ready to follow our march tQ
Oropesa without a moment's del ay, though aware
that he must thereby sacrifice the whole of our
wounded, and that too when no enemy was in
sight. Tbis was a most galling arrangement to us,
and it cut us the more deeply, that the old Spa-
niard, though literally encumbered with cars and
waggons, refused to spare usmore than seven for
the transportation of the bI'ave men who had
fought and bled for his country. The abandon~
ment ofthe town was, as may be imagined, a most
heart-rending scene. Such of our poor soldiers as
we.re in a condition to move at aH, craw]ed after
us, some still bleeding, and many more with their
wounds open and undressed; whilst those wbose


VOL. T. 2 D




418 NAltRATIVE OF THE


hufts were too severe to permit of this, lay upon
their pallets, ~and implored their comrades not to
desert them. By indefatigable exertions, and by
sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, Sir Arthur
Wellesley got together forty cars, which enabled
lIS to bring forward in all about two thousand men ;
but there were still sorne hundreds left behind, aH
of whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity or ho-
nour, might have been preserved. The reader will
easily believe that such 'a scene, added to the ex-
treme distress which scarcity of provisions occa-
sioned, cast a damp upon our spirits which we had
not anticipated, and which certainly ought not to
have been the consequence ofa victory hardly won
indeed, but singularIy splendid.


As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley was rnade
acquainted with Cuesta's determinations, he re-
monstrated in strong terrns against the iro policy
and cruelty of the measure; but his remonstrances
were disregarded. During the night uf the 3rd,
the Spaniards carne pouring in upon us like a
flock of sheep; and a scene of noise and confu-
sion ensued, of which no words could conveyan
adequate conception. At the same moment intel-
ligence arrived, that Soult had passed the Teitar,
and that his advanced-guard was alreadyentering
N aval Moral. The bridge, of Almaraz . JIlust,
therefore, be either destroyed by the Spanish pea-
sants, or in the hands of the enemy; and hence




PENINSULAR WAR. 419


we were reduced to the alternative, either of
fighting our way through Soult's corps~ or of
returning over the bridge of Arzobispo, and taking
up the line of the Tagus. Sir Arthur Wellesley
gave to each aspect of affairs a due portion oi'
consideration. He felt, that should he determirie
to advance ágainst Soult, he might,. from the
nature of the country, and the facilities which the
line 'of the Teitar afforded to an army on the
defensive, be kept, in spite of his utmost exer-
!ions, in play, till Ney had arrived with his corps,
and J oseph and Victor were again able to come
on. Nor was this the on;ly risk which he rano
Should he not succeed in forcing his way to
Plasencia, his circumstances would become despe-
rate indeed; for the destruction of the bridge
at Almaraz, which was now fully ascertained to
have taken place, deprived him of all means oC
crossing the Tagus; and a retreat, in case of
disaster, became, in consequence, extr-emely pre-
carious. These were contingencies of grave and
serious aspectj but they were not the only consí-
derations whieh served to guide him. By suhse ..
quent accounts, it appeared that the enemy were
pushing by La Calzada upon the Arzobispo
bridge; there was, therefore, no room 1eft for
hesitation, nor a moment to spare in matúring and
acting upon sorne decision.


The greater part of the Spanish army arrived at




420 N A1UtAT1VE 01' THE


Oropesa during the night of the 3rd; but itwas
the rnorning of the 4 th before Cuesta hirnself carne
in. Sir Arthur Wellesley instantly waited. upon:
him, for the purpose of stating his views as to the
line of conduct which it behoved us to pursue.
He represented to hirn, that situated as the allies
now were, with a French force hurrying forward
to surround thern on every side, and destitute of
all rneans of subsistence,except the little which,
frorn day today, ffiight be collected in an ex-
hausted country, the only step which they could
venture, in cornrnon prudence, to take, was to
assurne the line of the Tagus, and to rernain there
in a defensive position, till stores could be col-
lected, and sorne prospect of acting on the offen-
sive, more attractive than was now before them,
could be discovered. Cuesta, however, whose
fears had driven hirn to evacuate Talavera, to
sacrifice our wounded, and to leave the way open
for Victor's arrny, was now stoutly opposed to
every proposal which had a retreat for its object.
He was satisfied that a second battle would end
quite as advantageously for us as the first ; and he
gave his voice decidedly for risking it. It was
useless to rernind . him that the physical strength
of men, to whom no provisions could be supplied,
would not suffice to carry thern through the toils
of a. long action; and that, if we did fight, we
should fight under all the disadvantages of a state




PENINSULAR WAR. 421


of utter· and deplorable exhaustion. He would
listen to no arguments of the kind, till at last,
perceiving that argument was thrown away, Sir
Arthur Wellesley assumed á higher tone. He
told him plainly, that whatever the Spaniards
might resol ve upon doing, he would not sacrifice
the arrny of which he was in command; and he
left him, to issue orders for an immediate march
towards Arzobispo. The orders were promptly
obeyed; and we· passed the bridge just as the
enemy's patrols began to appear in sight.


The path which leads from Arzobispo, through
.the pass of Mesa d'Ibor, into the great road from
Almaraz to Truxillo, Merida, and Badajoz, had
been represented to us as wholly impassable for
artillery. We found it extremely bad, no doubt;
but we nevertheless contri ved to drag our guns
alóng, and by dint of extraordinary exertions,
reaehed Toralida among the mountains, on the
5th. We remained there only during the night,
and resting at Mesa d'Ibor on the 6th, we carne
in, on the 7th, to Deleitosa. Here a halt took
place during two daJ s, of which the troops stood
greatly in need; for though our journeys had not
·been remarkable for their length, they had been
accomplished in the face of numerous and severe
difficulties. In the first place, no bread had been
issued out from the commencement to the close of
our march, and the men had tasted none for three




422 N ARRATIVE OF THE


whole days. This, of itself, was suffiCient to wear
out their strength; but, besides suffering from
hunger, they had a rough, and ofien precipitous
track to follow; and they travelled through a
district everywhere laid waste, and deficient in all
the necessary articles, either for sheIter or sup-
port. The season of the year was, indeed, in our
favour, the weather happening tú be remarkably
temperate; and it was well that the case proved
so; ror h~d winter overtaken us, circumstanced
as we then were, it would have been a hard task
to foretell the probable consequences. As if for-
tune, too,had determined to try our patience in
every possible way, we were scarcely settled in
Deleitosa, when intelligence of the overthrow of
Austria reached uso It was communicated from
Seville, through our ambassador Lord Wellesley,
and no doubts could be entertained as to its au-
thenticity. The reader will readily believe that
news so afHicting carne with doubIe weight upon
men already beginning to lose heart iñ conse;..
quen'ce of their own sufferings and reverses; and
that not a few of the most desponding amongst us
looked upon affairs as despeTate, and all chance
of successful resistan ce to French power as ab-
solutely taken away.


No such sentiments, however, found a home in
the breast of Sir Arthur Wellesley. He saw and
felt the' difficulties of his situation keenly enough ;




I'ENINSULAR '" AR; 423


perpIexed as he was by being kept a good deal in
the dark as to the steps which the enemy were
preparing to take~ and harassed and annoyed by
the continued supineness of ihe Spanish autho-
rities; but he was far from regarding the game as
lost. On the contrary, he spoke and actedon all
public occasions asif events were taking the very
Course whichhe had expected them to take; and
he satisfied every one~ either that he had providedt
or that he was perfectly competent to provide,
against any aecident or contingency which might
chance to occur. Our principal danger arose from
the. side of Plasencia. Were Soult, whose force
was now ascertained to faIl littleshort of twenty-
five or thirty thousand roen, and who was _ well
known to hold the Spaniards in soyereign con-
tempt, to push upon Portugal, by way of Coria,
andthe othef towns which we had passed in our
advance, then shQuld we hethrown into circum-
stances of great embarrassment; for his line of
march -would, in this case, be shorter than any
which we could take, and he might reach Lisbon
before uso Butwe eotertained sanguine hopes
that Marshal Beresford, of whose junction with
the puke de la Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo we
were informed, must, by this time, he sufficientIy
advanced to. intercept the movement; and Sir
Arthur invariably caused it to appear, that for such
hopes there were amplegrounds. Nevertheless, it




424 NARRATIVE OF THE


was gene rally felt, that ifhe intended to look ex-
c1usively to the defence of Portu'gal, the sooner he
took up a line for that purpose the better. On
Cuesta and the Spaniards, it was evident enough
that no further reliance could be placed; there
were around us, at present, no means of subsis-
tence; our' communications from every quarter
were either entirely interrupted, or at best very
uncertain; and, aboye all, sickness raged amongst
us. Our effective strength, including General
Cniwford's division, was reduced at this period to
seventeen thousand meno Where so many re a-
sons existed for the adoption of a defensive sys-
tem, there was little doubt that it would be adopt-
ed by him, who was so competent to judge of its
fitness; and they who entertained this expecta-
tion were not disappointed.


1 have alluded aboye to the supineness of the
Spanish authorities, and the unsatisfactory rela-
tions in which our intercourse with the civil go-
vernment at Seville stood, amply exemplified as it
was by the arduous task which Lord Wellesley had
to perform in the position in which he was placed,
and fully borne out by the voluminous and con-
stant correspondence that was kept up at this
time between the two brothers. Jt is not my
province, however, to enter further into those cir-
cumstances than to state that our chief was not
ony caBed upon to consider every military point




PENINSULAR WAR. 425


as connected with his arrny, but that every civil
arrangernent in the Peninsula was submitted to
him; and hence he cornmenced that early practice
of universality of reflection and decision, to which.
for reasons in the hands of Providence, he seerns
especiaI1y to have been designed.




426 NAItRA'l'IVE" OF THE


CHAPTER XVII.


Defeat of Cuesta's army at the bridge of Arzobispo-Victor
enters Talavera-Sir Robert Wilson's corps worsted at the
Puerto de Banios-Sir Arthur Wellesley takes up the line
of the Tagus--Cuesta is superscded, and General Eguia
succeeds to the command ofthe Spanish army-Distresses of
the British army, and extraordinary conduct of Eguia and
the Spanish government-Sir Artbur WeUesley retires upon
the Guadiana-General Arrezaga defeated at Ocana, and


, the Duke del Parque at Pamarue-Successes of the French
in Andalusia-FaU of Gerona and Astorga-Massena as·
sumes the command in the Peninsula-The British arIO y
moves towards Almeida, leaving General Hill's corps at
Abrantes-Comparative strength ofthe opposing armies, and
mutual preparatiolls for the campaign.


W E resumed our march on the morning of the
11th, and arrived that day at Jaraicejo, a place
distant about three leagues from the former posi-
tion. Here we paused for sorne time, sendingthe
cavalryas far to the rear as TruxilIo, and occu-
pying Almaraz and the Puerto de, Miravete with




PENINSULAR W AR. 427


two divisions; but the head-quarters \Vere- estah-
lished in J araicejo, and the main body of the army
cantoned in the villages round. To oprselves
nothing occurred, whilst we.reIhained here, deserv-
ing of particular notice; but a variety of events,
more or Iess important, were going on elsewhere;
and of these, as they were reported to US, and~
generalIy speaking, truly reported, it may not be
amlss if 1 subjoin a brief outline.


The . first rumour which reached US, was of a
defeat which the Spanish anny had sustained,
on the 8th, at the bridge of Arzobispo. It ap-
peared that Cuesta, having fortified the bridge,
alld leaving two divisions of infantry, withone of
cavalry, under the Duke of Albuquerque, to de-
fend it, returned, in the night of the 7th, to Para-
leda de Garben, where better facilities for housing
and covering his troops existed. He had scarcely
departed, when the enemy appeared in force UPO!!
the opposite bank, and employed themselves,
totálly disregarded by the garrison of ,Arzobispo,
in 8earching for a ford. This they 8ucceeded in
discovering, about two or three hundred· yardE!
aboye the barricade, and they sent over a column
of cavalry, supported by infantry, which, falJing
upon the Spaniards during the heat of the day,
took them wholly by surprise. They were put to
the rout in a- moment, with the 108s of twelve
pieces of cannon; and had the French füllowed




428 NARRATIVE OF THE


with the vigour 'which usually characterised thero,
the Spanish arroy musthave been entirely dis-
persed. Cuesta, however, finding that he was not
pursued, succeeded in rallying his men, and then
retreated into the pass of the Mesa d'Ibor, where,
upon ground partaking as much of the nature of


, impregnability as it is easy to conceive, he took
up a position.


With respect to the enerny, again, it was under-
stood that Victor had entered Talavera, where he
behaved with the utmost humanity and kindness
to our wounded; whilst the arroies from the north
were surmised, rather than accurately known, to


- have retrograded upon Plasencia. Of the exact
posture of the latter we were, however, ignorant.
We knew only that they had not appeared, at
least in force, in the vicinity of Coria, though seve-
ral plundering and foraging parties had arrived
there; whilst a corps of five or six thousand men
Was fulIy ascertained to keep its station still in
Plasencia. But we ascertained, at the same time,
that a division had moved back as far as the
Puerto de Banios, with a view to intercept Sir
Robert Wilson. This officer, it may be necessary
to state, had fallen in from Escalona, some time
ago, upon our left. When we began our retreat
towards Arzobispo, there were no opportunities of
cornmunicating with him, or drawing him off at
the inst-ant; and he had now penetrated in pursuit




PENINSULAR WAR. 429


of us, to the Puerto de Banios,whither the French
corps has tened to attack hirn. Sir Robert Wilson
could neither decline the battle, nor very success-
fully maintain it. In artillery he was quite defi-
cient, the whole of his guns having accompanied
our train, and his men were considerably harassed
by repeated marches; but they offered a stout re-
sistance, and when at length they were forced to
yield, made good their retreat upon Ciudad Ro-
drigo. This they did, not as armies usually retreat,
in compact bodies, and covered by their skir-
mishers, but by utterly dispersing, and again uni-
ting at the particular point of rendezvous which,
previous to their rout, had be en deterrnined upon.


In the mean whíle Marshal Beresford, with his
Portuguese arrny, was in position at Zarza, whither
General Crawford, at the head of four British
regiments, hastened from Castello Branco to join
hirn. The Marshal was confident that he was
capable of arresting upon the frontier any French
corps which might attempt to penetrate into Por-
tugal; and that he could easily contrive to keep
it in play till we should be able too arrive, by way
of Abrantes, to his assistance. This assurance,
together with the absence of all immediate maní-
festations on the part of the enemy of a desigil to
advance beyond Plasencia, induced Sir Arthur
Wellesley not to relinquish with precipitation his
defen~ive line of the Tagus, but to remain quietIy




430 NARRA1'IVE OF 1'HE


inhis present attitude, untilthe progress of things
in other parts of the country should furnish him
with better reasons, either to advance or retire.
By acting thus, we still retained command of the
great road to Seville; and by keeping theenemy
in doubt touching our future intentions, we hin-
dered him from directing his undivided attention
to other points; whilst, at the same time, our re~
treat was secure, and an escape to the Spaniards
as far as Monasterio, was by no means imprac-
ticable.
- Matters were thus circumstanced, when the
recall of Cuesta from the command of his army
was announced. N otwithstanding the general
. confidence which appeared to be entertained in
his honest integrity, and devotion to the cause of
hiscountry, he had exhibited, of late, too many
proofs of incapacity to direct a campaign, to be
permitted any longer to fill his high situation.
He was superseded-though not with any marks
of ignominy; and the guidance of the troops de-
volved,as a matter of course, on General Eguia, the
next senior in rank. An idea had prevailed
amongst us, sometimes, that the command would
be conferred on Albuquerque; at other times,
that ii would be offered to Sir Arthur Wellesley ;
hut the surprise of the former at Arzobispowas
supposed to have stood in the way of one of
these arrangements; and to the other, the national




'PENINSULAR WAR. 431


pride of the Spaniárds opposed insuperáble ob-
stacles. Had the case not been so, and had such
an offer been actually made, Sir Arthur Wellesley
must have experienced consÍderable embarrass-
ment either in accepting or declining it: it was
probably quite as advantageous to the general
cause, as it was certainly much more agreeable to
the private feelings of our leader, that no such
difficnlty of choice was submitted to him.


During the first few days of our sojourn atJa-
raicejo, we were tolerably well supplied with bread;
and cattle being pJenty, we had' no cause to com-
pIain; but as no regular system of furnishing the
army had been entered into with the Spaniards,
this state of comparative abundance was not oÍ'
long continuance. The country immediate1y round,
from which all our necessaries were drawn, socm
becameexhausted, and we were again' reduced
to subsist upon a very scanty and uncertaiÍl allow-
ance. The forage for the horses, likewise, became
scarce, and many of them died in consequence.
In the means of transport, too, for OUf sick, our
wounded, and even Cor our ammuilition, we were
deflcient. N o horses, mules, or cars, were sent to
us, notwithstanding repeated and earnest requi~
sitions, till it became, at last, a questioÍl, whether;
in the event of a compu]sory movemeht, we should
not be under the necessity of abandoning aIl to the
enemy. Our sickness, moreover. was not di-




432 NARRATIVE OF THE


minished. The hospitals received fresh occupants
as fast as those who had previously filled them
returned to their duty; nor could we, by any
exertion, muster on parad e more than 1 have al-
ready specified as our effective force, namely-
seventeen thousand meno With respect to Cuesta's
or rather Eguia's army, again, aIl accounts agreed
in representing it as reduced to twenty thousand
firelocks, . and these rather diminishing than in-
creasing, But it was not in our own imrnediate
neighbourhood alone, that affairs began to assume,
every day, a more unpromising aspecto InteIli-
gence reached us, upon authority which we could
not dispute, that Venegas had suffered two great
defeats from Sebastiani, strengthened by two di-
visions from Victor's arrny; that the first occurred
at Aranjuez, on the 5th; the second on the 11th,
at Almoriand. The truth is, that the enemy, as
soon as he found that we had escaped hirn, coun-
termarched, with accumulated force, upon Vene-
gas; who, taken in sorne degree by surprise, was
beaten with heavy 10ss, and compelled to retreat
to Santa Cruz, in the mountains.


These circumstances, coupled with a persuasion,
that in case Venegas should be closely followed,
Eguia would be ordered by the junta to move to
his support, created in the minds of aH a thorough
conviction that our stay in the position of the
Tagus could not be very protracted. The COIl-~




PENINSULAR W Alt •. 433


templation of a retreat was not, however, a very
enlivening one, accompanied as it was with fears
for the safety of our hospitals; whilst the smallest
mishap upon the occurrence of which it was pos-
sible to calculate, consisted in the abandonment of
two 01" three brigades of artillery, and many stores.
To Sir Arthur WelIesley, in particular, such a
necessity could not but appear in colours the most
distressing; for he had adventured upon great
things by his forward movement; he had achieved
a great victory; and it was mortifyillg in the ex-
treme, to relinquish the hold which these gave
him upon the confidence of Europe. Yet, with
his means, how could he act? The handful of
troops whom he now commanded, was composed
of second battalions-of many youths,both officers·
and men, made certainly of different stuff, andin-
ferior in stamína, to those whom Sir John Moore
had Jed; indeed, the guards, the buffs, the 48th;
and 61st, with the light division which had 18.tely
joined under Crawford, were the only portions of
the anny which,· at other periods, would have
been regarded as fit ror active service .. Oí ihe
cavalry, again, it is impossible to speakin higher
terms. . They were dropping off daily; and both
men and horses suffered from sickness, to adegree
even moreappalling than that which befen tlle in-
fantry. 1 consider it as no reproach upon any
officerin the service, when 1 here record my con-


VOL. I. 2 E




434 NARRATIVE OF 'fUE


viction, that there was but one who did not abso-"
Iutely despair at this juncture-and that one was
Sir Arthur Wellesley. But Sir Arthur was far
from despairing; he had already declared his
conviction, that even in the event of Spain's sub-
version, Portugal could be defended. Into Portu-
gal he accordingly prepared to remove, where, in
comfortable cantonments, the health of his sick
might be restored, and the strength of his weary
and convalescents re-established.


That this resolution wasnot taken upon trivial
grounds, the slightest survey of the occurrences,
both political and mUitary, which distinguished
the latter months of 1809, will suffice to proveo
With respect to poli tic al transactions, the supine-
nessor treachery of the SupremeJunta became
every day more and more conspicuous; --and the
duplicity of all the authorities" with whom "we
were necessitated to confer, rose, at last, to a
height which nothing could justify. General
Eguia, full of professions, dec1ared over andover
again, that, let happenwhat might to his own
soldiers, the wants of the English should be made
good; and on" the very day, perhaps,on which
these assurances 'Yere "penned, he would permit
parties of his troops to seize and appropriate to
their ownuse, stores ofbiscuit,or other articlesof
food,. which had" been collected forour use, and
were on their wayto our cantonments. In per-




PENINSULAR '" AR •.


fect keeping with these transáctions,' we were' day
after day urged, both by him and by the Supreme
Junta, to' resume the offensive, whenall parties
knew that we possessed no' means whatever' of
transport, and when they refused to suppIy us
with any portion of the mules or draft anima]s, of
which they possessed so large a quantity, as to be
able to employ inany in dragging emptycars,
merely that theymight bereadyin case of any
unlooked-for emergency. From all these circum'"
starices no ground remained, for us to doubt that
the Spanish government were either imable oÍ' un.;;
willing to support us; and thattheywere per<.
fectly indifferent as ,towhat OUT fate might be;
provided some paltry' benefit might accrue .indivi-
dually to themseIves.


In a 'military point oí view, again, our I¡ttIe
army wal3 at this moment· threatened on all sides
by a force of full seventy thousand French troops;
and there was 'not a Spanish or Portuguese corps,
with the exception of that of Eguia, with which
we, werein communication. U po~ Eguia, how.;
ever, we could not'count, even for a momento "In
the first place, his troopswere of the very worst
déscription, undisciplined, unfriendly, arid' dis-
heartened by repeated reverses; and in the next
place we were aware that orders had cven thus
early reached him, to march for the support of
Venegas, taking us alongwith him, could he pre-'
vail upon us to move, but, in the event of our re-




436 NARRATIVE OF THE


fusal, proceeding without uso The enemy, too;
were reported to be making preparations for an
incursion into Portugal, by way of Ciudad Ro-
drigo and Almeida; and although Beresford had re-
pres~nted his own force as sufficient to deJay, ifnot
to obstruct, their progress, such a report, coming
in at such a moment, was not to be neglected.
AH. these causes combined to induce Lord Wel-
lington (for hehad by this time been raised to the
peerage by that title) to fall back; and he díd so
with the less reluctance, that he felt himself bet-
ter able to give support, even to the Spaniards,
from a position which promised to furnish, at least,
necessaries to his troops, than he could pretend to
do whiJst enduring all the miseries of sickness and
want at J araicejo,


. In pursuance of this determination, the army
broke up from its position on the 20th, and not
being harassed by any portion of the enemy's
force, made good its retrogression, in five marches,
by Truxillo, Meajadas, Medellin, and Merida,
upon Badajoz. Here, for the present, Lord Wel·
lington proposed to halt; and fue troops were
disposed in cantonments along the line of the Gua-
diana, in a position which at once se.cured their
further retreat, should it become necessary, upon
Lisbon; renewed their communications with Beres·
ford, .left open to them the meaos of advancing
again, at will, into Spain, and furnished tbem
abundantly with forage and provisions. But the




PENINSULAR WAR. 437


sickness which had raged so long, instead of aba-
ting, increased in violence, till before many weekli
had passed away, there were computed to be not
fewer than eight or nine thousand men in the hos-
pital. Severa,l causes, each of thero, perhaps,
sufficient of itself to produce the effect, were as-
signed for this inerease of sickness. By sorne it
was attributed, in no slight degree, to a sudde,n
change from a state of violent exertion to a state of
perfeet repose; by others, to the unripe fruit, ,in
which the troops too freely indulged; and by ,a
third party, to the malaria, or unhealthy fogs,
which, during the dry season, hang over the coun-
try in the vicinity of the Guadiana. Probably the
last was more conducive than either of the others,
to the resu1ts which we had so much cause to
deplore; but there can be little doubt that all
exérted their baneful inHuence over men, to whom
such things were new,and who, in consequence,
were more liable to suffer from them than either
the natives of the country, or troops better sea ..
sonedagainst hardships and relaxation.


The army remained here, notwithstanding the
inconveniences to which' it was subjected, till to-
wards the middle of December. Though both its
own sufferings, and the condition of the Spanish
provinces, precluded all hope that a forward move-
ment could be attempted, ,Lord Wellington, was
extremely unwilling to withdraw entirely from the




438 . NAltRATIVE OF. THE


vicinity oí the- seat of war; and he was desirous,
at the sametime, that the resources ofthe district,
upon which he foresaw that in the end he must
needs retire, should not be wasted and impaired
by a . premature arrival of his army. But though
the troops continued without occupation aH this
while, the case was widely different with respect
to their commander. The entire season of rest
was' devoted by him to continual exertions, both
for the' advancement of the discipline and efficiency
of the Portuguese levies, and to infuse, if it were
possible, something like wisdom andvigour ¡nto
the councils of the Spanish government; whilst·he
wasquietly preparing, in his own rear, measures
for the construction of that stupendous lioe of
works, which :more than once baffied the efforts of
the French arrnies, and proved the salvation ofthe'
Peninsula .
. In the mean while the Spaniards, with their
accustomed want of prudence and discretion, were
rushing at all poiots into collision with the enemy,
and were in all paints suffering defeat. Eguia
had not filled his new office many days, when,
leaving Albuquerque with ten or twelve thousand
mén towatch the banks of the Tagus~ aod straiten
the French foraging parties there, he hurried
away to the support of Venegas, of whose reverses
llotice. has already be en taken. Venegas, how-
ever, was already superseded. and General Arre-




:PENINSULAR WAR. 439


zaga comrnanded in his stead. He was an im-
petuous and rash officer; who finding himself, on
the :arrival of Eguia, at the head of fifty thousand
men, weakly conceived. that . no French. army
would. be able to make head against him. In the
misplaced confidence which anirnated their leader,
the Spanish troops largely partook; they required
to be led immediately to battle, and they spoke of
bririging back the junta, in a few days to hold its
sittings in Madrid. . Arrezaga hastened to comply
with their wishes. He led his columns forward
to, the plains of Ocana, near Aranjuez, where he
was attackedby Marshal Mortier, at the head of
his own and Sebastiani's corps, and defeated with
terrible 10ss. . The enemy boasted of having taken
twenty thousa~d prisoners, and represented the
number of slain at four thousand: probably these
were exaggerations; .but that the Spanish army
was annihilated, admitted of no doubt.
_ This disaster took place upon the 17th of N 0-
vember; it was succeeded by another hardly less
ruinous; which occurred in a different part of the
country, on the 28th of the same month.· The
Duke del Parque, at the head of a corps of sorne
twenty thousand rnen, had. for sorne time back
kept his ground in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo;
where,. being joined by Sir Robert Wilson, he
endeavoured, in a desultory war of posts, to harass
and confound the projects of the enerny. His




440 NAURATIVE OF THE


immediate opponent had been N ey ; . but tbat
officer, indignant at the appointment of Soult t<;>
the chief command of the French armies, which,
on the recall of Jourdan, had taken place, requested
and obtained permission to return to Paris. He
was succeeded in his trust by Marshal Marchand,
who, holding the Spaniards in utter contempt,
hastened to bring the Duke to action. A battle
was accordingly fought on the 18th of October,
upon the heights of Tomames; which,owing to
the improvident impetuosity of the French leader,
ended in favour of the Spaniards. The enemy
fled to Salamanca, whither the Duke instantIy
followed, and he entered the place on the very
morning of that night, in which General Marchand
found himself under the necessity of precipitately
abandoning it.


It was the disposition of the Spaniards to ex-
perience so much elevation at the occurrence of
every little instance of success, that they forgot
not only how to improve it, but how to preserve
the superiority which they had for the moment
obtained. The Duke del Parque differed little in
this respect from his fellow-patriots. Delighted
.with the applauses of the people of Salamanca,
and regarding his victorious followers as invincible,
he remained inactive in his advanced position, till
the corps which he had beaten received reinforce-
ments from Valladolid, when it, in its turn, be-




PENINSULAR W AR. 441


came the assailant, and moved towards him. A
triRing affair took place at Carpio, where, upon
sorne rising ground, he ventured to abide the as-
sault-and it was not unfavolirable to the Duke;
but the enemy only retired upon their strength;
and it soon becarne evident that a force was op-
posed to him, which he could not hope success-
fulIy to withstand. He accordingly retreated, with
all haste, towards Alba de Tormes, where he took
up a position, and where, on the morning of the
28th, he was attacked with great impetuosity.
The Spaniards were worsted, and compelled to
abandon their strong ground; and they retired
for a while upon Tomames in tolerable order; but
just as the scene of their former victory began to
open upon them, abody of French cavalry
charged their rear, and threw them into utter con-
fusiono '{hey thought no more of resistan ce, but
casting away their arms, Red in all directions into
the mountains.


By these two victories, the last remnants of the
Spatiish army were destroyed; and the French
were left at liberty both to push theirconquests
into thesouthern parts of Spain, and to threaten
Portugal through the province of Beira. Of the
former of these opportunities they hastened irnme-
diately to avail themselves. Joseph put himself
at the head of the arrny w hich was destined to
overrun the kingdom of Andalusia; and having


/~. 1;.;
j .~




442 NARRATIVE OF THE


under him Soult, as his major-general, with Vic-
tor, Mortier, and Sebastiani, each in command of
his own corps, he moved towards the passes of the
Sierra Morena. _ Hither the fugitives from the
battle ofOcana had Red. But neither they nor
their leader had recovered from the dismay which
that defeat occasioned, and neither offered, nor
pretended to offer, any obstinate resistance to the
invaders. _ The passes were carried, without the
necessity once occurring of halting the columns,
or forming in order of attack; and on the 21st of
January, 1810, the intruders' head-quarters were
established in the town of Baylen.


Though .. in- following the progre ss of this army 1
shaILneces~arily.anticipateevents, which, in order
of time, occurred later than others that yet remain
to be narrated, it may not be amiss if~in the pre-
sent stage of my. narrative, 1 remind the reader of
the fortune which befell both it, and that portion
of the Spanish nation against which it carried on
operations.


As 'soon as the junta became aware that Anda-
lusia _ was on· the point of being invaded, they
began to think of securing, not the manysteep and
rugged defilesby which the approach to that pro-
vince is guarded, but the safety of their own per-
sons,and thepreservation of their own property.
They issued decrees and proclamations, it is true,
by which they at once'endeavoured to deceive the




· PENINSULAR WAR. ."443


people into a notion of their.· own security, and
professed to rouse the little energy of which they
seemed to be possessed, into action; but they
neither exerted themselves Oto re-organise their
routed armies, nor took any steps to bring to the
post of danger Albuquerque's corps, though it was
the only one upon which, reliance could now· be
placed. On the contrary, they directed the latter
to act u pon such a plan, as promised most effectu-
ally to render its operations unprofitable; and
they :paid to the repeated and urgent entreaties
forsupplies,· which poured in from the com-
maIiders, of the' former, no more regard than the
worst 'enemies ofthe country would have desired
tbero to pay. But wbilst they were thus heedless
of other matters~ they.passed a resolution, in w hich
the Islé of Leon was declared to be the fittest and
most convenient spot at which to hold their. future
sittings; and they decreed that, on the 1st of
February, the members should assemble there for
the despatch of business.
- Thoúgh the junta: hado by this time lost, and
deservédly 10st, thegeneral confidence' of the
nation, the idea that they were about to be
abandoned by their Tulers, not unnaturally excited
among the p"eople of Sevill~ both indignation and
despondency. This, was not long in exhibiting
itself, by numerous movements among the popu-
lace; and when the ,members of the junta pre-




444 NARRATIVE OF THE


pared tó withdraw in' accordance with this decree,
they were arrested. A cry was raised, that Se-
ville shoúld be defended to the last, and that th~
chief command should be assumed by Don Fran-
cisco Saavedra, at that time minister oC finance,
and president of the junta. A scene of indescri-
bable confusion ensued. Saavedra exerted him-
self to the utmost, in arder to les sen it, and rea-
dily assumed the power which the people had
thrust upon him; but it was only to secure his
own escape, and the escape of his partners in the
government. The junta fled; and Romana, whom
the people sought to detain by violence, that he
might assume once more the command of his own
army, eluded their notice, and retired to Badajoz;
and . Seville was left, without magistrates. or rulers
of any class, to make its own terms with the con-
queror. It opened its gates to Joseph as soon as
he presented himself, and received him, not only
without resistance, but with acclamations.


Whilst these things were going on, and whilst
the different towns and eities of Andahisia were
vieing with one another in their expressions of
loyalty to King Joseph, and satisfactionat bis
arrival amongst the.m, Soult on the one hand, and
Albuquerque mi the other, were making the. most
strenuous efforts, the one to reach Cadiz before it
could be put in a posture of defence, the other to
throw himself and his army into that important




PENINSULAR WAR. 445


city, and to secure ¡t. 1 t has been observed that
Albuquerque had received, from time to time,
such orders from the junta as must have brought
about, had he chosen to obey.them, the destruc,"
tion of the only Spanish corps to which Spain
eould now look for defence. He had been direeted,
in the first instance, to move from Truxillo, and
the posts which he was left to defend along the
Tagus, upon La Plata, for the purpose, as it was
stated, of frustrating the enemy's intention of
penetrating in that direction into Andalusia. He
had hardly begun his preparations for obeying that


. order, when a second arrived, to require that he
would merely hold himself in readiness to aet on
the offensive, should such a coursebe deemed
advisable. Albuquerque, most fórtunately· for
Spain, and highly to his own honour, was not a
man to stand iu fear of responsibility, and he paid
to the last order no regard. He pushed forward
as he had previously intended to do, and took
post, with his infantry at Guadalcunal, and his
eavalry and artillery at St. Olalla and Ronquillo,
in readiness to move in any direction where· his
presence might seem to be needed.


He was thus situated, when further instructions
reached him, requiring that he should withdraw
the' greater part of the garrison from Bad~joz,
and, with all the force which he could eolleet, act
vigorously against the enemy. Albuquerque




446 NARRATIVE OF THE


knew that, even if he were to obey this absurd
order, and leave the important city of Badajoz
unguarded, he would not be able to muster such a
force as would authorise his entry upon any course
of active operations, against an enemy whose
strength, at the most moderate computation,
tripled his own. He therefore not only set the
order of the junta at· defiance, but strengthened
thevery garrison which he had been req uired to
weaken. This was hardly done, when fresh
instructions reached him. One day he was com-
manded to march upon Cordova, because the
enemy had made themselves masters of the pass
of Puerto· del Rey. On the· next he was sum-
moned to Seville, with al1 speed, for the purpose
of covering it. The last order reached him in the
morning ;. before night another arrived, by which.
the command of thepreceding day, to hurry on
towards Cordova, wasrenewed. Albuquerque was
thoroughly disgusted, as he had good reason to be,
with conduct so disgraceful and so extraordinary.
AH the while that thejuuta was thus misdirecting
him, he was in the habit of receiving authentic
information respecting the movements and desig ns
of the French; and he knew perfectly, that nei-
ther Cordova nor 'Seville were with them object!i
of the slightest importance, but that their designs
were upon Cadiz. He knew, moreover, that at
the very moment when the junta were recom-




PENINSULAR WAR.· 447


mending to him a rapid marehuponCordova,'
they were themselvespreparing to make good
their.Hight to the Isle of Leon ; and he was but too
well aware, that if thatisland~ and the important
eity whieh eovered it, were left to their guidanee,
and' to the protection of the weak garrison which
at present held them, a very few weeks would
suffiee to put both' into the possession of the
French. Albuquerque loved his country and its
independenee; and among all the Spanish gene.:.
raIs, there were few whose talents and fine feel-
ings hetter. qualified them to direet the ·means
which were to proteet the one, and seeure the
other; hut he was an object of e~eessive jealousy
to the paltry party whieh at this moment guided
the destinies of Spain, and to that jealousy he at
lasLfell a martyr. On the present oecasion .he
det-ermined to aet for him~élf. As 800n· as he
had aeeurately ascertainedhow matters stood, he
broke up from his position, and marched with
rapid strides, not upon Cordova or SevilIe,' but
upon Cadiz .. · By dint of the most praiseworthy
exertions, . he reached it just two days before
Marshal SouIt and his· army appeared under the
walls; . and he regulated its means of defence
with so mueh judgment and energy, that not aU
the exertionsof the Freneh Marshal, unremitting
as these were, proved adequate to its reduction.


Whilst these;successesattended the Freneh arms




448 NARRATIVE OF THE


in the south, their operations were hardly less
propitious to them either in the east or in the
north. In the east, Gerona, after enduring the
miseries of a protracted siege, was reduced, .and
the army of Blake, defeated in more than one
encounter, found itself in no condition to keep the
field, and was fain to retire into the fastnesses with
which Catalonia abounds, leaving all the towns
and level country in possession of the F.rench. In
the north again, Astorga, after a gallant resistance,
was compelled to capitulate; and the French were
understood to be in full preparation for a fresh in-
vasion of Portugal. To render· this the more
decisive, reinforcements were poured in fr<hn Ba-
yonne in great numbers; and Marshal Massena
was stated to be on his way from the Danube, for
the purpose of taking upon himself the chief com-
mand of the troops by which the conquest of the
Peninsula was to be effected. Towards the close
of 1809, therefore, and in the beginning of 1810,
Spain, regarded in a military point of view, was
almost entirely reduced. Her fortresses were~
with few exceptions, in the enemy's handsj her
eities, open towns and villages, had almost . all
submitted; there was no army in existenee to
which the patrio·ts could.look; and Joseph was
once more established, with perfeet authority, in
the capital. But that which, at the present june-
ture, gave to the general aspect of affairs 1ts darkest




PENINSULAR "WAR. 449


hue, was the submÍssion of Austria, and the con-
sequent deliverance of N apoleon froID aH appre-
hension in the north of Europe. The battle of
Wagram, in deciding the fate" of Germany, was
supposed by most men to have decided the fate oí
the Península likewise; for no one could doubt
that an the strength of the empire would now be
directed to the attainment of one object, namely,
the expulsion of the English fr.om the continent,
and the consequent subjugation of Spain and Por-
tugal.


Affairs were in this sta te, when Lord Welling-
ton, alaimed for the safety of Lisbon, threatened
as it was in the only quarter from whence danger
lllight be seriously apprehended, determined upon
abandoning his position on the Guadiana, and
taking up another, which might enable him to
watchthe progress .{)f any force that might Bit
down before Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. With
this view, the troops were put in motion on the
1Mh of December, and after a march which, with
occasional halts, occupied twenty-one days, estab-
lished themselves on a new line, which; in a some-
what extended and not wholly connected manner,
covered the frontier between the two rivers, the
Tagus and the Douro. The advance, under Ge-
neral Crawford, consisting of the first baUalions
43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. the 1st and 2nd
r{lgiments of Portuguese ca~adores, detachments


VOL. 1. 2F




450 NARRATIVE OF 1'HE


from the 15th and 16th light dragoons, the 1st
hussars King's German Legion, and one brigade
of horse artillery, took post in front of Almeida,
and sent patrols as far as Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst
General Hill, with one division, remained on the
south of the Tagus, to watch the motions of any
French force which might be disposed to act
againt Badajoz, and threaten Lisbon through the
Alentejo. Head-quarters were fixed first at Vizeu,
from whence they were afterwards removed to
Celerico; the cavalry, with the exception of those
already specified, and a few squadrons necessary
for relieving the outposts, found cantonments at
Abrantes, Santarem, Thomar, &c.; and the park
of artillery was established at Vizeu. With res-
pect to the Portuguese troops, they had their head-
q t:tarters at Thomar; and they were stationed
partly in that town, and partIy in the villages
near, as convenience or necessity pointed out.


The first good effect resulting from this change
of situation showed itself in the rapid recovery of
the sick, and the no less rapid restoration to fuH
strength of such as were already convalescent.
The country into which the troops were now
moved, is as salubrious as any in the Peninsula ;
and as they contrived, for the most part, to obtain
comfortable. quarters, neither the cold of winter,
nor the variable temperature of the spring, were
felt by them. Provisions, likewise, proved abun-




PENINSULAR "'AH. 451
dant; and forage, if not so plentiful as could have
been desired, was at least less scanty than it had
been, either at J araicejo or Badajoz. On all these
accounts, both Lord Wellington and his followers
had ample reason to congratulate themselves on
the movement which had been made; whilst the
condition both of the French and S panish armies-
the former too formidable to be attacked with any
prospect of success--the latter dispersed and
broken, if not absolutely añnihilated-Ieft no
ground to regret the state of temporary inactivity
to which they were compelled to submit.


1 have said that, whilst Lord Wellington, with
the main body of his army, too k post between the
Douro and the Tagus, General Hill was left on
the southern side of the latter river, to keep open
a communication with Badajoz, and to watch the
movements of the enemy on the side of Alentejo.
This latter arrangement was the more necessary,
as Mortier and Regnier, at the head of nineteen or
twenty thousand men, threatened the southeru
frontier from Merida; and though Romana was in
Badajoz,and Elvas was understood to be held by
a respectable garrison, it would have been unrea-
sonable to expect that either the one or the other
could arrest the progress of the enemy, should
they see tit to advance by this road upan Lisbon.
General Hill's main position was at Abrantes. and
it was of a nature to render him perfectIy secure,




452 "A IWA TIVE OF THE


as long as the waters of the Tagus should continue
full; buthe stationed himself usually at Porta-
legre, and he even marched, from time to time,
forward to Campo Major, as often as Romana saw,
or fancied that he saw, reason to believe that he
was about to be attacked in force. There was, in
this manner, a good de al of inexplicable, and, as
it appeared, profitless manreuvring between the
French and English corps. Mortier, whenever
the humour took him, would advance, as if with
the design of investing Badajoz; certain, that by
so doing, he would draw Hill from his quarters ;
whilst Hill no sooner showed himself,than Mor-
tier would again retire, and take up his former
positions.


In the mean while, though both Lord Welling-
ton and the French generals might have appeared
to' an ordinary observer to be passing the first
months of the yearin a state of inaction, neither
the one nor the other suffered a single day to
escape without turriing it to sorne account,
and causing it to exert a greater or less degree
of influence over the final issues of the cam-
paign. Lord Wellington, contented to keep the
enemy as long as' possible in check, was devoting
a' large share of his attention to the fortification
and proper armament ofthe lines at Torres Vedras;
whilst the greatest exertions were made both by
him and Beresford, to put the regular army and




PEi\INSULAlt WAR. 453


the militia of Portugal into a state of effieiency.
Reinforeements accordingly eame in to him every
hour, respeetable, not froro their numbers alone,
but from their discipline, til}" he saw hiinself at
last at the head of twenty-seven thóusand British,
and fun thirty-one thousand Portuguese, troops of
the lineo The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon
which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much re-
lianee was placed for bafRing and retarding the
advanee of the French army, let it begin when it
might, was put ina state of excellent defenee.
The old walls were repaired, and fresh outworks
added to it; and a garrison of five thousand men
being thrown in, with ample stores of every de-
scription, and a British officer, Brigadier-general
Cox, at their head, no doubt was entertained that
it would make a very obstinate resistanee. That
Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of
time, no one in the present stage of affairs ven-
tured to hopeo The Spaniards were, indeed, full
of protestations; they spoke of burying them-
selves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling
the glory of Saragoza and Gerona; but as yet
they were not invested; and to boast of what
they would do, doing in the end nothing, was no
uncommon practice among our allies. Still we
might, in the present instance, be deceived; they
miglit, by some accident or another, fulfil their
promises; and if so, we had but littIe cause to




454 N ARRATIVE OF THE


rear ror our own safety, or that of the Portuguese
capital, for sorne time to come.


The army remained in this situation till the sum-
mer of 1810 was far advanced, holding completely
in command the main approaches through Beira,
and carefully watchíng the others. It occupied aIl
this while the position of Guarda, of which Lord
Galway has spoken as presenting the only defen-
sible line between Lisbon and the frontier; and
though Lord Galway lived in an age when the
military science had not arrived at the perfection
which it has since attained, he cannot be said
greatly to have overrated the excellence of that
lineo We were now distributed over the ridges.
and along the deseent of the Sierra de Estrella;
a range of rugged mountains, which extend froro
Coimbra to Guarda, and end at last in the exten-
sive plains of Castile. By this means we cut off all
approach by the two great roads which run to the
north and south of the Sierra, and which alone are
passable to an army w hich moves with its roate-
r~el of stores and guns. Our advanced posts, as has
already been stated, were pushed beyond Almeida,
and covered by the rivers Aquida and Coa; both
of which are in winter formidable from their depth
of water and rapidity of current, and in summer;
not easy of passage, in consequence of the accli-
vity and ruggedness of their banks. Our right, in
the mean while, was protected by the Tagus,




PENINSULAR WAH. 455


watched and rendered impassable by the presence
of Hill's corps at Abrantes; whilst our left could
be threatened only from the side of Oporto, where
we had no reason to apprehend that the enemy
meditated any inroad. Thus were we justified in
considering ourselves secure, as long as the Tagus
should continue unfordable; and as this chanced
to be the case up to a period quite unprecedented,
we held our ground even beyond the season, when
we might have fairly anticipated either a volun-
tary advance. or a compulsory retreat.


In the mean while there were co1lected, so early
as the month 'of May, in our front, no fewer than
three corps d'armée; one, under Ney, composed
of three divisions, one under Kellerman, of two
divisions,and one, containing a like number of di-
visions, under J unot. Besides these, General
Montiniere was understood to be in Valladolid
with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of
cavalry; and last, though not least, Massena ar-
rived, and took upon himself the command of the
whole. If the several divisions be estimated at
ten thousand each-and no accounts which we
received rated them at less-then would the
total of the force immediately opposed to us amount
to fuU seventy-nine or eighty thousand meno To


. this we could oppose no more than twenty-seven
or twenty-eight thousand British, and abont thirty
thousand Portuguese troops; and the latter being,




456 NARHATlVE OF THE


for the most part, as yet untried, an absolute con-
fidence could not be reposed in them. Yet, in
spite of odds so tremendous, the best spirits and
the highest hopes pervaded all ranks. The num-
ber of our sick had diminished from nine to less
than two thousand, and we were daily and hourly
increasing in efficiency. A few skirmishes, more-
over, at the outposts, in most of which o.ur peo.ple
were eminently successful, tended to keep alive
that confidence in themselves and in their leaders,
which is so. essential to. the welfare o.f an army;
and it was no matter of trifling congratulation to
find that Qur Portuguese allies, in all such affairs,
behaved with a gallantry not inferior to. that exhi-
bited by. our own troops. There were, indeed,
many perso.ns in the army, who. saw so.mething of
risk in our advanced situatio.n. It was no.t to be
supposed that Lord Wellington, with a fo.rce so.
inferior, would attempt any o.ffensive operatio.ns,
o.r that he would even risk a battle, in case he
sho.uld himself be attacked; why then, it was
asked, remain in the immediate presence of an
enemy, before whom, whenever he mo.ved, we
must of necessity faH back? It is needless to an-
swer this 01' any other of the numero.us questio.ns
which about that time began to. make the ro.und of
the canto.nments. Lo.rd Wellingto.n was not afraid
to manamvre even the Portuguese tro.ops, tho.ugh
the enemy might hang upon their rear; he saw




PENINSULAR WAR. 457


no necessity for falling backupon Coimbra, till
the measure should become indispensable; he was
desjrous of protracting the war as long as possible
upon the frontier, anrl therefore'he remained where
he was. That he had not judged erroneously,
future events sufficiently proved; it would there-
fore serve no good end to enter here into any ela-
borate defence of a policy which requires none.


During the early months of spring, though the
enemy were in considerable force in the vicinity of
Ciudad Rodrigo, they made no serious attempt
to besiege the place. Occasionally, indeed, they
did here what Mortier was in the habit of doing at
Badajoz; that is to' say, they put themselves in
motion, from time to time, as if with a view to
commence operations; but our advanced corps
was no sooner reported to be in march, than they
again retired. lt was at such times, and under
such circumstances, that parties found an occa-
sional opportunity of exchanging a few shots with
the enemy; and that the ca~adores were enabled
to satisfy their comrades in the British ranks, that
when tbe hour of tbe grand push came, they would
not be deserted.




458 NARRATIVE. OF THE


CHAPTER XVIII.


Low state of the finances of the Briti5h army, and apprehen-
sions entertained by many respecting the issne of the war-
Massena opens the campaign by investing Ciudad Rodrigo
-Skirmishes at the outposts, and retreat of the light division
on Almeida-Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which surrenders-
Affair of cavalry in front of the British outposts-Rumours
of the enemy's intended operations, and dispositions to meet
him.


W HILST these things were going on, events daily
occurred, sorne of thern calculated to excite our·
spirits, and increase our hopes ofultirnate success;
others, as might be expected, having a tendency
widely the reverse. Arnong the agreeable inei-
dents just referred to, rnay be noticed the arrival
at head-quarters of Lieutenant-general Sir Brent
Speneer, an officer to whose merits every one
bore testimony. In addition to this, assurances
poured in upon us, that large reinforcements, both
from Sicily and N orth Arnerica, were 011 their
way ; whilst nurnerous desertions from the French




PENINSULAR WAR. 45U


army served to convince us. that the enemy's
troops, in spite of the proclamations and profes-
sions of the generals, were far from finding them-
selves comfortable in their· present situation.
From the month of January to the month of May,
J 810, there carne in near]y 500 men, all of them
fulIy armed, and not a few bringing along with
them their horses and appointments; and as they
were principally Germans and Italians, the cir-
cumstance led to a persuasion, that the foreigners
in the French service were beginning to grow
tired, either of the particular war in which they
were engaged, or of French supremacy in the ab-
stract. It is true that we could not boast of the
total absence of this military vice from among the
mercenaries who took rank under our own stand-
ards. A German dragoon would, from time to


. time, pass over from us as well as from the enemy ;
but the 10ss which we sustained by desertion was
trifling indeed, and carne not up, by one hun-
dredth part, to that endured by the enemy.
Among the sources of uneasiness, again, to which
we were subject, none affected us more seriously
than the low state of our finances, and the dif-
ficu1ty which we felt in recruiting them. The
army was universally in arrear for subsisten ce ;
many regiments had received nothing during seve-
ral months; and at one period there were but a
few thousand dollars in the military chest. Now,




460 NARRATIVE OF THE


ina country where nothing was, or could be taken,
without being paid for, and wheré the people,
accustomed to look with suspicion upon the paper-
money issued by their own government, serupled
greatly in reeeiving our bills and promissory-notes,
the absence of bullion was felt as an evil which
hardly any ingenuity or attention could ameliorate.
Our expenditureamounted on an average to
30,000l. monthly, and we drew daily rations for
forty thousand men and twelve thousand animals ;
yet at no time were we able to colleet in our own
neighbourhoodmore than 150,0001.; and the re-
mainder was consequently brought, at a heavy
los s and with immense labour, from Cadiz and
Gibraltar. But when the funds of these places
were at length declared to be exhausted, as to-
wards the middle of May proved to be the case,
our prospects became melancholy. By great ex-
ertions, however, on the part of Lord Wellington,
the credit of the army was so far preserved, that
it never suffered from an absolute deficiency in
articles essential to its existence; but individuals
unde:rwent numerous privations, and it was at one
moment apprehended that, unless large supplies
of gold and sil ver should speedily arrive froro
England, our movements might be cramped at a
moment when, aboye aH others sinee the com-
mencement of hostilities, it was of consequence
that they should be free and unfettered.




l'EXl~SULAR \\":\. R. 461


The reader, after this dénouement, will not be
surprised to learn that, a1tbough the very best
spirit prevailed, in general, throughout our ranks,
speculations, not of the most cheering or consola-
tory nature, were at this period entered into here
and there, as to the ultimate destiny which awaited
uso It is part of the English character to look,
under all circumstances, at events in the darkest
colours of which they are susceptible; and the na-
tional disposition was not slow in being brought into
play on the present occasion. By many it was
esteemed a project utterly hopeless to attempt
keeping possession of Portugal for any length of
time after the enemy should have fairly entered
upon his course of operations for its subjugation.
Men accordingly began to inquire respecting the
tonnage and capacity of the fleet, whether it,were
capable of"removing, when the moment ofretreat
should arrive, the troops and stores now in the
Península; and a question was even taised,
whether an effort would not be made to withdraw,
not our own soldiers only, but the Portuguese
army likewise. By such as started these ques-
tions, it was satisfactorily ascertained that, ex-
clusively of four ships of the líne andtwenty-three
frigates, there lay at anchor in the Tagus, trans-
ports possessed of ample stowage for forty thousand
meno This, it was concluded, would suffice for
the removal of the whole of the British army, with




462 :'Il"ATtRATIVE OF THE


its women and followers; and it was sagaciously
enough surmised that the vessels of war would
not be permitted to sail, occupied by their own
crews only; but that they would be given up, as
far as might be practicable, to the accommodation
of our faithful allies.


Whilst sorne were thus amusing themselves, in
speculating about events which were not destined
ever to receive their accomplishment, the enemy
was vigorously collecting their means, and pre-
paring to open the campaign with a force which
might bear down all opposition on the part of Lord
Wellington and bis army. Massena, who had paid
a short visit to Salamanca, returned again to Val-
ladolid, for the purpose of hurrying forward to
the frontier every battalion and company which
could be spared froro the internal management of
the country. Columns were accordingly reported
to be on the advance, both froro· the Asturias and
Gallicia, whilst the Estremadura corps, strength-


. ened by a fresh division of five thousand men from
before Cadiz, was stated to be approaching Bada-
joz in force. As yet, however, the only direct
indications of active operations being at hand,
were found in tho freq uent movement of cava1ry
patroIs along our front, and their daily atternpts to
discover sorne fords by which the rivers might be
crossed. With these, when they became too da-
ring in their approaches, our outposts would from




PENINSUI,AR W AR. 463


time to time skirmish; but nothing was done upon
a great scale, nor had we any good ground to sur-
mise upon what plan, after his arrangements should
be =complete, Massena intended to acto That he
would hazard all upon a direct attack in front, the
nature of our own position, as wel1 3S the opinion
which we entertained of his military skill and
talents, forbade us to believe; it was rather to be
expected that he would support his movement in
this direction, by corresponding movements upon
our flanks; but of any dispositions so to do which
he might be making, we were ignorant. The truth
is, that in spite of all secret intelligence, Il:nd the
expense incurred in securing it, our information
was still far frorn being accurate. This aros e, not
from any want of energy on our parts, but from
the natural disposition of the Spaniards, who never
dream of hazarding conjectures, or enteringupon
speculations, beyond the occurrences of the day.
When a French force was actualIy in motion, or
rather when it had already arrived within a short
distance of its point of destination, we seldom failed
to hear of it; but the mere assembling of troops in
the interior, they rarely took the trouble to report;
and hence we were not unfrequently left to guess
at the enemy's probable intentions, from consider-
ing how we ourselves would act, in case their and
our situations were reversed.


In themean time~ a few changes took place in




464 XARRATIVE OF THE


the disposi~ion and management of portions of our
troops; that is to say, Lieutenant-general Payne,
to whom the cavalry had hitherto been intrusted,
returned home, and Lieutenant-general Cotton
succeeded to the command. The first di vis ion of
infantry likewise, which had previously acted
under the orders of General eotton, was trans-
ferred to General Spencer; but the position of
the army continued unaltered up to a late date in
the summer; nor was it till the month of May had
been considerably advanced, that the enemy
showed any disposition to molest it.


His arrangements being at length. complete,
Massena prepared, at the head of the 2nd, 6th,
and 8th corps, to invest the fortress of Ciudad
Rodrigo. For this purpose he pushed on several
strong divisions, which, driving in our patrols and .
flying posts, established two bridges across the
Agueda, and took possession of sorne commanding
heights that lay between our position and the
town. It ~as not without the deepest reluctance
that Lord Wellington carne to the conclusion,
that any attempt on his part to interrupt the
progress of the siege, could be productive of no
good. In point of numbers alone, the enemy
surpassed us by at least one-third; and their
troops were aH admirably disciplined, ably com-
manded, and inured to war. Of our force, on
the other hand, the larger proportion were new




PENINSULAR W AR. 465


Ievies, which looked well, nodoubt, upon parade,
but which never having as yetcome under fire,
could not be expected to behave like veterans.
Besides, were the enemy' to suffer a defeat,
though he would doubtless be compelled to aban-
don his designs for the present, his retreat was
perfectIy secure; and there were ample resources
at hand .from which to 1ill up the gaps which the
fortune of a battle might have produced in his
ranks. The case' was widely different with re-
spect tous. Were we defeated, our ruin was
irretrievable; and were we even to succeed,
the success couJd not be purchased except at
an expense of life, which must cripple our
means during the remainder of the season, and
prove in the end more injurious to ourselves than
to the enemy. U nder these circumstances it was
determined, to the great grief both of our General
and his followers, that our attitude of watchfulness
must still be preserved; and to render it the more
imposing, head-quarters were transferred to the
town of Almeida.


N o great while elapsed, however, before the
inconveniences attending this latter arrangement
were found to overbalance any b~nefit which
could arise out of it. By taking post a:t Almeida,
LordWellington was doubtIess at hand to direct
every manreuvre which the advance might be re-
quired to make, and to observe with greater facility


VOL.!. 2 G




466 NARRATIVE OF THE


the movements and operations of the enemy; but,
on the other hand, he was in continual and immi-
nent danger. Should our pickets, by accident,
suffer a surprise, and their supports be over-
thrown, he might, before sufficient warning had
been given, find himself shut up within the walls
of Almeida, and exposed, along with the fortress
itself, to the risk of capture. These were serious
considerations; and they induced him, after
having spent a few days onIy in his advanced
situation, to withdraw as far as Alverca, six
Ieagues in the rear.


1 have· said that a corps of French troops,
having driven in our patrols and flying posts,
threw two bridges over the Agueda, and esta-
blished itself between Ciudad Rodrigo and the
British arroyo The movement in question was
effected earIy in June, and it completed the in-
vestment of the place, which had been begun as
far back as the 26th of April. At first, indeed,
the several divisions which closed around the city
attempted nothing more than an occasional and
irregular bombardment; whilst they intermitted
from time to time in the strictness of their block-
ade, as often as the appearance of an advance on
our parts led to the belief that we had determined
upon raising the siege. Now, however. matters
assumed a different aspecto The corps aboye
alluded to consisted of thirty-one thousand men :




PENINSULAR \VAR. 461
it was cornmanded by Marshal¡ Ney, and taking
post upon some high and advantageous ground,
appeared determined to cover with effect opera-
tions which were conducted' both with firmness
and science; and as it was supported by fuU thir-
ty-eight thousand, under the irnmediate orders of
Junot, to whom the prosecution of the siege was
more immediately intrusted, it could not but feel
itself secure. N othing, therefore, remained for
either party to perforrn, except to watch, with
equal earnestness, the progre ss of an undertaking
in which both were equalIy interested.


That the reader may the more easily enter into
the detaiIs which must by and by be laid before
him, it may not be amiss if 1 here make him ac-
quainted-even though, in so doing, 1 may be
compelled to recapitulate a little-with the exact
situation in which the allied and French armies at
present found themselves.


There were, in the position ofGuarda-that is to
say, on the right of the Tagus, and on the left of
the Douro-four divisions of British infantry, the
greater part of the British cavalry, with the mass
of the Portuguese troops, horse, and foot, under
the irnmediate orders of Lord Wellington. Head-
quarters being established at Alverca, the out-
posts, which were principally supplied from the
light division, extended along the Azava; a sman
stl'earn which, rising among the hills near Alber-




468 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


garia, falls into the Agueda, at a líttle distance
from Cesmiro. In rear of the light division, which
lay chiefly in and about Gallegos, though con-
siderably to its right and left, were the divisions
of General Cole and General Picton, the former
of which occupied Guarda, whilst the latter was
in cantonments at Pinhel. There were detach-
ments at Sabugal, on the right, and for a time, at
Sto Felices, on the left; though the latter was
soon withdrawn, and the place occupied by a por-
tion of J unot's corps. Guarda, however, ando the
stupendous heights around it, formed the key of
the position from which the retreat lay, either
towards the left, and so by Mondego, or to the
right, and so by the Zezere, to Marcello, Thomar,
Santarem, and ultimately to Torres Yedras.


Whílst the maín bod y retained this situation,
General HilI, at the head of the second division,
sorne cavalry, and a corps ofPortuguese, making
up, in aH, abont thirteen thousand men, was on
the left of the Tagus, employed, as has already
been hinted, in guarding the approach to Lisbon
by way of Alentejo. His position was more
moveable, and necessarily so, than that of Lord
Wellington; but the majn point to be defended
was Abrantes, in case the enerny should make
any desperate attempt to pass the river, and
threaten our communications. In like manner
General Leith, with a corps of ten thousand men,




PENINSULAR WAR. 46.9
of whom not more than two thousand were British,
was behind the Zezere, ready to support either
Hill or Lord Wellington, according as circum-
stances might require; whilst Romana, with his
division of infantry, strengthened by a few squa-
drons of Portuguese cavalry, kept post at Badajoz,
and in the country round.


On the side of the enemy,again, the 2nd, 6th,
and 8th corps, otherwise known by the appella-
tion of the army of Portugal, were oceupied, partIy
in eondueting the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and
partIy in showing a front towards the four British
divisions at Almeida, Pinhel, Alverea, and Guarda.
On the other side of the Tagus, thel'e were the
corps of Regnier and Mortier, formerly estimated
at nineteen thousand men, but since increased by
a reinforeement of five thousand. The latter di-
vision, leaving seventeen thousand men to eontinue
the bloekade of Cadiz, had hastened to take part
in the subjugation of Portugal; and the whole
were now manreuvring, so as to threaten Badajoz,
and ultimately to aet against Hil1. Besides these
there was a divis~on, estimated at eight thousand
men, whieh, under General Bonnet, threatened
the province of Entre Douro e Minho; whilst de-
taehments were quartered here and there, between
the frontier and Burgos; and from Burgos to the
Pyrenees, fol' the purpose of keeping up the com-
munication between Massena and France. On aU




4'70 ~ARRATIV1l: OF THE


these heads'Qur information was fu1l, and as the
event proved, tolerably accurate; whilst there
were other rumours afioat, wbich, though sorne of
them rested upon no sure ground, exerted consi-
derable infiuence over the feelings of the troops,
and on the p1ans of their leader.


We learned about this time, first, that the Ma-
tagorda fort before Cadiz had fallen into the hands
oi' the enemy, and that the city itself, crowded
with inhabitants, was not expected to hold out for
any length of time. This was alarming enough ;
but it was hardly more alarming to us, situated as
we then were, than a second report which came
in, that the French, wearied with the resistance al-
ready offered, and harassed by sickness brought on
by the exhalations from the Isle of Leon, had de4
termined to raise the siege, and bring the whole of
their force to bear against Portugal. N ext we
were assured, upon what appeared to be good aU4
thority, that the Emperor N apoleon was in fuIl
march towards Spain; that large divisions of his
guard had already entered Madrid; and that he
himself was expected to arrive there in a few days
at the farthest. Then carne an assurance, that
Souchet's corps likewise, which had been directed
upon Valencia, was stopped, and that it was hur-
rying on to join the arrny destined for the conquest
of Portugal. AH· the communications at present
made were, however, not of a nature so discoura-




PENINS ULA U W A R. 471


gmg. To counterbalance these recorded aboye,
we were told that General Bal1asteros was on the
banks of the Guadalquivir at the head often thou-
sand men, and that he was conducting himself
with so much spirit and judgment, as seriously to
impede the projects of Massena, by compelling
him to detach Regnier for the purpose of keeping
him in check. In like manner the mountains and
forests of Spain were represented as full of gueril-
las, who cut off every small detachment of French
troops that carne in their way, plundered the con-
voys, interrupted the communications, and kept
the whole of the enemy's post on the alerto These
bands were made up chiefly of Spaniards, into
whose hands Joseph saw fit to put arms, and who
never failed, as often as a favourable opportunity
came in the way, to deserto Then again Castile
was said to be in a state of extreme commotion;
insurrections breaking out in every quarter, and
adventurous bodies of armed peasants destroying
the garrisons of all the villages and open towns in
the province. So bold, indeed, had the insurgents
become, that aI\ aide-de-camp of General Keller-
man was fairly carried off from the gates of Val-
ladolid; and no man could consider himself safe
in the open country, unless attended by a powerful
escort. In a word, Spain, though overrun, was re-
presented as far from being subdued; and it ap-
peared to us that thegeneral who should attempt




472 NARRATIVE OF THE


to conquer Portugal, leaving a country so deci-
dedly hostile in his rear, must either advance with
a force so overwhelming as to carry everything
before him, or he must be in danger of having his
resources cut off, and of being himself placed in a
situation as perilous as that experienced by the
troops against whom he was preparing to acto


In the mean while, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
was proceeding with a languor which gratified not
less than it surprised uso The enemy broke
ground before the place on the 11th of June, and
on the 25th their batteries opened. Though the
means of the assailants were known to be ample,
and though littIe hope of being relieved existed,
the resistan ce offered by the garrison was such, as
to place them on a level with the brave defenders
of Saragoza and Gerona. They obstinately dis-
puted every inch of ground, making frequent
sorties, and attacking the covering and working
parties in the trenches; whilst they kept up from
the ramparts an unceasing fire, which occasioned
a heavy los s both of life and materiel to the be-
siegers. It was a galling thing to us, that we were
compelled to be mere spectators of so much bra-
very. The sound of their very musketry couldbe
heard within our lines, yet could we not venture
to aid them; we could only admire their heroism,
as we sincerely did, and lament that no ability
rested with us to second it. And it is but fair to




PENINSULAR WAR. 473


acknowledge that the gallantry of General Her-
vasti and his brave garrison excited our admiration
the more decidedly, as we h~d looked for no such
exertions at their hands. Of the former we had
be en led to thínk as of a weak old man, who
would rather anticípate the wishes of Massena,
than disregard hís surnrnons; whilst frorn the lat-
ter, more especially when under such a chief, we
expected nothing. Both the one and the other
showed by their conduct that we had done them
injustice; and they gained upon om: respect and
esteern, in exact proportion to the unworthy no-
tions which we had be en induced to form of
them. _


That the reader rnay affix its true value to the
obsttnacy of this defence, it is necessary to inform
him that Ciudad Rodrigo was far from being
either a very regular or a strong fortification. It
was surrounded by a wall, and the wall was made
up, in rnany parts, not of embankments or ma-
sonry, but of rubbish. An arrny of not less than
sixty thousand men lay around it, largely pro-
vided with arnmunition, stores, battering train,
and intrenching tools; and the works were pushed
on by thousands of men in each relief, all of them
Well skilled in the business in which they were
employed. The garrison, on the other hand, was
composed of less than four thousand soldiers; and
the inhabitants, including women and children,




474 NARRATIVE OF THE


barelyamounted to five thousand. The odds were
tremendous; but the Spaniards were true to the
cause of their country; and even women and
children took their turns in the labours of the
siege. At last, however, in spite of the most stre-
nuous exertions of the defenders, a practicable
breach was made, and the enemy advanced to the
assault, in the nlght between the 30th of J une and
the 1st of July. They were mel olÍ this occasion
with the same devoted bravery which had so
often fOlled them in the trenches. Blue-lights,
hand-grenades, and missiles of every description,
were showered down upon them when covering
the glacis, and crowding the ditch; and they were
finally repulsed with a 10s8 more heavy than many
general actions might have occasioned. But the
enemy were not to be foiled. They renewed their
attack, causing science and skill to perform the
work which bare bravery had failed in effecting;
and it soon became apparent that not all the gal-
lantry of Hervasti and his troops would be able
to continue the defence of the place many days.


The British army, all this while, was resting
in its position, and watching, with deep anxiety
and bitter regret, the gradual but sure destruction
of the city and its defenders. lt happened, how-
ever, that in proportion as the siege drew towards
a conclusion, the enemy became every day more
and more pressing; and encounters at the out-




PENINSULAR WAR. 475


posts were events of constant recurrence. Of
these the greater number produced no other effect,
than merely to enable a few individuals on both
sides to display their gallantry; but sorne were
more important in their consequence; and it may
not be arniss if 1 make the reader acquainted with
the circurnstances which attended one of thern.


On the 3rd of July, General Crawford reviewed
his division; and· for the purpose, no doubt, of
impressing the enemy with serious notions of its
strength, he caused the regiments to be forrned
and drawn up in rank entire. The spectacle was
not lost upon the French Marshal, who, with the
view of ascertaining exactIy the arnount of our force
between the Agueda and the Coa, and perhaps to
convince the besieged that thE'y had nothing to
expect from us, ordered a recognisance to be
made. - It took place on the following day, and
it brought on an affair which, under aH cir-
cumstances, possibly, might have been as well
avoided.


At an early hour on the morning of the 4th,
the enemy were seen to be in rnotion; with. five
regiments of cavalry, sorne battalions of infan-
try, and several guns. They passed the Azava at
sun-rise, and their cavalry, driving in our advanced
videttes, carne on with great rapidity, three regí·
rnents on the direct road frorn Gallegos to AI-
meida, and t wo by a path to the left, with the




476 NARRATIVE OF THE


view of turning our right flank. Thel'e Wel'e two
pieces of cannon, of the horse-artillery, stationed
at a small brook, about half a miIe to the rear of
Gallegos. These instantly opened upon the French
column; but though the tire was well directed,
and evidently galled them, it did not succeed in
stopping them. Our cavalry, in the mean while,
formed in real' of the guns, sending out three or
four squadrons, with the hussars, to skirmish; and
rather a sharp contest took place near a bridge
which crossed the brook .. The French made a
dash to secure it, and passed sorne officers, with
about thirty 01' forty men, to the other side; in
accomplishing which, however, as the bridge was
extremely narrow, they were 90mpelled to defile
from column. An opportunity was thus afforded
of attacking them to advantage, which was not
permitted to escape. Captain Crackenbourg, of
the German hussars, an officer of gallantry and
high character, saw in a moment the predicament
into which they had thrust themselves. He in-
stantly drew out two divisions of the hussars, and
eharging the body which had passed the bridge,
cut down their officer, and drove the rest, with the
loss of several killed and wounded, back upon the
column. The affair was accomplished in an in-
stant, but the promptitude and vigour which eha-
racterised its execution, both merited and received
the approbation of all presento The brave men,




PENINSULAR. W AR. 477


were saluted by the cheers of their comrades as
they returned, and the officer's name was justly
and honourably mentioned a~ head-quarters.


N otwithstanding this momentary success, the
enemy's force, especially in cavalry, was too great
to be successful1y resisted, and the light division
retired. It was with sorne difficulty, indeed, that
the troops contrived to carry off the guns; for the
French, having discovered other parts by wlÍich
the brook could be crossed, pressed upon them in
overwhelming numbers; but both artilIery and
cavalry fell back in good order; and being sup-
ported by the infantry, whose fire from among the
rocks and woods told heavily, they suffered but
little. By this movement, however, Gallegos,
Almeida, and the ground occupied on the preced-
ing day, were given up; and a new position was
assumed immediately in front of the town of AI-
meida, and in rear of Port Conception.


From this date up to the 1st, no event occurred
of any momento The fire from the fortress having
destroyed sorne of the enemy's magazines~ they
were compelled to intermit the siege till fresh sup~
plies could be brought up; and the garrison were
not slow in turning the breathing space· to good
account, by repairing, as fast as t~eir means would
allow, the injuries sustained by their walls. AH
this was prodigiously in our favoun~Could the
opening of the campaign be delayed till autumn




478 NARRATIVE OF THE


was drawing to a close, little doubt could exist
that it would produce no results capable of seri-
ously affecting our tenure of the country; for then
the fields would all be bare, the roads would be-
come impassable, and everything would be against
the invader, as it would be advantageous to the
invaded. It was to delay, indeed, that we mainly
looked for our best prospects of success;. and
should Almeida hold out as Ciudad Rodrigo had
done, our fondest wishes would be accomplished.
Then might we retire with perfect confidence,
either to Ponte de Marcella, or by a different
route to the intrenched position at Torres Vedras;
and from either of these strong-holds we might
look down in perfect security upon the French
troops perishing in- our front. How different might
have been the fate of tbe war, had Massena suc-
ceeded in commencing vigorous operations, whilst
yet the entire summer was before him !


In that case, though we might have repelIed,
even with the lines as yet imperfect, any direct
attempt to drive us back upon Lisbon, or ¡nto the
sea, our means of holding the country would have
been at least not greater than tbey afterwards
became; whilst the subsistence to be procured
by the enemy being abundant, tbe issue of the
struggle must, to say the least of it, have been
doubtful. But now there was not an individual in
the army who appeared not to feel, that, let the




PENINSULAR WAR. 479


enemy be delayed only one month longer, and the
chances were all in our favour; for Lord Wel ..
lington had taken tbe wisest and most prompt
precautions to render tbe sojourn of tbe French in
Portugal more inj urious to tbem tban a sanguinary
engagement. It is well known tbat the French
armies moved unattended by convoys, and un'"
provided witb stores of forage or provisions. They
depended, in all cases, upon the resources of the
country through wbieh tbey passed; and wben
these became exhausted, they could no longer
keep thefield. Lord Wellington had issued striet
injuilctions to the inhabitants to withdraw, with
aIl their effects, as soon as his troops should begin
to march upon their positions in the rear; and
could the peasantry but succeed in carrying along
with them the corn now growing in the fields, the
case of the enemy would be desperate.


Before matters came to this, however, many
chances were yet to be run; and these proved, .in
more than one instance, less favourable than we
had cause to expect. Ciudad, Rodrigo, ¡ndeed,
did its duty nobly. It held out a full month
against open trenches; and its governor capitu-
lated only when it would have been an act of in-
sanityto resist any longer. But the faH of Ciudad
Rodrigo came not unaccompanied by other evils,
nor was it the most severe calamity which befen
us at this time.




480 N ARRATIVE OF THE


The enemy having supplied the ammunition,
which had been expended, resumed their efforts
against the place; and on the 10th of J uly, a
second and more formidable breach was effected.
The columns of attack were already formed-they
had even taken their stations in the tren ches, and
were waiting for the word to advance, when
General Hervasti, seeing that all hope of relief was
at an end, hung out a white flag, and proposed a
capitulation. It is said that Ney, by whom the
force actually employed in the siege was com-
manded, refused to grant any other terms than
those of unconditional surrender; but that Mas-
sena, more generous, or more poli tic, consented
that the troops should march out with the honours
of war, and that the officers should retain their
swords and baggage. Be this as it may, the place
surrendered, and one obstacle to the advance of
the French army into Portugal was removed.


On the morning after Ciudad Rodrigo fell, an
affair took place between a portion of our light
division and a party ofthe enemy, which gave rise,
at the time, to a good deal of speculation. The
enemy's patrols were in the daily habit of visiting
the several villages and hamlets in our front, and
of committing in them acts of barbarity and griev-
ous plunder. General Crawford determined, if
possible, to put a stop to this; and he made ar-
rangements, on the rright of the 10th, for cutting




l'ENIJ:\SULAR WAR. 481


off the next party which should show itself near
his pickets.. With this view he took with him six
squadrons of cavalry, amounting to upwards of six
hundred men; and set off, soo~ after midnight, in
the direction by which he expected that they
would advance. General Crawford's object was to
arrive before daylight with a portion of his cavalry
in their rear, and to attack them in front with the
main body, which should be drawn up for the
purpose. Unfortunately for the success of his en-
terprise, he lost his way, and instead of pushing
sufficiently to· the left, fell in with the French
patrol at a moment when he was least prepared to
take advantage of the meeting. The enemy's
force did not exceed thirty cavalry and two hun-
dred infantry; but they were advantageously
posted in an open space, just beyond a narrow
defile; and to reach them it was necessary to
thread that-defile in a loug lineo The consequence
was, that though the hussars, who led, formed up
in succession as they got through, and charged their
opponents with great gallantry, they effected no-
thing m~re than the dispersion of the handful of
horse; for the infantry had time to form a square,
and not all the efforts of our people succeeded in
breaking it. The hussars rode brave]y up to the
bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely
thrown in, which killed or wounded upwards of a
dozen meno The remainder wheeled off, and pur-


VOL. 1. 2 H




482 NARRATIVE Ol<' THE


suing the French cavalry, made way for a sq uadron
of the 16th. These galloped forward, but al so
took to the left, and leaving the infantry unin-
jured, joined in pursuit of the cavall'y. When the
last charge was made, the French square were
without fire, every man having discharged his
piece, and none having be en able to load again ;
but when a third attempt was made, they were .
better prepared to receive it. It feH to the lot of
Colonel Talbot of the 14th to lead this attack. It
was made with daring intrepidity; but the enemy
remained perfectly steady, and reserving their fire
tiU the bridles of the horseR touched their bayonets,
gave it with such effect, that Colonel Talbot and
several of his men were killed on the spot. The
rest drew off, upon. which General Crawford,
despairing of success by the exertions of cavall'y
alone, despatched an orderly to bring up a detach-
ment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no great
distance.


Whilst this was doing, the enemy's littIe coIumn
began its retreat, which it conducted withslnguIar
steadiness and great order. The 14th dragoons
seeing this, prepared to Iaunch another squadron
against it; and it was already in speed for the
purpose, when ColoneI Arenschild, of the hussars,
observed cavalry advancing both in front and flank,
and checked the movement. It was much to be
regretted afterwards that he took this step, for the




PENINSULAR \V AIt. 483


horse which alarmed him, proved to be detach-
ments from our own peopIe, on their return f.-om
pursuing the enemy's dragoons, the whole ofwhom
they had captured. The French infantry lost no
time in availing themse]ves of the indecision of our
cavalry. They marched on, and returned to
their main body, without having lost a single pri-
soner, or suffered in killed or wounded.


It is probably needless to ndd, that when intel-
lígence of this affair reached head-quarters, a feel-
ing of extreme vexation pervaded the bosoms of
all to whom it was communicated. That six hu n-
dred British dragoons should have been baffied by
two hundred French infantry, was a circumstance
for which no one appeared able to account. But
the chagrin arising out of this little defeat, though
abl.!-ndantly palpable at the moment, soon ceased
to exert an influence over uso Events of much
greater moment were at hand; and rumours
poured in, one after another, each calculated to
engross our deepest attention, and to excite our
liveliest ¡nterest.


The fate of Ciudad Rodrigo was hardly authen-
ticated, when we heard that Regniel' had been
ordered to cross the Tagus, and that he was in
full march to form a junction with Massena, by
way of Almaraz and D'Alameta. General Hill im-
mediately adopted a policy correspondent with that
of the enerny, by moving upon Villa Velha. These




484 N ARRATIVE OF TIIE


manreuvres, it lS scarceIy necessary to add, Ied to
conjectures amongst us, as to the course which
the enemy proposed to pursue, as soon as he
should be freed from his remaining difficulties by
the capture of AImeida. My humbIe opinion led
me to believe that Massena would di vide his
army into three or four columns; and that with
the first and strongest he would march direct
upon Guarda, from whence he could push by
Cavilhao and Sevo]a, for Pampelhoza. In the
mean while, it was probable that the second ,co-
lumn would penetrate by Belmonte to Turdao,
and along the miIitary road to Cardejes and
Abrantes; for though orders had been issued to
render it impassable, it was far from being certain
that they had been properly obeyed. By the
march of these two, columns, the strong country
about Castello Branco would be avoided, and the
still stronger defences of the Zezere turned; whilst
a communication would be immediatelyopened
with Regnier, and a junction formed at Thomar.
The third column, again, would, in all probability,
push direct upon Castello Branco and Abrantes;
whilst the fourth, if a fourth were employed, might
be expected to follow US, in the event .of .our re-
tiring by the Ponte de Marcella road, communi-
cating' all the whiIe with the troops directed upon
Pampelhoza, and uniting with the rest at Thomar.
Were this plan adopted, it appeared to me that




PENINSULAR WAIL 485


we should be. driven back as far as Villa Franca
and Torres Ved ras ; for there were no impedi-
ments in the way to check the enemy, and as we
had such a position in our rear, it would not be
judicious to risk an action on any other ground,
from which, e\ren if we should be successful in it,
no permanent advantage could be expected.


1 have said that, in -case the enemy should de-
termine to advance in the order abo ve specified,
there was but slender proba9ility of our" being able
to arrest thei1' progress, or offer to them any steady
front, till we should have taken up the fortified
line at Torres Yedras. Of that line, and of the
state of defensibility in which it now stood, it may
be necessary to take a little notice.


The position of Torres Yedras forms the gorge,
or neck of a peninsula, at the extremity of which
the city of Lisbon is placed. It measures in ex-
tent, from the mouth of the Zezandra on the sea to
Alhandra on the Tagus, about twenty-five English
miles; and it embraces in its profile every species
of ground calculated to assist the operations of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Along tbis line
were erected, at convenient distan ces, no fewer
than one hundred and eight redoubts, differing in
dimensions according to the extent of the ground
allotted for them, and the purposes which they
were severaIIy in tended to serve; and the whole
were armed with a train of four hundred and




486 NARRATIYE 01" THE


twenty pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre.
To protect these redoubts, and to give to their
occupants ample space for offensive as well
as defensive operations, mountains were per-
pendicularly scarped, rivers were dammed up,
and inundations formed; whilst of the roads
which once crossed the isthmus, many were
cut up and destroyed ; and many more, adapted to
the movements of troops, were rnade. The truth
is, that art, in the present instance, only filled up
the outlines, which nature had already drawn, of a
battle field, as formidable as ever was occupied by
troops. But the strongest positions must always
have their weak points; and even the lines of
Torres Vedras, though approaching as nearly to
tbe ímpregnable as it is possible for lines to do,
were not without their assailable corners. In
sorne place s the redoubts were unavoidably placed
at íntervals from one another so considerable, that
should there not be powerful reserves at hand,
and moveable columns to block up the chasms, the
enemy might, without 10ss 01' difficulty, penetrate
between them. This was peculiarly the case on
the flanks~ in the space between Mafra and the
sea on the one hand, and between Torres Yedras
and the Tagus 011 the other; and as illluck would
have it, these very spaces were, aboye aU others,
the most favourable to the operations of au" attack-
lng force. The froní" of the centre was completely




P~NINSULAR WAR. 487


covered by Monte Junto, which, extending its ra-
mifications to the very works, would necessarily
render the enemy's movements in that direction
both tedious and difficult; but the two flanks were
without such shelter, and must therefore depend
much upon the valoUl' of those who occupied them.
Of that, however, no doubt could be entertained ;
and hence we felt that, in falling back thither, we
were withdrawing to a stupendous fortification,
which nothing but a regular siege, of which the
duration was incalculable, could possibly reduce.
The sole risk, indeed, which we ran, was from
want of supplies. Were the French themselves
amply provisioned, and were the Alentejo to be
occupied, as it was probable that it would, by
Mortier's corps from Valencia, then indeed an
army of 60,000 men, thrown back upon a city
cémtaining at least 250,000 inhabitants, could not,
it was to be apprehended, hold out many months ;
but on these heads we saw no reason to be appre-
hensive. The enemy, we were well aware, car-
ried few supplies with him. We had either taken
care already, or were busily exerting ourselves, to
hinder any from being provided by the country
into which he was about to enter; and aboye ~1l,
the sea was open to uso Though, therefore, there
was something not flattering in the idea of retreat-
ing to the most remote corner of the Peninsula, we
prepared to retire thither with the feeling that it


.




488 NARRATIVE OF THE


was " reculer pour mieux sauter ;" and we already
looked forward with confidence to the moment
which should enable us once more to resume the
offensive.




PENINSULAR WAH.


CHAPTER XIX.


Preparations proceed, and plaos are formed-The light divisiou
attaeked at Alrneida, ami falls baek towards 1\ ¡verca-Ge·
Ileral movement of the British army towards the rear-Inde-
cision of .M assena-DiffieuIties ag'ainst whieh Lord 'VeIling-
ton is called upon to struggle-Almeida besieged and takell
- The garrison enter the French serviee""':" The enemy ad-
vanee, and the British army retires towards Busaeo.


THE intervening period between the 11th and
18th of July, 1810, was spent chiefly in receiving
reports touching the further movements of the
army, and in making such dispositions as the turn
which afi'airs were threatening to take appeared
to demando We learned at this time that tlle
rumour already mentioned, as to the march of
Regnier's corps, for the purpose of forming a
junction with Massena, and acting in connexion
with him, was correct. Regnier had arrived at
Coria and Moraliga, and had unavoidably opened




490 NARHATlVE OF THE


a communication with _ the General-in-chief, by
Abego and the pass of Perales. To render it the
more secure, Massena turned to his left, whilst at
the same time he threwa corps to his right, which,
under J unot, established itself at San Felice.
Regnier's movement naturally drew our attention
chiefiy to that quarter, and General Hill was, in
conseq uence, ordered from Villa Velha to Castello
Branco, where he arrived on the 20th. But this
was not the only effect which it produced. It
led us into further surmises respecting the ene-
my's future plans; and it induced us to make
such arrangements, as promised most effectually
to baffle him, should they be carried jnto effect.


From the. system which he had lately ádopted
in distributing his force, it appeared that Massena
was about to attempt one of two momentous
undertakings. He would either strengthen Reg-
nier so much as to render him superior to Hill,
with the view of moving him immediateIy upon
Castello Branco, and so forcing round our right;
or he was manceuvringto join him, by the pass of
Perales, to his own troops, and then, with very
superior numbers, to attack us on the Coa. There
was little ground f9r doubt as to which of these
arrangements would prove mo~t advantageous to
uso In case he should adopt the former plan,
there was a risk of Hill being disabled, in which
case our situation in the position of Guarda would




PEKH\SULAlt WAlt. 491


become extremely precarious; whilst in the event
of any disaster befalling us here, Hill must retreat
upon the Zezere, and we foll<;>w, with all the speed
of which we were capable. Were he, on the other
hand, to collect his whole force in our front, Hill
might be brought up to our line in three or four
marches, and other benefits might arise out of a
battle on the Coa, such as would not probably
attend a similar operation at a point nearer to the
capital. In the first place, the enemy must ap-
proach to the attack across the rivers in our front,
of which the banks were extremely rugged, and
in sorne places quite inaccessible; so that, if he
failed, his annihilation was almost unavoidable.
In the next place, it was probable that the Portu-
guese troops would fight with greater spirit on the
frontier, than after they had re ti red a considerable
way through the country. In their present situa-
tion, they felt that they were posted to protect
their wives, their families, their homes, and their
possessions ;-carry them further to the rear, and
they would see that, all these were already com-
promised. Whilst in the last place, it was not
going too far to believe that an action fought upon
the Coa would be entered upon, even by British
soldiers, with greater spirit and livelier zeal, than
one forced upon them when arrived within view of
their shipping. AH these consideratiol1s com-
bined tú- produce a hope that Massena would




492 NAltRATIYl'; OF THE


choose the bolder and more perilous course of as-
saulting- us in our position aboye the Coa. But to
counterbalance this, there was the knowledge
which we possessed, of the great sagacity and
experience of the officer opposed to us; who had
been taught, moreover, in more instances than
one, that it was not by open force that he could
ever hope to overthrow a British al'my of not very
inferior numbel's. The prcbability, thel'efore, was,
that he would not 9azard the attack in question;
but that moving round us, and accumulating
forces upon us in all directions, he would endea-
vour to wear us out by constant watchfulness,
and so make a pl'ey of us 3.t last, with líttle hazard
to himself. N 01' was it a thing impossible, that he
would, by a false attack upon our fl'ont, endea-
vour to draw off Hill fl'om the defence of Castello
Bl'anco, whilst he moved, at the same time, stl'ong
columns by his real', and thl'ew himself between
us and oul' line of retl'eat. These several schemes
wel'e aH, to a certain degree, feasible; and aH,
therefore, required attention. But we were headed
by one who was not behind Massena either in
clearness of foresight, 01' multiplicity of resources ;
and we well knew that he would direct no move-
ment which the circumstances of the case might
not demando


1 have said that the light dívision under Ge-
neral Crawford, to which the care of furnishing




PENINSULAR WAR. 493


the pickets was assigned, feH back, after the af-
fair of the 4th, to a new position between Almeida
and Fort Conception, where it fixed its head-
quarters, and established the rnass of its infantry
at a little village caBed Valdelamula. Our people
rernained here in quiet for some days, the enerny
rnaking no dernonstrations bf a move; but, on the
morning of the 16th, the infantry were ,still further
witbdrawn, ,and took shelter under the guns of
Almeida. It is worthy ofremark that Lord Wel-
lington had positively prohibited all fighting on'
points further in advance than the Coa. His or-
dersto General Crawford, which, that they might
not be misllnderstood, had been twice distinctIy
repeated, were, that he should by every possible
rneans ayo.id an action; and that as soon as he
becarne aware of the approach of an enemy, he
should retire, with ample space between, to the
opposite bank of the river. Crawford, however,
conceived that the French would respect the for-
tress of Almeida, that they would not push him
very rapidly, and hence that he would be able to
rnake a regular retreat at any momento He ac-
cordingly made up his mind not to retire on the
first intelligence of a movement, but to wait the
arrival of the French columns, and then to fall
back, slowly, orderly, and with some resistance,
in their presence. N o great wbile elapsed ere




494 NARRATIVE OF THE


the prudence of his determination was put to the
test.


On the 21st, the enemy put themselves in mo-
tion, and entered, without opposition, Valdela-
mula, Sto Pedro, and Villa Formosa; upon which
the garrison was withdrawn from Fort Conception,
and the fort itself blown up. Another pause of
three days now ensued, after which a force com-
posed of twenty-five squadrons of cavalry, ten
thousand infantry, and a correspondent train of
artillery, pushed forward in the direction of AI-
meida. General Crawford was advertised of this
movement at an early hour on the morning of the
24th. The resolution which he had formed, how-
ever, of holding as long as it should be defensible,
his present position, remained unshaken, and in-
stead of retiring, he drew up his division in line,
resting his left upon Almeida, and having his right,
as well as his rear, covered by the Coa. Here he
prepared to give battle; and here, before many
hours elapsed, he was attacked in force.


There were three British pickets, t\yo ofinfantry
and one of cavalry, about half-way between Villa-
mula and Almeida. The sun had not yet risen
on the 24th, when they found themselves assailed
by the enemy's skirmishers, which in whole swarms
covered the advance ofthe columns of cavalry and
infantry. Our people retired, but they re ti red




PENINSULAR WAR. 495


slowly and in good order, disputing every inch of
ground; and both suffering themselves, and caus-
ing their assailants to suffer, no inconsiderable 10ss.
The skirmish was the more interesting, as it is
impossible to conceive any piece of ground better
adapted for a rencontre of the kind,-an extensive
plain, intersected continually by hedges, stone
walls, and ellclosures, stretching all the way from
Villamula to the Coa; and it was through this
that our soldiers feH back, retaining with obstinacy
each successive fence, till the superior numbers of
the enemy compelled them to abandon it. Dur-
ing the continuance of this skirmish, the French
cavalry made more than one attempt to cut off
portions of the British infantry, and they were not
always unsuccessful. A division of hussars dash-
ing forward into a part of the plain more open
than the rest, threw themselves between the inter-
vals in a company of the 52nd, and in spite of a
heavy tire with which they were saluted, suc-
ceeded in making prisoners of an officer and about
fourteen meno


The skirmishers being now driven in, the French
prepared to follow up their successes, by vigorous-
ly assaulting Crawford's position. They bore down,
with a dense column, upon his centre, where
the 95th, with two Portuguese regiments, were
posted; and in spite of a desperate resistance,
particularly from the 95th, and one of the foreign




496 NARRATIYE OF THE


battalions, pierced it. By this time our cavalry
had witbdrawn to the opposite side of the Coa,
and our infantry being in sorne disorder, affairs
assumed rather an unpromising aspect; Crawford,
accordingly, determined upon a retreat; but it
was undertaken under trying and ticklish circum-
stances; and it wa" not executed without a heavy
10ss, both in killed and prisoners. The only route
open to General Crawford's division, was by a
bridge across the stream; which, as it 1ay upon a
leve1 considerably beneath the ground now occu-
pied by the enemy, was unavoidab1y exposed to a
heavy tire from most of their guns. Thither, how-
ever, it was necessary to proceed, and thither regi-
ment after regiment was moved, covered in suc-
cession by the corps in the rear, and 1ast of a11 by
a body of skirmishers. The French made severa1
brave attempts to force the bridge; they charged
towards it repeated1y, as our peopIe were descend-
ing, and endeavoured to push a body of their ca-
valry across in our rear; but the opposite bank
rising abruptly, and being covered both with arti1-
1ery and infantry, they were on each occasion
stopped. At length the firing ceased; and Craw-
ford, having halted ou his new ground till evening,
retreated, under cover of the darkness, to a posi-
tion within four leagues of Alverca.


There can be no doubt that in this skirmish
the British troops fuUy supported their character




PENINSULAR WAR. 497


for gallantry and coolness; but it was to be re-
gretted that the action had taken place at aH. It
was not our wisdom to waste our strength in par-
tial encounters, particularly when these must be
followed, as in the present instance, by a retrograde
movement; and of this Lord Wellington was, 1
believe, fully satisfied, as he had cautioned any
such to be wantonly incurred. Yetwas Crawford
an officer of singular ability and bravery, and cer-
tainly one of the best in the army, as all his pro-


. ceedingsshowed; and even here he did as much,
or perhaps more, than most men in a similar
situation could have performed. But 1 doubt if he
was strictly within his orders; and certainly con-
siderable dissatisfaction was felt at head-quarters
when the report of Jhe affair carne in.


The enemy having thus begun to move, our
attEmtion was powerfully called to the next steps
which they should take; because it was concluded
that from these a tolerably accurate judgment
might be formed, as to the plan upon which they
proposed to conduct the campaign. AH eyes were
consequently turned upon them; but though they
showed themselves during both the 25th and 26th
on our side of the Coa, it was not in force sufficient
to authorise our coming to any conc1usion as to
their future proceedings. The question which
interested us most deeply at present was, whether
they would halt to besiege Almeida in force; or,


VOL. J. 2 1




498 ,~AIlRA'fIVE OF 't'IlE


leaving a corps to mask it, would push on with
the strength of their army into Portugal. In case
they should adopt the former lineof policy, then
might we continue where we were, watching their
progress, and striving perhaps, as opportunities
offered, to impede it ;-were they to pursue the
latter course, then must we remove elsewhere.
Lord Wellington, however, was desirous of obtain-
ing fuU information on these heads befóre he
moved his arrny, 01' !ook any other decided step;
and the 25th and 26th were, in consequence, spent
by us in a state of quieto


On the 27th the French pushed forward several
strong patrols as far as the river Pinhel. Though
there was nothing in this absolutely decisive of the
question at issue, still it gave rise to a belief that
they might perhaps' advance in force; in which
case Lord Wellington appeared to feel that the
army, situated as it now was, would fill rather a
precarious situatioll. As it was not illtended to
risk a general action here, we should, of course,
fall back to avoid it; but were we hurried in that
movement, sorne 10ss and much confusion would
be the consequence. It was accordingly resolved
to march some leagues to the rear, and having
opened free space for the British troops, by sending
on the Portuguese brigades in front, to establish the
head-quarters at Celerico. This place, situated at
the head of the gorges of the Estrella, presented a




PE:\fINSULA R W A R. 499


post of much greater strength and importance to
an arrny threatened by superior numbers, than the
extended line on which it had hitherto acted;
where it was liable to be forced at aH points,
should it attempt to defend itself throughout, or
where, should it concentrate, it could only assume
a position exposed to a fhousand haza~ds by turn-
ing. Nor was this aH. By falling back, in good
order, upon Celerico, we had it in our power to
despatch the whole of our divisions, which must
necessarily retire by the same road at perfect lei-
sure, and with proper intervals between thern;



because having the start ofthe enemy byseveral
marches, they would find it a hard rnatter to over-
take Dr annoy uso


As soon as this determination was formed, no
time was permitted to elapse before it was carried
i'nto effect. The cava:lry, amounting in aH to
twenty-four squadrons, were moved up to Alverca,
where they held themselves in readiness to cover
the retreat. The light division marched to Cele-
rico; the first to Penhancas; the third to Cara-
pentra, Fares, and the vi'llages near. With re-
speet to the fourth division, it continued to occupY
Guarda, because it was deemed essential to retain
that place for sorne time longer, in order to keep
open the eommunication with General HiIl, whose
corps was still in position at Alalay; but General
Cole received instruetions, in the event of our re-




500 NARRATIVE OF THE


trog-rading- beyond Celerico, to retire by a moun-
tain road and rejoin uso Of the enemy's inten-
tions, however, we were still ignorant. It was
confidently asserted, indeed, that all design of
acting- upon our right had been abandoned, and
that Regnier had attached himself to Massena,
merely for the sake of adding- to his weigbt, and
enabling- hirn to move with greater effect upon our
front; but the arrang-ement appeared in itself so
improbable, that we were scarcely disposed to
believe it. We were, however, equally prepa,red
for either emergency; and as our marches to the
rear were conducted without any interference on
the part of the enerny, we soon found ourselves
in a position from which it was in our power to
move, either forward or still further back, in com-
parative safety, and at our own convenience.


When we began our retrog-ression, it was with a
fun assurance on our minds, that a few days, at
the furthest, would suffice to throw sorne certain
lig-ht upon the enemy's plan s and intentions. To
our g-reat surprise, however, day after day and
week after week elapsed, and they still continued
as inert an:d undecided as ever. A1meida, tbough
invested, was not threatened with a siege, neitber
were corps in movement against us; though a full
fortnight had passed since the affair with Craw-
ford's division on the Coa, and a month since
Ciudad Rodrigo submitted. There was, of course,




PENINSULAR W AR. 501


but one line of poliey for us to pursue; we eould
only wait, with patienee, till Massena should see
fit to do something; whereas it appeared as if the
f'rench Marshal were either completely at a 10ss
how to proceed, or that his means and resources
were inadequate to the objects in contemplation.
The reader will easily believe that so great an
appearance of diffidence on the part of the French,
tended not a little to inspire us with sentiments
diametrically the reverse. Lord Wellington, in
particular, augured the best results írom a eonsi-
deration of matters around him; and if there were
any who still continued to harbour apprehensions
touching the final issue of the campaigo, these ap-
prehensions had eertainly lost mueh of their
strength and plausibility. No doubt there were
moments when a consideration of the existing
state of Europe-everywhere in submission to the
influence of France, and everywhere in arms
agaiost us - would renew those ~larms which
present events had a tendency to smooth down;
but with such speculations we felt that we had
nothing to do, and therefore we resolutely looked
forward with a hope, which we were willing to
believe rested on no insecure foundation.


Whilst our bodies were kept at rest, our minds
were from time to time occupied by rumours
which came in, in great numbers, from different
parts of the country. We heard one day that




502 NARRATIVE OF TRE


Regnier' had advanced as far as Castello Branco,
and that Hill hOO fallen back upon his strong po-
sition at Largedas. There had been a little skir-
mishing on this occasion; and it gave us satisfaction
to be told that the Portuguese cavalry had been
brought into play, and had acquitted itself well.
N ext we were informed that the peasantry were
furming t;hemselves into bands of guerillas, and
that they had already taken and killed several
straggling parties of the enemy in the vicinity of
Guarda. But the most pleasing intelligence of all
which reached us at this time, reported the suc-
cess which Silveira's followers had obtained over a
body of Fl'ench troops at Parba de Sanatrice. A
Swiss bat&lion in the French service fiad, it ap-
peared, attacked a Spanish post at the above
}place. The Spaniards gave' way, and fled; but a
body of Portuguese mili tia belonging to Silveira's
eorps, adva~eed against the enemy, and shut them
up in the town .. Having sustained a blockade
for sorne days, the enemy were glad to surrender
llpon terms; and they were sent, to the number of
four hundred, to their own eountry, on eondition
that they woufd not serve again in the Peninsula.
Considered in itself" su eh a vietory, followed by
such eonsequences, was not, indeed, an event
very highly to be spoken of; but it promised to
be produetive of effeets more important than the
mere removal of a few hundred of the enemy from




PE!\'IXSULAR W AR. 503


{he scene of operations. It gave the militia con-
fidence in themselves and in their leaders; and it
would doubtless induce others to emulate the deeds
of their fellow-countrymen, whenever fitting op-
portunities might come in the way.


AH our rumours were not, however, of a de-
scription so cheering. It was stated, upon autho-
rity which appeared to be good, that Mortier had
broken up from the neighbourhood of Seville, and
that he was in full march to replace Regnier's
corps on the left bank of the Tagus. That su eh a
movernent had been in contemplation, we were
well aware, and the chief source of astonishment
on our side was, that it had not long ago taken
place; but we.understood now, that sorne differ-
ences between Joseph and Victor onthe one hand,
and Massena on the other, had hitherto prevented
it. The former chiefs were unwilling to spare
Mortier from the support of the force employed
before Cadiz; whilst the latter insisted upon his
being despatched into Portugal, as essential to the
great operations in progress. The dispute, it
appeared, had been referred to Paris, and now
the Emperor's decision having arrived, Massena's
wishes were preferred to those of the King of
Spain and his lieutenant. To us this was rather
an alarming piece of news. We were already op-
posed by numbers so great, as to keep our utmost
vigilance and skill in action, for the purpose of




504 NARRATIVE OF 'rRE


effectual1y watching them; there was no need of
an addition to the sources of aJarm by which we
were surrounded; nor was it a cause of inconsi-
derable annoyance to reflect, that a large portion
of our nominal army was placed in a situation
where it could prove of no real service. The
reader is doubtless aware that under the common
head of the Peninsular army were included, not
onIy the divisions immediately commanded by
Lord Wellington, with such detached corps as
might be employed in operations along the coast
of Alicant, but the garrison of British troops shut
up in Cadiz, to the number of eight thousand meno
Unquestionably it was a wise precaution to intro-
duce so me British regiments into that important
place; without them it is at least problematical
whether Cadiz would have sustained, as itdid, a
tedious blockade of many months. But the ques-
tion is, whether two thousand men would have
sufficed for that service, whilst the remaining six
thousand could have. been employed to unspeak-
able advantage elsewhere. As yet, however, the
tact of conducting a continental war with the spirit
which was necessary, was new in England. Not
only were we deprived of this large portion of our
own force, and that, too, for a purpose which ap-
peared nugatory,-but of the reinforcements which
had been promised from Halifax and Sicily, one
regiment alone arrived; and even the vacancies oc-




PENINSULAR WAR. 505


casioned in the ranks of the different battalions in
Portugal, by death, sickness, and other casualties
of war, were either not filled up at all, or were
filled up very imperfectly. . This was doubly dis-
tressing, at the present moment" when the uu-
healthy season having returned, our sick began
daily to increase in numbers, and when, 1 regret
to say, instances of desertion, particularly from the
German cavalry, became frequent. Lord Wel-
lington, 1 apprehend, felt, though he carefully
strove to conceal it, tha-! he was not supported, as
he ought to have been, from home; and there
were few officers in his army, possessed of pene-
tration, who did not likewise feel it.


Though it falls not in with the plan of the pre-
sent narrative to enter minutely iuto the order of
affairs purely political, 1 may be permitted to ob-
serve that Lord Wellington found himself, at this
critical juncture, beset with many other difficulties
besides those which originated in the insufficiency
of his own force, and the tremendous superiority
of the enemy. AH responsibility was thrown upon
him. The instructions which he received were
generally so expressed, as to leave him ground for
doubt respecting the course which would be mos!
agreeable to his employers; whilst hints were
thrown out, that he ought to look aboye all things
to the preservation of the force intrusted to him.
In few words, the ministers were alarmed at the
crisis to which affairs had arrived, and their con-




506 NARllATlVE üF THE


duct partook of their fears. N or was the govern-
ment of Portugal to be depended upon. A variety
of intrigues were going on there, augmented and
renewed from time to time by arrivals from the
Brazils; and a thousand impedimenfs were thrown
in the way of every useful suggestion, provided it
ñappened to come from the English General or his
friends. At last a new form of government was
invented, in which both the British minister
ando Lord Wellesley were included; and by
which Admiral Berkeley was advanced to the
chief command of the fleet, as Lord Wellington
had been to the chief command of the army.
Yet even then,-even at a moment when Lord
'Vellington was enabled to mark out, as it were,
a situation for himseIf, he was far from being
emancipated from trouble. Continual referen-
ces were made to him on the subject of civil
arrangements, and he found himself almost una-
voidably involved in the many petty cabals and
jealousies, ofwhich he had so lIluch reason to com-
plain. lt is not going too far to affirm, that a
Britisn commander has seldom, if ever, stood in
a predicament more harassing and more un-
satisfactory than that occupied by the Duke of
WeIlington during the summer of 1810; and that
probably not a single individual in the service of
the crown could have carried himself through the
difficulties arising out of it, except the man who
stntggled with and overcame them.




PENINSULAR WAR.· 507


The indecision which had marked the enemy's
movements, ceased at length to exert its· influence ;
and on the 14th of August, 1810, they sat down
in force before the fortress· of Almeida. On the
following day, ground ,,'as broken; but the works
proceeded so slowly, that the 25th arrived before
the first batteries were constructed. At one point,
however, owing to the faulty nature of the fortifi-
cation, the approaches had been pushed, without
rnuch interruption from the fire of the place, to the
foot af the glacis; but the batteries just spoken of
were erected at a prodigious distan ce, and carne in
only with the line of the first parafIel, far beyond
the proper range of battering cannon. Almeida,
regarded by the Portuguese as one of the principal
bulwarks of their country, was garrisone.d at tbis
time by two regiments of militia, and one of the
Hne, which were placed under the orders of Briga-
dier-General Cox, an officerofmerit and resolution;
and it was confidently expected that the resistan ce
made by it would not at least faH short. however
much it might exceed the resistance offered by the
feebler fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.


Lord Wellington, as soon as he learned that the
enemy had begun the siege, once more moved his
arrny to the position w hich it had occu pied pre-
vious to the late retrogression.· His object in this
was not only to encourage tbe garrison to a des-
perate defence, by creating in it tbe hope of a




508 NARRATIVE OF THE


speedy relief, but to draw off the troops whenever
the place should become untenable, avoiding, at
the same time, a general action; and had the
garrison acted with even moderate determination,
there is every reason to believe that he would
have effected the latter objeet, even though he
should have failed in the former. But the garri-
son did not do its duty. lt yielded on the :first
appearance of ealamity, and aceompanied its sur-
render with proeeedings which left no room to
doubt that the aceident alluded to was not the sole
cause of a sllbmission so unlooked-for and so ill-
timed.


The enemy's batteries opened at a long range
on the 26th; and in the evening of that day a
magazine, in whieh was deposited the ehief part
of the powder in the place, unfortunately blew up.
lt happened that sorne cars were in the act of
couveying ammunitiou from the building, when a
shell exploded at the door, and the loose powder
having ignited, the :fire was communieated to the
whole depot, aud it instantIy exploded. This was
indeed a heavy calamity; and Lord Wellingtou
and Marshal Beresford, iu their publie despatches,
attributed to it, aud to it alone, all the events
whieh followed; but the conduct of the garrisou
was sueh as to couvinee every unprejlldieed 'ob-
server, that iu so doing they spoke, uot from feel-
ing, but from poliey; and that, even had uo su eh




PENINSULAR W AR. 509


misfortune befallen, little was to be expected at
their hands. It was no sooner known in the town
that the principal magazine had been destroyed,
than the whole of the office"rs, with the Tenente
Rey, or second in command, at their head, pro-
ceeded to Governor Cox in a body, and insisted
upon his instantly surrendering. General Cox
warmly remonstrated against the measure, and
ordering them to repair to their several posts, in-
formed them that he ¡ntended, as soon as affairs
should become desperate, to cut his way through
the enemy's lines, and join Lord Wellington. The


"officers withdrew in evident displeasure; but
when the Governor came forth to instruct the
soldiers in the duty expected from them, he found
that aUhad laid down their arms, and that there
was not aman willing to obey his commands, or
follow his footsteps. U nder such circumstances,
but one measure remained for him to adopto He
accepted the terms offered by the French through
the Marquis D'Alorna; and on the following day,
being formally summoned, he most reluctantly
surrendered.


This was bad enough: it was sufficiently mor-
tifying to find that our allies, when left to them-
selves, could not be depended upon as friends; it
was a thousand times more mortifying to be con-
vinced that with unaccountable fickleness they
were prepared, on suitable occasions, to becom~




51'0 NARHATIVE OF THE


0urenemies. The Freneh army entered Almeida
on the 26th, and the garrison being paraded be-
fore him, Massena behaved towards them with a
degree of good poliey, not gene rally pursued either
by him or his brother marshals. From the militia
he exacted nothing more than a solemn assurance
that they would 110t again take arms against the
French, and tben dismissed them tu~their homes;
whilst to the soldiers of the line he offered various
advantages, provided they would ·consent to take
service under the banners of N apoleon. To the
eternal disgrace of the persons thus tampered
with, aH, both officers and men, embraced the
proposal, and all passed over, without the slightest
apparent reluetanee, to the ranks of the enemy.
True, it was industriously given out that the mea-
sure in question had been adopted with Que -view
only-namely, that they might be preserved from
certain captivity in France, and find opportunities
of again desertiug to their countrymen; but it is
hardly neeessary to observe that no 0Ile dreamed
of again plaeing relianee on men who could thus
set all honourable and proper feeling at defiance.
For my own parto 1 looked upon the ci-devant
garrison of Almeida as a band of contemptible
cowards, or barefaced tn¿itors; and 1 believe ~that
the sentiments which 1 entertained towards them,
were, without a single exception, entertained by
every man and officer in the British_army.




PENINSCLAR WAR. 511


1 have rnentioned the Marquis D'Alorna as
taking part in this negociation, so little creditable
to the persons who were the subjects of it.
D'Alorna was a Portuguese of talent, though a
deterrnined and uncomprornising partisan of the
French. When they entered the country before,
under Junot, he declared warrnly in their favour;
and having been governor of the province of Beira,
was enabled to render them sorne important ser-
VIces. It is but fair to state, however, that
D'Alorna's treaehery arose, not frorn any motives
of personal arnbition, but out of an hereditary
abhorrenee of the reigning farnily, from whorn his
ancestors, for rnany generations baek, had suffered
great oppression. Many of them, indeed, had
been beheaded as traitors, when, according to his
statement at least, they had committed nodeeds
deserving of the punishment; and the hatred
stirred up by sueh cruelties descended, like an
he ir-100m, frorn father to son, till it broke out, at
length, in the person of the present Marquis.
D'Alorna was, as 1 have said, a ruan of ability";
but he was something more than this. He knew
intimately all the parties wrueh existed in his
native country, and all the seeret springs by which
they were severally guided; and he was more,
perhaps, than any other individual, competent to
direet the Freneh in the operations which they
might desire to undertake for its subjugation.




512 NARRATIVE OF THE


Such aman, actuated by such feelings, was not
overlooked by the politic N apoleon, who gave him
the ral1k of general of division in the French
armies, and sent him, in this capacity, against the
land of his fathers.


As 800n as the faH of Almeida becarne kl1own,
Lord Wellington lost no time in retracing his
steps, and again placing his divisions in the posi-
tion which hé had assurned previous to the late
advance. They had not, however, long resumed
their station, when they were called upon once
more to abandon it; for the enerny advancing on
the 1st, with a few squadrons of cavalry and sorne
infantry, attacked our outposts at Alverca, and
drove thern in. Lord Wellington was not willing
to risk a general action here, if it could be avoided.
He was desirous, on the contrary, of stretching
further to the rear, in order to bring his divisions
into closer communication with General Hill, to
be nearer to the position of the Ponte de Marcella,
and, if the case should require it, to take it up;
and all this he was anxious to effect for the pur-
pose of hindering the enerny frorn pressing be-
tween our corps, or pushing hard upon our right,
which, as 1 have already hinted, we looked upon
. as his probable course of operations. He accord-
ingly issued orders for the whole army to faH
back, and fixed his head-quarters on the following
day at Gouvea. By this· movement he kept in




PENINSULAR WAlt. 513


check any troops which n1ight endeavour to
advance from Sabugal by way of Covilhos, and he
threw an insurmountable obstacle in the way of
all attempt to alarm both Hill's and our corps, by
turning the fortified position of the Zezere.


It soon appeared, however, that in the plan of
operations which sorne had drawn out for the
enemy, they had fallen into many errors. In-
stead of manreuvring upon our right, Massena
moved the whole of his force, no( excepting the
corps of General Regnier, towards our left, and
drew us off, almost as soon as we had taken up
our new position, to fresh ground, and more active
undertakings. How this was effected, it will be
necessary to state at length.


The reader has been already iriformed that
Massena, instead of employing Regnier on the left
of the Tagus, called him in, and united him to
himself. The surrender of Almeida no sooner set
him free from the last remaining encumbrance in
his front, than he prepared to enter upon his
grand undertaking-the invasion of Portugal; and
contrary to all surmises, he resolved to commence
his campaign as follows :-Whilst Regnier moved
by the route which we had taken, with a view of
threatening the position of Ponte de Marcella in
front, two other corps, one under the command of
N ey, another headed by Junot, marched in par al-


VOL. I. 2 K




514 NARRATIVE OF THE


lel columns to the right, and directed their steps,
the former by the upper road from San Felices,
through Trancoso, tbe latter by Celerico, and
across the Mondego, near that town, upon Vizeu.
His object in these movements evidently was, to
turn the position of tbe Ponte de Marcella, and to
compel us to abandon a line, wbich, had we been
followed by the main body instead of by a single
corps, would have afforded an éxtremely desirable
situation for a general action. How it came about
that Massena determined upon tbis plan, 1 confess
myselfunable to form even a conjecture. Perhaps
he entertained, an idea that tbe passage of the Ze-
zere would be difficult, that Abrantes would pre-
sent to him a formidable obstacle, and that the
country between Castello Branco and tbe Tagus
would suppIy his troops with nothing requisite for
their subsistence; or perhaps he apprehended
serious obstructions from Romana's army, as well
as from the garrisons of Badajoz and Elvas in h'is
rearo Whether any or all of tbese motives had
weight with him, 1 know not; but there can be
little doubt that, in relinquishing the line of tbe
Tagus, he gave up some advantages; such, for ex-
ample, as a close .communication with Mortier,
and the army before Cadiz; for which, nothing to
be obtained by his new plan of operations would
seem to compensate. Be this however as it may,




PENINSULAR W AR. 515


we were soon informed that he had actualIy
moved in the order aboye described; and we
instantly prepared, by marching upon Cortico,
near the Ponte de Marcella, to meet him upon
the fresh arena which he had chosen to mark
out.


In former parts of this narrative, 1 have taken
occasion to particularise the amount both of our
own force and of that of the enemy. Our esti-
mates respecting the French were generally drawn
froro the reports of deserters, who are invariably
disposed rather to overrate than underrate the
strength of the party whom they have abandoned ;
but at this time we discovered, from certain
intercepted retums, that the effective strength of
the three columns aboye specified amounted, in
the whole, to rather more than 70,000 meno Our
numbers, again, were as follows: of British infan-
try there were in the field 23,868; of British
cavalry 2870; of British artillery 2000; making
a total of 28,738 British soldiers: of Portuguese
there were infantry 21,712, cavalry 1696, and
artillery 1000. The grand total of the allied
army accordingly carne up to 53,136. But of
these full 25,000 were at a distance, so me under
Hill, others under Leith, so that we too k up our
ground at Ponte de Marcella with littIe more than
28,000 meno We took it up, however, in such
time as to authorise a well-grounded expectation,




516 N ARRATIVE OF THE


tbat before any serious attack could be made, they
would be enabled to join; yet were we far from
being at our ease, especially when intelligence
arrived, that the whole of Ma~sena's ariny bad
crossed the Mondego. The truth, indeed, ¡s, that
against odds so tremendous, more particularly
when it was considered that one-half of our troops
had never seen an enemy, no man could be very
sanguine of success. Had all within our camp
been Britons, then, indeed, tbough the victory
would have doubtless cost us dear, we should
have still, counted upon it as certain; but with
every disposition to think well of the Portuguese,
we were unable to persuade ourselves, that when
the moment of triál carne, they would be found
equal, 1 say not to their allies, but to their ene-
mies. Our object therefore, was to avoid a ren-
contre, unless upon ground so favourableas almost
to insure success; and for the attainment of that
object, all Lord Wellington's movements were
henceforth directed.


As soon as he had positively ascertained that
the French were passing the Mondego with their
third column, Lord Wellington threw two divi-
sions, the líght and the fourth, to the north bank
of that river. In the mean while, the first divi-
sion, consisting of six British and two Portuguese
brigades, advanced from Coimbra, where it had
latterIy been stationed, as far as Mealhada, on the




l'ENINSULAH W AR. 517


great road to Oporto. The third division, Ge-
neral Picton's, with the cavalry under Cotton,
were thus the only force left on the southern side
of the Mondego; and they posted themselves,
the one behind the Alva, the other in front of the
Ponte de Marcella. It is, perhaps, unnecessary
to add, that the Iatter corps were left in these
situations, merely to keep open the communica-
tion with Generals Hill and Leith; and that they
received orders, as soon as these üfficers should
have formed their junction, to follow the rest of
the army across the river. From these various ar-
rangements, it became sufficientIy manifest that
Lord WeHington was even now Iooking out for a
convenient field on which to offer his adversary
battle; and we were not slow inarriving at the
conclusion, that the first great struggle would
take place at a point not very remote from the
position now occupied by the left of the British
arrny.


As 1t will be necessary for me, in giving a de·
tai! of future operations, to describe minutely the
nature of the ground just referred to, 1 will not
detain the reader by laying before hirn any pre-
mature or imperfect sketch of the position of Bu-
saco. It will be better, perhaps, to close the pre-
sent chapter with a recapitulation of certain un-
propitious rurnours, which, at this critical moment,
carne upon us with even more than their usual




518 NARRATIVE OF THE


exaggeration. We heard, to our extreme rnor-
tification, that Romana, having improvidently
quitted his strong-hold, and advanced as far as
Puente de Castro, haIf way between Seville and
Badajoz, had risked an action with Mortier, and
suffered asevere defeat. So complete,· indeed,
was the ront represented to have been, that
nothing except the distinguished gallantry of a
corps of Portuguese cavaIry, which Lord Wel-
lington had lent to Romana sorne time before,
saved the Spanish army frorn utter annihilation ;
but a11 the bravery of these rnen was unáble to
restore the fortune of the day; and the whole had
retreated in disorder to Badajoz. The battle was
stated to have been fought on the 15th; and as
Mortier was represented as fo11owing up the fugi-
tives with great vigour, it became with us a ques-
tion of some moment, whether he rnight not arrive
in time materially to assist Massena, by threaten-
ing our right from Alcantara, or even from
Abrantes. This was an idea pregnant with alarm
to many, and productive, as a11 ideas in these
times were, of a thousand idle conjectures and
specuIations. But our chief seemed entirely to
disregard' it. Whether he doubted the authen-
ticity of the report, or calculated upon the igno-
rance of his adversary, or upon his want of ability
to takeproper advantage of the circumstance,
should it be real, 1 know not. This, however, 1




PENINSULAR WAR. 519


do know, that he continued to issue his commands,
and to arrange his plan s, with the same unbend-
ing firmness; and that all things went on as cooUy.
as orderly, and with as much deliberation, as if no
such rumour had reached uso


END OF VOL. r.


\
LONDON:


'PRrNTED IIY A. J. VAl,PV, RED LlON COURT, FLEET STREE·t-. ...• cc .•. //
/




NARRATIVE


OF THE


P E N 1 N S U LAR W A R.


VOL. Jr




PRINTED BY A. J. VALPY, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.




NARRATIVE


OF TUI':


PENINSULAR W AR,.


FROM 1808 TO 1813. ,~;:~~
S.·.··( I /.'. ~··.~.l. ~ ~ ~. .~r./
?,' .' • ':::"/;


'BY LIEUT.-GENERAL clIARLES WILLIAM'VANE, " . ,/
! \... .... ~~ ..... ;I¡~QUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.c.;~ij~a, .


COLONEL OF THE TENTH ROYAL HUSSARS.


THIRD EDITION,


wnH AN APPENDIX OF CORRESPONDENCE.


IN TWO VOLUMES.


VOL. n.


,- ~. :,,- ,-.,",~.:
-.'- .


j
./


LONDON:


HENRY COLBURN, NEW BURLlNGTON STREET./~/··
1829. ./


.'. ''¡' .




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CONTENTS


o>


THE SECOND VOLUME.


CHAPTER I.


Battle of Busaco--The British army retires upon Torres
Ved ras, slowly followed by the French-Description of the
lines-General review of the campaign, and condition of the
two armies-Lord ,,y ellingtoll receives reillforcements Page 1


CHAPTER JI.


~Iassena halts before the lines, which are illdustriously streng-
thened by the British troops-Lord 'VelIillgton, alarmed fol'
Abrantes, sellds a corps across the Tagus to secure it-For-
tifies a new positioll on the south side of the harbour-The
enemy construct boats on the river-Retire to Salltarem, alld
take up a position - The alIies follow, and go illto cantoll.-




VI CONTENTS.


ments 1Il front of them - Various movements of uetachcd
bodies, and many rumours touching the future 32


CHAPTER III.


State of affairs on the southern frontier-Advance of Soult
against Badajoz-Capture of Olivenfa, and Ínvestment of Ba-
dajoz-General Mendizabal defeated, and Badajoz taken-
Campo Mayor reduced-Massena breaks up from Saníarem,
and retreats into Spain-Marshal Beresford marches towards
Badajoz-;-Attack of a French convoy at Campo Mayor-
The British corps passes the Guadiana, reduces Olivenfa,
and invests Badajoz-Lord Wellington visits this corps, and
gives directions for the siege-Is recaIled to the north, where
the army remains in position round Fuentes de Honor . 71


CHAPTER IV.


Battle of Fuentes de Honor-Re-investment of Almeida-
The French garrison blo~ up the place, and escape-Massena's
army retires into Spain, and Lord Wellington's Ínto canton-
ments-Siege of Badajoz by Marshal Beresford-Is raised
in consequence of the advance of Soult-Lord Wellington
sends off reinforcements to Marshal Beresford, and sets out
to join him-The Marshal's corps assemble in position at
V~Vff& 100


CHAPTER V.


Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz-Battle of
Albuera-Retreat of Soult, and renewal of the siege-It is
pressed with vigour, and a breach in Fort St. Christoval pro-




CONTENTS. VII


nounced practicable - Movements of the enemy to ,relieve
the place-Brilliant cavalry affair at Usagre 128


CHAPTER VI ..


Siege ofBadajoz-Fort Sto Christoval twice stormed without
cffect-Movements of tite enemy to relieve tite town-Lord
Wellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Por-
tugal-Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversion, and
retires to Cadiz-The Britislt army takes post behind the
Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas-Intercepted letter from
Marmont to Berthier-The allies go into cantonments. 155


CHAPTER VII.


Amnsements of the officers in quarters-Lord Wellington
suddenly moves towards Rodrigo, and invests the place-Dis-
position of the army in its new alignment-Description of the
country round Ciudad Rodrigo-Reports of the preparations
made' by the enellly to raise the sieg'e of that city, and ar-
rangements entered into in consequence 181


CHAPTER VllI.


Delay on the part of the enemy to connuence 0l'erations-
They advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; throw in a con-
voy, and pass the Agueda-Skirmishes along the front of thc
British line, which falls back upon Fuente Guinaido-Dis-
play of French troops thcre-Lord 1YeJlington retires to Al.
fayates- Partial actiolls during the lllovement-Thc enemy
withdraw, and the British troops retire into cantonuwnts be-




viii CON'fENTS.


hind the Coa-Ciudad Rodrigo observed by flying parties-
:Exploits of Don Julian 20 ....


CHAPT.Elt IX.


Increasing jealousies amollg the 8paniards, and nllmert>us
disasters in the south, produce gloom in the British arrny-
It continues in its quarters, and rnakes preparations to he-
siege Ciudad Rodrigo-The French armies suddenly withdraw
towards the south and east of 8pain-Lord Wellington moves
to the front, and invests Rodrigo-Progress of the siege-
Storming and capture of the place 231


Appendix 271




NARRATIVE


OF THE


PENINSULAR WAR.


CHAPTER I.


Battle of Busaco-The British army retires upon Torres Ve-
dras, slowly foIlowed by the French-Description of the
lines-General review of the campaign, and condition of the
two armies-Lo1"d Wellington receives reinforcements.


h has been stated in the former volume, that the
whole of the troops which composed the French
arrny of Portugal, advanced, in pursuit of us,by
columns of corps, between the Mondego and the
Douro. Instead, however. of continuing their
maTch, as we had anticipated, by these distinct
routes, they soon struck into a single line, and
proceeded, in one immensebody. along the Vizeu
road, on the right bank of the MondegQ. It 1S
worthy of remark, that the road thus selected IS


VOL. II. A




2 NARRATIVE OF THE


one of the worst in Portugal, and that it presented
at this time so many natural difficulties to the
transport of guns and wheeled carriages, as to be
by us esteemed quite impassable. Yet by that
road were the French troops pushed forward, and
though they were followed. by an enormous train
of carriages, of artillery, ammunition-waggons,
and other materiel, they nevertheless contrived to
make way with considerable rapidity and order.


As soon as the first intelligence of these move-
ments reached us, we retired from Celerico, and
took up fresh ground in the viciníty of Gouvea.
This was done under a persuasion that the enemy
would make his principal attack upon our right;
but it was no sooner ascertained that the road
by which we had fallen back remained unoc-
cupied, than Lord Wellington directed his columns
upon the point threatened, and in a very masterIy'
style of manreuvre, threw the whole of his army
across the Mondego, between the 25th and 26th.
At the same time, the corps of Generals Hill and
Leith were moved, the one from Largedas, the
other from, Thomar, by the Espinhel road; and
they both arrived on the latter day at the river.
Lord Wellington's corps crossed at the Bavia de
Pina Cova, and a1: the fords in the neighbourhood
of Ponte de Marcella. The light division, with
the cavalry,· were then pushed forward to meet
the enemy's advance as far as Santa Comba Dao;




PENINSULAR WAR.


the first division was placed at Mealhada, on the
great road w hich leads froro Coimbra to O porto;
the fourth occupied the left of the position of Bu-
saco, which it was now arranged to take up;
whilst the third, leaving sufficient room for the
first to form betweeo, in case the attack should
be made exclusively 00 the heights, unsupported
by anyattempt to turn our Hank, took post in con-
tinuation ofthe line thus marked out. Such were
the general arrangements entered into on the
25th; it remains now to describe the nature of
the ground on which it was pr-Oposed to risk an


. aetion.
The position of Busaco consists of one huge


mountain, which extends from the edge of the
Mondego to the great Oporto road, and supports
upon its summit the convent of Busaco, inhabited
by Plonks of the order of La Trappe. It measures
nearly sixtéen miles in width from the right, where
it eases itself off by gradual falls towards the Mon-
dego to the left, where it ends in a variety of
tongues of land, each as lofty, craggy, and rugged
as itself. It is covered in front by gorges of inde-
scribable depth, and defiles barely passable for
sheep. The principal inconvenience attending it
as fighting ground for our army, arose out of its
extent; for it was manifestly too capacious to be
occupied aright by sixty thousand men; whereas,
it is essential to the consitution of a military post, AfI'.~~


\¡~- '
'"'~"" .,:,




4 NARRA'fIVE OF 'fHE


that it be as easy of egress as it is difficult of ac-
cess, and that its flanks as well as its centre be
well secured. But where ground is too extensive
for the troops destined to hold it, the latter object
can never be perfectly attained; and in the pre-
sent instance we could not but feel that any seri-
pus endeavour to tum our left by the Mealhada
road, must in the end be attended with success.
Strange to say, however, Marshal Massena,-an
officer whose reputation carne second to that of no
marshal in the French service, -made no effort of
the kind. On the contrary, he led his columns
through the passes aboye described, and up the
face of heights approximating very nearly to the
perpendicular, and thus devoted them to destruc-
tion, froID the hands of men, posted, as has been
already mentioned, on their summits. Had he
acted by the advice of Lord Wellington,· 1 think
he could not have adopted a course better calcu-
lated to insurE~ a defeat, and that too with a 10ss to
the conquerors trifling, even in proportion to what
usually attends upon success.
- On the 25th, th~ enemy's advanced-guard took
possession of Santa Comba Dao, and pushed on to
Martigao, were Crawford had strongly posted his
corps. As it was· Lord Wellington's wish that no
affair of advanced-guards should take place, in-
structions had been issued for the light division to
retire, on the first alarm, to the mountain of Busa-




PEXINSULAR WAR. 5


co; and the movement was executed in admirable
order, and in the pre8ence of the enemy. Our
troops could not, however, fall back so rapidly as
to avoid; entirely, coming into .occasional contact
with their pursuers, and a good de al of firing, with
a tolerab1y smart cannonade, was the consequence.
But the 10ss on either side was trifling; although
1 had to regret the IOS8 of a fine young manmy
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Hoey, who was killed
by a cannon-shot atmy side. The light division
now threw itself upon some high and commanding
ground just aboye the great road to Vizeu, so as to


. communicate with the fourth division on it8 left,
and with the first upon its right. For the latter
division had been moved up from its station at
Mealhada, and now took post upon the hejghts~
where room had been allotted t6 it; ·and Hill and
Leith . being in full march over the Mondego, the
line was in excellent progress towards formation.
At length the arrangements were complete, and
on the 27th, at day-break, the army was an drawn
up in the following order.


On the right of the whole stood the second
division, commanded by General Hill, guarding
thedeclivities towards the Mondego, and flanked
by tbe stream. N ext to it came General Leitb's
corps, then General Picton's third division, tben
General Spencer's first division, then General
Crawford's light division; and last of an, upon




6 NARRATIVE 010' THE


the extreme left, stood the fourth division, under
the eommand of General Coleo The eavalry were
sent to the plains in front of Mealhada, where
there was room for them to act; and the artillery
was distributed at different points, aceording as
convenienee of ground, or the prospect of an ad-
vantageous range direeted.


1 have said that the light division drew up
upon some high and· broken ground aboye the
great road to Vizeu. The road in question, which
conducts from Coimbra to the town just named,
winds round the right of a projeeting tongue· of
land, and passing through the village of Mortea,
skirts the convent wall; from which, to the sum-
mit of the mountain, there is the spaee of barely
half a mile. ' On the 26th the enemy showed a
'strong force in this direction, as welI as in front of
that part of our position which was oceupied by
General Picton. Though they did nothing more
than show themselves, it became very evident that
Massena was really making ready to attaek our
formidable position, and we heartily congratulated
one another on a prospect so satisfactory: for it is
impossible to conceive a pie ce of ground more de-
fensible from aH attempts in its front. The glacis
of a fortress is not more bare nor open to the fire
of its defenders; whilst the abruptness of the as-
eent was of itself suffieient to render powerJess, at
least for a time, the heavily-Ioaded troops which




PENINSULAH. WAR. 7


might accomplish it. N o great while elapsed ere
our wishes received their full accomplishment; for
on the. following morning, soon after our line had
been formed, the enemy advanced to the attack.


At six o'clock in the m'orning two heavy
columns were seen to approach, the one along the
road, so as to fall in with the light division, the
other through a defile, in the direction of General
Picton's post. Both attacks were made with
great spirit and determination; but the latter was
evidently that upon which Massena mainly relied,
and to insure the success of which he had taken
every imaginable precaution. lt was intrusted to
an élite corps, appointed expressly for the service;
and it was headed by three of the most distin-
guished regiments in the French army; the 32nd,
36th, and 70th. These were placed under the
command of General Merle, an officer who had
acquired a high reputation from his behaviour at
Austerlitz; and they certainly gave proof that
neither they nor their leader had won a name
which they were not worthy to wear. They
pressed forward with a gallantry whieh drew
forth the hearty plaudits, not of their friends only,
but of their enemies; and in spite of as heavy a
shower of grape, round shot, and musketry, as it
is easy to imagine, they actually gained the summit.
They gained it too in good order, that is to say,
they were formed in an instant after the aseent




8 N.ARR.ATIVE OF THE


was won; and had they been supported, they
would have doubtless stood their ground for sorne
time; but there was no support in their rear;
and the 45th British,. with the 8th Portuguese,
met them with a bravery not inferior to their own,
or that of any other corps in· either army. The
contest was warm, but it was ¡lOt of long continu-
ance; for the 88th arriving to the assistance of
their cornrades, instantly charged, and the enemy
wete borne over the cliffs and crags with fearful
rapidity, many of them being lite rally picked out
of the holes in the rocks by the bayonets of our
soldiel's. The troops ernployed in this attack CQfi-
sisted oftwodivisions ofthe corps of Regnier, one
of which, under Merle, suffered the fate just
described,whilst the other remained in reserve at
the defile.


Whilst these things were going on in front of
Picton's post, twodivisions of the corps of Marshal
Ney, oue commanded by Loisón, and the other
by Mermot~ bore down· in like manner upon
General Crawford. Both of these divisions took
part in the assault, a third being left. in reserve;
and they advanced with great intrepidity over
half the ascent, exposed only to a trifling fire
frOID a few pieces· of cannon. The 43rd, 52nd,
and 95th, were in line there, and they permitted
the enemy to approach till less than one hundred
yards divided thern; and then one volley from




PENINSULAR WAR. 9


fight to left, coolly and deliberately given, thinned
the ranks of the assailants; after which our troops,
giving a loud and simultaneous cheer, rushed
forward with the bayonet. N ever was rout more
complete than that which followed the movement.
The enemy, unable to retreat and afraid to resist,
were roUed down the steep Iike a torrent of hail·
stones driven before a powerful wind; and not
the bayonets only, but the very hands of some of
our brave fellows; became in an instant red with
the bIood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more
decÍsive charges than those executed this day by
the two divisions which bore the brunt of the
action, were never perhaps witnessed; nor could
anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of
our rilen throughout, except, perhaps, the hardi-
hood which had ventured upon so desperate an
attack.


The 10ss of the French in these encounters was
estimated at somewhere between five and six
thousand men; Qurs fell considerably short of one
thousand; but as one of their corps, that of J unot,
had not yet been engaged, we naturally expected
a repetition of the battle on the following morning.
In this, however, we were deceived. Massena
had :already erred sufficiently in risking one at-
tempt to force our heights; and he had learned a
lesson which it was not probable that he would
speedily forget. Instead, therefore, of again di-




10 NARRATIVE OF THE


recting his troops against our impregnable rocks,
he was observed, soon after daylight on the 28th,
to be drawing off from the late points of attack,
and it was found that he was moving, with his
entire force, upon the Mealhada road, with the
evident intention of turning uso It was a move-
ment for which we were not only prepared, but
for which we had aH along looked, as a measure
of common prudence on the part of the enemy;
and as we never calculated upon being able to re-
tain Busaco after it should be executed, we now
made· ready to abandon the high grounds, and
continue our retreat. As soon, therefore, as the
dusk of the evening set in, we defiled to our left,
throwing Hill's division once more across the
river; and the rest of the corps marching during
the 29th, on Decentecio, Botao, Eiros, and Meal-
hada, the line of the Mondego was, on the 30th,
assumed.


As it was not Lord Wellington's design to make
any stand, or risk a second batde on the Mondego,
the army was put in motion again on the 1st of
October; and the head-quarters, having halted at
Redenha that night, carne in on the 2nd to Leira.
During these marches, the divisions of the army
were kept as near aS'possible to one another: the
right retiring by the main road, pushed directly
upon Leira; the left, passing the river somewhat


·lower in it8 course, came in, under the guidance




PENINSULAR WAU. 11


of General Spencer, to the same tine of march
near Pombal; by which arrangement one wing
was throughout at hand to support the other, had
circumstances occurred to require it. But the
enemy showed no disposition to harass uso Though
they entered Coimbra almost at the moment of
our quitting it, they suffered our rear-guard to
march on without molestation; and they even
halted during the remainder of that day, and the
whole of the next, in the place. On the 3rd,
however, they pushed forward strong patrols into
Condeixa, towards Leira. Here, part of our
magazine, containing corn and provisions, fell into
their hands; but the magazine was captured, not
because we were unable, but because we were
unwilling to defend it. The faet is, that Lord
Wellington had strictly prohibited the rear-guard
from engaging in any affair which could, without
compromising its own safety, be avoided; and the
!'ltores in question were abandoned, rather than
that a loss of life, however trifling, should be ex-
perienced in their defence.


The army rested in Leira till the morning of the
5th, when Lord Wellington, having ascertained
that the enemy were coming on in force, gave
orders that the retreat should be resumed. This
was done along the two great roads which lead to
Lisbon, by Rio Major and Alcoba~a, and on the
same evening head-quarters were established in




12 NARRATIVE OF THE


the last-mentioned place; but though no skir-
mishing occurred, nor any seriolishardships feH
to our lot, it was altogether one of the most dis-
tressing journeys which any individual in the army
was evercalled upon to perform. The proclama-
tions which had been issued, requiring the inha-
bitants to abandon their homes as wefeU hack,
were very . generaHy attended to, and spectac1es
more affiicting than this prompt obedience on the
part of the Portuguese presented, it were a hard
matter even to imagine. Crowds of men, women,
and childrell; of the sick, the aged, and the in-
firm,as well as of the robust and the yonng, co-
vered the roads and the fields in every direction.
Mothers might be seen with infants at their
breasts, hurrying towards the capital, and weep-
illg as they went; old men; scarcely able to totter
along, made way chiefly by the aid of their sons
and daughters; whilst the whole way-side soon
became strewed with bedding, blankets, and other
species of household furniture, which the weary
fugitives were unable to carry further. During
the retreat of Sir John Moore's army, numerous
heart-rending scenes were brought before us;. for
then, as now, the people-particularly in Galicia
-fled at our approach; but they aH returned,
sooner or later, to theirhomes, nor ever dreamed
of accumulating upon ourline of marchó or follow-
ing our fortunes. The case was different here.




PENINSULAR WAR. 13


Those who forsook their dwellings, forsook them
under the persm¡.sion that they should never be-
hold them again; and the agony which such an
apprehension appeared to excite among the majo-
ritf, exceeds any attempt at' description. N or
was it on aceount of the immediate suffering of the
eountry people alone that we were disposed. on
the present occasion, to view the measure with
regret. 1t could not but occur to us, that, though
the devastating system must inevitably bear hard
upon the French, the most serious evils would~ in
aH probability, arise out ofit, both to ourselvesand
our allies, from the famine and general distress
which it threatened to bring upon a crowd so
dense, shut up within the walls of a single city.
There cán be no question now,that this very mea-
sure, more perhaps than any other, preserved Por-
tugal from subjugation, and England from defeat;
but, at the moment, there were few amongst.us,
who seemed not disposed to view it with reproba-
tion; because, whilst they condemned its appa-
rent violation oí. every feeling of humanity and
justiee, they doubted the soundness of the poliey
in whieh it originated.


Whilstwe were thuscondueting ourselves, march-
ing with deliberation, and sweeping before us all
the reSOurces of the country, the enemy had ad-
vanced as far as Leira, and. seemed disposed, to
foHow us up with the fuH vigour of the sehool in




14 NARRATIVE OF THE


whieh their leader had learned his tacties. Their
videttes entered Leira about a eouple of hours
after our rear-guard quitted it, and they had, in
consequence, before them a choice of two roads to
Lisbon, one by the Tagus, the other bX the Sála.
But on both we were equally well prepared to re-
ceive them, as the following description of the new
arrangement of our forces will show.


It has been stated aboye, that in continuation of
the retreat from Leira upon the lines, the head-
quarters of our army were established, on the
evening of the 5th, at Alcoba~a. From Aleoba~a
a further falling baek was made upon Torres Ve-
dras and Rio Major; and from the lattei' of these
pIaees the troops began, on the 10th, to move into
the position. On that day General Hill's corps,
whieh had returned from the Ponte de Mareel1a
upon Thomar, arrived at"Villa Franca; and on the
followillg morning every division occupied the
ground marked out for it, and aU were in readiness,
at a momenfs notice, to assume the posts which
they might be required to defend.


Though 1 have already laid before the reader
something of a rude outline of tbe position of
Torres Yedras, 1 am tempted at the present stage.
of my narrative, that he may he the better able to
understand the plan of operations upon whieh it
was proposed to aet, to go rather more at length
into its localities and general disposition. 1 am




PENINSULAR WAR. 15


willing to believe, likewise, that ihe repetitions
which may be necessary, will be perused, even by
the unmilitary reader, without disgust; because it
is to the wise occupation of that position, and to
the judicious method pursued in maintaining it,
that the ultimate success of the Peninsular war is
to be attributed ; and because it will long continue,
even in its rude outlines, to present to future gene-
rations an enduring testimonial to the sagacity and
unconquerable firmness of our leader. With this
preface, 1 proceed now to describe, in as accurate
terms as 1 am able to employ, both the arrange-
ment of the troops, and the nature of the champ
de bataille, upon which the fate, not of Lisbon
onIy, but of Europe itself was to be decided.


Along the neck of the Peninsulaat the extre ..
mity of whichLisbon is bui!t, there extend severa!
ranges of high and rugged hills, intersected ~ere
and there by narrow passes, and covered, for the
most part, by deep ravines and defiles, in the
usual acceptation of the term, impassable. Along
these, at the distance of perhaps 25 English miles
from, the city, Lord Wellington had selected two
lines, one considerably in advance ofthe other, but
both of tremendous strength; and he had bestowed
upon their fortification so much of care, and dili.;.
gence, 'and science, as to place them almost equally
beyond the reach ofinsult from any assailing force,
however numerous and well supplied. Jfhe sys-




16 NARRATIVE OF THE


tem pursued onthis occasion was quite novel, and
the works erected were altogether such as were
not to be met with under similar circumstances in
any part ofthe world. It will not be necessary to
enter at muchlength into the merits of the second
line, because its strength was never tried; but of
the first or more advanced force, the following will
be found to contain a tolerably correct sketch.


This line rested its right upon the acclivities of
Alhandra, on the summit of which several for-
midable redoubts were erected, and was flanked
by the fire of adozen gun-boats, at anchor in the
Tagus. The faces of these hilIs were all carefuIly
scarped; the road which led through them. was
destroyed; and it was with' perfect justice con-
cluded, that here, at least, our position might be
pronounced impregnable. On the left of these
heights laya ravine or gully, called the pass of
Maltao, the gorge of which was effectually blOcked
up by .two formidableredoubts; whilst it was
completely comrnanded, on one hand by the hilIs
of Alhándra, and o~ the other by those of Armeda.
Thelatter, like the forrner, were. scarped, and
otherwise rendered inaccessible; and they com-
municated with the centre of the position, which
was a huge mountain, crowned bya redoubt more
extensive than any other in the lineo As this
mountain overhung the village of Sobral, its castle
kept cornpletely at command the great road which




l'ENJNSFLA J{ "'A H. 17


conducts from thenoe to Lisbon, and rendered it
utterly hopeless for any body of men so much as
to attempt a passage in that direction. On the
left of this redoubt, again, some high and broken
ground looked down upon Zebreira, and stretched
in formidable shape towards Pataneira. J ust
behind that village there is a deep glen, succeeded
by other hills, which cover the roads from Ribal-
deira to Exara de los Cavalleiros and Lisbon;
whilst on the left of the whole was a lofty moun-
tain, which crowded up all the space between
these roads and Torres Vedras. Such is a brief
detail of the leading features in this position; than
which it wiU be seen that, independently of all
that art had done for it, few can be imagined more
formidable; but when it is further undel'stood
that the ascents were all steep, rugged, and rocky ;
that -strong vineyards and deep ground everywhere
covered the front; and that, wherever natural ob-
stacles chanced to be fewer in numbel', or Iess in-
superable in kind than couId have been desired,
labour had not failed to suppIy them; and when
these things are taken into consideration, an army
once brought thither must either be faIse to itself,
or it might defy aH the force of the French em-
pire seriousIy to molest it. 1t remains now to
state in what order, and with what design. tIte
troops were arranged for its defence.


On the right of the whole was posted General
VOL. n. B




18 NARRATIVE OF THE


Hill's corps, the British troops occupying the vil-
lage of Alhandra, where they were kept ready to
be moved to any point which seemed most to be
threatened ; whilst the Pórtuguese stood prepared
to throw thernselves into the redoubts, and to
defend thern to the last extremity. Next to Hill's
carne Crawford's division, having the heights of
Arruda, and the works attached to thern, pecu-
liarly intrusted to its careo Then carne General
Pack's Portuguese brigade; the whole of which
were stationed in the great redoubt of which 1
have aIread y spoken. as crowning the hill aboye
Sobral; whilst Sir Brent Spencer's division garri-
soned the high ground aboye Zebreira, as far as
the village of Pataneira. General Picton's right
joined itself to Spencer's left, in rear of the last-
named place, at the ravine which there broke in ;
and Cole's division, connecting itself with Picton's,
carried on the line across the hills, as far as the
road to Exara de Cavalleiros and Lisbon. Last
of aH came General Campbell's corps, which occu-
pying the mountain between the· road and Torres
Yedras, formed the extreme left of our arrny.


1 have spoken of redoubts and other works, as
giving additional s.trength to this stupendous posi-
tion; it is right that 1 should refer to thero in
terrns sornewhat more explicito The reader is
not, perhaps, ignorant, that in fortifying a line,
su eh as that of Torres Yedras, for the· support of a




PENINSULAR WAR. 19


large army in the field, the ordinary practice is to
construct batteries and other points d'appui,
which shall present as imposing a front as may be
to . the attacking force, but shall be open and


-utterly defenceless from the rearo In the present
instance, however, the redoubts thrown up were
not so much field-works as regular castles, many
of which were capable of containing several hun-
dreds, whilst one required no fewer than three
thousand men to form its garrison. These were
built as if each had -been intended to stand a


. siege of s~x weeks, at the most moderate computa-
tion; they were placed in situations which ren-
dered them quite as defensible froro one side as
from another; and they were aH, to a certain ex-
tent at least, independent of those near them, and
well sheItered from their fire, should they fall into
the-hands of the enemy. It wasLord Wellington's
design to garrison these posts chiefiy with the
militia and least disciplined regiments; whilst he
kept the whole of the British troops, and the élite
of the Portuguese, free and unencumbered, to be
employed as circumstances might require. By
this arrangement he secured to himself the double
advantage of a moveable army and a fortified
place. Supposing the position to be forced, the
forts were still there to interrupt the enemy's com-
munications, and cut off their supplies ; whilst the
columns need only to be marched a few miles to




20 .NARRATIVE OF THE


the rear, in order to assume ground even more
defensible than that which they abandoned. 1 am
not willing to detain the reader by any remarks of
my own, at a period of the narrative so replete
with interesting oecurrences: but 1 cannot pro-
ceed further, without desiring to draw the atten-
tion of my brother soldiers in a particular manner
not only to the subject of which 1 am now speak-
ing, but to the whole plan of this campaign; be-
cause 1 am sme that a British army never took
part in one better adapted to. instruct it in the art
of manreuvring 'on a great scale, nor consequenUy
so well calculated to make efficient officers of those
who shared in it, or are disposed to take the trou-
ble of studying it as it deserves.


In the course of this narrative 1 have, in general,
eonfined myself so much to the movements of the
troops placed immediately under the orders of
Lord Wellington, that the reader, were he not
instructedfrom different sourees, might remain
ignorant that there were other corps of greater 01'
less efficiency employed at different points in our
favour, during the entire summer. These were, a
body of mili tia under Colonel Trant, which moved
hither and thither as eircrimstances seemed to re-
quire; General Silveira's army, consisting of sorne
eight thousand irregulars; a portion of the Lusi-
tanian Legion, under Colonel Wilson; besides
bandsof guerillas in all directions. It is deserving




PENINSULA R W AR. 21


of record, that Lord Wellington kept the whole of
these irregular troops among the mountains and
fastnesses, in points of perfeet seeurity, till the
ópportunity arrived for bringing them into play.
At what moment this oeeurred, and to what uses
they were eventual1y turned, will best be under-
stood by glaneing back through the whole of the
eampaign, from its opening' up to the present hour.


The faH of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida, instead of disclosing at once the plan
upon whieh Massena was preparing to aet, left us
for some time as mueh in the dark as ever; inas-
much as Regnier's eorps remained on the left of
the Tagus, and seemed still to threaten the division
of General HiB. The eonseqllence was, that an
opinion generaIly prevailed in our army-and 1
have reason to believe that it was embraced by the
Commander-in-ehief-that he would make his
main push upon our right flank, and amusing us in
front, follow up our movements with one corps
onIy. The defences of the Zezere were, under
these eircumstanees, naturally looked to by us as
of paramount importance; and it was chiefly to
secure them, that General Leith's eorps was formed
at Thomar, and kept in reserve. Contrary to all
expectation, however, and in direet defiance of
every ordínary rule ofmilitary manreuvre, Massena
left our right unmolested; and thoughhe was




22 NAHRATJVE OF THE


compelled to move upon a much larger portion of
the circumference of the circle than we were f he
threw his whole army~ in masterIy style, to the
north bank of the Mondego. He was quite aware
that, did we perceive this movement, Hill could be
brought into junction with us within a shorter
space of time than would be requisite to connect
Regnier with himself; and he knew also that the
movement could hardly be made witbout our
knowledge.· Massena, therefore, adopted his plans
up~m principIes more deep and more ~ubtile than
usualIy guide men in theirundertakings. By the
less observing, it was affirmed that he had chosen
the only road which was impassable for artillery;
and that he moved his arrny in·· one line, merely
that a reasonable excuse D1ight be made for the
delay on which he had already determined. There
is not, however, justice in these notions. Massena
took a road by which, and by which alone, he was
enabled to avoid the whole of the defences of the
Zezere, the strong positions of Sarsedas and Ponte
de Marcella, and, 1 may add, thevery rock upon
which he chose to make temporary· shipwreck of
his prospects, the line of Bnsaco; for had he per-
si$ted in his prudent course, and followed at once
the path by the Sierra de Caramala, he might have
arrived at the point where he now stood, within
a few leagues of Lisbon. N ow let attention be




PENINSULAR WAR. 23


paid to the plan of operations, by which Lord
Wellington contri ved to render aH the ta lent and
prudence of his skilful adversary ofno avail.


The first measure which our .chief adopted was
this: he caused an excellent road to be made on
the 80uth side of the Mondego, which extended an
the way from Celerico to Ponte de Marcella, and
beyond it to Coimbra. His next step was to pro-
vide against the delays and confusion to which the
enemy, who moved in a single continuous column,
were subject. FoI' this purpose, as he had deter-
mined, on many accounts, not to risk an action on
the fI'ontier, he took the precaution to throw his
divisions and brigades along the great gorge, ex-
tending from Celerico to the Alva; and he so ar-
ranged them, as that when the army began to
move, the troops followed one another by stages,
in tbe utmost regularity, and without any of that
bustle which a march en masse unavoidably occa-
síons. Possessed of these advantages, Lord Wel-
lington saw, clearly enough, that it was in his
power, ~n the event of Massena's advance by any
single road, to cross the Mondego with his whole
force, and to throw himself, whenever he chose,
between the enemy and Coimbra. As soon, there-
fore, as Massena's designs were satisfactorily as-
certained, he fixed, with a master's eye, upon the
banks of the Dao and the Criz, as the proper spots
at which to cast impediments in the way ofthe




24 NARRATIVE OF THE


French; whilst he should perform the arduous
and enterprising operation, of throwing the entire
of his infantry, artillery, and stores, by wretched
fords, and still more wretched bridges, across a
river of no ordinary dimensions or difficulties.


AH was .accomplished in the very order and
manner which he had in his own mind chalked
out. The bridges on the Dao. and the Criz were
then destroyed with astonishing celerity. Craw-
ford and Pack, with the advanced-guard, were
thrown across at Santa Comba Dao, and the rest
of the army accomplished a very brilliant ~a­
nreuvre with the utmost accuracy and perfection;
fuI' not a gun got out of its place during the con~
tinuance of the march, and when the moment of
inquiry arrived, everything was found in the exact
spot which it had be en intended to occupy. But
the most extraordinary feature of all remains yet
10 be noticed. From the instant when he fixed
upon the position of Busaco, Lord Wellington ex-
pressed his firm conviction that he would be at-
tacked there; and he adhered to that opinion, in
opposition to the sentiments of every fUllctiollary
by whom he was surrounded. There was a de-
gree of prescience in this for which it is impossible
accurately to account"; for there cannot be a ques-
tion as to the course which the enemy ought to
have adopted, alld which it was their wisdom to
adopto Instead of dashing themselves madly




PENINSULAR WAR. 25


against US, they ought to have continued to take
ground to their right, and so gone round a stu-
pendous mountain, which the slightest exercise
of milital'y penetration might. have shown that
they need not hope to pass. It is true that at
this time Colonel Trant, with his corps, ought to
have taken post at Sardao: he had received orders
to proceed thither, with a view of strengthening
our left; and it may be that the enemy had been
]ed to think of him as actually in that situation.
But had the case been so, it requires no depth of
discernment to discover that aH the resistance
which it was in his power to offer, would have
availed nothing against three French corps; more
especially when it is considered that there are
numerous· passes from Mortagao, by the Vouga,
into the Oporto road, which Trant possessed
neither force nor means adequate to watch. It
were absurd, therefore, to speak of this notion, as
at the time it was not unusual to speak of it, as in
any degree inHuencing Massena in the comse
which he pursued; for it requires only a glance
over the map to convince any one that all effort to
stop the enemy in the Hat country between the
Busaco and the sea, must have be en fruitless.
Had they chosen to bring their united force into
that arena, we could have done nothing to arrest
their progress; and hence it is, that 1 speak of
Lord WeUington's prescience as something quite




26 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


out of the ordinary course of events, inasmuch as
Busaco was a position simply and solely because
the enemy thoughtfit by attacking to give to it
that character.


That the success which crowned our efforts at
Busaco was productive of the most beneficial con-
sequences, and that the manreuvres which pre-
ceded the- battle were all admirable in their kind,
admits not of a doubt. By means of these _the
enemy's arrival at Coimbra was delayed, and time
given for the removal of the inhabitants; an advan-
tage which became the more vital, as we had been
disappointed in our expectation of an attack upon
the position of Ponte de Marcella. Far be it from
me, therefore, to throw out so much as an insinua-
tion that everything was not conducted with con-
summate ability and admirable foresight. Yet is
it as clear as the sun at noon-day, not only that
Massena might have passed us by without fight-
ing, but that, when we abandoned the ground of
our victory at Busaco, we did so, not because
Trant had failed in reaching his allotted station,
but because the ground was in itself indef~nsible.
The truth ¡s, that Massena, in this campaign, by
no means supported the reputation whichhis
previous services had obtained for him, or carne up
to the opinion which we had formed of him, as a
master of the military arto Throughout our
retreat, he scarcely ever followed us up with the




PENINSULAR WAR. 27


vigour which gene rally attends the movements of
a pursuing army, and all his operations were
marked by a languor and supineness which sur-
prised not less than they gratified uso It seemed
as ifthe Fren~h soldiers had already learned to
stand in fear of us, or that they had ceased to be
the men before whom the nations of the north
one after another gave way. Had we been at all
pushed, hampered as we were with the whole
population of the country, it would have been
impracticable, at more than one place, to hinder
stores and even stragglers from falling into the
enemy's hands; but from .the hour of our first
movement, up to the moment of our arrival in
the lines, not an effort was made so to harass
uso It is time, however, that 1 should cease from
this somewhat technical dissertation, and resume,'-
where 1 permitted it to slip, the thread of my
story.


During the last week of our retrogression the
rain fell in uninterrupted torrents; flooding all the
plains, cutting up the roads, and swelling every
mountain-stream to a roaring cataract .. In spite.
however, of the difficulties thence arising,· and
nothing daunted by the numerous privations
which threatened to befall his army in· an ex-
hausted country, Massena continued his march;
driving us back upon our strength; our re~ources,




28 NARRATIVE OF THE


our magazines, and our provisions, whilst his own
were suffering continual diminution, and his com-
munications with therear becoming daily more and
more msecure. The truth is, that both parties
were now committed to a desperate game. On
our side the chances of success were, doubtless,
infinitely greater than on the side of the enemy,
inasmuch as our position was excellent, our
troops were fresh and in high spirits, our supplies
were abundant, and the capital in our rear was
tranquil ;but we could not conceal from our-
selves that the game was still desperate, as well
with us as with them. Were we, by any fatality,
to suffer a defeat; were the French to force our
lines, and make themselves masters of our intrench-
ments, through the imbecility 01' treachery of their
defenders, or through any other of those accidents
to which war is ever liable, the chances were,
that neither army nor ships would ever escape
from the Tagus .. We were thetefore in the situa-
tion of men about to make their last throw, and to
stake upon it, not temporary prosperity, but actual
existence. The French, on the other hand, whilst
they advanced against us, plunged into a district
where means of subsistence must soon be wanting
to them, and left their rear to be acted upon by
clouds of irregulars, whom Lord Wellington now
surnmoned from their fastnesses for the purpose.




PENINSULAR W A R. 29


The bodies to which I anude were, five thousand
men under Trant, which were hurrying along the
road [rom Oporto to Coimbra; a similar force of
militia under Wilson, which had already arrived
at Busaco, and had taken sorne prisoners; two
distinct corps, the one estimated at fifteen thou-
sand men, under Silveira, the other at eight or
ten thousand men, under Bacillar, which were
advancing from the north; besides numerous
straggling bands, aH animated by the same feeling
of deadly hatred towards the French. Now these


. corps, .though very inferior to regular ttoops, were
still capable of creating constant alarm; inasmuch
as they were ever at hand to cut off convoys, to
destroy stragglers, to surprise magazines, al1d to
harass the rear-guard ; whilst in front the prospect
of a resistance was held out, which Massena could
notcontemplate without the most serious appre-
hensiol1. That the enerny considered their situa-
tion one of extreme peril and hazard, Wás dis-
tinctly proved by the state of inactivity into which
they saan fell; as if they felt their inability to
perform that which their wishes prompted, and
yet were unwilling to resign all hope without at
least ane effort to rea1ise it.


In the mean while Lord Wellington, whose
exertions were unintermitting, and whose activity
of body al1d mind surpassed all that could have




30 N ARRATIVE . OF THE


been expected even from him, was receiving every
hour fresh encouragements to persevere in the
judicious system which he had adopted. For
sorne time back he had been very urgent with his
own government, to send such reinforcements as
his circumstances required; and he was about
this time gratified by the arrival in camp of six
battalions from England, and four from Cadiz;
amounting, in aH, to between seven and eight
thousand men. By this happy addition, the effec-
tive strength of the British army was increased to
thirty-three thousand soldiers; whilst th~ SUill
total of its strength upon paper fell not short of
forty-one thousand. Nor was this the only addi-:,
tion which he received to his force at a moment
so critical. He prevailed upon Romana, whose
continuance on the southern frontier was proved
to be productive of no serious advantage, to join
him with as large a portion of his corps as he
could venture to remove; and fhere came in, in
consequence, about three thousand Spaniards, the
élite of the Spanish army, under that officer. The
corps in question marched from Badajoz and
Campo Major, and reaching the Tagus at Aldea
Gallega, was brought over from thence, and took
post at Exara de los· Cavalleiros, as a support to
our centre. Thus, with thirty-three thousand
British, thirty thousand Portuguese, and three




PENINSULAR WAR. 3l


thousand Spaniards, the allied arrny could muster
nearly seventy thousand men; of which the com-
parative inefficiency of sorne of its parts was more
than cornpensated by the nature of the ground
which it occupied.




32 N A RRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER n.


Massena halts before the lines, which are industriously strength-
ened by the British troops-Lord WeIlington, alarmed ror
Abrantes, sends a corps across the Tagus to secure it-For-
tifies a new position on the south side of the harbour-The
enemy construct hoats on the river-Retire to 8antarem, and
take up a position-The allies follow, and go into canton-
ments in front of them-V arious movements of detached
hodies, and many rumours touching the future.


LITTLE occurred in our irnmediate presence par-
ticularly deserving of notice, for some time aftel'
we finally took up the position of the Zebreira. A t
first, indeed, a few affail's· of cavalry took place,
most of which ended in oul' favour; but latterly
this force was removed to the real', as well be-
cause their services were not needed, as beca use
they could there be hetter supplied with forage,
than among the rugged defiles in front. There
\Vere also two partial rencontres of infantry; one
in which sorne Portuguese regiments, attached to




PENINSULAjt W AR. 33


General Cole's division, behaved well whilst re~
tiring from Ribaldusa towards Guaxara; and ano-
ther, which gave to the 71st regiment, assisted
by a company of the 95th and ~ few Germans, a
brilliant opportunity of distinguishing themselves.
On the 14th, a strong body of French troops at·
tacked a redoubt at Sobral, which the 71st were
appointed to hold. That gallant regiment not
only repulsed the assailants, but following them
beyond the lines, drove them, in their turn, from a
work which they had begun to construct on a
height opposite, and kept possession of the gronnd
which they had gained. These, however, were
the only instances in which large bodies of men
carne into contacto The pickets, particularly oa
our right, would, from time to time, engage, and a
good deal of desultory firing was the conseq uence ;
but such skirmishes produced no memorable re-
sults, and were, in general, productive of few ca-
sualties. The only person of note, indeed, that
feH on either side, was the French General St.
Croix, who was killed by a cannon-shot from one
of our gun-boats, as he was reconnoitring. . He
was an ófficer of distinguished gallantry and higb
character-one of the best in the cavalry servÍce
-Of the Emperor; and 1 Qwn that we sincerely
lamented the sorry manner in which a brave so}, ..
dier, who came with honour and safety through


VOL. 11. e




34 N ARRATIV E OF THE


the perils of Austerlitz, Esli~g, and Wagram, lost
his Jife.


But though all remained quiet in our camp,
and in that of the enemy, the latter were begin-
ning every day to experience more and more se-
verely the difficulties of the undertaking in which
they had embarked. Their communications be-
carne hourly less and less open; sickness began
to spread itself through their ranks; the stock of
provisions whch, in spite of our exertions to pre-
vent it, they had, on their first arrival, contrived
to discover, was rapidly wasting; and desertions
were exceedingly frequent. Their regular tr90PS in
the rear, were, moreover, singularly active; and
their enterprises proved to be, for the most part,
not more spirited than successful. A corps of
Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant and Ge-
neral Miller, entered Coimbra on the 7th, where
they captured a considerable depot of stores, as
well as four thousand sick and wounded, who had
been lodged there in hospital. This done, they
made ready the bridge over the Mondego for de-
struction; and then pushing their cavalry towards
Condeixa, harassed Massena's rear with continual
skirmishes. In entering upon the latter under-
taking, they felt theÍnselves perfectly secure; for
it was in their power, at any moment, to retire, if
attacked by superior force, across the river, and




'PENINSULA R 'VAR. 35


breaking down the bridge in their rear, to set all the
enemy's efforts to molest them at defiance. The
consequence was, that their attacks were both bold
and well managed; and the enemy lost not a few,
as well of those who met the assailants face to face,
as from the stragglers and plundering parties, which,
in spite of all risks, persisted in straying from their
eolumn.


A delay so continued, and so little expected
from the French Marshal, not unnaturally led to
a variety of conjectures, on our parts, as to its
originating causes and probable results. The
whole of Massena's operations,considered merely
in a military point of view, appeared to be so ¡n-
explicable, that we found ourselves under the ne-
eessity of regarding' them in a different light, and
referring them to political considerations entirely.
Hehad acted, from his first assumption 'Of the
eommand, as if he were embarked in an under-
taking, of the ultimate success of which he was
far from being sanguine; and in which he ha-
zarded his reputation on no other aceount, than
because he knew ~t to be a business, in the prose-
cution of which the Emperor was deeply in-
terested. There feH into our hands, during this
interval, several letters; sorne of instruction to
Massena from N apoleon; others, on private busi-
ness between Massena and his brother marshals.
Many of these were curious and interesting docu-




36 NARRATIVE OF THE


ments; and those of the former class showed
that the sources of information open to the enemy
were more ample and more correct than could
have beensupposed. The Emperor's directions
to Massena, which had reference to the opening
of the campaign, required him to enter Portugal
without delay, and to bring the English to battle
wherever he should find them. It was stated
that there were but sixteen thousand British
troops under Lord Wellington iil person, and only
four thousand under Hill; that the whole united,
inclusive of the Portuguese, could not exceed
thirty thousand men; that the Portuguese were
little better than brigands; and that there could
be nothing capable of arresting the progre ss of a
French force, which counted sixty thousand in-
fantry and twelve thousand cavalry, between
Ciudad Rodrigo and the capital. The probability
that four thousand men would shortly be brought
from Cadiz, was, moreover, urged as a reason why
Massena should sufrer no delays on his march;
whilst it was added that the spies in London
wrote strongly of the intentions of the English to
embark as soon as they should be hard pressed,
and abandon the country. Now it is worthy of
notice, that the nmnbers specified aboye, corres-
ponded exactly with the effective state of our,
army during the ear]y summer; and there is no
doubt that, at the moment when Buonaparte




PENINSULAR \VAR. 37


wrote, serious thoughts were entertained, if not in
Portugal, certainly in London, of relinquishing the
contest as profitIess, and beyond the means of
England to support.


From the tenor of this communication we were
Ied to believe that Massena had, as 1 have already
hinted, embarked in a series of operations which
his j udgment condemned; and that he now found
himself reduced to the mortifying alternative of
either risking all upon the chances of a battle, or
of remaining where he was, in spite of the nume~
rous privations to which he was subject, till fresh
instructions should reach him from Paris. Had he
confined his views, if not previously to his defeat
at Busaeo, at all events after that event oeeurred,
to the north of Portugal, taking up the line of the
Mondego for the winter, and detaehing a corps to
occupy Oporto, he would have made himself mas-
ter of a portion of the country; and making the
most of his successes at Ciudad Rodrigo and AI-
meida, would have optained credit for having ac-
complished a tolerably brilliant campaign. But
that opportunity was gone by. He had be en re-
pulsed at Busaco; he had passed the Mondego,
with a perfeet knowledge all the while, that his
communications would beco me at every step more
uncertain; he saw the whole militia of Portugal
rising in his rear, and yet leít his sick at Coimbra,
without a sufficient garrison to proteet them. He




38 NARRATIVE OF 'l'H"E


had done all this, not that he might follow us with
vigour, for the pursuit was so delibera te, that all
our stiagglers and almost aH our baggage escaped
uninjured; and now he lay perfectly inactive in
our front. lt was quite impossible to imagine that
an officer of Massena's character could have acted
thus, had he not acted under the influence of com-
pulsion. To that, therefore, we unhesitatingly
attributed the proceedings of our opponent. We
had reason to believe that he had despatched mes-
sengers to demand, either that strong reinforce-
nlents should be sent to him, or that fresh instnic-
tions, suitable to the turn which affairs had taken,
might be granted; and we accordingly looked
forward to a continuance of the procrastinating
system for sorne time to come; for reinforce-
ments, supposing the plan of reinforcing to be
adopted, could not arrive in a day. It is true that
the French corps in Galicia, augmented by every-
thing in Castile, would prove formidable; and
that the space between Galicia and Massena's en-
campmen1, might be traversed with perfect ease
in a fortnight. But the garrisons could not be
·withdrawn from Galicia and Castile ti11 others
arrived to replace them; and of the movement of
any force adequate to that purpose we knew no-
thing. Our minister at Lisbon, Sir Charles Stuart,
spoke indeed of fun forty thousand men as on their
way through Spain; but the only corps of which




PENINSULAR WAR. 39


our intelligence took notice, consisted of no more
than nine battalions of infantry, and two thousand
cavalry, on its march from Vittoria, towards the
Portuguese frontier. There WélS, no doubt, a pos-
sibility that the blockade of Cadiz might be inter-
mitted; in which case the arrny hitherto employed
there, uniting itself to Mortier's corps, might enter
Alentejo full twenty-five thousand strong,; and if
to this twenty thousand more could be added, on
the route from Galicia to Oporto, then indeed we
might expect sorne severe service belore long.
But however judicious all these measures might be
in themselves, there was nothing before us calcu-
lated to excite an apprehension, that they were
really in process of completion. On the con-
trary, we were led, from a variety of oc curren ces,
to guess that Massena's views leaned more to a
retreat than to an advance; and that he delayed
the former movement only till the sanctioll of his
master should be obtained, and his own credit
should be thereby saved.


The advanced parties of the Portuguese being
pushed on as far as Leira, and the garrison of
Abrantes seriously incommoding the French, the
latter moved in forceupon Salvatierra, where they
succeeded in establishing a bridge across the Ta-
gus, and so laid open to themselves the province
of Alentejo. This might be for the purpose of
securing those supplies which were no longer to


~_ .. ~~.-:--If~": ~ ~ ,l",· "




40 NARRATI\'E OF THE


be had from the north; but taken ill connexioll
with a rumour which prevailed of an intended at-
tack upon Abrantes, it appeared to us that Massena
was anxious to keep the Alentejo open as a line
by which his escape wouldbe secured. Abrantes,
however, was so well supplied and garrisoned, as
to leave us little ground to apprehend any misfor-
tune there, unless, indeed, it were attacked by a
force greater than the enemy could well spare from
our front; and hence we reflected, that if he
should retreat l?y the Alentejo, he must march by
a single toad, and that the means were still in our
hands of intercepting him, should we fee1 ourselves
sufficiently strong; or at least of harassing him
dreadfulIy, should that course appear "more advisa-
ble. To s-peak with candour, however, it must be
confessed that Massena's designs were as mysterious
to us as they were probably vague and undefined
even to himself; and we accordingly remained to
watch the result, not in id lenes!'!, hut in security,
upan our line ofimpregnable hilIs and fortifications.


There arose, at this time, 80mething like a
question amongst us, whether a movement on the
offensive, entered upon at this critical j uncture y
ll1ight not bringabout the most favourable results.
By su eh as argued in favour of the movement, it
was urged that the French were diminished in
numbers, broken in spirit, and devoid of confidence;
that the soldiers distrusted their leaders, and the




PENINSULAR WAR. 41


leaders distrusted the soldiers; and that a spirited
attack made at such a moment, would not only
not be resisted, but that it would probably end in


- a victory more complete than had been obtained
during the war. Fortunately for the cause of
which he was the main support, our chief saw
matters in a very different light. We estimated
the losses of the French army at the highest, when
we put down the amount, by deaths, sickness, de~
sertion, and the casualties of battle, at fifteen thou~
sand meno Now, as they moved into the country
with fuIl sixty-two thousand, this would still leave
tbem forty-seven thousand with which to meet us;
and as we could not pretend to bring more than
fifty thousand beyond the lines, our numerical
superiority would be an advantage hardly worth
calcuJating upon. To counterbalance it entirely,
again, it was to be considered that the enemy
were aIl veteran troops; whilst of ours, the larger
proportion were raw levies of Portuguese and
Spaniards, in many instances wretchedly officered,
and in aIl, but little accustomed to fleld movements~
i~' ThePortuguese had, indeed, behaved gallantly at


Busaco; and we were disposed to place in them
as much confidence as could be re po sed in any
soldiers as yet so imperfectly instructed in their
duty; but we should have hardly looked to them
for that regularity of manrellvre over a broken and
varied traet of eountry, which we should be sure




42 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


to find in the well~ained troops to whom they
would be opposed. Besides, our attack, if made
at aH, must be made without cannon; for we had
so completely destroyed the roads, and scarped the
faces of the heights, that artillery could not be
advanced, either by the one or the othel', as long
as an enemy lay befóre us to impede its progress.
The enemy, therefore, ifbeaten at all-which was
surely, under such circumstances, problematical-
could not be beaten without a heavy 10ss on our
side; and that 10ss would, as a matter of course,
faH upon the best men; because sueh only would


. be found at their posts. N ow ir, again, the defeat
were not perfeet, if it amounted to anything less
than a total rout and dissolution ofthe al'my, where
would be the benefit arising from it? Massena
would retire upon sorne strong positions, disputing
with us every inch of the country, and finally
make his escape to the reinforeements in his real' ;
whilst we should have exhausted ours, and erip-
pled our whole resources; fol' the attainment of
only a momentary advantage. N ay, it was far
from being impossible, that whilst we wel'e follow-
ing up the eorps opposed to us, othel's might ad-
vanee upon the lines, of neeessity feebly manned ;
and should these be carried, not even the total de-
struction of Massena and his army would compen-
sate for the misfortune. On all these aceounts,
and wi th the firm conviction on his mind, that




PENINSULAR WAR. 43


things were working as advantageouslyas he could
desire, Lord Wellington determined to adhere to
his defensive system; and the event proved, that
as his reasoning had not proceeded upon mistaken
grounds, so the results to which it led were not
fallacious.


N either the time of our soldiers nor that of
their chief was, however, wasted in idleness. The
former were busily employed in the construction
of new works, wherever their erection appeared at
all desirable, and in giving additional solidity to
those already thrown up; till the lines became as
perfect aspecimen of a fortified position as it was
possible for nature and art to produce. The latter
was indefatigable in his exertions to bring his
army into a condition of general efficiency, and
his exertions were too judiciously applied not to
be erowned with success. The Portuguese being
now thoroughly amalgamated with the British
troops, learned from them aH those lessons which
in after campaigns they turned to an excellent
account; and Beresford, to whom the entire merit
of their first trainingis due, was in consequence re-
lieved from all further responsibility in field opera-
tions. Every day brought in its improvements
among them; and the General was soon rewarded
for all his trouble by the conviction that he might
rely upon them almost as perfectly as upon his
countrymen. N or was Lord Wellington inattentive




44 NARRATIVE Ol<' THE


to the comforts, and even luxuries of his followers.
Provisions were abundant; there was no want of
wine; and sports and amusements went on as· if
we had be en, not at the seat of war, but in Eng-
land. Officers of all ranks, and in every depart-
ment, from the Commander-in-chief down to the
regimental subaltern, occasionally enjoyed the
field-sports of hunting, shooting, and fishing. The
men, too, had their pastimes when not employed
on duty; in a word, seldom has an army, occupy-
ing ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so
many hours of relaxation, or contrived to uniteso
completely the pIe asures of country life with the
serious business of war. It is probably needless
to add, that so great a show of security in their
leader had the best possible effect upon the tem-
per of the troops; or that the morale of the army
was sustained, not more by a contemplation of
things as they really were, than by a conviction
that they must be going on prosperously, other-
wise so much relaxation could not abound.


1 have said that, in this interval of quiet, a
variety of intercepted letters, as \vell private as
official, feH into our hands. Among others, we
were fortunate enough to become possessed of
Massena's account of the battle of Busaco, given
in a demi-official communication addressed to
Berthier. It was rather a curious despatch, but
contained, upon the whole, more of truth and can-




PENINSULA R W AR. 45


did admissions than were usually to be found in
French reports of actions. He acknow1edged
that he had been repulsed in both attempts upon
our position, with the 10ss of fO\lr thousaryd men,
besides a large proportion of his best officers,
whom he requested Berthier to rep]ace without
delay; and he stated the force with which he had
attacked, almost exactIy as it had been repre-
sented by Lord Wellington. Where alone he fell
into error, was in representing Regnier's corps as
having been opposed by a "colonne serrée" of
twenty thousand rnen under Hill; whereas it is
weH known to every militar y man in our army,
that the colonne serrée was á mode of forrnation of
which Lord Wellington constan tI y disapproved.
He had succeeded in overthrowing it at Virniera,
Ta]avera, and in this very affair of Busaco, and
was -not, therefore, 1ikely to have adopted it on
either occasion himself. But it was then so much
in favour with the French generals, that they put
no faith in any other method of fighting; and pro-
bably when Massena wrote his detail, he believed
all that he was writing.


So passed the time, from the beginning of Oc-
tober, when we took up our ground at Torres
Ved ras, to the rniddle of November, when we
were called upon to quit it. Rumours in abun-
dance poured in upon us during this interval, sorne
of them exhilarating enough, others sufficiently




46 NARRATIVE OF THE


gloomy; but as we seldom paid to such more at-
tention than was their due, ~e rarely permitted
them to exert any permanent influence over our
feelings andexpectations. The circumstance which
served most decidedly to impress us with a belief
that the enemy were far from being at their ease,
was, that desertions from their army occurred
daily; indeed, we received as many as 200 and
250 deserters in one week. Latterly, however,
these became less frequent, and strange to say,
several instances of the kind occurred amongst
ourselves. We had, moreover, abundant sourCes
of private gratification, in the many little fétes and
galas which from time to time occurred; more es-
pecially after the arrival of a king's messenger with
crosses and medals for the army. But the gayest
by far which took place at this time was held at
Mafra, on the 7th of November, on which occasion
Marshal Beresford was formally invested with the
order of the Bath. The thing was conducted with
great state and singular decorum, and gave univer-
sal satisfaction, both to the British officers and to
the Portuguese inhabitants. At length, however,
we were roused from this state of pleasurable in-
activity, by a piece of intelligence which we were
hardly prepared to receive, and which, in conse-
quence, carne upon us with a degree of surprise,
of which 1 confess. myself inadequate to convey
any just idea.




47


On the 13th of November advices reached us,
that a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand
men wason its way to join the army of Massena ;
that it had already passed the frontier; and that
the advance had arrived that day in Sabugal. At
the same time we were perfectly aware that the
enemy had for some time back been busily em-
ployed in the construction of a multitude of boats
at Santarem; 'and that these, with manyalready
built, which had fallen into their hands, were
mounted upon wheels, and put in a condition to
be transported overland to any point where they
úlight be needed. Whilst we were wavering
between the belief that Massena meditated a re-
treat, and the notion that very possibly he might
be disposed to make an attempt upon ,the fort of
Lisbon from the opposite bank of the Tagus, intel-
ligellce carne in, that not aman was to be seen,
either .at the outposts, or along the position which
the French arrny had lately occupied. They broke
up, it appeared, on the night of the 14th, and were
departed; but whether in fuH flight with a view to
abandon Portugal, or merely for the purpose of
taking up a winter's line, no one appeared to
know. The movernent was altogether as sudden
and as unlooked-for as frequently occurs in war;
and it threw us, for a time, into a state of amaze-
ment, which instantly set all our speculating pro-
pensities into full play.




48 NARRATIVE OF THE


One idea, and not entirely a visionary one, was,
that Massena despairing of su cee ss, at least during
the present season, had determined to faH back
upon Spain ; that his wheeled boats were destined
to supply the place of bridges over the Zezere, or,
in case of need, over the Tagus; and that in the
mean while he was retrograding by Thomar and
Estrada-nova, for the purpose of meeting and car-
rying along WiLh him the corps which had arrived
at Sabugal. 1t was objected, however, to this,
that nothing short of the most pressing necessity
could justify a measure, which, besides the imme-
diate abandonment of Portugal, must produce the
very worst effects upon the French interests in
Spain; and the objection, to say the least of it,
was not more wanting in force, than the supposi-
tion which it was· brought forward to combato
True, the army might have exhausted, and they
probably had exhausted, the supplies which their
confined situation furnished; and hence it became
necessary to shift their ground, for the purpose of
meeting the force now on its march, and the stores
it was supposed to convey; but a flight into Spain
was, upon more mature deliberation, pronounced
improbable; and hence other and no less feasible
theories were started to supply the place of that
rejected as soon as proposed.


1t was supposed, first, that Massena, guessing
that we might be informed ofhis coming reinforce-




PENINSULAR WAR. 49


ment, had become apprehensive of a disposition,
on our part, to attack him before it arrived; and
that he deemed it a wise measure to fall hack
upon stronger ground, there to- await its junction.
Secondly, and this was the most general opinion of
the whole, it was surmised that he intended to at-
tempt the reduction of Abrantes by bombci.rdment
andassault, the fall of which would supply him
with numerous means of every sort for the future
prosecution oí a scheme, upon which, at present,
he was manifestly too weak to think of embarking.
_ It was therefore believed that the French army
designed tB place itself in position behind the
Zezere ; from whence it might oppose aformida,ble
barrier to any efforts on our part, for the relief of
a fortress, the possession of which would be of
incalculable advantage to them, whenever they
should find themselves sufficientIy strong to -ad-
vanee again upon the capital.


Abrantes had long been put in an excellent state
ofdefence, and it was garrisoned by no fewer than
two regiments of the line and three of militia ;
had it been left, therefore, entirely to its own re-
sources, there was every prospect of its holding
out vigorously. This, however, was not the first
occasion on which we had been alarmed for its
safety; and measures had in consequence been
adopted, which placed it further beyond the risk,
noí only of cápture, but ofinsult. General Fane,


VOL. JI. D




50 NARRATIVE OF THE


with a brigade of Portug-uese cavalry, accompanied
. by several guns and a howitzer, had been passed


Qver the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march
along the southern bank of the river, and to des-
troy, if p'ossible, any boats which he might observe
in progress of preparation at Santarem or else-
where. He had obeyed these orders, and kept up
a long and warm cannonade on the enemy's inei-
pient flo~~lla; but his howitzer having been disabled.
his round-shot proved of little utility; and as no at-
~empt was madewith the Congreve rockets, whieh
now, for the first time, might llave been brought
into play, the enemy suceeeded in completing the
task which they had begun, and in furnishing
themselves. with ample means to cross the rivers
at their pleasure. This was certainly unfortunate,


. seeing that all the bridges had been carefulIy des-
troyed in their rear; and they were, to a certain
degree, hemmed in b~tween unfordable streams on
one hand, and our impassable lines on the other;
but there was no help foc it; and Fane, finding
his exertions profitless, went into cantonments.
He was thus circumstanced in quarters opposite
10 Santarem, when the retreat of the French be-
gan, and aecordingly"in a situation to render to the
garrison of Abrantes, in case of an attack, the most
powerful and opportune assistance.


The enemy's movement commenced from the
right of the line from Ribaldeira, Sobra1, and Villa




PENINSUI:AR WAH. 51


Franca; consequently the first alarm was given
by General Campbell's division upon our left.
Lord Wellington instantly wrote to Admiral Berke-
ley, to request that he would send up the launches
and boats of his fleet, in order tbat means migbt
be at hand to pass over General Hill's or any otber
corps wbich might be selected, to the left bank of
the Tagus. At the same time, General Crawford's
divisibn was ordered to advance from the Arruda
heights to Alenquer; and General Hill's, from
Alhandra to Villa Franca, with directions to feel
their way futther to the front, but to act with
caution. On the 15th, it was discovered that the
enemy were moving the whole oí their force on the
great road by the Tagús, a sniall detachment on]y
being left to protect the path which leads by Al ..
cantara and Rio Major to Santarem. As soon as
this' was known, General Spencer's division pushed
into Sobral and Alenquer; whilst Crawford, press-
ing forward from the latter place to Villa Nova
and Azembaja, discovered the enerny's rear-guard
in position between it and Cartaxo. These last-
mentioned movements occurred on the J 6th; on
which day likewise the head-quarters were trans-
ferred to Alenquer; but as it was of essential
importance" that we should be fully informed re-
pecting the enemy's probable designs, before we
committed ourselves too far by any more rapid
pursuit, a halt was ordered to take place on the




52 NARRATIVE OF THE


17th, in order that time might be granted for
the arrival of a report froIl). General Fane, whose
situation gave him excellent opportunities of
watching with etfect the" movement of Massena's
columns.


The report in question arrived in due thne, and
it led us to believe that the enemy were conti-
nuing their retreat from S antarem , and that no-
thing more than a. strong rear-guard remained be-
hind for the purpose of covering the movement.
It may be advisable to state bere tbat tbe position
of Santarem is exceedingly formidable, and tha1" it
cannot he turned eXGept by a very large army,
andat tbe exp~nse of mueh time and fatigue in
making a lengthened detour. We were, therefore,
far" froIl). experiencing regret, that Massena had
not deemed it advisable to offer us battIe on tbat
line, more éspecially as his abandonment of the
strong groun~ left us at liherty to look to tbe pro-
tection of Abrantes, and to throw such a force
there as might act witp eff'ect upon the enemy's
flank, under cover of the pace. ) L nder these cir-
cumstances, Lord Wellington determined to" esta-
blish his head-quarters at Santarem, to push on
Crawford further in fr:ont, and to hring up the
whole of.his army in" tbe same" direction, except
Hill's corps only, which, crossing the river at Vee-
lada in boats, and returning again by the bridge
below Abrantes, would be ahle to harass and im.,




PENINSULAR WAR. !l3


pede the enerny's communicatíons" and render
great assistance to us in our projected operations.
This was the more to be reekoned upon, because
Massena possessed but a single bridge across the
Zezere; and as he must move his entire army in
one column, it was not probable that he could do
so with su eh rapidity as to insure its passage un-
molested from either quarter.


The troops being put in motion for these several
purposes, it was soon discovered that General
Fane's first report respecting the enemy's designs
was not likely to be realised, and that they had
assurned the positíon from whieh we thought they
would have retired. The advance, under Craw-
foro, found Sahtarem occupied by what appeared
at first to be a strong rear-guard,but which
proved in the end to be the second corps which
had there taken up its cantonments. Upon this
the head-quarters, attended by Spencer's division,
were established at Cartaxo; General Cotton's
cavalry were sent forward to join the lightdivi-
sion; General Anson's brigade took the road to
Aleventre and Río Major ; and the fourth and fifth
divisions fixed themselves at Alenquer and Sobral ;
whilst the sixth remained stationary at Ribaldeira,
and the third at Torres Yedras.


Our army had not long taken up its new align-
ment, when it was satisfactorily ascertained that
the enemy were strengthening and disposingthem~




54 NARRATIVE OF 'fHE


selves in a very judicious mannery for the double
purposes, as it appeared, of securing cornfortable
winter-quarters, andprotecting, from the side of
Abrantes, all such supplies and reinforcements as
might be on the way to join them. Whilst the
second corps garrisoned Santarem, the eighth
took possession of a line of cantonments on the
right, extending by Torres N ovas all the way to
Thomar. Here part of the sixth corps was es-
tablished; and about four thousand infantry, with
three hundred cavalry, passed the Zezere, for t~e
purpose of establishing a téte-de-pont; for the
bridge; it appeared, w'as already ·aH but complete.
though boats· continued to be constructed in San~
tarem, and were hourly in movement towards the
river. With re8pectz again, to the reinforcements,
their advance was reported to be at Pinhel,
whither they had arrived after sustaining 'a sharp
action with the corps of General Silveira. The
latter having come upon them at Valvarde some-
what by surprise, succeeded i~ killing three hun-
dred, and taking many prisoners; but as the
enemy were reported to amount to fifteen thou-
sand meny Silveira could not venture to follow up
thesuccess which he. obtained. On the contrary,
he very prudently retired behind the Douro, as
800n as he had struck his blow; and theFrench,
leaving a detachment to watch him, pushed on
with the main body in the direction of Massena's




PENINSULAH WAR. 55


army. From all these particulars, we were led
tQ the conclusion, that Massena. entertained no
design of evacuating Portugal; but that he would
remain where he was, till the. junction of fresh
troops, and the arrival of a more favourable sea-
son, should enable hirn once more to act upon the
offensive.


Affairs continued in this state without the oc-
currence of any event calculated to interrupt our
tranquillity, up to a late date in Decernber. For
sorne time the weather was so boisterous, and the
rain feU in such constant torrents, as effectually
to hinder any military operations from being un-
dertaken; and when these obstac1es ceased to
exist, the policy both of the English and French
general s equally restrained theru. frorn entering
upon a winter's campaign. Inforrnation, in the
mean while, continued daily to accumulate upon
us, and much of it was from a source which left
no reason to doubt of its authenticity; whilst the
burden of the whole tended to strengthen our
conviction, that another struggle for the preserva-
tion' of Portugal must take place in the spring.
Of the various rumours which reached us, it will
be necessary to repeat only such as most deeply
interested us at the moment; and these 1 'proceed
to give in the order in which they carne in.


We learned that the head of the enemy's rein-
forcement, which Silveira had encountered by the




56 NARRATIVE OF THE


way, was now in communication with Massena's
line, and that it had c10sed in somewhere between
the extreme right at Leira, and the extreme left
at Santaremó Of the numbers which composed
the entire force, a variety of accounts were in cir-
culation, sorne rating it as high as lifteen or twenty
thousand men, others taking it considerably below
that estimate; but whatever its aggregate strength
might be, no more than five tho.usand men had as
yet arrived; nor were the remainder, as far as we
could learn, ascertained to be near at hand. The
reinforcement in question had, it appeared, been
obtained by a forward movement of the ninth
corps under Drouet ;which, taking possession of
the posts and cahtonments on the frontier, hitherto
occupied by detachments from Massena's army,
enabled these detachments to proceed to their
several corps. We had no reason to believe that
any part of Drouet's corps was actually employed.
in Portugal; by maoy, indeed, it was imagined,
that being under the orders of Joseph, it could not
be moved out of Spain unless by express directions
frorn Paris; bl\t one of its divisions' had certainly
marched :to the very extremity of its province;
and thus the whole of Massena's three corps were
rendered effective. At the same time other corps,
which had been scattered through Castile, were
represented as having fallen back upon Madrid;
and the province, thus relieved from the presence




PENINSULAH WAR. 57


of the enemy, was again in a state of rebellion.
Don J ulian, the gallant partisan, whose services at
Ciudad Rodrigo obtained for him so much well-
merited renown, was once more in· arms. He was
preparing to attack Zamora, where a very feeble
garrison had been left; and the probabilities were,
that unless fresh forces speedily carne up to take
the stations which Drouet had abandoned, that
part of Spain would become as hostile as ever.


With respect to Portugal, we heard that Sil-
veira's affair had occurred with a detached corps,
which had been thrown across the Coa to protect
the march· of the main body hither, by way of
Sabugal, CasteUo BÍ'anco, and Cardijos. The
Portuguese general, though deeming it prudent to
retire, stilI held Francola wÍth his outposts; and
the enemy continued to maintain a small bodyof
troops' on the other side of the Coa, on purpose to
watch him. J n the mean while, Trant was at
Coimbta, where all remainedperfectly quiet;
thóugh his advance, under Wilson, had lately
fallen back to Espinhel; whilst General Hill's
movernent on the left bank of the Tagus had been
arrested at Chamuca. The necessity for his
entrance into Abrantes no longer existing, Lord
Wellington did not consider it prudentto push
him on thither, as long as theenemy abstained
fmm making sorne decided demonstration of their
design to attack the place; and all their late ope-




58 NAltRATIVEOF THE


rations seemed to imply that they meditated
nothing more than defensive operations during
the winter. It was very evident, likewise, that
General HilFs march had seriously alarmed them
for the safety of theÍr expected reinforcements;
and that they looked to Abrantes with apprehen-
sion, ratber tban with any hope of being able to
make themselves masters of it; for they broke up
the roads willeh lead from thence to Punhete, and
otherwise strove to interrupt aH communication
between the Zezere and the town.


1 have spoken hitherto of the dispositions ofthe
French general in terms more vague perhaps than
their nature, and the re.sults to which they promised
to lead, seem,J;e demando • The line which Mas-
sena..at -present occupied was one of great extent
-insomuch that it might, at almost any point, be
pierced, and the position of Santarem. and the
troops cantoned there, eompletely isolated; yet
wasit one, taking into consideration certain disád-
vantages under which we laboured, demonstrative
of judgment in the individual who selectedit.
Were we disposed to try its strength,we must ad·
vanee to the attack over a country low· and flat,
and at present everywhere under water, leaving,
at the same time, IÍumerous openings by which a
spirited enemy might, in the mean while, pene ...
trate into our lines in the rearo Now, in spirit and
enterprise, no one can accuse French soldiers of




"PENINSULAR W AR. 59


heing deficient, and as they w~re aware of our
difficulties, little doubt could be entertained that
they would greedily take advantage of them. On
the other hand, Massena had possessed himself of
a district rich in corn; he possessed ample stóres
of cattle; and he enjoyed the prospect of living
at least as well as he could do in any part of Spain.
Bis communications with his rear were now more
secured by meansof the troops whom he had lately
brought up j his flanks were equally safe, notwith-
standing the proximity of Abrantes; and as most
oC the country people whom we had swept aw;;ty
with us had litde by little returned to their homes,
there appeared to be no difficulty whatever in bis
establishing himself where he was during the win..,
ter. But if ~uch were really his design, why con-
tinue to crowd forward so many masses, which,
weré it intended to pass any length of time in a
state of quiet, had much better be dispersed in
cantonments more- remote from one another? His
present mode of proceeding must lead to a con-
sumption of his means more rapid by far than was
accordant with sound policy j-could it be that
Massena entertained serious thoughts of resuming
the offensive at once? This was a grave question
at the moment; and it involved many other con-
siderations, not less important and weighty than
itself.


It was not to be expected that the enerny would




60 NAltRATIVE OF THE


a second time make their attempt upon Lisbon by
one side of the Tagus only, leaving to us the undis-
puted command of that river, and of both of its
banks". " They had already suffered so much froro
thelr neglect on this head, that nothing short of
infatuation could lead them into it again. On the
contrary, it required but a moderate degree of
foresight to discover, that let the attempt be made
when it would, a strong corps would be pushed
along the left of the river, and the most strenuous
exertions set on foot to molest the harbour, and aU
that came out and io, (rom the point of Almada. It
accordingly became a matter of serious importance
to us, thatapo"Sition should be marked out and
strongly fortified on the one ban k as well as on the
other. This was the more necessary. as, although
AdmiralBerkeley, when first consulted, had given
it as his decided :apinion, that the lines of Torres
Yedras with the inoer circle óf works about Fort
Sto Julien would; at any moment and under any
eircumstances, secure,incase ofneed, the safe em-
barkation ofthe troops,.the late alarm induced him
to come to a different persuasion; and he now
conceived, that unless something were done to
fortify the left as well as the right side of the har-
bOllr, the shipping,. Íncase ofa reverse at our lines,
would be exposedtó danger. Guided in part by
this consideration, and in part by the conviction,
that such a chain of posts would enable him to




PENINSULAR WAR. 61


employ Hill's or any other corps with perfeet se-
eurity on the opposite bank, Lord Wellington de-
termined to construct t here an intrenched position,
similar to that whieh he had constl'ucted at Torres
Vedras; and earIy in the winter the engineers,
with as many troops and artificers as eould be
spared fol' the purpose, were emploJ ed in its for-
mation.


The new line of redoubts extended across that
neck of land whieh is formed by a bed of the river
on one side, and by an inHexion ofthe seaon the
other; and it was of a formidable nature. In ad-
dition 10 this, great eare was bestowed in strength-
ening the inner circle of Fort Sto J uIien, and at
both points the heaviest ordnance at our command,
chiefly twenty-four pounders, were mouoted. By
this means oul' capabilities of defence were brought
to a state of perfection, as high as was compatible
with the end ptoposed, and the difficulties to be
ovel'come. But after a1l, the great question was,
whether, in case of an extl'emity, any works wouId
. suffice to covel' the escape of an army so numerOU8
as that now under Lord Wellington's command.
Thel'e could be no doubt thatboth banks of the
-river were well guarded-that ls to say, the new
lines around Almada effectually covered the 80uth-
ern side; whilst the fortifications about Sto J uIien
protected the bay and place of embarkation in all
directions; but the question still remained to be ~'.""'.
.J~ ,~\ té: -


. ti




62 NARRATIVE OF THE


answered~-was it possible for a force of forty
thousand men to escape in the face of such an
army, as should be capable of drívíng it fromthe
double line of Torres Ved ras, back to the sea? 1 t
was quite evident that nothing short of an over-
whelming superiority in numbers eould ever force
our first lines of defence. That superiority,how-
ever, were it su eh as to obtain this advantage,
would likewise be competent to bear down an
oppositíon whieh -might afterwards be offered;
and therefore our surest hope, 1 say not of ultimate
triumph, but even of safety, lay in our succes's in
the field. Of success, however, we must be doubt-
fuI, unlesssupport should be given to us with the
same unsparing liberality with whieh it was af-
forded to the enemy; and henee aH felt, even now
when the tide seemed to haveturned slightly in
ourfavour, that at no period since the commence-
ment of the struggle did we stand in greater need
of fresh troops of all arms and descríptions from
England. Thereeould be líttle doubt that N apo-
leon would, at length, be roused from the appa-'
rent apathy with whieh he had hitherto regarded
the affairs of Portugal. The probability was, that
the return of spring at the latest would bring to
Massena such an addítion of strength as we, with
our present numbers, could not hope successfully
to oppose in the field; and then we should be
compelled to retire once more within our lines,




PENINSULAR WAR. 63


and the war would become one, not of personal
contests, but of resources. Now, though we had
heretofore sustained this species of warfare suc-
cessfully, it was not to be expected that we could
continue to do so for ever; and hence our most
fervent wishes were, either that Massena might
find ·himself under the necessity of abandoning
Portugal before his supplies could reach him~ or
that we rnight receive such an addition to our
means, as would enable us to bring matters to the
issue of a battle, with something like a faÍr pros-
pect of victory.


Whilst we were thus speculating, and whilst
part of our people were employed in giving addi-
tiona1 strength to the works in our rear, few events
took place calculated to exert any degree of in-
fluence over the final issue of the war. 1 have
rnentioned the arrival of five thousand men at
Massena's cantonments, and spoken of them as
forming part of a considerable divisioll, which the
advance' of Drouet's corps, and its occupation of
the posts upon the frolltier, set at liberty to rnove
towards the front. The remainder followed theÍr
leading brigades, but after reaching the Zezere,
retreated again, with the 10ss of many hundred
men, through the operation of parties of guerillas
upon their rear and flanks. For sorne days they
were not heard of; but at length a report came in,
that a corps had made its appearance on the Coa, .




64 NARRATIV:E OF THE


and that having crossed that stream, itwas in full-
march towards the front. Whether this were the
same body which, after re'aching the Zezere, had
fallen back without so rnuch as opening a commu-
nication with Massena, we found it impossible ac·
curátely at this time to ascertain; indeed, our
information went no further than to establish the
faet, that it eonsisted of about sixteen thousand
men, and that its march was conducted with· great
deliberation, as if to protect a convoy.But the
impressionmade upon us was, that the corps in
question either consisted solely of the same troops
who had formerly made an attempt to join, or that
they and part of'Drouet's corps had united to
rnake the 'number; arid the information whic'h we
afterwards received went to satisfy. U8 that the
latter instructions had been correcto Though ha-
rassed as the rest had been, they succeeded in
. reaching their destination; and they made up the
wholé of the additional force which Massena re-
ceived during the winter.


In the mean while, the Freneh Marshal was
waiting anxiously for advices from Paris, whither
he had despatched General Foy, sorne weeks pre-
viously, with a stateÍnent of the 'situation and
prospects of his ariny. [


1 1 have noticed this.mission, chiefly because it furnishcs me
• with an opportunity of saying a few words touching statemeuts




PENJNSULAI:t \VAR. 65


The position which he had taken up at Santa-
rem, however, he carefully and industriously im-
proved, by covering the face of the hill with three
lines of abbatis, or otherwise intrenching the corps


. to which its defence was intrusted. It ought to
be observed here, that though Santarem lay consi-
derably in ad vance of the rest of h is line, and was,
as 1 have already hinted, to a certain degree, iso-
lated and detached, it was not on that account the
less favourable tohis general defence. On the
contrary, though other points might be easily
pierced, no advantage could be taken of the suc-
cess obtained, whilst this projecting post remained
in the hands of the enemy; whilst its natural and
artificial strength were both such, as to render any
attempt upon it, with our present means, in the
highest degree hazardous and uncertain. -Thus


which have appeared in a History of the Peninsular 'Var by
General Foy, and which has of late attracted sorne attention
aroong his countrymen. The General, on his arrival at Paris,
publishéd in the MOlliteur a variety of accounts, relative to the
conduct of his fellow-soldiers, and the dispositions of the English
arroyo In these 1 can by no means concur. For example :
He assured the ,French public, that whilst multitudes daily
carne over froro our carop, the crime of deseltion was hardly
known in tIte French army; whereas the returns in my posses-
sion distinctly prove that,we took in no fewer than 733 deser-
ters in the course of three months. But 1 feeI delicacy in
pressing, as an ad verse roilitary writer, our differences of opinion
further.


VOL. 11.




66 NARRATIVE OF THE


were we kept at bay by a line, abundantly acces-
sible in every, direction save one; because from
that one our own flanks and rear were in danger,
should we venture to try the fortune of an action
in any other q uarter.


There is but one other circumstance to which 1
consider it necessary to allude before closing this
chapter, and with it the history of the eampaign
of 1810. December was far advaneed, when an
offieer attached to the staft' of Massena's army,
who was proceeding towards Ciudad Rodrigo in
the disguise of a peusant, fell into the hands· of
sorne of our flying pa~ties, and was brought in to
head -q uarters. Frorn him we learned that the
Marshal had received no eornmunieations from
Franee since be first entered Portugal, and that he
was now labouring llnder the greatest anxiety for
the arrival both of intelligenee and instructions.
Our prisoner had been sent, it appeared, to meet
whatever corps or messengers might be upon the
way for the purpose of hurrying them on with as
few delays as possible; and though he was evi-
dently a man in whom no confidence had been
reposed, he spoke with so great an appearance of
eandour and openness, that we felt little disposed
to doubt the truth of his assertions. He informed
us that Massena had resolv~d not to attack our
lines, unless he shouldbe reinforced by a eorps of
twenty-five or thirty thousand men; and tbat in




PENINSULAR WAR. 67


case these faiIed in arriving, he had determined
tofall back, for the winter, by Castello Branco
and Alcantara, into Spain'. The advantages which
he proposed to obtain by this movement were, a
concentration with the armies operating in that
portion of the Peninsula, and the redriction of the
city of Badajoz, which would enable him, on the
return of spring, to debouch once more into Por-
tugal, with two large armies, one in the Alentejo,
and the other on the right bank of the Tagus.
Our informant further assured us, that instead of
having corn and supplies in abundance at their
. command, the French were suffering grievously
for everything. Their ammunition, their medicines,
their shoes, theirclothing, and provisions, were
an at the lowest ebb; whilst their linen, an article
upon which the welfare of an army depends in
no ordinary degree, was almost entirely exhausted.
Finally, he said that Massena was on bad terms
with all his generals, Loison and Freire being the
only individuals among them with whom he kept
up any great intimacy; that there were full ten
thousandsick in the hospitals; and that the entire
force of infantry and cavalry which they were
capable of hringing under arms, did not exceed
forty thousand meno


The only fact in aU this information which we
felt disposed to question, was, the reported design
of Massena to abandon Portugal. . There ap-




68 NARRATIVE OF THE


peared to be no necessity for this measure, and
many good reasons against it; and, therefore, we
stiU inclined to the opinion, that whether he with-
drew behind the Mondego or not, he would not
withdraw further, but endeavour, keeping his
communications open all the while with his
real', to obtain possession oCas large a portion of
the country as might be practicable. This, how-
ever, he would do, only provided he were left to
the guidance of his own judgment; for, should
a peremptory order to advance arrive from Paris,
advancE' he must and would at all hazards.ln
the latter case, we were aware, from othersources,
that he was prepared to sacrifice twenty thousand
men in the attempt to possess himself of our lines;
and that the attempt would be made both with
judgment and vigour, we c1early foresaw. But
of the result of any such endeavour, no one could
for a moment doubt; and hence no one looked
forward to the probability of its occurrence with
the slightest alarm, or even anxiety.


Such was our state, and such our prospects and
expectations, during the winter of 1810. On the
side of Abrantes aH was safe; the French having
resolved, and wisely resolved, not to besiege it;
whilst Silveira, wh6 on the approach of the rein-
forcements had retired across the Coa, was again
in readiness to act, as soon as an opening should
be given on the rear of the enemy. In the mean




PENINSULAR WAH. 69


while, Trant and Bucellar were on the alert at
Coimbra; and Wilson, retreating frorn EspinheI,
threw himself with his corps on the other side of
the Mondego. The latter rnovernent, was, indeed,
on one account, a subject of regret to us, inas-
much as it deprived us of our readiest and surest
source of intelligence, which could henceforth be
obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was
made under the impression that a further conti-
nuance in Espinhel would be hazardous, and
could not be risked. With respect to the French,
again, they, like ourselves, rested quieto Their
position was, as 1 have already stated, a good one,
and it was now greatly improved by their obtain-
ing permanent possession of one bank of the Mon-
dego; bywhich not only their flank, but all their
marches from the rear were, to a certain degree,
secured. But there were a variety of causes at
work competent, in due time, to disturb this state
of apparent tranquillity; and the spring can hardly
be said to have set in, ere they carne powerfully
into operation.


Before closing this chapter, which terminates
the carnpaign of 1810, it would be injustice not to
record the extraordinary zeal, ability, and activity,
which were displayed in two departments of our
army; 1 mean, the commi8sariat under Sir R.
Kennedy, and the medica1 department under Dr.
Frank. It i8 not my province to eulogise; but as




70 N ARRATIVE OF THE


the existence and life ofthe soldier depended upon
the direction of the latter with his valuable assist·
ants, and the comfort and sustenance upon the
former, it is impossible that 1 shouJd refrain, as
adjutant·general of the army, from adding my mite
of gratitude to these two very meritorious public
officers. And 1 must say that, when Dr. Frank
afterwardR from illness left the arrny, it occasioned
one general sentiment of deep public regret.




l)ENINSULAR WAR. 71


CHAPTER III.


8tate of affairs on the southernfrontier-Advance of 80u1t
against Badajoz-Capture ofOliven~a, and inve~tment ofBa-
dajoz-General Mendizabaldefeated, and Badajoz taken-
Campo Mayor reduced-Massena breaks up from Santarem,
and retreats into Spain-Marshal .Beresford marches towards
Badajoz-Attack of a French convoy at Campo Mayor-
The British corps passes the Guadiana, reduces Olivens:a,
and invests Badajoz-Lord 'Vellington "isits this corps, and
gives directions for the siege----Is recal1ed to the north, where
the army remains in position round Fuentes de Honor.


BEFORE pursuing further the fortunes of Massena,
• and the movements of the divisions immediately


opposed to him, it will be necessary, in as few
words as possible, to make the reader acquainted
with certain transactions which ;had been going on
elsewhere ..


Whilst the whole of the allied army was col-
lected in the lines of Torres Yedras, and its atten-
tion turned almost exclusively to the defence of
Lisbon, Soult, having assembled about thirteen or




72 NARRATIVE OF THE


fourteen thousand men in the south of Spain, ad-
vanced on Badajoz, for the purpose of effecting
adiversion on the side of Alentejo, and opening
a communication across the Tagus with Massena.
Generals Ballasteros and Mendizabal, who, on the
departure of Romana, commanded in that quarter,
found themselves unable to oppose him. The
former accordingly moved to his right upon Salva-
tierra and the lower parts of the Guadiana; whilst
the latter, leaving seven battalions with a brigade
of field artillery in Oliven~a, retreated across the
river. Oliven~a was not a place of extraordinary
strength; and had the reverse been the case, the
neglect of Mendizabal to supply it with a compe-
tent store of provisions would have rendered the
strength of its fortífications profitless: it was
blockaded on the 11th of January, and on the
22nd famine compelled the garrison to surrender.


Having taken measures for rendering Oliven~a
a place of arms in support of his future operations,
Soult detached Mortier's corps on the 26th to in- ,
vest Badajoz; and the· investment was at once
completed on the left of the Guadiana by the in-
fantry; whilst the cavalry, under General Latour
Maubourg, patroled round the right. N o great
while elapsed ere the investment was converted
into a siege. Ground was broken on the 28th, and
an attack directed against the Pardaleras outwork,
which was battered from the Sierra del Viento,




PENINSULAR WAlto 73


and enfiladed from a paralleI at two hundred and
fifty yards distant; and a breach being effected on
the 11th of February, the Pardaleras was, on the
same night, stormed, and carried with very little
opposition.


As soon as the movement of Marshal Soult was
known at Cartaxo, Lord Wellington despatched
his Spanish corps into the Alentejo, that it might
co-operate with Mendizabal for the protection of
that frontier; and he pointed out a position to the
north of Badajoz, having its right protected by
Fort St. Christoval, and its front covered by the
Gevora, as the best which the Spanish army could
take up, for the purpose of keeping open a com-
munication with the town in case it should be at-
tacked. Unfortunately, the brave Romana, who,
more than all the rest of the Spanish generals put
together, had obtained and merited our confidence
and respect, was unable to accompany his corps.
He was now labouring under asevere malady,
which, on the 27th of January, terminated his ex-
istence. But the division made good its position;
the post recommended was assumed on the 9th of
February; and it proved a constant source of
anxiety to the besiegers, and of confidence to the
besieged, by covering the introduction of numerous
supplies ¡nto the place. The enemy saw its im-
portan ce, and determined, at all hazards, to carry
it; and the improvidence of the Spanish General




74 NARRATIVE OF THE


was not long in furnishing them with the oppor·
tunity which they so much desired.


It happened that a h,owitzer or two, from the
opposite bank of the river, were enabled to throw
a few shells into the ground of the Spanish en-
campment, which, without doing much real mis-
chief, harassed and annoyed the meno Mendizabal,
very unwisely, paid to the matter a degree of at-
tention which it did not merit; and to get rid of
the nuisance, moved the whole of his army to its
left, completely out of the protection of Fort St.
Christoval. The enerny perceived his error, and
lost not a rnoment in availing thernselves of it.
Mortier established a flying bridge _ tlpon the
Guadiana aboye the town, and crossed over iil the
night of the 18th; whilst six thousand men from
the besieging army forded the Gevora, and at-
tacked the Spaniards at daylight. The resistance
made was as trifling as might have been expected
from bad troops, deprived of all the advantages of
position; and out of nine thousand infantry, and
a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, of which Mendi:'
zabal's corps had consisted, only three thousand
five hundred made their escape. - Three thousand
fled-to Badajoz, where they were shut up with
the rest of the garrison; whilst five húndred re-
tired upon Elvas, under the cornrnand of Don
Carlos de España.


The siege was now carried on with renewed




PENINSULAR WAH. 75
vigour,-and the Governor being killed, the command
devolved upon General Imaz, an officer who felt
no disposition to emulate the renown of Palafox
and Alvarez. A breach, exceedingly imperfect in
kind, was no sooner effected, than Imaz proposed
a capitulation; and on . the 11 th of March, at a
moment when he knew, froID telegraphic de-
spatches, that Massena was in fuIl retreat, and
that forces were on their way to relieve the place,
he marched out nine thousand troops into the
ditch, who layed down their arms to a similar
number of French infantry, with sorne six or eight
hundred cavalry, the total amount of the besieging
army. Had the slightest resolution existed in the
breast of that man, Badajoz might have been pre-
served; and all the blood which was aíterwards
spilled in retaking it, might, as a necessary conse-
quence, have been saved.


Mortier's next business was to invest Campo
Mayor, with a corps of five thousand infantry, and
six hundred cavalry. Campo Mayor is a large
frontier town, supplied originally with tolerable
fortifications; but which had oí late be en sadly
neglected, and were oí course íalling to decay.
Five thousand men is the smallest number which
would be required to garrison it; but at present
it was held by no more than two hundred militia,
undei the command oí Major Tallaia, of the Por-
tuguese engineers. That officer's means in cannon




76 NARRATIVE OF THE


and stores were as feeble as his force in men;
there were but five pieces of artillery mounted on
the ramparts; yet he compelled the enemy to
proceed against him with all the order of a siege;
nor was it till a practicable breach had been
formed in the body of the place, that he would
listen to any proposal of surrender. At last, how-
ever, seeing his defences ruined, and the enemy
prepared to storm, he stipulated for a delay of
twenty-four hours, in the hope that relief might
arrive; and none appearing, he very reluctantly
gave up the townon the 23rd of March.


In the mean while affairs were drawing rapidly
to a crisis on'the north side of the Tagus. Though
their change of situation conduced, for a short
time, very considerably to the cornforts of lVIas-
sena and his army, it was quite impossible that a
country already exhausted could longsupport the
burden which the presence of some fifty or sixty
thousand men, besides horses and other animals,
laid upon it; and this the French General began,
by degrees, to feel very sensibly. His troops be-
carne every day more and more sickly; provisions
became every day scarcer, and forage was not to
be procured by any exertions. The reinforce-
ments, too, for which he had waited so long and
so patiently, carne not up, by any means, to his
wants or his wishes; indeed, the fresh regiments
marched into his line were not sufficiently nume-




PENINSULAR WAIL 77


rous to fill Up the gaps which the casualties of
war had already occasioned there. Massena felt
that the moment for offensive operations had
passed away. Whether he regretted that he had
not hazarded an attaek upon our lines, at a mo-
ment when their yet imperfect state held out sorne
ehances of success, 1 know not; but eertain it is,
that he soon began, after his assumption of the
position at Santarem, to prepare for a retreat.
Parties were eontinuallyemployed upon the Ze-
zere, eonstrueting bridges, and throwing up works
for their defence ; his siek and wounded were gra-
dually, quietly, and cautiously, transferred to the
rear; and at the beginning of March 1811, there
remained in his eamp, besides sorne heavy artillery
of little value, only the men and horses fit for
duty, with as many stores, guns, aml11unition~
waggons, and tumbrils, as appeared necessary for
their use. Everything, however, was done with
so much address, that exeept of the faet that two
bridge s instead of one were now upon the Zezere,
we were kept in profound ignoranee as to his pro-
eeedings, and we eontinued to the last to cast an-
xious g]ances towards Abrantes, for the safety of
which we conceived that there were still good
grounds of apprehension.


1 have stated that, on the breaking up of the
French army from before the lines of Torres Ve-
dras, General Hill's division was sent across the




78 NARHATIVE OF THE


Tagus, for the purpose of giving additional security
to the garrison of Abrantes, and of embarrassing
Massena's movements, should he either attempt to
retire by the Alentejo, or take the route of Pun-
heteo As soon as the operations of Soult's army
became known, Marshal Beresford's corps was
likewise thrown across the river, with a view of
raising the siege of Badajoz, and giving relief to
the Spanish corps, already hard-pressed upon the
frontier. Beresford had not yet begun his march
southward, when ceftain indications of a move-
ment on the part of Massena, induced Lord Wel-
lington to delay his progress. Instead of march-
ing towards Badajoz, he was directed to advance
upon A brantes, and, repassing the Tagus there, to
threaten the enemy's posts at Punhete ; and a por-
tion of his corps, under Major-general the Honour-
able William Stewart, had actually obeyed these
instructions, . when the enemis designs became
suddenly developed. On the night of the 5th of
March, Massena decamped frorr.. his position at
Santarem, and concentrating the whole of his
army about Pombal, made demonstrations there,
as if he were not only willing, but anxious, to rest
the fate of the campaign upon the issue of a gene-
ral action.


On the 6th of March the head-quarters of the
allied army were established at Santarem, and
dispositions were made for pursuing the enemy




PE~lNSULAn WAR. 79


along the road which his main body had taken,
and disIodging him from the several posts which
he retained in other quarters. General Stewart's
brigacle passed the Zezere, and advanced, together
with the 4th, the 6th, and part oí the 1st divisions,
towards Thomar, where the French seemed at first
disposed to collect in force; whilst the light divi-
sion, supported by the 1st German huzzars and
royal dragoons, proceeded at a quick pace to-
wards Pombal. At Thomar no encounter took
place, the enemy retreating, on the appearance of
our people, towards the Mondego; but at Pombal
there was some fighting, and hopes were at one
moment entertained, that there would be a good
deal more. Our leading brigade came up with
the fugitives on the 9th, and succeeded, after a
brief but smart skirmish, in capturing about two
hundred prisoners; and on the 11 th dispositions
were made for bringing the enerny to action, by
the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light divisions,
assembled for the purpose. But Massena, instead
of waiting to be ass'ailed, broke up during the
night, and feH back, covered by the whole of
Montbrun's cavalry, by the 6th corps of infantry,
and by part of the 8th, in the directioll of Re-
denha. On the I2t~, a strong rear-guard was
se en posted at the end of a defile, in front of the
vilIage. It was immediately attacked by three
divisions of il1fantry, by General Pack's Portu-




80 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


guese brigade, and the cavalry; and after an ob-
stinate resistance, was driven through the defile
to the plain beyond. It next retreated to some
high and broken ground, where it again showed a
front; but from this position also it was compelled
to retire with some loss; and finally it withdrew
to Condeixa, where the main body had established
itself. .


The enemy's force assembled here consisted of
the 6th, 8th, and 9th corps; of the whole of Mas-
sena's army in short, except the 2nd corps, which
continued still at Espinhel. The ground which
they occupied was singularly commanding; and
as it could not be attempted in front, without a
sacrifice of Jives mueh greater than either his feel-
ings or policy induced Lord Wellington to risk,
arrangements were made for turning it. The
third division, under General Picton, made a long
and tedious detour to the right; but it succeeded
in throwing itself upon the left of the enemy's
line, which instantly broke into column of march,
and fell back. Similar movements were effected
with similar results during several successive
days; and the enemy, diverted from his original
intention of passing part of his force over the Mon-
dego at Coimbra, cOlüinued his retreat, in a single
continuous column, along the road which winds
between the river and the Sierra de Estrella.
The consequence was, that he passed over little




PENINSULAR W AR. 81


else than a succession of admirable positions; ánd
as he took care to cover his marches with the best
of his cavalry, with a force of infantry which never
feH short of ten thousand rnén, a,nd with only one
brigade of guns admirably horsed, his retrogres-
sion was conducted in good order, and with as
little 10ss as could well befall an army whilst ex-
ecuting a rnanmuvre of the kind. On one occa-
sion onl y were the French in danger of being
dragged into a general action, at manifest disad-
vantage to themselves. Whilst crossing the
Coera, the alIies pressed so closely upon them,
that to save his main body, Massena was content
to sacrifice a considerable portion of his rear-
guard, which, halting to be attacked, was cut to
pieces; whilst the columns escaped, with the loss
of sorne artillery and a great deal of baggage. It
¡s, however, extremely probable that all Mas-
sena's precautions would have failed to preserve
hirn, had it been possible to transport stores and
provisions as rapidly as our troops were capable of
rnarching; but on the 19th, it was found that the
columns had outstripped their supplies, and a halt
of sorne days was necessary, to give the latter
time to overtake them.


As it was not my good fortune to be an eye-
witness of this memorable retreat, having be en
obliged to leave the army froID severe illness for
three IDonths, 1 shall not pretend to enter IDl-


VOL. n. F




82 NARRATIVE OF THE


nutely into details of which 1 could speak only
upon the reports of others. It is sufficient to ob-
serve that Massena finally escaped to a position
on the Spanish side of the Agueda, after having
exhibited nurnerous proofs of capacity to direct the
rnovements of a retreating force, and leaving be-
hind him sorne sad memoriaIs of the absence of
an humane feelings frorn arnong his soldiery. The
line of the enemy's march could, indeed, be every-
where traced by the smoke of cottages, hamlets,
and towns, which they reduced to ashes; and
even those which escaped the ravages of the Hames,
were left in a state of total dilapidation and abso-
lute destitution. Of the acts of personal violence
which they committed, 1 would rather not from
hearsay give a relation; but this much may be
said, that the Portuguese must cease to feeI as
men cornmonly feel, if they ever forget the con-
duct of an army, which entered their country
with the warmest protestationsof friendship, and
in whose promises of protection too many were
tempted to place reliance. Even the towns which
had given shelter to the head-quarters of the French
generals were not spared. Torres Novas, Thomar,
and Pernes, were all of them sacked on the eve-
ning previous to their evacuation; the convent of
Alcoba~a was burned to the ground; the Bishop's
palace, and the whole town of Leiria, shared the
same fate ;-in a word, it seemed as if these men




PENINSULAR W AR. 83


had resolved to make a desert ofthe country which
they had failed to conquer; and that the war,
which they professed at first to wage only with
the Englísh and their armed partisans, had been
lurned against its peaceable inhabitants.


The last stand which the enemy made on the
present occasion, took place near Sabugal, and
proved hig-hly honourable to the British arms. On
the 3rd of April, the second corps was seen in po-
sition, with its rightimmediately aboye the bridge
and town of Sabugal; and its left extended along
the road to Alfayates, so as to command all the
approaches from the fords of the Coa towards the
upper part of the town. Lord Wellington made
his dispositions to attack it in front, flank, and
rear, at the same moment; and but foro the unfor-
tunate occurrence of a sudden shower of rain, it
would have been, in all probability, annihilated.
But though it escared being surrounded, it made
not good its retreat till after it had suffered asevere
los s in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and an
opportunity had be en given to one brigade of the
light division, which, single-handed, maintained the
uneq ual contest for sorne time, of increasing the
welI-earned reputation which that pecllliarly-
distinguished division had already acquired. After
this, Massena withdrew entirely into Spain; AI-
meida was blockaded; and Lord Wellington,
leaving Sir Brent Spencer- to conduct that service,




84 NAHRATIVE OF '1'HE


as well as to provide against emergencies in front ,
hurried away towards Badajoz, where his presence
began about tbis time to be seriously needed.


It has been stated tbat Marshal Beresford was
already moving to raise the siege of Badajoz, and
arrest the ptagress of Soult in that quarter, when
the unexpected concentration of Massena'g fOf(~es
at Pombal, induced Lord Wellington to recall him
to his assistance. On the 17th, however, when
all hope of fighting a general battle was laid aside,
the Marshal prepared to resume his original under-
taking; andputting himself at the head of the
2nd and 4th British, and General Hamilton's
Portuguese division, with the 13th 1ight dragoons,
sorne heavy cavalry, and two brigades of artillery,
he crossed the Tagus at Tancos. Marshal Beres-
ford proceeded by way of Ponte de Lor, Oralo, and
Portalegre, to Campo Mayor, where he an'ived on
the 25tb. The euemy bad just evacuated tlle
town; and a considerab1e convoy of artillery, am-
munition-waggons, and strings of loaded mules,
was seen travelling under tbe escort of three bat-
talions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, to-
wards Badajoz. An immediate pursuit was ordered,
and the allied cavalry was not long in overtaking
the convoy. which' made ready to receive them.
General Latour Maubourg, who eommallded on the
occasioll, formed his infantry into two solid squares,
which he supported by placing his cavalry on the




PENINSULAR WAR. 85


right; but a brilliant charge fmm two squadrons
oí the 13th, in which a similar force of Portuguese
took part, overthrew the French cavalry, and gave
to the allies momentary possession of the entire
convoy. The ardour of pursuit, however, canied
the conqueror8 too faro They followed the flying
cavalry under the guns of Badajoz, and suffered, in
consequence, sorne los8; whilst they gave to the
squares an opportunity of retiring in good order,
against which theycould not, in their scattered
state, make any impression. The consequence
was, that before any portion of the British infan-
try was enabled to come up, the whole of the con-
voy escaped within the gates, leaving Qnly a single
howitzer, with one or two ammunition-waggons,
in the handS' of our dragoons.


The enemy having thus withdrawn entirely
from -the right bank of the Guadiana, it became an
object of consideration how that river was to be
passed, in order that Badajoz might be put in a
state of blockade before it shouldbe provisioned,
or the damage caused in the late siege repaired.
There were but two bridges, one at Merida, the
other at Badajoz; and both were in possession of
the French; whilst the only practicable ford,--
and that too~ during the present season of the
year, practicable for cavalry alone,-lay under the
guns of Fort J uramenha. U pon it, however, no
reliance could be placed, as the sole channel· of




86 NARRATIVE OF THE


communication between different portions of our
army; for the first fIood would close up the pas-
sage entirely, by rendering the ford for a time
quite impervious. A bridge upon tresseIs was
accordingly directed to be formed, and put down
at a convenient point; whilst five Spanish boats,
with four pontoons, then in store at Elvas, were
converted into rafts, to be used, when circum-
stances should require, as fIying bridges.


It is not necessary to enter at much length into
the various obstacles which the army was com-
pelled to surmount, before it succeeded in efféct-
ing its passage across the Guadiana. Having
carried in its train no pontoons or other materials
for bridge-making, it was reduced to the necessity
of depending upon such supplies as the country
round, and the inefficient magazine at Elvas, were
enabled to furnish; and these proved so inade-
quate, that several heavy showers causing the
waters to rise on the very inorning after the
tressel-bridge had been completed, the whole was
swept away, and the labour of several anxious
days annihilated. It was at length determined
not to wait any Jonger, but to pass the troops at
once upon the rafts; and after they should have
taken up their graund of investment, to erect
another bridge at their leisure. The resolution
was promptly carried into effect. During the
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, the troops were ferried




PENI:\'SULAR WAR. 87


across in detachrnents as nurnerous as were at all
consistent with their personal safety; and on the
latter day, Marshal Beresford established his
head-quarters at a srnall village on the left bank
of the river. He had hardly done so, when an
attack was made upon the village, which so far
succeeded, that the cavalry picket stationed there
was surprised and destroyed; but a company of
infantry, which were in reserve to support thern,
carne up, and theenerny were finally driven out
with sorne loss.


Before these arrangernents could be accorn-
plished, the enerny were enabled to fill in their
trenches, to rebuild the breaches, and to throw
considerable stores of provisions and arnrnunition
into Badajoz. This done, Mortier returned
towards Seville; but he endeavoured to cast an
additional irnpediment in the way of our projected
siege, by placing a garrison of four hundred rnen
in Oliven!(a. The nurnbers thus shut up, thougb,
neither adequate to rnake a proper defence, nor
very formidable when considered as a post upon
our flank, were not altogether to be neglected;
and Marshal Beresford accordingly resolved to
comrnence his opemtions, by making hirñself
mast{lr of OIiven~a.


The care of conducting this attack was in-
trusted to General Cole, who sat down before the
place on the 11th. On the 15th, the batteries




88 NARRATIVE OF 'l'HE


beiug in readiness to open, the Governor was sum-
moned, and honourable terms offered, in case· he
should be' disposed to capitulate; but as these
were rejected, the firing began, and before noon
a practicable breach was effected. The Governor
now, in his turn, proposed terms of capitulation,
but was refused. The firing was resumed, and in
half an hour the place surrendered at discretion.
General Cole then has tened to join Marshal Beres-
ford, who, having established a bridge of casks
over the ford at J uramenha, and secured it by a
téte-de-pont, capable of containing fifteen hundred
men, was now in position at Sto Martha. Rere the
corps established itself; and from this point the
different objects were attended to, of our com~
pleting the investment of Badajoz; of alarming
General Latour Maubourg into a further retrogres-
sion; and of watching the motions of SouIt, who
was using his best endeavours to open a comrnu-
nication with the city.


Things were in this state, when, on the 20th of
April, Lord Wellington arrived from the north,
and gave directions for the immediate cornmence-
ment of active operations against Badajoz. The
great difficulty, however, was to fall upon sorne
such plan of attack, as might hold out a promise
uf speedy success, and at the same time should not
require the employmentof great means in its exe,..
cution. Jt was a matter ofthe first consequence t~




PENINSULAR WAR. 89


reduce Badajoz quickly; because, if a greater
space of time were allowed than sixteen days of
open tren eh es, besides the period requisite in pre-
paring materials, our informatio.n assured us that
Soult would be able to collect a suffieient force to
relieve it. On the other hand, seldom has a siege
been undertaken, in modero times, with resourees
less adequate to the design, either in intrenching
tools, ammunition, or guns. Lord Wellington had,
it is true, ordered an ampIe suppIy of everything
requisite to be forwarded from Lisbon; and an
ample supply of everything requisite was actually
prepared; but when the stores began to be put in
motion, it was found that means of transport were
wanting; and hence not one-tenth part ofthe ma-
teriel promised ever reaehed the ca;mp of the
besieging army. N otwithstanding these disad,.
vantages, our engineers set steadily to the ope-
ration of reducing the place; and the preliminary
steps to the breaking of ground before the Parda-
leras, the Castle, and Fort Christoval, were taken
so early as the 22nd df April.


Before, however, any use could be made of these
preparatory arrangements, a despatch from Sir
Brent Spencer summoned Lord Wellington to his
original station on the northern frontier. Having
drawn out directions for the future conduct of the
besieging force, and recommended to Marshal
Beresford, in case of any ~ttempt on the part of




90 NARHATIVE OF THE


Marshal Soult, to risk an action, Lord Wellington
departed from the Guadiana, and arrived at the
position in the vicinity of Almeida, just in time to
meet the danger with which his troops were there
menaced. Jt will be necessary here to describe
somewhat at large the situation in which our army
at this time stood, on the banks of the Agueda;
and as 1 happen to be enabled, from personal ob-
servation, to enter upon my task, 1 do so with
greater readiness than if, as in the earlier pages of
the present chapter, 1 were obliged to write from
the statements and observations of others.


Between the Duas Casas and Touron rivers,
there extends a range of heights, which formed,
on the present occasion, the main feature in our
position. Our right, though placed directly upon
Nava d'Avel, might be said, in strictness, to rest
upon the Coa; for the country between the Coa
and the village being extremely impracticable,
little danger was to be apprehended from any at-
tempt made in that quarter. Our centre extended
along the heig"hts just alluded to, between the vil-
lages of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa;
whilst our left, which embraced Fort Conception
and Valdelamula, circled round by Almeida, so as
tocomplete the blockade of that important place,
at the same time that it appuyed upon ground
extremely favourable. With respect to the ar-
rangement of the troops, a few words will suffice.




PENINSULAR WAH. 91


On the extreme right of the line, General Hou-
stoun, with the seventh division, took post; the
cavalry being formed next to him, though some-
what in .advance. After the seyenth carne the first
division, thrown considerably forward, and upon
very advantageous ground, and communicating on
its left with the third, which again heldcon-
nexion with the light, as it did with the sixth and
fifth. The fifth division, under Sir William Ers-
kine, formed the extreme left of the line; whilst
the blockade of Almeida was, in an especial man-
ner, committed to the sixth division, under Gene-
ral Campbell. Every division and brigade was,
however, in a situation to move at a- moment's
warning, and by short and direct paths, to any
post in the entire line which might be threatened;
and hence, though to external appearance our
flanks were far removed from one -another, the
space of three hours would have brought the most
distant battalions in position to the same ground,
at any given point. Such was the local state of
our army, from the day when Massena retreated
across the frontier, up to the end of April; and such
it continued to be, when Lord We1lington, after
having examined the condition of affairs in the
south, returned to direct the series of operations
which were impending.


When Massena finally withdrew from the Por-
tuguese territory, it was confidently anticipated




92 NARRATIVE OF THE


that he would scarcely be in a condition to re-
sume offensive operations for severaI months to
come. Rumours of his excessive unpopularity
began aIso to make their way within our campo
We were told a variety of tales touching a quarrel
which had occurred between the Prince of Esling
and MarshaI N ey, into which, it was added, that
the whole army had entered, with a decided lean-
ing towards the latter officer; and it was repea-
tedly rumoured that Massena was on the eve of
his recall, and that some new chief would shortly
appear upon the stage to supply his place. Whe-
ther these reports were we11 or ill founded, we
hardly cared to inquire; but wecontinued to pre.,.
serve an attitude of extreme watchfulness towards
the front, at the same time that the blockade of
Almeida was kept up with a11 the diligence and
vigoQr of which we were capable. With respect,
again, to the enemy's position, we were not so well
informed. We were aware that they occupied Ciu-
dad Rodrigoand the country round in force, whilst
their outposts extended along the Agueda, and
their patrols occasionally passed it; but whether
they had sent any of their divisions to the towns
in therear, as some of our communications asserted,
we possessed nó means of accurately ascertaining.
The first days ofMay, however, brought in a tole-
rahly explicit declaration of the enemy's designs ;
and _we found that any noticins which we might




PENINSULAR WAl{. 93


have be en led to form, as to the disorganisation and
consequent inefficiency of Massena's army, were
quite as groundless as many other reports which
daiJy poured in upon uso


1 have said that the centre of our line extended
at this time along the heights between the villa-
ges of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa; a
few words more respecting the localities of the
former ofthese villages may not be amiss.


Fuentes de Honor was not, strictly speaking,
embraced in our position, and though occupied by
the light troops of the 1st and 3rd divisÍons s.up-
ported by the 7th regiment, it was he Id merely
as an advanced post. Yet, in spite of its advanced
situation, it possessed so many defensible features,
as to form, in point of fact, one of the main bul-
warks of our ground; and its strength came fairly
into trial on two separate occasions, at the period
to which 1 now refer. On both was the judgment
which directed its selection distinctly shown; and
therefore 1 will endeavour to detail its particular
features and bearings.


Fuentes de Honor stands at the bottom of a
valley, and on the bank of a small rivulet or brook.
On either side are rising grounds; and through it
passes the main road to Caseja, Gallegos, and from
thence to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the Ciudad Ro-
drigo side, an extensive morass is bounded at sorne
distance by a thick wood; and though the ground




94 NARRATIVE OF THE


certainly rises there, as it does in rear of the vil~
lage, still the troops which advance in a hostile
attitude froro that quarter, must pass over a con~
siderable tract, where they will be exposed to a
heávy and destructive fire from almost every point.
The village itself is crossed in various directions
by walls, which afforded excellent cover for infan-
try, and were not altogether profitless against
artillery; whilst in its rear arise sorne rocky heights,
which at once covered the troops whilst in posses~
sion of the place, and afforded them a safe place
of retreat, in case they should be driven out. Above
these rocky heights was our main line arrayed ;
from whence., in case of need, reinforcements could
be continually sent to the troops in the village;
whilst, in the event ofthe village itself being car-
ried, the conquerors would find that their Iabours,
so far from being completed, were only beginning.
To sum up all in few words ;-it would be ex-
tremely difficult to conceive a post so well adapted
to give to its defenders a superiority quite unusual
over any force which might attack them; so easy
of defence from its local situation; so secure, in
point ofretreat; and withal so extremely impor-
tant to the line which it was designed to cover;
as furnishing an arena of con test quite distinct
from the main position, and totally independent
of it. This post, as 1 have aIread y stated, was
held by the light troops of the third and first divi.,.




PENINSULAH WAR. 95


sions; and it became, as soon as. Massena found
himself 5n a condition to renew hostilities, the
theatre of operations, hardly less sanguinary, or
less gIorious, than the hills of Busaco, or-the plains
of Talavera.


Before 1 proceed, however, to give any account
of the operations which may be said to have marked
the opening of another campaign, it may not per-
haps be amiss if 1 offer a few remarks, in addition
to those already recorded, touching the present
prospects of Lord Wellington's army, as compared
with those which were before it at the correspond-


. ing period in 1810.
In the month of February, 1810, Lord Welling.,.


ton formed himself in position, on almos! the same
ground which he occupied now. His was then
the only thing in the shape of an army throughout
the Peninsula; for the Spanish corps had been
aH, one after another, overthrown; and there re-
mained no force capable of keeping the field,
except about twenty-seven thousandBritish, and
an equal number of Portuguese troops. lt unfor-
tunately happened, al so, that both the British and
Portuguese were suffering dreadfully from sick-
ness; whilst the latter, as is well known, ne-
ver havingas yet found an opportunity of prov-
ing themselves, could not, even if efficient in
other respects, be perfectly relied upon. The ene-
my had just made themselves masters of Andalu-




96 NARRATIVE OF THE


sia, without being under the necessity of striking
a blow ;-Cadiz was in a state of blockade ;-and
Regnier and Mortier, threatening Portugal through
the Alentejo, were but feebly opposed by a mi-
serable levy under Romana. Massena,likewise,
was around Ciudad Rodrigo with upwards of
seventy thousand veterans; and from the fortress,
garrisoned only by Spaniards, and superintended
by a Spanish governor, no very obstínate resist-
ance was expected.


1t is not, perhll:ps, going too far to affirm that
few men, situated as Lord Wellington then was,
would have regarded bis case as otber tban despe-
rateo He was opposed, with less than fifty thou-
sand effectives, to the undivided strength of the
French empire; for there was no diversion going
on in the nortb of Europe, nor any prospect of
such diversion being speed·ily effected. It is true
that the lines were in his rear, fortified as care-
fully and skilfully as time and circumstances would
allow, and that his retreat thither could never be
prevented; but formidable as the lines were, no
one ventured to pronounce them impregnable, es;'
pecially if assailed by the. whole of the French
corps then in the Peninsula. The truth, indeed,
is, that among the' heads of departments, and
throughout the army at large, there were at this
time few, who did not look forward with some-
thing like anxiety to a speedy re-embarkation.




PENINSULAR WAR. 97


Portugal has no gates, it was said, by closing which
thirty thousand British soldiers can pretend to
shut out the French army; and to talk of defend-
ing it, now that Spain has been subdued, is as
idIe as it could be, to talk of defending the solitary
province of Galicia, Andalusia, or Arragon. Em-
bark we must, before long ;-and happy shall we
be, if our embarkation be not impeded or pre-
vented. Such, however, were not the senti-
ments of our chief; and it must be so interesting
to posterity to record what passed in his mind at
the period 1 allude to, that 1 hesitate not to give
his opinions, in nearly his own words,as commu-
nicated to myself:


" There is no doubt that the task which 1 have
uridertaken is Herculean, particularlynow, that
the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that
there is nothing in the shape of an army in the
field but ourselves. 1 think 1 am, however, in
such a situation, that 1 can retire and embark
whenever 1 please; and if that be the case, the
longer 1 stay, the better for the cause, and the
more honourable to the country. Whether 1 shall
be able to hold my ground at last, must of course
depend upon the numbers and the means by
which 1 sh:!l be attacked; and adverting to the
difficulties ofsubsistence even for small numbers
in this country, 1 hope that 1 shall not be at-
tacked by more than 1 shan be able to manage.


VOL. n. G




98 NARRATIVE OF THE


The necessity of keeping my real' open to the
Tagus is· a difficulty; and 1 should be able to
effect my object with gl'eater ease, if 1 was not
\lnder the necessity of effecting everything, not
only without 10ss, but without risk 01' even the
appearance of risk, in order to please the good
people of EngIand."


These are memorable sentiments, contrasted
with those which, it must be admitted, were gene-
rally felt by the army. - How well and how accu-
rately all our commander's calculatíons had been
formed, the turn which events took speedily de-
monstrated. The enemy advanced-they over-
carne the obstacles opposed to them-and we re-
tired, as it had been previously arranged, to Torres
Ved ras. Here then, at the very extremity of the
Peninsula, Lord Wellington took his stand; and
here he remained till the results of his own pro-


. found combinations compelled the enemy to fall
back into Spain.


How different wasour situation now! Instead
of acting solely on the defensive, we were engaged
in two offensive operations at once, both of them
ofthe very fil'st importance. We had even ven-
tured to divide our strength in the faces of those
very corps which but ayear ago th-reatened us .
with annihilation; and we were carrying· on two
sieges, and covering the divisions which conducted
them, at the mouths of the two gl'eat roads which




PENINSULA R W AR. 99


touch upon the Portuguese frontier. Thus by the
unbending firmness of one man, aided by the admi-
rable discipline and courage of his troops, had
the course of a war, of late so alarming, been
arrested; and the French, instead of overrunning
Portugal, and bringing under their yoke the last
portionof the continent of Europe, were held in
check in a country where their superiority ex-
tended no further than over the spots of ground
.covered by their several bivouacs.




100 NARRATIVE OF THE


CHAPTER IV.


Battle of Fuentes de Honor-Re-investment of Almeida-The
French garrison blow up the place, and escape-Massena's
army retires into Spain, and Lord Wellington's into canton-
ments-Siege of Badajoz by Marshal Beresford-Is raised
in consequence of the advance of Soult-Lord Wellington
,sends off reinforcements to Marshal Beresford, and sets out
to join him-The Marshal's corps assemble in position at
Valverde.


ON the 1st and 2nd of May, several large bodies
of French troops were observed to pass the
Agueda and the Azava, and to make a movement,
as if with the design of threatening our communi-
cations, and, if possible, effecting the relief of the
fortress of Almeida. Towards the evening of the
3rd, the sixth corps showed itself in. three lines on
the ridge which overhangs Fuentes de Honor, in
a direction parallel to that occupied by us; and
they shortly afterwards opened a heavy can-
nonade, which they followed up by a desperate




PENINSULAR WAR. 101


assault upon the village. Lieutenant-colonél
Williams, who commanded a battalion of light
companies, gallantly sustained the attack for sorne
time; but it was found necessary, at last, to sup-
port him with tbe 7 J st, under Colonel Cadogan,
as it again was supported in succession by the
79th and 24th regiments. The battle had not
lasted long, when Colonel Williams teceived a
wound, which compelled him to quit the field,
and things were in s()me disorder; but at tbis
moment Colonel Cadogan pressed forward with
the 71st, and driving the enemy with the bayonet
from all the ground which they had won, restored
the fortune ofthe day. It is scarcely necessary
to add, tbat tbe 7lst were ably supported by tbe
79th and 24th; upon tbe senior officer among
whom, Colonel Cameron of the former corps, tbe
command of the whole devolved.


Though checked in their first advance, the
enemy repeatedly renewed their attack, bringing
up, on each occasion, fresh troops; and on every
occasion were they driven back with a heroism
which has never been surpassed, and but rarely
equalJed. They fought, however, with great gal-
lantry, and more than once stood to be bayoneted
by our soldiers in the main street of the village;
but their success, whenever obtained, lasted but a
moment, and they were instandy swept away by
adesperate charge from the men whom they be-




102 NARRATIVE DF-TlIE


lieved that they had DverCDme. The 71st, which
had repeatedly attacked and DverthrDwn cDlumns
.of French trDDps Dn the rDad, were tempted, tD-
wards dusk, by the appearance Df what they CDn-
ceived tD be a gun .on the Dpp.osite acc1ivity, tD
I'ush acrDSS the rivulet? and becDme the assailants
in their turno N.othing c.ouldbe m.ore impetu.ous,
and yet mDre DrderIy, than this charge. They
lite rally b.ore d.own everything befDre them, till
they reached the .object Df their search; when, tD
their m.ortificati.on, they discDvered that it was
nDt a gun, but .only a tumbril .of ammunitiDn. ·Of
that, hDwever, they made themselves masters ;
and thDUgh· severely galled Dn their return by a
murderDUS fire .of musketry and grape, they re-
gained Fuentes de HDn.or with their trDphy. and
spent the night there in quieto


As may readily be imagined, the dawn Df the
4th had n.o! yet appeared, when the whDle Df Dur
line gDt under arms, and waited in. anxiDus expec-
tatiDn fDr a renewal Df the cDmbat. Day broke,
hDwever, without disclDsing any disp.osition, .on
the part Df the enemy, t.o resume the .offensive;
and as h.our after h.our stole Dn, a belief naturally
ar.ose, that n.othing wDuld be attempted, at least
fol' the presento . Inthis persuasi.on we were
str.ongly c.onfirmed by the rep.ort .of several de-
serters, wh.o this day carne in t.o us, and fr.om
wh.om we leárned that Massena, Dverawed by the




PENINSULAR WAIL 103


obstinacy of yesterday's resistance, had resolved
to attempt nothing further, till he should be re-
inforced by a body of the imperial guard, which
was understood to be 011 its march to join him.
That the statements of the deserters were not to
be disregarded, a variety of circumstances led us
to believe. In the first place, clouds of mounted
and staff officers might be seen, riding, from time
to time, along the opposite ridge, and examining,
with apparent care and minuteness, into our dis-
positions. In the next place, as evening ap-
proached, we observed no inconsiderable addition
to"the enemy's cavalry, particularly to their hus-
sars and lancers, arrive. The reader need scaréely
be reminded that our force was greatly weakened,
more especially in cavalry, in consequence of the
formation of the separate corps, which was now
acting under Marshal Beresford. Of the latter
description of troops we could not muster, at
present, more than fifteen or sixteen hundred in
the field; and the total amount of our effectives,
including Portuguese of all arms, fell short of
twenty-nine thousand. On the side of the enemy,
again, the cavalry were computed to exceed four
thousand; whilst the sum of the effectives fell
not 8hort of forty-five thou8and. These were
fearful odds, especiaIly when it is considered that
we were fighting for the attainment of one specific
object, and that we were not only calIed upon to




104 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


resist with effect this tremendous superiority, but
tó continue, at the same time, the blockade of
Almeida. Yet had the men confidence in their
leader, as their leader had confidenee in them; and
that feeling, aided by the judicious choice of
ground, and the able manreuvres which our divi~
sions severally exeeuted, carried us safely and
gloriously through all our difficulties.


At three o'clock in the morning of the 5th, our
advanced parties sent in to state that the enemy's
columns were in motion; and before six they had
commenced a desperate attaek, as well upon the
vi.llage of Fuentes de Honor as upon the 7th
division, which oceupied a wood and sorne broken
ground on the right of our lineo In Fuentes tha
assailants were met with the same spirit of deter-
mined resistance which had frustrated all their
efforts on the 3rd; and if for a moment they
seemed to have made an impression, they were
almost immediately. afterwards driven with 10ss
from the ground which they had won. 011 the
right, affairs went on with rather more of apparent
peril; though even there the danger was never
very imminent. It was here that they deemed it
expedíent to employ the mass of their cavalry,
which carne on, stróngly supported both by in-
fantry and guns; and asevere loss was on our
part experienced, before a final check was given
to the progress of men who fought like troops




PENINSULAR W AR. 105


habituated to victory, and as yet unaccustomed to
reverses.


The first attack fell upon· General Sontag's
brigade, which had been especiaUy directed to
defend the wood, but which, overwhelmed by
numbers,retired, after a gallant and obstínate re-


. sistance. Our cavalry seeing this, and anxious to
cover the retreat of their comrades, q uitted a very
commandingand yet open posítion on which they
had been drawn up, and descended, with two or
three pieees ofhorse-artillery, into the low ground.
It was an unfortunate movement, and opened·to
the enemy the only prospect ofpermanent suecess
which they enjoyed during the whole of the day ;
for they immediately occupíed in force the heights
wbich had been abandoned, and pressed our peo~
pIe so vigorously, that it was found necessary to
give to this partor our line a new direction. The
light division, which had advanced to support
tbe cavalry, finding the post aIread y evacuated,
~. wheeled to the right, and made arrangements to
. protect a fresh movement of General Houston's


division, which they ~xecuted in masterly style.
rrhey drew up in squares of battalions, received
:aud repulsed repeated charges of the French caval-
:ry, and then marching through our own sq uadrons,
susÚlined a cannonade as galling as has frequentIy
fallen to the share of troops in that dense order.
1n tbe mean while~ no formidable force of Blitish




106 NARRATIVF. OF TIlI<:


dragoons could be brought together, for our infe-
riority in that arm was too decisive to warrant
any granddisplay; but a few squadrons charged
from time to time through the intervals of the
squares with. greater 9r less benefit, according as
opportunities offered. In the end, however, this
species of manreuvre threatened to be productive
of more harm than good. Our troopers, in re-
tiring, got among our owri squares, and threw
them into confusion, from which, but for the judi-
cious conduet of the ehasseurs Britanniques, mueh


. misehief might have aeerued. These, however, by
a well-directed Ranking fire, hindered the enemy
from taking advantage of the opening made, and
henee our retrogression was effeeted with but little
10ss on our part, and a heavy sIaughter among the
Freneh.


The right was now appuyed by a strong hiIl, on
the summit oí whieh stood an old tower; and the
enemy finding that the newalignment had be en
taken up without the slightest disorder, paused
before they ventured to assail it. Their successes
he re amounted to nothing more than the oecu-
pation of some ground, whieh, at the eornmenee-
ment oí the action, had been held by us; they had
in no respect broken our ranks, and they were as
far from turning them as ever; whilst in the direc-
tion of Fuentes de Honor, upon whieh a variety of
attempts had been made, they were beaten baek




PENINSULAR \VAll. 107


at all points. They had attacked it in front, and
on both flanks, with infantry, artillery, and caval-
ry; but the steady valour of the 71st and 79th
regiments, supported by the 24th, set all their
efforts at defiance; and now, after several hours of
severe fighting, not the slightest impression was
made. Massena seemed to feel that our troops
were made of more obstinate stuff than even he
had anticipated, and towards evening he relaxed
in his exertions. His columns on our right halted;
those which had been employed in the assault of
Fuentes drew off; and the whole army prepared .
to bivouac, in the order in which it stood at the
close ofthe action. Similar arrangements were
entered into on ·our side .. The pickets were sta-
tioned along the front of the position; and large
fires were lighted across the ridge; and both
parties lay down to rest with a confident assu-
rance on their minds that the battle was inter-
mitted ónly till the return of daylight.


We were, as usual, under arms long before
dawn appeared; but it brought about no such re-
sults as we had anticipated. The enemy were
before us, indeed, in the same force as ever, and
in the same attitude which they had assumed on
the preceding evening; but they exhibited no dis-
position to renew the struggle; whilst we were
content to retain our attitude of watchfulness, and
to act as we had hitherto done, entirely on the de-




108 NAItRATIVE OF THE


fensive. In this manner the whole of the 6th
passed away, no movernent of any importance
being made on either side; and night again closed
in, bringing with it an increased persuasion, that
the morrow must, at all events, lead to sorne more
decisive issues. But those amongst us who anti-
cipated another battle, found, on the return of day,
that they had rniscalculated the enemy's courage
'or resources. The dawn of the 8th showed their
columns in full retreat; and towards noon it was
satisfactorily ascertained that they had taken the
road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Massena; with his who]e
arrny, reinforced by every battalion aÍld squadron
wbich he had be en enabled to bring up from Cas-
tiJe and Galicia, was thus foiled by three divisions
of our divided force; he was compelled to retreat
before men over whom he had calculated on ob-
,taining an easy and brilliant victory ; and Almeida,
for the relief of which he had shown hirnself
deeply interested, was left to its fate. It may be
worth while to inquire into sorne of those circurn-
stances which tended to produce a failure so re-
markable, and to place fresh laurels on the brows
of one, to whose renown all Europe was already
beginning to bear witness.


There can be no doubt that the general arrange-
ment and disposition of the aUied troops was
marked by aH that judgment and military saga-
city, which so eminently cháracterise the tactics




PENINSULAR WA'R. 109


of the Duke of Wellington. Every species of
force, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, was
posted where it could act to the best purpose and
with greatest effect; whilst due advantage was
taken of all the natural inequalities which pre- '
sented themselves, to shelter our people, as far as
might be, from the enemy's fire. Yet our line was
in many places unavoidably exposed, and open to
the attacks both of cavalry and artillery; whilst
the thick woods in our front afforded to Massena
the most convenient plateau which he could have
desired, for the distribution of his columns unseen,
and therefore disregarded. Had be rightly availed
himself of tbis advantage, be might bave poured
the mass of his force upon any single point, and
perbaps made an impression befare we could bave
bad time to support it. There were, besides this,
otber and equally obvious modes of proceeding, to
which be bad no recourse. Massena's superiority
to us, both in cavalry and artillery, was very great.
Had be commenced his attack witb a violent can-
nonade, jt must bave produced sorne bavoc, and
probably considerable confusion in our lineo He
might tben have moved forward bis cavalry en
masse, supporting it by strong columns of infantry;
and had eitber tbe one or the otber succeeded in
piercing tbrough, our situation would bave been
by no means an enviable one. It is, indeed,
higbly probable that his 'Cbarges would have been




llO NARRA1'IYE OF THE


repulsed; but in this case, a third resource was
left to him, of which he might al so have availed
himself. Had he thrown his cavalry round our
right flank,-a movement which we should have
found it no easy matter to prevent,-crossed the
Coa, advanced upon our lines of communication,
and stopped our supplies, at the moment when,
with his infantry, he threatened to turn us; then
pushed upon Sabugal and the places near, he
might have compelled us to pass the Coa with all
our artillery at the most disadvantageous plac.es,
and cut us off from our best and safest retteat.
There was, indeed, a time during the continuance
of the affairof thé 5th,·.when his design of acting
in this manner was )eriously apprehended; and
Lord Wellington was, in consequence, reduced to
the necessity of deciding whether he should relin-
quish the Sabugal road, or raise the blockade of
Almeida. But Lord Wellington's presence of
mind never for a moment forsook him. He felt no
distrust in his troops; to retain his hold over a
secure and accessible }ine of retreat was, ~there­
fore, to him, a éonsideration of less moment than
to continue an operation of which the ultimate
success could be now neither doubtful nor remote;
and he at once determined to expose Sabugal,
rather than throw open a communication with
Almeida. It was a bold measure, but it was not
adopted without due consideration ; and it received




PENINSULAR WAR. 111


an ample reward in the successful termination of
this hard-fought battle.


The 10ss experienced by our army during the
operations of these two days was very conside-
rabie; for the actions, a1though partial, were
maintained with signal obstinacy on both sides.
It fen chiefly upon the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions
of infantry, and upon the cavalry, and amounted
. in aH to nearIy sixteen hundred meno That of the
enemy was much greater, and carne not short, on
the most rnoderate computation, of three thousand.
They left four hundred dead in the village of
Fuentes de Honor alone, and a large proportion of
prisoners fell into our hands. N otwithstanding all
this, however, they retrograded soslowly, that on
the 9th it was stil1 doubtful whether some fresh
efforts might not be made. They had taken, as 1
have -stated, the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and ap-
peared about noon on the preceding day to be in
full retreat; but their retreat was conducted with
the utmost leisure, w.hieh the peeuliarity of our
circumstanees WQuld not permit us to interrupto
On the contrary, we applied ourselves sedulously
to the double task ofstrengtheningour own ground
by means of intrenchments, and resuming the
striet blockade of Almeida, in which late events
had compel1ed us to relax; and on the 10th we
were relieved from a11 further uneasiness respect-
ing Massena, by the diseovery that he had leftno




ll2 NARRATIVE OF THE


more tban a few cavalry pickets on the banks of
tbe Azava. Thus was an end put to a variety of
conjectures, o which some had begun to hazard,
touching the probabilities of another action in this
quarter; and Lord Wellington was left at liberty
to pursue such plans as he should consider best
adapted to the situation of the country, and most
suitable to his own means and resources.


In addition to giving security to _his position
aboye Fuentes de Honor, by directing certain
field-works to be thrown up here and there for its
defence .. Lord Wellington issued orders that °the
blockade of Almeida should be resumed. On first
arriving in this province, the British general caused
Almeida to be reconnoitred, with the view, ir pos-
sible, of carrying it by a coup-de-main. As, how-
ever, it was found too formidable for any such
attempt, and as the arrny was not possessed of a
battering train, or other materials necessary for the
conduct of a regular siege, he was, per force,
obliged to content himself with its investment;
and confident hopes were entertained, that famine
would, before long, do the work of war. It had
now been blockaded sorne time, and its stock of
provisions, originally scan'ty, was drawing, we
were well aware, rapidly to an end; it was there-
fore of the utmost importance. not only to prevent
fresh supplies from being thrown in, but to hinder
the garrison from effecting its escape; a measure




PENINSULAR WAR. 113


which the governor was known to have in contem-
plation. On this aecount, Massena's eQlumns had
no sooner abandoned their ground, than the sixt,h
division, on whom the duties of the blockade de-
volved, were commanded to resuQ}.e their labours ;
and they marched for the purpose, uÍlder the ord~rs
of General Campbell, back upon their canton-
menís.


Gener;:JJCampbell, a zealous and enterprising offi-
cer, was exceedingly desirolls that the arrangement
of the blockade should be intrusted entirely to
himself; and being ambitious, as it was but natu~
fal that he should, of the honour of reducing this
important place through hi~ own.~kill, he requested
and ()b\ained permis$iQn 10 condllct all details-
withoqt any interference. Whether it was; th,at
GeQeral Campbell felt too confident, or, wheth~l'
any other circumst_ances bad weigilt with him, 1
know ·Ilqt; but tl!e Qven,t proved that, in making
his dispoliitions, he adopted a system of incau\ion,
which led to resul~ IIWftifying to 4ims,elf, ~~ f,LU·
noying to the wllOle al'my. Instead of coverÍI)g
with troops t4e l~ft fa,ce of Almeida, th~ h,anks Qf
the ¡\gl,lep,a, ~I;ld the bridge ~t ll~rba <lel Puerc,o,
the~e . ppint¡; rePlain~ un,guard,ed; an,d he p~~t~
a Qrig~dE} .a.t·Jun~a a11dMalp~rteda, thr(};w l>a.qk
General P~ck tQ Ci¡;¡co V ~IJI~s,l,\nd watc~~d; with
a degre,e ~f atteijt~(;m, $,e right, faqe qf the. tO,,"11,
frOID whi~h 110 mOyet;nellt was likely to be made.


VOL. JI. H




114 NAltRATIVE oIo' THE


with a probability of success. Of Barba del
Puerco in particular, it behoved him, in the opinion
of aH, to be excessively jealous, because, through
it ran the most direct and shortest road towards the
enemy's outposts; indeed, so conscious were all
parties of this, that on the 11th the 4th regiment,
from Sir William Erskine's division, was, in spite 01'
the late agreement, ordered up to take possession
of the heights aboye that place. But the ar~ange­
ment came too late, for matters were already in a
train for an attempt, the success of which, whilst it
speaks nothing· in favour of our prudence, must
ever redound to the honour of General Brennier,
the brave man who condllcted it.


A little before midnight on the 11th, animmense
explosion was heard in the vicinity of the fortress ;
though our head-quarters weretoo far removed to
be aware of thé circumstance. Soon afterwards
General Pack, who chanced to be at Malparteda
with the pickets of his brigade, spread an alarm
that the place was blown up, and that the Frel1ch
garrison was marching in good order towards
Barba del Puerco. General Pack's pickets of-
fered as much resistance as they were capable of
offering; but the enemy soon broke through, and
passing along the flank of the reserve, our people
were unable to arrest their progress, even for a
momento General Pack sent immediately to sum-
mon General Campbell, who, on the first noise,




PENINSULAR WAR. 115


had hurried frorn his quarters; but the latter has-
tened to the front, not leaving, as it was said, posi-
tive orders behind him, and carne up whilst his
own troops were yet dispersed. and in disorder.
Great delay occurred in consequence, in bringing
thern to the point threatened; whilst the 4th regi-
ment failed in its attempts to head the flying gar-
rison; by which rneans Brennier was enabled tB
lead his troops in a close and compact column from
Almeida as far as the Agueda, without having ex-
perienced any serious rnolestation by the way.
General Pack, indeed, by great exertions, con-
trived to hang with a few of his men upon the
enerny's rear. and pointed out, by the flashes of
hisrnusketry, the exactpath which they had taken;
but Brennier conducted all things in a manner so
cool and soldier-like, that not the slightest symp-
tom of confusion was manifested throughout tbe
night. He had given positive directions to his
soldiers, from the instant oftheir quitting the town.
to continue their march in profound silence; how-
ever heavy might be the fire of the besiegers, they
were not to return a shot; "and when daylight
arrived, in case they should find themselves sur-
rounded, they were to make an opening wherever
they best could, with the bayonet. N o commands
could have beenmore punctually obeyed. The
sound of a voice was not heard among them; and
they never once returned the desultory tiraillade




116 NARRATIVE OF THE


with which General Pack's men endeavoured tó
gall-them.


Having reached the Agueda, they made a halt,
in order that sorne stragglers who had lagged be-
hind, might regain the column. This measure af~
forded an opportunity to the 36th, 2nd, and 4th
regiments, to close upon them; and as the French,
when they resumed their march, mistook their
way by diverging a little too much to the left,
these regiments were enabled to reach the bank of
the river just as the fugitives were crossing the
bridge at Barba del Puerco. A destructive tire
was immediately thrown in, by which between
one and two hundred men weremQwed down;
whilst two squadrons of the royals having fianked
them, succeeded, in conjunotion with Pack's Por-
tuguese, in seeuring ten officers and two hundred
men as prisoners. Thus about oIíe-third of the
garrison of Almeida was cut off. But the remain-
ing two-thirdseffected their escape, not less, in
all probability, to the astonishment of Marshal
Massena, than to tha regret of Lord Welliogton
and his followers. It seemed as if, by t11,i8 unto-
ward event, all the advantages obtained by tbe
battle of Fuentes ele Hónor were tbrown away.
N ot that we very deepJy regretted tbe escape of
the individuals: they were brave men, had made
a bold venture, and deserved that it should be
~rowned with suceess; but it was mortifying to




PENINSULAR W AR. 117


reflect that now Massena might, with sorne show
of reason, speak of his late operations as a victory,
and not as a defeat. He might, in a specious man·
ner, inform Europe that he had manreuvred merely
for the purpose of bringing off the garrison of AI-
meida; and as the garrison had actually escaped,
how could we contradict him? It is not wórth
while to dwell longer on this affair; but 1 will
venture to affirm that no one who witnessed the
effect this disappointment produced upon our army,
will ever be able to forget it.


General Brennier left Almeida in a state of sad
diJapidation. On examining it next day, we found
that three out of the five bastions of which it was
composed, had been blown to atoms; the crests
were thrown down into theditch; and the stenes
ofwhich they had principally bean composed, were
burlad, by the violence of the explosion, in all di-
rections, and to great distances. Whether the
foundations were materially shaken, we had not
the means of immediately ascertaining; but the
revetments and ravelines were equally untouched2
and the main outline of the rampart and ditch
remained entire. The other two bastions had not
beeninjured, the mines having by mere accident
faiied to expIode. Yet was the whole a complete
ruin; and though we jurlged that it might be so
far restored, for a moderate expense, as to be ren·
dered secure against a coup-de-main, we saw




118 NARRATIVE OF THE


plainly cnough, that to put it again in a state of
defence, and render it capable of withstanding a
siege, would require much time, much labour,
and much money. In this country the expenses
oí mason work are very hea vy, and Almeida was
entirely constructed of masonry; whilst the Iapse
of six or eight months-the smallest space of time
that its re-erection would require-would, in all
probability, produce events calcuIated, either in
one way or another, to render its existence or non-
existence a question of very littIe importance.
On these accounts, Lord Wellington determined
not to interfere respecting it, but to Ieave it to the
Portuguese 'government to determiue whether it
shouId be rebuilt or not; and ir it were, in what
form, and after what plan, the repairs shouId be
applied.


, The sensation produced by the escape of the
garrison, and the destruction of Almeida, having
subsided, we began again to give our undivided
attention to the reports w hich arrived from various
quarters, relative to the French, as weIl as to
speculations and surmises touc1ting ourselves. Of
the French, it was confidently asserted that they
had 'retired upon Salamanca, Zamora, and Toro;
that Massena had 'received his recall from Paris ;
and that Marmont, of whose junction we had pre-
viously received accounts, was now in the chief
command. Their generals, moreover, were said




PENINSULAR WAR. 119


to agree in opinion that nothing could be under-
taken' against Portugal or the English, till the
army should be completely reorganised, and
strengthened by large supplies, both of men and
means. ,AH likewise, combined, it was said, in an
outcry against Massena, whose conduct towards
Ney had been warmly condemned, not only by
the corps of N ey himself, but by the oftic'ers of
the army in general, and whose measures were
characterised as having been, from the first,. with-
out object, and destitute of judgment.. A strong
sense of discontent was thus said to be general
throughout their ranks, and discipline was stated
to have become, in consequence, grievously re'-
laxed. As to ourselves, though our credit might
not, perhaps, stand on ground quite sO'elevated as
that which it occupied previous to the late failtire
at Almeida, yet it must be admitted by an that
the British army had established for itself a repu-
tation such as it had not, at any other period of
the war, obtained; and there were few who
looked . forward without a sanguine and welI-
grounded expectation, that future events would
only add to the glories of the troops and their
illustrious leader. We had now be en fairly pitted
against the warriors and chiefs before whom the
powers of Europe gave way; and we had come
forth from the struggle in a manner which could
hardly fail to satisfy all that we were at least not




120 NARRA'l'IVE OF THE


inferior to them in any qualification befitting sol~
diers. Everyindividual in the army felt this, and
every one felt to whom the praise was due. The
consequencé was, that Lord Wellingtonwas looked
up to with a degree ofenthusiastic devotion, which
'it may not, perhaps; be easy for a common reader
to understand; whilst aU his proceedings showed
that in hisanny, in itsvalour and patienee, disci-
pline and coolness, he reposed a eonfidence of
which the soldiers knew themselves to be worthy,
and which .it 'Was their principal boast, that they
had in no instance ahused 01' betrayed.


As BOOIl as Almeida feU, and it became satis-
factorily ascertained. tbat nothing of sny impor-
tance W<nHd. be attempted on this side oí Portugal,
Lord W~lingtol1 began to direet a large share of
bis attention to the eampaign in the south, and
made ready lo assist Marshal Beresford, not only
with strong reinforcements, but with his own coun-
sel and presen'Ce. For this putpose, he pol hvo
divisiOllS~ the 3rd and the 7tb, under GeneraIs
Picton and Houston, in march towards the Gua-
diana, directing thero to move by Campo Mayor.
The rest ofthe army was then ordered into can-
ton'menti!!; the sixth division at Mealhada, Jueda,
and Frenada; tire' nfth at Fuentes de Honor,
Ponte Vilhe, and· Nave d'Avel; the first at Aldea
de Ponte and Albergaria; the ligbt at Gallegos~
and along the banks of the Agueda; and the ca-




PENINSULAR W AR. 121


valry at Cesmeo and the villages near. Along
this line, by the extraordinary exertions of Mr:
Kennedy and the comm:issariat department, the
troops were, upon the whole, well supplied; and
though forage was rather searee, still the cavalry
contrived not only to keep up the condition in
which they previously stood, but even to improve
upon it. Sir Brent Spencer, likewise, on whom,
in the event of Lord Wellington's absence, the
eommand of the whole devolved, was unremitting
in his exertions to provide for the wants of the sol.
diera, and to guard them against surprise. But
on the latter head no great risk was apprehended ;
and therefore Lord Wellington; as soon: as he had
seen his arrangements in a train towardstheir
eompletion, set oft: accompanied by the heads of
departments, for Badajoz.


It may be necessary here to advert to circum.~
stances which, during the last fortnight, had be..:
fallen Marshal Beresford and his corps.


On the 22nd of April, in consequenee of diree-
tiOO8 given by Lord WeHington himself, measures
were taken for completing the investment of Ba ~
dajoz, and for preparing fascines, gabions, and
other implements neeessary for the conduct of the
siege. These were somewhat interrupted by thé
sudden rise of the river on the 24th; which sweep~
ing away the bridge of casks, which had been
thrown across, cut off all cornmunication between




122 NARRATIVE QF THE


the investing army and Portugal. On the 29th,
however, the communications were restored by
means of flying bridges; and on the 1st of May,
the bridge of casks was replaced more firmly and
more conveniently than ever.


On the 4th, General William Stewart invested
Badajoz on the left bank of the river; having
marched from Talavera la Real with five thousand
men at midnight, and taken up his ground without
any loss at nine in the morning. By some mis-
take, however, and the occurrence of several
disasters,' the investment on the southern side was
not effected till the 8th, and then only after a good
deal of skirmishing, and with considerable difli-
culty. But a flying bridge was, in the interim,
established on the Guadiana, immediately below
the mouth of the Caya; roads of communication
were formed round the place; and the guns and
stores were moved froro Oliven!;a according to
orders; and as those intended to act against Fort
Sto Christoval were brought up on the same day
which saw the investment completed, prepara-
tions were made to break ground, and commence
the siege with vigour, that evening.


Without going into a regular journal of this
siege, it may be' proper to advert here to the
amount of the rneans with which a handful of
British troops endeavoured to reduce one of the
strongest and IDOst regularly fortified places in




PENINSULAR WAR. 123


the south of Spain. For the attack upon Fort
Christoval-to the results of which they looked
for success in the undertaking at large-there
were provided five hundred intr~nching tools, two
thousand sand-bags, a few planks, and about two
hundred gabions. The artillery consisted of three
brass twenty-four pounders, provided with three
hundred rounds per gun, and two eight-inch
howitzers, supplied each with two hundred rounds.
The besieging corps was made up of Qne British
brigade, two battalions of Portuguese of the line,
and a battalion of militia, mustering in all about
four thousand men; one hundred men of the line
were appointed to act as overseers; forty-eight
carpenters, and thirty-six miners, were attached
to the engineers; and there were present twenty-
seven rank and file of the corps of royal military
artificers. • .


The soil upon whieh the working parties began
their operations proved so rocky and unyielding,
tbat though· ground was broken on tbe Digbt of
the 8th, and four hundred men were employed in
breaking it, ten men only were enabled to work
under cover, when daylight appeared; and the
progress made was in consequence both slowand


~ 8ee an extremely interesting work by Colonel Jones, of
the Engineer~, called "A Journal of the 8ie~es ill the
Peninsula."




124 1\1 A RItA TIVE OF THE


unsatisfactory, On the 10th the garrison madea
sortie, which was at first attended with success-
the troops employed making their way, in spite
of the covering parties, into one of our advanced
works; but the guard of the trenches soon reco-
vered the ground which was lost, and drove the
enemy back with considerable slaughter within
the walls. On this occasion the indiscreet valour
of sorne of our officers tempted them to lead their
men up to the very glacis of the fort; and they
sustained, for no purpose, a 10ss, which might
have been well avoided, of nearly four hundred in
killed and wounded. On the 11th the breaching
battery being completed, and the guns and
howitzers prepared for service, our artillery opened
the attack, attempting, with the howitzers, to
keep under the fire. of the place; whilst with the
three twenty-four pounders, they strove to batter
in breach thé smalIer flank of Fort Sto Christoval.
But our gunnel's were Portuguese recruits, who
knew little of their duty, and exhibited abad
specimen of practice; whereas the fire from the
fort was both well directed and warmly kept up.
The consequence was, that long before evening
our batteries were silenced; and the three guns,
and one of the howitzers, were rendered unser-
viceable.


N othing intimidatedby these reverses, Marshal




PENINSULAR WAR. 125


Beresford prepared to renew his efforts with aH
the means which he was able to bring together.
Other guns were moved round to Fort Christoval,
and a new battery constructed and armed; but
before a fair trial could be made of its efficiency,
reports reached the General, which caused him to
suspend, for the present, the whole of bis under-
taking. He learned that Soult, having collected
an army .of fifteen or sixteen thousand, men, in
communication with General Latour Maubourg at
the head of six thousand more, was in full march
for the relief of the place; and as the corps with
wbich be covered the siege was by no means com~
petent to oppose that force, it becáme indispensa-
ble to relinquish every other object, for tbe sake
of effectually meeting the danger which threat.;
ened. On the night between the 12th and 13th,
therefore, when a fresh parallel bad just beeo
Qpened, and upwards of fourteen hundred men
were paraded, for the purpose of briskly carrying
on the work, an order arrived that the under-
taking should be relinquished, and that tbe troops
should march, without delay, to the position at
Valverde. The orders were promptly obeyed.
On the night of the 13th, all the batteries were
distilounted; and on the ] 4th, such materíals as it
was found impossible to remove, were bumed, or
otherwise destroyed. On the. night of the 15th,
the lastcorps which had halted to complete these




126 NARRATIVE OF THE


operations, tóok their departure; and the first
siege ofBadajoz was formalIy raised.


Such was the substance of the information
which reached us; part of it whilst we were yet
at Villa Formosa, and part whilst wewere prose-
cuting our journey towards the Guadiana. That
Marshal Beresford's situation was one of extreme
difficulty and delicacy, any one who reflects must
percelve. There was submitted to him no other
alternative than either to fight with the Guadiana
in his rear,over which his communications were
precarious and indifferent, or by a retreat, to abán-
don Badajoz entirely, and permit the enemy, by
taking possession of the course of the river, to
strengthen and consolidate himself in Estremadura
and the south of Spain. He knew, indeed, that
Lord Wellington was hurrying to his assistance,
and he was aware that two divisions had begun
their march for the purpose of supporting him:
had it been practicable, therefore, to protract mat-
ters, and to avoid an action till the reinforcements
should arrive, it would have been his policy to do
so. But the enemy pressed forward ",ith so much
rapidity, and manifested so decided an intention
of overwhelming him at once, that in point of fact
he can hardly be said to have possessed a choice.
He accordingly concentrated his troops, as has
been aboye related, at Valverde, whither likewise
the Spanish generals~ Blake and Castaños, with




PENINSULAll WAR. 127


twelve thousand men, hastened· to join him; and
the three chiefs having concerted their plans, and
made every disposition to receive the enemy,
awaited that battle which appeared to be inevi-
table.




128 WARRA TIVE OF THE


CHAPTER V.


Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz-Battle of AI-
buera-Retreat of 80ult, and renewal of the siege-It is
pressed with vigour, and a breach in Fort 8t. Christoval pro-
nouneed prácticable-Movements of díe enemy to relieve
the plaee-Brilliant cavalry affair at Usagre.


lw consequence of the advices which he received
from the south, Lord Wellington, as soon as he
saw matters in a proper train upon the Agueda,
set off to join Marshal Beresford, and to superin-
tend in person the operations which that officer
was conducting. We quitted Vil1a Formosa on
the 15th, and travelling at the rate of sixty miles
a day, without baggage or impediments of any
description, arrived in Elvas before dark on the
19th. Whilst performing this arduous journey,
a variety of rumours relative to late transactions
met us at every stage. At one place it was stated
that the enemy were coming on in force, and that




PENINSULAR WJ\[L 129


a battle might hourIy be expected; at anothel",
that Marshal Beresford had resolved upon a re-
treat, not feeling himself equal' to oppose the
French; and, at a third, that a great action had
been fought, and that it had ended in favour of
the allies. It will readily be imagined that the last
rurnour, though it entered in no respect into parti-
culars, tended, in no sligbt degree, to elevate our
spirits, and quicken our pace. On reaching Elvas,
however, more accurate details were given; for
Colonel Arbuthnot, from the Marshal's head-
quarters, met us here, and from him we received
an official account of one of the most obstinate, as
well as sanguinary actions, in which British troops
were ever engaged.


The most advantageous position which it is pos-
sible for an arrny to assume, which desires to check
the advance of a hostile force froll1 Seville to
Badajoz, is beside the village of Albuera, among
sorne undulating heights which stretch towards the
rear, and are covered by two small streams run-
ning in parallel directions upon the flanks of the
plateau. On this ground Marshal Beresford de-
termined to take post, and fOl" that purpose ad-
vanced his troops towards Albuera on the 14th
and 15th; but Soult, having hurried from Seville
by forced marches of not less than six leagues a
day, was beforehand with him; and the cavalry,
which had been sent on as far as Almendralejo to


VOL. ll. 1




130 NAURATIVE OF THE


reconnoitre, was driven back in disorder. It was
accordingly found, on arriving at the village, that
an extensive wood, of which it had been Marshal
Beresford's intention to avail himself, was in pos·
session of the French; and hence, that whatever
dispositions he might deern it advisable to make,
must be entirely restricted to the country on the
western bank of the Albuera.


The position selected for the army was accor·
dingly behind the litt1e river Albuera, where
the road from Seville to Badajoz and OIiven~a,
after passing the stream by a bridge close to the
village, separates into two branches. Here the
ground rises from the river in gentle undulations,
which, extending to the right, afford no single point
d'appui more favourable than another, but tempt
him, who has already arranged his line along their
summits, to draw it out from hill to hill, and emi-
nence to eminence. It was here that the allied
armies were posted on the evening of the 15th;
their left resting upon Albuera, and covered by the
stream, the steep banks of which, together with
sorne walls and buildings, afforded to it a good
deal of shelter; whilst their right, extending to a
considerable distance, found no commanding fea-
ture on which to lean.


Marshal Beresford had on this occasion under
his orders !L corps of Spaniards, whom he stationed
in a double line upon his extreme right, between




PENINSULAR WAR. 131


two hillocks, one somewhat in advance of the
other; next to them carne the second British di-
vision, which, under General Stewart, composed
the centre; and on the left of aU were the Portu-
guese of General Hamilton's division, supported by
General Alten's brigade of light Germans. The
fourth division, under General Cole, which did not
reach its ground till after the battle began, formed,
as a reserve, in rear of the second; whilst the
main body of the cavalry took post upon the right,
so as to cover the Spaniards, and hinder them from
being turned. With respect to the exact numbers
of this army, it is not very easy to form a correct
judgment, bécause the Spaniards are proverbial
for the great inaccuracy of their returns; but
taking these at 12,000, the Portuguese at 8000,
and the British at 7 flOO, the total amount will
reach about 27,000. That it could not exceed
this is certain, however much it tnight fall short of
it. In cavalry, Marshal Beresford's corps was ex-
tremely -weak, and his artillery amounted to no
more than thirty pieces.


The force with which Soult prepared to raise
the siege of Badajoz was, in point of number, in-
ferior to that of the allies; but in cavalry, artillery,
and the general character of the troops, it was
greatly superior. Twenty thousand French in-
fantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty pie ces of
cannon, bivouacked, on the night of the 15th, in




132 NARRATIVE O.F THE


the wood; and the whole advanced next day in
the finest order to the attack.


It might be about nine o'clock in the morning
of the 16th, when a heavy force of cavalry, sup-
ported by t~o large columns of infantry, were
seen moving towards the bridge, with a view, as
it was supposed, of piercing the allied line in that
quarter, and making themselves masters of AI-
buera. AH eyes were instantly turned to the
point threatened, and the most effective prepara-
tions were made to meet and repel the attack;
but before the excellence of these could inany
degree be put to the test, a new source of alarm
disclosed itself in another direction. The enerny,
instead of corning on as had been expected, ra.,
pidly changed their plan, and under cover of their
cavalry, and favoured by a thick fog, filed off
towards our right. Rere they pressed forward
with an impetuosity which the Spaniards, who
were stationed there, could not withstand ;and in
a few minutes they were in possession of the
most cornmanding heights, upon which our right
Rank depended for support. The Spaniards be-
haved, on this occasion, with considerable gal-
lantry. They gave way, it is true, and fell back ;
but their retreat was conducted without confu-
sion, and though repulsed, they were far from
being defeated. But their retrogression threw
open to the enemy, not only the key of Marshal




PENINSULAR WAR. 133


Beresford's position, but the only good road by
which, in case of a disaster, he could retire; for
it laid bare his line of communication with Val-
verde, and exposed him to the risk of being
hemmed in between the river and the enemy's
eolumns. It became, therefore, an objeet of the
first importanee to reeover the heights which had
been lost; and it was in striving to attain thatend,
that the chief portion of the loss occurred.


Marshal Beresford endeavoured at first to bring
back tIte Spanish troops to the eharge; but find-
ing them extremely unwieldy, and little eapable
of executing a nice manreuvre, he passed the
whole of General Stewart's division through them,
towards the right. This done, General Stewart
immediately deployed his first brigade, consisting
of the buffs, the 66th, the 2nd battalion 48th, and
the 31st, into line, and pushed them, under Co-
lonel Colbourn, up the hill, against the enemy's
columns. Their advance was spirited, and their
tire admirably directed; but before they could
approach within charging distance, the enemy's
cavalry broke in upon their right. One wing of
the buffs was now directed to be thrown back;
but the regiment, confused, in part by the ap-
proach of the cavalry, and not rightIy Ullderstand-
ing the orders given, fell in upon the second bri-
gade, which, under General Houghton, was ad-
vancing in eolumn to support its comrades. The




134 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


movement unavoidably threw that brigade like-
wise into confusion, as it happened at the moment
to be in the act of deploying into line; and henee
it could afford no adequate assistance, for sorne
time, to the leading regiments, which were now
engaged under the most fearful disadvantages.
The consequence was, that the first brigade suf-
fered terribly, as well by a tremendous fire of
grape whieh was poured upon them from the
height, as from the cavalry whieh rode through
and cut them up at their leisure. The buffs, 66th,
and 48th, were, indeed, annihilated, and the 31st
escaped a similar fate, only because, being on the
left, it had time to form, and was thus enabled to
sbow a regular front to the enemy.


In the mean while General Houghton's brigade
had completed its formation, and advanced gal-
lantly to the charge, the General himself animat-
ing his troops forward, and setting them an exam-
pIe of the most devoted bravery. He was thus
employed, cheering them on, and waving his hat
in front of the line, when three balls pierced his
body, and he fell. The brigade, however, was not
daunted by his fall; it still pressed forward, and
the regiments of which it was composed, namely
the 57th, 1st battaIion 48th, and 29th, vied with
one another in deeds of heroism. The 57th and
29th in particular, the former under Colonel ln-
glis, the latter under Major W ay, performed pro-




PENINSULAR W AR. 135


digies of valour ; but notwithstanding their utmost
exertions, nobly seconded by those of the 28th,
34th, and 39tb, under Colonel Abercrombie, the
enemy succeeded in maintaining their post. At
tbis moment we had lost a whole brigade of artil-
lery, a large number of prisoners. and eight stand
of colours, belonging to the buffs, the 66th, the
48th, and 57th regiments; and affairs began to
wear an unpromising appearance. But Marshal
Beresford determined to make one effort more for
victory, and happily it was not made in vain.


General Cole's division had not yet been en-
gaged; it reached the ground after the battle
began; and having rested for a space in rear of
the centre, was moved towards the right, where it
formed en potence. Jt was now ordered down
into the valIey, for the purpose of carrying this
formidable height. N othing could exceed the
gallantry of the fusileer brigade, to which the
arduous task was mainly iÍltrusted. Though de-
prived, at an early stage of the action, of their lea-
der, Sir William Myers, the fusileers pressed on
without a moment's pause, or even hesitation, and,
amidst terrible slaughter, drove the enerny from
the ridge which he had so long and so obstinately
defended. They were, however, ably seconded
by Colonel Abercrombie's brigade, as well as by a
brigade of Portuguese under Colone] Hervey,
which repeatedly resisted ana repelled attacks




136 NARRATlVE OF THE


froro the enerny's cava1ry; and they retook the
whole of the captured guns, with the exception of
a single howítzer, and three out of the eight stand
of colours which had been lost. In this grand
assault General Cole, with almost every individual
attached to his staff, was wounded; General
Stewart received two contusions; and few of the
senior officers, either of regiments or brigades,
escaped unhurt; but its success was decisive of
the fortune of the day, which now declared in our
favour. The enemy made no fresh eflorts to
regain his post, but retiring in good order across
the rivulet, took up for the n1ght the ground from
which he had advanced in the morning.


Whilst this trernendous conflict was going on
upon the right, several attempts were made to pene-
trate into the village, and to break through our left
in the direction of the bridge. The latter were
bravely met by the Portuguese troops, who con-
stantly droye back the colurnns asrast as they carne
on; whilst General Alten's light Gerrnans, lining
the walls about the village, hindered the assailants
from making any irnpression there. Sorne cavalry,
which showed thernselves here, were watched by
the 13th light dragoons, and by a Portuguese
brigade, under Colon.el Otway; but the rnass of
the enerny's horse, independentlyof those squa-
drons which committed so much havoc arnong the
infantry, was extended beyond üur right, and




PENINSULAR WAlt. 137


threatened to take us in rearo It was judiciously
opposed by General Luroley's heavy brigade.
which, moving as the eneroy moved, and con ti-
nually presenting to them a front of resistance,
hindered thero froro effecting 'a design which
must have be en productive to us of the most se-
rious consequences. Our artillery, likewise, was
admirably served: its fire was very destructive,
and the men stood to their guns till many of them
were sabred; indeed, there was not an officer or
soldier in any department of the army who failed
this day in doing more than his duty. 1 have al-
ready spoken of the daring intrepidity of the fu-
sileers and it deserves to be held up to remem-
brance; but the bravery of the 57th and 31st feH
in no degree short of that of their comrades. These
regiments having ascended the height, stood their
grOl;md nobly against all the efforts of a column of
French grenadiers. The enemy's fire thinned their
ranks, but never once broke them; for at the
close of the action, the dead and wounded were
found in two distinct lines, upon the very spots
which they had occupied whilst alive and fighting.
They fought, too, in every imaginable order which
infantry can be called upon to assume. They re-
sisted cavalry in square, deployed again ¡nto line,
received and returned repeated volleys, whilst a
few yards only divided them from their oppo-
nents; and at last carried everything before them,




138 N ARRATIVE OF THE


by a charge with the bayonet. AH this could
not, of course, be done without a prodigious
slaughter on both sides; indeed, thekilled and
wounded lay in masses so compact~ that full
seven thousand bodies occupied the· space of a
fewhundred feet; and our artillery, when ad-
vancing towards the close of the day, were com-
pelled to pass over them, deaf to their cries, and
averting their gaze from the brave fellows thus
laid prostrate in the dust.


The victory was a highly important one, but it
was purchased at arate dearer than had been re-
quired to secure any other victory in the Penin-
sula. Out of 7500 British troops engaged, 4158
were placed hors de combat, the Portuguese lost
389, and the Spaniards nearly 2000; so that
there fell of the allies this day no fewer than
6577. Of the enemy's 108S we were necessarily
unable to form a calculation equally exact, but it
was estimated to amount to full 8000, among
whom were three generals killed, and many supe-
rior officers wounded. The latter fact we learned
from our prisoners, who asserted that the casual-
tíes among their leaders had been such as to leave
the troops in many· instances at a loss from whom
to receive orders, and that this circumstance, more
than ally other, led to the retreat from the height,
and the abandonment of further operations.


During the batUeof Albuera, a number of little




PENINSULAR W AR. 139


events occurred, some of them honourabJe in the
highest degree to individuaJs, and others, not dis-
graceful, but somewhat ludicrous. It is not ne-
cessary for me to add my tribute of respect to the
memory of the brave youth, Ensign Thomas, of
the Buffs, who refused to resign the standard of
his regiment except with life, and whose Jife paid
the forfeit of his devoted gallantry. Though young
in years, and holding but an inferor rank in his
profession, his name will be recorded in the list of
those ofwhom England has just cause to be proud;
and his example will doubtless be followed by
others, as often as the chances of war may leave
them only a choice between d~ath and dishonour.
But there were one or two circumstances besides
this, of which little notice has elsewhere been
taken, and which appear to me to be deserving of
some passing record.


During the hottest of the action, Marshal Beres-
ford exposed himself with a degree of intrepidity,
which could hardly fail of spreadirig an example
of heroism around. He repeatedly dragged the
Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them
to lead their men forward, and show them the
way; and when individually charged by a Polish
lancer, he grappled his adversary by the throat,
and threw him from his saddle. A very different
fate attended the personal exertions úf the Portu-
guese staff. They too were charged by a single




140 NARRATIVE OF THE


lancer, who knocked down one with the butt of
his pike, overset another man and horse, and gave
ample employment to the entire head-quarters
before he was finally despatched. These heroes
declared that the man seemed possessed by an
evil spirit; and that when he fell at last, he lite-
rally bit the ground. The lancers, as is well
known, were peculiarly daring in their attacks, and
mereiless in their operations. They seldom paused
to offer quarter, but speared our men without
merey, whether offering resistanee, or giving proofs
of submission.


Sueh is the substanee of an official report, whieh
was communicated to us at Elvas on the 19th;
and it must be eonfessed that a 'diselosure of the
los s sustained too k away, in sorne degree, from the
satisfaction which would have otherwise accom-
panied the announcement ofa fresh vietory. 'Vhen
the amount of casualties suffered at Albuera carne
to be added to those experienced before Badajoz,
and in the affair of Fuentes de Honor, it appeared
that, unless powerful reinforcements should arrive
speedily from England, the plans for the rest of
the campaign must receive serious interruption
from the absence of adequate means to carry them
into effect. We had, it in contemplation, be it
remembered, at this time to reduce the two for-
tresses of Badajoz and Rodrigo, and to keep the
army of Portugal oceupicd in thc north; whilst




PENINSULAR WAR. 141


80ult should be threatened in the south, and
an effort made to raise the blockade of Cadiz;
and to effect these different ends, we possessed onIy
the force which had followed Massena from Torres
Yedras, diminished by fuIl nine thousand men,
who were hors de combat in the late encounters.
It was impossible to think of this without expe-
riencing the liveliest anxiety, or to cast our re-
gal'ds homewards without an ardent hope that a
proper spirit might animate the counciIs of those
in whom the power of right1y carrying on the war
was vested. That we were commi tted in the
eyes, not of the Peninsular nations only, but of
Europe at large, couId no longer be questioned ;
all now 100ked to us and to our fortunes as the
criterion by which to try the wisdom of their own
resistance or continued submission to the French
yoke; and hence, if we should either reIinquish
the contest, 01' conduct it with languor and indif-
ference, the prospect of a secure peace was felt to
be as remote, as when arms were first assumed
against the aggressions of Buonaparte. 1t was our
business, however, not to speculate upon proba-
bilities, or to waste time in idly wishing for an
increase of means, but to turn those already at our
disposal to the best account; and Lord Wellington
was not aman to permit present opportunities to
be negIected, merely hecause the future happened
to be not quite sobright as he either desired,




142 NARRATIVE OF THE


or had reason ,to believe that it ought to have
been.


On the retreat of the enemy after the battle of
Albuera, Marshal Beresford sent back General
Hamilton's Portuguese division, with orders to ob-
serve Badajoz upon ¡ts southern side, whilst he
himself ad vanced with the rest of his corps, and
too k post at Almendralejo. The troops were thus
distributed when Lord Wellington arrived; and as
it was essential that SouIt's columns, which were
understood to have concentrated at Fuente del
Maestre, should be narrowly watched, he did not
interfere with the material parts of this arrange-
mento But the reduction of Badajoz being the
object in which he felt most deeply interested, he
applied to it all the resources and numerical force
at his disposaI, and earnestly urged forward every
measure which promised in any way to accelerate
the undertaking. No great while elapsed befo re
the siege was regularly renewed; . and ifthe means
applied were still very inferior to what they ought
to have been, they were at least more respectable
than any which it had been practicable to apply
during the late investment; and not less respect-
able than the circumstances of the army, and the
general resources of the country, were adequate to
procure.


As soon as the two divisions carne up, of whose
march from the position of the Agueda notice has




PENINSULAR WAH. 143


already been taken, Lord Wellington proceeded to
invest the place anew, upon both banks of the
river. For this purpose, the seventh division, under
General Houston, drove in on ,the 25th an the
enemy's posts upon the right bank, and established
its pickets within a short distance of Fort Christo-
val, at the same time that a fiying bridge was
thrown across the Guadiana as at the last attack,
and the stores and materials forwarded from Elvas
to the depots before the place. On the left bank,
again, the Portuguese corps was aIread y at its
post; but it was strengthened, on the 27th, by the
arrival of, the third division, which, marching from
Campo Mayor, crossed the Guadiana at the ford
aboye the town. The garrison was thus shut com-
pletely within its works, and the business of the
siege began.


1, have said that the total amount of men and
means employed in this service, though certainly
greater than had been employed before, was not
such as to raise any very lively expectations, in
the breast of an ordinary observer, ofa speedyand
successful termination to our labours. There sat
down before the place a besieging army offourteen
or fifteen thousand men, including three thousand
Spaniards, and two thousand Portuguese militia;
and the artillery to be employed amounted to forty
pieces, among which are to be numbered four ten-
inch and six eight-inch howitzers. Of mortarswe




144 NARRATlVE OF THE


possessed none; eight, therefore, 01,lt of the ten
howitzers, were directed to be used as such; and
our guns, of which two were twenty-four poun-
ders, and four sixteen pounders, were all brass,
and oí Portuguese manufacture. The engineers'
stores col1ected on the occasion comprised 3500
intrenchiilg tools, 60,000 sand-bags, 600 gabions,
a very few fascines, and an extremely inadequate
quantity of splint~r-proof timber and planks;
whilst, independently oí the officers, there were
attached to the department, 169 men of the line,
to act as overseers, 48 carpenters, 48 miners, and
25 rank and file, of the corps of royal artificers.
The chief engineer and principal director of the
operations was Lieutenant-colonelFletcher. Major
Dixon, oí the Portuguese artillery, was at the
head of that department; and Captains Ross and
M'Leod were put in chargeof two depots, which
were established on each side of the river.


To oppose this force, there was understood to be
in Badajoz and in its outworks, a garrison of three
thousand men, amply provided with food and other
stores for two months' consumption. Their artil-
lery, too, was oí a very excellent description. It
numbered flin 150 pieces; from which a fire might,
at almost any point; be thrown out, infinitely su-
perior to that which we could bring against it ;
and though, at first, we were led to believe that
the stock of ammunition was scanty in the place,




PENINSULAR WAR. 145


a short experience of its uses served to convince
us that in that rumour there was no foundation.
In spite, however, of these disadvantages, our
engineers appeared sanguine as' to the results.
They determined to make two attacks upon two
sides at the same time, directing one against Fort
ChristovaI, and the other against the old castle.
That the reader may the better understand the ob-
ject of these, it will be necessary to inform him,
somewhat more minutely than has yet been done,
how Badajoz, Fort Christoval, and the Castle,
were respectively s~tuated.


The large and fortified town of Badajoz stands
upon the left bank of the Guadiana, having one-
fourth of its enceinte washed by the river, which
variesfrom about three hundred to five hundred
yards in width, and secures aH the spaee whieh it
embráces froin insulL Towards the land side its
defences consist of eight regularly construeted
fronts, connected by a good eovered way and
glacis. The ravelines are, however, unfinished;
but the fronts possess whole revetments, .and the
escarpe of the bastions Ís thirty feet in height,
though that of the curtains is considerably lower.
In advance ofthese fronts are two detached works,
namely, the Pardaleras, a crown work, about tWQ
hundred yards distant, and the Pecurina, a strong
redoubt, four hundred yards removed from the
glacis. On the north-east side, again, where an


VOL. II. K




]46 NARR.ATIVE OY THE
angle is formed by the junction of the river Revel-
las with the Guadiana, there is a hill, measuring,
perhaps, 120 feet in height, the summit of which
is crowned by an old castle; and the walls of that
castle, naked, weak, and only partialIy flanked,
form part of the enceinte of the place. The castle
itself embraces an area ofvery considerable extent,
and might, if proper care were bestowed upon it,
be rendered exceedingly formidable; but its de-
fences have, by sorne accident, been most unac-
countably neglected, and, at the period of which 1
am now speaking, it was defici~nt even in an ordi-
nary parapet to shelter its guns.· It was against
this point that oUr engineers determined to conduct
one of their attacks, and it was he re . that they
seemed to possess the best, if not the only chance,
of ultimately succeeding.


On the opposite bank of the Guadiana, and in a
direct Une with this ancient building, stand the
heights of St. Christoval, which measure in alti-
tude little less than the hill of the castIe itself, and
may. from the peculiar shape and bearing of the
latter eminence, be said completely to command
it. The castle hill, it will be observed, forms a sort
of inclined plain, which eases itself off towards the
edge of the water; and hence a spectator from the
summit of the heights of St. Christoval is enabled
to see, with perfect accuracy, anything which may
harren to be going cm withín the walls of the




PENINSULAR \VAR. 147


castle. To hinder an enemy from availing himself
of this advantage, a square fort, of aboye three
hundred feet per face, has been constructed. It is
strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp
twenty feet in height; and it i8 capable, from the
rocky nature of the ground on which it stands, to
offer a stout resistance, even when methodically
besieged. Between it and the town, however, the
communication is far from being good; inasmuch
as it is carried on entirely by mean s of a long
bridge, subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more
precarious and insecure instrumentality of boats.
Against this fort was the second attack directed ;
and the obstacles to be encountered soon proved to
be as serious as from the general appearance of
the place might have been expected.


Every preliminary measure having been duly
adopted, large working parties were ordered out
on the night of the 31 st, and ground \Vas broken
both before the Castle and Fort Sto Christoval.
The former operation went on wholly unobserved
by the enemy, till daylight disclosed our people,
already well covered by their embankment; but
in the latter we \Vere immediately detected, and
an incessant fire of grape and round shot kept up
in the direction of the noise. In spite, however, of
this interruption, the men toiled on; and four dis~
tinet batteries, at different rlistanccs from the place,




148 NARRA'flV1I: OF 'l'HE


were marked out, and in part completed. From
that moment reliefs reguIarIy succeeded one ano-
ther by day as well as by night; and though the
enemy, by shifting two or three of their guns, con-
trived to throw shot into our very trenches, still all
the batteries, including one against the angle of
the castle, were completed and armed by the 2nd
of June. On the 3rd they opened; and a heavy
fire was kept up on both sides, during several days
and nights, without the smallest intermission.


It was now that the inefficient nature of Portu-
guese artillery, as well as the inferiority of Portu-
guese ammunition, became conspicuous. Our
guns, one after another, became disab~ed by their
own fue; whilst our breaching batteries. though
they caused the masonry both of Fort Christoval
and the Castle to peel off, were far from producing
that effect which had been anticipated from them;
On the side of the castle all that couId be said
was, that at the end of several days of open bat-
teries, the waU and rampart appeared to be a little
shaken; but of a practicable breach the com-
niencement had not yet been made ;. llor could it
be surmised how far it was ever likely to be ef.
fected. On the ~ide of Fort Christoval, however,
our progress, though not what it was expected to
have been, seemed more certain. Two bastions at
Iength fell, apparently filling up the ditch with




PENINSULAR WAR. 149


their ruins, and on the 6th, the breach being re~
connoitred, it was conceived that an assault might
safely be hazarded.


There were a variety of reasons'which combined
to produce an inclination in Lord Wellington,
rather to risk an attack before the place should
have been laid perfectly bare, tban lose even
anotber day in distant cannonading. We heard
from a11 quarters that the enemy were moving. in
great force, for the relief of the place. So early,
indeed, as the 25th, the very day on which the
re-investment took place, cireumstances occurred
to produce a suspicion of the kind, and every hour
gave to it greater force, and an increased degree
of credibility. On that day an affair took place in
front of our covering corps, which, though credit-
able in the highest degree to the troops engaged,
could- not be regarded by us, at head-quarters,
without uneasiness, since it clearly indicated a
disposition, on the part of Marshal Soult, to re-
sume the offensive, and led to the conclusion,
either that reinforcements had already arrived, or
that they were close at hand, and therefore to "be
securely counted on.


The advanced station of our cavalry was, at this
time, in Usagre, a small town, distant about two
leagues from Almendralejo. Rere General Lum-
ley, who commanded the allied squadrons, took
up his quarters; and here an opportunitywas af-




150 NARRATI\TE OF THE


forded him of distinguishing himself. . On . the ~
25th, about nve hundred of the enemy's cavalry
crossed a líttle stream which runs before the vil-
lage, and filing through the street, which our
peopIe, on their approach, had evacuated, de-
bouched at its extremity, and formed with a wall
in their rearo General Lumley seized this favour-
able opportunity, by ordering out the 3rd dragoon
guards, and 4th dragoons, to charge. They exe-
cuted the movement in good style, and overthrow-
ing the French in a moment, cut down about one
hundred, and made many prisoners. The rest
fled in every direction; whilst their comrades, in
large numbers, stood upon the opposite bank of
the rivulet, to witness a defeat which they could
not interfere to prevent. The affair naturally pro-
duced the best effect upon the spirits of our troop- .
ers, who had ~almost beglln to consider themselves
inferior to the French; and it hadan effect diame-
trically the reverse upon the enemy. The latter
came not on again whilst our squadrons retained
their attitude of defiance; but as it was not
intended that we should keep this place by dint
of hard fighting, that attitude was gradually laid
aside.' Our men f~ll back upon Los Santos, Vil1a
Franca, . and Puebla; and the enemy too k quiet
possession of Usagre. . .


Had the report of this rencontre come alone, it
would have been treated byus as an indication of




PENINSULAR WAR. 151


nothing more than a desire on the part of the
French Marshal to feel how we wer~ disposed, and
whether it might not be practicable to alarm us
into an abandonment of our present undertaking;
but it did not come alone. We soon learned that
Drouet had actual1y set out from Salamanca for
the south, with seventeen battalions and several
squadrons; and that a large proportion, if not the
whole of Marmont's army, was expected to foHow.
Lord Wellington instantly despatched orders for
General Howard's brigade of the first division, as
well as for a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to
hasten from the Agueda, in order to reinforce liS at
Badajoz; and instructions were, at the same
time, conveyed to other divisions, that they should
hold themselves in readiness to undertake a simj-
lar journey. By and by a rumour carne in that
Drouet was near at hand, and that his arrival at
Cordova was confidentIy expected on the 9th of
June at furtbest. Nowas Soult was at this time
at Llerena, Villa Garcia, and the villages near,
there could be little doubt as to bis being able to
eolleet a force upon the Albuera by the 12th; and
then the question arose, whether it would be pos-
sible for us to continue our operations against Ba..:
dajoz beyond the 10th. lt wás quite evident that
the covering army, even after it should have been
strengthened by the troops called in from the
north, would not be competent to oppose Soult,




152 NARRATIVE OF THE


. thus inereased to fuU thirty thousand men ; where-
as, should Marmont himself appear upon the stage
in this quarter,' to risk a battle with the covering
and even besieging corps combined, would have
been most injudieious. On all these aceounts
Lord Wellington determined to try the effeet of an
assault on the very first opportunity whieh should
hold out the slightest prospect of success; and
hence the breaeh in Fort Sto Christoval was no
sooner pronounced practicable, than preparations
were made to storm it.


.


In the mean while a few changes occurred . in
the distribution both of the men and officers em-
ployed in this part oftbe country. The Portuguese
government had become, of late, so little attentive
to the eondition of ¡ts arroy, that the troops, desti-
tute of pay, and miserably supplied with necessa-
ries, were sinking fast into tha state of inefficiency
from which they had been so lately delivered.
The men, after enduring privations more severe
than eouldhave been borne by the natives of
almost any otlter country, began at last, sorne of
them to desert their colours, and the rest to lay
aside allthat esprit de corps, with which Marshal
'Beresford had taken so much pains to inspire
them; and the offic"ers, as many at least as were
not Englishmen, or thoroughly imbued with the
English system, hardly endeavoured to restrain
them in their proceedings. U nder these circum-




PENINSULAR W AR.


stances, it became indispensable to relieve Marshal
Beresford from his command of the covering corps ;
because it was felt that, if he could not restore
something like alacrity an.d discipline to tp.e Por-
tuguese legions, no other officer in either service
need attempt it. Marshal Beresford was accord-
ingly called in, and General Hill proceeded to
take upon himself the charge thus rendered vacant.
At the same time, General Howard's brigade was
incorporated into the second division; whilst the
remains of the brigade lately commanded by Ge-
neral Houghton, as well as of the buffs, the 31st,
and the 66th, being formed into a single battalion
of detachments, and placed in the brigade of Ge-
neral Lumley, were attached to the same divi-
sion. The brigade of Portuguese, likewise, which
marched from the Agueda at the same time with
General Howard's regiments, took its station in
the second division. Thus, whilst the third and
seventh divisions, with one corps of Portuguese,
and another of Spaniards, under the immediate
orders of Lord Wellington, pressed the blockade,
and carried on the siege of Badajoz, the second
and·fourth divisions, with the light brigade of the
King's German Legion, supported by General Cot-
ton with the cavalry from the north, as well as by
the cavalry of the south under General Erskine,
covered their operations; the infantry holding the




154 N ARRA TIVE OF THE


poslhon of Albuera, as being the most advanta-
geous in this neighbourhood, and the cavalry
keeping watch at Almendralejo, Los Santos, Villa
Franca, and the country round.




PENINSULAR WAH. 155


CHAPTER VI.


Siege ()f Badajoz-Fort Sto Christoval twice stormed without
effect-Movemcnts of the enemy to relieve the town-Lord
lVellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Por-
tugal-Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversi()o, aod
retires to Cadiz-The British army takes post behiod tlle
Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas-Intercepted letter
from Marmoot to nerthier-The aIlies go into cantonments.


THE breach in Sto Christoval having been ex a-
mined by Lieutenant Foster of the engineers, and
pronounced practicable, orders were issued that
an assault should take place on the night between
the 6th and 7th of June; and the forlorn hope,
consisting of twenty-five men, advanced about
midnight under the guidance of that officer, and
directed their operations against the part which
'appeared most assailable, namely, the right salient
angle of the fort. By the fire of our batteries the
palisades had all been destroyed; and as the
counterscarp was here little more than four feet in
depth, it proved no obstacle to the assailants : they




156 NARRA TIVE OF THE


sprang into the ditch, and marched straight to the
foot of the breach. But here asad reverse awaited
them. 'The enemy, labouring incessantly between
dusk and the hour of attack. had removed the rub-
bish, and the escarpe was found to stand c1ear
nearly seven feet from the bottom of the ditch.
Our men, though totally unprepared for such an
occurrence, made· repeated effort$ to surmount the
obstac1e; but all were unavailing. They accord-
ingiy,det~min~ to relinquish the attempt, and
they might have retired with a very trifl.ing IOS8,
had they not been met by the main bod y of the
storming party, amounting to 155 meno These
having brought with them a few ladders, insisted
~pon trying the effect of an escalade; and they
unhappily planted their instruments against a point,
the '. summit of which overtopped the longest of
them by full five feet. The consequence was, that
the enemy, roused to a sense of their danger,
hurled down into the ditch a shower of shells,
grenades, atones, and other missiles, which taking
effect among men unavoidably crowded together.
produced considerable slaughter aúd great con-
fusiono The partyat length retired. leaving behind
them twelve dead. artd carrying away upwards of
'ninety wouúded.


From this' period up to the 9th, our people
sedulously employed themselves.in constructing
ne.W batteries, and making better preparations for




PENINSULAR WAlt. 151


a fresh assault. There arrived upon the 8th
seven iron guns, which having been transported
from Lisbon to Elvas, were from the latter place
forwarded to our camp; and these, with the whole
of our serviceable artillery, amounting to no more
than seven cannons and two howitzers, played in-
cessantly upon the breach, and the batteries which
commanded and defended it. But the practice
was far from being accurate, and the walls seemed
to be made of materials more than ordinarily du-
rabIe; for after expending a considerable portion
of ammunition, it was found that the breach could
not be made by many degrees more promising
than it was before .. Still, as a good deal of rub ..
bish lay under its gorge, so as to form, in our view ...
a sort of rude path up the face, it was again de-
termined to try the fortune of an assault, andthe
determination was formed on grounds not Yery
dissimilar from those which guided our Tesolutitms
on the previous occasion.


We heard, upon authority.which left us<. no room
to doubt the truth of the raport, that Drouet fiad
actually reached Cordova on the 7th and 8th;;1\Illd
that his divisioR ofeight thousand menWll8:¡·in
communication with the corps of Marskal Soalt¡
The latter, too, hOO, as it appeared, refused·'his
left, and was manreuvring that he might com~i by
Medellin, into connexion, either with a part;:.«
with the whole ofMarmont's army; farol·the




158 NARRATIVE OF THE


movement of the latter towards this quarter of
Spain we were now c.redibly informed, andwe
saw at once that the main effort of the enemy
would be directed to the preservation of Badajoz.
N or, in truth, was this at all to be wondered ato
Situated as their forces now were, Badajoz was to
the French a point of paramount importance, in-
asmuch as it formed the key of all their intended
operations in the Alentejo, and a connecting link
with Seville and their divisions before Cadiz. Jt
was but natural, therefore, that they should use
every effort to preserve it; and that such was their
intention, a despatch received on the 8th from
General Spencer, together with other information
collected elsewhere, sufficientIy assured uso The
following is an outline of the details contained in
that despatch, in which, as the reader will éasily
believe, we felt ourselves deeply interested.


The enemy, it appeared, entered Ciudad Ro-
drigo on the evening ofthe 5th, with 2,500 cava1ry,
14 rieces of artillery, and 16,000 infantry ~ and
our light division retiring, on the 6th, as far as
Nave d'Avel, the French pursued their march in
h~o columns, composed chiefiy of cavalry, along
the roads which lea,d to Gallegos and Carpeo.
The rnass which moved by the latter road seemed
to be the stronger of the two, and it was accom-
panied by six pieces of cannon. Our cavalry, ob-
servingthcm aH the while, feH back to thc high




PENINSULAR WAR. 159


grounds, and formed a line between Espeja and
Gallegos; upon which the enemy pushed through
the wood, in two bodies, with great impetuosity,
and made a daring attempt to cut off a large pro-
portion, if not the whole, of the force opposed to
them. The cavalry, however, saw through the
manceuvre, and skilfully defeated it. By inclining
to their right, they avoided the left and front at-
tacks directed against them, and coming down
with great gallantry upon the column on the Es-
peja road, overthrew and repulsed it with 10ss.
On this occasion the royals particuIarly distin-
guished themselves. Our people then retrograded
to Sabugal, whilst the French having merely en-
tered Fuentes de Honor, and patroned as far as
Almeida and the Coa, withdrew their troops, and
ended their recognisance.


Whilst the preceding operation was going for-
ward, another and more important movement,
which this was intended to cover, received its ac-
complishment, though not unnoticed by uso De-
spatches from Colone] Grant, who occupied posts
about the Puerto de Banos, informed us that two
divisions of Marmont's infantry with 500 cavalry
had passed along the real' of the reconnoitring co-
]umns, and arrived on the 6th-the very day on
which the recognisance was made-at Los Santos
and Fuentes .. They were commanded by Regnier,
and continued their march upon Banos, at which




160 NARRA TIVE OF THE


place their leader 81ept on the night of the 9th.
But it was not from the reports of our own officers
alone, that we obtained, at this time, a pretty ac-
curateinsight into the enemy's designs and opera-
tions. Froro intercepted letters which feH into
our hands, we leamed that Marmont fully in-
tended to co-operate in raising the siege of Bada-
joz-though whether with the whole or onlya part
of his force, we had no opportunity of accurate-
Iy determining. AH our speculations, however,
tended to excite a belief that, if he moved at aU,
he would move with his army en tire ; and we
were the further confirmed in this opinion by va-
fious hints,which, though in their more direct
allusions inexplicable, were yet sufficiently clear
to put us generally upon our guardo It was stated
in these letters that as soon as Badajoz should be
relieved, the two Marshals would proceed to aet
upon the plan originally formed; and henee, though
of the object of that plan we necessarily remained
in the dark, we were not slow in discovering that
it required for its aceomplishment a perfeet union
of force. U pon these grounds we came to the
conclusion that Badajoz must either be reduced
at once, or not at aH;. because we eould hardly
pretend to continue the siege in presence of Mar-
mont's and Soult's armies combined; and as littIe
could we hope to fight them to advantage on the
south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city in a




PENINSULAR WAR. 161


state of blockade. That we might not, however;
be exposed to greater hazard than was necessary,
General Spencer received directions to move by
Penamacor to Castello Branco~. which place he
was commanded to reach on the 12th, and to hold
himself in readiness to form a junction with our
corps at the shortest notice.


Such ''las the general state of our affairs, when
the breach in Fort Sto Christoval was .pronounced,
for the second time, practicable; and it may not
be amiss, before proceedingto narrate the par-
ticulars of the assault, if 1 give a brief review of
the relative strength and prospects of the cont~nd-
. .


mg armles.
There were now, on the south and no1'th fron-


tiers of Portugal, two large and effective French
armies,-that of Marshal Soult in the province of
Estremadura, that of Marshal Marmont in La
Mancha. The former, by dint of extraordinary
exertions, was enabled, when reinforced by Dr6uet's
and Sebastiani's divisions, and by two or three
batt~lions, which he did not scruple to withdraw
from· before Cadiz, to muster full thirty thousand
men; of which not fewer than four thousand were
cavalry; the latter having reorganised the army of
Portugal, and arranged it into'Sixdivisions, posses:-
sed thir.ty thousand infantry, besides cavalry and
artillery. Allowing, therefore, for casualties on the
march, and for those little' niis-statementswhieh


VOL. JI. L




162 N ARRATIVE OF TIIE


are unavoidable in making up all returns, the gross
amount of the two corps, whenunited, would not
faH short of sixty thousand meno N ow, on our
parts, aIthough our force upon paper showed nearly
fifty tbousand British troops, we were quite un-
able, from sickness (and there were at this time
12,500 upon the list) and other necessary deduc-
tions, to bring more than thirty thousand men into
the fieId. The Portuguese, again, having become,
in every respect, far Iess efficient than they were
wont to be, could not be calculated at more tban
twenty-five thousand ;whilst the Spaniards, who
spoke of themselves as twelve thousand strong,
might muster perhaps eight or nine thousand.
Thus, in point of gross numbers, the opposing
genera1& were almost on a footing of equality. But it
ought to be remembered that, whilst the French pos-
sessed ample means of reeruiting their losses, and
were enabled, after every reverse, to make head
again with almost undiminished strength, our rein-
forcements eame in slowly, and by small detaeh-
ments at a time. '1'0 pursue the siege of Badajoz,
therefore, leisurely, and with a striet attention to
rule, would be to lay ourselves out for a general
and decisive aetion, in which. we must fight in an
open ~ountry,with .our Hanks exposed, and the
Guadiana closing. us in upon the rearo It is true
that, at the present season, the waters of the river
were low ; that it might be forded in various points,.




PENINSULAR WAR. 163


and could not, therefore, cut off our retreat, sup-
posing us to be worsted; but the question was,
whether it were worth while to cast all upon the
hazard of one throw; more e~pecially when the
stake on the side of the enemy was not, and could
not be made, equal1y desperate with our own. To
act thus had never yet been Lord Wellington's
policy; and he saw nothing in present circum-
stances to bring about a change in his plans. On
the contrary, he resolved to make oue effort more
to possess himself of the beleaguered city; and in
case that should faíl, either to prosecute the un-
dertaking, provided he were left to do so at his
leisure,or to retire from before the place, and take
up a convenient position somewhere on the north
side of the Guadiana.


Actuated by these motives, and anxious to avail
himself of the opportunity still within his reach,
Lord Wellington gave orders that Fort St. Chris-
toval should again be stormed, on the night of the
9th of J une. On this occasion, the storming party
consisted of two hundred men, twenty-five of
whom, as formerly,formed an advanced-guard, or
forlorn hope, under Lieutenant Hunt, orthe royal
engineers. They marched from the trenches at
the signal given, and pushed for the ditch; but
the eIiemy were far better prepared to receive
them no"," than they had been before, and opened
a heavy tire upon· them as soon as they arrived




164 S A RRA.1'IYE OF 'rHB


within range of musketry. U nfortunately. Lieu~
tenant Hunt was killed upon the glacis; and
though the troops leaped into the ditch with their
accustomed gallantry, and pressed ·forward as
they imagined towards the breach, they had no
longer a leader capable of guiding them, and in
consequence 10st their way. They went forward,
provided with two ladders fmm twenty-five to
thirty feet in length; but they applied them, not to
the breach, but to the face of a bastion which was
not in ruins, though considerably injured by stray
shot. The consequences were such as might be
anticipated. After persisting in their efforts to
escalad e with the most daring bravery during a
full hour, they were finally compelled to retreat,
with the 10ss of forty men killed, and no fewer
than one hundred wounded. Thus ended the se-
cond attempt on Badajoz; for on our parts nothing
further was tried at thistime. During. the 10th,
a truce was agreed upon, for thepurpose of carry-
ing off the wounded, and burying the .<lead; and
in the evening our guns and stores began to be
removed. On the 11th, all that could be done,
without attractíng notice, towards the attainment
of the same end, was effected; and on the 12th,
the siege was finally raised, after it had cost the
allies 9 officers and 109 men killed, with 25 officers
and 342 men wounded and taken prisoners.


But though the stores and materíe} were thus




PENINSULAR WAR. 165


removed from before Badajoz, it was not esteemed
prudent to withdraw the covering army fromits
position on the Albuera, till the enemy, by sorne
movement more deeisive than they had yet made,
should throw further light upon their future inten-
tions. In spite of the extreme probability of the
rumours whieh had reaehed us, it wouId have
been something more than prudent, had we
ehanged our whole line of operations upon their
authority alone; and henee the eorps of whieh
Marshal Beresford had originally been in com-
mand, but whieh was now under the orders of


. General Hill. kept its ground, and retained its at-
ti tu de of watehfulness, up to the 16th. Upon
that day, however, we reeeived offieial information
that Regnier, with the advanee of Marmont's
corps, was at Truxillo; and that the main body
was in the act of passing the Tagus at Alcantara;
whilst Soult's army was observed to be feeling its
'Yay, with the eavalry and light troops, from
Llerena towards Medellin and Merida. It was
. therefore impossible any longer to doubt that the
object of the enemy was a combined operation for
the relief of Badajoz; andas they refused their
left, and· marched strongly towards their right,
our left became of eourse the probable point of
attack. Under these circumstances, the position
of the Albuera was pronouneed wholly untenable ;
nor was there any other on the left of the Guadiaria




166 NAItItATlVE OF 'fIlE


which offered the slightest advantages, or held
out to us the smallest inducement to take it up.


It would have been quite unnaturaI, had Lord
WeHington; thus situated, felt otherwise than
mortified and gl'ieved to a great degree. In spite
of aH the exertions which he had marle, and the
numerous successes which he had obtained, he
saw himself, at the present juncture, in a situation
at least not more enviable than that which he
filled on the opening of the campaign; for the re-
sources of the enemy,instead of diminishing, ap-
peared to increase, whilst his own were becoming
daily more and more enfeebled. 1 have said
that the Portuguese army -\vas "not now in the
state of efficiency in which it appear~d to be
twelve months before. On the contrary, without
pay, without provisions, without sufficient means
of transport, the troops seemed to be rapidly fall-
ing back into their original disorganisation; whilst
"the commanders were involvedin continual di&-
putes and quarrels, as well with one another, as
with the Regency and the court of Brazil. With
respect, again, to the Spaniards, nothing could be
more disgusting than the apathy with which they
regarded passing events, unless, indeed, it was
their excessive and "mistaken jealousy of English
interference. Though we had drawn upon our-
selves last year aH the French armies ofthe north,
neither Castile, nor Galicia. nor Biscay, nor Na-




PENINSULAR WAR. 167


varre, nor· the Asturias, nor Lean, made the
faintest effort to take advantage of the diversion ;
andnow, when the armies of the south and of the
centre were collected in our front, both the in-
terior . and northern provinces of S pain remained
perfectIy quieto Madrid, which was at this time
freed from the presence of French soldiers, was
actually guarded by the citizens in the name of
Joseph, and with arms and ammunition given to
them by the French; whilst the Cortes and the
Regency had become objects of contempt, as
general and as complete as ever was heaped upon
the government of this or any other country. In
every department cabal and party spirit were at
work. Each cornmander of an army had his own
pIans and his own adherents, both in the Regency
and in the Cortes; whilst among themselves there
existéd but one point of union, and that was to
be found in a universal distrust of their alIies.
From Spain, therefore, little was now to be ex-
pected; indeed, it was confidently given out
that Joseph had retired from the Peninsula, and
that Ferdinand was about to return with Marshal
Berthier* for the purpose of allaying all misgivings,
and reconciling the nation at large to the wishes
of N apolean. N or were OUT prospects by many
degrees more bright, when we looked only tb the
defence of Portuga1. By the capture of Badajoz
in the south, and the destruction of Almeidain the




J68 NARRA'l'lVE OF 'fHE


nOFth, the two great roads ¡nto the heart of the
Mímtry were laid open; for the government hav-
ing refused to advance money for ¡ts repair, AI-
meida was blown up; and hence it was in the
power of Buonaparte, whenever he shouldthink
tit strongly to reinforce his armies here, to march
upon Lisbon by the route which to himself should
appear most advantageous. . lt is true that OUI'
works about the capital were capable of a long ..
and obstinate defence, and that if EngIand chose
to turn her undivided strength to that point, she
might unquestionably preserve it; but it admitted
of serious douht whether the preservation of Lis-
hon would repay the cost of defending it, espe-
cially when it must be defended by suhjecting the
richest provinces in the kingdom to devastation ..
These were gloomy and somewhat dispiriting COh-
siderations. Whether they occurred to Lord Wel-
lington or not, 1 take it not upon me to determine;
but before the rest of the army they rose in full
force; there were few who looked far into the
future without serious misgivings.


Lord Wellington having maturely weighed all
the reasons for and against his proposed proceed-
ing, at last sent for Castaños and Blake at AI-
buera, and opened to. thero the views which he
entertained, and the determination to which he
had come. He díd so, prefacing his declaration
by a statement, that nothing which they cOllld do.




PENINSULAH WAR. 16!}


or say would induce him to depart from his own-
pIans; leaving it~ at the same time, to themselves
to choose whether they wouId foUow us in om;
movements, or act independently; and when they
adopted the latter alterna ti ve, . he explained to
them his own sentiments as to the best course
which they had it in theirpower to pursue. This
done, he dismissed them, and immediately issued
orders for the breaking up of the army from Al-
buera and Badajoz. The movement took prace
on the 18th; and all the stores and baggage being
safely conveyed to the rear, the columns moved
without impediment or confusion upon their new
ground. On the 20thof June the following was
the disposition oí the allied British and Portu-
guese arIl,lies.


At Torre del Mouro, on the line of the river
Caya, an extensive encampment was formed, which
rested its right flank upon Elvas, and had its left
covered by Campo Mayor. It was occupied, 1st,
by the cavalry under Sir Stapleton eoUon ; 2ndly,
by the second and fourth divisions, by Major-ge-
neral Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry,
by Major-general Alten's light brigade, and by
two brigades of nine pounders. These troops were
all under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-ge-
neral Hill, and held the right wing 01' Elvas moiety
of the encampment .. The third and seventh divi.,.
sions again, which moved from the trenches, di-:-




170 NARRATIVE OF THE


rected tbeir steps towatds Campo Mayor; wbere
on the ·left of tbe camp tbey reported to General·
Picton, as tl~e/genior officer. In the mean wbile
General 'Spencer's corps; which, in obedience to
directions previous1y given, had advanced to Por-
talegre, formed a separate encampment for itself.
It was kept there, because Portalegre con8tituted
a convenient centre froID whence it might either
be brougbt, in case of need, into tbe camp at
Torre del Mouro, or thrown back across the Tagus,
should Marmont demonstrate in that quarter;
whi1st tbe communication between the two, which
happened to be neitber remote nor intricate, was
sufficiently preserved by patrols and flying parties.


It is to beobserved tbat the object of tbi~ new
alignment was pure1y one of defence. It was as-
sumed under tbe persuasion tbat tbe enemy, wbo
had collected in strength, would not content them-
selves with the relief of Badajoz, but press forward
with a view to besiege E1vas, and probably make
an ilTUption into Alentejo. N ow, as the 108s of
Elvas would have been productive to us of conse-
quences the most disastrous, inasmuch as it wou1d
nave supp1ied tbe French with an additiona1 pivot
on wbich to turn, and comp1eted tbe exposure of
too fichest and most fertile districts in Portugal,
Lord Wellington made up bis mind to risk every-
thing for its preservation; and with this view he
disposed his army in such order, as that it might




PENINSULAR WAR. 171


selze the first favourable opportunity of striking a
blow. Should Marmont, previously to sitting
down before the place, choose to risk a great battle
by attacking us in our position~ the nature of the
ground which we occupied would give to us ad-
vantages the most decided; should he, on the
other hand, commence his operations before the
town, leaving us to observe or molest him as best
sllited our own convenience, we might wait with
patience till the fitting moment had arrived, and
then become ourselves the assailants. Thus were
we provided against either extremities, supposing
the notion formed touching the enemy's designs to
be wen~founded; whereas, if no forward move-
ment were made on their parts, then might we
either remain q llietly where we were, till general
events should take a turn more favourable, or
resume the offensive as soon as our own circum-
stances,and the distribution of the enemy's force,
might appear to authorise the measure. That
Lord Wellington himself anticipated a general
action is, 1 believe, true; he spoke of its probable
occurrence, and took all the precautions to insure
a vlctory, which his genius pointed out; and as
he possessed sources of information to which no
other individual had access, there can be little
doubt that he carne to that conclusion on grounds
perfectly reasonable. As to myself, 1 own that 1
considered the enemy had gained a great deal by




172 N ARRATIVE 01< 'filE


the successful resistance of Badajoz; more, per-
haps, than in the present state of the campaign
they had any right to expect; and as their troops
stood at least as much in need of repose and re-or-
ganisation as ours~ it appeared somewhat impro-
bable that they would, for the sake of harassing
us, deny to themselves that of which they strongly
experienced the want.


But whilst Lord Wellington thus distributed his
own forces, he was neither unmindful of the ad-
vantages to be derived from a diversion, nor care-
less of the condition of the strong-holds which he
had fallen back to protecL


To effect the former of these objects, General
Blake was directed to put his corps in motion,
and, marching down the right bank of the Gua-
diana upon the Conde q.e Unebla, to cross at Mer-
tola, so as to threaten, at once, Seville, the camp
befare Cadiz, and the rear of the French arroyo
For the purpose of prosecuting the latter, nume-
rous working parties were employed every day,
not only at Elvas-where, in truth, their exer-
tions were múch needed-but likewise at Campo
Mayor,· and the fortress of Juramenha. 1 have
said that the exertions of our artificers were in a
peculiar manner needed at Elvas, and 1 said tru]y.
By the negligence of the Portuguese government,'
that city-the most important by far upon the
southern frontier-had fallen ¡nto a state of mise-




PENINsur.AIl WAR. 173


rabIe dilapidation. The walls were in mány pIaees
broken down; the ditches filled up; and the few
pieces of artillery mounted upon the ramparts
were all of the worst deseription; whiIst, to add
to its general disabilities, it was heId at this time
by a garrison composed entireIy of Portuguese
troops; and the Governor, though one of the best
of his class, was still onIy a Portuguese officer.
On these several accounts it became sufficientIy
manifest, that if the place were intended to offer a
moderate resistance, great eare must be taken to
remedy so me, at least, of its defects; and since it


. suited not the poliey of the times to change the
garrison, or displace the' Governor, Lord Welling-
ton determined that the excuse of ruineddefences
should not be at hand to sanction a tooready sub ...
rnlSSlon. . Its works were carefully and scienti-
.ficaUy repaired, and rendered capable, under
proper management, of holding out for a very con-
siderable length of time. Besides these opera-
tions, however, which, thoughdoubtless very lIseful,
were .certainly not very interesting, nothing was
attempted on our part; and as the enemy, with a
few trifling exceptions, continued as peaceably dis-
posed as ourselves, we were left, somewhat to oU\,
surprise,and not a little to our mortificabon, to
spend the bestof the summer months in idleness.


From the 20th of June to the 21st of Ju]y, our
army remailled in its double encampmellt, at Por-




174 NARRATIVE OF THE


talegre and Torre del Mouro. Few incidents
occurred, during the whole of that time, calculated,
in a military point of view, to arrest our attention,
or rouse us from our lethargy; and of these few,
it unhappily occurred that almost aH proved of
an unsatisfactory nature. The enemy, instead of
following us up, as had been anticipated, confined
their operations entirely to the southern side oí
the Guadiana, never venturing upon anything 00
our bank ofthe river, except an occasional recog-
nisance; and these recognisances, being conducted
generally by cavalry, were generally successful,
as far as success was desired. On one occasion,
in particular, they contrivcd to make prisoners oí
nearly one hundred and twenty men, belonging to,
the 11th light dragoons, and twenty hussars oí the
German legion; and as this was tbe most serious
affair which took place during an entire month,
it may not be amiss if I give a particular account
of it.


It has been stated that, in forming our present
encampment, the line of the Caya was taken up:
it may be necessary to remind the reader, that in
making use of this expression, no more is meant
than that, our troops were posted in the rear oí
that river, and in' a direction parallel with its
general course. The Caya is a shallow and wind-
ing s.tream, which runs in one of its branches,
nearly north and south from the mountains near




PENINSULAR WAR. 175


Campo Mayor, to t-he Guadiana. Its banks are
in general low and open, though on our side there
was a range of commanding heights, not vel'y fal'
removed frorn the stl'eam. It ~o happened that
our cavalry pickets, instead of being posted upon
this rising ground, were l'anged along the margin
of the river, sorne of them in the very angles
formed by its detours, and in spots where no vigi-
lance could enable the videttes to observe an
enemy till he was close at hand. In one of these
most inappropriate spots was a considerable party;
of the 11 tQ. stationed, on a morning, when the
French thought fit to push a large force acl'Oss the
river, for the purpose of ascertaining how we were
employed. Our cavalry behaved with their accus-
torned gallantry, charging the Ieading squadron oí
the force irnrnediately opposed to them, and
driving it back with precipitation upon its support;
but they were ignorant all the while that other
squadrons had turned them, and that overwhelming
numbers were already formed jn their real'. The
consequence was, that the whole partywas su1'-
ro'unded, and with the exception of a few indivi-
duals, who contrived to cut their way through, all
were taken. It is scarcely necessary to add, that
the disaster gave rise to a variety of reports, and
to much condemnation; but 1 consider it not
worth while to repeat it.
. In addition to such occurrences as this, the only




176 NARRATIVE OF THE


sources of public interest which we possessed,
arose from the various reports which, from time to
time, carne in, of the movements both of the
French armies and of the Spanishcorps. We
learned, for example, that Soult had retllrned to
Seville with the whole of his force, and that he
had detached a division to oppose Blake, who had
crossed the Guadiana, according to the precon~
certed plan, at Mertola. Instead, however, of
pushing for Seville, Blake contented himself with
making a night attack upon the castles of Puebla
and Unebla, in which, as a matterof course, he
failed; and now, on receiving intelligence of the
march of Soul1's detachment against him, he with-
drew to Ayamonte, and emharked for Cadiz.
Marmont, in the mean while, was stated to remain
stationary at Merida and its vicinity; from whence
his cavalry were sent to the front for the purpose
of foraging, as often as necessity'req uired. Large
reinforcements of stores and artillery were, at the


. sametime, thrown into Badajoz; its works were
thoroughly repaired, and its garrison was increased
to the amount of five thousand mello But the
most satisfactory piece of iutelligence which carne
to us, was conveyed in a letter from Marmout him-'
self; which, though addressed to Marshal Ber-
thier, fell, by great good fortune, ¡nto our hauds.
The General had intrusted it to one of his aides-
de.-camp, whom he despatched, as a most coufi-




PENINSULA lt W A R. 177


dential person, to París; and who, being inter-
cepted, as well as his communication, by a wan-
dering band of Spaniards, was sent in person to
our campo As the letter was really a curious one,
and as it served to convey a very correct idea of
the state of the French army, as well as an ex-
tremely favourable notion of the judgment and
good sense of its commander, it may not be amiss
to repeat here a brief outline of its contents.


Tbe letter in question was dated from Merida,
at a period posterior to the relief of Badajoz, and
the consequent retrogression of our divisions. It
began by informing his Excellency the Prince of
N eufchatel, that having succeeded, in conjunction
with the Duke of Dalmatia, in raising the siege of
Badajoz, the writer had since directed his undi~
vided attention to the re-organisation and re-esta-
blishment of discipline in the army of Portugal.
The system of requisitions, and the irregularity of
supply, had been carried, it was continued, to so
great a height, that the army was become liUJe
better than a rabble of banditti; nor could any
thing be attempted with the slightest prospect of
success, tiU the method should be entirely
changed, and the troops provided and paid in such
a manner, as to render them both contented and
manageable. To, accomplish this, the Marshal
was thEm devising plans ; and he earnestIy pressed
for instructions and assistance froID the Emperor,


VOL. Ir. l\f




178 NAKRATIVE OF THE


in carrying them into execution. In the mean
time, however, he meditated a removal to the right
bank of the Tagus; whilst Soult, who had heard
of succours being sent from Cadiz to Tarragona,
and considered his presence in the south as indis-
pensable, was preparing to march thither without
delay. With him the Marshal would leave the
fifth corps of infantry as well as several battalions
of cavalry, these being more immediately destined
for the defence of Estremadura; but he added an
earnest request, that they might thenceforth be
attached to the army of Portugal, as an arrange-
ment not only natural, but necessary.


The letter went on to state, that with his own
corps, amounting to thirty-twothousand infantry,
and from three to four thoúsand cavalry, the writer
intended to place himself in sorne convenient camp
between the Teitar and the Tagus, where he should
be able more narrowly to watch the conduct of
his troops, and improve their discipline. The only
obstacle to this arrangement arose from the diffi.-
cultyof providing adequate supplies of food and
forage; but though doubtless very great, Marmont
expressed sanguine hopes that he should be able
to surmount it. In tbis case, and supposing that two
or three months' "repose were obtained, and that
the remounts of horses, and re-equipments of va-
rious kinds promised should arrive, he entertained
no doubt that the fine arrny of Portugal would




PENINSULA R \V A lL 179


again become tres redoutable, and capable of exe-
cuting any service in which the Emperor might be
pleased to employ it. He next proceeded to spe-
cify the position and supposed. strength of our
army. He reported the departure of Blake's corps,
and its embarkation for Cadiz, subsequent to the
failure of its attack upon the casUe of Puebla,
and entered into a variety of other particulars,
which abundaritly testified that the channels of
information possessed by the French, were at least
as perfect and as open as those possessed by our-
selves. But of his own plans, Marmont said no-
thing more, ínasmuch as it was his design to re-
main wholly upon the defensive, till specific or-
ders shotild reach him from Paris. In- addition to
this despatch from Marmont, a letter from General
Tresion, chief of the staff, was likewise inter-
cepted ;but it contained little calculated to in-
terest, except an explicit dec1aration that the
French troops were unable to cope with the Eng-
lish, and that their best chance of success lay in
manreuvrmg.


1 have reason to believe that the communica-
tions made in Marshal Marmont's despatch, com-
bined with other circumstances of less moment,
determinedLord Wellington to forego, for the
present, an offensive operations against the enemy
in Spain. It was c1ear that against odds so tre-
mendous he could not, with his present strength,




180 NARRATIVE OF THE


hope to accompliah any object of importance, since
Marmont's corpa alone was capable of offering to
him a stout resistan ce ; and should it fall back
upon that of Soult, its superiority would become at
once overwhelming. He accordingly made up his
mind to place his troops in temporary cantoll-
ments; and the divisions began, on the 21st, to
break up from theiÍ" respective stations for that
purpose. Two of these, the third and the sixth,
were arde red to cross the Tagus, and to occupy
CastelIo Branco, and the villages near; the se-
venth was directed to move upon Niza; the light
to Campo Mayor; the first and fifth to Portalegre,
whither the head-quarters likewlse removed; and
the second and fourth to Evora and its adjacents.
Thus was a very strong corps of infantry, sup-
ported by the whole of the cavalry, kept in Alen-
tejo; whilst the remainder of the army taking post
in the vicinity of the Tagus, beame disposable
towards any point which nlÍght chance to be
threatened.




r¡.; N I N S U LA It W J\ R. 181


CHAPTER' VII.


Amusements ofthe officers in quarters-Lord Wellington sud·
denly moves towards _Rodrigo, and invests the place-Dispo--
sition of the' army in its new alignment-Description of the
country round Ciudad Rodrigo-Reports oi' the preparations
made by th!:' enemy to raise the siege of that city, and ar-
rangements entered into in consequence.


IN the·preceding pages, rny narrative has been so
completely confined to a detail of the great ope-
rations of the army, and of the results arising out
of them, that 1 have as yet found no opportunity
of making the reader acquainted with the general
mode and style of living adopted at this time
among the staff and other officers. 1 t may be
sufficient to state here, that no set of persons could
more industriously strive to unite mirth with hard-
ships, and relaxation with severe d~ty. For sorne


. time, we contented ourselves with keeping pointers
and greyhounds, and indulging, as often as oppor·




182 NARRATIVE OF 'CHE


tunities offered, in the sports of shooting, coursing,
and fishing; but now ataste for hunting began to
prevail amongst us, and fox-hounds and harriers,
more or less numerous and good, were established
in the different divisions of the army. At head-
quarters we were fortunate enough to become pos-
sessed of an excellent pack, which afforded us
much amusement, and occupied time which would
have otherwise htmg heavily on our hands; and it
is worthy of remark, that in such minor under-
takings, no man entered more heartily than our
leader. It was during this summer that he -first
instituted the custom, which he never afterwards
laid aside, of throwing off at settled points on
established days in every week, whilst the army
was not in the field, and the incidents, replete with
mirth, to which these meetings gave rise, are far
too numerous to be recorded, though they will be
long remembered. Then, in our quarters, we lived
gaily and well. A spirit of good-fellowship and
hospitality everywhere prevailed; and in the midst
of war,-balls, private theatricals, and agreeable
parties, were things of continual occurrence. It is
lmnecessary to add that this system, whilst it de-
tracted in no de~ree from the discipline and effi-
ciency of the troops, spread abroad arnong those
who carne under its influence the very best dispo-
sitio n and ternper; and aH men realIy learned to
love their occupation, even at its most trying mo"'




PENINSULAR WAR. 183


ments, from a recollection of the many enjoyments
of which it became the source.


It has been stated that on the 21st of July the
army broke up from its camps, (or the purpose of
taking possession of a line of temporary canton-
ments on each side ofthe Tagus. AH was duly
executed by the 23rd; and on that daythe whole
of the divisions,' with the exception of the fifth
aJone, which still kept the fieId at about a league's


. distance from Portalegre, were comfortably housed
at their respective destinations. The movement
was hardly made, when we were joined by four
regimentsof infantry and oue of cavalry, from En-
gland-. namely, by the 26th, 32nd, 68th,and 77th
infantry, and the 12th light dragoons; aH of them
strong in numbers, and extremely effective; whilst
the arrival of General Graham at Lisbon, who
carne as second in command from Cadiz, was offi-
cially announced to uso The latter piece of in-
telligence was received with much satisfaction;
for. General Graham had seen a great deal of ser-
vice, and wherever employed, had proved himself
always to be an officer of enterprise and talent;
and his late success at Barossa, however much it
may be supposed to have depended upon the
valour of the troops engaged, certainly took not
away from the reputation which their leader had
previously acquired.


We were scarcely settled in


,.'--'




184 N ARRA TTVE OF THE


when a variety of rumours began to cireulate, most
of them ealeulated to inspire apprehension, and
very few of a eontrary tendeney. In the first
place, a report was conveyed to us through certain
Spanish offieers at head-quarters, that two sepa-
rate columns, consisting of thirty thousand men
each, were on their mareh to reinforce the French
armies in Spain; one froro the side of Dalmatia,
and the other from an opposite direction. Nor
could the numerous detaiJs with which we were
favoured, of the formation of bands of guerillas,
and of their daring enterprises, in any effectual
degree lessen the impression which it had pro-
dueed. Much has been said of these guerillas, as
well by the Spaniards themselves as by the histo-
rians of other countries, who have aerived their
information chiefiy from S panish sources; but all
who served in the Peninsula ean attest that a less
efficient and more mischievous body of marauders
never infested any country. It is not denied
that they cut off, froro time to time, a small convoy,
or an isolated detachment; but unfortunately
they did not confine their operations to attacks
upon the enemy. Whoever feH in their way, be
he friendor foe, rarely escaped unplundered ; and
the inhabitants of the smaller villages everywhere
dreaded their appearance as much as that of the
French. Yet were these the onIy portions of the
population of Srain which could be said to be in




PENINSULAR WAl{. 185


arms. In the country places, it is true that the
people were generally disposed to favour the cause
of independence; and that from the llttle ham\ets
and solitary cottages, by far the larger proportion
of recruits for the Spanish army was procured;
but in the towns, one wish, and one alone, seemed
to prevail-namely, that the repose of the inhabi.:
tants might not be interrupted by the approach of
any troops, whether French or British. Tran-
quillity at all hazards, and at any cost, was the
boon for which the mass of the population of
Spain now pined, till it became too apparent, that
were we to withdraw from the Peninsula, the war
would come to an end before the close of a single
summer. Nor, in truth, was the existence ofthat
feeling very greatly to be wondered ato The
Spaniards possessed no force competent, at any
point, to make head against ,the invaders; almost
an their strong pIaces were in the hands of the
French ; whilst discord the most atrocious and the.
most palpable reigned in those very assemblies
which ought to have guided the energies of the
people, and directed their exertions. We heard,
indeed, about this time, of the re-capture of
Figueras, and it was one of the few rumours
which served to keep alive anything like a hope
that Spain might yet do something worthy of her
ancient renown, and of the cause in which she
was embarked; but neither this, nor a few trifling




186 N ARRATIVE Ol!' THE


successes near Astorga, nor even the triumphs of
Don Julian, who was intercepting convoys, and
making prisoners about Salamanca, was sufficient
to inspire us with any great degree of confidence
in the exertions of our allies. On the contrary,
we felt that the British army was, and must con-
tinue" to be, the principal in this war of Peninsular
independence; and hence it was not very easy
even for the most sanguine amongst us to believe
that, should Russia and the northern states persist
in their pacific policy, Great Britain could possibly
retíre from a contest so unequal, in triumph, and
with honour.


When the army first took up its liríe of can-
tonments, an opinion generally prevailed, that
nothing further would be attempted, on our parts,
till the sultry season should have passed away.
With respect to the enemy, every thing appeared
to indicate that, whatever might be done in other
parts of the Peninsula, Portugal would be left
undisturbed, till the arrival of the promised rein-
forcements from France, and other favourable cir-
cumstances, should authorise a fresh invasion.
Marmont, it was ascertained, having withdrawn
his troops into the vale of Plasencia, with the
exception of one division only under General Foy,
which was appointed to watch the left bank of the
Tagus, had established his own head-quarters at
Talavera de la Reyna. Soult was gone to the




PENINSULAR WAR. 187


south, with the intention, as was believed, of
laying siege to Carthagena; and Suchet, to whom
Tarragona had lately submitted, was preparing to
push his conquests in Alicant and Catalonia. In
the mean time, Bessieres was assembling oue
considerable corps at Valladolid, aud Bonnet
another at Leon aud Benavente; whilst Joseph,
who had lately returned to Madrid, was amusing
himself and his subjects with proclamations, as
absurd in their language as they were nugatory in
their effects. He was assuring them at once, of
the increased love of the Emperor towards the
Spaniards, and oí the march of sixty thousand
fl'esh troops from France into Spain; and whilst
he threatened the severest vengeance agaiust the
bauds of plunderers by whom the. roads and
passes were everywhere infested, he held out the
brightest hopes to all sueh guerilla chiefs as chose
to aecept rank in the imperial service. N ot a
word, however, was said, either by him or his
generals, of further attempts against Portugal or-
the English; and henee there were few amongst
us who antieipated any other result, than that the
line whieh we had now assumed would be main-
tained, at all events, throughout the dog-days, if
not till the return of spring. .


Whilst the rest of the army were thus indulging
in dreams of q uiet . and repose, the ever-aetive
mind of their leader was meditating an enterprise,




188 NARRATIVE Ol" THE


hazardous, no doubt, and at the best beset with
diffieulties, but in the highest degree influential
upon the general issue of the war. The possession
of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz on one side of
Spain, and of three out of the four principal for-
tresses on the other, gave to the enemy a faeility
of movement, of whieh it was of the utmost con-
sequence to deprive them; and Lord Wellington's
principal views had, in consequenee, been, for
sorne time back, directed to the recovery of pIaces
of the importanee of which every day brought
proofsmore and more decided. How he failed ih
his attempt upon one of these, the reader has al-
ready been informed, as well as of the eircum-
stanees whieh would have rendered a fresh effort,
in the same q uarter, even more hopeless than the
effort already made. But with respect to Ciudad
Rodrigo, the case was somewhat different. Should
Soult really embark in the siege of Carthagena, or in
any other expedition calculated togive to his army
fuIl oecupation, Ciudad Rodrigo must necessarily
be left, in a great degree, to the protection of its
own garrison; and with the garrison of Ciudad
Rodrigo, even though it should be supported by
the single eorps of Marmont, Lord Wellington be-
lieved himself fully adequate to cope. With the
hope, therefore, th.at sorne such occurrence might
fall out, stores and guns were quietly, but indus-
tl'iously, transported from Lisbon to Oporto, and




PENINSULAl{ \VAR. IS9


from Oporto to Lamego; and at the moment
when, to all external appearance, "his undivided
attentíon was bestowed upon recruiting the health
of his troops, he was looking to their employment
in a species of operations, for which, to confess
the truth, the British army was, at this period,
less prepared than any other army in Europe.


1 have said that, at the period to which my pre-
sent narrative refers, the British army was, among
all the armies of Europe, the least prepared to
undertake the duties of a siege,-and for this ob-
vious reason, that it was, and long continued to be,
deficient in those establishments, without which it
is utterly impossible either to defend 01' attack forti-
fied places to advantage. In expressing myselfthus,
it is very far froID my intention to cast the slightest
stigma upon the corps of engineers. Our engineer
officers were then, as they are now, equal1y able
and scientific; but besides that, in the Península
at least, they were few in number, the absence of _
all adequate support in the other departments of the
army, rendered them quite incapable of applying
the science to its legitimate ends, or causing it to
produce its legitimate effects. Ours was, perhaps,
the only army in Europe which possessed no corps
of sappers and miners, nor any body of men pecu-
liarly trained to carry on the more intricate de-


" tails of a siege. We had~ it is true, what was
termed the regiment of royal military artificers ;




190 NARRATIVE OF THE


that lS to say, a battalion of carpenters, black-
smiths, stonemasons, and other handicraftsmen;
but not one of these had ever seen a mine; and as
to a sap, they were probably incapable of under-
standing the very meaning of the word. In the
regiments of the line again, there were hut few,
even among the officers, who had ever bestowed
much attention upon these important matters;
whilst the men may be pronounced. without reser-
vation, to have been universally ignorant of them.
N ow. when with such materials our engineers be-
gan the labours of a siege, how was it possible
that they could carry them on either with rapidity
{Ir success ? . These officers could not be present
in a variety of pIaces at the same moment; and
wherever they were not present, the probability
was, that nothing was done as it ought to have
be en done. Then, again, in all the materials
requisite for sieges, we were greatly deficient.
We had no pontoons norpontooneers; our b!"each,.
ing artillery, chiefly of Portuguese manufacture,
was both meagre and badIy supplied; and our in-
trenching tooIs consisted simply of the most com-
mon description of spades, bill-hooks, and pick-
axes. The truth is, that the British government,
never having contemplated the possibility of its
armies being engaged in a serious c,ontinental war,
and feeling secure against invasion from the de-
cided superiority of its fleets, had never bestowed




PENINSULAR "\VAR. 191


attention upon the organisation of means, withoñt
which the bravest troops in the world will be liable
to disaster, as often as they find themselves op-
posed by ramparts and ditches; and hence the
British army, in no single instance from the
commencernent to the close of the Peninsular
struggle, sat down before a fortified place but
under disadvantages. Both the General and his
followers were conscious that they possessed nei-
ther the physical nor moral elements for such en-
terprises, and they never entered upon themex-
cept when an irresistible necessity compelled.


But though the case was so~ and though now,
more perhaps than at subsequent periods, we felt
our own inferiority in these respects, Lord Wel-
lington was not, on that account, disposed to per-
mit what appeared to be a favourable opportunity
for the re-capture of Ciudad Rodrigo to pass un-
heeded. The divisions had taken up their canton-
ments but a few days, when an intercepted return
of the provisions in that place fell ¡nto our hands,
from which it appeared that the existing stock was
scanty, and that the prospects of securing a fresh
suppIy were both remote and contingento It
instantly occurred to him, that were it practicable
to invest Rodrigo previous to the arrival of a con-
voy, famine might be made to do the work of a
siege, whilst, at all events, a knowledge that the
fortress was in danger,. couId not but dishearten




192 NARHATIVE OF THE


Marmont, even if it should fail in alarming Soult
in the midst of his southernoperations. The plan
was no sooner conceived than carried ¡nto execu-
tion. Whilst the second British, and General
Hamilton's Portuguese division of infantry, sup-
ported by two brigades of cavalry, received orders
to remain at Estreroos and Portalegre, under Ge-
neral Hill, for the protection of Alentejo, the re-
roainder of the army, consisting of the dragoons,
the light, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions,
was suddenly called into the field, and on the
sixth day after it had taken up its cantonments,
found itself in full march towards the north.


On the 1St of August head-quarters reached
Castello Branco, where a haIt of a single day oc-
curred. On the 8th, they were transferred to
Sabugal; and on the 10th, Lord Wellington fixed
his residence in the town of Fuente Guenaldo.
A loose and extensive line was then taken up,
froro Villa Vicosa on the right, to Gallegos on the
left, along which the several divisions and brigades
were distributed, the 1st occupying Penamacor,
the 4th Pedrogao, the 5th Payo, near the pass of
Perales, the 6th Gallegos, the 7th Alfayates and
Villa Mayor, and the light Mortegao, on the op-
posite side- of the Agueda. With respect to the
3rd division, it remained, with the bulk of the ar-
tillery, at Fuente Guenaldo; whilst the cavalry
was scattered here and there in squadrons and




PENINSULAR W AJ>. 193


srnall parties, according as the nature of the ground
rendered their presence desirable, or facility of ac-
cornmodation invited.


Before 1 proceed to give any account of the
operations to which these arrangements proved a
prelude, it wiU be necessary to make the reader
somewhat better acquainted with the real state
aud local situation of the fortre8s, towards which
our attention was now turned.


Ciudad Rodrigo.is situated upon one of tluee
hills, or rather eminences, which stand upon the
right bank of the Agueda, and rise abruptly out of
an extensive plain, in a state of high cultivation,
and at this time covered with an abundant crop of
corno The plain in question is bo;rdered on the
north and west by a range of rugged mountains ;
and on the south-east, by a similar range, still
m.o.re rugged and impervious. The formerof these
ranges consists of cliffs and ·crags, separated from
one another here and there by wide passes,
through which several excellent roads conduct to
Salamanca and into Castile; the latter can boast
only of the pass of Perales, a defile so precipitous,
as to be perfectly useless in a military point of
view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at
th~ distance of man y miles from the walls, and
hence both are equally unamiling for the purposes
of a blockading force; whilst neither offers a posi-


VOL. JI. N




194 NARRATIVE OF THE


tion at all favourable or commodious to an army
intended to cover the progress of a siege.


It is rather singular, in a country like Spaio,
that the whole flat should be deficient in springs
and pools, and that the only source from which
water can be procured by the inhabitants, is
the Agueda. 1 need scarcely add that this
circumstance alone, independently of all other
considerations, gave to the projected siege no very
favourable aspect, since it was manifest that, should
it be undertaken, the mass of our troops must
establish themselves at a distance from the river,
and suffer serious inconvenience in a matter, not
less important than any by which they were liable '
to be effected. But the difficulty which would thus
be experienced in supplying the men with one of
the most essential necessaries of life, was not the
only, nor, perhaps, the greatest obstac1e, which
stood in the way of our design on the present oc-
casion. Should we fairly embark in the siege,
we must do so with the fuIl determination either
of abandoning our whole train, or staking every-
thing upon the fate of a battle, in case the enemy
should approach in force to the relief of the garri-
son; because the condition of the country in our
rear was such, as to preclude all hope that heavy
guns and stores, once brought up, could ever be
removed hastily, and in the presence of a superior




PENINSULA R W AH. 195


force. In the first place, the roads in this part of
the country are rarely suchas deserve to be termed
good; during the dry season, they may, indeed, he
traversed by carriages of aoy description; but
after rain they are impervious to all except the
lightest and best constructed. In the next place,
the rivers which separate Rodrigo from Portugal,
particularly the Agueda and the Coa, are not only
difficult on account of the steep and rugged nature
of their banks, but they are liable to sudden
rises oí many feet, which will, in the course of a
few hours, sweep away bridges, and render fords
impassable. Supposing, therefore, that we should
bring up our guns and stores unmolested, open our
trenches, and establish our magazines, it would be·
vain to speculate upon any other issue than suc-
cess; for retreat we could not, even if defeated,
without abandoning all these to the enemy. There
was not, either, as 1 have already hinted, a1'1y
ground upon which a covering army could draw
up to advantage. Were we to take possession oí
the north-western ridges, our troops would be
separated into numberless little bands, no two of
which could co-operate well together, inasmuch as
the heights are all a great deal too rugged in their
faces to permit of easy communication from the
one to the other; whilst we should be exposed to
the risk of being forced at· sorne one point, and
having the enemy in our rear, before we were




196 NARRATIVE OF THE


properly aware of their approach. To post our-
selves in the plain,. again, could be done only at
the expense of prodigious labour and much time,
since the plain'ought to be fortified before it could
offer a position; and even then it would be ex-
posed to the hazard of turning, or being drawn out
ti11 it became feeble from its very extent. In the
outward appearances of nature, therefore, we saw
nothing calculated to inspire us with confidence
as to the issue of the intended operation; and no
man can say our chief examined the ground super-
ficially. He spent an en tire week, from three
o'clock in the morning till six in the evening of
every day, onhorseback.


If the nature of the country was not such as very
strongly to encourage us in our designs, the infor-
mation which we received from a variety of quar-
ters, both as to thc state of the fortress, and the
probabilities of its being relieved, were equally at
variance with our wishes and expectations. It
was soon discovered that the scarcity of provisions
under which the garrison was reported to labour,
had long ago been removed. A convoy of stores
of every description had entered the place just
before our arrival, and it was now victualled and
provided for at least two months to come. Evi-
dence, likewise, was not wanting, that the French
marshals were determined to hazard aH, rather
than permit a post of so much importance to be




PENINSULAR W AR. 197


wrested from them; and hence, that our siege
must be cornmenced, under the moral certainty of
being attacked by all the disposable force in the
country long before it could be brought to a con-
clusion. The following is a brief summary of the
rumours which now prevailed, relative to the dis-
position and numbers of the enemy's troops; and
by which, in the event of our embarking in the
affair, we should, in aU"probability, be assailed.


The corps of "Marshal Marmont, distributed
through the vale of Plasencia, mustered in all
thirty-five thousand men; there were at Bena-
vente, Toro, Valladolid, &c. about fifteen thousand
more; whilst ten thousand fresh troops, from the
reinforcements lately introduced into the country,
were understood to be within a few marches of
Salamanca. It was not difficult to foresee that,
whenever Marmont should deem it expedient to
take the field, he would do so at the head of these
corps combined; or, in other words, with a force of
not less than sixty thousand meno N ow, it unfor-
tunately happened that the allied army was suf-
fering at this moment more severely from sickness
than it had done at almost any previous periodo
There were in hospital, or unfit for duty, no fewer
tban thirteen tbousand British, and five tbousand
Portuguese-a fun tbousand of whom had broken
down during the late march; and hence the ut-
most amount upon which it was possible forus to




198 NAltRATIVE OF 'fHE


calculate, e.xceeded not forty-two or forty-three
thousand meno The matter to be decided accord-
ingly was~ whether, with such mean s, we should
be justified in laying siege to a strong place, well
supplied, well garrisoned, and covered by an army
which, in point of numbers, surpassed our own by
nearly one-third; more especially after our late
failure at Badajoz, the impression of which had
not yet departed from men's minds. There could
be but one opinion as to the prudence or impru-
dence of the undertaking, and that opinion Lord
Wellington immediately embraced. He found
himself mistaken in the estímate which had been
formed of tbe . defensibility of the place, and he
now wisely abstained from a vain attempt to ac-
complish that for which his means were manifestly
incompetent. Having placed Rodrigo in a state
of blockade by drawing around it a chain of posts,
he determined to await the result in the position
which he had assumed; and he found comfort
under a temporary derangement of his plan s, frOIn
the conviction that his movement would at least
operate as a powerful diversion in favour of othe.
provinces and eities of Spain.


Matters continued in this state, from day to
day, and from week to week, without giving birth
to any events worthy of record. The blockade
was maintained with so much diligence, that tbe.
garrison began at last to experience something like




PENINSULAR WAR. 199


distress, and the preparations for converting it into
a siege, though not absolutely laid aside, went on
slowly and with languor. Occasionally, too, an
affair of posts would occur, in which, 1 regret to
say, the enemy were not always unsuccessful;
whilst rumours, as usual, came in to supply with
subjects of speculation those who had little in their
own immediate occupations or prospects to excite
interest. One day brought intelligence of the for-
midable attitude assumed by the Spaniards in Ga-
licia; thenext furnished a detail of their overthrow
and dispersion. Now we heard of Blake's arrival
in Cadiz, and of the great deeds which he ex-
pected to perform in Andalusia; again, of the ra-
pidity with which Suchet and Sebastiani were
completing the subjugation of the southern pro-
vinces; and the probability that Grenada and
Carthagena would shortly be redueed: But it
was not till towards the end of August, that eer-
tain indications of a movement on tbe part of
Marmont, gave to our own situation its ordinary
character of ¡nterest; and September was far ad-
vanced before we ]earned to believe that impor-
tant operations were realIy at hand.


The first expectation of hostilities about to re-
commence, was excited by a report that Marmont
had broken up from his cantonments, and that his
columns were in march towards Castile. This
carne in about the 24th óf August, and as it was




200 NARRATIVE OF THE


supposed tu rest upon tolerably good evidence.
Lord Wellington made instant preparations to
meet the threatened danger. The divisions which
had hitherto occupied cantonments between Fu-
ente Guinaldo and the Tagus, closed up; the first
and fourthpassing the Coa, and stationing them-
selves -at Nave d'Avel, Fuentes de Honor, Villa
Formosa, ~nd ValdelamuIa; whilst the remainder
took post on the heights of Pastores, at El Boden,
at Montiago, Albergaria, and the places near.
By this arrangement, the several brigade's of the
allied army were so distributed, as that they couIJ,
at a moment's notice, concentrate between the
Agueda and the Coa; whilst all the principal de-
files of the mountains beyond being watched, the
possibility of throwing a corps unobserved either
into Rodrigo, 01' upon any link in our communica-
tions, was prevented. A point d'appui, likewise,
for those in front, was eonstituted at Fuente Gui-
naIdo, where a position was marked out, and
strengthened by respeetable' intrenehments; in a
word, every precaution was taken which the eir-
cumstanees of the case appeared to demand, and
whieh would enable Lord Wellington either to
fight to advantage, should it be his poliey to risk
a battle, 01', having kept out his advaneed eorps
to the last moment, to fall back upon his re-
saurees.


We werc thus situated, the expeetations of aH




PENINSULAR WAn. 20i


being excited to a high degree. when there fell
into our hands letters and other documents, which
threw a good deal of light, as well upon the
amount of the enemy's means, as. upon the plan s
which he had be en lately devising, and the man-
ner in which he proposed to carry them into exe-
cution. Of the letters, one, and not the least in-
teresting, was addressed by General Foy, from his
head-quarters at Almaraz, to General' Gerard,
commandant of the 5th corps at Zafra. It bore
date so long ago as the period of our first arrival
in our present line, and informed the writer's cor-
respondent of the march of the British arrny to-
wards Ciudad Rodrigo; of Lord Wellington's
designs upon that place; and of the measures
which the. French were abóut to adopt, for the
purpose of defeating them. General Foy, it ap-
peared, was under orders to join Marrnont at
Plasencia, whilst Gerard was to move upon
Almaraz and Truxillo; eight tbousand men were
on their march from the anny of the centre; and
their arrival at the Tagus might daily be expected;
As soon as these should come up, Marmont was to
push, with the whole of his army, through the
pass of Baños, and to advance upon Ciudad Ro-
drigo frorn the side of Alba; whilst General D'Or-
senne, with as many troops as he might be able to
collect, was to threaten the blockading force from
Salamanca. Such was a general olltlinc of the




202 NARRATIVE oJo' THE


enemy's plan, as far at least as it couId be col-
leeted from the statements of General Foy j with
respeet to the amount of resourees at his disposal,
we possessed other and not less aeeurate means of
information. Of the strength of Mannont's eorps,
after it should have be en reinforeed by the pro-
mised divisions, little doubt could exist; we set it
down, allowing for casualties and sickness, at
forty-five thousand effectives; D'Orsenne's we
were disposed to calculate at twenty-five or thirty
thousand; and there were incIuded in it fifteen
thousand infantry, and five hundred cavaIry orihe
imperial guarda The latter faet we learned from a
perusal of certain oflicial returns, whieh, together
with the intereepted letters aboye alluded to,
came into our possession; and we were the more
inclined to place reliance on their accuracy, from
private aceounts representing the division of guards
as littIe short of thirty thousand. One of D'Or-
senne's generals, for example,in a private com-
munication full of the most extravagant bombast,
informed the Governor of Rodrigo, that they were
coming with twenty-five thousand guards; and
then, added he, H Nous verrons si ces illustres
Anglois nous attendront, ou si, comme a l'ordinaire,
¡ls se retireront." This statement was, of course,
treated as a gros s exaggeration; yet the amount of
force known to be at Marmont's disposal was su eh
as we could scarcely hope to fight to advantage¡




PENINSULAR WAH. 203


and a~ Lord Wellington saw nothing in the exist-
ing state of affairs, which demanded that his pru-
dent counsels should be abandoned, he resolved
not to hazard a general action at aH. On the con-
trary. it was his intention to retire leisurely across
the Agueda, or even further, in case he should be
hard pressed; and, from sorne other and better
ground, to act offensively or otherwise, according
as circumstances might direct.


1 should try the patience of the reader beyond
endurance, were 1 to repeat, in regular order. aH
the demonstrations and trifling movements on the
part both of the enerny and ourselves, which, up
to the middle of September, served to keep alive
the interest under which we now began again to
labour. At one time, a corps of French cavalry
was known to have threaded the pass of Baños,
and aH were, in consequence, on the alert, as at
the cornmencement of great undertakings. At
another, the cavalry were stated to have with-
drawn; and a rumour prevailed, that Marroont
was once more falling back upon Plasencia; and
that the design of relieving Rodrigo was aban-
doneel. For this, a variety of causes were as-
signed. Soult had fought asevere action with
Blake, and had suffered a defeat: he had returned
to Llerena, and part of Marmont's troops were on
their way to reinforce him. The Spaniards in the
north, too, were acquiring fresh resolution, and




204 NARRATIVE OF THE


great things' might yet be expected from them.
Thus were we amused, day after day, by state-
ments which at the best could be very imperfectIy
relied upon, and which were not unfrequently
devoid of all . foundation; till men cea sed in the
end to turn their eyes, with the smallest interest,
to any other part of the stage besides that imme-
diately before them. But matters were drawing
gradual1y to a crisis; and proofs began by degrees
to develope themselves, touching the real predica-
ment in which the belligerent parties stood; and
the fate which, as a matter of course, might be ex-
pected to attend ourselves. .




PENINSULAR WAH. _ 205


CHAPTER VIII.


Delay on the part of the enemy to commence operations-They
advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; throw in a con-
voy, and pass the Agueda-Skirmishes along the front of the
British line, which faUs back upon Fuente Guinaldo-
Display of French troops there-Lord Wellington retires to
Alfayates-Partial actions during the movement-The
enemy withdraw, and the British troops retire into canton-
ments behind the Coa-Ciudad Rodrigo observed by flying
parties-Exploits of Don Julian.


lT was now the middle of September, and the
enerny's grand movement for the relief of Ciudad
Rodrigo -was still deferrec1, though each successive
day brought additional proofs that no great while
would elapse ere it would receive its accomplish-
mento We lÍeard from various quarters that Mar-
mont's columns were in march towarc1s Tomames
and Val de Fuentes, and that the imperial guards,
with other troops to the number of twenty 01'
twenty-five thousand men, were collected in and




206 NARRATIVE OF THE


about Salamanca. N ext carne intercepted cont·
munications, which stated that a convoy would
arrive near the place on the 20th or 21st at the
Jatest; and that the force with which it was pro-
posed to cover its introduction, would render aH
idea on our part of an attempt at molesting it, in-
admissible. Upwards of sixty thousand infantry.
cavalry, and artillery, it was said, were prepared
to raise the blockade; it was even hinted that a
fresh irruption into Portugal was at hand, and
that a campaign as active as had yet been per-
formed, and pregnant with results the most im-
portant, might be expected. Such reports and
.surmises, from whatsoever quarter conveyed,or by
whomsoever stated, were received with the liveliest
interest by the army at large. The sun never
rose without an expectation that great deeds
would be accomplished, 01' at least begun, before
his setting; and never set without producing a
conviction, that when he rose again, it would be
upon a scene of carnage and strife. AH, however,
were prepared to bid that morning welcome, let it
come when it might. The best dispositions which
his circumstances would allow had already been
made by Lord Wellington, and the best spirit pre-
vailed among the men; so that, if one feeling ap-
peared more conspicuous than another, it was of
impatience that the game, so long anticipated,
should be so tardy in its commencement.




PENINSULA lt W A R. 207


In the former chapter a general outline has be~n
given of the order in which· the allied troops, from
time to time, arranged themselves; it may not be
amiss to give here in detail, the llature of the
ground which theyoccupied at this criticaljuncture.
There were two divisions, the fifth and the light,
on the right bank of the Agueda; the one occupy-
ing Payo, the other Martiago. The latter com-
municated by its left, through Pastores, with the
third division of El Boden; which, again, exten-
ding along the river Azava as far as Gallegos,
united with the sixth, and thus leaned the left of
the whole Jine upon the Agueda at Cesmiro. At
the same time, Fuente Guinaldo, Nave d'Avel,
and the posts in that direction, were held by the
fourth and first divisions; whilst the cavalry were
at Ituero, Espeja, Carpio, and along the plain
which skirts the left of the high ground that runs
parallel with the Agueda from Fuente Guinaldo to
El Boden and Pastores, where it terminates in an
abrupt fall towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The two
lines of operations, again, which it was probable
that the enemy would select, were either by Gal-
legos and Almeida, passing the Azava and Duos
Casas rivers; or along the great road which leads
to Fuente Guinaldo, turning the Azava, and
making direct for Sabugal. . Now, as the country
on the latter of these was in every point of view
more defensible than that upon the former, Lord




208 NARRATIVE OF THE


Wellington earIy determined on making it the line
of his retreat; and the divisions upon the more
advanced chain accordingly received orders, in
case of an attack, to retire, after having well dis-
puted their ground, towards Fuente Guinaldo.
Here it was expected that a more ~esolute stand
would be made, under cover of the redoubts and
other works which had of late becn thrown up j
whilst, in the event of further falling back, every-
thing was so settled, that themovement could be
executed at any moment, and with comparative
security.


Such was the order oftheallied army, when, on
the 24th of Septernber,a considerable body of the
enemy showed themselves in the plain before
Ciudad Rodrigo. They carne from the Salamanca
and Tomames roads, and were accompanied by a
countless number of waggons, cars, aneI loaded
mules. Their progress was sIow, and apparently
cautious; but towards evening the convoy began
to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen
squadrons of cavalry. which passed the Agueda,
and a Iarge column of infantry, which h~lted upon
the plain. Still no syrnptoms were manifested of
a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt
anything further than the object which was thus
attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at
dusk, and a11 bivouacked that night near the town.
In the morning, ho\vever, as soon asobjects becam~




PENINSULAR W A R. 20fJ


discernible, on~ corps of cavalry, amounting to at
least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a
whole division of infantry, appeared in motion
along the great road, whieh, leading from Ciudad
Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Boden on the left ;
whilst another, less numerous perhaps, but, like
the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched
direet upon. Espeja. They both moved with ad-
mirable steadiness and great reguIarity; and as
the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear
and beautiful, their appearanee was altogether very
warlike, and extremely imposing.


As it was not for sorne time ascertained whether
strong reconnoissances only, or the advarice of the
whole French army, were intended; and as Lord
Wellington felt great reIuctance to abandon the
heights of El Boden and Pastores, unless threat-
ened by numbers whieh it would have been use-
less to oppose, our troops neither shifted their
ground, nor rnarle at first any general disposition
to cover the points threatened by concentration.
The enemy's columns, on the contrary, pushed on
-not disregarded certainly, but as eertainly with-
out drawing us into any premature disclosure of
our intentions; till the larger mass, which was
rnoving towards Guinaldo, reached the base of
sorne rising ground, which was heId by a portion
of the third division. These troops instantly
forrned; and though they consisted of no more


VOL. JI. o




210 NARUATIVE OF TIIE


than one British brigade under General CoIvllle,
and one Portuguese regiment of infantry-the
ninth-some pieces of Portuguese artillery, and
four squadrons of General Alten's cavalry, they
contri ved to arrest, for a considerable space of
time, the further advance of the assal1ants. Ii
was my good fortune to be particularly mixed with
this affair, and as one more brilliant has notoften
been accomplished by a handful of British troops,
l shall take the liberty of giving here a somewhat
detailed account of it.


1 have said that the enemy's column was per-
mitted to approach. almost to the base of the
heights, before any disposition., was made, on our
part, to harass or impede its progress. The guns,
indeed, opened upon. his leading sq uadrons as soon
as they arrived within range, and it wasconsola-
tory to observe that their fire was well directed;
but the infantry continued in close columns of
battalions behind the ridge, and the cavalry stood
in similar order, each man with the bridle of his
horse slung across his armo As soon, however, as
it became distinctly manifest that an attack was
in serious contemplation,. our troops prepared to
meet it with their accustomed gallantry and cool-
ness. The infantry wheeled into line; the cával-
ry mounted, and made ready to move wherever
their presence might be .required; whilst the ar-
tillery, redoubling their exertions, poured forth a




PENINSULAH WAR. 211


shower of grape and case shot, which exceedi~gly
galled and irritated the enemy. These arrange-
ments were not lost upon the French; they too
gave to their front a greater extent, as speedily as
the nature of the ground would permit, and ad-
vanced forward.


The attack was begun by a column of cavalry,
which charged up the heights in gaHant style;
cheering in the usual manner of the French, and
making directly for the guns. Our artillery men
stood their ground resoJutely, giving their fire to
the last; but there being nothing immediately at
hand to support them, they were at length com-
pelled to retire, and the guns fen, for a moment,
into the hands of the assailants. But it was only
for a moment; for the 5th regiment was ordet'ed
instantIy to recover them. They marched up in
line, and firing with great coolness; when at the
distance of only a few paces from theiradversa-
saries, they brought their bayonets to the charging
position, and rushed forward. 1 believe this is
the first instance on record of a charge witIrthe
bayonet being made upon cavalry by an infantry
battalion in line; nor, perhaps, would it be pru-
dent to introduce the practice into general use;·
but never was charge more successful. Posses;.,
sing the advantage of grotind, and keeping in close
and compact array, the 5th literaUypushed their
adversaries down the hill; they thenretook th·e~




212 NARRATIVE OF THl:


guns, and limbering them to the horses which had
followed their advance, drew them off in safety.
Whilst this was going on in one part of the field,
repeated and impetuous attacks were made in ano-
ther upon the handful of cavalry, which, under
General Alten's orders, manfully stood itsground.
Columns of the enemy's squadrons pushed again
and again upon the heights at different points, and
under different leaders; but they were overthrown
as regularly as tbey carne on, by sbort eharges
fromour resolute troopers, who drove them down
the deseent witb great slaughter, and still greater
confusioll. It is worthy of remark that, onaU
such occasions. the assailants outnumbered the
defend-ersby at least four to -ene; and that, em'"
boldened perhaps by their recent successes at the
outposts, they carne on with tbe recklessbravery
wbicb is exhibited only by men aecustomed to
conquer; but nothing could exceed the steadiness
of our cavalry; and tbeir excellenee became only
the more apparent, on aceount of the great odds
10 which they were opposed. There were present
in this rencontre two squadrons of tbe 1st hussars
of tbe King's German Legion, with a similar num-
Qer of the 11th ligbt dragoons; between whom it
was impossible to' determine wbich performed
feats of tbe greater gallantry; indeed 1 can per-
sonally attest tbat. the single souree of anxiety
experieneed by the officers in. eommand. arose




PENINSULAR WAR. 213


from an apprehension lest these brave fellows
should follow the broken multitudes down the cliffs
and preci¡Jices into which they drove them. To
hinder this were the efforts of. others and myself
mainly directed; and it was not without conside~
rabIe exertions that we succeeded.


The action had continued in this state ror sorne
time, the enemy continually assaulting our front
and left, and we as continually repulsing them,
when Captain Dashwood, an active officer of tbe
Adjutant-general's department, suddenly disco~
vered a heavy column moving towards the rear of
our right, round which it had penetrated unob·
served, and therefore unresisted. N ot a minute
was to be lost, for even a rnoment's indecision
would have enabled the French to accomplish their
object of surrounding uso A retreat was accordw
ingly ordered, and the heights were abandoned.
It is scarcely necessary to add, that the peculiarity
of our situation compelled us to look rather to the
celerity with which this manreuvre could be exe-
cuted, than to anything besides, and that the re-
treat of the cavalry was, in consequence, more
precipitate than orderly; but the brigade of in-
fantry, which consisted of the 77th, 83rd, and 5th,
covered ¡t, and found fresh opportunities of exhiw
biting their steadiness and high state of discipline.
They formed into squares \n the plain in rear of the
hussars, and when the French cavalry came oli in




214 NAltRATIVE 01<' TIfE


overwbelming numbers, and at full speed, opened
upon them a fire so destructive, tbat it completely
checked them. This was the last effort oneither
side. The enemy, overawed by the commanding
attitude assumed by our infantry, drew back; and
our troops continued their march upon Fuente
Guinaldo, where they ar~ived, in due time, with-
out further molestation.


Whilst the right of our line was thus employed,
Jarge masses of the enemy's cavalry and infantry
bore Jikewise upon our left, and drove back the
advanced post s from .carpio, and the stations near.
They were opposed chiefly by the 14th and 16th
dragoons, which .charged with great gallantry as
often as o:pportunities offered; but as it was highly
improbable that demonstrations thus made in force
llpon both flanks would not, sooner or later, end in
anendeavour to bring on a general action, Lord
Wellington early began to make his dispositions for
the evento Fo!' this putpose, the light divisÍon was
commanded to cross the -river, and hold the right
of _ the line at Fuente Guinaldo; the thírd- and
fourth divisions, with GeneralPack's brigade, took
théir ground so as to be flaÍlked by the redoubts ;
the seventh, which had hitherto been in reserve at
Albergaría, :cIosed up; ·whilst the fifth remaíned
still on the right bank of the Agueda, with a view
of giving additional security to that flan k of the
position. The cava1fy, again, were an moved into




PENINSULAR WAR. 215


the centre, and took post in front of the town. At
the same time the sixth division defiled from Gal·
legos and Espeja towardsits right; whilst Gen-eral
Graham, who comínanded the ,force on the left of
Ituero, and was, with the first division, at Nave
d'A vel, received 'iHstructio~s, in case the right
should be sorely pressed, to march at the shortest
notice to ¡ts support. Every movement was made,
and every object accomplished, on the night ofthe
25th, without the slightest confusion or risk; in-
deed the only circumstances which befell during
the progress of operations, at all deserving of
record, occurred at Pastores, where the 74th and
a battalion of the 60th regiments were posted.
By sorne mistake or another, the orders for the
retreat of these regiments did not arrive till all
support had been withdrawn, and the enemy were
seen in their rear; upon which Colonel Trench of
the 74th, the senior and a very distinguished offi-
-cer, with great ju'dgment passed tbe Agueda, and
made good his retreat by tbe right bank. He feH
in, during his perilous journey, ~ith a party of
.French cavalry, most of whom he succeeded in
.making prisoners; and having re-crossed theriver,
.overtook hisdivision about midníght, with the twó
battalions unbroken and uninjured.


The nigbt .of the 25th was spent by us as it is
,customary f.or soldiers to spend á night upon
which tbey have reason to expect that a day of




216 NARRA'J'IVE OF THE


battle will rise; that is to say, tbe superior officers
lay down in their cloaks upon the fioors of the
houses, whilst the men slept on their arms, round
large· fires~ which blazed along the range of the
position.


Long before dawn,. however, all were astir and
in their places; and the different regiments looked
anxiously for the moment which should behold the
commencement of a game as desperate as any
which they had been yet called upon to play.
But, instead of indulgingour troops as they'ex-
pected, Marmont contented himself with making
an exhibition of his force, and causing it to execute
a variety oí manreuvres in our presence; and it .
must be c~nfessed that a spectacle more striking.
has rarely been seen. The large body of cavalry
which followed lis to our position, and had bivou-·
acked during the nigbt in the woods adjoining,
were first drawn up in compact array, as if waiting
for the signal to push on. By and by, nine batta-
lions of infantry,· attended by a proportionate
quantity of artillery ~ made their appearance, and
formed into columns, lines, echelons, and squares.
Towards noon, twelve battalions of the imperial
guard carne upon. the ground in one solid mass ;
and as each soldier was decked out with feathers
and shoulder-knots of a bloody hue, their appear-
ance was certainly imposing in no ordinary degree.
The ~olid column, however, soon deployed into




PENINSULAR WAIt. 217


columns of battalions-a movement which was
executed with a degree of quickness and accuracy
quite admirable; and then, after having performed
several other evolutions with ~qual precision, the
guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac.
Next carne another division of infantry in real' of
theguards, and then a fresh column of cavalry,
till it was computed that the enemy hadcollected
on thissingle point a force of not less than 25,000
meno N or did the muster cease to go on, as long
as daylight lasted. To the very latest moment,
\re could observe men, horses, guns, carriages.
tumbriIs, and ammunition-waggons, Hocking into
the encampment; as if it were the design of the
French general to bring his whole disposable
force to bear against the position of Fuente
Guinaldo.


The position of Fuente Guinaldo was held at
this time by three divisons only of the allied army,
not one of which could bring into the field. so
manyas 5000 bayonets. Our numerical inferiority
was, therefore, very great; and as there was
nothing in the nature of the ground calculated to
mak~ up for a superiority in numbers so decided,
Lord Wellington at once determined to abandon
his works, and retire. In accordance witb this
resolution, we began our retreat immediately after
daI'k on the 26th; the right wing taking the two
roads which lead, Olle by Castelhas dos Flores




218 NARRATIVE 01<' THE


and Furealhos, the other by Albergaria and Aldea
de Ponte to Nave d'Avel, whilst the left feH baek
upon Bismula, and behind the Villa-major river;
andthe troops went ofl:' in sueh perfeet order, that
not only were there no stragglers, but not au
article of baggage, however valueless, was left
behind. Our movements had, however, be en
closely watehed by the enemy; for on the morn-
ing of the 27th they appeared in two eolumns,
each consisting of twelve squadrons of cavalry,
and a division of infantry, upon the two roads by
which our right wing' was retiring. These eolumns
mutualIy supported one another; and their great
object appeared to be, notso much to overtake
and force us to give battle, as to hurry us in our
march; but they were in no single instance suc-
cessful. On the contrary, their obstinacy on two
different occasions· enabled portions of our corps
to beat them back with sorne 10ss, and with á.
great deal more ofcohfusion.


The enemy's force which marched by Furcal-
hos, was stopped at that place by the infantry of
the light division. They had fallen in with the
,cava1ry early in the day ~ which, retiring before
thero, drew them to sorne broken ground, where
fhe infantry was formed; .and a few discharges
from the skirmishers served to convince them that
here at least our line of maTch was not to be
pressed. They therefore abstained from making




PENINSULAR WAH. 219


die attempt ;.but the corps which followed the
Aldea de Ponte road seemed animated by a more
daring spirit, and pushed vigorously to obtain
possession of a range of heights which lead from
that village to Nave d'Avel; and had they suc-
ceeded, the communication between the right and
left wings of our army would have been destroyed.
But Lord Wellington no sooner obset:ved their de-
sign than he took effectual me.asures to defeat it,.
by cornmanding the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions,
with a considerable force of cavalry, to haH and
concentrate upon the point threatened. The dis-
position was hardly effected, when our people
were assailed by clouds ()f tirailleurs, which, as
usual, covered the front of theFrench columns,
and a very brisk skirmish ensued. Jt feH chieBy
upon the 4th division, supported by General
Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry; in ...
deed, the brunt of it was borne by the fusileer bri-
gade under Colon el Packenham;· but though
warm for the moment, it\Vas not of long -conti-
nuance.. The enemy were chased at once froro
the high grounds which they had gained. They
fied, rather than retired, -beyond Aldea de Ponte,
and they were pursued with . the impetuosity
which English soldiers generally exhibit, consider-
ably further than it had been intended to follow
them. The consequence was, that our light
troops were, in their turn, driven back by the




220 NAHRATIVE oto' 'I'HE


enemy's supporting column, which, roused by the
sound of firing, had crossed over from the Furcal-
ho~ road, and were compelled to retire upon the
divisions in posit-ion, which had not, sine e the
commencement of the affair, once changed their
order.


An opinion now began to prevail, that it was
Marmont's intention to push us across the Coa,
with the rapidity of one who had already con-
quered, or was, at aH events, secure of conquest.
Lord Wellington himself adopted the idea, and in-
dignant at the presumption which aH his adver-
sary's movements displayed, he resolved to render
the proposed task somewhat more difficult of per-
formance than it appeared to be regarded by the
French Marshal. There were some heights, or
rather acclivities, about Rendoa· and Soito, which
offered an extremely favourable position, the Coa
covering both flanks, and a retiring angle oí the
river forming their point d'appu1. Thither the
army moved on the night of the 27th, and there it
was proposed to fight a battle on the morrow, in
case the French should persist in the design for
which we gave them credit. With this view the
fifth division received orders to pass the Agueda at
Navas Freas, and to form the right of the line
aboye Quadraseias. The fourth division was to
draw up upon the left of the fifth ; the light above
Soito; the third in· front of Pouca Tarenha; the




PENINSULAlt WAR. 221


first. and sixth at Rendoa~ where the ground
was peculiarly strong; and the seventh, with the-
cavalry, in a second line in the rearo There can-
not be a doubt that we should ~ave fought here
with much greater security to ourselves than at
Fuente Guinaldo; because the natural defCnces
would have shielded our troops far more effec-
tively, whilst the approaches for the enemy were
both difficult and exposed; yet there were objec-
tions even to this position, which the most s~­
guine found it difficult to overlook. There wa,g no
secure retreat. With a river like the Coa in our
rear, it would have been absolutely necessaryo-
either to repel, at all points~ the enemy's attacks,
however formidable, or to perish; for the line,
once broken, could not be withdrawn without suf-
fering a 10ss, which, in ou1' case, must have proved
fatal. As it happened, however, the excellence
of the position was not destined to be tried, for
the enemy never approached it. Whether it was
that Marmont's provisions failed him, 01' that he
deemed it unwise to attack us upon ground so for-
midable, 1 know not; but on the morning of the
28th, the strength of bis columns had disappeared,
and only a rear-guard of cavalry remained to
keep possession of Aldea de Ponte.


N otwithstanding the apparent retreat of the
enerny's columns, Lord Wellington did not con-
sider himself justified in abandoning the line




222 NARRATIVE OF THE


which he had taken up, till sorne more decisive
proof should be afforded that immediate danger
was at an end. About noon on the 28th, how-
ever, aH doubts on the subject were removed by
the return of Major Gordon, brother to the Earl of
Aberdeen, to head-quarters; who, so long ago as
the 25th, had been sent to the French army as the
bearcrof a flag of truce, and whom Marmont had
very prudently detained during the progress of
his,late operations. Major Gordon was, as might
be expected, well stored with interesting anec-
dotes relative to the situation and feelings of the
French army. He had received the most marked
attention froro Marroout and others ofthe generals,
with whom be lived on terms of familiarity, and
who scrupled not to carry him along with them in
their rides, and to give him the fullest insight into-
all their dispositions and arrangements. He spoke
of the enemy's troops as being generally well ap-
pointed and equipped, especially the cavalry and
imperial guards; and he estimated their numbers
atfull 60,000, with 120 pieces of cannon. The
French, it appeared, expressed themselves in
terms ofthe highest respee! touching the military
tal.ents of Lord Wellington, o{ which they con-
sidered his retreat from Fuente Guinaldo as fur-
nishing another brilliant specimen; for they had
fully anticipated an action at that place, and all
their plans were laid to secure a decisive victory.




PENINSULAR W AR. 223


The great bulk of their army, it appeared, was to
have been directed against our right, partly forc-
ing and partly turning it; and whilst the cavalry,
of which theybrought full six thousand into the
field, amused and occupied the centre, our left
also was to have been assailed. They were there-
fore not a little disappointed, when the dawn of
the 27th displayed our works and position aban-
doned; and whilst they lamented the mischance
which had thus wrested the laurel from their
brows, they gave our chief full credit for the pru-
den ce which dictated his determination to fall
back. Major Gordon further stated that the
French, when they first passed the Agueda, enter-
tainednoother design than merely to reconnoitre
OUT position, and to retire again; but that, irri-
tated by their cavalry 10ss, they pushed on, and'
wer~ afterwards tempted, from a contemplation of
our _extended alignment, to bring up, as they did
on the 26th; the whole oftheir army.


Now, however, the campaign was at an end.,
They were aU in full march towards Spain, for
the purpose of separating into corps, and retiring
to different quarters; that of General D'Orsenne
into Galicia, where, after it should have received
large reinforcements, and passed un del' the com-
mand of Oudinot, it was to become the army of
thenorth; whilst that of Marmont, with its an-




224 NAltItATIVE OF 'filE


cient title of tlfe Army of Portugal, was to retura
to its original station about Plasencia.


The single circumstance of Major Gordon's re-
turn sufficed to convince us, that in the opinion
which he had forrned relative tQ the future pro-
ceedings of the French arrny, he was not mis-
taken; since Marmont, had he ¡ntended to pro-
secute the invasion of Portugal any further, would
have scarcely permitted him-first, to acquire so
much accurate information-and then, to carry it
over to the English General; and it ought he re to
be recorded that the arrny possessed few more
able, intelligent, and active officers, and perhaps
none who móre largely possessed the confidence
of Lord Wellington, than Major Gordon. lt be-
carne, therefore, evident enough, that, for the pre-
sent at least, the carnpaign was at an end. Dnder
these circumstances, a question naturally arose,
how was it probable that the allied troops would
be disposed of?-in other words, would the close
investment of Ciudad Rodrigo be resumed, or
should we follow the example of the enemy, by
withdrawing into temporary cantonments? Against
the scheme of a renewed investrnent, there were
many and powerful reasons to be urged. In the first
place, every chance of reducing the place by fa-
mine was removed, the late convoys having amply
supplied it with aH manner of stores; whilst to




PENIKSULAlt WAR. 225


the vigorous prosecution of a siege, the approach-
ing rain y season threatened to oppose obstacles>
such as we could scarcely hope, even with means
more ample than those actually.at our disposal, to
surmount. But these, though sufficiently weighty,
were not the only objections to which the under-
taking was liable. The enemy had already. given
proof that they were disposed to make any sacri;.
tices in other quarters, rather than permit a place
so important to faH into oUt hands; and having
once drawn their force to a head, it was very little
probable that they would hesitate about doing so
again, should similar reasons for the rnovement be
he Id out to them. To sit down, however, before
fortresses, only that he might be compelled to
retire again, sll.ited not the policy of Lord Wel ..
lington; he therefore determined, at least fol' the
present, to suspend any attempt upon the place,
and to give to his soldiers that rest of which their
general exhaustion and increasing sickness stood
so much in need.


On the 29th of September the al1ied army broke
up from its position in front of Alfayates, and
leaving the light and fourth divisiolls to observe
Rodrigo, and discharge the duty oftheoutposts,
passed the Coa, and withdrew into cantonm:ents.
By this arrangement, a Ene was taken up, which
extended froID Penamacor, on the right, to Cele-
rico on the left; and head-quarters being estab-·


VOL. IJ. p




226 NARRATIVE OF Tl-lE


lished atFrenada, every disposition was made to
pay attention to the sick, of which the numbers
became every day nlore and more alarming. When
we first established ourselves in Fuente Guinaldo,
there· were, besides Portuguese, thirteen thousand
British soIdiers in hospitaI,-when we retired be-
hind the Coa, that number had considerably in-
creased; and we had not inhabited our new
quarters a week, before it swelled to the enormous
amount of sixteen thousand men: The unhealthy
season carne on, too; fevers and agues made rapid
progre ss amongst us, till scarcely a regiment could
muster upon parade two-thirds of ¡ts numerical
strength; and the medical attendants almost sank
beneath the fatigues which they were condemned
to endure. To add to our present discomfort, the
billets were, for the most part, extremely smaIl
and incommodious. The rain, which feH in tor-
rents, soon penetrated the thin roofs of the cottages
among which the troops were distributed; and
even the Iarger mansions, or chateaux, of which
the general and staff officers were put in possession,
ceased, at last, to resist a deluge so incessant.
Then, our out-of-doors occupation was destroyed.
We could neither hunt nor shoot, nor folIowthe
differentemployments which, in dry weather, COll-
tributed equally to our hea1th and amusement;
whiIst a total abs~nce of books, with fare some-
what scanty and coarse, enabled:i\,ls to struggle


"'}




PENINSULAR WAR. 227


with difficu1ty against en~~i. On the whole, 1
have no hesitation in pointing to the period of our
sojourn among the villages on the left bank of the
Coa, as one of the least interest~ng throughout the
Peninsular war, during which there occurred ab-
solutely nothing to individuals, calculated either
to excite or amuse; and in which public events


. were, with a few memorable exceptions, such as
to depress, rather than elevate, the spirits of those
who gave to them any grave or serious attention.


Having premised thus much, 1 shall cease to·
drag the reader through a detail of the petty
actions which dístinguished one day from another
in this tedious time of rest, but merely state the
least unimportant; and as these happened to be
neither numerous nDr very unusual in theirnature,
a few words will suffice for the purpose. It is
first, however, worthy - of remark, that· though
driven by circiImstances into this state of tempo-
tary inaction, Lord Wellington ceased not for a
moment to devise plans for the future, or to pre-
pare the means of carrying them into execution.
Before the weather broke, serious thoughts were
entertained of making an attempt up~n Ciudad
Rodrigo by escalade; but the rising of the waters
caused it to be abandoned, perhaps not unhappily
for the credit of our arms. N ext, a scheme was
devised for the commencement and p~secution of
a síege, as soon as the aspect of affairs in La·




228 N ARRA TI VE OF TIlE


Mancha and Galicia might authorise the measure;
and working parties were in consequence employed
at Almeida, with the view of converting it into a
place d'armes against the projected undertaking.
Without absolutely investing it, flying parties
passed contillually round Rodrigo, so as to in ter-
rupt the communications between the garrison, and
the army in its rear; and these performed, on
several occasions, services of considerable impor-
tance: the following may be taken as a specimen.


Don Julian de Sanchez was one of the most en-
terprising and able of aH the guerilIa chiefs whom
the progress of the war had called into active life.
He commanded a small body of irregular horse,
with which he repeatedly executed exploits such
as few men besides himselfwould have attempted;
till hisname became as famous in the rude songs
of his countrymen, as it was dl'eaded and abhol'l'ed
by his country's invaders. Don Julian had thrown
himself into Ciudad Rodrigo, when Massená laid
siege to it; and contributed not a little OOth by
his example and personal exertions to the gallant
defence which it offered; and when at last a sur-
render became indispensable, he cut his way, at
the head of his troops, through the enemy's lines,
and escaped. Since that period, he had harassed
and destroyed numerous convoys in Asturias, Ga-
licia, and others of the nol'thern provinces; and
llOW, having attached himself at length to oul'




PENINSULAR WAR. 229


army, he rendered himself exceedingly useful, by
taking an active part in those patrolling expedí-
tions of which 1 have just spoken ..


1 t was the custom of the French garrison to
send out their cattle every morning beyond the
waIls for the purpose of grazing, under the protec-
tíon of a guard, which at once tended them, and
watched the movements of our partíes. Don
J ulian determined, ir possible, to surprise the
herd; for which purpose he concealed his people,
day after day, among the broken ground on the
bank of the river, not far from the town; but the
guard proyed, for a time, so vigilant, that no op-
portunity occurred of effecting his designo At last,
however, an accident occurred, which enabled him
to accomplish, not only his original purpose, but
one which he did not dream of accomplishing. It
so happened, that on a certain day-on the l5th
of October-General Regnaud, the governor ofthe
place, rode out, attended by his staff and a slender
escort, and ventured, somewhat incautiously, to
pass the Agueda at the very spot where Don
Julian's ambuscade lay concealed. He was in-
stantly surrounded by the Spauish cavalry, aud
made prisouer; aud as if fortune had determined
to reward the latter for their patienee, the cattle
appeared at the same moment at a sufficient dis-
tance from the walls to authorise an attack. The
attack was made with the most perfeet success.




230 NARRATIVE O-F THE


and both Governor and cattle were conveyed in
triumph to our head-quarters. In a native of any
country except France, sucb an unlucky coinci-
dence would have produced a degree of gloom not
to be sha,ken off; but by General Regnaud, bis
misfortunes were borne with the utmost pbilosophy
and good-humour. He became a frequent gl1est at
Lord Wellington's table, and we found him an ex-
tremely entertaining as well as intelligent com-
panion. He talked very freely of the designs of
his own superiors, and laid open to us much of the
internal economy of the French armies, among the
leaders of which it appeared, from his statements,
that no great cordiality prevailed; and his reason-
ings on the general aspect of the war, though not
always sound, were invariably speciaua, and al-
ways interesting.




PENINSULA R "'AR. 231


CRAPTER IX.


lncreasing jealousies among the Spaniards, and numerous
disasters in the south, produce gloom in the British army-
It continues in its quarters, and makes preparations to be-
siege Ciudad Rodrigo-The French arroies suddenly with-
draw towards the south and east of Spain-Lord Wellington
moves to the front, and invests Rodrigo-Progress of the
siege-Storming and capture of the place.


WHILs'r we were thus conductillg ourselves on
the banks of the Coa, affairs gradually assumed"
in other quarters of the Peninsula, an appearance
less and less cheering. At Cadiz, discord the
most ill-timed prevailed, both among the inhabi-
tants and the government;. whilst the troops in
general, instead of improving in discipline and
military skill, became more and more inefficient
every day. AH c1asses, too, manifested towards
their allies a degree of jealousy, for which no
adequate cause could be assigned; they suspeded




232 N ARRATIVE OF THE


every proposal, however disinterested in its nature,
and threw impediments in the way of every de·
sign, provided only the one chanced to originate
with an English officer, and the other were to be
carried into execution by English soldiers. Nor
were matters in a condition many degrees superior
to this eIsewhere. Madrid suhmitted quietly to,
the domination of the usurper, and the whole
country from thence to the Bidassoa was overrun.
In Galicia, General Abadia was at the head of
only 7,000 recruits, miserably clothed and fed,
though sufficiently armed; whilst Castanos's ariny
of Estremadura mig'ht muster perhaps 750 officers,
and 2 or 300 men !! 1 t is true that in· Catalonia
the Spaniards were reported to have obtained
somesuccesses under Lacy; and that the Empe-
cinado and Mina were both actively employed as
guerillas; but Suchet had already achieved so
successful a campaign, that, with the exception
of a few strong places, the southern provinces
might be considered as subdued. AH this was
discouraging enough; yet was it less discouraging
than the paI pabIe proofs which every day pre-
sented themseIves of the exhausted patriotism of
the Spanish peopIe, Men of all ranks spoke
openly of the folly- of continuing a struggle so
hopeless; and most of the higher orders hegan
seriously to provide for their own safety, by giving
in their suhmission ta the new dynasty. In a




PENINSULAR W,\R. 233


word, the nation at large seemed weary of the
war, and desirous of being relieved from its mise-
ríes at any cost and upon any terms; whilst the
government appeared more anxious to recover the
revolted colonies of South America, than to deliver
the mother country from the presence of its in-
vaders. At the very moment when every exer-
tion ought to have been made to ¡ncrease the
numbers of the army, and improve its discipline,
the regency was sending its bes! regiments across
the Atlantic for the purpose of keeping Mexico
in obedience, and re-conquering tIle Caraccas,
till the troops themselves refused at last to pro-
ceed. and mutiny threatened to fill up the mea-
sure of the calamities under which Spain laboured.


With such prospects in the political horizon,
.and an absence of comfort amongst ourselves, a
spirit of dissatisfaction began to arise in the
bosoms of many, as well as a powerful feeling
that the cause had at length becomedesperate.
The Portuguese, no doubt, were still true to them-
selves; thatis to say, the dissensions in the local
government were rendered comparatively harmless
by a decree from Rio Janeiro, which placed the
resources of the country at the disposal of Lord
Wellington and Marshal Beresford, and left tbem
at liberty to act, in military matters, according to
the dictates of their· own judgment. But there
were few individuals attached to the army so




234 NARRATIVE OF THE


short-sighted as not to be aware that, should
Spain finally submit to the power of France, any
effort to maintain Portugal must be futile. Mul-
titudes accórdingly now began to turn their eyes
e)sewhere, and to desire employment either in
England or the colonies; and the numbers of
those who actually requested and obtained leave
to quit the country, were by no means inconsider-
able. Our chief alone appeared to retain his
usual sanguine expectations; for he continued his
preparations for a fresh caropaign with the same
diligence and with the same composure, as if the .
state of the Peninsula had been as favourable, as
from the proclamations of the Cortes, and the
statements in the English newspapers, it was re-
presented to be.


We were thus situated, when the report of a
brilliant enterprise, admirably conducted by Ge-
neral HilI, in Spanish Estremadura, came in to
enliven uso When Marmont withdrew to his can-
tonments around Plasencia, he left a corps of his
army, under General Gerard, at Merida, which
subsequently returned to the vicinity ofZafra,
where it took post. Gerard remained quietIy here
for sorne time; but being ordered to levy contri-
butíons on the inhabitants of Caceres, he moved,
about the middle of October, towards that place;
thus endangering the depot of Castanos's corps,
which had there lts head-quarters. To counteract




l'ENINSULAR - W AR. 235


th.is movement, and defeat its object, General Hill
was directed to take the field. He advanced from
Portalegre on the 221id, and causing the enerny to
evacuate Aleseda, of which they had recently pos-
sessed thernselves, he pursued them as far as AI-
cuerca, where he contrived, in a rnasterly and
scientific rnanner, to surprise and disperse thero.
The foHowing is a briefaccount of this splendid
affair :~


General Hill passed the night of the 21st at
Malpartida, where he obtained such inforrnation
of the enemy's incaution, as induced hirn to en-
tertain a hope that they rnight, by dint of ex-
traordinary exertion on his part, be overtaken, and
brought to action. With this view, he put his
columns in march at an early hour on the morn~
ing of the 27th, and following certain by-paths,
artived that evening, unobserved by Gerard, at
Alcuerca. He was now within one short league
of Arroyo del Molino, the village where Gerard's
corps was to pass the night; so he prohibited aH .
fires frorn being lighted, and took other necessary
precautions to conceal his approach.. He was
perfectly successful; for the enerny remained in.
utter ignorance of his proximity, till they found
thernselves attacked on the morning of the 28th"
just as tbey were preparing to co~mence their
marcho Thus taken by surprise, they offered, as
might be expected, no very resolute resistan ce ;:




236 NARRATIVE OF THE


and the victory was such, that out of 2,500 in-'
fantry, and 600 cavalry, of which the French
corps originally consisted, seareely 500 made their
escape; General Gerard himself being wounded,
and his artillery taken. General Hill received, as
he deserved, the highest encomiums for the ability
with which his enterprise was eonducted; and
the enterprise itself continued, for sorne time, to
furnish the ehief topie of conversation at head-
quartets.


In the mean while, however, Lord Wellington,
with that unwearied diligence whieh so peculiarly
distinguishes him, was applying all the powers of
his mind to the removal of certain inconveniences,
under which, both now and at former periods, his


, army had painfully laboured. The two great evils of
which we found principal cause to complain, were,
the impoverished state of our military chest, and
a very inadequate as well as uncertain supply of
the means of military transport.· To obviate the
former, our chief devised a scheme for the passing
current through Spain and Portugal of exchequer
bills; and to try how far tbe theory could be re-
duced 'to practice, be requestoo that a supply


. should be remitted from England to tbe amount
of 150,0001. For thé diminisbing the latter, he
caused a number of cars to be fabricated after a:
particular model, so that boys might be capable of
managing them ; and arranging them ¡nto brigades,




l'ENINSULAR WAll. 237


composed ea eh of thirty-five carriages, he placed
them, after the fasbion oí tbe commissariat mules,
under their several capitaos or leaders. How far
the fi1'st of these devices was found to answer its
end, 1 take it not upon me to determine; but tbe
last proved productive of the greatest advantages,
and at once rendered us independerit of tbe ca-
price and jealousy which too frequently stood in
the way of our most important undertakings. Un-
happily, however, out efforts to straiten the gar-
rison of Ciudad Rodrigo were not attended with
the same beneficial results. In spite of our utmost
diligence, the enemy contrived to tbrow convoy
after convoy into the place, till in the end the
investing force became infinitely more straitened
for provisions, forage, and other necessaries, than
the force whiqh it sought to inconvenience. The
truth ¡s, tbat our troops were, at the present
juncture, at too great a distance from the fort,· to
watch it to any good purpose; whilst they were
too far in front to find subsistence for themselves
in a country which had so long and so frequently
been the seat of active operations. It was in vain
that one or more divisions moved up, from time to
time, towards the Agueda, as often as a report
carne in, that sorne fresh supplies were collecting,
and sorne fresh convoys about to move upon Ro-
drigo. They arrived either to learn that the
stores had already passed, or that the wholehad




238 NARRATIVE o¡.' THE


been a false alarm; till both men and officers
began to grow heartily tired of a species of war-
fare which harassed and fatigued themselves,
without bringing the slightest inconvenience upon
the enemy. At last the General determined upon
withdrawing a portion of his army further to the
rear; where the horses, which hadwasted away
to mere skeletons onaccount of the scarcity of
provender, might be enabled to· recover their
strength, and to scatter the rest over a widet SUf-
face, wherever more convenient accommodations
could be found for it.


In accordance with this arrangement, the fifth
and sixth divisions; with the whole of the cavalry
except a single brigade, retired towards the Douro
and theMondeg'o, where they occupied a range of
villages infinitely more commodiou·s than any
which had oflate been assigned to them. Head-
quarters, howevel\ continued, as before, at Fre-
nada; whilst the first division, under General
Graham, took post at Pinhel on the left, the third
and fourth in the centre, between the Agueda and
the Coa, the seventh on the left, extending as far
as Penamacor, and the light, under Crawford, con-
siderably inadvance, at Guinaldo, on the right
barik of the Agueda. The good effects of these
changes .were almost immediately feIt. Our sic k
daily díminished, our horses gradually returnedto
condition, arrd the spirits of all rose, as they felt




PENINSULAR WAR. 239


themselves becaming more and more efficient;
whilst a blessed change in the weather, byenabling
us to resume our ancient out-of-door occupations~
tended, in no slight degree, to r~store our primitive
good-humour.


In this channel affairs continued to flow, till
the year 181] "came to a close. Our parties la-
bouring assiduously at Almeida. brought it, by
degrees, to assume something like tbe appearance
of a fortified place; whilst preparations ~ere bu-
sily made for throwing across tbe Agueda a bridge
upon tressels, sufficiently durable to resist the in-
fluence of the stream. Stores and ammunition,
with a considerable train of heavy artillery, were
likewise moved towards the front; and the divi-
sions of infantry stationed tl1e1'e, busied them-
selves in the construction of gabions and fascines.
Everytbing, in short, appeared to indicate that
sooner or latter Ciudad Rodrigo would be regu-
larly besieged; and the first opportunity which
offered for the purpose, was not permitted to pass
unnoticed.


During the last three months, the enemy's
troops in the nortb and centre of Spain had 1'e-
mained "tolerably quiet, there being no force, with
the exception of General Abadia's corps, to occu-
py their attention; whilst in the south, hostilities
were carried on with increasing vigour. Master
of Tarragona, and victorious over everything in the




240 NARRATIVE OF THE


field, Suchet sat down before Valencia, whilst
Victor drove back Ballasteros under the walls of
Gibraltar, and directed a considerable division of
his corps against Tariffa. In the mean while,
General Drouet, at the head of twelve thousand
men, insured the subnüssion of Spanish Estrema-
dura; and Soult, whose head-quarters were under-
stood to be at Seville, kept that kingdom also in
subjection. Thus were the -Spaniards pressed
on every side by corps against which they could
make no head; and it appeared as if the subjuga-
tion of all those important places, which up to the
present moment had offered the most steady resist-
ance, were at hand.


I have in former parts of this narrative taken
occasion to observe, that whatever might have
been their conduct in the field, the Spanish troops
seldom failed to do their duty when employed in
the defence of fortified places. The fortress of
Murviedro, which Suchet found it necessary to
subdue, as a preparatory step to the reduction of
Valencia, cost him dear; and the same spirit
which had animated the garrison of the one place,
appeared to prevail among that which held the
other. Tarifra, too, being happily occupied by a
thousand English soldiers under Colonel Skerret,
withstood and repelled all the efforts of the enemy
to carry it; whilst bands of guerillas gathered
round the rear of the French armies, and seriously




}>ENINSULAR WAR. 241


retarded . their progress. It beeame necessary,
under these circumstances, to reinforee their
strength from other provinees. The whole of the
disposable regiments in the vicinity of Madrid
were, in eonseq uence, moved to Toledo; and to-
wards the end of the year, Marmout himselfbroke
up from his cantonments at Plasencia and Talave-
ra, and fell into the same lineo It so happened
that D'Orsenne, with the army of the centre, took
the road, about the same time, to Burgos; and
we were left without any thing in our front, as
weIl upon the side of Beira as in the direction
of the Alentejo ..


Lord Wellington was no sooner made acquainted
with these several movements, than he hastened
to avail himself ofthe opportunity whieh they pre-
sented, of effecting that end towards which his
most anxious attention had been so long and so
steadily turned. Directing General Hill to ad-
vanee upon Merida, as well with the view of
alarrning Drouet as to effect a diversion in favour
of the beleaguered plaees, and to draw off part of
the enerny's force from Ballasteros, he himself
made ready to invest Ciudad Rodrigo in form, and
to wrest it, if possible, out of the hands of a garri-
son, now unavoidably left to its own resources.
There were not wanting amongst us sorne who
criticised this design, and would have greatly pre-
ferred a general inroad into Spain, bare as it was of ~~=E::':"


VOL. II.




242 NARRATIVE OF THE


French armies up to the very walls of the capitat;
hut Lord Wellington was too well aware of· the
difficulties to which his troops must be exposed,
were they, in the month of January, 1812, to pe-
Retrate into an exhausted country, to give to that
suggestion one moment's consideration. Besides,
his own honour, and the honour of his army, were
in some degree staked' upon the recovery of the
fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst the safety of
the province of Beira might be said mainly to de-
pend upon it. Orders were accordingly issued
fuI' the immediate advance of as many stores as it
was possible to collect; whilst the divisions in
front closedone upon another, and made ready to
move upon the Agueda.


Seldom has an army embarked on a business so
arduous, under circumstances more unfavourable
than those which attended us at presento In the
first place, the situation of the place to be at-
tacked, standing, as 1 have already said, upon the
brink of a rapid river, and surrounded by a vast
plain destitute of positions, water, or even cover
for the troops, rendered it impossible to establish
ourselves permanently about it, without exposing
the men to hardships which must soon prove fatal
to their health. It would therefore be necessary,
after driving the garrison within their lines, to
carry on the siege by relays of divisions; in other
words, to keep the main body in cantonments oa




l' J¡~NINSULAR W AR. 243


the 1eft bank ofthe Agueda, whilst a certain num-
ber of brigades should push on the works on the
right bank, the rest relieving them in that duty at
the expiration of a certain space of time. N OW,
tbough the Agueda be fordable in several places
.during dry weather, it requires but a few hours
of heavy rain to render the fords impassable ~
whilst the rain, which might chance to last for a
few days, would inevitably sweep away the only
bridge which we had found it practicable to 1ay
down. At the present season of the year, how-
ever, such rains were not only of probable occur-
rence, but confidently to be apprehended; and
therefore we set out with a: prospect before us, of
continual interruptions, from causes which no
exertionson our part would suffice to obviate. In
the next place, the means at our disposal, whether
of transport 01' attack, fell infinitely short of the
very lowest calculation which the superintending
engineer had been able to formo Instead of 1400
cars, th~ amount demanded, we could muster no
more than 450 j and our whole mate riel consisted
of 38 twenty-four pounders, with 12 howitzers.
We possessed not a single mortar, and our stock,
bothof powder and she11s, was exceedingly scanty.
There was, moreover, every reason to apprehend
that, as soon as the enemy should be made aware
of our design, they would hasten to defeat it, and
a question naturally arose, whether, under a11 cir-




244 NAHRATIVE OF THE


cumstances, it would be possible for us to bring
the undertaking to a fortunate termination. Now
a repulse, in any case, would have been abun·
dantly distressing.; had this been our first attempt
of the kind, not to succeed in it would be infinitely
more injurious than not to embark in it at all; but
were we again thwarted, after all that had oc·
curred already, it was hard to calculate upon the
mischief which might be expected to ensue. Yet
was it absolutely necessary that something should
be done, as well for the gratification of the people
of England, as to satisfy our allies that we were
not indifferent to their calamities; and as the only
choice submitted to him lay between the siege of
Rodrigo, and an advance into the interior of Spain,
Lord Wellington w1sely deterrnined on the former.
On the 5th of January, the divisions in the rear
began toclose up; on the 6th and 7th, the army
assembled, and on the 8th we crossed the Agueda
in force, and completed the investment.


Of the general features of the country by which
Ciudad Rodrigo is surrounded, a sufficiently ela-
borate account has been given already. 1 will not,
therefore, repeat it here; but as little 01' no notice
has yet been take!1 of the defences by which it
was covered, it may not be amiss if 1 endeavour to
make the reader acquainted with their nature,
before 1 proceedto detail to him any circum-
stances--attending the siege. The following de-




PENINSULA R WAR. 245


scription is extracted from Colonel Jones's Journal
of Sieges; a work which every soldier would do
wel1 to study, and which every eivilian may pe-
ruse with satisfaetion :-


" Ciudad Rodrigo is built on a rising ground, on
the right bank of the Agueda ; it has a double en-
ceinte all round it; the interior wall is of an old
construction, ofthe height of thirty-two feet, and
is generally of bad masonry, without flanks, and
with weak parapets and narrow ramparts; the ex-
terior enclosure is a modern fausse-braie, of a low
profile, and is constructed so far down the slope of
the hill, as to afford but Httle eover to the interior
wall; and from the same cause of the rapid deseent
of the hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imper-
fectly covered by its glacis. Onthe east and
south sides, there are ravelines to the fausse-braie;
but in no part is there a covered way, nor are there
any counter-mines: without the town, at the dis-
tance of three hundred yards, are the suburbs;
they are enclosed by abad earthern retrench-
ment, hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during
the investment of the place in 1810; and the
French, since they had been in possession of Ro-
drigo, had made strong posts of three convents-
one on either flank of the suburbs, and one in the
centre; and they had also converted into an in-
fantry post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated
just beyond the glacis on the north-west angle of




246 NAIUtATIYE 01' TIlE


the place. The works of the suburbs, therefore,
though contemptible in themselves, yet as sup-
ported by these convents, were considered as fully
competent to resist a coup-de-main.


"The ground without the place is generally
flat, and the soil rocky,_ except on the n01'th side,
where there are two hills, called the lesser and the
greater Teson; the one, at 180 yards from the
works, rises nearIy to the level of the ramparts,
and the other, at 600 yards' distance, to the height
of 13 feet above them.The soil on these hilIs is
very stony, and during winter, water (usual1y)
rises at the depth of six ¡nches below the surface :
the French had erected a small redoubt on the
highest hill, which, from its situation, prevented
anyattack on that side ti11 it should be taken : this
redoubt was supported by two guns, and a howit-
zer in battery, on the top of the fortified convent
of Sto Francisco, at 400 yards from it, and a large
proportion of the artillery of the· place, (particularIy
mortars and howitzers placed behind the rampart
of the fausse-braie,) was in battery to fire upon the
approach from the hill."


There were two points at which this place
might be readi1y assaHed; one on the eastern and
southern sides, where the ground was more flat,
but the suburbs extensive; the other on the north,
where the hill and redoubt just alluded to pro-
tected it from insulto Lord W~llington seemed.




l'E~INSULAR WAlt. 247


át first disposed to make his approaehes from the
former of these quarters; but, on mature delibe-
ration, it was found that the superior fire from the
northern face would l}Ot present obstacles so seri-
ous as those which the rocky nature of the soü,
and the resistance to be expected from the for-
tified convents and suburbs, would offer on the
other. 1 t was known too, from the system of
aítaek adopted,by Massena, that the walls on the
northern front might be breached at a distance;
whereas, on the southern and eastern fronts, it
appeared doubtful, from the natural faH of the'
ground, whether any impression could be made,
exeept froID batterieserected on the erest of the
glacis; and as the saving of time was to us a mat-
ter oC thefirst consideration, that which promised
most speedily to lay open the body of the place,
was pronouneed to be the best. For these, among
other reasoris, our chief readily laid aside his first
intentions, and having closely reconnoitred the
eity in all its faces, he determined to act upon
the second with as much promptitude as vigour.


With this view he resolved that ground should.
be broken on the night of the day in which the
investment was effected; afid as it was~essential,
as a preparatory measure, to obtairi possession oí
the redoubt which crowned the greater Teson,'
orders were issued that it should be attacked by a
party of the light division, and earried by escalade.




248 NARRA TIVE OF 'fHE


Our troops, to whom no ladders had be en issued
out, and who probably did not dream of requiring
such implements thus early, immediately sat down
to construct them, and the sides of a few Spanish
cars which had conveyed intrenching tools from
Almeida, supplied them with materiaIs. They
tore them to pieces, and long before the appointed
hour a sufficient quantity for the service in con-
templation was completed. Three hundred men
of the 52nd and 95th regiments then prepared,
under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Col-
bourne, to assault the outwork. They were to be
supported by two firing. parties, which received
instructions to keep up a warm discharge of mus-
ketry upon the opposite flanks, for the purpose of
distracting the attention of the garrison; whilst
the storming party, descending into the ditch,
should cut away the palisades, and mount, with
the assistance of their rude ladders, into the re-
doubt. Everything was done with the most ad-
mirable order and daring courage. At nine o'clock
at night, the several detachments moved to the
posts assigned them, and our brave fellows, find-
ing thatthe palisades were close to the outward
side ofthe ditch, sprang over them, without paus-
ing to break them down. They then rushed pell-
mell into the redoubt, and taking the enemy com-
pletely by surprise, made themselves masters, not
only of it, but of the entire garrison which had




PENINSULAR WAR. 249


been appointed to defend it.Two officers, forty
men, and three pieces of cannon captured, were
the fruits of their success; and it was purchased
by the loss of only six men kilIed, three officers
and sixteen men wounded.


The way being thus cleared to ulterior opera-
tions, 700 men irnrnediately advanced towards
the hilI, 300 of whom were to effect a lodgmelít
close to the redoubt, whilst 400 should open the
communication to it from the rearo They suc-
ceeded in both objects with wonderfully little
los8; for the enerny, irritated by the fall of the
outwork, directed all their flre upon it, and our
people were in consequence enabled to pursue
their tasks unmolested. When morning dawned,
therefore, the cover was found to be such, that
reliefs might, with perfect safety, be employed to
complete by day what had be en so welI begun at
night; and hence, within little more than twenty-
four hours from the investment of the place, 'our
engineers found themselves in a situation to mark
out the first parallel. That, again, was begun,
and so far brought to perfection, between sunset
on the 9th and sunrise on the ] Oth, as to afford
excellent shelter to the workmen; indeed, so
unremitting were the zeal of the superintendents
and the activity of tÍle troops, that hefore noon on
the 13th, not only was the first parallel completéd,
but three batteries, capable of containing thirty-




250 NARRATIVE OI<' Tl'{E


two 'pieces . of artillery, were erected. The guns
were likewise brought up, the platforms laid, and
an ample supply of ammunition lodged in the
magazines ; . and we began already to talk of tbe
opening of the batteries as an occurrence which
might be hourly expected.


We . were thus situated when intelligence ar-
riyed at head~quarters, which, without aIarming
either Lord Wellington or his followers, increased
the anxiety of all to bring the undertaking before
them as speediIy as possible to an end. We
learned that Marmont, after proceeding in the
direction of Valencia as far as O~ana, had sud-
denly given out that his presence in the east was
not required, and returning with four of his divi-
sions, had taken the route of the Guadarama pass
towards Valladolid and Salamanca. His object
was represented to he, a desire to throw supplies
into Ciudad Rodrigo, of our operations against
which, however, both he and D'Orsenne were
said still to be in ignoran ce; indeed we ascer-
tained, upon what appeared to be good autbority~
that even at Salamanca, a distan ce of only sixteen
leagues from our' trenches, not a rumour of the
siege had, so Iately ~s the 12th, got abroad. A
good deal of time had thus been gained by us,
upon which, ai the commencement of the business,
it wouId have been idIe to calculate; but it would
have been: worse than idle to suppose tbat a




i'Jo:NINSULAlt WAH. 251


secresy, under any circumstances so remarkable,
would long continue to screen our operations.
On the contrary, it was but just to believe that
the French generaIsmight, even whilst we were
discussing their plans, be made acquainted with
the perilous predicament in which Rodrigo stood ;
and it was beyond a question, that whenever they
díd aseertain that faet, they would make the
utmost exertions to relieve i1. The matters, there-
fore, upon which alone we eonsidered it necessary
to speeulate, were, the probable period at which
they would be enabled to arrive, and the amount
of force with which, within a given space of time,
they could be in a condition to threaten our be-
slegmg army.


With respect to the former of these conside-
rations, it was the opiníon of Lord Wellington, that
were they to exert themselves as they might, suffi..,
cient time would not be granted for a regular and
scientifie prosecution of the siege to a close. He
therefore directed that the batteries in the first
parallel should be armed, and that they should
open at once upon the body of the place, without
pausing to silence the enemy's fire, or ruin his de';'
fenees. By this means he hoped to effect a breach
in the course of a few days at the furthest; -when
he wouldeither storm with the counterscarp entire,
or approaeh by the more secure but tedious process
of sap, according as Marmont should, 01' should




252 NARRATIVE OF THE


not, sho\V a disposition to molest him. With re-
speet to the latter question at issue, it \Vas not so
easy a matter to eome to any eertain eonclusion.
Some time ago a rumour had prevailed that D'Or-
senne, with the division of guards, was recalled to
Franee; but that was now aseertained to be desti-
tute of foundation. On the eontrary, that general
was stated to be himself at Valladolid, with a
portion of his corps; whilst the remainder were at
Burgos, and in the country to the north of it.
Now, were Marmont and D'Orsenne again to
unite, their force would doubtless outnumber liS in
the same proportion in whieh it outnumbered liS
before; indeed the odds against us would be
greater, inasmueh as \Ve could not now, with any
honour, abandon our works, and must therefore
separate our army into eovering and besieging
corps. For the enemy to effect this junction,
however, a larger space oftime would be required
than would be necessary on our part to accomplish
the reduction of the place, even by the most
tedious process contemplated; and hence we felt
no great apprehension that our labours would be
interrupted by the united armies of Portugal and
the centre. Still a very considerable force, per.-
haps forty thousand men, could, it was believed,
be brought against us so early as the 27th 01' 28th;
and even fo1'ty thousand men would oceasion no
t1'iBing inconvenience to troops entangled, as we




PENINSULAR WAR. 253


were, round a strong place, and destitute of any
favourable position from which to aet against them.


With this prospect before him, Lord Wellington
at once urged forward the siege by every means
in his power, and took such steps as promised
most effectually to secure those employed in it
from interruption. Sorne of the divisions whieh
had hitherto oeeupied eantonments eonsiderably in
the rear, were moved up, and placed themselves
in quarters, the: fifth at Albergaría, at Janea, and
on the Coa; and the seventh at Payo. The
cavalry, consisting of the brigades ofGenerals Slade
and Anson, of the 1st hussars, of Alten's. of the
3rd dragoons and 4th dragoon guards under Le
Marchands wíth four troops of horse artillery, were
at Ituero; and General Bradford's brigade of Por-
tuguese infantry at Barba del Puerco. General
Híll, likewise, reeeived instructions to throw a
couple of brigades across the Tagus at Villa Velha,
for the purpose of giving additional support to our
right; whilst he himself, in case of need, should
faH back upon Portalegre and Niza. Thus it was
ealculated that an arrny of 38,000 infantry and
2500 cavalry could, within a few hours, be assem-
bled at any given point; and with 38,000 infantry
and 2500 cavalry, it was felt that there existed but
srnall ground of apprehension, let Marrnont take
the field when he rnight.


In the mean while, out' works before the town




254 XARRATIV·E OF THE


were proceeding with the same diligence and
vigour which had bitberto characterised them.
There was a fortifiedconvent on the right of the
captured redoubt, which commanded the very
spot upon which it was proposed to form a second
parallel. This it was considered necessary to re-
duce; and the service was performed on the night
of the 13th, in the handsomest manner, by the
light companies of guards, supported by Lord
Blantyre's brigade. OUl' men approached the
post wholly unobserved, and making their way
within the barricade, found the garrison of fifty
men collected round a large fire; and sound asleep.
The enemy. roused thus awkwardly from tlíeir
slumbers. fled in all directions, without making the
fa¡ntest effort to defend thernselves; and as they
left arrns, knapsacks. and every thing behind, they
.easily leaped froin the windows, and effected their
,escape; but the convent remained in' our posses-
sion, and it proved óf the utrnost utility in covering
the progressof the sap, which was irnmediately
.begun, and carried ón to the line of the projected
parallel. .


The enerny had hitherto confined their resist-
ance to a heavy ccmnónade frorn the walls; on the
14th, they tried the fortune of a sortie, and for a
moment or two their success was such as to
threaten the most serious consequences. An ex-
ceedingly culpable custom prevailed among the




PENINSULAR WAR.


troops stationed for the defence of the tren ches, by
which the old guard, as soon as the relief came in
sight, began to move off; thus leaving the ad-
vanced line wholIy undefended fromany effort
which the gal'rison might make to take possession
o~ iL "From 'tn.e 'tops {)l tn.e \()Wel'll" ~\) wn.\ch ~'ffi.­
cers were constantIy stationed, this extreme negli-
gence on our part was repeatedly observed; and
the Governor having ascertained that it was a mat-
ter of daily occurrence, resolved to take advantage
of it. At eleven o'clock, therefore, in the forenoon
of the 14th, about five companies sallied from the
town, just as one of our guards had quitted the
trenches, and the other was as yet at sorne dis-
tance from thern; and they pushed on with so
much haste, that they arrived at the very waU oí
the convent before they were stopped. The work ...
men, unarmed and surprised, could only retire be-
fore them; but an alarrn being immediately given,
Lord Blantyre's brigade, with a detachment of
Germans, hastened to the spot, and with difficuIty
threw themselves between the French troops and
the point of attack. The latter were then driven
back, and they fled within the town, having
effected no other object besides upsetting most of
the gabions which had been placed on the pre-
ceding night; neither they nor we suffering any
serious 10ss in killed or wounded.


There had been mounted, during the earlier




256 NARRATlVE 01' 'fHE


part of this morning, twenty-five heavy twenty-
four pounders in the batteries already constructed
in the first parallel. With these a fire was
directed to be opened, partly upon the point in-
tended to be breached, and partly upon the con-
yent of Sto Francisco, another fortified post which,
from the left of the redoubt, enfiladed our pro-
jected communication between the first and second
parallels. At four o'clock in the afternoon it be-
gan; and of a spectacle more strikingly magnifi~
cent, it has rarely been the good foríune even of a
British soldier to be a witness. The evening
chanced to be remarkably beautiful and still;
there wasnot a cloud in the sky, nor a breath
of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artil-
lery broke in upon its calmness, and volumes
of smoke rose slowly from our batteries. These
floating gently towards the town, soon enveloped
the lower parts of the hill, and even the ramparts
and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the towers
and summits lifting their heads over the haze,
showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial
castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on
a summer's day. The flashes from our guns, an-
swered as they promptly were from the artillery in
the place, the roar of their thunder reverberating
amongthe remote mountains ofthe Sierra de Fran-
cisca; these, with the rattle of the balls against the
masonry, and the occasional crash as portions of




PENINSULAR WAR. 257


the wall gave way, proved, altogether, a se ene
whieh, to be rightly understood, must be expe-
rienced. 1 eonfess that J have seldom been more
powerfully and yet singularly affected, than 1 was
by this magnificent combination of sights and
sounds; and the chances are, that 1 shall nevel'
again enjoy another opportunity of experiencing
similar sensations.


The point against which our present efforts
were direeted, was that which the Freneh, during
the siege of 1810, had breached, and which, ac-
cording to the opinion of our ablest engineers, had
not yet obtained that solidity which time, and
time only, bestows on masonry. It was, how-
ever, so well covered by the fausse-braie, that se-
rious doubts were entertained, whether it would
be practicable to reach it with effect till after that
should have .been blown in; whilst the distance
at which our batteries were erected, fuIl 650
yards from the crest of the glacis, rendered the
practice less accurate, as well as less destructive,
than it would have otherwise been. Both of these
circumstances told against uS; but our guns, of
English· manufacture, were excellen t of their kind,
and our gunners skilful; and hence it was easy
to perceive that the top, at least, of the rampart,
crumbled rapidly before them, and that it required
only a better position to enable our object to· be
attained to ¡ts fullest extent. Preparations were


VOL. n. It




258 NARRATIVJ:: OF THE


accordingly rnade to advance our works further;
and a sap, destined to crown the surnrnit of the
lesser Teson, was begun.


The guns, which were directed excIusively upon
tbe convent of Sto Francisco, made of that post,
after sorne hours of heavy firing, a heap of ruins ;
and it, as well as the suburbs, were taken posses-
sion of by the 40th regiment 800n after' dusk on
the 14th. Partieswere then sedulouslyemployed,
as well in extending the second parallel, as in
throwing up fresh batteries; and on the 17th, our
trenches were advanced to the surnrnit of the
nearest hill, within 180 yards of the body of
the place. From the new batteries, likewise, so
commanding a fire was brought to bear, both
upon the main breach and upon an old tower,
somewhat to the right of it, that the latter át length
fell with a tremendous crash, and the former was
pronounce4 practicable. Pits were next dug, here
and there, along, the glacis, into which riflemen
were introduced, with orders to fire unintermit-
tingly upon the embrasures; whilst a continued
shower of grape and canister, thrown in both by
night and day, kept the faces of the breaches


. cIear, and hindered any attempts at repairing them.
Such was the condition of Ciudad Rodrigo-


the fausse-braie shaken to a,toms, and two for-
midable breaches in its main wall; when Lord
Wellington, wil1ing to spare the lives both of his




PENINSULAR W AR. 259


own troops and of the garrison, sent in to demand
a surrender. The reply, though not such as could
have been desired, was nevertheless one which all
brave men must admire; and 1 give it in the
words of the Governor, because these alone can
do it full justice: .. Sa Majesté I'Empereur,"
said he, " m'a confié le commandement de
Ciudad Rodrigo. Je ne puis pas le rendre. Au
contraire, moi et la brave garnison que je com-
mande s'enseveliront dans ses ruines."


N othiug therefore remained but to carry the
place by assault; and to this end all our future
exertions were turned. On the 18th the town
was closely l'econnoitred by Majol' Sturgeon, of
the staff corps, whose exertions and ability from
the· commencément of the siege had been very
conspicuous. He reported that on the enemy's
left of the main breach there was a favourable
point of entl'ance fol' a body oftroops, which might
assist in flanking the appl'oach .of the column of
attack in that qual'ter, whilst the lesser breach on
the right was perfectly accessible; and Lord
Wellington, satisfied by the declal'ation, detel'-
mined to defer the final struggle no longer. The
night of the 19th was accordingly fixed upon as
the proper period fol' commencing the assault;
and in the mean while, aH the details of the plan
upon which it was deemed advisable to condud it,
were drawn up, and maturely considered.




260 N AURA TIVE OF THE


AH who know Lord Wellington are aware that,
to the kind of influence by which other men are
liable to be effected, he is and ever has be en an
entire stranger. In all his undertakings, be they
great or small, the single circumstance which had
weight with him was, that yverything should be
done correctly; and that the least possible incon-
venience should be experienced, not only by the
persons immediately employed, but by the army
in general. Acting upon this principIe, he issued
orders that the attack should be made by the
divisions, whatever they might chance to· be,
which should happen to be on duty that day in
the trenches; and as the light and third divisions
enjoyed that good fortune, upon them the honour-
able task devolved of carrying Ciudad Rodrigo
by assauIt. The third division, consisting of the


. brigades of Major-general M'Kinnon and Lietlte-
nant-colon~l Campbell-that is to say, of the
45th, 74th, 88th, and five companies of the 60th
regiments on the one hand, and of the 5th, 77th,
83rd, and 94th on the other-were to attack the
main breach. They were to be preceded by the
light companies, under Major Manners, as a
storming party; as these, again, were to be
headed by parties carrying wool-packs and lad-
ders; the former for the purpose of filling up the
ditch, the latter to enable too assailants to mouot
the wall. They were to form, General M'Kin-




PENINSULAH WAR. 261


non's leading aud Colouel Campbell's supporting,
in the second parallel; and they had as their re-
serve a Portuguese brigade, drawn up in order in
the trenches. To aid this principal attack, a de-
monstratlon was to be made on our right by
Major O'Toole of the 95th rifle corps, at the head
of five companies of that regiment, and of the light
companies of the S3rd aud 94th; aud the parti-
cular care of guiding this little column was as-
signed to Major Sturgeon, at whose suggestion it
prepared to acto In the mean while the smaller
breach on our left was to be stormed by the light
divisiou, consisting of Major-general Vandeleur
and Colonel Barnard's brigades-in other words,
of two battalions of the 52nd, one of the 43rd, two
of the 95th, and two of Ca~adores. The attack was
to be. led by General Vandeleur's brigade, which
issuing from the left of the convent Sto Francisco,
was to descend into the ditch, and advauce, first
upon the breach in the fausse-braie, and then upon
that in the body of the place. As soon as they
should succeed in gaining the summit of the
fausse-braie, they were to detach to their right,
for the purpose of communicating with General
M' Kinnon's brigade, and flauking the assault of
the principal wall; and whenever they had
crowned the breach in that wall against which
they were directed, they were in like manner to




262 N ARRA TIVE Ol!' THE


tur~ to the right, and join the main aUack. This
done, and a communicati0Il: between the tw~
columns being established, an effort was to be
made to burst open the Salamanca gate, opposite
to the convent of Sto Francisco; upon which the
rest of the division, which up to that moment were
to remain in reserve, would enter and se cure the
eonquest of the place. Here, as at the greater
breaeh, a select party of men were appointed to
head their comrades; they consisted oí 300 volun-
teers under the eommand of Major N apier; and
they, like the storming party elsewhere, were
preceded by tbe bearers of bags, ladders, and
the other engines of assault. Finally, the parties
appointed to carry these necessary implemEmts
were prohibited from taking with them their arms;
arid the storming parties received positive instruc-
tions on no account whatever to tire a shot.


Partly with a view to draw a portion of the
enemy's attention from the breaches, and partly
under the idea that, during the confusion, an en-


. trance might be obtained by escalade, General
Pack's Portuguese brigade feceived instructions,
as soon as the tiring should become general, to
demonstrate against the outwork of Sto Jago, and
the convent of La Caridad. They were to plant
their ladders at the moment when their comrades
issued from the trenches; and they were to ren-




PENINSULAR \VAR. 263


der the attack either a real or a false one, accord-
ing as circumstances should direcL The last
clause in these instructions was not, perhaps, the
least interesting to those affected by it; it was
this :- "Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by as-
sault this evening at seven o'clock."


As the preceding orders appeared at an early
hour in the day, ample time was afforded for mak-
ing every preparation which the circumstances of
the case required, and both men and officers were
fullyand correctly apprised of the duties which
they were expected severally to perform. They
were not inattentive to these instructions, and ex-
actly at the moment specified, each column took
its station, in readiness to obey the signal of ad-
vance. It would be no easy matter to describe
the state of a soldier's Jeelings during the pause
which ~nsued. The evening was calm and tran·
quil, and the moon, in her first quarter, shed ayer
the s.cene a feeble light, which, withouf disclosing
the shape 01' form ofparticular objects, rendered
their rude outline distinctly visible. There stood
the fortress, a confused mas s of masonry, with its
breaches like shadows cast upon the wall; whilst
not a gun was fired from it, and allwithin was as
still and mbtionless as if itwere already a ruin,
or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On
our side, again, the trenches crowded with armed
men, among whom not so much as a whisper might




264 NAHRA'fIVE OF 'fHE


be beard, presented no unapt resemblance to a
dark thunder-cloud, or to a volcano in tbat state
of tremendous quiet which usualIy precedes its
most violent eruptions. But the deJay was·
not of long continuance; at a few minutes past
seven o'clock, the word was quietly passed that all
things were ready, and the troops poured forward
with the coolness and impetuosity of which Bri-
tish soldiers alone are capable, and which nothing
could successfully oppose.


No piece of clock-work, however nicely ar-
ranged, couId obey the will of its maker more ac-
curately than the different columns obeyed that
night the wishes of their chief; and his orders
were, in consequence, executed at every point
with the same precision and regularity as if he
had been manrenvring so many battalions upon
a revue plateau. General M'Kinnon's brigade,
amidst showers of grape and musketry, rushed,
without a check, to the foot of tbe great breach,
and in spite of numerous obstac1es, and the most
determined resistance, succeeded in gaining the
summit.


But a serious opposition awaited them there.
The enemy, driven from the main wall, took shel-
ter behind aretrenchment, in front of which they
.had dug a ditch of considerable width; and whilst
our men were vainly endeavouring to pass it, a
mine was 8uddenly sprung. The havoc oc-




PENINSULAR WAH. 26ñ


casioned by that terrible explosion was prodigious,
numbers of the bravest and most forward of the
men being b]own up and destroyed. Unfortu-
nately for the army at Iarge, the galIant M'Kinnon
was among them; but the rest, nothing daunted
by the fate of their comrades, only redoubled
their exertions, with a courage which seemed to
rise in proportion to the difficulties opposed to it.
They were thus situated, when Major Q'Toole's
little column, which had acted under the guidance
of Major Sturgeon upon the right, joined them;
when finding that all their efforts were fruitless,
and that it was impracticable to press further till
the results of other attacks should be known, they
established themselves among the ruins.


In the mean while, both the light division under
Crawford, and the Portuguese brigade under
Pack, were following up with equal reso]ution the
measures pointed out to them. The former is-
suing from the convent, made for the lesser breach,
their brave chief leading as few like himself could
haveled, when a musket-ball struckhim in the arm,
and penetrating the side, lodged in his lungs. He
feH to the ground, and was borne from the field in
a dying state. Almost at the same moment,
Major Napier commanding the storming party,
Colonel Colbourne of the 52nd, and General Van-
deleur, all most distinguished and brave officers,
received severe wounds, and the troops were left




266 NARRA'TIVE .01" 'fHE


to tbe guidance of accidental Jeaders, and tbeir
own bravery; but neitber tbe one nor the otber
were wanting. Tbe pause of a moment, and only
of a moment, occurred, when, with a shout which
was distinctly heard over the roar of musketry
and cannon, they renewed the charge, and in five
minutes had won tbe ascent. Then arose the cry
of victory from every quarter; for General Pack's
Portuguese had succeeded in their escalade, and
tbe troops rushing along tbe ramparts, speedily
opened the way to the third division, and the
town was our own. The enemy fled in the utmost
disorder. They were pursued from street to
street, and froro house to house, with the fury
which is irrepressible among roen flushed witb
eonquest, and exasperated by the roemory of coro-
rades slaín; and all who continued to offer the
slightest resistanee were iromediately put to the
sword. To the honour of British soldiers, how-
ever, be it recorded, that not a single Jife was
taken in wantonness. He who threw down his
arms was spared by the very hand which had
been uplifted to rlestroy him, and hence out of a
garrison which consisted originally of 1800 com-
batants, full 1500 wel'e made prisoners.


It were vain for .me to attempt any description
of the .scenes of plunder and confusion which now
presented themselves in every quarter of the town.
The firing, which had eeased fol' a moment, be-




l'ENINSULAR WAH. 267


cause the contest was at an end, was renewed,
here and thel'e, in the extravagance of triumph;
whilst shouts amI screams lllingled fearfully with
the groans of the wounded, and the outcries of
men in a state of intoxication. Many houses like-
wise, in different districts, burst forth into ftames,
whether wantonly or accidentally excited it was
impossibIe to determine; whiIst the churches were
ransacked, the wine and spirit cellars emptied, and
for several hoursevery species of enormity was
perpetrated. AH these things occurring du~ing
the night, the darkness of which being but imper-
fectly dispelled by the light from the burning edi-
fices, produced an effect which non e can desire to
experience again. At length the drunken dropped
gradually asleep; the wounded were removed to
temporary hospitaIs; and though of the houses al-
ready on fire the greater proportion were burned
to the ground, the further progress of the ftames
was arrested; and by dawn on the following morn-
ing a degree of order was restored, such as few
who beheld the condition of things immediately
posterior to the assauIt couId ha.ve anticipated.


The casualties among the allied forces, during
the progress ofthis important siege, were, as might
be expected, numerous; 9 officers and 217 men
being killed, and 84 officers and 1000 men wound-
ed; and of these 6 officers and 140 men were
killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded,




268 NARRATIVE OF THE


on the night of the assault alone. It is scarcely
necessary to add, that the 108s of so many valuable
lives was keenly felt, not only by private friends,
but by the army in general; but among them aH,
there fell not one more universally nor more justly
lamented than Major-general Crawford. He was
an officer of whom the highest expectations had
been formed. and who, o~ every occasion, found
an opportunity to prove, that had his life been
spared, the fondest hopes of his country would not
have been disappointed; and he was aman, to
know whom in his profession without admiring
was impossible. To me his death occasioned that
void which· the removal of a sincere friend alone
produces. From the moment of receiving his
wound, he knew that all hope of recovery was
idIe; he lingered on for several hours, and at last
submitted to his fate with the magnanimity of a
hero, and the resignation of a Christian.Poor
Crawford !-whilst the memory of the brave and
the skiIful shall continue to be cherished by Bri-
tish soldiers, thou wilt not be forgotten; and the
hand which scrawIs this humble tribute to thy
worth must be cold as thine own, ere the mind
which dictates it shall cease to think of thee with
affection and regret.


The task does not devolve on me, as 1 have al-
ready more than once expressed, to enumerate
those who, on the present occasion, peculiarly dis-




PENINSULAR WAR. 269


tinguished themselves. AH díd their duty, and
beyond this a British soldier knows not how to
proceed; because, when in the presence of an
enemy, a British soldier consiq,ers his utmost ex-
ertions as called for, and therefore gives them.
To the talents of Colonel Fletcher, chief engineer ;
of Major Dixon, director of the artillery; and of
Major Sturgeon, of the staff corps, the highest
praises were given by our illustrious chief; whilst
to the ·bravery of Lieutenant Gurwood of the 52nd
regiment, who, after leading the forlorn hope~
escaped unhurt, he bore th~ most decided tes-
timony, by presenting him with the sword of the
captured governor. The fruitsof the victory were,
as 1 have already stated, 1500. prisoners, a ver y
large quantity of ammunition and military stores,
and no fewer than 321 pie ces of cannon, of different
calibr~s, but almost all serviceable.


Thus fell the important fortress of Ciudad
Rodrigo. Its conqueror lost no time in putting
the works once more in a state of defence; and
long before Marmont, who was exerting himself
to relieve it, could bring his troops into the field,
the British army wasin full march towards other
and no less memorable triumphs.


1 have nowarrived at that period of the war in
the Peninsula, when 1 am necessarily compelled
to take leave of my readers.


Asevere fever, caught on the banks of the




270 NARRATIVE OF THE PE:'IlINSULAR WAR.


Guadiana, increased by fatigue and anxiety of
mind, compelled me to solicit, when our army
removed to the south, Lord Wellington's leave of
absence to return to England for the recovery
of my health.


To abler and more competent pens will the
task be hereafter assigned, of giving to posterity
the full and perfect details of the great events of
this war, and especially of its glorious conclusion,
of which these sheets are only, and that up to a
certain period, a very weak outline. If, however,.
my humble undertaking should call into play the
greater talents and abilities of others, it wiU not
have been made in vain; and if 1 should be so
fortunate as to carry the ¡nterest of my brother
oflicers along with me in the précis of events, of
which my qescription must now close, 1 will, next
year, venture to submit to them, in a similar
shape, my military recollections of the campaigns
of 1813 and 1814 with the allied armies on the
continent, where it was my fortune to proceed,
under the gracious commands of my Sovereign,
after 1 lefr the Peninsular army in 1812; first as
Minister to the court of Berlin, and afterwards as
Ambassador at the court of Austria.




APPENDIX


OF


e o R R E S P o N D E N e E.






SI NCE the publication of the first edition of tbis


Narrative, the Author has received communications from


sorne of bis brotber oflicers; and he deems it but justice
to them to give these letters, with bis answers, to the


public, in this Appendix. For bimself, the Author must


again repeat what he stated in his Advertisement,


"That tbe defiCiency of the work is at once acknow-


ledged; and he hopes, under the circumstances in wbich


it was written, it will meet with indulgence."


v. L.


VOL. JI.






CONTENTS OF THE APPENDIX.


rAGS


Copy of a Letter from I .. ieut.- General Inglis to Lord
Londonderry 27'1


Lord Londonderey's Reply • 278
Second Lettef from J .. ieut.-G€OOral Inglis to Lord


Loudonderty 279
Lord Londonderry's Answer . 280
Letter froID General Lord Howden . • 281
Lord Landonderry's Letter to Lord Howden 283
Lord Howden's Second Letter • 287
Lord Howden's Tbird Letter 288
General Order by Sir J ahn Cradock 289
Letter of Lord Castlereagh to Sir J ohn Cradock • 290
Extract froID Lord CastlE'reagb's Letter to Sir John


Cradock 291
Letter froro Sir J ohn Cradock to Lord Castlereagh ib.
Letters froID Sir J ohn Cradock to General Stewart. 292
Letter froro Sir J ohn Cradock to Marshal Beresford 296




276 CON'fE~TS OF THE APPENDlX.
PAGE


Letter from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock. 297
LeU.er from Sir John Cradock to General Robe 298
Letter from Sir John Cradoek to P. Rawlings, Esq. 299
Letter of General Robe to Sir J. Cradock
Extraet of a J~etter from Sir John Crudoek to Mr.


Hookham Frere
Letter from Major-General Sir N. ,Trallt
Lord Londonderry's Reply .
Letter from Lieut.-General Sir H. Fane to the Mar-


quis of LOl1donderry


300


301
302
311


312
Lord Londonderry's Ánswer • 316
Letter from Mrs. E. Matthews to Lord Londúnderry 317
Letter from Mrs. Robert Crallfurd, Widow 'Of Gene-


ral Craufurd to Lord Londonderry • 319
Lord Londonderry's Answer • 320
Major-General Sir J. Wilson to the Marquis of


Londonderry • 321
The Marquis of Londonderry to Major-General Sir


J. Wilson 3'14
Tables of the State of the Forces, Returns of Killed


and W ounded, &c. &c.




APPENDIX OF CORRESPONDEN CE.


Copy of a Letter f1'om Lieutenant-general Inglis to tite
Marquis of LondonderJ'Y ..


Brighton, 2nd uf May, 1828.


My Lord,
It is with great regret 1 observe in your History of the


Peninsular War, that your Lordship mentions that the
57th regiment lost their colours at the battle of Albuera,
and, in the same paragraph, that many prisoners were made
by the enerny.


My being in co:mmand of the 57th regiment un that day
will be sufficient apólogy for my addressing you on this
subject, which your Lordship will admit my feelings as a
soldier are naturaIly most deeply interested in.


I take the Jiberty to annex a copy of the paragraph
aUuded to, with one or two remarks.


Lieutenant-general,


I have the honour to be,
My Lord,


y our most obedient servant,
Wl\-L ING LIS,


Lieutenaut-general.


The Marquis of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &0.


COPY.-Page 535. Quarto Edition.
" At this moment we had 10st a whole brigade of ar-


" tillery, a large number ofprisoners l and eight stand of




278 APPENDIX


''''colours beJooging to tbe huffs, the 66th, tba 48th, and
.. the 57th regiments."


REMARKS.


The 57th rf'giment brought into tbe field on the 16th
of May, 1811, at the battle of Albuera, 579 rank and
file, out of which llumber 415 were killed and wouaded ;
the remaining 164 were marched off the field by Lieute-
nant-adjutant Mann, who was only the fourteeuth officer
in rank at the commencement of tbe action. The colours
are in my possession, and not one man was missing.


WM. INGLIS,


Lieutenant-general •.


Copy of a Letter from the Marquis of Londonderry tu
Lieutenant-generallnglis.


Holdernesse House, May 9th, 1828.
Sir,


On my arrÍval froDÍ Paris yesterday, 1 receÍved
your letter of tbe 2nd instant. 1 much' regret tbat
there should have been any inaccutacy on my part in my
allusion to the 57th regimento My information as to the
events of the battle of Albuera was collected hastily at
the moment~ and 1 was not a· personal observer in the
fieId.


The passage you alIude to mentions, "at one moment
.. we had lost a whole brigade of artillery, a large number
" of prisoners belonging to several different corps;" but
tbere is no specitication of any number of prisoners par-
ticularly to tbe 57th regiment; and out of 415 killed and
wounded, it is not surprising if, amongst these, prisoners
~'ere stated to exist. With regard to the colours, sorne




OF CORRESPONDEN CE. 279


were at one moment taken, as 1 was informed; but your
own knowledge c1early proves the standards of tbe 57th
were not taken; and if tbere is a second edition,· 1 sball
be very glad to rectify an error by construction, whicb,
however, permit me to say, 1 consider as reflecting not in
tbe smallest degree upon the corps who so gallantly and
gloriously triumpbed at the conclusion of that memorable
battle; and 1 hope you will permit me to add, from the
various opportunities which 1 had of remarking tbe 57th,
tbey do not possess many more sincere admirers than
myself.


(Signed)
Lieutenant-General


1 bave the honor to be,
&c. &c. &c.


V.L.


Sir W m. Inglis, K. C. B.


SecondLetter from Generallnglis, lo Lord Londonderry.
Brighton, 18th July, 1828.


My Lord,
1 am extremely sorry to observe in the 2nd edition of


your Lordship's N arrative of the Peninsular War. it still
appears that the 57th regiment lost their colours at the
batde of Albuera on the 16th May, 1811; and tbat it
likewise appears in too N aval and Military Magazine as
an extract from your Llrdsbip's bistory.


1 beg to refer your Lordship to my former letter on this
subject, with your Lordship's reply, dated 9th May, 1828.


Considering tbe high authority of your Lordship, holding
the first otticial situation in tbat army at the period, 1 trust
you will allow me to express myself, fecling it an impe-




280 APPENDIX


rious duty to defend the honour of my old friends, as theÍr
commander, besides my very long service witb them, having
entered the service as ensign in the 67th regiment in the
year 1779.


Lieutenant-genernf,


1 hal'e the honoor to be,
My Lord,


y our Lordship's most obedient
Humble servant,


WM. INGLlS.


The Most Noble The Marquis of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &c.


Answe'r to 2nd Letter from General Inglis.
J uly 21st, 1828.


Sir,
1 am honoured witb your second letter, in date the 18th


JuIy. relative to the error in my book as to the 57th regi-
mento In the next edítion your Ietters to me, and my
answers, will appear in the Appendix. and 1 am entirely
ready to admit your more accurate knowledge and infor-
mation relative to the corps commanded by yourself.


1 have the bonour to be,
y our obedient


VANE LoNDONDERRY.




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 281


Copy oj a Lelter jrom General .Lord Howden fo the
Marquis of Londonderry.


May 14th, 1828.
My Dear Lord,


There are spots in the sun without impairing its splen~
dour-so is a very small error in the beautiful composition
of your book.


In my humble case, page 245, (Quarto Eclition). there
is a paragraph that wiII misIead tha ordinary reader, and
in it there is not the justice 1 feel due to me. It could
only proceed from mis-information, and therefore 1 will
venture to correct it. 1 will transcribe tbe passage;-


" He reached Lumiar on the 6th April; wbere Sir
"John Ctadock had fixed his head-quarters, and found
" him making such dispositions as díd not indicate offeu~
"sive measures. General HiII, it was said, at this time
" suggested bolder measures. and he was aided by Bere~
" ford's eouncil; and it was agreed that, instead of con-
" tinuing preparations for a retreat, the 'combined Bl'itish
" and Portuguese armies sbould move forward. The ene-
" my were at tbis time in a state of perfeet ¡naetion."


Lumiar is but two or three miles from Lisbon, and
therefore no preparations for retreat could be made tbere,
as, undoubtedly, if the idea of retreat, or rather say em-
barkation. was tbe least in contemplation, it would have
taken place in Lisbon itself. 1 suppose Leiria must
have been meant, whicb is above eighty miles from Lisbon
011 the road to Oporto, to which place the army, such as
it was, had moved under my command ; and it may at once




282 APPENDIX


be asked, why proceed so far? For no otber purpose,
than to retreat? For tbe enemy had no! made any for-
ward movement, from Oporto, of consequence.


General Hill never suggested to me " bolder" measures,
and 1 do not recollect tbat Marsbal Bercsford urged any
movement of a more positive nature than those already
adopted.


1 believe it must be allowed that the security of Lisbon,
the object upon which every thing turned both then and
thereafter, couId never, for a moment, be out of the
thoughts of the officer who commanded in chief; and
until sorne light appeared as to the intentions of Soult,
who commanded in the north, and Victor in the south,
a rapid and thoughtless march from Lisbon would have
been deemedunjustifiable rashness, not to be iedeemed by
attractivc "boldness." Had those French generals joined
in common uníon, and made a simultaneo lIS movement,
notbing could have given a chance of saving Lisbon, but
a determined reslstance in and about the town of Lisbon


'¡tself. Why they did not act in concert must remain an
impenetrable mystery, or be ascribed to the worst of pas-
sions, and most destructive jealousy on their parto


1 will, some time or other, lay before you intercepted
letters, to prove that the united march to Lisbon was tbe
original intention between these two generaIs, as also a
copy of my orders-that, notwithstanding the very weak
and defective state of the army 1 had (one' reginient of
cavalry, the 14th, only) until the arrival of aH your gal-
lant and glorious band from England, it never was my
intention to retreat or embark; and my letters io govern-
ment will evince that we should have made a stand to
tbe last moment at Lisbon, in a more contracted Jine than
Torres Yedras, with sucb powers and defellces aswe




OF COIUtESPONDENCE. 283


could array. Tbis resolotion may. be viewed as one of
temerity, but still it was so determined.


Now. my dear lord, forgive the shadow of a reproach to
you, and from my pen too, which,. sllVe this Httle expla-
nation, with my voice is always employed in unbounded
admiration of your eloquent and lucid work.


Ever most truly yours,
HOWDEN.


Copy of a Lelter from Lord Londonderry to General
. Lord Howden.


H oldernesse House, May 16th, 1828.
My Dear Lord,


I lose no time in replying to your leUer of the 14th
instant; and aUow me to assure you, if 1 endeavoured to
avoid one thing more than another in my imperfect book,
it was the .giving offence to any one. Above an 1 must
deplore having, 'however inadvertently: expressed my-
self in a manDer of your position and services which might
mislead; because, my dear Lord, there are few men whom
1 respect publicly, and value privately, more than your
Lordship.


An extreme desire to avoid delicate questíons, the who]e
bearings of which I was not officially and properly in
possession of, added to tbe caution that was imposed
upon me by knowing tbe secret thougbts ofmy brother,
induced me to confine myself in my Narrative as near to
simple factsas the several cases would admito But as you
can upon me for a more accurate explanation, 1 can have
no difficulty in transcribing from my manuscript the part
1 omitted in reference to yom situation and intenti~ns.


Under date of the 23rd April, 1809. I write as follows.




284 APPENDIX


from Lisbou. Previous to General Hill's arrital, whieh
bappened OD tbe 6th, Cradoek, from tbe inadequ3ey oí his
force, had determined most properly not to advance from
Lumiar, and had every tlting prtparedfor tIte worst, But
when HiII came, and he heard other eorps were following,
(and being also pressed by Beresford,) be took. the resolu-
tion of advancing, and it was settled that a combined move-
ment both of the British and Portuguese army towards the
north, should be made, &c. This day, 'THE 23RD' the
British troops are to assembJe at Leiria.


The former certainly with prudence, previous to IIill's
arriva], resisted an advance, while the laUer, perhaps with
too little precaution in the judgment of some, was urging
it. From Mr. Villiers' general tone about Cradock up
to the present moment, he has aeted most judieiously
in every r.espeet. As to his feelings, it is in vain to
deny he was deeply wounded, the orders coming the
very moment he hád determined to advance the army.
His first wish and impression was to returo home, but
afterwards gallantly resisted this impulse, and deeided
to go to Gibraltar, exerting himself to the utmost to
stop any murmurs that might be amongst the indivi-
duals most attached to him7 so that} upon the whole,
this difficult and delicate arrangemellt has beeo earried
into effect as well as the circumstances of tbe case would
allow. Mr. Villiershas aeted with much judgment in an
the business here, beloved by the army, whom he takes
great notice of, keepipg tbe generals together, respected
highly by the people of Lisbon, and enjoying the confidence
of tbe government. Wellesley has written to Cradock and
Beresford, announcing his arrivaI and intentions, and
begged them to come here; so we loo k out for them to-
'morrow, when some general determinatioo will be taken.




OF CORRESPONDEN CE. 285


Under date of the 21th April, 1 write as follows, froRt
Lisboll.


1 have just seen Cradock, with whom 1 have had a long
conversation. Jt is impossible not to admire the gooa
sense whieh sooms to actaate bis conducto The Ietter he
wtote to yousufficientfy marks his feelings ; but he assured.
me, upon his honor, white he, personally, must suffer, that
he thought the gov-ernment were right to do what tbey
tbought most judicious. At thesame time, a righ.t mea-
sure often brougbt on itldi'Viduals unmerited misfortunes.
He aeemed quite sure to receive fr{)m the government
tbosemarks of approbation ror his conduct, 'Which under
critical circumstances be trusted he had merited. In
deciding .on goiug to England ultimately, aOO resigning
Gibraltar, wben anotber lJetson can be appointed, he says
be has been led by what is the feeling oí tbe army, as
many general officers may look upon Wellesley's employ-
mertt in the active army of the cou-ntry as tbeit bemg laid
aside; and he might incur aU their dísapprobatiGn, if he
1lilemly sat down uoder the arrangement proposed. 1
replied that no man was to sacrifice himself on a supposed
tmblic feeling. He asked me ihen, upon my honour, what
1 shollld do in a similar predicament, as to the offerof
Gibraltar; and 1 said tbat, if 1 wouId have Recepted
Gibraltar when in England as a €ommand tbat was agree-
aMe to me, 1 should go there now,more especialIy if 1
thought, in so doing, 1 was additionaHy promoting the
king's service. 1 tbink Cradock 1S satisMed of yonr
friendly feelings iowards him; and oue canDot éOntem-
pInte his sitnation without pain.


Uuder date of the 1st Muy, 1 write as follows from
Lisbon.


1 s1ated that {)radoCk had determilled not to ad\'ance




286 AP]'ENnIX


previous to HiIl's arrival; and Villiers sbowed me 11 letter
from Cradock, in which there was no fixed intention of
moving mentioned, which were the grounds of the opinion
1 gave in my letter of the 23rd April. Jt appears, how-
ever, since, that on the Saturday before Cradock could
know we were landed, he met Beresford half-way between
Leiria and Thomar, and settled an aavance upon Coimbra,
but no operation was actualIy commenced.


1 have now, my dear lord, copied my original manu-
script letters, where they relate to you, your conduct, and
your determinations, nearly verbatim. But rather than
give this long detail in my book, which in some parts
embraced delicate points, 1 simply said as follows:-
"General Hill rcached Lumiar on the 6th April, where
Sir J. Cradock had flxed bis head-quarters; and found
him making such dispositions as did not indicate offensive
measures."


Allow me just to observe, tbat yoo must know if your
bead-quarters were 00 the 6th at Lumiar, which my
leHers assert; and if so, and if, previous to General Hill's
arrival, no fixed plan of advance had been ordered, 1 hope
you will agree, tbis part of tbe paragraph is not incor.
recto


Permit me, however, to observe, 1 only state a general
J' on dit," for the truth of which 1 canDot Dor do not
vouch, but which wu'J probably excited by Hill's arrival
witb a corps eager for battle; and that preparatwns for
the WOfl'st (viz. emba:rkation,) which might have been
necessary, if you had been aUacked by a joint operation of
the enemy from north and soutb, before your reinforcements
arrived, were no longer so necessary.


This, my dear lord, is the Resumé of my impressions a.t
the time, connected witb my leUers; and allow me to hope




OF CORRESPONDF.NCE. 287


that all your reasoning justifies the tine that seems tó have
been taken so properly 'at the time, upon which, however,
1 have not presumed to express my individual opinion.


In conclusion, 1 have only to add, that it will afford me
the greatest pleasure to give publicity to any or every
part of this explanation you think tit; or to afford further
information, as far as my documents or memory serve, on
every part of the subject.


Ever yours, my dear Lord,
Mos! sineerely and affectionately,


VANE LONDONDERRY.


Second Letter from General Lord Howden to
Lord Londonderry.


lt:lth May, 1828.


My Dear Lord,
1 only write a word to return my warmest thanks for the


Ietter of yesterday, alld the other communications, that
must have given you so much trouble to annex.


Could any thing make me more attached to you, it
would be the generous feeling, so strongly displayed in
your letters to LordCastlereagb, towards me, at the pe-
riod 1 endured the most distressing circumstance that ever
fell to the lot of a Commander-in-chief-his supercession
in command, almost in view of the enemy. and at the same
time receiving the united praise and approbatioD of aH his
measures from his king and government.


The painful remembrances can never be obliterated from
my mind; but the lapse of nearly twenty years afforded
the usual lenitive of time; they therefore slumbered, but
still are awakened by the luminous records of your work.




288 APPENDIX


1 am lookiog over sorne papers, and among tbem 1 find
leUers to you, in office, of tbe 3d and 5th of April,l809,
from Lumiar, wbich hear strongly upon the situution of af-
fairs in Portugal at that period, and show the well-
grout1ded apprehension of un united attack from Sonlt and
Victor in the soutb, who had advanced within a few
leagues of Badajoz.


Lumiar, which gives rise to the Jittle point between us,
being but two miles from Lisbon, crea tes aH the mistake.
" Head-quarters there" is, in fact, Lisbon itself, and the
idea of any retreat from thence, would only he immediate
em harkation.


Ever most truly yours,
HOWDEN.


Lord Londonderry merely acknowledged the receipt of
the ahoye Ietter, and expressed his readiness to act upon
this correspondence in any manner Lord Howden pointed
mtt.


May 28, 1828.


Thil'd Le.tte1·from General Lord Howden to tite Marquis
of LondondernJ.
Hereford Street, 21st May, 1828.


My Dear Lord,
1 r~i'Ved your note this morning, and shall say Jittle


more, tban fbat you are very gODd, and it is like yourself,
to think further of me.


Without boubling you with more particulars, 1 believe
1 have laid before yOu sufficient materiaIs to do away the
little paragraph in y{)l:Ir excellent work, tbat has given
mepain, and (lid ñot, as 1 conceived, do me justice-how it




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 2SH
is to he repaired, 1 sbalI leave toyour kindness; for 1
cannot enter into ally controversywith you.


It was my unbappy lot to be debarred from any par-
ticipation in aH the glories of Portugal and Spain that
followed my supercession; but 1 may be alIowed to main-
tain that all that was possíble, und.er very critical circllm-
stances, was done before the arrival of the reinforcements
from England, and that no one false step took place; foro
if any one error had been committed, the transcendent
triumphs that succeeded, and the brightest annals in
English history, migbt and would have been lost to the
world; to this alone 1 lay claim.


The warmest and repeated thallks of his Majesty, and
the British government through Lord Castlereagh, to the
very close of my command, were the gratifying but sol e
reward.


Tbe. Marquis of Londonderry.
&c. &c. &c.


Ever yours,
Most truly,


HOWDEN.


(Copy) Before the arrival of General HilI with tbe rein-
forcements from England, the 6th April, 1809.


General Order by SIR JOUN CRADOCK.


Lumiar, 29th March, 1809.


The several arrangements for the troops to en ter upou
the campaign will take place immediately.


The Deputy Commissary-general will distribute, with
tbe least possible delay, to the several corps, and the beads
of departments, the allotted means of transport; and a re-


VOL. n. T




290 APPENDIX


turn will be made to tbe Adjutant-general of tbe aetual
equipment, or of tbe defieieney, jf any arises.


Lieutenaut-eolonel Robe wiIl exeeute aU the arrange-
ments andorders be may baye already receiyed about tba
artillery, and report tbe conclusion to the Commander of
the Forces. Especial care is to be taken by tbe command-
ing officers of the cayalry aOO artillery, andtbe Deputy
Commissary-general, tbat a sufficient quantity of spare
sboes be seeured for tbe lengtb of marcb tbey may be
engaged. The Commander of tbe Forces desires, in tbe
most urgent manner, tbat tbe greatest care and attention
be paid to the preservation of tbe mules, &c. as no de-
ficiency can be supplied.


LeUer from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock.
Downing Street, 16th February, 1809.


Sir,
y our dispatches of the 19th, 21st, and 31st uIt. and of


tbe 2d inst., bave been received and laid before the King.
His Majesty has commanded me to express his high


approbation of the line of conductyou haye pursued, and
entertains a conyiction that tbe same good sense, temper,
and steadiness. which seem to guide your decisions,. will
be persevered in, and will finaIly oyercome any unpleasant
difficulties that may arise. 1 haye nothing to add to my
despatches ofyesterday.


Lieutenan t- General


1 haye the honour,
&C. &c. &c.


CAS'fLEREAGH.


Sir J oho Cradock, K. B.




01' COHRESPONDENCE.


L:tract from Lord Castlereagh's letter lo
Sir John Cradock.


Downing Street, Mareh the 30th, 1809.


" Y ou must believe me sincere when 1 assure you tbat,
witb respeet to yourself, in addition to mueh personal eon-
fidenee, the government feel very strongly, indeed, with
respeet to the whole of your eonduet io Portugal, whieh,
io times and under circumstanees ofpeeuliar diffieu1ty, has,
io every instanee, met with their unqualified approbation,
and, 1 can truly say, fulfilled every wish and expeetation
1 had, or eould have formed, when you were seleeted for
the eommand."


Copy oj a Letter jro'fn Sir John Cradoclc to
Viscount Castlereagh.


Lumiar, 1st April, 1809.
My Lord,


1 lose not a moment, as thevessel is under weigh, to
state that tbe aeeouot has arrived tbat Oporto has sur-
rendered to the enemy. 1 lament that 1 eannot send to
your Lordship the partieulars. 1 learo, however, that the
Bishop is on his way to LisboD.


From the very imperfeet information that is eurrent,¡t
appears that no resistanee was made. It would be too
sanguine to expeet mueh any. where, eonstítuted as the
'Portuguese troops are, and from the general iosubordina-
tiOD that prevails.


1 am not in possession of any furtber aeeounts from tbe




292 APPENDIX


French and Spanish armies in Estremadura, nor of the pro-
ceedings of the Salamanca corps, since they invested
Ciudad Rodrigo.


Our movements will be either to advanva to Leyria, as
the best mode of forming a junction with the Portuguesa
troops in the neighbourhood of Thomar, or it may be ne-
cessary to retir"l tbence still nearer to Lisbon, to protect, as
well as our means will permit, tbe capital, which compre-
hends, in aB probability, all that is really an object to the
cnemy.


Viscount Castlereagh.


1 have the honour,
&c. &c.


J. C-RADo.CK.


Copies 01 Letters from Sir Jo/m Cradoclc lo
B. General Stewart.


(By the Isis, Captain Towers.)
(Prívate.)


N.B. 'fhese letters passed B. Generat Stewart on his way
out from England.


Head-Quarters, Lumiar, 3rd April, 1809.
My Dear General,


Though an opportunity offers, 1 do not write to Lord
Castlereagh, as 1 really have nothing to submit to his
Lordship in an official shape. AH my ideas and reasonings
are before him, andwe now seem just approaching to the
crisis to put them in execution. The total defeat of Cuesta
will allow the enemyto do what he pleases upon our most
vulnerable quarter; and General Beresford told me last




OF CORRESPON1;lENCE. 293


night, that a division was within a league of Badajoz,
the inhabitants of which were imploríng our assistance.


1 cannot yet send you the particulars of the miserable
resistan ce made at Oporto, hut it teaches us to expect the
same in every place where the British army is noto The
enemy, 1 learo, has pushed on a small advanced guard
beyond the Douro. The Salamanca division, after show-
ing themselves before Ciudad Rodrigo, has moved to
San Felice to execute their ultimate designs.. We have no
reason to alter the former estimates of the numbers of the
enemy: the Oporto. division from 20 to 15,000; San
Felice from 12 to 9,000; and the Estremadura, deduct-
ing what they may have lost in the late action with Gene-
ral Cuesta, from 35 to 33,000.


y ou may guess how unpleasant are my feelings, not to
move the British forces, small as they are, against General
Soult, or the enemy in possession of any part of Portugal;
but 1 do notbelieve there is any person in the army who
would encourage sncb an idea.


Prepared as we are on aH sides, we bave no choice but
to rémain in the best po sitian tbat can be fOlind, (and aH
are bad,) to cover Lisbon and tbe Tagus, and wait the
reinforcements that must be sent, if we are to maintain
Portugal. lt is unnecessaryto repeat that no dependence
whatever can be placed, 5n their present state, upon the
Portuguese troops; if 1 said that the whole were ready
to mutiny and revolt, 1 believe 1 speak General Beres-
ford's real sentiments, They will not be commanded by
their own officers, and they do just as they please. 1 have
given an tbe British officers that General Beresford has
asked foro To quit the defence of Lisbon, and march the
British troQPs to join such people as these, was impos-




294 APPENDIX


sible. Tbe best of tbem will come to join us, and tbey are
to have our flank at Sacavem under Genera) Beresford.
y ou know how unequal our force is, to extend to the left
-properly to Belem. We have no intelligence of the
approach of General HilI with his troops •.


Had we sufficient force, even under the pressure tbat
surrounds us, we might strike a blow at Soult, or the
Salamanca corps; but, a~ we are, nothing can be done.


Your's most truly,
J. F. CRADOCK.


The Honourable B. General Stewart .


.,er Sarah.
Head-quarters, Lumiar, 5th April, 1809.


My Lord,
I.have the honor to inform you of the arrival of tbe


force under the orders of General HilI, with the exception
of one transport, containing about 300 men, which parted
company during the voyage. Tbe. packet is under weigh,
which prevents my giving your Lordsbip any further parti-
culars. The position of tbe enemy, 1 may say, remains
almost the same as when 1 wrote on the 3rd instant to
General Stewart. The closer approacb to Badajoz, how-
ever, must more mark tbe intention to invade Portugal
with the powerful force from tbat qllarter.


U nless upon sure· grounds, 1 will not move the Btitisb
force so far from Lisbon as to expose this valuable station
(in any point of view) to more than tbe common danger ;
buí, since the present accession of strength, it may be




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 295
advisable to make a movement to Leiria, there awaiting
and acting upon the events of the dáy.


1 have tbe honor,
&c. &c. &c.


J. CRADOCK.
The Viscount CastIereagh,


&c. &c. &c.


P. S. 1 bave the honor to annE'X tbe report of Captain
Rose, just come in from Elvas.


(Prívate.)
Lumiar, April 6th, 1809.


M Y Dear General,
N othing material has occurred since my lctter of yester-


day to Lord Castlereagb. We sban move on Saturday
and Sunday to Leiria; but 1 shaIl nothing adventure
from the protection of Lisbon and the Tagus, without being
somewhat ascertained of tbe movements and intention of
General Victor, now apparently tbreatening Badajoz;
and prepared, if it be bis design, to enter the Alentejo,
in the line of the Tagus.


1 send you our order of battle. 1 hear the ellemy is par-
ticularly strong in cavalry at Oporto; in this we are very
deficient.


y our's most truly,
J. CRADOCI'-


The Honourable B. General Stewart.
&c. &c. &c.




296 ,APPENDIX


(Copy)
CopY of a Letter from Sir Joltn Cradock lo


Marshal Beresford.
Caldao, 20th April, 1809, twelve o'clock.


My dear Beresford,
I have this instant received your letter of the 19th. 1


was upon the point of writing to you, to state I had made
sorne alterations in the disposition of the British force, froID
the arrangement I lately sent to you. 1 shaIl now concentre
the whole at Leiria and Batalha for the sake of accom-
modation, with an advance corps in front. The army will
march to-rnorrow and reach Leiria, as soon as it is predica-
ble. Mr. Commissary Rawlings must be severely checked
for his totalIy unfounded representations of supplies,
which were only calculated to mislead every one concerned,
in the most dangerous manner. AH the recommendations
you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the
coasts, have been ever since acted upon to the utmost of
my exertiolls; but the difficulties started by the admiral
and the commissary were so great, that 1 cannot say 1 have
any dependence upon immediate aid.


My dear general, 1 have only to repeat that it is the
first wish of' my mind to reach General Soult, or any part
of his force; but nothing can persuade me to commit the
British army, either from the want of suppIies or ammu-
nition. 1 will never allow them to be in any state but
a formidable one; alld 1 wilI not depart from the established
principIe and instructions of government. 1 alone am re-
sponsible. If false and ill-judged steps are taken, the




OF COlrRESPONDENCE. 297


weigbt of blame will fall upon me. It will give me tbe
greatest pleasure to see you. 1 shall be at Leiria on Satur-
dayabout noon. 1 will either go to Overna on Sunday, or
meet you at any other place. Let me know by your next
communication.


Yours most sincerely,
J. F. CRAVOCK.


Marshal Beresford.


Copy of a LeUer from Lord Castlereagh lo
Sir John Cradoclc.


Downing Street, J une 2d, 1809.
My Dear Cradock,


1 have delayed my answer to your letter written to me
on your departure from Lisbon, till 1 coutd be assured it
would find you atGibraltar. Yonr wish to return has been
80 strongly conveyed to me by your friends here, tbat 1
can have no desire tban to fulfil your request. You have
do~e everything tbat honour and duty could require from
you towards the service and government in the most ex·
emplary manner. What i8 most satisfactory to your OWll
feelings, it can only be necessary for roe to be assured of,
to fee! it incumbent on me to promote ; and, in this sense
1 most cheeJ'fulIy advised the' King to leave your return
in your OWll hands. If 1 have not entered into tbe extent to
which some of your friends (whose judgement upon such
a point may be more correct than mine) have felt upon the
nature of your command at Gibraltar, 1 am sure you will
believe it has not proceeded froro any indifference to your
military character or reputation. For both 1 must always
feel the utmost solicitude, and shaIl be happy to avail




298 APPENDIX


myself of any oecasion of markiug it. As we shall probablj
800n meet, 1 shall only assure you of the same regard and
esteem with which 1 am,


Lieutenant-general,


Dear Ctadoek,
y ours most sincerely,


CASTLERHAGH.


Sir Joho Cradock, K. B.
Gibraltar.


Oopy 01 a' Letter Irom Sir J. Cradock to General Robe.


Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.
My Dear Sir,


I very sensibly feel the want of horses and mules you
represent for the service of the artillery; and the more &1,
as all the efforts to make up the deficieney, sioce my ar-
rival io Lisboo, have not had any effect with the Regeney.


As it is my intention to take up a position at sorne
distance without deJay, 1 am to request th~t you will
this day see the commissary-general on the subjeet, and
report to me what can be don~ upon this mostimportant
poiot. Every exertion must be made.


General Robe,
Commanding artillery,


Lisbon.


I have the honour,
&c. &e. &e.


J. CRADOCK.




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 299',


From Sir J. CradocTc to P. Rawlings, Esq.
Lisbon, December 3Otb, 1808.


Dear Sir,
1 lose no time in commuDicatiDg to you my intentioD to


take up a position at Sacavem for most of the British
force left in Portugal, exclusive oftbe garrisoDs at Almeida
and Elvas. 1 cannot as yet point out the Dumbers, Dor for
what exact time the provision should be made; but it
may assist your arrangements to te11 you that you may, in
a great measure, draw back tbe supplies at SaDtarem,
Abrantes, and Castel Branco, on]y leaving sufficient for
those corps in Colovera.


Stc. Stc. Stc.
J. CRADOCK.


P. Rawlings, Esq.
Commissary-general.


Alter Orders.


Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.
The several corps in Lisbon and the vicinity will hold


themselves in readiness to march out of the town. The
_ details will be arranged in the course of to-rnorrow.


The quarter-master-general wi11 irnmediately take the
necessary measures for the embarkation of the sick.
U pon returns being seDt to Commodore Halket, the
proper number of transports will be provided.


Major-general Mackenzie will take upon himself the
command of the troops to be p1aced in advance, aud will




300 APPENDIX


give such general directions as he sball tbink necessary.
The Commander of the Forces directs tbat tbe troops
about to take the field, sbould regulate themselves upon
the equipment presented by General Moore; with the
addition, that each man shullId take his hlanket.


J. CRADOCK.


l-eUer from General Robe to Sir John Cradock.
Lishon, December 31st, 1808.


Sir.
In ohedience to your orders, 1 have seen tbe commissary-


general, who is using every exertion; hut from the want
of co-operation by tbe Regency. he can do littleor nothing.
He can only procure ten mules to-night, and be is pro-
mised twenty to-morrow. He says he will he able to let
your Excellency know, by to-morrow, the utmost of his
ability in that way.


His Excellency,
Sir John Cradock.


1 have the honour,
&c. &c. &c.


WM. ROBE,
Commanding Artillery.




OF COftUESPONDENCE. 301


Extract of a Letter* from Sir John Cradock lo
Mr. Hookham Frere.


February 17th, 1809 .


.. 1 fear your Excellency is led to entertain a more
favourable Dotioo of the efficiency of the Portuguese army,
than in any shape they are entitled to; in short, in my
opioion, they want every thiog that co~stitutes a respect-
able force. Except about 10,000 English arms, they have
no other. Many of the regiments of cavalry are without
horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are
not half clothed; aod as to subsistence, they live at free
quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To
take the field with effect, or assurance of food, seems to
me out of the question. Sioce the first moment of my
artival in Portugal, 1 wished to produce the advance of a
small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has beeo im-
possible.


1 t is a matter of serious lamentation, that such mis-
representations of the Portuguese force should go home,
or reach your Excellency; for it appears absolutely neces-
sary tbat, at tbe present crisis of the war, the foreign as-
sistance tbat we bave to depend upon, should be duly
estimated, and brought into close calculation."


lO This ¡eUar was founded upon the report oí Brigadier-general Cotton,
who inspected the Portuguese cavalry. The verbatim repolt is. mislaid, Ol
probably sent to England.-H.




302 ApPENDIX


Before the arrival of General HiIl with the re-inforce-
ments from England, the state of the British forces in
Portugal were as follows :-


10,225, including every man in Portugal; occupying
Lisbon, Almeida, Elvas, the forts on the Tagus, &c. &c.


5221 being every disposable man, capable of marching,
ioc1udiog convalescents.


From the adjutaot-general's reporto


Copy 01 a Letter Irom Major-general Sir N. TrallJ;
to Lord Londonderry.


My Lord,


No. 7, Hertford Sreet, May Fair,
19th .JuIy, 1828.


Haviog been absent upoo the continent when your
Lordship's Narrative of the Peninsular War made its
appearance, 1 have had no opportunity uotil this day of
noticing one.or two passages which you have introduce?
ioto it, wherein roy name is mentiooed in reference to the
movemeots of a corps of militia which had served under
roy orders during Massena's invasion of Portugal in 1810;
and as those passages appear to have been writtenunder
an erroneous impression, 1 coosider it to be my duty to
replace the facts with which they are cOl:lDected in a more
accurate point of view than your Lordship has represented
ibem; but 1 would assure you, that in resolving to address
this letter to you for that purpose, 1 have been influenced
by no other feeling tban tbat wbicb would attribute wbat
you bave stated to tbe imperfect information which had
reacbed you; and which you had 00 reason to discredit
wheo you accepted it as your authority.




OF CORIU<;SPONDENCE. 303


In page 443 of your book, (first edition of it,) after com~
menting upon the want of penetration which had been
manifested by MasselJa in having attacked the position of
Busaco on the 27th of September, instead of resorting at
once to the measure which he subsequently adopted, of
turning it by its left, your Lordship remarks as folIows :-
" It is true that at this time Colonel Trant, with his corpa,


. ought to have taken post at Sardao: be had been ordered
to proceed thitber witb a view to strengtben our left; aod
it may be tbat tbe enemy had been led to think of him as
already in that position; but had tbe case been so, it
requires no depth of discernment to discover tbat aU the
resistance wbich it was in bis power to offer would bave
availed bim notbing against tbree French corps; and more
especialIywheo it is considered that tbere are numerou~
passes into the Oporto road by the Vouga, whicb Trant
had oeither meaos nor force adequate to watcb." And
agaio, in the folIowing page, your Lordship observes, tha!
"when Lord W ellington's army abandoned the ground of
Busaco, be did so, not because Trant had failed in reach-
ing bis aUotted station, but because tbe ground in itself
was indefensible."


Now. my Lord, abstracted from the error wbich your
Lordship was under, in supposing me, throughout the aboye
observations, to have been absent from Sardao at the
period to which the last quoted paragraph in particular has
alIuded, 1 should only have to acknowledge myself in-
debted to you for the pubJic expression of an opinion wbicb
would so effectually contradict tbe very absurd assertions of
one or two other writers upon the same event, and whe
would pretend that my absence frQm Sardao, (as presumcd
also by them,) had been the principal cause of Lord Wel-
Iington's refreat from Busaco; as if it wasto be expecfed




304 AI'PENDIX


that the undisciplined corps of Portuguese militia whieh
1 then eommanded, who were embodied and 'armed only
within the preceding nine or ten months, reduced in
number to barely 1,500 men, through causes which 1 shall
hereafter explain, and who, in faet, should only have been
considered as little else than a eollection of armed pea-
santry, could possibly, and however well disposed in other
respects, have arrested the progress of an army of veterans,
consisting of 650r 70,000 men, headed by their numerODS
cavalry, and marching in a single column upon the given
point whieh these writers would have allotted to me to de~
fend; the idea is altogether too ridiculous, and 1 have
therefore never thought it worth my attention to refuje h.


But as what your Lordship has written upon this sub-
ject, and for which 1 would again avow myself under obli-
gation to you, has been grounded npon the mistaken
notion that 1 did not reach the post which 1 had been
instrueted to oecupy, before the enemy had effeeted his
operation, and consequently before Lord Wellington had
commenced his retrograde movement, 1 believe that the
following explanatiQIl will leave no doubt upon yonf mind,
that upon this point your Lordship had been misin.
formed.


Sardao was in faet the only place mentioned as my
destÍnation in the order which directed IDy removal to the
Lower Vouga ; and as my corps did absolutely arrive there
before Massena crossed the Serra de Caramula, that
order, it must be allowed, was to all intents and purposes
put into execntion, .as far as it was possible for me to
understand tbe intention of it, where no more specific
object had been annexed to it.


It had reaehed me on the 23rd September, when we
were in tbe vicinity of Moimento da Beira, moving upon




OF CORRF.SPONDENCE. 805


Lamego; and as we had marched in the three or four
preceding days about seventy miles, your Lor~ship wouId
perceive, on consulting a map of the country, that we
had marched a distance of two hundred miles in nine
or ten successive days, as calculated by the route through
Oporto, that by which 1 was directed to move,' and
to which 1 had not myseIf given a preference; and it
cannot be doubted for one moment, that where the
roads are so generally in abad state, as they are
throughout Portugal, w~ must have made extraordinary
efforts to arrive at Sardao on the 28th September, the day
on which my militia entered it, ann as early in that day
as from twelve to two o'c!ocI., P. 1\I. The first French
troops that arriveu at Boyalva, where the passage of the
Caramula was effected, and which is four miles distant
from Sardao, only entered that village at five in the after-
naon of the same day, aecording to un official intimation
which was transmitted to me by Sir Stapleton Cotton, who
commanded the British cavalry upon my right, and with
whom 1 was then in free communieation.


But, my Lord, if you were, as 1 presume was the case,
present at this crisis at head-quarters, possibly you may
recollect that 1 had an interview with Lord \-Vellington in
the forenoon of the 28th, upon the heights of Busaco,
having pushed forwanl in advance of my troops, in order
to receive his J .. ordship's eommands; and 1 now request
your particular attention to what passed upon that oeca-
sion, as it forms the most essential eircumstanee conveyed
in tltis explanation, as f¡jr as my own proeeedings are con-
cerned in it.


'- c.


Ris Lordship, after enquirillg in what position 1 had
left my militia, and on being informed that 1 hourly ex-
pected it at Sardao, thrn, (and for the first time that 1 ~oo:;¡,,_.~~:


VOL. Ir.


t'(
"r{'.
~~~




306 APPENDIX


bad beard the village mentioned in any form) pointed out
Boyalva as the ground upon wbich be was desirous to see
me posted. 1 instantIy proposed to bi's Lordship to follow
up bis suggestion, and 1 was stiU in time to act upon it, as
two hours would have sufficed to have carried me back to
my corps, and another would have removed it to its new
position; but this offer was declined; and as his Lordship
then expressed himself, because be considered my militia,
under aH its disadvantages, as incompetent to offer resist-
ance. 1 would bere observe that 1 found, through my
observations at a later period, that in reality (but which
Lord Wellington was not aware of) the village of Hoyalva
was altogether useless as a point of defence-lst, because
it is situated upon the western slope of the Caramula, and
does not protect the summ.it of it, or the approaches from
the eastward; 2dly, because it is in itselfentirely open;
and 3rdly, because there are to my own knowledge, passes
practicable for cavaIry 011 either flank of it.


From what 1 have just now mentioned, it would natu-
rally appear that Lord Wellington at this moment, having
ascertained what were M¡:¡ssena's intentions, had aIready
made up bis mind to retire upon his lines: he could only
have defended the passes of the CaramuIa by detaching
several thousands of his more efficient troops in that direc-
tion, and his front would, in this case, have been too ex-
tended not to have rendered it vulnerable in some one
point, if attacked, according to Buonaparte's tacties, byan
overpowering mass of the enemy's best troops. He
would thus, perhaps, have saerificed aH the advalltages
whieh he had just "then acquired by his recent victory, as
the Portuguese troops; who were only in the iofancy
of their experience, might have lost their eonfidellee in their
allies as well as in tbemseIves; and, in short, the fate of




OF CORRESPONDENCE 307


Portugal, as well as of Europe, might have been unfavor-
ably decided by any other measure than that which he
adopted at this critical momento It is in this reasoning
alone that the real motive of his Lordship's retreat from
Busaco is to be found, and certainly not in attaching any
degree of credit to the very unfounded imputatioo which
has beeo attempted to be thrown upon the corps of militia
meo which was uoder my orders.


Inthe course of your nanative, your Lordship has esti-
mated the strel!gth of my corps at five thousand ; but at no
time did it exceed three thousand five hundred io effec-
tives durillg this campaign: the mean may have be en two
thousand five hundred. Two of my regiments were em-
ployed upon the lines of Torres Vedras, and the others


. were never completed to their complement, in conse-
quence of the rigorous system of recruiting which had be en
exerdsed in order to supply the deficiencies of the regular
battalions.


When 00 our march to Sardao, wc had traversed the
districts in which the militia had been levied, and as very
many of the men had, notwithstanding my precautions,
availed themselves of the opportuníty of revisítíng theír
families, this. circumstance, joined to extreme fatigue, had
reduced our numbers, as 1 have above described it.


Had not my communication with the army been inter-
cepted by the enemy's movement upon the night of the
28th, no possible doubt could have arisen in regard to my
arrival at Sardao; as Lord Wellington would have beeo
more thoroughly acquainted with my precise situation


. ,


since 1 oot only held possession of that post 00 the 28th,
but duriog the entire of the 29th; 011 the eveoing of which
day, the Freoch, after cutting off one of mypatrols, posted
a piquet at one extremity of the village, whilst mine oc-




:308 APPENDrx


cupied the other, and our respective videttes were in pre-
sen ce in the centre of it. It was, indeed, only at day-
break on the 30th, that, when 1 became assured of the
complete evacuation of Busaco, 1 determined to shelter
my corps behind the Vouga, about six miles in my rearo
But as this measure could not pass unnoticed by the ene-
my, my rear-guard was penetrated by a charge of his ca-
valry, and it lost an officer and twenty-five meno


This affair in itself was in other respects of no impor-
tanee; and if 1 have brought it under your Lordship's no-
tice, it is only to explain what must have been hitherto
mysterious even to Lord \Vellington himself,-the extra-
ordinary allnsion which M"assena made to it in úne of his
reports oC that epoch: here are nearIy his words :


.. General La Croix, when scouring the country widl
his cavalry, feH in with a British division, which he com-
pelled to retire across the Douro, after destroying several
hundreds of its number, and capturing six hundred." The
fact is, that after the charge 1 mentioned, La Croix recon-
noitred the defensive position which 1 took up at the Vouga
Bridge, and not having any infantry to support hÍl,n, made
no attempt to force it, hut quietly fell back upon his army.


In olle of the passages which 1 have already quoted,
your Lordship seems to imagine, that if Massena did not
tum fhe Busaco position on the 27th, it was probably be-
cause he conceived me to have arrived at Sardao. But
besides that circumstances had already made him ac-
quainted with my small number, he had been enubled also
to trace my motions up to the 23d of September, when his
army was between m"e and the vmage yon mention, and
that 1 was then moving in an opposite direction.


1 had made an attack upon the escort of his heavy artil-
lery on the 20th, at aplace called Raanz or Rantz, on the




OF CORltESPONDENCIC. 309


road from Trancoso to Viseu, and 1 subsequentIy moved
upon Moimento da Beira, and towards Lamego.


Upon the occasion 1 alIude to, we captured two officers
and one hundred men; but, although:.r was disappointed in
my principal object, that of seizing upon the park of artil-
lery, which 1 am persuaded might have been effected had
1 been accompanied by a detachment of British dragoons,
the atrair was in so far fortunate, that according to the
aceount given ofit by General Pampalona, who was then in
l\Iassena's army, and has sínce published a memoir of this
eampaign, it essentialIy eontributed to the defeat of the
enemy on the 27th. The eseort was obliged to faH baek a
day's mareh upon Trancoso ; Massena's ad vanee was by this
mean s delayed during two days; and it was preeisely in this
interval that Lord Wellington was enabled to pass his
army from the left to the right of the Mondego, and with-
out molestation to oecupy the position of Bnsaco.


It was after tbis affair that 1 was ordered by General
Bareelar, who commanded in the north ofPortngal, to march
to Sardao by Oporto, rather than by the more direct but
more diflicult route ofPedro do Sul-an error which Lord
Wellington publicly animad verted upon, but in which he
was aware that 1 had not in any degree participated. Bar-
celar, in fact, conceived the intention of the order he re-
eeived tobe for the protection of Oporto; and for the first
time of his life perhaps, for he was conscientiously obe-
dient, he took upon his responsibility to act upon his own
prívate opinion.


As a matter secondary to that whieh had induced me to




310 API>El\"DIX


trouble your Lordship with this very protracted communi~
cation, 1 beg leave to observe to you, that in your mention
of the recapture of Coimbra, you made the following mis~
takes:


1st, That event took place on the 7th, not the 9th of
October. 2dly, General MilIer's corps was not present in
the attack-it only arrived on the following day, and mine
alone had been engaged upon the occasion. And, 3rdly,
Thcre were very nearly five thousand prisoners taken, in-
cluding one hundred and fifty-seven officers-not four thou-
sand as you have stated.


1 would here conclude this long letter, by requesting your
Lordship to make every allowance for the anxiety which
had induced me to address it to you; but on reading it
over, 1 findit incumbent upon me to devote a few lines, at
its termination, as a tribute due from me in recollection of
the intrinsic good qualities of the militili. soldiers who were
under my command during the war in the Península. It
has happened that the· mention 1 have already made
of them, has represented them, as a body, in unfavor~
able colours; and such only was the picture 1 could draw
of them at the period then before me; but from my gene-
ral experience of the individual characters of the men who
composed my corps during the several campaigns that J
eommanded it, 1 do not hesitate in my opinion, that
no better material s could be found to form excellent sol-
diers: they were patient when under great privations;
temperate in their habits ;-obedient to their superiors;-
and they possessed at once a constitutiollal bravery, which
only required adequate discipline to be usefully called into
action; and as much, if not more, perhaps, of genuine




OF CORltESPONDENCE. 3] 1
patriotism than the natives of any other country in Europe,
with the exception only of our own.


1 have the honour to remain, my Lord, your Lordship's
mo¡;;t obedient humbIe servant,


.N. TRANT,
l\fajor-generaI in the Portuguese ser vice,


and late Lieut.-Colone! British.


Letler ¡roin Lord Londonderry io Major-General
Sir N. Trant.


Holdernesse House, July 21st, 1828.
Sir,


1 am honoured with your Ietter of this day's date, and
1 am entirely ready to acknowledge that your statements
of the facis you describe may be more authentic than the
information 1 have detailed in the part of my book to which
you have alluded, as regards the conduct and services of
yourself and corps under your command.


In great military operations, various views will be taken,
and different opinions formed; and it is difficuIt to com-
bine the sentiments of officers on abstraet details.


My object has been, without wishing to give offence tú
any of my brother officers, to eoUeet a general precis for
future historians of those eampaigns which 1 witnessed;
and 1 eoneeive 1 can in no better way answer the object
your commullication has in view, as bearing upon my
History of the Peninsular War, than by publishing the
same, together with this answer, in the Appendix to thc
next edition of my work.


1 have the honour to be,
Sir,


&e. &e. &e.
(Sip;ned) VANE LONDONDERRY.




3]2 APl'ENDlX


FrulIl Lieutenallt-General Sir H. Fane to {lle ltlarquis
of Londonderry.
Avon-Ringwood, 14th August, 1828.


My dear Lord Londonderry,
1 have only recently found leisure for reading your


" N arrative of the Peninsular 'Var."
Taking for granted that, where the proceedings of named


individuals are detailed, you will be desirous of having auy
material errors pointed out, 1 take the libel'ty of addressing
you; and of calliug your atteution to the following quoted
passage in the .said work, relative to me.


At page 465, 466, Quarto Editi.ou, you write as follows :
" General Fane, with a brigade ofPortuguese cava1ry, ac-
companied by several guns and a howitzer, had been passcd
over the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march along
the southern bank of the ríver, and to destroy, if possible,
any boats which he might observe in progress cf prepa-
mtion at Santarem, 01' elsewhere. He had obeyed theso
orders, and kept up a long and warm cannonade on the
enemy's incipient flotilla; but his howitzer having been
disabled, his round-shot proved of little utility; and, as no
attempt teas made wít/¡ the Congreve rockets, which now
for the first time migltt ltave been brollght inlo play, the
enemy succeeded in completing the task which thcy had
begun, and in furnishing themselves with ample mean.'>
to cross the river at pleasure."


1 bcg leave to trouble your Lordship with copies of parts
of tltrf'c dispatches 01' mille, dated the 8th., 12th, alle! lGth
of No\'('rnber, 1810.




OF COltltESPON-DENCE. 313


Almeirim, 8th November.
My Lord,


1 am just returued to this place after having reconnoitred
thc whole river as hig'h as the mouth of the Zezere.


The number of boats we have been able to discover is as
follows:


1st, Below Santarem, in a creek 2
At Santarem 3


&c. &c. &c.
To Lord Wellington, &c. &c.


Almeirim, 12th N ovember, 1810.
My Lord,


From a spy sent over the river, by my desire, by Colo-
nel Mestre, and from a peasant who escaped from San-
tarem last night by swimming the river, 1 learn that there
certainly is a large quantity of rnaferials collected in the
Pra~a. He states himself to have been made to work
daily, and that he was employed in the Pra~a three days
ag'o; that he saw as many as twelve boats at least, and
a great quantity of plank, poles, &c. which, he says, are
piled as high as the roofs of the houses.


As the attempt t'o destroy these will be attended with
the destruction of the Iower town, 1 shall take no step
until 1 receive your Lordship's further instructions. The
materials cannot be made use of in the present sta~e of
the river; therefore no ill consequence can arise from my
delaying, &c. &c. &c.


'1'0 Lord W clling'ton, &c. &t:.




314 AI'PENDIX


The reply to this last dispatch, was a desire tbat 1 should
try what could be done; and on the 16th of November 1
wrote as follows :


Almeirim, 16th N ovember, 1810.
My Lord,


I have to make known to you that 1, this morning, ac-
cording to your wishes, endeavoured to set fire to the ma-
terials collected by the enemy in Santarem.


We fired forty- two 32-pounder carcass rockets; four or
five of which only, (I think) feH into the town; alld wbich
did not appear to me to do any damage. At any rate,
they elltirely failed in effecting my object.


Four of them burst almost immediate\y after leaving tbe
frame, but fortunately did no injury to any one.


The range of these weapons appears to me to be too
wild to be of service, employed as we employed them; for
a town no larger than tbe lower town of Santarem, is too
small an object to be hit with any certainty, as our ex- .
perience of this morning proved. Fired into a large city
fuH of combustible materials, or amongst crowded shipping,
they certainly must have a most terrific effect; particularly
if fired in tlights of 30 or 40 together. Going, however,
into a town in the state Portuguese towns 1l0W are, with
little but the waUs and roof of any house remaining, I
think they will do no good." &c. &c. &c.


To Lord Wellington.




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 315


From these extracts, your Lordship will perceive,
1st, That only 5 boats could be seell at Santarem; and


tbat what others migbt have been there, were in the midst
of the town.


2ndly, That the reason why the rockets were not tried
hnmediately upon rny having the power of trying thern,
was, an apprehension tbat 1 rnight not meet the appro-
bation of the Commander of the Forces, if 1 burned the
town of Santarem.


And, 3rdly, that as soon as 1 received his sanction for
the attempt, 1 díd make it; and did "bring into play the
Congreve rockets;" and made a very fuH report to the
Cornmander of the Forces of rny having so done, and of


. my opinion relative to tbese missiles.
The rockets were under the control of Lieutenant Lind-


sey, of the Royal Artillery; who was the officer specially
appointedfor their management.


U nder these circumstances, 1 am at a loss to imagine
how your Lordship's statemellt, that" no attempt was made
with tbe Congreve rockets, when they mighthave been
brought into play," can have been inserted in your Nar-
rative; and 1 cannot but tbink that. you will desire to cor-
rect tbis statement, should anotber edition of your work
be called foro


1 am, rny dear Lord Londollderry,
Very faithfully yours,


To the Marquess of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &c.


H. FANE.




316 APPENDIX


-


Answer from Lord Londonderry io Lieulenant-General
Sir H. Fane.


Wynyard Park, August 17,1828.
M Y Dear Sir Henry,


1 ha ve to acknowledge the receipt of your Ietter of the
14th instant.


In my advertisement you will observe that the defi-
ciency of my narrative is at once admiUed; and under
these circumstances, I had hoped it would meet with in-


, dulgence, especialIy from my friends and brother officers.
1 am anxious, you may be assured, to correct every


error t~at is pointed out, especialIy where the proceedings
of named individuaIs are detailed; and 1 shall send you!"
commnnications togethel' with this answel', to be inserted
in the Appendix to the 3rd edition, 8vo. which is just
coming out.
. 'Vithout entering into discussion, 1 shall only say, I


wrote from the best information 1 could procure at the
time, entircly unauthorised ol' unassisted by any body in
the army. 1 seldom or ever saw communications ad·
dressed by general officers direct to the Commander of the
Forces; and the impression at the moment at head-quarters
was, that the enemy did avail themselves of the means of
crossing the river; and it was in general report, that the.
Congreve rockets had not been brought into play. How-
ever, from your statement, this must be erroneous, and 1
shall have much pIe asure in placing your letter in my hum-
ble record before the publico


Bclieve me, my dea)' Sir Henry,
y our's very faithflllly,


VANF. LONDONIllWRY.




OF CORRESPO~DENCE. 317


Leiter Irom Ml's. E. Mattlzews to tlze Mat'quis 01 Lon-
donderry.


7, Cecil Street, Margate, September 14th, 1828.
My Loro,


Dnder the most proud though painful feelings, 1 take
tile liberty oi' addressing you, ano 1 am sure your Lordship
will pardon the intrusion when 1 explain the motive.
Having been informed that your Lordship had lately pub-
lished an admirable work on the War in the Peninsula, 1
felt "ery desirous to peruse it, but could not procure a copy
from any of the libraries of this place; but on taking up
the Kent Herald of the 28th of August last, the first ar-
ticle that met my notice was an extract from that part of
your Lordship's publication which treated of the Battle of
Albut<ra, the impressive description ofwhich renewed again
in my breast painful feelings, which time had in sorne mea-
sure softened, though not healed. The subject to which 1
allude, is the notice your Lordship has been pleased to par-
ticularly take of the gallant conduct of my nephew, Ensign
Thomás of the Bnffs, who feH in that battle, bravely de-
fending acolour of his regimento The little hero was bom
in Jamaica, and being an orphan, was committed to my
care at the age of four years, and was,edncaíed and pro-
vided for by my husband Doctor Matthews, who was tnen
surgeon of the same regimento The extract, as 1 read it,
with respect to his endeavouring to preserve the colour by
the forfeiture of his life, was not the only act of heroism
performed by him on that memorable day, and which your
Lordship probably 1I0t being aware of, 1 will take the
liberty ofmentioning. He had, previously to his regiment's
being broken by the French cavalry, taken the commano of




318 APPENDIX


Captain Stevens' company, there being no other subaltern
but himself attached to the company, and the Captain being
wounded ot the commencement of the battle, The circum-
stances are detailed by Captain Stevens in a leUer he wrote
Doctor Matthews from Olivenza four days after the action,
which letter 1 have now before me, and beg leave to trans-
cribe an extract from it for your Lordship' s inforrnation, under
the impression that it might not be displeasing to you, as
tbe Author of tbe History of a War which terminated so
gloriously to the British name, to be made acquainted with
anyadditional minutia which your Lordship might in sorne
fnture edition thillk of sufficient value to be recorded.


The extract runs thus: "1 cannot refrain from tears,
while 1 relate the determined bravery of your gallant little·
subaltern, who feIl on the 16th instant, covered with gIory;
and it must in some measure alleviate the grief 1 know you
will feel at his 10SB, to know that he felllike a hero. He
rallied my company after 1 was wounded and taken pri-
soner, crying out, ' Rally on me, men, 1 will be your pivot.'
Such glorious conduet must surely meet its reward in
that world where a11 troubles cease, and aU grief is at an
end. He was buried witb all the care possible, by a ser-
jeant and private, the only two survivors out ,of my com-
pany. which consisted of sixty-three when taken into
action." The colours he died in protecting, it appears he
took possession of at the moment the officer who held
them was killed, his company being dispersed. This
gaUant little fellow was not sixteen years of age, when
he so bravely sacrificed his life for the honour of his
King and country. His 10ss was, and is still most painfully
felt by me, for he was as truly amiable in his private life,
as he was gallant and brave in performing his duty to his
King and coulltry as a.soldier. With mally apologíes for the




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 319


liberty 1 have taken, which 1 am sure your Lordship will
excuse as the effusion of grateful . feeJings for the kind
manner in which you was pleased to call to notice the re-
membrance of one so near and dear to me,


I havethe honour to be,
My Lord,


y our Lordship's Most obedient,
Humble servan,t,


ELIZ. A. MATTHEWS.
To the Right Honourable


The Marquis of Londonderry,
&c. &c. &e.


Letler from M1·S. Craufurd, widow of General Roberl
Craufurd, to Lord Londonderry; and Answer.
My Lord,


1 have lately fead, with strongly awakened feelings,
your Lordship's account of the Peninsular War. It has
brought before me the observations and opinions upon it 1
was used to hear, in a remarkable degree, and placed me
where 1 was when listening to them.


The tribute to the memory of him from whom 1 heard
them has called forth the deepest emotion.-At the close
of the book, 1 am led to address a few words to your
Lordship, not that 1 would presume to trespass on yon
with a detail of the feelings of an individual almost un-
known to you, and after the lapse of a number of years,
since the onJy link between us was broken, but because 1
am anxions to beg as a favour of your Lordship, that you
will have the goodness to direet the publisher in any




320 A PPENDIX


future editions of the work to correct the spelling of the
name; which, being peculiar to the Craufurds, to whom
my husband belonged, is often 1pistaken, and is so in your
Lordship's work. It is a point of no great moment on
most occasions, but very important to myself and to my
family on this.


\Vith every grateful and gratified sentiment,
J have the honour to be,


My Lord,
y our Lordship's


Obliged Servant,
M. F. CRAUFURO.


Dawlish, 16th Octoher, 1828.


Dear Madam,
J. am hOlJoured with your letter. J feel much flut-


tered that my humble testimony to your husband's glori-
ous career should have met your approbution. Those who
knew him onlyas an officer, appreciated, as they deserved,
his science, skill, and matchless bravery ;those who re-
garded him also as a friend, (as J did,) never can forget
him. 1 shall send your note and this answer to m y pub-
lisher, as the best way of having your wishes complied
with.


I have the honour to be, &c.
VANE LONDONDERRY.




OF CORRESPONDENCE.


Major-General Sir J. Wilson to the
Marquis of Londonderry.


321


2, Somerset Street, Portman Square, 3rd Dec. 1828.
My Lord,


Having only very recently had an .opportunity of peru-
sing your Lordsbip's work entitled " Narrative of the War
in Spain and Portugal," I have noticed an error or two
respecting myself which 1 feel extremely anxiolls to have
corrected; and as I now find that the third edition is on
the eve of publication, 1 take the liberty of addressing
your Lordship with this view ere the new edition meet the
public eye. 1 am quite contident from your Lordship's
high mílitary feeling and sen se of justice, that you will
readily concur in the correction of a paragraph, which
1 cannot doubt upon your Lordship's pemsal of the fol-
lowing explanation will appear to require it. The pa-
ragraph in question, p. 481, is as follows: " In the mean-
while, Trant and Ba~ellar were on the alert at Coimbra;
and Wilson, retreating from Espinhel, thr~w himself
with his corps on the other side of the Mondego. The
lattet movement was indeed, on one account, a subject of
regret to us, inasmuch as it deprived us of our readiest
and surest source of intelligence, which could henceforth
be obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was made
under the impression that a further continuance in Espin-
hel would be hazardous, and could not be risked." The
facts were plainly these: In December, 1810, 1 occupied
Espinhel and other small villages on the Thomar road,
with about 1500 mili tia and a' detachment of Portuguese
cavalry, the enemy being strongly posted in my front at
Cabac;os, from. which point he had lately compelled me to
faH back after two sharp attacks upon my isolated corps,


VOL. JI. x




322 APPENDIX


being then full thirty miles or more from Coimbra, the
nearest support. At this time .Drouet's reinforcement to
MasseDa's army entered Portugal, taking the Ponte de
Marcella road; aDd as the enemy progressively closed
iD upon my rear, those in my front moved to give their
hands to him. It now became imperative upon me, iD order
either to avoid being hemmed in by an overwhelming force
approachiDg iD my froDt and rear, or being cut off from
GeDeral Ba~ellar's army, of which my divisioD formed tbe
advanced guard, to throw myself across the Mondego j but
as soon as the enemy presented his flaDk, 1 re-crossed the
river, and at Corvo, not far from Espinhel, had an affair
with his rear guard, makiDg Dear a hundred prisoDers, and
posting myself as near as 1 could to the latter village,
where Dr~~et's corps halted sorne days, thus recoveriDg


. the former !ine of commUltication with the grand army by
the Zezere and Abrantes; (for these movements 1 refer to
Lord WelliDgton's dispatches of January 1811;) but my
subsequent removal from this line of country a few
days afterwards, was whoUy independent of what was
occurring near me, to the south of the Mondego; it was
the result of other causes, which were these: In the mean
time Silveira's movements had brought Claparede's divi-
sion UpOD him, and the enemy meeting with no serious
resistance in his advance, entered Lamego without oppo-
sition, Silveira retiring to the right bank of the Douro.
The enemy's rapid advaDce upon Lamego necessarily gave
General Ba~ellar considerable alarm for the safety of
Oporto and the lipe of the Douro, the defence ofwhich
was one of the principal objects committed to his charge.
He, therefore, ordered Miller's division and mine tI} hasteD
to Silveira's supp~rt, expecting that some stand would
be made in a country ful! of pl}sitions, in order to cover




OF CORRESPONDENCE. 323


Lamego, and enable us to eo-operate with him; but before
we eould arrive, he had erossed the Douro at Pezo de
Regoa with preeipitation.


From this simple statement of faets it will appear evi-
dent-


1st, That when 1 threw myself aeross the Mondego,
it was to avoid being erushed by a superior force closing
upon me in front and rear, and that it was not then, the
ineonvenience alluded tO\ by your Lordship eould have
been felt; for having immediately afterwards re-erossed
the river, the former eommunieation with head-quarters
was presently restored.


2ndly, That when sorne days after tbis, my distant
removal from the south of the Mondego to tbe Douro took


. place, thereby suspending the more direet eommunieation
witb head-quarters, it was tbe eonsequenee of positive
orders 1 -reeeived to move in an opposite direetion against
the enemy, wbo was t.hen seriously rnenacing the line of
tbe Lower Douro, and to whom the glove bad hastily been
thrown down in that quarter, without any adequate exer-
tion -having beeo made to redeem it. In neither the one
case nor the other did I then aet from any impression of
my own; but from an unavoidable necessity eaused by the
movements of the enerny, as well as in eonformity with
the orders 1 received ; and if in this there was any thing
that formed a subject of regret to the army, it is to the
causes 1 have just endeavoured to explain, and to these
aloue they ought to be attributed.


1 have the honor to be,
y our Lordship's most obedient,


Humble Servant,
JOHN WU.SON,


Major-General.




324 APPENDIX OF CORRESPONDENCE.


The Marquis of Londonderry lo Major-General
Sir J. Wilson.


Wyoyard Park, Dec.15th, 1828.
Sir,


1 am honored with your letter, and shall have much
satisfaction in inserting it in the Appendix of the 3rd
edition of my work which is now coming out.


1 had much rather give your fuH explanation, than pro-
ceed to any partial correction of my own. My wish has
been only to record events as far as 1 was acquainted
with them, and 1 feel much pleasure in any explanation or
elucidation being afforded by the parties concerned.


1 have the honor to be,
y our obedient Servant,


VANE LONDONDERRY.


END OF THE CORRESPONDENCE.




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No. I.
State of the Forees in Portugal under the eommand of Lieutenant-gencral Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.


Head-quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1S0t).


General Officers
commanding


Brigades.
Stations. Regiments.


I
l · D ' Alterations since las! 'O


I SerJeants. rumrs. Rank and File. R " ,,; elurn. "'"t:I
, • ~ ~ g'.,
~ 2 ~ . 4 4' ..¿,.¿ C':S"C


" ." .. >-. "t:I"t:I 'O ",. .,...:. P:;CQ ~2. a ~ w E~ ~ ~.! § ~ § ... ~~bDt~~ ~~ ~ j ~ 'g 2 ~ • 2 ~ ~ s ffi • E 2 . $3 -: a) ~ ~ ..¿ ~ "E .~ ~ o ~ '-g ~
.3 .~ ~ g '00 ~ ~ u ~ ..:sa s ~.!:I:I E ~ .!;( S .5 ~"'3 ~ C'd ~ <n ~ § § 'Tj Q) Q)


Officers.


j j ~ Ó j ~ cñ &0 ~ J3:5 ~ J1:3 ~ Ji 8 ~ ~;;;E ~ o Ci o ~ ~ ~ cC ~ ~
------11--11:--------11 ------- --:--- ---------1-----------


B. G. Fane {


M. G. Colton {


B. G; H. camPbel{


M. G. Hill {


M. G. Tilson r
B. G. A. Campbcll f


B. G. Cameron r I
B. G. R. Stewart {


B. G. Sontag r
M. G .lVl'Kenzie r


B. G. Langworth {


5 3rd Dn. Guards , 1 2 ¡ 10 5 5 4 3fi ., .. 8 ... , 045 10. . 655: 60~" l1304
t 4th Dragoons . 2 2 S 9 (j 6 6 37 .... b .... (;59 13.. 6721 702.. 5


(14th Lt. Do. . 2 2 7 15 1 4 6 3, ... 2 8.... 579 21 71 6711 506.. }
, 20th Lt. Do. . ..] 1 4. . 1 2 14 1 3 3 l.. :l18 4 60 2821 188,. 1 1 1463


) Srd Do. K. G. L. . .. " 2 ].. 2 6 ., 4 .... 1 49 2 72 ]2~1 61.,
{" 16th Lt. Do. . l 1 6 15 ].1 6 6 3h.. 1 8 .... 617 20 34 671 665 ..


( 1st Bn. Coldm. Gds. , b.. 10 .• 14: 5 69 5 2 22.... 1102 75 1 11"8 1 .. ~
~ 1st Bn. 3rd Gds. 1 Ú 1 12 .. 14 5 6~ 2 2 16 4.. 1133 73 ti 1212 ~2292


l 1 Co. En. 60th o o ••• o 1 ]. . . , 3 1 'o 1... . S7 3, . (]O o. • •• , ., J
"3rd or Buft's o.. 1 7 14 (j 2 33 ;¡ '2 18 2.. 668 99 3~ 805 .. .. .... 4.. }


, (j6t.h Fo"t 2nd Bn. . '" o 1 g 14 10 6 311 2 1 1& 1 .. a1ó 38 9 662 1 ,. 2001
) 48th Do. Do. .. 1 2 7 13 !! 4 3u z.. ]4 2.. 667 48.. 715


{" 1 Co. 5th Bn. 60th o o ••• , 1 1. . . . 3 l.. 1... . 67 3. . 60 f 5th Co. Do. .... 2 3 3 6 2 19 .. " 8 .... 'rT7 32 l! 311 ")
) 88th Foot, 1st Bn. . o • o 2 8 15 5 4 S!, .. " 15 .. ' . ~50 143 28 721 ¡1439


{ 87th Do. 2nd Bn. "" 2 G 17 8 5 38 .... 14.... 6]2 88 1 701 .J
f7thDo.2ndBn. .. 1 .. 817 .. 5 21¡ 4 2 13 .... 515 46 , 572 ~


) 53rd Do. 2nd Bn. .. 1 2 5 6 9 6 36 1 1 16 1.. 635 571 2 691 (1206
t.. 1 Cn. 5 th Bn. 60th .... 1 1 1 1 2 {j .." 2 .. .. 56 11 1 61; .J


(9th Foot, 2nd Bn. .. .. 1 6 11; 2 5 3~ lU ~ 9 7.. ~9!; 21U! 20 728 J ! 8Srd Do. Do. .. 1 1 !.< 17 12 5 46 2 1 19.,., 163 7I! 22 856 1316
L 1 Co. 5th Bn. 60th o o • o •• 1 l. . . . 4 .' .. 1 .. ,. 55 31 1 59


5 1st Bn. Dts. I 1 5 15 f. 5 48 9 4 9 2.. 14] 157 20 918 12 ., 4 .. 1 1 , 1290
~ 29th Regl. .. I 1 ti 15 3 6 2(; ¡; 2 15 3.. 549 7ti 5 630 ~ S 2nd Bn. Dts. .. 1 , 7 17 !J 4 SO 9 ~ ]0 1 o 133 211 14 958 3.. J


:1 97th Regl. .. 1 2 6 8 5 4 3~ 4 ~ 19... SI: 70 17 604 1 .. 1307
ti Co. 5th Hn. 60th o o o o •• •• 2. o •• :1 2.. 1." 51 4.. (jI


(27th Foot, Srd Bn. o 1 3 U 10 8 4 42 ... , 22.,. 658 134 2 794 ~ ! 45th 1st Ditto lIS 6 Il 4 34 .. .. 18.. . 615 125 27 767 S( 1980
L 31 s t 2nd Do. o.. 1 7 11 b 4 37 2 2 17". 107 97 4 808


{


5th Bn. K. G. L. o .. ] 7 12 8 4 31 b 1 14 1" ~71 92 11 774 1 1 1
7t


o


h Do. Do. o '. 2 Ii 10 4 5 SI; ., 1 14 2.. 631 81 9 721 2 .. 2 ., 2769
2nd Do. Do. J 2 7 15 7 6 37 :1 1 15." . 146 49 8 803 1


1st Do. Do. . o 2 10 19 3 2 32 4 J 12' 3.. 121 11 ¡; 8 847 ........
2~th Foot. 2nd Bn. '2 5 7 3 2" ... o 22, o •• 100 26 3 72!l


30th Do. Do. 1 '. 2 6 5 6 29 2 é 14 2" 398 4ó 189 632 .. 1
rndts. Co. K. G. L. ¡~.... 1 2.. .. 4 . o •• l ... '1 30 14 4 48


Total"I a 32~~m; M/ll93 137 24 1097;¡; ~ 42332 1 mo1238g ~90 22580, -28-1-.(' ..... -<. 'c-I-E .... 2-·-. -1. -13"7'] -;]
I :




No. n.
State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, and Royal Engineers,


Head Quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1809.


Oflieers. Serjeants.


.;


]1'1 ~ "O 'T.. ._ ::.J S .'~ ~
':¡::s U


~ g ~
~ ~ ~ .¿


ce :::::l ';::::;->.. ~ .&~J5~.S
~ ~ ~ ~ ..::.= 8 ~~~~~8


Drumrs.


El.! 1 ~ ~ ~
;lo W U


~
~


Rank and File.


.,;
'"' 00


.,;
§


a
a


o
U


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o


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~


Alterations
.inee lasto


-d .r;;
'" ." ~1'1~] ] !l) "'O.l:: 1004 rn


.S ffi .~ ~ ~ '::::<::<::<~


Civil Braneh.


." .


<1 ~
.. ... ....


o o ~..: ~ ~
~t;'031~


"ss.:.gi ª S>.¡"'=~·...t 8~ G 8~ !í E-<
-------!l-I-I--'--I-II_II __ '_' __ II_I_I __ II __ ' __ ' __ '__ II __ '__ 11_1_1_1_1_11 __ '_' __ ' __


t Artillery British Drivers
f Artillery


German .)
\.. Drivers


Engineers


Wn. Tn. attaehed lo Artillery


Waggon Train


31 .. 1 10


.. ,11 5


1, .. 3


11 15 " .. 8 11 5


61' '11 4 12 1 ••
6 7 , ..


7 , .. 1)


•• ,"'1 •• 1 , •.


8 1"11.' 2, .. 1 ••


21 .. 111 5 14 5


2 "'11 •• 3 11 1)


22 2 161 12 l •..
911


283


1 244


5912861 628


311 2111921457115291146" .. ,., •. , •. ,."


3111 2 179 2711021 308 •• I 1, .. l. o" •
14\ 61 24117111 182 5111. o¡ •• , •• 1. O,"


25 26


56 14 771247


62 20 12 94 lO, •• , .• J • .o".


Total •• 1I4111-;-~~I-;II~II33l;;l2~11712IuI1990 IMsIW31193Illmlmll¡-;;I7I~I~IJI-2 16r¡;-I~-




No. lB.
Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Battle of Oporto, 10th, 11th, and 12th May, 1809, under the command of


Lieutenunt-general Sir Arthur Wellesley.


KiIled. Wounded. lVIi;sing. Total.


!Í oi iI:i .j, oi lI:i .; 'ti oi '" .~~ '" 00 ~ tl ~ al := tl .; . f "ó Corps. ti) .<: .., e ~
-= ~ ~ ....... If~ . -= . 2 ...... en E-< • <l " . ~ ~ )j '" ~ El )j en '" S )j • i':l " . ~ El .'d -= en e rñ ~ .: ~ al -= o: ;: ¡:: ca -= ~ e ~ 'a


" " ';; ~ OJ., ~ ... ... .~ "
,.. ~ -c; '" ~


- ""
¡'j "E ..>4


'" ~ ¡:¡ ..>4 Q) o '" - ",,'" 6 ..>4 " .., ct ~ ¡:¡ .... '" o .., .~ 'g ~~ .~ .~ !3 .~ '" o .., .~ ~ 'P 2 ª -= . .." " " ~ .~. f/l ¡:;. E á " ~ª" " ~ 'f ¡:; " " '" '" ... '" '" '" ~ '" '" ¿s8 ........ J]~Q:; ;,:¡;;'¡ ú~ " '" ;::¡~ ;,:¡::a )::1 a; ;::¡o:: (.;) ;.:3>2 if.!;::¡ o:: (.;) ....en .... if.! u
-.-


-


1


.I.:¡:rr· 1 .. 1 .. 31 35 1 .. 49 50 11" 1 .. 16 17
. .. o, o, .. 4 4


1 .. .. ....
"


10
J 1


1 1
21 2


~ >, Royal Engineers
.: :E 14 th Light Dragaons .. 12 1 1 18


() .c Srd Foot, 1st Batt. 7 12
~~. 48th D". 2nd Do. 3 1. I~
~ '" ~ 60th Do. 5th Do. 4
~ ~ ~ 66th Do. 2nd Do. 1 1 7


- o 18t Batt. Detachments l' .
Jfo 1st Line Batt.K.G.L. 1"


:.§ Rifle Companies .. , .. ,. '1"""""'1 .. " .. 1 •• 1 .. 1 .. 1 •• 1 •• 1 •• 1 :1
-< ;::¡ General and Staft' Officers ...... .. .. .. .. .. 2


21' 'l"l"l"!""'" '11 2 -.-.-.-,-,-,-,-,,-,-,- -,-,-,-,-,-,,-,-,-1-1-1-1-1-;\\--; -; -; -; -:-.riT~ U2 l23 General Total. .11 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1~3112 1 3 121 3 l .. 11 l .. 18711 .. 1 •• 1 •• , ..


N ames of Officers killed and wounded. Remarks.
RECAPITULATION.


16th Lt. Dragoons, Major L. Stallhope
Do. Lientenant Tomkinson


1St Bn. Detach. Capto Ovens (38th Regt.)
Do. Do. Lieutenant Woodgate (52nd Do.)


1st En. K.G.L. Capto Detinerillg
2nd Do. Do. Capto Lan!(hren


Rifle COSo Do. Lieutenant Lodders
Staft', Lient. Gen. The Han. E. Paget {


Do. Capto Hill, A.D.C. to Majar Gen. Hill


Slightly
Severely


Slightly
Do.


Killed
Slightly
Severely


Lost his right arm,
doillg well


Slightly


lI:i
'" Dates. 11'15


'" ..


"
" '" ;,:¡


-.


Killed.



'" ~ . ri ~


.;
" .


m <tJ
. " " en <: El )j ~ '§ .8 So ~ El ~


'-' .:>. '" .- '~;:I ¡:::
'" '"


'" ~ ... .. '" 2~ ~~ J5~~
- --


----


Wonnded. Missing.


lI:i m ~ lI:i
'"


tl '" ti) ~ . f .;::¡ 00 a
""


if.!
. .; ~ ~ a ., " ~ rñ " ¡:: .'d E iJ o: ¡:: en .., ... ,.. .~ " '; ~


" "
" o " ~ ~.~ ; ~ '" S en '" o: . .." .., " " . .." 0..::: 00 .~


'" '"
.:>.'" ~~~ '" '" '" c3~ -= ... '" '-;,:¡¿S u .... o:: ;,:¡;; ¡


.... Jl
-


- -
-


--.
-


- -- - -
-



a;:;;


...""
8.'d


¡:¡ ....
" a ... ..
;::¡~


--


14th Light Dragoons, Majar Harvey { 10th May, 180911 ............ _ ... .. 1 •• o- o. _. o- 3 .. •• o • o. o. o.· •..


Total.


'ti
f! e . ~ rQ § . 5 5


f cti .S ~ e 2 6
Q,) ti ~ .- .~ el) E § .~ ~ g ~ .~ e


(.;);;'¡'-1;.:3¡;.]Jlo
-- - --


.. 1 •• o, o ••• ..



~


.'d
....


'" ¡; 'O~ E-<
-


3
" Do. Captain Hawker


Do. Lient. Knif'e


Lost his rigbt arm,
doing well


Slightly
Do. Uth Do. Do. . d. dI 1. .111 .. 1 .. 11911 .. 1 .. 12141 .. 131 .. 1 6311· -l .. 1 .. 1 •. 1..1 .. 1211411 .. 1 .. 13141113121 9611109


3rd Foot, or Buft's, Lieut. Monaghan
48th Fo"t, Majar Er,kine


66th Do. l\I8j<Jr l\Inrray
Do. Capto Benning
Royal Engineers, Lieut. Geo. Hamilton
~ Lient. ----Portuguese .. E . ( nslgn----


Do.
Slightly


Severely
Slightly


Severely
Wonnded


KiIled


12th Do. Do. ~¡~l" U· 'IJ' '1~11~1~12'~1' 'I~ I"I~:I" '1' '!j' '1~1~1~1~¡1~1~1~1~¡~¡~1~1~~11~23
.... ~1..~ .. r. 42 2 " 417 14t 153 [1 .. [ .... 2 16 2 4 5 7 I " 2211 236




I ~c
No. LV.


State of the Forces in Spaill and Portugal, under the commalld of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.
Head Quarters Placencia, 15th July, 1809.


- ¡;
Drmrs·!1


Alterations.
.:i Offieers. Serjeants. Rank and File. Horses. ~ .~ ~ lI1en. Horses. i~' ~ IV rz _:~ .S a ---1 ----... o General Officers


ro
:;.¡


. 1
i. l • .e;'""'Oü~ I'l.- commauding Regiments. Stations. o; ro 'O


'"" ·1"8 '" -"" " '" ..¿ ..¿ ..¿ ..¿ ~cdc:..r~ '" I;r~ <=: ;;
'""


""O r~ '" h~ Brigades. ro o ro 00 -n " " " § ~i~ " "'C 2l g ~~~O) ~ e E
" I " '" "' ' .... '" 'O ro '0; " ;;:: • El I ;:¡ ..¿ ....:I~ t::~ o " a a: ~ ;:; :;.¡ ... oh :;g " & ~ ~ ;ji E ¡, S " ... ..¿ . '" .:2., ;:;., " 'en ~ ..; ~ g El ..; § ~Iii ~ e a; u " : § p::; .:e!' " 'O '" '" <lo r.:l :;, u t: ~ J1 o t: .;:: '0 ~I~ O~ o ~ " p:¡ :;.¡ ;¡ :2 U ~ iñ W U ¡:.. cnu U E-< o... if) (; -, ¿; p::; ;::::; ~ U-


--- ----


B. G. Falle S 3rd Du. Guards Camp Placencia .. 1 2 ti 9 5 4 4 30 4 2 7 .... 5:19 67 ¡¡g t;(J5 582 .. o. o. o' o. o • o ••• o. 8 1 :! ..
} 1081 ~ . " t 4th Dragaolls Do. :! 2 8 10 ~ ti 5 28 2 7 8 .... 552 54 5~ 6¡¡4 055 3 .... 0= ..


11
•• o. .... •• o. o, o. o •• , ~ S 14th Lt. ])ns. Do. 2 1 6 14 1, ti 211 4


"
7 1 411:i 54 110 ¡¡4!1 fíO(; .. 1 .. 1 .. .. 9 ....


} 1014 S 304 ~~ M. G. eotton .. "1 • , o. .- .. t 16th Do. Do. Do. .. .. 1 7 14 3 4 (j 32 1 4 H .. .. 519 73 62 654 líO'¡ .. ,. o. o • o ••• .. .. o- •• 4 ....
B. G. Anson ~ 23rd Do. Do. Do. .. 2 1 8 14 11 5 4 33 .. 1 !) ..


"1 41:)0 45 3 52~ fi:!1 •• o. o. , . o. o. o. o. o. o, 5 .... } 952 - t 1st Do. K. G. L. Do. 1 1 6 8 51 4 (j :!5 3 5 Ü .. ,172 75 20 5()7 587 1 .. 3 .... ..
. ~I •• o. .. o. o. o, o • .. S 1st lIn. Coldm. Gds. Do. .. 8 .. 10 I 121 4 .. 62 8 3 20 2 986 118 .10 1184 .. o •• _ 1 1 .. o. o, •• " o. o- ... ~ 1 ~ B. G. H. Campbell Do. 1 ,í 1 7 .. .1.:11 3 .. 55 11 4 19 1 "li 1025 lGl 13 1200 .. :; t 1st Do. 3rd Do. I 1 .. :: 52068 ~ 1 Ca. ¡¡Oth Do. •• o- .. 1 .. . . .. 4 .. 1 .... ' 5¡¡ 1 1 58 .. S" 6bt Foot. 1st Bn. l\1arching to jo;n .. 1 2 7 17 7 :; .. 40 4 1 I 18 2 I 1I S~O 5U 13 883 ..


.. ¡l4"r .ll B. G. Cameron t !:I3rd Do. 2nd Do. Camp PlacencÍa .. 1 1 8 22 (Ji fi 3fi 5 1:1 15 4 .. ' 537 26~ 31 850 .. .. 1 fIl . 1 Ca. 60th Oo. .... .. J 1 I "3 4 .. 1 .. .. 1 51 4 4 5U .. O B.G.Low ~ 5th Ln. Bn. K. G. L. Camp Galistia •• lo 1 5 II 7 32 8 2 13
2 "1' 60fi 142 26 774 .. .. 3 .. l1151 ..¡ l 7th Do. Do. Do. o, •• 2 4 10 5 5 .. 38 4 2 14 .. 545 158 25 72H ..


.. ~ f 1st Do. Do. Do. .... 2 7 l() (j 4 .. 211 4 ¡¡ 11 4.. 506 110 7 713 ..


:: 1m6 1-- B. G. Langworth t 2nd Do. Do. Do. .. 1 2 7 15 6 (j .. 37 3 1 14 1 .. I 67!J 97 14 790 .. 1st aud 2nd Ln. Do. ])0. " -, .. 4 4 2 1 .. 6 a 1 1 .. .. 101 39 2 142 .. $ 53rd .Fo"t 1 st lIn. Camp Placencia .. 1 1 8 1;, 5 2 .. 39 fi 10 16 5 .. 727 178 132 937 .. o. o. o. o. o, o. o- o. o- o, o •••
:: (19"} M.G.Tilso~ 66th Do. 2nd Do. Do. o, •• .. 8 13 8 4 .. 2H 2 3 13 4 .. 543 88 28 650 .. .. 1 ci { 48th 2nd Do. D". .. 1 1 5 10 7 3 .. 31 5 2 10 4 .. 591 110 2 703 .. .. J


:: j 394 ~ 1 Ca. 60th Do. ., , . .. 1 1 .. .. .. 4 .. .. 1 .. .. 52 6 1 5!! .. .. 1 flstBn. Dls. Do. .. 1 1 4 1:¡ 2 2 .. 43 8 9 7 4 .. 609 277 47 933 ..
:: }2034


B. G. R. Stewart t 48th Foot 1 st Bn. Do. .. 1 1 9 20 2 4 .. 46 3 1 17 2 .. 8:15 60 .. 885 .. '--- 20th Do. Do. Do. 1 1 ti 14 5 (j .• 30 9 3 1'; 2 500 123 H 731 .. ci·~ .. .. f 45th Vo. ])0. V cnta da liase goua .. 1 1 9 8 6 a .. 35 4 ~I ~i.3 .. 752 107 97 956 .. o, o. o ••• 2 .. .. .. o. o- o • o, ,. ~2244 .5 M. G. l\1'Kenzie t :nst Do. 2nd do. Do. .... 1 7 7 !J 3 .. 32 3 737 (;6 17 820 .. 1 .. ~tt4 24th Do. Do. ))0. .. 1 2 9 9 7 2 .. 4~ I I 22 1 75~) 1I7 22 894 ..
.. "1" 5 ~


1


II


7


---..




~
~ ~ ~


I:S:B§
o ~.~


.. S';;:
~ S'~ ~or:l


a> "


General Officers
commanding


Brigades.
Regimenta. Stations •


No. V.


CONTINUATION.


.... S . D l' d "1 I AlteratiOJlS. J .¡ Officers. ..!::: elJeants. rmrs. ..ank an ]< 1 e. Horses. ---1\-i I H . o ~ 'en. ürsps. 1 ~.:~
'" u 1


1


¡:~.c,;; Q) -rl ~ • • • ..-d""Ci. "Ó '.;::]~~
• ~ • ¡:: o '"C '"C "'O "C' (l). ClJ •• ,' ID CJ «1' ~


(f".j o rIl (c.:. rñ.w: ;:::. ;:::. ¡;:l • ¡::: bJl "'C f:: ~ ""O ,~ ~ ~ ........ ~
-- • s:: ~ ... ~ o:d - cd..... cd +J ro' '- Q;I ...... I-o~_


C) o oo..... v ~ .!:: ~ .::: e S ¡::¡ E' e ¡:; '"d • ~ .-. e2 o ~";:::.:. ~ ~ s:::I Q :1,)
o


M.G. 1I IIf5 Coso 60th Camp Malperteda


~ U .~ -[ ~ .;;1 ~ ~ ~ .:< § % ~ S 3:i ~ S ~ ~.J! S ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ E.g 5] ~ ~ ~]
o ...! ~ ro .~ ¡:: jg ~ ~ .~ o 2::.::! o ~ .~ o o ~.~ " .. 0 ·0 w ..... C) f¡ 2 ~ '" v ~ ~ .~


___ 11 !1------II~~~_'=__~I~~:1 ~ <fl_~ ~ <fl U ~_~~~,~~=- ~=_=_=_~~=_:...:¡ ~~ ~
1 41 7 5 3 21 2 2 8 1 1 268 S6 10 S14


M'KeDz;e Col. Donkin t 88th Foot 1st Bn.
87th Do. 2nd Do.


<ti I r 7th Do. Do.
. -'" n. G. A. C=Pb·1l1 t ,,'" Do. " •. O"" 1 Co. 60th S ... f 2nd En. Detach. ¡:C;u


<ti C 1 K' 97th Foot, 1 Bn. O • emmlS { 40th Do. Do.
1 Co. 60th r 43rd j.'oot, 1st En.


B. G. R. Crawfordll t 52nd Do. Do. lI;¡th Do. Do.
{5tl. Do. 2nd Do.


• . 28th Do. Do.
M. G. Llghtbournell .12nd Do. Do.


88th Do. 2nd Do. r 34th Do. Do.
B. G. C. Crawfurd (S9th Do. Do.


68th Do. Do.
Lt. Col. l\1'Lean 27th Do. Srd Do.


Major Dundas Royal 8taft' Corps
Captain Plate l. G. Co. K. G. L.


IJo.
1)0.


Camp !'Iacencia
Do .


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


])0.
Marching to join


Do.
Do.


Camp near Eelem
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.
Do.


Lisbon
Placcncia


Santarem


'fotal"


- - !I !J 20 4 6 32 8 5 13 3 1 606 10H 61 776
"'''11 6 In II 5 37 6 4 16 1 _. 618 188 22 828


1" 5 12 5 20 11 4 12 1 _. 414 144 5 56S
1 .. 2 5 4 H 4 28 5 3 13 4 537 131 22 6110


1 2 4 1 1 l.. 6·t 6. . 70


11
1


2
1 1


8 25 1 3 25 11 3 11... . 627 301 1l 9311
3 H 3 4 32 4 2 lb.. 1 506 106 23 635


7 2\ 6 6 39 10 5 17 4 _. 753 142 21 916
2 4 1 1 .. _ _ 56 41" 60


1 2 9 20 6 6 5:1 23 .. .. !J9S. . • • 993
1 2 8 20 7 5 55 ]!J _." 1001" " 1001


1 2 10 27 6 Ü 55 19 _. .. 1023" _ _ 1023
1 2 9 12 8 6 40 20 .. .. 562 39 .. 601


1 2 6 13 9 6 40 3 19 1 .. 575 70 .. 645
1 3 9 5 10 6.. 31 l!J 2.. 615 35 .. 650


1 2 8 5 12 5 33 2 20 ... _ 613 S!J .• 652
1 .. 5 8 6 6 39 1 \2 .. 10 629 S9 47 715


1 2 6 5 4 4 21 16 .. .. 644 30
1


1 675
2 5 8 4 5 32 1 18 .. .. 522 14'. . 536


·.1.,


.. j ..


"1"


11' _, ..


111


1


~ 5 lt 13 6 4~ 7 iI2~.~:: 8~~ l:~: ~~ 10;:~ -. F'R' ~'I"
_. " .. 2 " 2" 2 l.... 16 ni 20 47 .. " .... " .. 1¡:W~2965¡¡6259 192 ;) 1542178130 63~-3151278á4 3ll(1008~317S, 3556' ·2 10~¡ ¡¡ I ¡f;lll!-S¡;-¡--;'-


J~
~5} 1 ~


Jr1942


}M7
}~~
}~




No. VI.


State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, Royal Engineers, &c.
Hea(l Quarters Placencia, 15th J uly, 180lJ.


--. __ ._._~._-•• _----' 11 seJjts.11 Drmrs. II Rank and .File. Officcrs.
o;


" o ~ o ,¿ ~
u . " " ~ ~ .~ 2 .•


g ';? ;.. ~ I~ :3~:3~w


ZJ
:;


'" ill~ 'l:: ~
oC '" W ~


.¿
"


..,< I ~ ~ o
'ñ u


" ¡¡l v • ¡::::: :J:¡ ..:< E ~J58 ~ ~ ~ il< ".¡ " i:í3
't:>


:;
E


a
o


u
"3


o
E-<


.1


~
:t:


.;
" "3
~


Alterations.


.¿ ,.Q


'¿I'I~]~~] ~~-5&~=-5
'S v .~ =lJ ~ 2 ~


.. QQQ':;il<~


Civil Branch.


r-: iJ.
..... '" ~ 3 . ~ 00 ~


"'.... o


§ ~ ~
''>: 't:> E'" <::1


o ~ o
U U U


;i
1::


:s ;::
<t1


-------,11-1-1-1-1-11-11-1-1-11-1-1-11--1--1--1--11_11 __ 11-1-1-1-1-1-1-11-1-1--1--f Artillery
British )


t. Drivers


f Artillery
German~)


t. Drivers


Engineers


Wn. Tn. attached to the Artillcry


Waggon Train


31..1101121 511 .. 1112111111 4111511 33tll 6912201627 3181 17 I 49


21 61 111 4 II! 01. .1 2 11 51 .. 1..11 3491 381 651 45211 49tJ11 81


5112 912 3111211 1821 251 1011 308


111 1511 31 101 17011 19611 36


11 .. 1 4112, .. :!, .. 24 3 27


1 1 3 1 71 3112 1123, .. ~I. ~ 2371 131 411 29111 139


-.-.-.-.--.,-11-1-1-11-1-1-11--'-_'--'--11--'1--11-1-1-1-1-1-1-11-1-1--,--
Total..1141212*91IO/l61I,171414111412171112871151143711815/18201111111 .. 1..1 .. 1..1..1 .. 1 .. 11318111149




No. VII.


Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.
in action with the French Army, commanded by J oseph Buonaparte in person, in front of the town of Talavera de la Reyna,


on the 27th July, 1809.


Regimenta.


14th Light Dragoons
1st Do. Do. K. G. L.


Royal British Artillery
Do. ~~ngineers


1st Bn. Coldstm. Guards
2nd Bn. 24th Regt.


1st Bn. 29th Do.
211d Bn. 31st Do.


1st Bn. 45th Do.
1st Bn. 48th Do.


2nd Do. Do.
5th Do. 60th Do.


Ist Do. 61st Do.
2nd Do. 87th Do.


1st Do. 88th Do.
Ist Bn. Detachments


1st Line Bn. K. G. L.
lstand 2nd Lt. 130. Do.


Killed.


.' ~ E l.i
'I:l = . :;.l .-


m o ~ <..,.. • ~
oom8 rñ~. ~rñ~ ~ ~ • ~ ,§ B ~ ~ § § ~ .3 g ~ E. ~ 'Cñ ~ ~ ,~, § ~j~~ú:.3~w5Jj~


---------


1


1


1"''''''
:0.1 •• 1 •• 2


1 "1"


'g l' ~ ~ .-"1 "
" ...


" o ~ ;r:


"1 9 2 7


1
1


"


10 ..
22


1


"


4 ..


3 ..
3 ..


26 ..
7 ..


13 ..
2 ..


4 ..
2nd Lt; Hattll. Do. 1,"


5th Do. Do.


Wounded. Missing. Total.


00 ~. 00
.,; ~ . [) ~ ;;:; ~ & cD ~ t-[) "


<,...


'"
o . ...
~


-o e..2 ~ ~ cri~ ~ ..9 w.o.~ .... -0 (1)'0
• Ü ::= ,.¡ ~
.~ too.cl~ ~.~ .~


'11 m
~ '" .~~ ~ <i S ~ S ~I~ ~~~oo~=oo ri~~ ~ .--;~ü !i:; ~ .; 8 .~ ~ s.o • ;2 ~ S .!t gs ~ .: ..; a~vl ~~il.IC .-~U.~'" ~ I ~ & 51 . ..:: 2 a m ~ e ~ ~ ~ 'a ~ .~ ::l ~ ~ ~ ... ...


,,"[l)O' Jí~
.-"1 "


" ~ .. o
~ ::r: ~ ~ .~ .~ ª".~ 'a ~ ~ .; 8 a ~ ~ -a .~ v:;.l-l:iE:;.l-l:;ilwO'JíCi ~::r: ~:;.l-l
~ c. :s 'tij >t:: ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~.E: ;::I.~"'P... !:)


.5l c:l ~ ~ E "'" 1ü .... cd o a,¡ o ~ ~ CI:l ,~
-=- =-:.. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ =- =-=- =- -=- =- =-1-1-1-1-


"1" . ...
.. 1


1
112


21513


111


1


1


"


1 ti
2 ..


2 1\11 413
2 ..


2........................ . ... 1 ........ 1 ...... 2 ..
6.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 ........................ 12 .•


42 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. l............ l ...•...... 53 ••
31 .. 1 85 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.......... 2 l 2 .......• 109 .,


13.. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... 7 ...... 1 ................ ~4 ••


~ :: :: :. :: :: : :1:: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :::: :::
4 ............ 1 .......... 1 lb ........•. 1 .......... 1 25 ..


3.. .. ................... .. .... 1 .............. 6 ..
3 .. 124 ......... , .......... I .. 33 ........•. 2 5 4 .. .. 4 •. 183 ••


2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. I ., •• •• •• •• •• 30.. .. .. .. .. .. 2.......... 62 .•
í! .. 38.. .. .. .. .. 211 ., .. .. .. .. 13.. .. .. .. .. 2 2...... 3.. 64 ..


7 ....... , .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. .................... 9 ..
2 .. 23.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5.......... 1 l...... 2.. 49 ••


3.. .. .... .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 ..
61" .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.. 32.. . .... , .. .. .. .. .. 11.. ., .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.. 49 .•


.. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. :; 1 43.. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. 1 7 G .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 5 2 138 •• T"t'l"':~~~; ~ ~ ;kt 1~1~ - -;-~ ~~ ~ ; ::~~ t~,;' •••• "" ". ;; •••••• ";"., 2 ::: ~ ;; ~ ~ ~; 7~ "; 7th Do. Do. General Staff




VIII.
N ames of Officers Killed, W ounded, and Missing, 'falavera de la Reyna, 27th J uly, 1809.


Killed. Wounded. Missing.


Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rernarks. Rank and N ames. Regiments.


Capto Fordyce,D. A.A. G. 8Ist Regiment. Lient. Hembruck 1st Lt. Dns. K. G. L. Severely Capto Poole { 1st Bn. Detachts. 52d Hegiment
Lient. Col. Ross Coldstream Guards Capl. Boothby Royal Engineers. Do. Walsb 91s1 Hegiment


Capto Lodge 31st Regt. 2d Bn. Capto and Adjt. Bryan 1st Bil. Coldstr. Gds. Do. Lieut. Cameron 79th Do.
Lient. Graydon 88th Do. 1st Do. Lient. Popham 29th Reg. Do.


l\1-Carthy Do. Do. Capto Coleman 31st Do. 2d Bn. Do.
Lieut. George Beamish Do. Do.


lWDougall 91s1 Regt. Ensign Gamble Do. Slightly
Ensign La Serra 87th Do. 2d Do. Soden Do. Do.


Lient. Col. Gnard 45th Do. 1st Bn. Severely
Capto Woolf 60th Do. 5th Do. Do.


Major Coghlan 6lst Do. 1st Do. Do.
Capto M-Crea 87th Do. 2d Do. Do.


Sorncrsall Do. Sligbtly
Lient. Kavcnagh Do. Do.


Bamall Do. Severely
Kingston Do. Do.


Johnsoa Do. Do.
Carrol Do. Do.


Ensign Moore Do. Slightly
Knox Do. Severely


Bntler Do. Do.
Capto Dnring Rifle Corps, K. G. L. Slightly


Lient. Holle Do. Sevrrely
Adjt. Deliris 7th Line Bn. K. G. L. Do.


b




1\0. IX.


Return of Killed, 'Vounded, and Missillg, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-gelleral Sir Arthur W ellesley, K. B. in action with the
French Army, commanded by J oseph Buonaparte in person, at 'falavera de la Reyna, on the 28th J uly, 1809.


11


Killed. _~~,~n~~d. __ .__ JlJissíllg. 11 ________ Tota~
. ~ .~ I ~ ·I:!: .~ 1 ,; . 1:1: I'~ ,; .,..".,


::::;;::: . - r- >:t::= " - :-=! ~ Q,) • -....i ;-: I
ro o ", '- "" "ol ~ ... . ~ I "e.. "" I~ .....--. +-' ::;;.' ~ - Ul ...... '"' ....... ......... ':"':;l .......


'f) • e .;:::: • ~ ""d rn r .:3 .;: .:l. l-o '"Ó :r... - . ¡;;;: o. ~ ""C n -i . rl O. ¡.:.,
_ m...; '!'''.,¡ ": 1;; lo e _ ' ":;,.¡ • ., ". .,¡!3 <l>" _"' ,ol ",,,, • • tl " = ... ~, f< ",. .,¡ '" <l> ] ~ ~ . 0 :: H.:: ~ ¡:::: = ~ rñ ~ 1-; ;J'I .S H a I ¡..., ¡:: == ce 00. ;:: c::; U rñ = :=.. I ro ~ ¡:;: C':l ~ '"2 ¡; ::.J ~ e ;::::: ':.. .... ~ ...... ro: I . ~1~s·-.~;·~(¡t~I·~.§~ ~ ~~2.~.~.r,I.~.r..;'~~~§ ~ ~,~21~9-ª1~,.~"";2~~"'á ~ ~.s:;I~IªII~I~,""~II~ S ~ ~


:¡¡ ~ - ~ :t :¡¡ ..... «:í • ,...., ¡..., ce: -. ¡¡,¡ - ~ ... __ G" - ~ I-f :::"' .... ~ o :;.. o '-' 0:= -1 "'" .::: ro • .... ;::j w o _ o ::,; ,-o::: (- 'l.I .... ~ .' t:'::I ~ 104 ~~=-::.~~ ~ ~~i~=-~-~. ~,~=_:;;~,¿_,~~::yI-~I.=-~I=-I~-~I~~~I=-~~~~.:5- 2 ~ I:~ :;"¡J,=-:::'I~:~:~~ ~'rZ ~ ~ :il
. 9 ' l' 1', I 1, l' 1 , General Staff 1 . . , .. .. .. .. l' . . ·1" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. 13. ·1" ....... .


3rd Dragoull Guards . :.! l ........ ¡ .. ,.. L, "1" .... "," .... "1.. 1 "1
1


,, "l'· .. l ... 1.. ~ a
.1th Dragaoll' ~ 9 . '1' . 2.. 71 4 . ..,... . ........ 1 .... , .... l. ... i .. ~ . . 10 13


Uth Light Dragoolls "¡"I" ~ 2i 2 3 ...... [ .. "1 61. 3. ..' .. ,,, .. 1 .. 1.. .. •• 1:; ' .. "jl .. ¡ 2 :1'." .. 31
16th Do. Do. .. .. .. (j :.!I ··1 1 ...... 1 .. •• :,: 2 ··; .. '1· .. ···· 2 2 ........ 11 .. ··.. 13 25


23rd Do. Do. .. 21.. 3 .. 44 70 3' .. 1 .... ¡ 2,1, 43,:.!i ..... :.! 1 7 :l 9ül2U ...... 5 ;': 1.. 12 3 18~224
1st Do. Do. K.G.L. .. 1 .. 1.. . ""1" .. 1 32, .. 1 1 .. 1 .. : 11 2: :!!l27 ...... ·1·· 2 5 .. , .... " 1'11 "1'" 1:1 3164


Hayal. Brítísh Artillery .......... ¡ 1 .. .. .. :? .j0l .. ·· 1 ...... , .. : .... 1 ~~I" .... 1 .. "1" .. "1" .. 1 .. :.!I J •· ".'. 2h 4() Do.~ermaDDo. ..1 .. ··1·... ..:!~ 11 .. ·· ...... 1 ... 3 .. 1 :jll" .. 1.. ......... . ............. ,. 4 .. 30
Do. hllglll~ers l" .. l .... ¡ .. I .. "1 .......... J.... .... .. .. . ....... I .... J.


D". Statf COT!,' 1 l.... .,.. .. .. .. .. ' .. i . . I 1
Colrbtrealll Guardo, 1st lIn. 3;~:.I 5 .. 1 ..... : 1111, 2:1!1 .. , .... ,.. 21" :, .. 2." I1 1 27!< 31'11 Do. 1st ])0. .. 4.. 4" .. 1 I 1··I:l .. 1 •• 1 111 1, 2.1!)! .. I .. 1 i¡ 4.. 4 l.. 1:¡ 1 :W5


3rd Hogt. Jioot, 1st Do. 1 .. :'!'j .. 1 1 ........ ' .. ' ;" .. ' lO:.!' .. !.. 1I ¡l.... ü .. 134
7th Va. :.!Ile! Do. I .. ü .... 21 .. 1 .. : ~I~: ;il: .. :.. 1 .. l .. 1 .. ;1 .. ti.. 1 2 5~


24th Do.:.!ne!Do. 2 .. 42 ," :JI 1'¡4 1 .. : 1.11"12;'.;, .. ,.. :!I l' 12. I 11 .. I~ .. 31b
20th Do. 1st Do. 1 .. '2:, l·· .. :!14 .... '. ". "f \1:.. .. .. "'l" :j .... ;!: 11" .... l .. 12:;


., 1 t D .) J 1) 1 "0' I ') " '1 \ 1 . .. 1'''/
.) ~ O. _11 o. .. '" _ .. .. . '. . . 4 .• •• •. o' ,. • •• •• ' :.::...... u. . ~_


40th 1)0. IstlJo. 7 1.. .. 1,.... 2,..·17 .. 1.. .. .. '.. ..1.. . ... 1,........ ;! .. 55
45th Do. ht Va. !J' .. [1.. .I! .. 1:\0'.. 11' JIj l JJ :1'" .. 5' 14[;


4Hth Do. 1st Do. 2:! .. I I,:j 5 1 ':\' .. 1:\2'.. .. .. ~, :; 1.. 3 .. 15',
·1Sth Do. :lile! Do. 11 .. :.. 1 1 .. , :\'.. 50' .. 1 !.. ". . ..1 1 i 1 .. 4.. {l]


5:I,d Do.2nd])o. .. .... 1.. (j;.. 1111.... .., Ji .. ¡ :10i.. '.... I! .. !.... 1 .. 3(j
(iOth [)o.:,th Do. ..!.. t: '.. .. 1i 3 J .. , 11"1 :11:.. 2: .. 1(0 :! .;11.. :¡ 1 40


Oht ])0. 1st ])0. '1" 1 1 i 1 ·12 .. ' 4i .tl] "I IO J .. Pi::.. .., .. \l. ;" ~i 1 ¡ ]0 I :.!41
6tith ])". 2ml Do. !.. ,,!.. 1 .. \.i "l·· :.¡ :¡I (;, :! .... : ;'1" r:l'.. 11 .. lO :\' .; :.! .... I 7 .. I()S


ll:lnllJo.2T1J ])0. 11·· .. 1 .. ··1 :¡.. :l7 .• ,.. ..,21,,1 :1 1 II¡ I:-\!I,.. ..' .. :¿~. :/1 b :\ 1 "Il~ 2 254
87th Do. 2nd Do. 11... "'.. ti .. ; .... ' .. 1; .. 11 .... · 3 •. 411.. ..1 .. " .. I 1 .... el .. 53


IlHti: Do. 1st Do. l.. I 111 ...... i .. "111111 .. ' .. l .. Ü!J...... .. " ..... . .. ",' 2 1 1.... l .. 8ú
!l7th Do. 1st Do... ,,1 (, ........ "," .. .. .... :!;¡.... ..·1 '21 .. "", .. 1 1.. .." .. 5~ ~st Ha·tahon Detachments 11.. "J :.J:! ..... j .. ¡ 1; 3i 5" O~ 1 ]";)"J" "l··· .. ' 1 1 1.. .. 1 31 ',.. ..1 6 2 1~(;


:.!nd ])0. Do. ¡.... " 1, .. • 1"1" .... 1"1,, ...... , .. 1 \.\.. .. .. .. '... .... 1 1"1'1" " .. .... ...... :!I lstLi.,~ llalt:K.G.L... 11" .. 1 1 3f .. ","," 1, :1151 1 .... l;ll I1 :.!~7,,,J.. .. .. : ....... "i" 1 .. " .. 1 4; ('11 ··ll;l! li 264
bt and 2nd Ld¡t Bu. K.G.L.. ,,1·· .... L ..... "1" .. ··1·. .. .... :Ji .. 31 .. ,.. ""'1 .. 1 ...... "J" l ........ ",","" .. , H,,, 4('


'!ndLine Bu.K.G.L. ...... .......... ~ ... ;il ... '11 J :11.1,4" ,,' I~ :¡ 271:.... .. .... '"...... :14 .... 1 11 :\1 5' 4 .... U'I 3 3:;:¿
",,1>0. ,"'- '. ··1··, , .. .. "''''1···· ' .... , '1"'" ··1 ' , "", . .1.. ...... ' ...... , .. , ... ,lO' .. 1 ...... , .. , " '1 "· .. 1 "1' "'1"


n" Do Do. TOOI..I, -';",~; ;It:; ~ ,;~j,~ ;, •. ; ~1;-7,~1~ ~d.is ;, ,,:::d ~: ~:-f,!~ IJ H~ ~:¡~;i 7 k ,;:;:!~:~:,,: ;,! ;::,fo u:: ,;;;


Regirnents.




Wúunded.


Hank and N ames. Regiment8.
-------------


Captain Goodman 6lst Regiment 1st Bn.
Hartley Do.


Lieutenant J\1' Lean Do.
Trench Do.


Collins Do.
Givill Do.


Emign Brackenbury Do.
Adjutant Drew Do.


Capta;n Kelly Gr.th Do. 2nd Do.
Ste",ar! Va.


Adams Bt. LI. Col. Do.
Lientenant Morris Do.


Dudgcon ])0.
Hnmbly Do.


Steele Do.
Shewbridge Do.


Morgan ])0.
Ensign Cotter Do.


M'CaTthy Do.
Captain Summerfield IS3rd Do. 2nd Do.


Reynolds Do.
J~ieutenant N icholson Do.


Balowyn Do.
Johnsoll Do.


Abell Do.
Pyne Do.


Ensign Boggie Do.
Carey Do.


Lertoller Do.
Adjutant Brahan Do.


Major Gongh 87th Do. 2nd Do.
Lieutenant Rogers Do.


Ensign Pepper Do.
Captain Brown 8l:itb Do. ] st Do.


Lieutenant Whittle Do.
EIIsign Whitelaw Do.


!\Iajor Hoss
"'" n'g;moo' l Captain 1\1 'Pherson 35th Do. '"


Bradby t~lb Do. _" !l
Chancellor ;ISth Do. "5 ¡¡


Lieutenant Gilbert I ~Hlh Do. d §
M'lleth 1""" no_ J ~ ., Fullerton I~HthDo. ::; ~


l\1unroe 1421111 Do. >=1 i
Brown 43rd Do. i


No. Xl.


CO NT [NUATIO N.


-1 ltemarks. I~k and N ames.
----------


Slightly }!ojor 1I0dl'cker
Do_ Captain Marshall


Do. Captain Salt'e
Do. Petersdorft


Severely Lieutenant Go',ben Senior
Slightly Ern. H odenberg


Va. Fk. Hodenberg
Severely SaJfe


Slightly Schlutter Senior
SevereJy Ensign Allen


Do. Lieutenant Col'mel Dranns
Do. ,Majar Helleville


])0. ICaptain BreJman
Do. Heldrill


])0. Sharnl'oust
Do. Lientenan! Buerman


Do. Wcnckstern
Do. Wessell


SlightIy Wick
Do. Holle


Leg ampu!ated I Ensign Tineh
¡';everely ¡';chllliat


Slighlly I llilleb I ])0. I Elumenhagen
Sever~ly eaptain Hamelberg


Slightly Gerber
Severely Lieutenant Linsingen


Do. During
Slightly Ensign Brandfs


Vo. Kohler
Severdy Majar Berger


Slightly Lieuteuant Volger
Do. Freytag


Severely Ensign Offen
Do. Captain AlIen


Do. Jhake
Do. Lieulenant An.Ierson


Do. Captain Leckey 13. Major
Sligbtly EIlsign Reeves


1)0. Lieutenant Shipley
Severely


])0.
Sligbtly


no.
])0.


Wounded.


1
Regiments. I


----------------


1st Line Dn. K. G. L. I Do.
1st Line HIl. K. G. L.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


.1;".
Do.


Do.
2nd Line Bn. K. G. L.


Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
])0.


5th Line En. K. G. L.
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


7th Line Bn. K. G. L.
Do.


Do.
Do.


23rd Lt. Dragoons ~1 Do.
Do. S


45th Foot 1 st Bn. t 48th Do. 2nd ])0. 11
197th Do. Do. 1


1


I


Hetllark: s.


Iy


Y


Iy


y


y
y


Iy
Y


Iy


y
y


y
y


y


y


Iy


Missing




No. X.


Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Talavcrade la Reyna, 2t!th July, 1809.


Killed. Wounded. WOllllded.


Rank and Nallles. Regiments. ,Rank and, Names. Regiments. ~emarks. ~k al:d Na~1 ~egiments. Hem~
}lajor Gen. l\i'Kenzie M~.Jor ~eneral IhU t>hghtly Lieutenant Klrwan 7th Foot :lnd Bn. Severely


Br. Gen. Langworth Bngr. Gen. A. Campbell Do. ,Muter Do. Do.
Captain Reckett (Bde. Ms.) Coldstream Guards H. Campbell Severely not dangerous A dJatant Page Do. Slightly


Gardner Do. 4:~rd Fool ,Capto Whittingham 13th LI. Dns. D. A. Q. N. G. Slightly Liellt. Cul. Drummond 24th Do. 2nd Do. Severcly
Lient. King 23rd LI. Dragoons i Blair !lb! Regiment Brigad" Majar Severely :\-Iajor Popham Do. Do.


Power Do.' Bouverie Cold. Gds. ~ A. D. Cam~s to Lieut. Gen. ~ srd tI ICaptain Callis Do. 1)0.
Wyatt Sritish Artillery Burgh !l2nd Re~t. i Sir A. Welle.ley S ' 1" I Y Evans Do. Do.


Ensign Parker Coldstream Guards Z,er~sell ~st Le. Bn. A.D. C. tO,B. ,G. Langworlh Se~erely ~ie~tena?t Vardy Do. Slightly
eaplain Walker 1st Bn. 3rd Guards ~ra1~ (SlClhan ltt.) Do. lo Lt., GI. Sherbrooke Shghtly "nslgn ~rant Do. Severely


Buehanan Do. Captam Enee 3rd nn. Guards. Severely Skeene Do. Do.
Dalrymple Do. IColonel Ha"ker 14th Lt. Dragooll" t>li~htIy Johnson Do. Do.


Ensign Ram Do. I'Captain Chapman Do. Severely JesBamin Do. Do.
Adjutant Irby Do~, Hawk~r Do. (Jo. ~djut~nt Topp ]).0' SlightIy


Lieutenant Beaufoy 2nd Do. 7th F oot Lleutenant Elh. Do. Do. CaptaJ.n G auntlett :l9th Reglment Severely
Majar F. Orpen tilst Do. 1st Bn. I Wainman Do. Slightly Newbold 1)0. Slightly


Capt.in H. James Do. ¡ SlIlith Do. Do. Lieutenant Stan~ns 1)0. Severely
Lieutenant IIemus 1)0.: Bellee 16th Do. Do. Do. Leshe Do. Do.


Lieut. Col. Gordon H3rd Do. ':lnd Bn. Capto Howard 23rd 1)0. Du. Severely Stanhope Do. Do.
Lieutenant D.hman (Jo. Frankland Do. Do. Nicholson Do. Slightly


Montgomery Do. Lord W. Russell Do. Slightly ,Captain Niehnols 318tDo. :lnd Do. Do.
Hood Do. Cornet Dudwell (Ju. Do. Lieutenant Girrllestone Do. Do.


Captain Blake 88th Do. 1st. Do. Lieutenant Polen 1st Do. K. G. L Sevl'rely A. Beamish Do. SevereIy
Wersabe 1st Line Bn. K. G. L. Cornet Tueto Do. t>lightly Captain CoIquhoun ~lOth Du. 1st Do. Sligbtly


Lieut. Hy. Hodenburg . Do. Lient,. C.o!ollel Framingham Royal British Artillery Do. i\~ajor Gwynn 45th Do. Do. Severely
}~vert 5th Lme Bn. K. G. 1. Captam 1 ay lar Do. Do. Lleutenant Cale Do. Do.


Dachenhausen Do. Baylles Do. ])0. I Liellt. Col. Donelan 18th Do. Do. Do.
Hemelman Do. ,Lientenant Stanway Royal Engineers Do. :\lajor Marston Do. Slightly


Captain Todd Royal Stalf Corps Do. Captain Wood Du. Do.
Lientenant Shanahan . Do. Do. FreJlch Do. Do.


Lieut. Col. Stibbert Severely Lieutenant Dronght Do. Sevcrely
. Sir W. Sheridan Do. Do. Page Do. Do.


Captain ¡'lilhnan Do. Do. Cheslyn Do. Do.
Christie Do. Do. Gill Do. Slightly


Collier Slightly Cuthbertsoll Do. Do.
\Vood Do. Do. Ensign Vandermeulen Do. Severely


Jenkinson SevereIy Lieutenant Johnson 48th Do. 2nd Du. Slightly
Ensign Sandilallds Do. not dangerons EJlsign RenIly Do. S~verely
Li~ut. Col. Gorrlon 18tl~n. 3rd Guards t>lightly :\Iajor Kingscote 53rd Do. 2nd Do. Sli~htly


!\lajor F'otheringham Do. 1)0. Captain Stowell Do. Do.
,Captain Giels Do. Do. Garlifte U.Major 60th Do. 5th Do. Do.


Emign Aitchison Do. Do. Andrew Do. Do.


I


Towers ])0. Do. Lieutenant Zuhlke Do. SevereIy
Seolt Do. Do. Ritter Do. Do.


Lient. Col. l\Iuler :~rd Foot or Hnlfa Severely Mitchell Do. Do.


!
:\lajor Drummond (Bt. Lt. Col.) Do. t>lightly Ensign Altenstein Do. Do.


'aptai:J Furllaee 6lat Do. 1st Do. Slightly
Laing Do. 1)0.




No. XV.
Return of KiIled, W ounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-


general Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. OIl the Advance of the French Army towards the
Position of Busaco, OIl the 25th and 26th September, 1810.


KilIed. 'Nounded. Missing. Total.


Regiments.
¡ ~. ~. ~ I .. ~.


'-> ~ • ü ~ . U ¿¡ . U ~;~ ~ I~ cA ~ ~ "'::: i ~ ~ 1.- • ~ ~ ... tñ ~
:: O.$.o"'d .Q '-' .. M"O • .:: O.~":l .= OOh"O


é ~ ~ i: ~ S ; rñ .8 a ~ ~ g E 2 ai 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ e § ~ .S ~ ~ ~ ~ s § ~
g 1" ,~!ti ;:;; ~ El ~ ~ fl ~ ':!'!ti ;;; ~ El "á ~ ~ ':í ,';f!ti ;;;¡ ~ El"", ~ 5 ~ ,';f!ti;:S ~ E ~ ~ g- ;:: d ~ ~ ¡:;-- Z ('j s ª'".~ ~ Ctf ;..: ¡:-> E ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ s..: ¡:""l 2 ~ o ~.2:: = ~ ~ ~ E d ~


Ü ...:¡ ;.; ;5 P' .Jj :::=< ~ :::: '->...:¡ ;iI :ñ 01 )] :::=< ;::; :::: ü --' ;.; r7í 01 Ji :::=<1;::; :::: '-> ...:¡ ;iI :ñ 01 :Jj :::=< ;::; ¡::c:
~.:::;:~:~:...o",I~~~::·-~I~~ :.~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~II~III~I~ ------ --


16th Do. Do. I . . .. .. .. 2 .. " 4 3
11 .. 15[12


4[ 9


.. l··
Total British Lass. "']~[']]]]]~li]]~[[I-~[[I~I[I=!=[[[i]~I~il~[I~[[I~[I~127


1st Hussars, K. G. L. 2 31 4 11 .. 1 3[ 6


+HF ~~,: ~~i ••. ~ :,I~:ldl-I:I+I+II~dI:,+I~I+F.I~~I~ Portuguese Arllly General Total ..
Captain Hoey, 99th Regiment, D. A. A. G. severely l wounded.


Comet Keating, 16th Light Dragaons, slightly S


d




,· ..... l ~,


No. XVI.


Retllrn of Killed, W oundcd, and Missing. of the Army under thc Command of His Execllcncy J.ieutenant-general Lord
Viscollnt 'Vellington, K. B., in Action with the French Anuy, Ilnder the Commaml of Marshal Massella, Prince oi'


Esling, in the Position of Busaco, on the 27th September, 1810.


K~]Jcd., . . wounde~. . Missing•. 1I Total..
~~ ~ '* -~ 2 ~ : ~ I ~ I r~ ~


<1 • I U ;- " • '-' ;;: " • U ;- 1" . U .-o ¡n '- .... o .e ..... .,..... o ~ ~ • ~ o ~ '- . ~
"O .;: O.¿~"'C 0"0 .¡:: O.,;~"'O .0 .::: o .~"C ....... • ¡:: o.~ "C


00::,) OO:;<;l' rñ"'~ ¡:::: 00::.,) OO~.' i:,"-'C.,l ¡:: 00:..;; r.n<:C", oo!So,.¡p l.Il¿:;il Ul<:::l;ñ i3a.. ~ ~ rñ.9 ~ ~ lo-; ¡:; S ce: al ~ 00 .S f ~ $o-, ~ S c: rñ ~ al .9 § ~ ¡..., ¡:::; E tt: 'J~!'"¡; 00 .~ ~ ~ ~;:: S (Ij ;, !:"':~ct$+>!::.o.·2~S~ ~ ¡::":5.;E~b.o··;;;Cl,;S~ ~ ;::...=8-f ....... t.l..2~S..::r::~'¡:::.J185f-'OJ..2~8..!4 ~
-; .~ ~ ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ § 8 ~ .~ ~ ~.~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ § ~ 1-3 .~ '~' ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ '~. e ~ ~ 1-3 .E '~. ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ 'C-O e § a


G"",¡ swr I~. ~f ~~~ -': ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ :' ~' ~ ~ "-,:~~,, " =,' ~~'. ~~ ~;~ ~ ~~ ~~: ~ <, ~ ~ ~ :' ~ ~. A " "
British Horse Artillery l" .. .. .. 2. . 1 .. .. " .. 2
Do. Foot Do. .. .• .. ] .. 1 .. 4. . . .1. . .. •• .. •. .. ].. 5


German Do. Do. .. .. .. 3.. ..," .... "1" .. 3
3rd Foot 1st Bn. 1" 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. 2


5th Do. 2nd Do... 1 .. 1.. 1i .. 1..' ." '1" ,," 1 .. , 7, ..
7th Do. 1st Do... I .. 1 .. 22 .. ' .. .. 1.. .. l.... 2:3'


9th Do. l~t Do. r, .. l" 1 .. 1 .. 17.. .. .. .. l.... 1 .. 22
24th Do. 2nd Do. .. "," 1 .. " .. 1·· . '1" l ......


3!'thDo.2ndDo. 1 .. 4 .. '.. .. 1.... 17.. ' '...... I .. ¡.. 1 .. 21
42nd Do. 2nd Do. .. .. l.. .. .. .. .. 2 1 3. . ' ..' . l! 1 3


Corps.


43rd Do. 1st Do. .. .. 1" 1 .. 7. . ' .... 1. . 1 .. 7
1


,


45th Do. 1st Do. .. 1 21 .. l" :1 . . 3 .. 101i .. 12 .. . . i 2 1 4.. 4 .. 13!J
50th Do. 1st Do. .. .. .. .. . .' 1 ., . '1" ..


52ndDo.lstDo. 3.. 11.. lO.. 11 .... ' ...... 13
60th Do. 5th Do. 3·· 1 3.. lli .. 5 .. !.. 1 3.. .. .. .. .. 24


74th Do. Ii .. 1 .. 1.. 20.. .. .. i .. 2.. .. .. 1 1 .... 1.. 21'
711th Do. 1st Do. 7.. 41.. .. .. 1 .... 1.... ti.. .. 2...... .. 1 .. 54


83rd Do. 2nd Do. 1 . . .. 1 3. . . " . . .. "1 .. .. l.. '" '. 1 3
88th Do. 1st Do. I ., 29.. 2 3 l! 1 2 .. 92.. ' I .. ¡'.. 2 3 3 1 3'.. 122


95th Do. 1st Do. 9 . . 4 I 27.. . ... 11 • • •• •• •• •• 4 1 1 36
1st Line Bn. K. G. L. :1 •. 1 .. I .. 4. . 1 .. 1 .. 7


1st Light Do. Do. ..1.. 1 .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 10.. 2 .. "1" 3.. 12
2nd ])0. Do. Do. I .. .. .. 11.. 11" 5.. ..!.... ..,.... 1.. 1 .. Ii
2nd Lino ])0. Do. 1 .. 2. . ] I .... ", .• , . . Ii. . . " I .. . '1 1 1.. 9


5th Do. Do. Do. 1 .. '" ., .... ' .. i . . 11. . ¡'. " . . . ... I •• • • .1.. .. .., . I .. 1I
7th Do. Do. Do. .. ..... .. .. .. 1 i. . b .. ' . . . ....... ¡ ........ i •. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. 1.. l'


------1-1----- -- ' ---1-- -------'--------'-----1--:---'-- ---I_~ __
Total1ossBritish ...... 1 1 2 1 .... 5 .. 97 .. : .. 1315 1Ol() II .... :JI :)4311 .. ' ...... 1 1 .... 1 .... 1 .. 12g .... 31 (j 1218 21 .... :J7 :1 .jIJ5'1"


Do. Portngnese .. ~.:..:..:..:.~ ___ .;..:. .... ~~_~':":'I.~j~~~ I~.:..:..:..:.-=.'.:.~~~~ ___ ~~ ':":'':'':'--~':'':'.'.:L·· '!'.Ij~t' ____ I,! ~I~ -=~ ~I':":'I~' 12 1!~~_._.
Total. ·1 .... i 1 .1 2 31·'~r~ Ii 1 179 "I! 1 316 1521 141 .... 30 :l 11I17 .. 1 .. 1.. .. 1 .. \ .. / .. "13 1 .. /.17 .. ¡ 1 3 7 :.n¡23 17¡ .... :l9 41143 ..




1\'1
e


L
E


L


B
4


6
6


Killed.


Rank and N ames.


.jor Smith
ptain Urquhart


eutenan! Ouselcy
!Sign Williams


eutenant lIenry John80n


itish
'. Foot Captain W. l\'l'Intosh


Do. De 80uza
th Foot ])0. Charles Fax


ndDo. Do. Sali,bury
Eusign Castes


Das N ovas Franei


No. XVII.


Names of Ofllcers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810.


'Vounded. Woullded.


ltegiments. I Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. Rank and Names. Regimeuts. Remarks,
45th Foot 1st Hu. ¡Lieutenallt Colonel Barclay 52nd }'oul SJightly ¡ Major Prior . 1st Regt. Ports. Slightly


Do. I C. Campbell 70th Du. A. A. G. Do. I Ensign J. M. de Pantos Do. Do.
Do. eaptain Ld. Fitz Somerset 43rd Do. A.D.C. lo Ld. Wellington, Do. I B. de Senio Do. Do.


74th Do. G. Preston 40th Do. Do. to Sir B. Speneer Do. : Captain F. Auzabis 8th Do. Do. Do.
8t:!th Do. 1 st Bn. Lieutenant Majr 7th Do. 1st Bn. Do. ! Lieutenant V. Matthias Do. Do.


Liudesay 9th Do. Lst Do. Severely I Ensign Jno. A. Rodrigo Do. Do.
Captain Meaeham t4th Do. 2nd ])0. SJightly Manuel Pedro Do. ])0.


Lieutcnant Miller 3~th Do. 2nd Do. Do. I J. Manuel ])0. Do.
;\lajor Gwynn 45th Do. 1st Do. Severely l Felix Antonio 9th Do. Do. Do.


Lieutenant Harris Do. Do. ¡Captain P. Jose 16th Do. Do. Do.
Tyler Do. Do. ,'Ensign J. Maria Do. Do.


Anderson Do. Slightly , Lientenan! J. Galderio 19th Do. Do.
Majar Napier 50th Do. 1st Do. Severely Colonel Champion 21st Do. Do.


Captain G. Napier ;,2nd Do. 1 st ])0. Slightly Captain S, Hurgess Do. Do.
Lieutenant C. 'Vood Do. Do. Lieutenant J .. Maehell Do. Do.


Lieutenant Col. Williams 60th Do. Do. Ensign J. Montero Do. Do.
Captain Andrews Do. Do. J. Alberto Do. Do.


Lieutenant J oice Do. Severely Botello Cas 3rd Cassidores Do.
Eberstein Do. Do. Segurada Do. Do.


Franhein Do. Slightly J. Chrostimo Do. Do.
Cargill 74th Do. Severely Captain J. Bernardo 4th Do. Do.


Captain Douglas 70th Do. 1st Do. Do. Lieutenailt A. Queroz Do. Do.
1st Regt. Portugllese Lieutenant Colthurst 83rd Do. 2nd Do. Slíghtly J. D. Vasconeella Do. Do.


8th Do. Do. Major Sil ver 88th Do. 1st Do. Severdy (siuee dead) Ensign }'eliziamo Do. Do.
16th Do. Do. J\l'Gregor Do. Do. Captaiu L. Homm íith Do. ])0. Do.


21st Do. Do. Captain J\I' Ut'rmott Do. Do.
Dansey Do. Slightly


4th Cassidore. Bury Un. Do.
Lieutenant }'itzpatrick Do. Sev('rely


Nickle ])0. ])0.
E",ign Leonard Do. SeveTely


Lieutenant During 1st Line Hn. K. G. L. Slightly
i"Uajor Wurmb Do. Do.


. Lieutenant Stoltc Det. 2nd Lt. Do. Severoly
!Captain J. Cameron 79th Regiment 1st Bn. Missing




Killed.


-


Rank and N ames.


Majar Smith
Captain Urquhart


Lieutcnant Ouseley
Ensign Williams


Lieutenant Henry Johnson


I


British
4th Fool Cap!~in W.l\f'Intosh


Do. De 80uza
66th Foot Do. Charle, Fox


ü2nd Do. Do. Sali,bury
Enoigu Caste.s


Das N ovas Franci


No. XVII.


Names of OfficeJ's Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810.


I
I Hegiments. I Rank and N ames.


45th Foot lst Bn. LieuteJl:mt Colonel Ilarclay
Do. C. Campbell
Do. Captain Ld. Filz Somerset


14th Do. G. Prestan
88th Do. 1st Bn. Lieutenant Mair


Lindes.y
Captaio Meaeham


Lieutenant ~Iiller
Majar Gwynn


Lieutenant Harris
Tylcr


Anderson
¡Majar N apier
¡Capt.in G. Napier


iLieutenant C. Wuod
\ Lieutenant Col. Williams


'CaptalIl }\ndrews
Lieutenant Joice


Eberstein
Franhein


Clirgill
Captain Douglas


1st Regt. Portuguese Lieutenant Colthnrst
8th Do. Do. Major Sil ver


16th Do. Do. l\I'Gregor
21st Do. Do. Captain l\l' ])ermott


4th Cassidores
Dansey


Bury
Lieutenant }'itzpatrick


Nickle
En,ign Leonard


Lieutcnant j)uring
,Uajor Wurmb


Lieutenant Slolte
ICaptain J. Cameron


w, Jlluded. 1
1


Wounded.


Regi ments. Remarks'!1 Rank and Names. llegiments.


52nd Foo'
70th Do.


'13rd Do.
40th Do.


1th Do. 1:
mh Do. 1:


24th Do. :
3tith Do ..


45th Do.


50th Do •.
• 2nd Do.


60th Do.


74th Do.
7!Jth Do.


83rd Do.'
88th Do.


1st Line .


Det. 2nd
19th H~g:


Slightly '1 ~,faj~lr Prior' ls! Regt. Ports.
. A. G. Do. ,Enslgn .l, M. de Pantos Do.


A.D.C. to Ld. Wellington, Do. I B. de Senio Do.


Bn.
Do.


Id Do.
nd Do.


sI Do.
)0.


Do.
Do.


1])0.
st ])0.


Do.


Do.
)0.


)0.
Do.


st Do.
Id Do.


st Do.
)0.


:)0.
Do.


)0.
Do.


Do.
)0.


n. K. G. L.
)0.


.1. Do.
,nen! 1st Dn.


Do. to Sir B. Speneer Do. Captain F. Auzabis 8th Do. Do.
Do. Lieutenant V. l\latthias Do.


Severely Eusign Jno. A. Hodrigo Do.
Slightly Manuel Pedro Do.


Do. J. Manuel Do.
Severely Felix Antonio 9th Do. Do.


Do. Captain P • .lose 16th Do. Do.
Do. Ensign J. Maria Do.


Slightly Lieutenant J. Galderio 19th Do.
Severely Colonel Champion 21st Do.


Slightly Captain S. Burgess Do.
Do. Lieutenant J. MacheIl Do.


& ~~L~~ ~
Do. J. Alberto Do.


Severely Botella Ca. 3rd Cassidores
Do. Segurada Do.


Slightly J. Chroslimo Do.
Severely Captain J. Bernardo 4th Do.


Do. Lieuteflallt A. Queroz Do.
Slightly J. D. VasconceIla Do.


Severcly (since dead) Ensign Feliziamo Do.
Do. Captain L. Homm Gth Do. Do.


Do. .
SliglitIy


Do.
Severely


Do.
Severely


Slightly
Do.


Severelv
Missing


Remarks.


Slightly
Do.


Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.


Do •
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.


Do.




No. XVIII.


//
/.


.~
Return of Killed, W ounded, and Missing. of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general


Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in skirmishing with the Enemy's Advance on the 4th,
5th, 8th, and 9th October, 1810.


Regiments.


3rd Dragoon Guards


1st or Royal Dragoons


14th Light Dragoons


16th Do. Do.


1st Hussars K. G. L.


]st or Royal Dragoons


16th Light Dragoons


1st Hussars K. G. L.


Wounde'l. ,1 ___ ~l\Iiss~~_ Total.
"1 oi ,; ~ ':; r.Q~ ~.... rñ;: B <; <ñ~


,,:§. _.~~~ I;~. ~.~~~ m~ ••. "~~~ ~¡::itll i,';>-''C=Ct! .¡:;¡:::¡r. ~~:::¡;; .C::C W Z;'>,~c8 •
.§ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ E ~ -: ~ I ~ I ~ .~ .. ¿ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ 'B ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ § -:5 .-: ~


o..-rn t .~~=SP!""Ic..:j:t.lt _~-=, .... ...., .... :...-rn't:: .;;..!""""'l:::-,S ....
ro .~ .::: c:::: !-.o ct: ~ k ~ :: o ro.~ =. a:! .... ~ ~ - ~ o o '3:1.~ ¡::: e 1-0 ~ ~ 1-0 ~ o O


I
'"


I ,, :J_=-~~ :::IU ~=-=-=-=-I'=-I=-::.I~bu ~=-=-c=- =-=-=-:ñ :::1:,) ~:.=- '"' =-
--,---._,--,-- I I1 i 1 I I


•.. , .. .. •• . ...••..•. 1
1


" I l. ___ .1 .. . ....... 1


" .J.
", .. ,1 1 "1.1


1


",,,,,,,,,


.. ,11 1315, . '1 ..


5 5 Ili .. ,,,, ..
211"1""""


31311,,,, .. , ..


Killed.


I ~ ~ ~~ :01 • ~ -~I~"; ~~= . .~ "Sb ~"" ~ ~ .§~ ] ~ ~ I~ I~ I ~:,)....::~·'LJ'fl~~ -~


81 !JI 7


111 1 3112


4


5


12


2


~12Illlrl"l"n 3 3 2 4
1


4 ti 2 ... oO ....... 16 1824


5 () 3


41 4 4 " .. .... .. 1 .. 4 5 lO
4


1


4 4 .. .. .• .. .. .... 8 810


11 .. IH:17 42 ........ 2 .. 252923


Total. .11 •• 1 .. 1. ·1 .. 1 .. 1· .13131;;112r~I~I~I-·· 121~1281;I;¡¡rlll~n-·· l-¡n;oI;I;1141~TT~I-.. 13D;;Jlfi;l;
16th Light Dragoons,


Do.
lst HIlSS:lI'S, K. G. L.


Captain lHurray. slightly.
Sweetenham, sevorely.


Aly, slightly.
Linsingen, Do.


1,t or Royal Draf!:oom-, Lielltenant Carden (mi~sing.)




No. XIX.


Return of Killed, W oUl1ded, ul1d Missil1g, of the Arrny undt>r the Command of Lieutenant-general
Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in an affair with the Enemy near Sobral, 14th October, 1810.


Killeel. 11 \Vounded. l\lissing. Total.


i ·0 i. li ~ 'o . .;: 'S I 00 i ~ fFJ
;,g. i..~~-g lul2. oo.i;~-g cñ;;. riJ.~É)-g rñ~. ;..rl8'"g ,~ :: = !; ~ e S ro I.~ ~;; ..:; t' ~ El ro .c ~ ~ ~ ~ :: S.:a .S ~ ~ ~ ~ e S ~ ~ ~ ~., ~ ~ ~ El ~ • li~ .... ?f.' ~ ~ ~ := ~ • B "!: ~ .• ~ ~ ~ S ~ • .g -::: .~., ~ ~ ~ s,..:.¡: • ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ¿j ;1 ~ § ~ ] ~ ~ :f 2 ~ ~ ~.~ el ~ ~ ~ ~ e § ~ ª".f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ¡; ;;.~


R .. giments.


ü ,...:¡ :.:¡ 'lJ 3'ü 'lJ ~ ;:¡:; >-< I,ü ,...:¡ ~ 'lJ 3'ü rn ~ ~ >-< ü H :.:¡ 'lJ 3'ü lfJ e :>:: >-< ü >-1 ;.;¡ lfJ O'ü rn ;:::: :>:: >-<
GeneralStaff I~~~~-.. ~~-"I'i--¡-:-:~~-" ~~-.. ~I~'~'~'-" ,~,~,-.. --------


2Hh Foot 2nd Bn. i '.... .. .. , .. , .. ,
, I


11 . . 1_ ., ••


1


11 .. , ..


7 11


1


::


2 11 .. 1


50th Do. l,t Do.


60th Do. 5th Do.


7lst Do. 1st Do.


Dets. 95th Do. 3rd Do.


1st Line Bn. K. G. L.


2
¡


6


1


",,,


41 .. 1 23 .. , ..
I


7


1


2


4 10


4 30


... } 9


1


2nd Do. Do.


5th Do. Do.
1 ..


11


4 'j' _lo.
I


"J" 4


...1


7th Do. Do.


Total .. ::H+IH·I~::ii~~l ~~~ .: ::::I+~I+r. ~I~ +~~:i;'-
General Staff, Captain 1Jouglass Mercer, arel 11001 Uuarus, acting A. D. C. to Lt. Gl. Sir B. Spenccr, slightly.


!)iith Foot, 3rd Battalioll. LieuteIlant}~eles, severely.
"lh Line B"llalioJl, K.(;.L. .\Iuller. Do.




No. XX.


Heturn oI' Killed, W ounded, and Missing,of a Division of the Army under the command of His Excellency Lientenant-general Lord Visconnt
Wellillgton, K. B. in action with the Frcnch Army near Almeida, on the 24th J uly, 18] O, Head-quarters Alverca, 25th J uly, 1810.


Regiments.


General Staff


Royal Horse Artillery


14th Light Dragoons


16th Do. Do.


1st Hussars, K. G. L.


43rd Foot, 1st Bn.


52nd Do. 1st Do.


15th Do. 1st Do.


Total British Loss ..


1st Bn. Cassidores


3rd Do. Do.


Total Portuguese Loss ..


Grand Total. .


. ~~~~~~d. J Missing.~! Total.:
.!'l I ~ ¿ ~ ¿ I·~ I . I ~ 1 ..'!! ~ ~ ~.i! ;;. W


KilIed •


al CJ _ rr..... c....: Q) V ~ 00 ....: a;¡ ,r, -::.:n ~ C) U ~ ~ ¡::: .,..,. '+-O ;: ~ I ..... ¡...¡ 'Io.i c:: • ...... .~ J- 4-i;:. ..... H
o oi ...... ~o \"1:0 ~I ~ • ~ o dO ~ I+-t .~o ~o rn. ....... ~ o I ~ ~ rñ .5 ~ é ~ E S ~ ~ rñ ~ ::J 00 .S ffi ~ ~ ~ I a § I:!: '" 1 ';j u J, .S \j rJ Z!" S :;; 'en J, ~ U W .S "rJ ¡';" s ;a .., w :o ~ 1:i. ~ rñ 5 -= :e ci2 :5 ro §. ~ al ~ ""O '~ W -O rñ §. ~ cA ~.~ ~ :n:o rñ §. ~ w t ""d ;:::; ~ ...; 8 .5 .8 b(¡ •• :E g3 e,.!tl ~ ~ t.; o .5 -;:: b.I:., ~ ~ I E ..:.d (!.I ~ ~ .:; S 5 ~ .~., ~ gS a..:.:: ~ ~ t:: ~ t:: s B b.O • :2 ~ ;::: .!:4 H ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ g .~ ~ ;.: .~ E § ~ 8 ~.~.~ §'.; .~ ] ~ '~I E ~ ~ a I ~ .~ 3 ~.~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ 2 ~ ~ t: S ~ ~ ~ ~ '§ ~ ~ .~ 2 ~ y ~ ~ ~ ~i~e.I='~~~ =-~~~ ~I=-~~=-ei~~~=--=-~~I,:::.=- -=-~ ~ ~ w ~'=-,- ~ =-=-=- a ~~~~ ~ ~~~:"-=-I~=-


...... 1 .. ··1" .. .. .. .. .. .... 1" "1" "1"1" .. ··ji" .. '·1 ..
.. , .. , .. , .. ,.. .. l ............ 1.. .. 21.. .. 2.. .. .. , 211 3


11 .. 14j....I.. l' 1 .. 4 •• 1 •• 1 1 .. 1 .. li ..
!


o.' ••


i


11 .. 1 .• 1 .. 121"1131' '1"11"1"1'.1 41 (j,.,
.. , .. , .. , .. , .. 1, ........ 1 1 .. 1 ..


!l11


3'.. "l'. 3
21 .. 13... .... 2 .. 4


771 .. 1 .. 11··, .. 1 114, .. 1 5171 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1101:.! 1104, .. , ..


• _l •• 1 •• t •• 1 •• 1" -l' -l' -1 31 •. 11 .. [ .. 41 •• 1 ••


~~.I':'·-H~'~~~~ ~i~~ ~II~ ~~I~- ~1~lj~ ..!.~~I~ ~.:.' .:--.~~ j~I~I~I~~~ ~j.~ ~~~":'~~~~-=I~I~Cj~
-- '1-r ' ¡ -- - - -- , --1'" " 1, -- , , ,'-- ---- "' ''',- -" --------1 ' 1- - - - -- , '" --1- - , , , , >ti - - - - - - '" '"'1' " ~~[[IT~~~~·:-~'~~~~~'~~~~ ~--::~[ ~,~~~. II~~ ~ ~:~I~ ~~~~: . ~~~~::~.: I~.
;~~t[;IJ;;1 ~;~~:~~~~~ ,::~;I=l;--I[;~~ :'::[; ;; ;o~:--=;: ~ ,::;~




No. XXI.


Returo of OfIicers Killed, Wounded, amI Missing, on the 24th July, 1810.


Killed. Wounded. I 1\Iissing.


Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. I Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks.
Lient. Col. Edward HuI! 43rd Foot 1 st Bn. Lieut. Shaw 43rd ltt. A. D. C. ~


,------------------


Slightly ¡Lt. J. 1\I'Culloch 9"th Regt. 1st Bn. taken prisoner Captain E; Cameron Do. to B. General Crawford S
Lieutenant J "bn N asan Do. Lieutenant B1atchford 14 tll J"ight Dragoons Severely


D.lH'Leod 95th Do. 1st Do. Captain P. Deshon 43rd Regut. 1st Bn. Slightly
'fhomas Lloyd Do. Do.


W. F. 1:'. Napier Do. Do.
J. W. Hull Do. Severely


Lieutenant George Johnstone Do. Sligbtly
J. P. Hopkins Do. Severely


H. Harvest Do. Slightly
James I\I'Dearmid Do. Severely


J ohn Stephenson Do. Do.
Roger Frederick Do. Do.


Majar Hcnry Hidewood 52nd Do. 1st Do. Slightly
Captain R. Campbell Do. Do.


James Creagh 95th Do. 1st Do. Severely (sínce dead)
Samuel l\Iitcbell Do. Do.


1st Lient. H. G. Smith Do. Slightly
Mathias Pratt Do. Severely


Reilly Do. Do.
Coane Do. Do.


T. Smitb Do. Do.
2nd Lient. George Simmons Do. ])0.


3rd Cassidores ~ One Officer, rank t and name unknowll


:,




.~~:'


No. XXII.
State of the Royal British and German Artillery Drivers, Engineers, &c.


Head-quarters, Cartaxo, 15th February, 1811.


Officcrs, Serjeants, Drurnmers. Rank and File. Alterations sinee last, I
Civil
---~-----c----~ Branch.


" Siek. l~ Siek.¡ 1:: I Sick, ~ Men. Horses. I~ ~ ~ ~ ¡ 1::: '"' - ::: '"'1 :::: ,,¡, I .. I.~ ,S '
..,.J CI:l .Oc .o¡;: .O!=l ""'d "'O .. '"dl ..... ~wcn


.... • ¡:: Q.l -o 1.... "'C I ''''' "'o..... <l) • c.J"¿ • '"O Q) ro. M·
2 i .S ~ ~ ~ ~ .; § E:g ~ .: ~ fJ ¡ ~ .~ ~ ...: ...! § ~.~ ..... I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ E 1 ~ ~ 'O ~ t


1m
a:


p ;... ('C <U T.. ¡:: ¡::l ::: ;:: ¡::H ¡:: e ¡:: :::'~ ...... 1::: ::: ¡:: ~:::"::;:! ~ rI> ""O .. ~ t: ~ o u I~" o:.¡... el ~ <Il ~ t.J ~o ....... ""'~ ..... <l.>~-o~lc..::.....¡,-or-!. c:J <l.J (jJ ,.., OF-l""': C) QJ""O ..... Q)"'s;::s ..... "'Cl·:r. ¡::¡Cl..!:ld~--=
........ '" ;:j ~ ~ ifJ JJ 1Jl ;:: 'Il q) T.J 00 a. 1> '1' 'n 00 E rJ). ro: ~ ~ ¡::; c:; :..:. !.Il el - u ~ ~ e S" 1- ¡:: '.;:s


...: ! ;;.~ ;:; ~ ¡:; E ~ i5 ~ "'O I ¡.; ~ -=- o c: '"d ~ ~ ~ o'C "'O 'O o ::l ...... CJ ;!l <l) f :2 ~ V IV a f o ~ ~ o ....
H '" ~ ...:¡ en :Ií ;:.., ;:.., --1 ;,);:.. ;; ¡Ii: :lo. --1 U ,:lo.:'l il< il< < U ¡¡,,:'l ¡..., =: ;;::¡ ~ ~ ~ :::¡ ;.- ;:.., ~ i~ ;l U;'- U il< U u <1


J


' {Horse l~rtiJlery - -: ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ --, -; ~ ~ --,-- -H/-l -; 29 ~3 -,-,- -2-7-0 -·-·-r~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -.-,-,~,~,~
Do, Duvers 6 ]26 <1 20 42 1921420 I 9 .. ,," 9,"


_ B, FootA~tillery 3" 1122 5 16 .. 1 2 7 .. 2 3 63022,62 97 12 823 .' 1"1" 1 .. 11 1 .. " .. ,,11 4 118118147
~ Do. DrIvers 2 7 1; fi :! 17 5 .. 4 :;07 11 5334fi 7 724 5791230 .. " . ,l .. 1" ,. Iv:; 5 3, ..


P:; lG'f Do. Artillery 5 12 2 .7 5 .. . 229 10 13 25:;, '
t. Do, Drivers 1 " 120 4 11 1 136 1881 78


Engineers 10 12 .. 3 .. 16 " 17 ,.!


Waggon Train 1 1 615 3 2:l0 .. " 16 1 4 ... , 1 " 1
232


.. 28196 3 45!11 2!1.. ............
9


1


31"''''1'''' '" 'l" Total,,1~2 :W~IM WI ;g2~;-3~!~1~1;; ~218-. '-!~I;;:!J4 738 -;;- 287411480 317. ~3~~11, ;9~~ -6-;;;41
, , 1 ; l' • 1 ¡


314,,, 2




No. XXV.


Rcturo of Killed, W oundcd, and .M:issing, of thc Army under the Command of Lieutenant-
general Lord Viscount W cllington, K.B. in Action with the French Army froro the 6th


to the 15th March, 1811. Head-quarters Lousao.


Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.


~. ~. ~. ~.
00 ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ui ~ .~ ~ O'~"'Ci .~ o.¿.-o .~ ,o.~'"Cl .~ O.~'"d


(/lCfl. ~CIJ(1)~ cnco:: • • r,:¡". __ Ulct:.oOOa,..= ¡flcc· '~vs:: ~ .s ~ ~ ..::;;¡ a ..: rñ ,ñ ~ S ~ !: ~ S ~ :ti 00 S S ~ ~ ~ S ~ cñ rñ.S s: ~ E e El d 00 ~i~~~~.~§~~ 2.a.~~L~~~~"á ~ ~~~1~~~~;~~ ~~~ftc:~~8~ ~
..! ctl.~ ~ .5 t.. t; ;.. ~ o ~ ce I'~ :: ::.. ..... :; l-o ~ :: I~ :'ti .~ 1 ¡:; i1 :... t ... ;'1: :;:¡ ~ C':l .~ ¡:; .5 '"' ~ ¡..., ~ o


"" U -l ;:.< en O' en :::¡ ::c ;:: "" U -l ;,;¡ "fj O' "f) :::¡ ~ ~ 1'" U -l ~ W O' :f] :::¡ ~ ;:¡; "" U ....:: ;:.< W O' :f] :::¡ ~ ::c:
8th March 18111[~~~~~·~~~ 1 ~~I~~~~~~~-~~ ~~j~~~~~-;-; ~~~~~~~1~---;;10


9th Do. • .,. ·1· ., •• , •• , •• , •• 11 1


10th Do.
¡


.01 •• , •• 1 •• 1' .1 •• 1211 .. 211 213


11th Do. •• I •• I.ol •• I··! 1 ........ 1 o. •• •• •• 4 .. 5,··


""'j" .......... 8 3 5 1 .. 5 .. 106 4 ................ 5 .... 1 5 .. 5 .. 11917
..1 .. l .......... l~ .. ,1 531 .. 10 .. 93 .................. 4 .. 541 .. 10 .. 109, ..


l .... 2 1 .. 6 .. 1 ..•. 1 1 .. " l.. 57,. ., , .•.. , ..... , ,. .. .. .. ,. 3 1 ., ., 2.. 631~


12th Do.


14th Do.


15th Do.
------~--,- ---------- --1------- -----.-----


British 1
1


" .. 3 .. .. .. 1 .. 27 (j: 1 6 !JI I .. lü .. 264 ~ .. .. .. .. .. .. I(j 8 1 ti 12 4 1 .. 17 .. 307 :,21
Portuguese ¡ ................ 21 .. 11" 21 1 3 .... 6 .. 80.. .. ...... ~ .. !J.. 2 1 3 .... 7 .. llol~


Grand Total .. II~~3~~~-¡~:u;-;;-II-¡-;1~7-¡~;-:-:- 344 7 ~~-:-:F~~ 1 ~;;-; l--;137\~~;~ 417 121


f


(Signed)
E.1\'[, Pakenham,


Col. D. A. G.




No. XXVI.


"l\ ames 01' thc Otlicers Killed aud W oUllded
from the 6th to 15th March, lS11.


Date. Rallk alld Names. !I Regiments.
'1


Uth March, l~ll


I
Lielltenant 'fhomas Gifford 1: i;2nd Foot 1st En.


Sawatzky 60th Do. 5th Do.
15th Mareh Hepenstall 1 88th Do. 1st Du.


WOllnded.
11th March, 18U Lientenant Hopwood 9i\tb Regt. 1st En.


I En,ign Jose Joaquim Figeo 3rd Caeadores Lientenant Clark 5th Foot, 2nd Bn. March 45th Do. 1st Do. Cross ¡¡2nd Do. 1st Do. Ensign Lifford Do. Do. I;!lh Do. Adjutant Winterbottom Do. Do.
< Lientenant lIippenstall 8!lth ])0. Do.


I Captain Rogne 94th Do. Lientellant Beckwith 95th Do. 1st Do. Captain Chaproan (15th 1st Caeadores Waldron 27th II th of the Line Ensign Jase Felicissimo 4th Cacadores Jose P. de Carto 6th Do.
Captain Napier 43rd F 001 ] st En.


DalyeIl Do.
Ensign Carroll Do.


Captain George Napier 52nd 1)0. 1st Do.
William Mien Do.


14lh Do. < William Jone! Do. Lientenant Wynne 60th ])0. 5th Do.
Crabb 74th ])0.


!I
]'IJajor Sle"ar! 95th Do. ht En.


Lieutenant Strode Do. \'1 Joa'luim Manuel I bt Cacadores ~ 1
I I.t LiclItellant l\1'ClIlIoc!t ;, U5th .1)0. bt Bu. 1 ;¡(It Do. t I tlld ])0. Kincaid ])u.


I Remarks.


Severely
Do.


Slightly


Slightly
Severely


Scverely
Slighlly


Severely
Do.


Slightly
Scverely
Sli~htly


Do.
Severely


Vo.


Severely
:'Ii¡;htly




-....
el)


,....


~ ;;;:
1:


'"


No. XXVII.


Return of Killed, W ounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of His ExceIlencv Field-marshal the
Marquess of 'Vellington, K. B., in the Affair at Fuente Honore. •


11 ' ~ :ill"~. ¡ ~ !111 ' d 1, "':~d. ~ I III I l. t"ij"1 i~ I I 1I . . . T."I .
:-0: " ;:: 0::" - S ~ o ~ I "' _ ,," ;; El '" 00 - "' " ¡; "1 1" :: ~ ,,; , ,n.,," ~ 10:: I e 1;;,3 ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ t 5 ~ ~ ~ -; ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ § ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ '$JC ~ ~ E ~ "'ª & 1 ~ 5 ~ ~ § . ~ E


1": ..e ~.~ e .3 i: e ,.:;: I ~ .3 .~ ..:s _~ .~ ,~ !'E I ~ ~ d o c.~ ~ ~.;:; -:: E ';:;> ¡: 2 "3 o . .:: S ;;.§ é ~ ~ 2
_____________ II=__-=-=-=__:.. ~Cf]_=_=_I=-=- =-:=..:::..=-~~~=--=--~ ::: =--=-~ =-'"'-~! ~=-~ ::; =-:=..:.J.=-=--~!=_, __ , __ _


/ Royal Horse Artillcry ].. . '1" I .. . .1
1


" ... _¡l .......... 1 ..
I·lth Light Dragoons l' . 1, 1 1 .. .. .. 1 1 .. ...... I 1 1 ..


16th Do. Do. .. .. ] .. 1
1


,,, "1" "1" "1" ...... ..
1st HlI;;,ars K. G. L. .. o • • • .[.. 1 .. .. .. 4 5 5 .. .. .. .. .. . .. .


5th }'not 2nd 13attalion .. 1. . .. , .. "1 .. . ·1" 4 4 ..
24th Do. 2nd Do. .. .. ..l·· .. .. ..1.... 2 2.. "l"


4¡!nd Do. 2nd Do. ..1.. 1:. 1.. .. 1.. 5 7.. .. .. 111
45th Do. ht Do. ..1.. .. "1-' .. 2 :2 ..


50th Do. 15tDo. ..¡ .. I.. 1 1 ... ¡.... :¡ 5.. .. ..
fiOth Do. 5th Do. 3 :l.. J •. " •• .• !J 11. . 1>1 1-1 ••


7lst Do. 1st Do. h ~.. :2 I 1 2.. 31 3H. . 61 6 ..
74th Do. Do. .. .. 1 l.. .. .. .. .. 9 9 . . . ...


79th Do. 1 sI Battalion I 1.. 4 5 .. 1.. ..1 1.. 1 í 20 ..
8:{rd Do. 2nd Do. . ·1· . H 9 . . :¡ :l ..


88th Do. 1st Do. o • '11.. 2 .. 3 5 .. 2 ..
8!lth Do. 2nd Do. .. . (¡ b . . 6 6 ••


92nd Do. 1st Do. !I 10.. 1 .. 9 10 ••


1111 .. 1 1, ..


•• 11"
'


" Jo ••


11 .. 1 .. 1 .. 11, ••


1, .. 11 1 ~ ';1'1 ¡-31::


1
:1 3 3


1
4 5 5


4 4 .•
2 2 ..


7 !I ..
2 2 ..


3 5 ..
20 22 ...


43 52 ..
10 10 .•


21 25 ..
12 12 ••


3 5 ••


..!l ¡;:;
.."


~ I I ~"'" . '" ¡::: "(; ~ ~:i:


94th Do. Do. 2 :1 • • 1 •. 2 3 .•
95th Do. 3rd Battalion 1 .. !I 10 .• i . . 1 .. 9 10 .•


1st Jjght 13attalion K. G. L. 2 2 .. o 5 5 "1 .. 7 7 ..
2nd Do. Do. . .1 1 .. I •• 3 3 .. .. . ... i. . 4 4 .•


1st Line Do. Do. . . l' . :2 4 .. ' . . . .'. . . .. '1" 1 1 2 4 ..
2nd ])0. ])0. <1 4 .. 1 . . . .1. . .. .. .. 4 4 .'


\ 5th Do. ])0. l. . . .1.· .. i. . l .. 3 4 •• 1 .• . .•. " .. 1 . . 3 4 ••
7th Do. Do. 1,,:,,-,_":"-'1":"-' _______ 1 ______ 1 __ ~..:..-.~_1_:I ..:..-.1..:..-. __________ I]..:..-.~· ..:..-...:..-. __ ~ ._. ~_2 __ 3..:..-.
~:t~~'~~~~~~se ~~~IL~~L~~~~~IL'~ii,l_!11,L l~~ 1;~~!:~~~:~~~ 1 ::~~í!~I!L~~)~_~~~~ 1~~ 2!:~


GeneralTotal ... " II] .. ··:! .. :12:¡¡;4Il .. 4101521111111701 :W4/G¡ .. I ...... -... 1 .. 21221
1


1 1 .. 5lJ 5:2 1,1122326211




:No. XXVIII.


Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded on the 3rd of May, 1811.
--------


Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and Narries. llegimen Is. Remarks.


Killed. Woundeu.
Lieutenan t Cowsell 7lst Regt. 1st Bn. Captain Krauchenberg 1st Hus.ars, K. G. L. Slightly


Captain Imlach 19th Do. 1st Do. l\1'Donald 42nd Regt. 2nd Bn. Severely
Lieutenant Rudkin 50th Do. 1st Do. Slightly


Ensign Gran! Do. Do.
Lt. Col. Williams 60th Do. 5th Do. Severely


Duchestaletle Do. Slighlly
Captain lWlntyre 7lst Do. 1st Do. Severcly


Lieutenant Fox Do. Do.
M'Crea Do. Sligbtly


Ensign Kearns Do. Dangerou"ly
Adjutant Law Do. Slightly


Lientenant Calder 19th Do. 1 st Do. Do.
Ensign Brown Do. Severely


Lieutenant Hill 92nd Do. 1st Do. Do.
Uniacke 95th Do. 3rd Do.


Captain de Barros 6th Cacadares
Lientenant de Moratto Do.


Manuel J oaquim Do.
J. de Sto Anna Do.


Eusign F. de Roxa Do.
Antonio Pinto Do.


Adjulant B. de l\Iagelhomes Do.




-....


No. XXIX.


Retllrn of Killed, WOlluded, and Missing', of the Arrny under the Cornrnand of His Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B.
Oll the 5th Muy, 1S11.


Killed. ----------vVounded. Missing. Total.


,l. . 1 . 'l' I i ,S'. ~ . í I • I i 1 1 <::i'1 '1 . i i~1 \ iI:i' • • -l· . ~ I ~ ~ r.ti • ~ w. .:; rñ ~-t • 1, ~ .!!:. ~ • ~ rñ ZJ rÍJ ~.... • e '~ rñ .:!: 00 !!!.;.... • ;s .!! lOO • r~. • !:.::::
I ro <J.) -;::tl.~ rñ ¡::I ¡::: H ~ rIJ. i en ~ ~ IJ'J ..... .;, ¡::::¡ :::... ~ IJ'J :f] ~ -- en.= . ¡:: ¡:: t! ;...:., rn 'l1 :¡" ...... :r..~ • m =?l ~ tT.I


: Uí 8 j :s %. ;; '~I<::i ¡j El 0 .;;¡ 'Ji i ' <i 8 ::..;J ~.s ;; .=.L <::i ¡; S 0 ~ 'Ji 1 -' 'l 8 :s 5 § .;.r <::i ::; \ El ,~ .;;¡ :l? ,.: 88 S. .':; tJ S. <::i ~ S 0 -.; g¡
! ~ 'O ~ ';i' ¡t¡5 .~ ~ I!S '5"' ~ ~ <5 ~! ~ 'O ...; ~. ;-.~ ~ 5 'P 2.,:.; a s I (U "'§ ...; '~. ª"'.~ ~ ~ .~ e ~ o ~ ¡:"O: _' ~ ~I ~ ';¡j ~ 'c:;; 2 ~ 'O s I ~=-'::'~~::' :';I-'=-~I:",~~_=J~"=-=-~'I=-=-='~~=- '" ... ~J::.. ~~=-~=-I::.=-~~!:..~ .. ~J:.I~=-I.=-,=-~I~ ~0..~=-~...':-.-1 =:


\


1 , " ,_
IGelleralStajf i·· .. ·· .... ·· .............. 1 :! .... ··1;·1............ 2 .................... 1 ........ 2 .. ¡ •.•••• 1.......... 2


Horse Artillery : . . " " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 3


1


.... .. , "1 .. 1" .. .. ". •• 1 I 3 .. ,.... .. ...... i .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. '.. .. "1" .. .. .. 2 2 6
E'ootDo. ...•...... l .. 4 5!J .... "]"1 112 .. 18 2121 ' ........ ' .... 12 .... 1 .. 2226 30


1st Hoyal Dragoons ¡ .. .. .. .. 4 418 ...... · ... 1 J .. 36 37 ~4, .. .. .. .. .. "' .. 1.... 40 41 42
14th Light Do. , ' •.. " .. .. 3 3 5 .• .. .. .. 21:! l.. {¡.. 21 32211...... 3 3 3 .. 1 2, 2 l.. 6.. 27 38 30


lGth Do. Do. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7 41.... .. .. 2 ........ 1(¡ 18 5 1.. .. 1 .. 2 2 11 2 .... 1.. 33 27 11 1st lIussar. ~. G. L. l· .. ·...... 1 :! 61 .... I 1. ... ~ .. 3~ 4:11:!0.............., 111 .... 3 2 37 ~? 26
ColdstreamGds. IstBn., •• "1" .. .. 4 ·1 "1" .. 1 1.... 2 .. 4/ 50 .............. 1.. 7 8.. 1 11 .. 1 .. 2 .. 58 02


3rdFootGuards,lstDo.: .......... 1 .... ;; 6 .......... 11···· 3 .. 4953 ...... 1........ 1213 .... l .. l .. l .. 3 .. 6672
1st Fo"t, 3rd Do. I " •• •• •• • .,.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. b 9 .. 1" .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1.. 8 9


5th Do. 2nd Do. 1 .... " .. .. .. .. ...... .. . ... '. .. .. 3 3 .. ' .... " .. .. .. .. .. ., ...... " .. .. 3 3
9th Do. 1st Do. " ., " .......... " . ·1.. .. .. .... 4 4 .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 4


24th Do. 2nd Do. . ......... 1.. 45 .................. ~ .. 17 l!J .. I ........ 1 ........ 45.. 1 l. ... 2 .. 2529
30th Do. 2nd Do. .• .• •. . ... \ ...... 1.. 3 4.......... .. ...... 1.. 3 4


42nd Do. 2ud Do. .. 1.. 2.. .. ........ 1 .. 22 23.......... ..,.... .. ...... 2.. 23 25
44th Do. 2nd Do. .. " .... " .. 4 4......... . _ .. 1. . . ... " " .. 4 4


Regimenta.


45th Do. 1st Do. 3,3.. •.······ .... 1 l .. , .......... l ..•... 4 u .... 1 ................ 4 4
50th Do. 1st Do. 1 .... ,...... .. 3 :1 ..


1
.............. ~ .. 1921..................... .. ...... 1 .... 2 .. 2629


51st Do. .. .. '.. .. .. .... ...... '.. ...... 5 5...................... 1 1.. .......... .. .. .... 5 5
.;..' 60th Do. 5th Bn. .. .. 1.. .... . ... , .... 1.. .. "1" 1. ... 1 .. II 14 ............ 2 .... 12 1 34,39.. .. ...... l .... 1.. 12 15 ~ l1lst Do. 1st Do. . ... " .. .. :! ..•. I 1 .. 10 13.. ., l.... ~ 1 (j 1 64 74...................... . .. '1·" I 4 2 1 9 2 108 126


-:: 74th Do. " •• •. .. .. 1 2 3. . 2 •.. ' I l.. 52 56................. . .. .. .. .. 2 l.. 1 l.. 54 5\'


00
....


~ 79th Do. 1st Do. I .. 2(j 27.. 1 ., 2 5 1.. 5 .. 121 135.. " ........... " .. 2.. 92 94.. .. .. l.. 2 5 l.. 8.. 239 2.56
83rd Do. 2nd Do. . ......... 1 .... 11 3.. 1 .... 2 .. 2ti 2!J .... ' ............•... \.. .. .. \ .... 2 .... 31 26 32


85th Do. .. ........ 1 ...... 1213 ...... li2' .... 313:! 39 .. 1 ................ 2140431 .......... 3 .... 528492
88th Do. 1st Bn. . ....... 1.. 1 2.. .. .... 1 1 1 .. 1 1 45 49...................... 1 1.......... 1 1 .. 1 1 47 52


!J2nd Do. 1st Do. . •. '1" .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7.. .. "I··t 1 .... 2 .. 32 3ti ...... ·· ........... '1" 1 2.. 39 43
!J4thDo. ..••.............. . ..... 1·.······ ...• 44 ... ,...... .... 44


!J.,th Do. 1st Bn. .. " " .. " .. .. .. .. ' .... ' ... " .. l.. (j 7. ......... . .. .. 1 .. 6 7
!J5th 2nd Do. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "1" .. .. .... 1 l. .. .. 1 1


95th 3rd Do. . ......... 1........ 1 .. .. .. ..... .. .. .... 2 2 ....... ·.... 11.. 1 2.. .. 1 .... 1.. 1I 5
ChasscUIs Brittaniquo ...•.•.... .. 2.. 28 30.. .. " 21' 1 1.. 2 .. 15 21... . ..... 7 7.. .. 2 1 1.. 4.. 30 58


lstLightBn.K.G.L............. ........ 22 .. , .. 1............ 11 .. 1 .................... 33
2nd Do. Do. Do. . .. '1" .. '. .. .• .. . • .. 1 1 .. \.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 .. í.. .. .. .. .. .. .... .... 2 2


1st LineDo.Do. .. .. ,........ .. l ......... 3 .. 14 1~.. ................ 1 1 .. !.. 1 ........ 3 .. 15 19
2nd Do. Do. Do. .. ...... 2,2... ... , 21" ........ 11 la .. ".............. 2 2 .. 1.. 2 .......... 15 17


5th Do. Do. Do. . ..• ¡.. .. . .\.. .. 1 ........ i .... i. ... .... 8 ~ .. 1
1


" .. .. .. .. .... .. .... 3 :~.. .. " .. .. .. .... 11 11
7th Do. Do. Do. .. .. ; .. " .."...... 1 J .. ," .. ' .... :..... 1.. J.. 4 (j.... ........ "........ 2 2...."........ 1.. 1.. 7 9 Brun~~i~o~:I:ritiSh .. ~ ~i~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~!~~ 141.~ }I'~I~I~ ~¡I,~¡i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ -;~ ~,I ~ ~ ~I~ ~¡~ ~ ~ ~.~ 2~ 2:: ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~lli~~i.~ ,,:: ":l:'


Do. Portuguese •.. "," .. ' ... "1" J 11 44 50 .... " l. '1": 2 4 .• 11 .. 140 l;,I> ... , .. " .........• 117143 51 .... " 1 .... 2 4 .. 17 8 22/ 2J!J ..
Grand Tutal .. ~~I~~""-I71~"t;3[~3W8 4;r2!-:-:-24:¡;I23112~4 9061030;M1 ~~1~2a 1~!;!;26!J 294 '5 2~13418 ;-;132831613481522145


.'1




No. XXX.


CasuaIties which have occurred in the Trenches and Batteries before Badajoz,
betwecn the 15th and 18th May, 1811.


\ Killeu. 1 WOllnued. ,Misoing• Tot.1.


11 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ i i ~ I~ i iJ J. ~
1


o rñ ¡:: ,;; f..., "'O e . e & .... "O 1:3 . el ,; ¡..,"-o ""::: • e rñ ~ ""O U ~...¡..l (l.o::: ::..) 7l.:t::. !J Q,l o ,::..) (/1 ttI· ...... Q) Q .'; ~:.: c' -+-':¡". ¡:::
. w.: ~ ~ ;:: S co:: i .g § 'a o:: co:I ,;..s ~ g: o a I cd - ~~ .~ ~ ~ ~ s '"


\


-'-' 13 .5 ..... ~ .• m El ~....:: ....:. ~ ::: ...., bJ) • ro El ~ -.:: ~ 5 :o: ~ 1M.· ~ El I~ ~ ~ Él 5 -- ;:1 .• ~ ;: ..!.:: \ ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ ; 1';-- ~ .. ~ '§ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ I ~ .~ ~ ~ II"§ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ ! ~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ § § -S --------II=-~~~~ ~~=_~==_ ~I;;; ~~~~:!=__=__~'=--I~~~~I=-~~=-~==- ==-~~~~Icñ ~=-~-~
Royal Engineers 1 1 l.. 2 2 2 .. " ... '1" .. 3 1 .. [". ".. 4


27th Regl. 3rd Do. .. I .. 4 ¡¡ 2 ti 1 52 6·1 ..... , ] .... 2 " .. 9 1 56 69


34th Do. 2nd Do. .. " " 1


40th Do. 1st Do. 10 lO 2 1 11; 2\ 2 1 "... .. 28 31


Regiments.


60th Do. 5th Do. .. .. .. •. 1


91th Regimeol 7 71" 1!J 19 ...... " 26 26
2nd Lt. Bn. K. G. L. i' • ., •• l.. .. .. .' ... .. " ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1


I! I
Total Dritish LOSS"II~-----~~~~I~~-:-~--~I~ 921091........ --~~~ -l-~:-:-- -~-~~ 133


Portuguese Los8 .. 1 ... , .. 1 1 .• 2 .. 4014 , ...... I l.. 4 1 88!J5 ...... 1 ...... " ~2 231" 3 2 .. 6 1 150162
1_-________ 1_1 _________ --- ,--------- -1-.--.-------


General L08s"ll .... 1 2 ] " 3 ,,6168 1 .. 4 4 1 " 122 18012041 .... " 1 " .... "¡22¡2311 1 .. 5 7 21 .. lo 21 263 2!J5




<U


'"
" ~
~


'"
"d


'" .. ~
'" ....


"..


.,J;¡ ~
<U .-< ~ ""


+=< .:
';::


<:>


'"


XXXI.


Return of Killed, 'Voullded, and Missing, of the Army ullder tho Command of his Excellency Field-marshal
the M arquess of Wellingtoll, K. B. Commander of the Forces at the Siege of Badajoz.


,; Killed. . 1 lo Woundcd. . 1,; l\IiSSing..,; - Total. •


- "'1 - " - '" - '" ~ cñ .~ I~ r.r: .r:!~ w .~ ~ 'J~ .~ ~ ...., rn e :: rn o ...... oc. o ...... ;r¡
~ 00 ~. i ~ ~ 1:0 w ~. 2 ~ ~ ~ rñ ~. ~ ~ -g :o 00 ~. $ t -g ~ al .9 ~ P ~ § ~ . 1~ ~ :: g ~ e = :o: • --: rñ .~ § ~ ¡:; S c;l .:~ ~ .:= S ~ ;:; S ~ •


:; .§.. ~ ~ .~D ~ ~ ; .; ~ I -; .~ ~ ',; '~:b .~ § ~ ~ -;.~ ~ I'~ ,:1) t¿ ~. ; -2 3 I ~ .2., á :; .~ í:ti .~. ; ~ ]
~ ;2 j I~ ~ 33 ~% ~ ~ ~ :.~ ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :J; o J ~ 6 ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~:~ ~ ~ J :3 ~ ~ ~ ;:S ~ ~


-7th Fllsileers, lstH~~----- ----------~ II~---------- -----,------- - ----------;-1
40th l<'oot, 1st Do. 1 .. 1 1


48th Do. :!nd Do. .. l" 1 1
51st Do. .. .. 4 4


66th Do. 2nd Do. 11·· I 1 1
1<11" Do. 1 1" "1" 1 ~ 1 .. 23 83rd Do. 2nd Do. .. .. 3 3 . . 3 3


85th Do. .. l.. .. .. 1 1 . . .• .. 1 1
Chasscurs Britannique _ 3 :: 1.. ..1.. 4 4 "1" "1" 9 9


Detadt: 1 st and :!nd 1t. Bn. h_.G.L. . '1" 1 1 "1" " " .. 1 1
Brunswlck üels . '1" " .. 4 4 •• .. 2 2 .. 4 4


----------------------------------------


TotaIBritish10SS .. II ..I"I .. I"" .. " .. 6 6¡ .. "" .... " 1,,~021 ...... " "1"1"1 .. 121211 .. 1"1"~.I .. I .. lll"12812!l
Do. Porlugucsc. '1 ~ ~ ~.2 ~ ~ ~ ~ -= ~ ¡.2.2 ~ ~ -= ~.2.2 ~ ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~_ -= -= .2.2 ~ ~ -= ~.2.2 ~:~ ~


General Total.. . ..... I 1 .. .. .. .. (5 161] l.... ~.. ~ 1 ,,3 1;(1 ........... [.. •• •• 4 4 l l.. 1 2.. ~ 1 72 80


[


5th ltegiment :!n,l Bn.
'" Chasseurs Britannique


'" .;; Total British ..
'g Do. Portuguesc ..


·1 .. i["11 .. " ...... 11" ........ ,,! .... "1 .. 1" .... 1 ...... 1 .. "1" .. l .... 1 .......... 1
.. .......... " " .............. " .... 1 1 .................... "," ............ 1 1


_' ___________________ ,_ 1---------- -1--- _-_'-__ -_-


~~~14~~~~·~ ~.~ .... p~ •• ~i~~~~~ ~~ •. ~H·4 ~~ .• 1~ J "" General Total. .




No. XXXII.


Contiuuation of the Siege of Badujoz.


w Killed. \ -:-__ . WOl1nde~~ __ . __ 1 ;. .l\Iissing.
~ i ~ ~ w ~ ~


§ ~ .~ g ~ .~ 5 ~ ~~ § ~
:o rJi~. ~~"'C ~ oo~. ~~]:O ~~. ¿~""O e <7:§


::.,¡ 'OI,,~ OlE" ::.,¡.·"OI~ '"E" ::.,¡ '''"en "E;; ::.,¡ ."" ~ .~.~ ~ .~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ 'ª ~ .~ ~ ~ § ~ ~ :; i'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ [. ~ ; ~~j~~~~d~~3~3~&~~~~~~~jJ~~jd~~3~~~


Total.


en


~Iiti 'fii .:a
" ~ ;:il:n


I~ .:.. '~'"d ~ ~¡' ¡¡l' 83 S ~ ce .~ E ; ~
:1l~~E-4


·-------11---,-,-- _. - - - - - - - -- - - --'- - - - - -. - - ---- - -.- - - ---,-,.-,-,-,-,-.


f39th Fool, ~nd Bn. 51st Do. " 51th Do. 1s1 Do. § 85th Do.
i\


,
11 ••


1 r ••
11 1


2: ~
li 1


11 2 ) 1
------ --- --I-=I-r----I-I---------- ------


21
2


1 l
1 ~


2 2


Total British.. .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 .. .. .. .. 11·....· 5 ni.. .. .. .. .. .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. l...... 6 1
lJo.rortuguese •. \I~~.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:._=_= .:..:..:..:. ... ~. ':":'I.:..:.~~j-=¡.:..:..:..:..:..:. ... -..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:..:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:. ... .:..:..:..:..:..:.~~


General TotaL. i ........ " ..... .:...- 3 __ 3 .... l·· .. '1...... 7 1 El "_~ _ .. _. :_. '" .. .. ........ 1 ...... lO 11
(


Royal Artillery
48th Foot, Ist'J3n.


74th Do.
o 83rd Do. 2nd Bn.
~ § 85th Do.


~ ~rD'.
............ 1 .. 1·· .... ' ................. J' 1 .. ' ........ ' ........ ·.:'1·· .. ·· .... 1 ...... 1 1


. .1..1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .................. ' ..... 1 1¡ .................. "1" ........ l·· .... i 1
:: :: :::: :: :: :J~ :~ :~ Ili ., •.•..• : .. ¡ 11 " .•.• : •• : : ••• '. ·f •...•••.•. ' .. ¡ ¡


l· I " , . . 1- - -- - - -1---,--------------------11'-- - -1- -1-----; fotal Bnbsh .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1 ] .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. 7 8 ................ " .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. 1; [)
Do. Portuguese. ·I.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~~ ___ ~i~ ~.:..:.-..:..2..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:. ~~I~.:..:..:..:. -..:..:..:.-..:. .:..:.~.:..:..:..:.'.:..:..:..:. -..:.¡.2..:..:..:..:..:..:. .:..:.~~


General TotaL. I ............. .!.. 515 .. .... ,1.... 1 .. 21 23 . ·1·· ................ 11 .... ··1 ) .. i" 1 .. ~6 28
Royal Artillery .... 1.... .. 1:.. .. .... 11 JI ...... 1.. .. .. 11 .. ····.. 2


7th Fusileers, 1st HIl. .. .. .. .. .• 1 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1
5th Regt. 2nd Bn. 3 3'1" .. 1.. 3 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... 1.. (j 7


45th Regl. 1st Du. .. ... " " .. .. 2 2 ...... " .... " .. 2 2
51st Do. .. .... , .... 1.. .. <1 4 .. 1 .... ,.. .. .. 1 .... "l" 4 4
~ I 66th Do. 2nd Do. . . i 1 1 ..•. l. • . .•••• ! •• ' •••• 1 ••••• , •• " 1 1


..; 74th Do. .. ·.1.... ........ .. 22 ........ .. ...... ~ 2
.::; \88th Do. 1st En. . ....•.... " .. •. I l .•.. I •• •. .•.••• 1 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ..... .. .. .. 2 2


>r.> 94th Do. .. .. " .. .. .. .. •. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. " .. .. 1 1 .. " .. .. .. .. " .. I •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 1 1
--- ------- ------.---- -----------1----------


Total British ...... " l·· ...... 5 6 ...... " .. " 1 .. 1516 .... " " ........ " ........ 11.... 1 .. ;l0 22
Do. Portuguese .. . ... .:..:. .~.:..:. "- .. 4' .2..1 . .:..:..:..:..:.:. .. .:..:. .. .:..:. ~ -=..: ~.:..:. .. r .:..:.,.:..:. .. .:..:. .. ~I.:..:. .. .:..:. ~I.:..:. .-..:..:..:. .. ~ ~


GeneralTotal ........ 1 ........ fl 7 .... ! ........ 1 .. 24125 .... "," .. ; ................ 1, .... 1 .. 3032
. ' 1 1 I i I 1 I




.\0. XXXIlf.


COl! tillllatioll 01' t1w Sieg·t· of lJadajoz.


1 KilJed. WOUlléit-d. l\1issing. Total.


1-1; --1 ¡411-- ·I-;-I~--¡ I'~I-;--l- ~I~,I-'-i ·--I--I~ -
1 . \ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ I ~ I~' I . ~ ~,~ I ;3 i ~ ~: l. ~ ~ [.; i ~ ':g 1 ' .1 f ~"~ 1 ~ ~ ~


I ~ lE 1; I.~I~ ~ i 6 ~ I~ 1, 5 B j ~: ªIft I ~ § -~ ¡~ i ~ j ~ i ~. - m § .: '~ ~:'3 ~ I.~ •• ~ sI'; lo¿
':1 ~I.~ I ~ lE 1 ~ 2 (~, ~ i ~-, ;-Ij ¡ ~ .e f ~ 181 ~ 13'1~! ~ I ~ I~ .~ 81 § le ~I ~¡ § 1 ~ 'B ¡ f' ~ ~ 'O


_________ . ____ I:,::,!~!'" i~.I:J) 'f2 ,=i~ ,-=-",", ,=-;=_~;';:~ 1'" :~ ::::: ,-:1 ~i--- !"'I~ 0_ if1 =-I=- f-< ~'::..I==-l~,~ 1(j)_I=-_::::: 1'::..'
Hoyal EII¡únpprs 1 .. / .. 1 .. 1 .. 11 ...... 1 .. ' ..... l: . .¡..¡ .... ' .. 1 '1 ,'",,,',,1·, .. "1··1·· .. 1 .. 1 J, ... I .. ! .... 1 J ()o.SUdl'Corl" .... 1 .. ; ...... j ••••.• 11 ' .. ¡ 1\ .. : ..... 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .......... I..i .. ' '1 .. 1 .. 1 .. : .... I 1
~th Ltl'gllnrnt:!m\Hu. "1" ··1' .... ,,,1 1' 11:" .. : .... 1 .. · ' .. J ] "'''' ""1" "1"1"" 1 .. , .. 1· .. · .-: .. 2 l' ~


I tb Do. . .. ·1·· "l·· . ·1· . , .. , . ',' ·1········· 1 1 .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. '1" .... "," J, 1
45th Do. 1>t Jlu. 1 ...... ' .. i"· .. 1 l' 1,1. ..1 .. '...... , :! ~. .. .' ...... 1 .. 1... .............. 31 3


';Ist])o. 11., .... '·'1'····' ~"·· .. Il .... 11 .. :11 .. ' .. I .......... 13~ .. ' .. ¡I .... 1, .. 101 42
ro ,74th Do. ¡"'" .. ; .. ' ...... J 11,.... .. ... "'11 1 .. 1 .. 1 .......... 1 ..... 1 .. , ........ , .. ~I 2


": 83rd !Jo. 2nd Bn. .. .... ' .. ; .......... 1,· .... 1 .... 11 .... 1 .. 1 ., .. , ........ 1 ...... ' .. 1 ...... 11 ... , 1
;g 8.'tll])0. ··1···· ··'··1··,···· .. ¡, ... ::1"'" 1'''1 51 ~ ,.¡ .. I .. I .... " .......... ,2 .... 1, .. 51 8


';/SSth])o.[stlln. ..1 .. ' ...... 1 .. ' .... "11 "l' "," .. , .. ;;,:~ ... '1'.' ........ 1 ........ 1 ..
1


...... 1 .. 31 :; ~ '¡ (lC1l1h Do:, l' ·t· . ""1,, . 1
1


"!'" ., .. ;" 1
1


" ," : "1'" .... ::1' ~l'" I ", .' "1" .. "1" .. "1" . '1" .. ,,!.. 4:\' 31
.a"ScUlo ,n .fllll'lue ... , .... "1" ........ ,' '1" .... " "1 el e .. "1" .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. e ~ [)etach.lstOilld~IldLt.Bn.K.U.L. .... I·T·:"I·~" [ 1 .. ¡ .... i .. "''''''1 1 l' .. i .... , .. " .. "1"1" .. 1 .. 1 .... ! .... 1 .. ~ :l ~ !Juke of IllullSWlCk ~:~al BIitish,. -:-~I~:~~I~:IH::'~I:~I~ ~¡J~:< 1: l;:~II~~ ~ i~:h:t~< ~~:~II"~ I'~II;~'II~~ ~:II~-: <i~-li:'~:


Do.l'orlllguese .. ~~I~:" ~~~I~!~~~_!J J~,~~I~J-=~:l~::I~~I"I~~,.:...:.~~j~~,.:...:.~~~ ~j:..:.~~I-~
(ieneraITotal.. ·T·! .. I .... ¡! .. l.;,lIi ,,1 11;.: ¡1 .. 151 .. 82!14[ .. ; ... \ ........ 1 3 31/ .. 11" 1 .. 61 .. )00113


f
=!"=th=lte=gi--I!le=llt--b ...... IB=n· .......... --:\~'II ... .' .. , .. I·Tel"1lJll.I .. "l' . 1· ..1.-. l;-ll¡.J~:· ' .. 1


1


" · .. ·I .. I· .. ¡I.~I .... ··I··~ ,,1 1; 1
.,[,tDo. 1" .... "1"1" ...... 1 .. · .... " .... ",,, " ............ 1 )' .. " .. "1" .... 1, 1


701th])o. .., ........ "'1" ]1 1 \" .. i .... 1 .... " 11 1 :. ' .. , ... " ... 1 •• 1 ............ •• .. 1 21 ~
;g 83nlllo.2no Do. '\ .. ,,, ........... , ...... 1··\ .. " .. , . ::,2"":"1'" .. 1 ...... ' .. 1 .. : ....... .' ...... ~I ~


" .' l'!8th Do. lst ])0. 1'" .... ·[ .. 1" .. ' .. 1 .. 1. r .. , .... , . 1[ 1 .. 1" ... -¡-. .. .. .. ", ... ..........1 1 1 ~ 1 '1' tI I3 't' 1 --1-'1- '--)-1\: '---I-I-·I-,-~I-=-:I--:--! -------1 -ll---'-I--'-I-~11-7 t::. O a n l~ l. '1 .. ... .... ," \. _ .... '1" ., I •• I . n ¡ ni .. '"1 .• , " •• .. \ ., .•• , •• •• •• •• ~ [):e~:::::~I~:;:~:::\<'" ::1:'1::1:' :::1 J. ::j~I-:-+~ :¡-~\·i·f~-~~~~I'::~I~l~II~:I~··~~:I·.~·~ ~~I-l::-¡:
1 1 ' ,1 1, I ,1 !,' ., :


It




f
45th Regiment 1st Bn.


SBth Do. 1st Do.
~ !)4th Do.


:; Chasseurs Britannique


00 l Total British ..
Do. Portugnese ..


General Total..


Royal Engineers
52nd Regiment 2nd Bn.


29th Do.
51st Do.


'" , 57th Do. 1st Do.
~ ~ B3rd Do. 2nd Do.


¡=¡ ..:; / 85th Do.
.<=: ¡Chasseurs Britannique ó> Duke of Brunswick Oels


Total British ..
Do. Portuguese ..


General Total ..


'" (7th Fusileers


XXXIV.


Continuatioll 01' the Siege of Badujoz.


Killed. I WOlJuded. --~1~"----'------'-'---Total.
-, , ,--, ,¡--- :-- I '1


. 1 " v -
- .~ I :!:~ :.~ .~~ .~ ~ !l.l "'CI I U) C"e. ~ CJ) :::: ti) ce o: 8" ."" ~ "8 '" ''':'' '" onl§ -"1 ~ ~ " o: " ~I"' ..!l ~ "d ~ '" • e ¡::: <f.l ~ I§ l' '" ~.; "d ~ " '"1'S ~ ;... cd ..¡..j o ~ _ ~ ~.§ a~~ "~ <t; = ~ ;,;¡ "n ~ :: ..: ...: i ~ '§ ~ .; ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ '§ ~ w :::¡ ~ ""' k .. ¡ u ..... '" w w :::¡ ~ ""' '" U 1 ..... .~ e ; ~ ¡3 ;- ~ d 3 ~ e ~ ~ ~ ;- .~ "~Iiti '" '" o: ~:.loo '" -" El '¡:;: =' " ... en:::¡ " tJ " o ,'<11-~¡... r~ '§ ~ ·~ttl :~I-3 ~ ~I~ ~ '" ,'<1 ~ ~ '3 o E-<


• ... 00 00 "1" .. 00 11 1' .. 00 .... 00 00 "1" .. " " " .. " 1 1
001·· "1" .. 00 " .. 00 00 " ...... 1 1 ............ 00 00 .. .. .. .. .. •• .... 1 1


..: ........ 1 1 ... ",," .. 00 3 3 .. " .. " " 00 " " " " .. " .. .. .... 4 4
"1,, " " .. 1 ] .""""" 00 .. , .... " " " .. " " " " " " " " " .... 1 1


..... ~'-:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:---;;2:~ -:-:-~~-:-:-'-:-:--:-:--:-:---;-,--;- -:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:-¡-:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:-~-7 ,,~+::~~~:; f~~ ::~~~-:I :il:~i:~~~~+ :: ~ >:: ~i:,:
" i 1 1 -' -.


'


1' ¡ l' -
11" " .. " 00 1['" 1 "," ........ 1 .. " .. " " .... " .. " 1 1" " " .. " i!


.. " .... " 1 1 '" " " "" 1" .. 11" 00 " .. " .. " " " " .. " "" 1" 2
,1" " .. " " "!,, " " " " "" 1 1 .. " " " " ........ " " " .. " .. .. 1


1 .....•.. 23 24, .. 1 1.... 2 .. 29 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 2.. .. 2.. 52 51
.. " ,,' " " .......... 1 1 " .... J ........ 1 ...... 1"".. 1


.. " "1" " "1" ...... 1 1 .... " " .............. " .... 1 1
11.. .. .... 6 7 ,," 1.... 2.. B 11 .. J .. ""...... 1 .. 1 2.. .. 2.. 14 1!1


"1" .. 1 1 .. 7 8, .... 1 ........ 1314 " 00 .. " " .... 2 2 .... 1 .... l .. 22 24 -,-,~~"~'~~~~I~~ .!:I~~.~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~,.!:~~.!:~~-'::
.. , .. ¡3'.... 1 .. 38421 .. 2 4".. 6: .. ,,668.. 1.. 1 ...... 2 4 .. 31 7 1.. 7 .. 96 114


.... 21 .... 1 .. 913:, .... 1 .... 1'1 .. 1517 .. 1 ............ 11113 .... 2 .. 2431
1" ,


-:-:-,-:-:-'~-:-:--:-:-2-:-:-47~F2~1-:-:--:-:-7-:-:-nl85 -:-:-2-:-:-1-:-:--:-:--:-:-2--;-1141 0 1-:-:-
1


9-:-:- 1201-~
a 'Portuguese Los.


ii General 'l'otal"II"I"I"¡"I"¡"I"I"I"'I."¡"¡"I"I·+H 21211"1':~'J"I"I"I"I", " , , , , , ' , , General 21 i! -'-'-'-1-1-1-1-1-·
]," 1


11
"


1 1 ..
1


1


" SBritiSh Artillery a Portuguese Do.


~i General Total. .
"I"¡"¡"I':I"I'J" "1" .......... " 2 2 ........ " .... " .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 2 2


.. .. .. '" .. .. .. 6 fj •• 1 l........ 28 30 •. .. .. .. .. •. .. .. .. ". 1 l.. .. .. .. 34 36
------ ---- --------- ---------.- -----1---- ---


6 ül.. 1 1 .. ". .. .. 30 32 .. . "l" .. .. .. .. .. .. " 1 l........ 36 31l
I ! ,1 '"'




.\xxv.
Namns 01' the Otti('ül'S al Badajoz, frolll tlw :lOth May lo 11th J une.


Killed. -------.--.--¡----l[~~=--:~:=~ ___ :--=~;~~~-~.-- =~~~==-
!tclllarks.¡I¡ ltank and Numes.


---1-----
1I 30th l\lay.


30th Mayj .. Lt. R. de Mello 2nd Portuguese Line I¡Lieut. Col. Oliv('[ t.1th Portuguese
2nd June .Lieut. ;':"dgwick 5th Regt. 2nd HIl. MaJor (jomes 21st Vo.


5th ])0. i K J lawker H. B. F. Arti!l"ry i En"gn Jose Vlcente UD.
Jlunt ltoval J.:llgiueers :lrd June


Westropp lil;t Regillleut : Ensign Leslic 57th Foot 1st Rn.
Jlog¡( 8:¡th Do. ! 4th June


J. l'c;reira 7th of the Une ¡Lieut. J. B. <1" Lo¡wz Portuguese Artillery
'Majo!' 1\1'(;,,"chy 17th Do. l 5th JUlle


.Léut . .I. ,le lUeneara HJth Do. ¡Lil'u!. Furs!er Royal Engineers
I I Westmacott Royal Stall' Cur!,s


Heal'dsley ,)1 s! Rt'gt.
i GamUlell 85th Do.


l Grant Do.


[
'Cal'taill l\Iaxwell 17th l.tcgt.of the Linc


IErl'ign J. E. ]\ugu"se ])0.


1


, (H!t June
'Captain Patton Hoyal Enginecrs


Hank and N ames. Regiments. l{egÍlnen ts.


I Smcllie 5!,t Fuot
¡Licut. Hicks : D,.. I


Mortan Id5th !Jo.
Dnfief ChasseursBritannir¡ue


Lewzcllew,ky L. B. Lt. Lllfmltry
Jose Forlis 17th of the Line


, 11th Jnne
,Captain V. J~arricros 31'(1 J)ortuguü¡;C


¡Lient. Bal" Lo!,,,,, I ])0.
I 1


Hemark,.


Scverely


S"VNe!y (sinee al'a,,)¡,
Do. i


Do. :¡
Sligbtly 1:


])0. 11
Severely 11


Do. 1


Severely
Do.


Do.
SligbtJy


Severely
Slightly


Sli~htJy
Se"crcly


1
1


I


:1
11


I!


Rank ana Names.


Ensign Leslie
Cuptain Nixon


Budd


Missing.


Regimcnts. i ltcmnrks,


!Jlh JUIlC
57th Foot 1st Bn.


)l5th Ho.
l!Jth of the Linc




No. XXXVI.


Ueturu of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of thc Army under the Command of his Excellcncy Field-marshal the Marquess of WeJlington, K. B.
Commander of the Forces at the Siege of the Fortress oi' Ciudad Rodrigo.


Killed. l. Wounded. . l\'Iissing. Total.
Ql ~ •• ~ ~.~ ~ ,-


<l' ¡;:: ,ti:: <l' .~ 'l;;;:. ,- ti:: lO' .-
.... o 5 rf¡ I'¡s o ,!; rñ ~ .... o ~ rñ .fl o ~ ;. ~


if1 • o. . s:I 00 ~ "O 1m. 'O • a JJ ... "O r.n. o . ~ .;, I-t "'O rn. 'O • e W '"' '"'O iiU~.~¡~ ~¡§ ~i~~~.~a~ ~¡§ ~iiU~j§~ ~~~ ~iiU~j~~ ;¡~ •
a,¡ c..3 s.s ..... b() • ~ 8 ~ ~ ~ tl.l ¡:I - (; !3 ..... bll,_ ~ S ~ -! ~ c,.¡ = ....; 15 .s +" So • ~ S,.::( -=: a,¡ QJ ¡::: ..; o ~ +" So,. ~ E..!:il -=: (1.) ~ ~ ~ .~ ~.~ .~ ~ .~ E: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ .~ ~ .~ .~ ':a ~, E a ~ ~ ~ ~ g ~ g. ,§ .~ ~ J:1 e 2 ~ ~ ~.z.§.~ ~ .~ 'm ~ ';:-: g a ~ ~ ~u~~uH~~~~~~~DUH~U~~OO~~~~~~u~2u~~oo~~~~~~UH~UH~~~~~~~


-----------------------1-----------------------------
'Royal Engineers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "," .. .. .. .. 1 l.. .. .• .. 2 4.. .. .. .. .. .. .. '. •. .• •. .. •. .. .. •. .. •• I l.....·.. 2 4 ..


\


7th Foot 1st Bn. " ...................... i.. . ........ , .. .. .. .. .. 3 3.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. .. •. .. .. •. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. •. .. 3 3 .•
;g 40th Do. 1st Do. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. ].. .. 1.. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. .. l .. ¡ :J 4.. . .•...•...• , '. .. .. .. •. .. •• .. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. 2.. 3 5 .• 23rd Do. 1st Do. . ................... 1 11" .................... , 7 7 "1" ............................................ 8 8 .•


.; 48th no. 1st Do. . .... , .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. :¿ 2.. . ........... " .. .. .. .. .. .. . ...•... '. .. •. .. .. .. 3 3 ••
..::: II Duke uf Brunswick Oels ....... , .. .. •• .. .. .. 1 l.. . ............. " .... 11 l............................. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .... 1 ] ..


- Tutal British. ................ l.. 2 3.. .. .. .. .. 1 l.. .. ] .. lA 21 .. 1 .. .. .. .. •. .. .. •• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 l.... 2 .. 20 24 ..
"' ______ ---_ -----------.~ -1---1 ------ - ~ ----- - ---- - - -- - - --
~ Do. l'ortuguese.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. l.. 7 8.. . ...... , .• l ........ 33 34 . '1' .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1.... 1 .. 41 43 ..


¡ ----------------------~----- ------ ----------------
Ci General Total. ................. 2 .. 911 .......... 12 .... 1 .. !5155 .. 1 .... ~ ............ ~· .... · ........ 1 2 .... S .. til67 1 ..


.,


§
o-,


.s
::;


Royal Artillery
Do. Engineers


5th FODt 2nd fin.
45th Do. 1 st Do •


74th Do.
88th Do. 1st Do .


.. "1" .................. ~I" -2 2.. ..1 .. - "1"- .f"'j" .. 1 .. ~.' 2-;~
.......................... 1 1 3.. .. .... "1" .. .. 1 1 3 ..


.......... 22.............. 23.. .............. 45 ..
. ......... 22.............. 89.. ..1 .......... ·· 1011 ..


.......................... 1 ........ 6 7.. .. ............ ," .... .. .. .. 1 .. 6 7 ..


--~'~-~.:..:.~~~-=-.:~. ~~~~~-~~~~I~~~~ ~.:..:.~I.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.I.:..:..:..:..:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.!..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~~.:..:.
Total Britisb.. .. .. .. .. .• .. .• .. .. .. 7 7.. .. •. .. .. 1 4 J.. 11" 32 39 .. . ... " " .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 4 l.. l .. ;1946 ..


Uo. portuguese. ~'':'':'':'':'.~ ~~.:..:.C~-~.:..:.!.!..:..:. ~~.:..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:.~. ~ .. .:..:..:..:. _~-=.:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~ ~.:..:.~ ~~.:..:..:..:.~~.:..:. ,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,~,:,,:,,:,,:,~~._~~,:,,:,
(;eneral Total ...................... !J 9 .......... 1, 4 1 .. 1 .. 3542 .................................... 1 4 1.. 1 .. 4552 ..


...




'"
'" .,


A


• E
.:::


~


,


!
~


Q




~
~


A


<U


~
...


-


~
'" ...,


00
....


No. XXXVIf.


Con1 inllation of tIJe Sieg'c of Ci lldad Rodl"igo.


Killed. Wounded. Missing. 1 Total.


11_.;:; -1' -~--. --I----.~ - ~---i~r - . .~ t ~----~---- 1
I
~ i ~ ~ --o ---I~


:Z . -3 . ~ I . ~ ~ :.~.s !I . ~ .~ ~ ~ .~. ~ . ~ al l 0 ~ '~. ~ .@ ; ~,~
. rn ~ rI):':. l1'.l ~ ¡::: ;..0 'fJ:¡:;' u. <V e "11 :;,) ~ ~ .' ...... 1 v .:::: - w ~ tIJ;:· ~ a,.. ¡:: ~ i~ 00..5 ~ ~ ~ S... ,;.. ~ ~ :.J 00 :e ;::: ~ i=: S ~ 'I~ ~ ~ i1:: ¡ ~ ;::::;c:: ;. i~ v ri:,.~ ~ ~ ¡::: S ~ I .;


I
¡¡ I g .: c; .s ~ ~", ~ E ~ ...: g ~ ;::: ~ 18 5 ~ =-1 • ~ E ~ ~ ~ ~ ;:; .:. o ~ ~ .;f.. ~ I S ~ ....:: ~ te . .: ~ 5 ~ .bI: -' ~ S ~ ....: ~


;: -O .~ ~ ~ ~ .~ I~ :'F ~ ª ~ e ~ -3 ~ I ~ ~ 2 ~ ~ E' 2 ~ 'O ~ t '3 .~ g' ~.§ ~ ~ f'l ~ 3 ~ 8;1 ~ i I'~ .~ ~.~ ~ ~ .~ E § ~ o 1'" ü ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,:ñ:oo ~ Xi ~ =::: ~ ...J ....:¡ I~ ~ ...:: I~ ·ñ 'f2 :::: ~ ~ - :) :,.) ...J ~ ~ ~ ~ Cf) Ti o ~ ~ :t i::..:J ..) H ;:; lÜ ~ ~ cf] 'T.1 :::¡ ::: ~ ~
---,-. ,---'----------------1-------1-- ---- ------ ----_._.------


Royal Engmeers l.. .. I 1 .. ," .. .. 61 ti.. 7 7 "
13r<l FOOl, 1st Bn. l' .. ;, 5.. 5 5 ..


52nd Do. 1st Do. . . 3 3.. 3 3 ..
52nd Do. 2nd Do. . . 1 ] 3 3.. " 4 ..


H.egilllents.


95th Do. 1st Do. j •••• "1'" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 2.. 2 2 ..
95th Do. 2nd Do. ¡ •••••••• ",' _ " •• •. •• 2 ~ .. . ..... [ ................ "1" 2 2 .•


: , I I Do~~;~;t~:~t!::~:: [~~1~1:~~~1=,~~4~~ ~ ~1~11~~~I~~~~~~i~ ~~~~~~~~I~'=~~~I~ ~=,=~c~~~r
General Total. . ..1 ............ 1 .. 1" ;, ~.. .. .. 1 ........ ," ...... 3232:" .............. "," ...... "1" .... 1 .. : o. .. \ o. .. o. .. :n 37¡ ..


Royal Artillery .......................... 1 ...... ~.. li .. l1112 .. .. .... 1 .. 1.. .. "1..r.~I~I" .. .. .... 1 .. IJ 1:1 ..
Cold,tream Glla. rds, 1st Bn. . ..........• " .......... "1 ..•...... ·1·· ... , .. \0. 2 2 .......... "l' .,.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 :.! ..
~~~hFf)o~.~:d~:.j)o. ::::.::::: .~.: ::1:: .......... :::::::: ~ ~:: :::::::::::::: ...... :::::::: o. .... ~ ~::


42nd Do. 2nd Do. . .. '1" ...... o. o. o. .... 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ••• '1" 5 5.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ..........;, 5 ..
60th Do. 5th Do. .. .. .. .. . ..... 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 2.. ...• .. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 í ..


IstLineEn.K.G.L. .......... 11 .• 1 ..............•..•.. 1212 ....••.............••....... j.. ..1313 ..
;~~d~~·to~· : :~.~.~~~~~~.~~J~J_~~!:~~~ ~~d~~~~ ~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~


Total British.. . ..........• " •... ¡I.. 7 7 .. ; ....•..... 1.. .. •. 1 .. 57 ;';8 ., ! .••••••• '. .• •• •• •• •• • •••• _l' . '.. .. .. .. .. .. .. l .. 64 ti5 .•
Do. Portuguese.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 ;-¡ .. I.. .. .. .... 1.... .... 4 '; "1" .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1........ 7 8 .•


1 ______ ------- _________ 1 _____ ---------------~;---- ----- - ------
General Total..: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . -1-. 10 10 1" i .. .. .. .. .. ].... l' 6\ 63.. .. .. .. .. ..1.. .. .. .. .. .. .. l·· '.. .. .. .. .. 1.... 1 .. 71 73 ..


----- "-- ---------..-.-..-


fRoY",IArtillery ¡-\ ...... \~: .................. -\I..~"" "1" 5 7 .. ¡ ...... \ ...... ·T' .. 11...... .. .. 2 .......... () fi .. ;~I;/ ~~~, 1Is~\~:: 1 :: .. :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ; ~::! : : :: :: :: :: ~ ;:::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: 1 :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ! :::
"i 48th Do. 1st Do. 1·.····1 .......... ·· .. 1 1 ... ' .................. 1 .. ] 1 .. : ................... 1 .......................... 33 .. ~ 60th Do. 5th Do. j .•••• , .. .. .. .• •. •• •• 2 2 .. 1.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ] 1 "1" .. .. .. ... .. o. ...... o. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1 J ..


I ~ ----


-g; Total British .. 1 ¡-:-:- ~ -:-:-I~ -:-:-j~ ~ ~ ~ -:-:- --; --; -:-:- 1-:-:- ~. ~ ~ '2 -:-:- ~ -:-:- ~ -:-: ~ lo. " .1:: ~ ~ -:-: ~ ~ ~.r~ ~ ~.- ~ ~ -:-:- ~ ~ ~ ~ .-;; ~.' ~. ~ .... 22 24 ~
- D:,::::::,::. ¡. ~F t~ ~ ~ .. ~";'I~ •• ". ~ ~ ~~-~;~~:I. t •• ~ ~ ~"~ ~I~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "~~; ~ ~~ ~.~:~ :: ~


'l




:'\ o, .'e'e". \' II L
'rhe Stol'miug (Ir Ciudad Rodrig-(L


-··-·.------:1---- .-- Killcd, -----11-- ,Voundc,L
,


1'- ._. __ ~ _____ ... __ _
-1-- ~ 11 1...--1 t: >. ;,


I ' "; -~ I ' I ¿ I 1; ~ ! ., 1 ~ I J' I ~ .:, -¡¡; 'l. ~] 0 ª ; ~ :~] ~ ~ , ,: ~ ~ j 4 ª;, ~ ''3] te ~;, ~
I


ifj • o ." " ~ "; ~ - 1....· ~ . '" o ~ - .'" ¡ .... j." ." ,o i ~ "'" or,. e • S e ,; I ~ ''0 ~ 'J •• ::,.., I.í.~ 00.:0::. ___ Ifl Ch' .... • '~r- mr ~", .......
- '!! ~ • ;;: ;'S !. I ;n ~ I ~ e 1-:= "'="' '-' • ~ ;::~. r. ".:: ::; ¡:::: (2 '":" u ·1 \'::; .: m V~ 1;:: :::: -:: 1-:: - v 1. ¡::: .:: u¡ :L ~ e 8 o:: '-' í..-<:;".... .........,.....,.w ,,, "-' LI' '...... Q) _ ...... - _ ro "" • 'J •• ..., ""' ¡::¡ .....,.....;...0 I;'~ I'~:¡'" J..... 'J,.. ¡::::: -.... ¡.:;;¡ .... ~ 5 :; os: ~ I~ I·ft q,i 2 ~I ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ ",:,'! ;; ~~ ~ ::: I s. ~ "i I,ª ,~,.§ ¡; l·?'" ~I'= 1,·2f 'Zi ~ 1 ~ § '-;3 j § i ;; 1 ~ ~ := ¡.g <i ;::: .~ ~ ~ 1-;; r~ ? ~ -= .7 % rC .s :.: :; 1;:: :; .'0 I c:: . .= .;: !: .~. ~ r~ ;.~ ~ I ~ -!:: :; I rO ~ :.c '1 ..:. I_~ ~ e 5 .::;. ~ ~ ~ ,0 r~ o .2: ~ ,:;'.% ~ e '"'=,.. t .... cr! -o


. ------k: -=- =-:::. =-=-=:'I~ ~r2-!=- ':...:... ~::.=-:=.:::.. =- =-:". - ,~:-' - t-. ~~~ ::.!:'..:::.. =-¡=-~ :::"1'" ::.'=-:. :-' =_ =-1"" :::.. =- =- ~.:"- -=.i=- .=J:... Gcneral.St~ff 111 ........ ··1 .. :···· .. , .. "1 ¡ 3 ......... : ...... ¡ .... "1 ~L .. '"I"I .. I·y·· .. 1·1·· .... 41 ......... .J ....... 1
1


.... ~ ~~~~tlC~::l~~ncer~ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :::::::::: i::::: r :: :: 1 ~II: : 1:: :.;:: : t : 1:: :: :: I J: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: i::::::::,::" i
5th Foot,:llldHn ... ', .... ¡ ........ 11 .. 32134 •..... 1 1411 "1 <l ••• 19, (i°ll .. ¡ .... 1 .... 1 ........ 1' ........ ! ...... [ :1 4111 .. 41" 81 9c!


43rd Do. I sl Bn.1 .... " " .......... 1 .. (¡ 7··...... I :1.. .. .. 4 1 :lfi 3,j,,, .... , .. "!" .......... " ... :.. .. .... I 2...... 5 1 :\2 41
C'1l4;¡thDo.htJ)O, ........ 1 :1 ...... IIIl~ 17 .. 2 :l ...... JI :':;¡!:\I ...... 1 ........... ·1 .. · , ............ 341 ...... 2,237 ·1tl


:;; 5:lnd Do. 1 sI Do. .. .. .... I ... o ...... 1.. 2 a .... 1 1 .. .. .. .... 1.. :.::.: 25 ................ "1" .. .. .. .. .. 1 I 1 .... · .. 11·· 24 28
,..., Do.J)o.2ndDo ............ o ..... o .... 1 1 1 ...... 1 ~ .. ;:¡ H .................. 1 .... 1 .............. 1 .. · .. 2


1
" ti !)


i- (iOlh])o.5th])0 ................... 1 .... l·· .... ,. 1 .... ·· ..... , ::1 4!' ................. 1 .. ..1.· ........ l .... 1 .. 1··· .. 11" 3 5
Sl 74th])0. .. .................... 4 4 ........ 2 1 j .... ~ .• 11


1
1i,: ............ I .. ¡ .. ··1 .... 2 :! "1" .. ," 2 1I I .... :.: .. 17 23


:;J' 7:th Du. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 13 .!........ ;¡ 1 1 I .. :.:.. ~~I 3hll"' ....• ' ... '·1 .......... 1 ••• ' •••••• :.. :\ I 1 1 .. :\.. 41 50 :;1!l·~rdJ)o.2ndDO'"'''''''''''''''''''' 1, l .. ···o .... '; .. "1" , .... ,.'! .~! ................ "1" .... ,; '.; "," "1"" ··1·········· .? .5 ~ H~thDo.lstDo ....... , ............... 71 ' ............ , .......... -.1 -." ," , .. " ............ 1 .... ~ " ...... ' .. '.' ~i""""" 3.\ 37
C> [Ji '1) .., 2 1" O," " .) 1 ~ ., .. ~!". , ." •• L ( •. , '7 (i7 ~ " th _ o. . •.. o ••• .:.. •• '" " •• •• '-' ":',1' •••••• v.... ••.. ¡ di .'0: .)-1 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• l" .... i" ;; ~ ......, otJ '.


.5 !Ji;thDo •• l stuo·I ............ ¡ .......... 11 J ...... ' .. 1 :l ....... 1 .. ll.jl'l~;."I· .. · ........... ··' ........ 1' ........ 1 " ....... 1 .. ](i 2~
o g~: V)~··~~~~~<L: ~~: ~;~~,~~~~~~ ~¡_~:~ :::::: ~~~~ ::I'_~ J.Ji _J:,:~~~~,~~~~::: ~:!~~~~~I~i,~~:: ~~~ ~~~I~i~_ ~ J ,f~."l,::~~:~J, I : .:: l' I :: :: ~~. ~i:; ~ e, " '; ';" I';";':,":~: :: i t :: :: J I 1" ¡' f¡" ':¡t ~ ¡~ 1.' ';;<¡i


(;,."J T"r,L 1-;-::,:: ~, "~I··· ::,' I 1 ,"'1'" : JI' '¡"'it' 1;.', ~ ,""'1''' .. Til .. ti Ti'" l' IT? ,; l;;;i'l ' I 1"1 ' :;, ;;¡


J'llissing:. Total.


[~cgi.m(,llb.




...


...


00
...


~
!:1;!


.c:
<5


...


i\o. XXXiX,


Retul'n 01' Killed, 'Voumletl, and Missing, of the Army under the Commnnd of His Excellcl1cy l"ield-marshal tho Marquís oi'
'VeIlington, K. B. at the Battle of Albuera.


I
: ____ !"iJ~ed. __ .y-. Woullded. 'l. , Missing. . Total. ,


u, I ' . I "' I . 1", , I I ."' .
. • Q3 I ~ • • w ~. . 1;:; ~. ~ ~


1] e" i o: ~ '3] i ~ :;:; 3 ~ 3.1' "' :;:; ~.2 i .; ~ en ........ • -= 10;"'''0 "1'1.0.~ .~"O 'fJ"':::.= 'M~ oc.:;.~ '".....-0
- 2; W . := x .;,: j;;:::I . '_ 2: '-> • ",1;::;, :'J;,:" . - ci. ij l. "' '" u: ~"' '= . ~ ."'- '-> • :!2 "'.;, ;;:"" •


"':¡... '.1) l...... ~ -, :;::; ~ ro Xl"'=" r.n .8 1-"'" ¡:::,.... cI'j if! ...: C1,; I ,¡n.S ~ ;: I -1 S·... rn IX: ~ <F:...... "':' = ....;:::: ctl u:< ;¡;~"':~,~'¡:;ClJ.~S~ ~ CJ C:;;:"';=:c::i¡"::SJ:.. ~ ~,.!:t: ....! :o.. ~~"'=I~ro ...... ~··~S..;::1 ~ CJ ,¡;,C~~·¡;.3 :'1..' ~ 8...::d -.:: ~
::l -=. :: ·......,1 ~ ~ 1':;: ~ .~::::: I=l r;: ~ 1= :: ~ .~ ",:.; 1::: '¡¡:J é:: .~ a ¡ J;::: ~ ~ ;::. o· ::: ,.::::.... ";:! ? '7, Iq:::: 'r¡;:j ;::::: ¡<::: ~. ';::::::2, ;31,-,;:! ::s ';:¡; q::: .~::: = ro: M ~ o Q) ot: I~ ~ = .::; ....... ro .... - " - Q.I ..:: ~ ~ ..: ro H ~ ro ...... o :¡, - Q.¡ ce ~ ..... ,:::, ............ ~ ~ e o¡, O,Q.¡Ir.; - (¡.t = ~ :... .... ro "O o ::.~= ~ I~~'=-~.!=--=_ ~_=-,~ j~ I~I~I~::.~ 0 __ ~ ~I-=- ~ I~ ::'~I~~~~I';'< I~~=- =_ ~=-r~~j;:¡ :~~,_~_=-0..¿=--=-~-::"


General ~t~fr, 1 ....•. ' .........• ,. .. 1.. 7 .... ' .. "," .. .. .. ., . . 71,··· .. 1 .. ' ...... , ....... , .. .. .. t. '1' .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 .•
RoyalBntlshArtillery .................... 3 3!1 ...... ·· 1


1


.......... 10 111'10 ...... 1 .............. 1 11 ..... ,. 1 .... ,. .... H 15;0
Do. German Do. ........24 .... ,1 Hí 17 .... ·· .. 1 .... ] 2!J 3110 ..... ,. .. 2 .. ,. 45 48 34


3rd Dragooll Guards '!J 10 l) .. 1.. !J H ú .. .. .. •. .. .. 1 ) 14 .... ',... 1 .. · . ) H 20 l!)
4 th Dragootls 2 3 11 l' I 1 1 1 15 20 110 ..••..•. 2 .. 2 4 2 " '1" •• :l 1., I 2 1 19 :!í 2a


13th Lt. Dragoons .. .. .. .. 1 l.," ..... , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. , .. '1" ,. .. .. ,. ,. ) 1 1
3rdFoot htlln. ..1 12' .. 4 .. t082lU.. 41 ~ l .. 11 1 222 248 ........ 1 ... , 2 1511 HiI17!J.· ! ..... " ,,112 :¡" 30 2 5!JI ti43


7th Do. 1st Do. . .•..... 1," 2., ti3 6.';., .. :;',11"/,, 14, .. 263 29t.. ........ ,.1 ...... ,. ~ ... I ,. 3111 .. ,. ]ti,. 321; 357
7th Do. 2nd 1)0. . . '11 1 "1" ].. 4(j .19.. 1 3, (j.. 1 1 (¡ 1 2(j(i :lOO.. .. .. .. .. .. .. :' "," 1 ·1 10" 1 17 1 315 34\1 ~3nl D". !"t Do. .. 1 .. 1, .. 1 .. n llJ ,. .. 3! 4 3 1 Il! 1 23~ 25~ .... " .. .. 1 .. 5 1;··.··· 1 ,. 41 4 4 1 14 1 :HO 33!)


27th Do. :lrd Do. .. 1 1 2, . . ... ,.. •. .. 5" . , ......... , 1 ., .. ¡; 8
28th Do. 2nd Do. .. 1 2fi 27.. :.oi 3 1.. 8 .. 123 137.. , .... ",. 2 3 1 t) 1 14f1 ](;4


2!Jth Do. .. 1 I 3 2 .. 73 80.. 1 3, 4 :1 1 12.. 220 245.. . '1" II 11 ...... 1 ,1:, fi 1 14.. 304 3:3(j
31st Do. 20d Do. 2 1 26 2!).. ' 2: 3 2 .. 4,. nfJ lt(;.. .. .. :.1 :1 ~ •. (j 1 141 155
34th Do. 2nd Do. .. 1 1 I 3 .. 27 33.. 21 2 .. .. ().. !l5 \151" :\ 3 1.. !J.. 112 128
39th Do. 2nd Do. 1 .. .. 14 15.. 1; 2 1.. 4,. 73 81.. 2 ~..... .. . 1 1.. 4. . 8!J !J1l


40th Do.lst Do. 3 3.. ., .. .. .. 8 8.. . ... \.. ..1...... II 11
48th Do. 1st Do. .. 1 2 .... (¡.. 58 67 .. 5: 7 1 1 !J 183 2071.. Il fi ..... : 1 5i \! 1 1 15 1 247 280


48th Do.tlld Do. 3 I .. 4 .. 40 4~ ...... '.," 4: 4, 2 .. :1 1 S~ !l6:.. 125 ~ 71751!l0 ... , .... 1 U,'I12 ,1 .. 1~ 8 2!l71:\43
57th Do. 1 st Do. 1 1 3 I 8:1 ~!J.. •. 1 I (ji 11 ~.. 11 ¡¡ 304 33!J.. " .. 1 2 7 II ::.. 14 4 387 4:!H


60th Do. 5th Do. 1.. 1 2.. ..' 1 .. .. :!.. 16 H,'.. .,.. .. .... 1 .. ·· 3.. 171 21
6tith Do. 2nd ])0. 1 1 .. 1 1 50 5;' .. 11 ~ 3 .. 13.. !lI Ilfil.. 4 1 96101 .......... :! !J 4., 1101 2 237 212


97th Do. .. .. .. .. 'l" .. .. ) 1. . .. 1 )
1 st Lt. Do. K. G. L. " .. .• .. .. 4 4. . .... 1 1 1 1 1 3, . 55 63. ' 2 2..:"... 1 1 1 1 1 3 . . ()) 6!)


2nd Do.])o. _______ ~ ,:_:.I.:_: . .:..:..:..:.~_~~ .:..:~~~.2:.:..: ~':":_:.:_·L~~~ ~~~.:..:.~:. ~~~ -':'C ~ _~ ____ ~~~~ .. ~~ .2.:..:.~_:~ 32 ~ __
DO~'~!~~!ul~~t!:~::li~j~ .. ~~~ ?J~.I~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~: _:I~:;i~~!~¡ J;2~i~2;~7:~ ~~~~~~~j~:~ ~ ~~I~~I~ 1!1~,~i~~~~ll~:; ~:J;~r~~~ l~


General Total.·1 I • _1 1 I I ti 13 lI! 1 133 4 !J13 !l84 ti:; I ti 1 .. I ;¡! 51 1S:ti6 22 7 146 IOj2656 :.!!l9· 35j ...... i 1 4 H J 1 .. :!8 11 51715701171IOj· ·1 ti \ 7 5U 10732 8 207~5 408H 45017 115


RegilIwutS.




No. XI,.


N ames of tite omcers Killetl, \Voullded, amI }[issing', at Albuera, 1Gth May.
--~-"-- --~-~--- _._---~---


Killed. WoulIued.


British. Regimcnts• Portuguese. ltegimen ts., Driti,h. llegimcnts. Remarks.
-~


----, ----~~"----~----~ ----~----- ------~~--


Maj. Gen. D. Boghton Staff-surgeon Boolman ~Iaj. Gen. (he lIon. U. L. Cale Sli,,;lltly
Lieutenant Fox :lrd Dn. Guards J. P. J. Jase I\lontro I Hon. W. Stewart Do.


Captaill BUl'ke 3rd 1<'oot, ,,,¡ Bn. Capto J.:gerloll 34th Rpgt. Do.
Lieutenant Herbert Do. \Valler I03rd ])0. Severely


Ensi¡;:n Chadwick Vo. Houveria, A .D. C. to Major Gen. 1 Sici]ian Hegt. Do. Thomas Do. the Hon. G. L. Cole ~.
Captain Erek 7th Do. IstBn. Warle l:lllll Do. Do.


Lieutcnant Archie Do. : Baring,A.D.C.toMaj.Gen.Altcn 1st Lt. Bn. K. G. L. Slightly
Captain MOlltague 23rd ])0. 1 st Do. I Capto Hawkcr ¡{oyal Artillny Do.


2nd Lieutenant Hall Do. Lient. Thiele Do. Ger. ])0. Severely
Captain Humphrey 20th Do. Capto Holmes Hit Dragoons Slightly
J~ielltenant D uguid Do. Lieut. Wildman ])0. Do.


Ensign Killg Do. Adjt. Chantry Do. D".
.Furnace Do. Capto Marley :3rd }'oot, 1st Bn. Do.


·Vanee Do. Gordon Do. Severely
Captain GibboflS :14th Do. 2nd Bn. Rtevens Do. Do.


Lit"utenant C. Caslle Do. Camerun 1)0. Do. and taken prisoller
Ensign Sarsfidd Do. Lieut. Juxon Do.


Lieutenant Beard 30th Do. 1st Do. Shepherd Do. Slightly
Lient. Col. Duckwartb !8th Do. 1st Do. Hooper Do. ])0.


..


Lieutenant Page Du. Latham Do. Do.
Ansaldo Do. Wright ])0. Do.


Lieutenant IJiddon t8th Do. 2nd Bn. Woods Do.
Loft ])0. Hougltton Do. Se\<rely


Drew Do. Titlow Do. Do.
Ensign Rothwell Do. O'Donn"ll Do. Do.


Major Seotl nth Do. 1st Bn. Ensign Walsh Do. Slightly
Captain'Fawcett Do. Lielltenant-eolonel Sir vV. l\Iyers Bn. 7th Do. 1st Do. Severely (,ince dead.)
BelJnin~ 56th Do. 2nd Bn. Capto Cholwick Do. Slightly


Lientellant Shewbridge ])0. Singer Do. Do.
Ensign Coulter Do. Crowder Do. Do.


Lieutenant Whitney Lieut. Provost Do. Severely
IHaultry ])u. Do.


ElIis Do. Du.
S. B. J ohnstonc Do. Do. (since dead.)


Jl.lullens Do. Severely
H('nry Do. Slightly


Joncs Do. Severely
;\lor~an nu. Do, •




No. XLI.


Continuation of the N ames of Killed aml Wounded at Albuera.


Wounded.


Hauk aud Names. HegiIllents. Remarks. Rank and Namcs. IlegillJents.
------I------I-C-·-----II- -·-----1-----·---


Lient. R. J ohnson
Gibbons


Moses
Br. Lt. Col. lllakeney


Capto M'Ginncs
Orr


Tarlctoll
-LiBul, Erwin


Healy
Wray


Orr
Seaton


Penrice
Loreutz


Holden
Fraser


Acting Adjt. l\k'gher
Lieu!. Col. Elli,


Capto H urfor"
M'Donald


Stainforth
I sI Lieut. Ilarrison


Booker
Treeve


Thurpc
2nd Lieut. C"stl,,"


HarJis
Ledwith


Adjl. M'Lean
Capt.Gale


Carroll
Lieut. Crulllmer


Cottingharn
Sheltuu


Ensign lngraJ~L
Lieut. Col. White


Major Way
Capto Hod~e


Todd
Nestnl"


Lient. Stall11u<j
Brocke


7th }'usiIeers, 1st B", Slightly
llo. Do.'


Do. Sevcrely (sinee de?d)
7th Do, 2nd Hn. Sevcrely


])0. Left arm amputated
])0, Severely


Do. Slightly
])0. Severely


Do.
Do.


Do,
Do.


Do.
Do.


])",
Do.
Do,


23nl Do. bt nu.
Do.
Du.


Do.
Do,


!Jo.
Do_


llo.
Du.


Do.
D".


])0.
i8th Do. ) ,t Bu.


Do.
Do.


llo.
¡¡o,


Do,
29th Do.


Do.
Do.


Ilo,
lIo.


Uo.
Do,


Severely


Sp.verely


Slightly
Do,


D",
Do.
Do.


Slightly
])0.


Scvl'rely


Slightly


Severely
Sli~htly


Do.
Do.


Slightly
Se\-erely


!
SlightlY


~liO'htlv
t :-. "'


"-P""l'i'l y'


I


Lieut. Popham
Briggs


Rnsign Lovelot'k
Kearney


Lovelock
Adjt. Wil!!


Capto },lemming
K¡.ox


Lient. Bntler
(ipthin


Cashell
Ensign \Vilson


Nicholson
Capto Weddringtoll


Wyatt
Lieut. Hay


Walsh
Capto Brine


Lieut. Ha)'t
Pollard


Ensign Cox
Capto Wilson


Freuch
Bell


Morrisot
i Parsons


I Lient. Crawlcy
I f'terrj"g


! Vfrigllt
! O'DollOgllUe


Duke
M'Intosh


Vincent
Ensi~n Collins


\ djt. Sleele
Capt. Watkins


1
- Wangh


Droughl
I Wood


, Lient. John:-;nn
\' a!'LkrHlf~ 111111


Sh"il


~9th Fusileers
llo.


Do.
Do.


Do.
Do.


:\ 1 st Do. 2nd
Do.


Do.
Do.


])0.
Do.


IDo.
¡.14th Do. 2nd


t Do.
IDo.


I Do. :l:lth Do. 1st
1 Do.


'1 Do.
])0.


!18th Do. 1st
1 Do.


I
llo,


Do.
I ])0.


Do.
))0.


Do,
Do.


Do.
Do.


IDo.
i ])0.


I
Do.
·l~th Do. 2n(1


Do.
Do.


Ilo,
Do.


n".
llo.


j .
. ,


Remarks.


5efereIy
Slightly


Seferely


SeTerely
Do.


Slightly I ])0.
Do.


])0.


Se~erely
Do.
Do.


Do.
Slight1y


])0.


Slightly
Serercly
Slightly


Slightly
llo.


Do.
Do.


])0.
])0.


Do,
])0.
])0.


Slit111ly
])0.




No. XLII,
N ames 01' Olliccrs Continuccl. Killed aud 'VOllllded aL Alhuera,


'Vounded. Woundcd.


--------.,--.------ --------,-------:------
Rank and ]\"ames. n"giments. Hcmarks. H.ank and i\ ames. ltegÍments. Hemarks.


------------'---------------------,,----------.--'----------,------


I,icutenant Sharp
Ensign N orman


lII'Dougall
Lieutenant Col. Inglis


MajoT Spring
Captain Shadforth


M'C1ih/¡OIl
Jermyn


::;tainforth
ndy


Kirby
],ieutenant Evatt


Bax!er :
M'Larhlane!


J\l'Farlane 11
Dix
Patter!"on ¡


Hughes
SheridaTI


Virtch
lIIyers


M'Dougall
Ensign Torrens


Jackson
Lieutenant lngerleben


Captain Fcrns
'Licutenant lIiclen


Hervey
1,'Estrang0


Chamher.
J\I'Carthy


Cort.!
Hane!


Crompton I


18th .Foot 2nd Bn.
])0.
])0.


,7th Do. 1 st Do,
Do.


llo.
Do.


Do.
Do.
Do.


Do.
1)0.


])0.
Uo.


Do.
Do,


Do.
Do.


¡Ot\¡ Do. 5th Do,
';¡¡th Do. 2nd Do.


Ellsign Walker
Hay
Mack


,\I ajur H artwig
Ensigll Srnalkenson


Adjutant Tapie
Captain L lJ rrsc


Ilst Lt. Bn. K, G, L


I lnd Do. Vo.


Slightly


Sevr'rely
])0.


Slightly
Do.


Slightly
Scvprely
~¡ightly


Slightly
Do.


Sliglttly


Slightly


::-ievercly


~everclv
~lig)¡IJy


P ortn {1Ut':-;C.
Colonel Collins ~


.\rljutant Jose de Mello
Ensign P. Broquet


Captain Jose de Mattos
James Jolmsoll


Lieutenant J ose Miranda
Ensign J. S. Yascoucellas
Lieutcnant J. 1'. de Carvalhos


n. de N "pules
Captain A. P. D, Aragas


Lielltl'nant-colonelllawkshaw
Majar .J. Paes


Captain F . .r acob
.T. P. HoeaJo


Lieut, Ant. Carlos
. t\nJrcw Camaeho


LO?lilJON
1"DI-:-"Ij",l) 11'1. .\, J. \AI.l'}, .l:~J.:,1) J,Jo.' {o)l'fll, UhJ..'1 ::-IULLL


2nd Rr>giment
Hit ])0.


ith Do.
lJo.


Do,
Do.


11th ])0.
Do.


23rrl Do,
1st Bu. L. L L,


Do.
}Jo.


V".
no.


llo"


tí ¡ir:
~ '~~;


"\ '~t


, .... ~",


'/ /J;