

NARRATIVE

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR,

FROM 1808 TO 1813.

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL CHARLES WILLIAM VANE,

MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.C.B. G.C.H.

COLONEL OF THE TENTH ROYAL HUSSARS.

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TO
HIS MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY
GEORGE IV.

SIRE,

AMONGST the many distinguished honours your Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer on one of your most devoted subjects, none was more deeply appreciated than your appointment of him to the colonelcy of that regiment which your Majesty so long commanded in person. It is from a constant and everlasting sense of this military distinction, that he has ventured most humbly to lay at your Majesty's feet a short narrative of those campaigns in the Peninsula in which he had the honour and good fortune to be engaged.

With the profoundest respect and devotion, the writer begs permission to subscribe himself,

Your Majesty's

Most dutiful Subject and Servant,

VANE LONDONDERRY, Lieut.-Genl.

COL. 10TH ROYL. HUSSARS.





ADVERTISEMENT.

THESE Reminiscences of some years of an active professional life were never intended to meet the public eye. They were written always in great haste, sometimes at long intervals, and sometimes when fatigue entirely oppressed the body, and when the frame courted sleep rather than the most trifling occupation. But the great motive which prompted the first committal to paper of the imperfect details which these sheets embrace, was the affectionate and indulgent spirit with which they were received by him to whom they were addressed. They would probably have remained buried with the object of that unbounded attachment and devotion which gave them birth, had not the circumstances attending the late events

in Portugal recalled the former scenes passed in that country, where British soldiers had enjoyed so many triumphs, and where the deepest interest had been blended with their career, by their learning, practically, under the greatest Master of this or any former age, that profession in which their destinies were involved.

When a new force was equipped, and, launched under new auspices, was about to sail for that quarter, it occurred to me that these hasty sketches of a former period, however light and imperfect, might not be wholly uninteresting to those brave brother soldiers, who were embarking again for that land where so many laurels had been already gathered.

I therefore determined to arrange, with a friend, my letters and memoranda in the form of a narrative. Their deficiency, in many respects, is frankly acknowledged; and it is hoped that, being composed under the circumstances of constant fatigue and activity, the Author may meet with indulgence. On another point also he has to claim consideration from his brother officers. They know, as well as himself, how impossible it

is for any individual to render justice to the meritorious deeds of every division and corps in a long campaign; to describe all parts of a field of battle; to enter into the various views that are taken; or lastly, to detail the heroism of the several officers in the performance of their duties and exploits. Happily, the task of a eulogist or a critic belongs to higher powers. The following sheets have been compiled for other purposes. If they stimulate young officers to record the events of the moment as it flies, and the interesting scenes they may engage in, for the information of parents and friends at a distance, their publication will accomplish one useful purpose; and if they enliven one leisure hour, in camp or quarters, of the brother soldiers of the author, his object is more than gained.

V. L.

MAPS AND PLANS.

Map of Spain and Portugal, showing the seat of war,
to face page 1. Vol. I.

The following six plans to be placed at the end of the Appendix of Correspondence, Vol. II., preceding the Tables :—

I. Plan of the action near Corunna, Jan. 16th, 1809, Lieutenant-general Sir John Moore, commander-in-chief.

II. Passage of the river Douro, on the 12th May, 1809, by the British army under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. in face of the French army, commanded by Marshal Soult.

III. Plan of the battle of Talavera.

IV. Sketch of part of the ground about Fuentes and Villa Formosa, occupied by the allied army on the 5th and 6th May, 1811.

V. Plan of Badajoz and its environs, invested March 17th, 1812, and carried by storm on the night of April 6th, by the allied army, commanded by General the Earl of Wellington.

VI. Plan of Ciudad Rodrigo, describing its siege by the allied army, 1812, General the Earl of Wellington, commander-in-chief.

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THE memorable struggle in which, during fifteen or sixteen years, England had been engaged, may be said, up to the year 1807, or rather 1808, to have been a mere war of defence. Whilst her

fleets swept the seas in each quarter of the globe, crushing, wherever they came in contact with it, the naval strength of the enemy, her armies either rested idly upon her own shores, or were scattered in detachments among her colonies, or at best found themselves from time to time called upon to bear a part in some petty expedition, the object of which was usually as unprofitable, as the means employed for its attainment were insignificant. If we except the short campaign of Egypt, and the still shorter though hardly less brilliant affair of Maida, the entire period, from 1793 down to the commencement of the Peninsular war, presents us with no single record of deeds performed, worthy of the ancient military renown of Great Britain; for neither the capture of a few islands in the West Indies, nor the seizure and subsequent abandonment of Toulon, nor the contests in Flanders and at the Texel, nor even the reduction of Copenhagen, can with any justice or propriety be referred to, as adding much to the lasting reputation of this country.

But though the case was so, and government appeared all this while unaccountably anxious to avoid bringing its land forces fairly into contact with those of France, it was by no means indifferent either as to the numerical strength or to the internal discipline and organisation of the army. The threat of an invasion, followed up as it was by

the assembly of numerous bodies of troops along the French coast, infused into the people of England a military spirit, of which, for many generations back, they had known nothing; and the minister of the day was far too prudent not to turn it to a right account. Every encouragement was given to the enrolment of corps of volunteers; and these corps of volunteers, as well as the regiments of militia, all served as so many nurseries for the line. Men who had once borne arms, even though they carried them in sport, began to feel their objections to the life of a soldier gradually abate; and many an individual who put on a uniform with no other design than that of protecting the peace of the country, became, before long, a member of the regular army. The victory of Trafalgar, likewise, as it left us no enemies with whom to contend at sea, naturally enough turned the views of the brave and the enterprising to the land service. From all these causes, recruits, both in officers and men, presented themselves as rapidly as the most warlike administration could have desired; insomuch, that on the 1st of January, 1808, there were enrolled under the British standard, of regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery, exclusive of foreign mercenaries, little short of three hundred thousand men.

Of the discipline which pervaded this prodigious mass, it is not necessary to say much; even our enemies—those at least who were our

enemies, and who still entertain towards us a degree of rancorous jealousy for which no good cause can be assigned—allow that the discipline of the British army was, and is superior to that of any other army in Europe. Under the wise and paternal management of the late venerated Commander-in-Chief, a code, stern enough in theory, but mild though firm in practice, had been established. Promotion too, which in former times had proceeded without any regard whatever to the fitness of individuals, was rendered as equitable as it ever can be under a system which admits of advancement by purchase. Boys were no longer permitted to hold commissions, whilst they were yet acquiring the first elements of education; nor was it any more in the power of the minister of the day, to reward the favourite who had proved in any manner useful to himself, by bestowing upon him the command of a regiment. A regular scale was drawn up, in accordance with which no man was permitted to hold an ensign's commission till he had attained the age of sixteen. Three years' service was requisite to qualify him for the rank of captain, seven years for that of major. Nor were other and equally important matters left in the condition in which they once stood. In former times, each colonel or commanding officer of a regiment was in the habit of manœuvring his corps in any way or upon any plan

which to himself might appear most convenient. The consequence was, that in the British army there were almost as many systems of field movement as there were regiments of cavalry and infantry; and, that hardly any two could, when called upon to act together, act to any purpose. This disadvantageous mode of proceeding was abolished. One uniform and consistent system was drawn up for the infantry; another for the cavalry; and all regiments were expected to render themselves perfect in these, before they attempted to learn any thing besides. Such changes, together with the establishment of hospitals for the wounded and disabled soldiers, and for the education of children whose parents had fallen in the defence of their country, could not fail of producing the most beneficial effect upon the *morale* of the British army; which, from being an object of something like abhorrence to its own countrymen, and of contempt to the troops of other nations, rose to command, as well as to deserve, the esteem of the former, and the respect and admiration of the latter.

There were, however, one or two considerations, which, notwithstanding these acknowledged improvements, long continued to keep alive a disinclination on the part of the ministry, to commit the British army on the great field of continental warfare. In the first place it was doubted whe-

ther, among our own generals, there could be found any, capable of opposing the experienced and skilful warriors of France. We had never been accustomed to carry on war upon a large scale, except in India; and in India, it was believed that, for the successful conduct of a campaign, talents of the first order were hardly required. In the next place, it was not considered either prudent or just to push a handful of British troops into the heart of Europe; where, at a distance from the sea, and cut off from all communication with their own country, they might be compromised at any moment, either through the imbecility or treachery of our ally. England, it was imagined, ought not to take part in a continental war, unless she could do so on some point not very remote from her own shores, and covered by an extensive line of coast; because, in spite of the magnitude of her army in the mass, she could never, it was asserted, pretend to bring more than thirty or forty thousand men into the field. These considerations, it is hardly necessary to add, prevented a British army from appearing in the field at Austerlitz and Jena, or taking a share in any of the previous armaments which from time to time rendered Germany the theatre of war. But the latter objection to the employment of our own troops, the mad ambition of the French ruler at length removed; whilst it only required the ex-

perience of a single campaign to demonstrate, that in the former there had never been any solid grounds of reason.

By the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon Buonaparte was left master of the continent of Europe; the greater part being actually in his possession, and the rest entirely under his control. Over the Germanic body he exercised an authority more real and more absolute than had ever been exercised by the most powerful of the emperors. Switzerland submitted to call him her protector, obeyed his edicts, and filled up his ranks with men. Holding France, Flanders, and Italy for himself, he had placed one brother upon the throne of Naples, another upon that of Holland, whilst for a third a kingdom was erected in the heart of Germany, with territories taken indiscriminately from friend and foe. Joachim Murat, the husband of his sister, possessed a principality, with the title of Grand Duke of Berg; Eugene Beauharnois, his wife's son, was married to a princess of the house of Bavaria, and governed Italy as his viceroy; whilst he was prepared, upon the next vacancy, to place his uncle, Cardinal Fesche, upon the papal throne. Not satisfied with thus enriching and loading with honours the members of his own family, he portioned out among his marshals and companions in arms, kingdoms and principalities won by the sword; and Dukes of Istria,

and Dalmatia, and Ragusa, and Dantzic, were numbered among the new nobility of France. His own reputation moreover, political as well as military, had risen to a height quite unprecedented; for it is not going too far to affirm that the whole civilised world, dazzled by the splendour of his achievements, lay, with the solitary exception of Great Britain, at his feet.

An empire acquired as had been that of Napoleon, can never even for a moment be said to rest upon a sure foundation. One error in politics, one failure in war, may suddenly excite a storm which all the vigour of its chief will not be able to surmount; and of this truth the Emperor of the French was doomed to furnish a memorable example. Nor will it readily cease to afford matter of astonishment to the reflecting mind, that the first and most decisive blow to his power, should have come from a quarter where, above all others, he believed himself, and had just ground to believe himself, the most secure.

When the sovereigns of Europe deemed it expedient to arm for the purpose of opposing the progress of the French Revolution, the courts both of Madrid and Lisbon entered, with apparent cordiality, into the general league. Spain sent an army across the Pyrenees, to which a few battalions of Portuguese attached themselves; whilst Portugal despatched nine sail of the line to follow

the fortunes of the British fleet. The war in the south of France was not conducted either with skill or vigour. For a time indeed, that is to say, as long as the Directory found itself too busy to pay much attention to the state of affairs in that quarter, the allies obtained a few successes, but they in no instance followed them up with the slightest intrepidity; and they had hardly been opposed by moderate forces, when the tide of fortune turned against them. They not only lost the little ground which they had gained, but their beaten columns were pursued across the frontier; Catalonia was overrun, and Madrid itself threatened. An imbecile prince, and no less imbecile favourite, alarmed by the progress which the victorious republicans were making, hastened to put an end to a disastrous war, by a disgraceful peace. It was concluded in 1795, by the treaty of Basle, which, at the distance of a year after, was succeeded by a league offensive and defensive, entered into at St. Ildefonso.

From that moment Spain became, in point of fact, nothing more than a mere appendage to France. The family compact, as it was now absurdly termed, having been renewed with the Directory, it was not to be expected that it would cease to operate when the démocratical form of government gave place to the imperial; or that the Emperor of the French would be less ready to avail

himself of it, than had been the rulers of the republic. At the instigation of Buonaparte, Spain declared war against England; and a contest began, which could hardly fail of bringing upon her the heaviest disasters. During its progress, her marine, which Charles III had taken the utmost care to foster, was destroyed; her commerce received a fatal blow; the intercourse with her South American colonies was interrupted, and the way paved for that separation which has since occurred; her finances became every day more and more embarrassed; and public credit sank to the lowest ebb. Her army, likewise, was drafted away to fight the battles of her lordly ally in the most distant parts of Europe; and she was left in a situation as helpless and pitiable as has ever been filled by a nation.

It is hardly necessary to state that, at this period, and for some time previous, Spain was governed by an individual on whose head fortune appeared to have taken delight in showering the richest of her favours. Manuel Godoy, a man of obscure birth, who originally filled no higher station than that of a private in the royal body-guards, having attracted the notice of the Queen, was by her influence raised to the highest dignities in the state; and came at last to possess an authority more decided than that of the weak master whom he professed to serve. Godoy was, at the

breaking out of the French Revolution, commander-in-chief of the armies, and lord high admiral of the fleets of Spain; and at the close of 1792, he was appointed to the important office which Florida Blanca had filled under Charles III, that of President of the Councils. He it was, who, after conducting the war with so little ability, accepted peace, upon terms which laid Spain at the feet of her neighbour; and he received, as the reward of his services on that occasion, the title of Prince of the Peace. Godoy appears to have been a strange compound of weakness with genius, and of numerous vices, with a few virtues. That he willingly and knowingly betrayed his country, there is no reason for supposing; but like all upstarts, he considered the general good as a matter to be postponed on every occasion to his private benefit; and he unquestionably brought about the downfall of the Spanish monarchy in the vain attempt to uphold his own power. Godoy was not disposed to favour the French, for he both feared and hated their ruler; but, like his sovereign, he feared that extraordinary man more than he hated him, and therefore submitted to receive his yoke. When the peace of Amiens was broken, Napoleon, in virtue of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, called upon Spain to join him with her fleets and armies; but Godoy was desirous of evading the request; and he even succeeded, for a short time,

in purchasing an insecure neutrality, by the payment of forty thousand pounds per month into the imperial treasury. At last, however, Spain was hurried into the war, which brought so many and such severe calamities upon her; from the effects of which she has not yet recovered, and probably never will recover.

Whilst Spain was thus acting the part of a province of France, Portugal, faithful to the terms of her ancient alliance with England, continued to maintain a hostile attitude towards the common enemy. Not that she acted thus either willingly or confidently. Deprived by the treaty of St. Ildefonso of a barrier against French invasion, upon which she had been accustomed to count, Portugal could not but feel that, in striving, even with the aid of England, to assert her independence, she was attempting that which neither the condition of her defences, nor the numerical strength of her population, authorised her to attempt. But she was well aware that no peace would be granted to her on any other terms besides the shutting of her ports against English vessels; and she felt that a rupture with England must speedily reduce her to the lowest extremities of distress. Under these circumstances, the court of Lisbon issued orders for the enrolment of large bodies of troops. The arsenals were filled with warlike instruments; the forts and towns on the frontier were

put in a state of repair; and the *ordinances*, or levies *en masse*, received instructions to repair, each company to its accustomed place of rendezvous, on the first alarm of an enemy.

It is not necessary to detail at length the particulars of the war which ensued. For a time no event occurred of greater importance than the occasional capture of a Portuguese merchant-man by one of the French privateers, which, in great numbers, found shelter in the ports of Spain. An invasion was indeed threatened; Buonaparte, when in Egypt, declared to his troops, that “a time would come, when the Portuguese nation should pay with tears of blood for the insult which it had offered to the republic,” by despatching a squadron to act in conjunction with the British fleet in the Mediterranean. But the continental war which broke out in 1799, delayed the execution of that threat; nor was it till 1801, that any serious movements were made for carrying it into effect. Then, however, the fate of Germany being decided, and peace dictated to the rest of Europe, the First Consul began seriously to turn his attention towards the accomplishment of his prophecy; under the persuasion that, in detaching Portugal from England, he would be striking a blow at the power of the latter empire, in what he was pleased to term the most accessible part of her dominions.

A convention was accordingly entered into at Madrid, between the French republic and his Catholic Majesty, which had for its object the forcible deliverance of Portugal from the alliance of England. It was followed, on the 27th of February, by a declaration of war by Spain, for the prosecution of which her troops were already in motion; whilst a French corps of fifteen thousand men passed the Pyrenees, and took up its quarters in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of supporting the Spanish army, to which the task of invading Portugal was assigned.

To oppose this attack, the Duke de Lafoes, prime minister of Portugal, occupied both sides of the Tagus with a corps of thirty thousand men. They were miserably armed, wretchedly equipped, and neither paid nor fed; and the only British force at hand to support them, consisted of a brigade of foreign regiments, a detachment of the 20th light dragoons, and a few cannon, under General Fraser. The campaign was, as might be expected, unfavourable to the Portuguese, though by neither side was much activity or talent displayed; and before the middle of June, peace was signed between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz. But with the terms of that peace, though they included the shutting of the Portuguese ports against all intercourse with England, the First Consul was not satisfied; nor was it till the 29th of the

following September that the court of Lisbon succeeded in obtaining his approbation of the treaty. To secure this, Portugal was content to pay one million sterling to the French government; besides consenting to other arrangements, both commercial and territorial, all of them in the highest degree prejudicial to her own interests.

The peace of Amiens suspended for a while the operation of that article in the treaty which closed the ports of Lisbon and Oporto against English merchandise, and the old commercial intercourse between the two nations was renewed; but the rupture, which so soon followed, again placed Portugal in a difficult situation. At first, Buonaparte insisted upon the necessity of recurring to the prohibitory system, and appeared bent upon allowing no modification of its operations; but a variety of considerations led him at last to change his tone. The war in which Spain by his dictation had engaged, unavoidably produced an interruption in the arrival of those treasures from South America which he found so useful to himself in the prosecution of his schemes of conquest: it was necessary that some harbour should be left open for their reception. On this account, and on condition of securing, during the continuance of the maritime war, a monthly tribute of forty or fifty thousand pounds, Buonaparte consented that Portugal should continue to main-

tain a friendly intercourse with Great Britain ; and she became, in consequence, the only neutral state in the south of Europe.

In this condition both Spain and Portugal remained, from 1803 up to 1807 ; the one suffering all the misery attendant upon a compulsory alliance with a power which exhausted her revenues, and ruined her commerce ; the other writhing under the pain of a heavy contribution, and exposed every day to fresh vexations, which she possessed not the means of resisting. Nor were the internal affairs of either kingdom in a more prosperous state than their external connexions. In Spain, the nobility were sunk to the lowest pitch of degradation ; the clergy, avaricious and domineering, ruled the people with a rod of iron ; and the King was not ashamed to appear as a tool in the hands of the very man, who, to all appearance, was living in a state of adultery with his wife. Every department of the state was mismanaged. The towns, deserted by their inhabitants, presented a melancholy picture of what a nation must come to, whose rulers are possessed neither of energy of mind nor honesty of character ; and the very fields were in many places left uncultivated, for want of sufficient hands to till them. In like manner, the Spanish army, which, under the Emperors Charles V and Philip, had been the admiration of Europe, was now a thing of no name,—a very

by-word of derision and contempt to the troops of other nations. The few soldiers that remained in the country were without pay, or clothing, or even arms; the officers, taken from the lowest classes, were not ashamed to wait, as servants, in their uniforms, behind the chairs of the grandees. All the arsenals were empty. There were not provisions or stores of any kind, in any of the fortresses, sufficient for a month's consumption of the wretched garrisons which held them; and the very foundries had ceased to work, except at remote intervals.

Yet was the spirit of Spain far from being wholly broken. Driven from the higher and prouder circles, it took refuge among the peasantry; nor would it be easy to point out, in any quarter of the world, a nobler or finer race of men than those who cultivated the vine on the banks of the Ebro, or led their long lines of mules from one quarter of the kingdom to another. These men had partaken in no degree of the degeneracy of their superiors. The memory of their country's former greatness was kept alive in them by those traditionary ballads which Spaniards, more than the inhabitants of any other European state, delight in repeating; and they never failed to contrast it with the humiliating attitude which the imbecility of their present government condemned them to assume. Had there been in Charles sufficient firmness to desire

an emancipation from foreign thralldom, he might have roused, in one day, the whole male population of Spain about him. But there was no such firmness in that weak monarch. The dupe of Godoy on the one hand, and of his own fears on the other, he continued to hug the chain which bound him, as long as it was possible so to do; nor, when that chain was burst at last, did the smallest credit attach either to him or to his worthless minister.

In Portugal, the same, or nearly the same, order of things prevailed. The Regent, a weak and superstitious prince, was not, indeed, like his father-in-law, under the influence of a favourite minister, but he was as completely the slave of his confessor, as Charles was the slave of Godoy. As long as it was permitted him to attend religious processions; as long as the church seemed to flourish in its primitive grandeur; he cared not how other departments of his kingdom were guided, or in what plight his people dragged on existence. Nor were the nobles who surrounded him more patriotic or more respectable than those who surrounded the throne of Spain. In Portugal, as in the neighbouring country, all that had ever been admirable in the national character could be found only among the peasantry; who, in spite of the corrupting influence of their superiors, continued to the last a high-spirited, brave, and obedient race.

It has been said that Godoy cannot with truth be accused of submitting wilfully and knowingly to the yoke which France had placed upon the neck of his country. Like the mass of the people, he writhed painfully under it; and as it afterwards appeared, nothing but an overwhelming dread of the consequences had deterred him from making a vigorous attempt to cast it off. At last, however, the general feeling on that subject became so strong, that he determined to do something for the purpose of indulging it. The plan which he devised, and the method which he pursued in maturing it, are already well known to the public; but since to these the whole series of events which followed may be traced back, as to their immediate causes, it may not be amiss to offer here a brief recapitulation of the leading circumstances which attended them.

The overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty in Naples had sensibly alarmed the court of Madrid; and the prospect of that rupture with Prussia which ended in the peace of Tilsit, struck Godoy as furnishing a favourable opportunity of stirring up all Europe against a man whose ambition seemed to be without bounds. A secret arrangement was accordingly entered into between him and the ambassador Strogonoff, into which the Portuguese Envoy was admitted, that the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal should instantly arm, for the

purpose of attacking France at a moment when her troops should be called away to oppose the Emperor of Russia in the north. These preparations were to begin in Portugal; with the ostensible view of overawing which, Spain was next to increase her armies; whilst expeditions being fitted out in the English ports, a combined force was to invade the south of France, which, it was believed, would not be in a fit state to offer any efficient opposition. Such were the plans of Godoy, in proposing which so much secrecy was preserved, that no other agent of the government either at home or abroad was made acquainted with what was pending; but they were destined never to be carried into effect. Before a single step had been taken either in Spain or Portugal; before any direct communication had been opened with England, there suddenly appeared a proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, calling upon all good Spaniards to arm, and to assist in delivering their country from the perils which menaced it. This proclamation was given to the world at a time when Buonaparte was absent on the Prussian campaign; and its tenor was such as no person could possibly misunderstand. It produced a very powerful effect; but the effect was directly the reverse in kind from that which it was intended to produce.

Baron Strogonoff and the Portuguese Ambassa-

dor, equally startled at the great imprudence of the step which had been taken, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project which they now equally pretended to condemn. So fearful, indeed, was the court of Lisbon of being supposed to be a partner in the conspiracy, that it compelled Earl St. Vincent to withdraw, with his fleet, from the Tagus. Godoy instantly saw the folly of the act into which his natural precipitancy had hurried him. He hastened to offer such explanations to the French Ambassador as he judged most likely to allay the anger of Napoleon, and he instructed his private agent, Don Eugenio Izquierdo, to make the most abject submissions in his name to Napoleon in person. Paragraphs likewise appeared in the Madrid newspapers, some of them ascribing late events to an apprehension of an invasion by the Emperor of Morocco; others offering rewards for the detection of the miscreant who had forged a circular letter to the intendants of provinces in the name of the Prince of the Peace; whilst the motives of the proclamation, of which the authenticity could not be denied, were industriously pronounced to be a sense of duty towards France, and an over-anxiety to oppose the projects of England.

Buonaparte received the documents above alluded to subsequent to the battle of Jena; and he read in the palace of the King of Prussia a corres-

pondence which placed the intended revolt of Spain beyond a doubt. He vowed at the moment to take revenge, but it suited his policy to utter the vow in secret; and he affected to have cordially forgiven the fault into which his ally, the King of Spain, had been drawn. It is now, however, perfectly ascertained that this disclosure of the feelings of the Peninsular nations towards him, opened his eyes fully to the danger to which his power must always be exposed whilst these nations continued to be governed by their present royal families. He determined, on the instant, that the houses both of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign, and that their places should be supplied by those upon whose subserviency to his own views and wishes he might have better reason to depend.

Had Buonaparte, as soon as the designs of Spain became known to him, directed his victorious legions upon Madrid, the dethronement of Charles would have been viewed by the rest of Europe as an arrangement dictated by self-defence; whilst it is not improbable that the war never would have assumed the character which his future proceedings gave to it. But it was not in the nature of the French Emperor to act, in any case, either with openness or candour. Though a passionate lover of war, he never effected that by force of arms, which he believed it practicable to effect by

diplomacy; and the principle which guided him in other cases failed not to operate here. There were, however, other reasons for the system which he pursued, and these deserve to be recorded.

There are few states in which the favourite of the reigning monarch becomes not, sooner or later, an object of hatred to the heir apparent, and, as a necessary consequence, to all who are disposed to worship the rising sun rather than the sun in its meridian. This was peculiarly the case at the court of Madrid. Godoy was, and had long been, at variance with Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias; and so bitter was the feeling of animosity which subsisted between them, that the bare adoption by Godoy of one line of policy, was sufficient to guide Ferdinand to the adoption of its opposite. As soon, therefore, as Godoy's hostility to the French became known, Ferdinand made haste to declare himself a supporter of the French interests. He even went so far as to address a private letter to Napoleon, in which he entreated him to deliver his father and mother from the influence of an artful favourite; to free Spain from the thralldom of an upstart; and to honour himself by granting him an alliance with a princess of the imperial blood. Whether Buonaparte ever entertained any serious intention of complying with these requests, it were difficult to determine; but this much is known, that he answered Ferdinand's letter kindly, and

that he readily consented to become the arbiter in the disputes which divided the royal family of Spain. How his arbitration was conducted, Spain and Europe will not soon cease to remember.

In the mean while however, under the pretext of standing in need of their services, Buonaparte required that a corps of sixteen thousand Spaniards under Romana should proceed to join his armies on the shores of the Baltic. To these were added a division of six thousand men, which, with General O'Farrel at their head, had previously served in Tuscany; and thus almost all the regular troops on which the government could depend, were removed to so great a distance from Spain as to be perfectly useless. But Napoleon's duplicity ended not here. At the very moment when he was giving Ferdinand assurances of his regard and protection, he induced the weak Charles to heap upon Godoy an additional load of favours, till both the king and his favourite became intoxicated, the one with joy, the other with vanity. By this means, by appearing to each party inclined to countenance it in its projects and wishes, he not only kept alive, but widened the breach which already existed within the court of Madrid, and put matters in a train for that issue which, in all probability, he had already determined to bring about.

The peace of Tilsit having restored him victorious to his capital, Buonaparte began to make im-

mediate preparations to support a war of diplomacy by one of violence. Without any reasonable excuse having been assigned for the measure, a corps of twenty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry was seen to assemble in the month of August, 1807, at the base of the Pyrenees, which assumed the somewhat enigmatical appellation of the Corps of Observation of the Gironde. Whilst this force was organising itself under the directions of Marshal Junot, the Spanish minister at Paris was entering into a secret treaty; the object of which was nothing less than the erasure of Portugal from the list of nations. By the terms of that treaty, since become illustrious as the "secret treaty of Fontainebleau," it was agreed that Junot's army should enter Portugal at once, aided by three divisions of Spanish troops; that a second army, of forty thousand French soldiers, should assemble in Gascony, ready to support the first, should it meet with any serious opposition; and that Portugal, being subdued, should be divided into three parts, of which the following distribution was to be made. The province of Entre Minho e Douro, with the city of Oporto as its capital, was to be erected into a kingdom, under the title of Northern Lusitania, and given to the King of Etruria, in exchange for his Italian possessions, which he ceded in full and entire sovereignty to Buonaparte. In like manner, Alentejo

and Algarve were to be given to Godoy, who was to assume the style and title of Prince of the Algarves; and the remaining Portuguese provinces were to be held by Napoleon himself, till a general pacification should enable him to restore them to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and the other Spanish colonies which the English had conquered. These three sovereignties were, however, to be held by investiture from the King of Spain; and their princes were to owe to him the same sort of obedience which, in the feudal times, the holder of a fief owed to his sovereign lord. The colonial possessions of Portugal, again, were to be equally divided between the crowns of France and Spain; and the Emperor of the French was, as soon as it should be convenient, to acknowledge his Catholic Majesty as emperor of the two Americas.

Though nothing officially transpired indicative of the object which the army of observation was intended to effect, Europe was not so short-sighted as to remain for one instant in doubt as to the ultimate field of its operations. In the first place, the officer who was placed at its head had long filled, and still continued in name at least to fill, the station of ambassador at the court of Lisbon from the imperial cabinet. It is true that, on the opening of the Austrian campaign, Junot had quitted the seat of his diplomatic duties, that he might exe-

cute the more congenial offices which devolved upon him as aide-de-camp to the Emperor; but he had done so by the express permission of his master; and instead of his place being supplied by another commissioned representative, the business of the mission was intrusted, as in the case of other temporary absences of the principal, to the chief secretary, M. de Rayneval. This circumstance was of itself sufficient to create a suspicion that something prejudicial to the interests of Portugal was intended; and if there were any who at first appeared willing to doubt on the subject, their doubts were not permitted long to exist. The treaty of Fontainebleau was hardly signed, when the ministers, both of France and Spain, presented a strong remonstrance to the Prince Regent, requiring that the Berlin and Milan decrees should be strictly enforced at every harbour of Portugal; and it was further required, on threat of the immediate commencement of hostilities, that all the British subjects then resident in the kingdom should be seized, and all the British property confiscated.

The conduct of the Regent of Portugal under circumstances so trying, was not very different from that which might have been expected at his hands. He dared not refuse obedience to the first mandate, and he remonstrated against the second only in the mildest and most submissive terms.

But the powers with whom he had to deal entertained no wish that he should pay to their remonstrances a prompt attention ; they were pleased, rather than the reverse, at every appearance of dissatisfaction which he happened to exhibit. Finding that "his sense of religion, and the regard which he had for existing treaties," would not permit him at once to commit so flagrant an act of injustice, the French and Spanish ministers demanded their passports ; and before either these could be given, or the unhappy Prince was enabled to appeal through his own ambassadors to the generosity of his neighbours, the troops destined to overrun Portugal were in motion.

CHAPTER II.

March of Junot's army across the frontier—It arrives at Salamanca, passes Alcantara, and enters Portugal—Its sufferings by the way—Alarm of the court of Lisbon—Proposal to emigrate to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and Sir Sydney Smith—The court gives its consent, appoints a regency, and embarks—Junot reaches Lisbon—His measures for the preservation of public tranquillity—His behaviour, at first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical—The tri-coloured flag hoisted—The regency abolished—Junot assumes supreme power—The Portuguese army disbanded, and a heavy fine imposed upon the people—General discontent of all classes—Numerous broils and arbitrary punishments—The Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection—Exertions of Junot to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against the English.

THE treaty of Fontainebleau was not yet signed, when on the 17th of October, 1807, Junot received orders to put his troops in motion within twenty-four hours. At daybreak on the 18th the first division of the army of observation of the Gironde crossed the Bidassoa; it was followed on the 19th

by the second; and the whole army, marching in six columns, each at the interval of one day from that which had preceded it, entered Spain. About the same time, three corps of Spanish troops began to take the road towards Portugal, by different routes. One of these, which was appointed to act under the immediate orders of the French Marshal, was directed to assemble at Alcantara, on the Tagus. It consisted of eight battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, and two companies of sappers and miners; and it was commanded by Don Juan Carrassa, captain-general of the province of Estremadura. Another, destined to act by itself, for the occupation of Northern Lusitania, mustered fourteen battalions, six squadrons, and one company of foot artillery, and was placed under the direction of Don Francisco Taranco y Plano, captain-general of Galicia: its point of rendezvous was Tuy, on the borders of Minho. A third, at the head of which was Don Francisco Solano, marquis del Socorro, and captain-general of Andalusia, was composed of eight battalions, five squadrons, and a troop of horse artillery, and received instructions to collect in the vicinity of Badajoz. In order to complete these corps, it is scarcely necessary to state that every disposable soldier in the Spanish army was put in requisition; that even the King's body-guard furnished its quota; and

that in the capital itself there remained, after their departure, a garrison made up of skeletons only, and the depots of regiments.

The French army was every where received, during its progress through Spain, with the utmost cordiality ; it was supported at the expense of the government, and it reached Salamanca, where the General expected to winter, before the middle of November. But the last division had not come in when a courier arrived at head-quarters, bringing the most urgent and imperative directions that no halt should be made between the Bidassoa and Lisbon. Junot had accordingly no alternative submitted to him. Without having had time to make the slightest preparation for such a march, he set forward in the dead of winter, to pursue a route along which no depots of provisions or stores of any kind were established ; where it was at least doubtful whether he would not meet with a formidable opposition from a peasantry brave to a proverb, and proverbially jealous of the appearance of foreigners among them ; and where, at all events, he was quite sure of having the serious obstacles to overcome, which a mountainous district, intersected in every direction by rapid rivers and mountain streams, would not fail to throw in his way. The apprehension, however, that an English army might arrive at Lisbon before him, was quite sufficient to make all these difficulties appear light.

He pushed on, and with the leading brigade of his army, reached Alcantara on the 15th.

In this place he found General Caraffa with his corps of Spaniards; but there was a woful scarcity of means by which to recruit the vigour of his own battalions, worn out by long marches through a difficult country, and in tremendous weather. It was with the utmost difficulty that the French soldiers could be supplied, each with rations for two days. Still the Emperor's orders must be obeyed; and on the 19th, after having circulated proclamations in which the Portuguese were assured of protection from insult in the event of their remaining quiet, and threatened with the most terrible punishment if they should in any way impede the progress of troops which came only to deliver them from the yoke of England, the allied armies were once more put in motion.

It is not necessary to follow the movements of Junot's corps very minutely. It is sufficient to observe that, though the peasantry in general either rested peaceably in their cottages, or at the most fled to the mountains and left their homes desolate, the route of the invaders might be traced, by gardens devastated, houses ruined, and whole villages burned to the ground. Notwithstanding this was the case, and though not a gun was fired from the day when the head of the first French column passed the frontier, till the arrival of its

rear-guard in Lisbon, the march was far from being a tour of pleasure to those who performed it. The season chanced to be particularly stormy and inclement. The rain fell in torrents, cutting up the indistinct paths which traversed the mountains, and swelling into formidable rivers, streams which might usually be crossed without apprehension, either by man or beast. The reader is doubtless aware that the road, if such it deserves to be termed, which leads from Alcantara to Lisbon, by way of Castello Branco and Abrantes, passes over the summits of a ridge of rocks, and through a country as desert and unfruitful as any which the European traveller is in the habit of visiting. It was by this track that Junot thought fit to proceed; and the fatigue and privations which his troops were in consequence condemned to endure, are represented to have been more terrible than generally fall to the lot of a retreating army. As a matter of course, neither wintry torrents nor permanent rivers were, in that wild district, supplied with bridges; the soldiers were consequently obliged to cross as they best could, whenever such obstacles came in their way; and such was the rapidity of the streams in many places, that whole companies of men, and whole troops of horses, were swept away and destroyed. A march through defiles like these could not long be conducted with order or regularity. The artillery was soon

left behind ; of the cavalry, only the best mounted were enabled to keep up ; and even the infantry lost its ranks, and straggled, for many miles, over the face of the country. Long before the towers of Abrantes rose upon their view, the French columns may be said to have dissolved themselves ; for there were not above five thousand men who followed the General that were in any condition, either from bodily strength or local situation, to oppose an enemy.

But though fully aware of this, and of the risk which he ran by disregarding it, Junot felt that other and still stronger reasons forbade his pausing, even though a pause of a few days might bring back to their standards the thousands whom weariness and famine had left by the wayside. At Abrantes, intelligence reached him of the line of conduct which the Portuguese government was preparing to pursue ; and it was with him an object of the first importance to reach the capital, if possible, in time to interpose for its prevention.

The treaty of Fontainebleau had not been kept so secret, but that the English government obtained information of its object ; and that information it lost no time in communicating to the cabinet of Lisbon. England had given her assent to the proposition made by the Regent of Portugal, of shutting the ports of his kingdom against her mer-

chants; she was aware that her ancient ally, in so doing, acted only by compulsion; and she therefore connived at the transaction. But it was impossible for her to forgive the next step which his timid policy induced him to take; and when he proceeded, in obedience to the mandate of France, to arrest all British subjects, and confiscate all British property, Lord Strangford, the ambassador, could do no otherwise than retire on board of one of the ships of the squadron, which, under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, lay at that time at anchor in the Tagus. As soon, however, as the details of the secret treachery reached them, both the Ambassador and the Admiral requested and obtained an audience of the Prince Regent. In this they laid before him the particulars of the accounts which they had received; and in the most forcible terms urged him to adopt some means for the preservation of his own person, and the safety of the royal family. The great question, however, was, of what nature these means were to be. He had hesitated too long to permit any idea of open resistance being entertained; besides, neither the army, nor the fortresses, nor the general state of the nation, was such as to inspire any hope of resisting successfully. It was then that the British functionaries pressed upon him the wisdom of removing with his court and family to the Brazils, and fixing there the seat of his government, till

the troubles of the present times should pass away. This was a terrible alternative; nor can it surprise any one, that the Regent of Portugal should have wavered long, and frequently changed his determinations, before he could muster sufficient courage to adopt it. But, at last, the famous article in the *Moniteur* was shown to him, in which it was openly announced that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. All ground of hesitation was now removed. The British subjects who had been arrested were set at liberty; the British property which had been seized was restored to its rightful owners; and the royal family of Portugal made every preparation for quitting the ancient seat of its sovereignty under the protection of the British flag. These resolutions had been formed, and these preparations were in a state of forwardness, when Junot reached Abrantes; and it was the notice which he received of the intended emigration, which induced him, without pausing to refresh his followers, or collect those who lagged behind, to press on towards the capital.

The consternation and anxiety which were evinced by the inhabitants of Lisbon, as soon as a rumour of the intended departure of the Prince got abroad, beggar all attempt at description. Devotedly attached both by nature and habit to the persons of their sovereigns, the lower orders beheld, in the proposed emigration, a certain pre-

lude to national ruin and individual misery ; whilst the higher classes, such at least as reasoned at all, came to the conclusion that, as surely as the royal family should abandon the palace of their ancestors, so surely would the prophetic declaration in the *Moniteur* receive its accomplishment. Nor was this the only circumstance which tended to excite general alarm, independently of the impending approach of the French troops. As if he had come thither by appointment, Junot's army had hardly crossed the frontier, when the Russian admiral Siniavin entered the Tagus, with nine ships of the line and two frigates. Such a coincidence could not fail deeply to affect men already agitated by a thousand fears and doubts ; for though his arrival was purely accidental, it appeared to the ill-fated Portuguese that a plan of co-operation between the French General and the Russian Admiral had been laid ; and that the latter had come, at this critical juncture, to render assistance to the former in the subjugation of the kingdom.

In the mean while, great preparations were making by the court for its intended emigration. The royal treasury was emptied ; much of the plate, both of the Prince and of the courtiers who designed to follow him, was packed up and made ready for removal on board of ship ; and finally, a proclamation appeared, assigning as the motive for

a step so decisive, the conviction which rested upon the mind of the Regent, that his person, and not the oppression of the Portuguese people, was the design of the present invasion. A regency was likewise nominated, to consist of four individuals; namely, the Marquess de Abrantes; Lieutenant-general Francisco da Cunha de Menezes, regidor das justiças, principal castro of the royal council; Don Pedro de Millo Breyner, likewise of the council; and Don Francisco de Noronha, lieutenant-general, and president of the board of conscience. In case any of these should refuse to act, the Conde Monteiro Mor was nominated to take his place; and the same nobleman was appointed president of the Senado da Camara, having the Conde Sampaio, or Don Miguel Periera Forjaz, and Joam Anthonio Salter de Mendonça, as his secretaries. These functionaries were instructed to use every exertion for the preservation of the general peace of the kingdom; they were to administer the laws in every respect as if the Regent himself were present; and above all, they were themselves to receive, and to instruct all good Portuguese to receive, the French troops as friends. Upon this point the proclamation was the more explicit, inasmuch as both the English Admiral, and the inhabitants of Lisbon, had manifested a strong desire to defend the city to the last; and as the Regent was satisfied that all resistance

must be fruitless, he positively forbade any to be offered.

Whilst matters were in this train on the banks of the Tagus, Junot was moving, as rapidly as the state of the weather and the disordered condition of his troops would allow, upon the capital. He had assembled together as many soldiers of every corps and division as appeared capable of bearing the fatigue of a renewed march, and he caused large vessels to be constructed for the conveyance, down the stream, of those multitudes whom disease or weariness rendered incapable of proceeding further. General Caraffa, with a portion of the Spanish corps, was detached to Thomar for the purpose of collecting provisions, and keeping that part of the country in awe. The reserve of artillery and the heavy baggage, which had been left behind, received instructions to follow by the road which passes Alcantara and Badajoz; whilst the guns attached to the divisions in advance, were most of them conveyed by water carriage. Having completed these arrangements, he found that it was possible for him to move forward at the head of six or eight thousand men; and he lost no time in putting them in motion.

On the 26th of November, the advanced guard, consisting of four chosen battalions and a regiment of Spanish hussars, reached Punhete. On the following morning it passed the Zezere in boats;

and Junot, who accompanied it, was met on the opposite bank by Jose Oliveira de Barreto, commandant of Aranjó. This officer was desirous that the march of the French troops should be suspended ; and that some confidential person should be sent forward, for the purpose of arranging all the details of occupation with the proper authorities. But as he accompanied his request with an enunciation of the proposed departure of the royal family, Junot would on no account accede to it. The troops continued their march.

The rains had fallen so heavily, that the whole plain of Golega was inundated, and the advanced guard which traversed it found the water cover their knees ; the rest of the troops, by turning off in the direction of Torres Novas and Pernes, escaped that inconvenience. But no obstacles impeded them. They reached Santarem in due time, and found it in a state of great order and prosperity. None of the inhabitants had abandoned their homes, and all received the invaders with kindness ; they were repaid for this conduct by the sack and ruin of the town.

At last Sacavem, a village situated about two leagues from Lisbon, was gained ; the head of the column reaching it at an early hour on the 29th. Here the French general was met by deputations from the supreme council, from the city, and from the merchants of Lisbon, who came to congratulate

him on his arrival, in the names of these bodies; and here he was informed of the embarkation and actual departure of the royal family. At the same time the representatives of the regency, Lieutenant-general Martinho de Souza e Albuquerque, and Brigadier-general Francisco de Borga Garçon Stockler, warned him of the state of violent excitation into which the inhabitants of the capital were thrown. They assured him that an English fleet was at the mouth of the river, evidently waiting for a fair wind to carry it up; and that, unless the greatest precautions were used, it would be a hard matter to preserve that amity between the French and the Portuguese, which not prudence only, but the express orders of the Prince Regent, required them to preserve. Junot heard them to an end, and then dismissed them with a declaration, that he would hold the regency responsible for the peace of the city. To the other deputations, again, he recommended diligence and zeal in calming the spirits of their fellow-citizens; and he sent forward numerous copies of a proclamation, to be posted in the most conspicuous parts of Lisbon, declaratory of the good-will of the Emperor towards the Portuguese nation. This done, he made ready to pursue his journey.

But though he thus affected to hold the perils of his situation in contempt, it was not possible for Junot to feel himself really at his ease. Of the

twenty-eight thousand men whom he had led across the Pyrenees, scarcely six thousand were at this moment in a condition to act. The rest were scattered over the line of march in one long column, divided here and there by impassable torrents, or no less impassable inundations. The division nearest to his advanced guard was that of General Delaborde, which had as yet penetrated no further than to Santarem. Of the cavalry and artillery which had fallen into the rear soon after the army began to move from Alcantara, no intelligence had reached him; and he was quite ignorant whether or not the Spanish corps, which had been directed to move by Alentejo and Entre-Douro-e-Minho, had yet begun their march. Thus situated, and with a large and populous city before him, in which at least ten thousand regular troops were in garrison, Junot could not but look forward to the event with serious apprehension. But he was aware that any appearance of doubt or misgiving would now prove fatal to him. He accordingly got together as many men as could be collected, and on the following day entered Lisbon.

It is hardly necessary to remind the reader, that whilst the French Marshal was thus performing his painful journey, the royal family of Portugal were hurrying their arrangements for the abandonment of their country. The morning of the 27th had been fixed upon for their embar-

kation; and on that day, amidst the tears and regrets of many thousand spectators, they ascended the vessels appointed to convey them. But the wind proved not only adverse but boisterous: it blew a perfect hurricane, and the fleet was unable to move. At last, however, a favourable breeze sprang up, and at daybreak on the 29th the anchors were lifted. It was well that the storm ceased when it did; for the ships were scarcely across the bar when the French entered the city.

For some little time after the arrival of Junot, all things went on, or appeared to go on, in the Portuguese capital, as they had been accustomed to do. The French soldiers coming in by small detachments, were conducted by the native magistracy, and by the native troops, to their quarters; and both they and their officers possessed sufficient prudence to conduct themselves with decency and decorum. But the stragglers were scarcely collected, and the strength of the weary restored, when French domination began to show itself in its true colours; and a blow was struck at the national pride of the Portuguese, such as they found it difficult even at the moment to bear.

As soon as he found himself sufficiently strong to act with a high hand, Junot gave orders that Lisbon and all the ports in the Tagus should

be evacuated by the Portuguese troops; whose places were to be supplied by French divisions. Delaborde was nominated governor of the capital; and his soldiers were quartered, not in barracks or public-houses, but in the convents. General Loison with his division occupied Cintra, Mafra, and the sea-coast as far as the mouth of the Mondego; one brigade, under General Thomieres, being quartered in the castle and peninsula of Penniche. To the third division, at the head of which was General Travot, was intrusted the defence of the entrance of the Tagus. Its headquarters were at Ocyras, and it had garrisons in the forts St. Julien and Cascaes on the right bank; whilst on the left, two battalions were encamped upon the heights of Mafarem. The cavalry and artillery were kept entire in Lisbon; there were detachments of infantry in Santarem and Abrantes; and a Swiss battalion had the garrison of Almeida. Such was the disposition of the French troops: the Spaniards were arranged as follows:—

The division of General Caraffa having recalled its detachment from Thomar, took up its quarters in Lisbon, and was intermixed with the French corps; Solano, again, who had presented himself before Elvas on the 2nd of December, and to whom that important place opened its gates, having disposed three battalions in the fort, es-

tablished his own head-quarters at Setubal. From that point he sent out parties, which occupied the castles and towers of the Alentejo and Algarve, and completed the subjugation of the new principality ; whilst Taranco was in like manner spreading his force over the northern provinces. The last officer having secured Valença, a place of considerable importance as commanding the passages of Minho and the Lima, threw a garrison into the chateaux of Sant Iago ; and on the 13th took possession of Oporto, where he fixed his head-quarters.

Having ascertained that, of the arrangements just described, some were already complete, and the rest hurrying to their completion, Junot proceeded to impress upon the minds of the Portuguese by decided proofs that they were a conquered people. On the 13th of December, a grand review of all the troops in the capital was announced. The soldiers assembled in the principal streets and squares, the infantry in battalions, the cavalry in squadrons, and the artillery limbered up and in order for service ; and the whole population of the place flocked from their houses in order to witness the spectacle. They were gazing with deep interest at the scene before them, when a salute of artillery from the walls of the Moorish fort attracted their attention. All eyes were instantly turned thither, and they beheld the

ancient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon which the tri-coloured standard of France was mounted. It was a sight which seemed to affect them with emotions too deep for utterance. At first a solemn silence prevailed, broken only by the rattle of the soldiers' arms, or the voices of their commanders ; but by and by a murmur arose, resembling rather the roar of the ocean upon its bed of sand, than any other sound in nature. The people were grievously agitated. Cries of "Portugal for ever ! Death to the French !" were heard on every side ; and it appeared that some mighty popular convulsion was inevitable. But Junot had taken care to secure the persons of the regency, and of the principal men of the city, whose heads might pay the forfeit of any act of insurrection ; and the mob, without leaders and without arms, gradually melted away. The rest of that day, and the whole of the night, were spent in a state of feverish agitation, which, without leading to any immediate results, gave sure indication of a spirit of discontent abroad ; and which, sooner or later, must bring about some dangerous convulsion.

In spite, however, of this flagrant attack upon their dignity as an independent nation, the Portuguese continued for some time to bear their fate, if not in absolute quiet, at all events without giving vent to their feelings in a way calculated to excite

the serious alarm of their conqueror. Private quarrels, ending even in bloodshed, between individuals of the garrison and the inhabitants, were by no means unfrequent; but in public, that is to say, on a great scale, events appeared to flow on in their usual channel. Junot made no other change in the form of the government, than by adding to the list of regency one or two creatures of his own; and the laws continued to be administered in the name of the legitimate sovereign as heretofore. Above all things, Junot was extremely cautious in concealing, as far as he could, the terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau. So far from divulging these, he took care on all occasions to make it known that the Emperor was particularly desirous of preserving the integrity of the kingdom of Portugal; till at last the idea began to be entertained, that at the worst the Portuguese might apprehend only a change of dynasty.

The same line of conduct which he pursued himself, the generals in command of the Spanish corps had been pointedly requested to adopt; but to the wishes of their chief they paid, in this respect, very little attention. Taranco, indeed, went no further than to insinuate to the authorities of Oporto, that they ought from thenceforth to regard their city as attached to the monarchy of Spain; but Solano, the personal friend of Godoy, went much further. He appointed a grand judge,

and a superintendent of finances, in the name of Emmanuel, prince of the Algarves; and he caused certain pieces of money to be coined, bearing upon them the arms of that minion, with a suitable inscription. Except in these particulars, however, Solano did nothing very offensive to the prejudices of the Portuguese, by whom, on the contrary, he seems to have been highly, and not undeservedly, esteemed.

Matters continued in this state, Junot directing the principal share of his attention to the sea-side, and making every exertion to oppose any attempts which might be made by the English against him, up to the 1st of February, 1808. On that day, however, he published a decree, which had issued from his master whilst at Milan, and bore date the 23rd of the preceding December. It dissolved for ever the council of regency appointed by the Prince of the Brazils, and directed Marshal Junot, duke of Abrantes, to govern Portugal alone, in the name of the Emperor Napoleon. It required that a chosen body of Portuguese troops should be sent, with as little delay as possible, into France. It changed the appellation of the corps now stationed about Lisbon, from that of the army of observation of the Gironde, to that of the army of Portugal; and it condemned the Portuguese nation to pay, as the price of the protection of their private property, a fine of one hundred millions of francs.

Such were the orders of Napoleon ; and these the Duke of Abrantes proceeded, without the slightest compunction, to enforce.

The effect produced by the promulgation of this decree, and by the changes in every department of the state which arose out of it, was such as it were no easy matter to pourtray. It was felt, not in the capital only, but through every part of the most remote provinces. The army, already in a state of disorganisation, disbanded itself, and those who had carried arms as soldiers, continued to bear them as robbers and plunderers. The peasantry, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow their fields with corn. The higher classes, whose usual place of residence was Lisbon, fled in dismay from their homes, till the city presented the appearance of a place lately visited by the plague. True, indeed, there were traitors to their country, who continued to surround the throne of the intruder, and to flatter his vanity, or that of his master, by addresses the most fulsome and degrading ; but the mass of the nation felt keenly the insults and wrongs to which they were subjected, and seemed to wait only for the proper moment to take revenge.

It was not long before the offended pride of the Portuguese began to vent itself in acts of violence, for which the growing insolence of the French furnished ample grounds, but which were invariably

followed by punishments the most terrible and the most arbitrary. At Mafra, because the populace had uttered cries indicative of the state of their feelings, one citizen was condemned to death by sentence of a military commission, and publicly executed. A few days afterwards, a quarrel arose at the village of Caldas de Ranha, between certain of the French troops quartered there, and some soldiers of the 2nd regiment of Oporto. The affair was represented to Junot as a seditious commotion; upon which not only was the regiment broke under circumstances to it the most ignominious, but six peaceable inhabitants of the place, who had taken no part in the disturbance, were shot. Similar scenes occurred in almost every city, town, village, and hamlet in Portugal, till the minds of the people were wrought up to dare as well as to endure every thing.

As soon as Junot perceived the state of feeling to which the Portuguese in general were brought, he lost no time in fulfilling another of Napoleon's directions, by disbanding the whole of the army, except those regiments only which he had appointed to proceed into France. Previous to the present invasion, the standing army of Portugal amounted to thirty-seven regiments of horse and foot. Junot permitted no more than six regiments of infantry and three of cavalry to remain with their colours. The rest were dismissed to their

homes; and even this paltry force received positive orders to march, under the guidance of the Marquis de Alorna, towards Bayonne. The militia had long ago been relieved from the fatigues of military service; and now to complete his measures, an edict was given out, requiring every Portuguese to surrender up to certain constituted authorities his fire-arms; and prohibiting even swords from being worn in the streets or public ways.

Things continued in this state from the month of February till summer had considerably advanced. In every part of the country, such pictures, carved devices, or emblems of any sort, as had a tendency to keep alive a recollection of past national independence, were removed or defaced. The royal arms were pulled down from over the gateways of the palaces; the *Quinas*, or old Portuguese standard, was universally displaced, to make way for the imperial eagle; and even justice was now administered according to the French code, and in the name of the French Emperor. Yet were there occurring from time to time events which might have served to satisfy any reasonable person that matters had been pushed too far. Not to dwell at length upon the tumults and massacres which here and there took place, it soon became evident that the Spanish troops who had accompanied the French, were

allies only in name. The chiefs, disgusted and dissatisfied with so flagrant a violation of the treaty of Fontainbleau as the recent acts of Junot presented, hardly affected to conceal their chagrin; whilst pieces of information began gradually to circulate among the common soldiers, which stirred up in them a disposition the reverse of friendly towards their nominal comrades. At last, an order arrived from Madrid, accompanied by an humble request on the part of Godoy, addressed personally to Marshal Junot, for the return of the several corps into their own country. Acquiescence with it was of course refused, wherever Junot possessed the power of refusal; and the divisions of Caraffa and Taranco remained at their stations. But Solano's corps actually took its departure, with the exception of four battalions, which continued to garrison Setubal. Junot was alarmed by this movement, and despatched Kellerman with his brigade to Elvas, for the purpose of watching its results. In the same disposition, he ordered General Quesnel, a French officer, to proceed to Oporto, and take the command of the Spanish troops there, whom the death of Taranco had deprived of a leader; and he particularly directed him to overawe the Portuguese by the presence of the Spaniards, and to keep the Spaniards to their duty by exciting in them a dread of the Portuguese. Nor was he remiss in the

adoption of other expedients for the preservation of public peace. Whilst his emissaries were busily employed in all quarters collecting a tribute oppressive beyond endurance, he gave every encouragement to those worthless Portuguese, who judged it a prudent measure to approach the imperial throne with their petitions, and to draw up the forms of a new constitution, to be administered by some prince of the Emperor's choice. To the state of the marine, likewise, he paid considerable attention. Through the exertions of M. Majendie, a captain in the French navy, he fitted out and armed two ships of the line, of 74 guns each, three frigates, and seven smaller vessels; besides several hulks, in which it had been customary to confine prisoners. It is true that none of these were rendered effective; but they at all events served the purposes of floating batteries; and they promised to prove of considerable utility in case an English squadron should endeavour to force the passage of the bar. All Junot's dispositions, however, were of no avail. A cloud had already collected in another part of the horizon, which there was no reason to expect would dissolve without a storm; and the storm no sooner began to rage, than it extended its influence to every part of his insecure vice-royalty.

CHAPTER III.

Entrance of fresh armies into Spain—Seizure of the frontier fortresses, and advance of Murat upon Madrid—Consternation of Charles and Godoy—Preparations for escape to South America defeated by the mob—Godoy dragged to prison—Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king—Murat arrives in the capital—Departure of the royal family for Bayonne—Tumult of the 2nd of May—Resignation of the rights of the house of Bourbon—Secret instructions of Ferdinand to the regency—Measures adopted by Murat to preserve public tranquillity.

THE sixth article of the treaty of Fontainbleau had stipulated, “that a corps of forty thousand French troops should assemble at Bayonne, on or about the 20th of November, for the purpose of supporting the force previously sent into Portugal, in case the English should oppose its progress, or menace it with an attack ;” but it was expressly specified that the latter corps should make no movement in advance until the two high contracting parties had come to a perfect understanding on the subject.

In accordance with the tenor of this arrangement, Junot's corps had hardly commenced its march, when the army destined to support it began to be formed. Early in November there were twenty-four thousand infantry, between three and four thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, in the camp; and by the 22nd of the same month, the whole, under the orders of General Dupont, crossed the Pyrenees. For this movement the assent of the Spanish court was neither obtained nor requested. Buonaparte felt himself already too strong to stand in need of it; and the corps pressed forward without opposition of any sort to Valladolid. Here the head-quarters were established; the troops being cantoned in the villages along the course of the Douro, whilst detachments were pushed on as far as Salamanca, in order that a persuasion might be generally created that its ultimate destination was Lisbon.

Not satisfied with having thus introduced two armies into the heart of nations professedly in a state of profound peace with his government, Napoleon caused a third to form itself where the two former had been stationed, and a fourth to be organised at Perpignan, in the very opposite extremity of the Pyrenees. No great while elapsed before both the one and the other penetrated into Spain. The former, under Marshal Moncey, consisting of twenty-five thousand infantry, three

thousand cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon, passed the Bidassoa on the 9th of January, occupying the three provinces of Biscay, and extending as far as Castile; the latter, which amounted in all to about fifteen thousand men, and was headed by Duhesme, made its movement about a month later. The progress of both was marked by deeds of treachery, of which a few words will suffice to recall the particulars to the recollection of the reader.

As soon as Napoleon had fully determined upon the proceedings which he afterwards adopted with respect to Spain, it became to him a matter of the first importance to be put in possession of the different fortresses and strong-holds which covered its northern frontier, and protected it against French invasion. These, it is probably needless to add, are St. Sebastian, in Biscay; Pampeluna, in Navarre; and San Fernando de Figueres, and Barcelona, in Catalonia. Whoever may happen to command these four cities, may be said to command the four great passes of the Pyrenees; and to obtain the command of them at any cost and by any means, was the last and most urgent order given by their chief to the French generals.

The methods which these severally adopted to carry their master's projects into effect, are too well known to require a very minute repetition. San Fernando, feebly garrisoned, and more feebly governed, opened its gates to the brigade of General

Nicolas, as soon as that officer demanded permission to lodge his soldiers in the citadel for the night; and the troops which thus obtained an entrance, rewarded the hospitality of their allies, by turning them out of the place, and keeping possession of it themselves. At Barcelona, a little more of cunning was requisite by the general-in-chief Duhesme. Having obtained quarters for his men in the town, he fell upon the following stratagem, for the purpose of introducing them into the two castles,—the Citadel, and Fort Mon Jouich,—which, at opposite extremities, hold the city in subjection. On the 16th of February, the troops were ordered to assemble on the glacis of the citadel, under the pretext of being reviewed previous to their departure. Lecchi, an Italian officer, commanded on that occasion; and the soldiers who acted their part in the business so cleverly, were all Italians. Whilst the Spanish garrison—the guard upon duty at the gate not excepted—were intently occupied in watching the progress of the inspection, two companies upon the right of the line suddenly fell to the rear, and throwing off their knapsacks, ran with great speed towards the drawbridge. This they covered, before there was time given to raise it; and General Lecchi following with the whole of his staff, and exclaiming that he only came to pay a visit to the Governor, two battalions were enabled to make

good their entrance, whilst the Spaniards were yet wondering at the cause of the sudden tumult. As soon as his object had been so far effected, Duhesme proceeded to attempt the reduction of Fort Mon Jouich by a process somewhat different. He boldly demanded, in the name of Napoleon, that it should be surrendered to him, threatening, in case of refusal, an instant declaration of war; and the Governor was too timid, or too faithless, to resist such an appeal.

The most important, however, of all the frontier towns is Pampeluna; and the task of obtaining possession of it devolved upon General Darmagnac. Pampeluna, like the other places already occupied, lies wholly at the mercy of its citadel; and though Darmagnac's troops were very readily admitted into the town, the Governor, an old and faithful Spaniard, took every precaution to hinder them from making a lodgment in the castle. With this view he would admit no greater number than sixty or seventy French soldiers within the walls at a time, who came only to receive their daily rations; and behind whom, as soon as they had entered, the draw-bridge was carefully drawn up. It required some management to deceive an officer possessed of so great a degree of caution; but Darmagnac's mind was fruitful in resources, and he contrived at last to outwit his wary antagonist.

The French General had taken up his abode in

a house which stood upon the esplanade, midway between the town and the castle; into which, during the night of the 15th February, he introduced a hundred grenadiers, well armed, and amply supplied with ammunition, one by one, and in profound silence. On the morning of the 16th, a fatigue party of sixty men proceeded, according to custom, to receive their rations in the citadel; but they were all men of tried courage, and at their head was an officer of valour and known judgment, M. Robert, chef de battalion of the 70th regiment. Under the pretext of being before their time, and of waiting for the arrival of the quarter-master, some of them remained standing upon the draw-bridge, whilst the rest took shelter against a passing shower, in the guard-room. At a given signal they rose upon the Spanish guard. The sentinels were disarmed, and the muskets of those who were not on duty, and with which the French soldiers had pretended to amuse themselves, were suddenly turned against their owners. The hundred grenadiers now advanced at a run; and two battalions, which had been for some time formed in expectation of the event, showed themselves on the glacis. In spite of all his vigilance, Don Francisco Certero saw that his post was carried, and he submitted.

The manner in which St. Sebastian, again,

changed its masters, was even more simple than any of the preceding. General Thouvenot having been sent thither with the ostensible view of forming a depot, for the assembling of stragglers from different regiments in advance, and forwarding them to their respective stations, took care to increase the number of his detachments so largely, that they became at last too many for the Spanish garrison ; and the garrison was in consequence marched out, to make way for a corps of French troops.

Having thus succeeded, almost beyond his expectations, in opening a way into the very heart of Spain, Napoleon no longer deemed it necessary to affect concealment as to his ultimate purposes. Column after column poured across the Pyrenees, till the whole line of road from the Bidassoa to the Douro was covered with French soldiers. In Catalonia again, fresh reinforcements daily arrived, till Marshal Bessieres, to whom the chief command in that district was assigned, found himself at the head of twenty-five thousand men, including six thousand of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of the imperial guard. But it was to Murat, grand duke of Berg, that the important task of subjugating Spain was committed. He was recalled from Madrid, where for some time back he had acted ostensibly as ambassador, though in reality as the promoter of internal dis-

cord in the bosom of the court; and being appointed lieutenant to the Emperor, proceeded to take command of the grand army.

In the mean while, events had occurred in the Spanish capital, such as to draw upon the actors in them the attention, not of Spain only, but of the whole of Europe. First of all, the inhabitants of Madrid were astonished by the sudden appearance of a royal proclamation; in which it was announced that Ferdinand, prince of Asturias, had been detected in a conspiracy to dethrone and murder his father, and was arrested. This was followed in a few days by a second proclamation, which informed the public that the Prince, having confessed his guilt, and given up the names of his associates, had been pardoned, "the voice of nature prevailing over that of strict justice," and admitted once more into the royal favour. The surprise excited by proceedings so extraordinary had not subsided, when intelligence of the operations of the French armies on the frontier, and their rapid advance into the heart of the country, excited in a much more forcible and natural degree the consternation of all classes. Godoy, alarmed not so much for the probable fate of the nation, as for the destiny which might befall himself, thought at one moment of recalling the Spanish troops from Portugal, and keeping them in readiness to act as circumstances might require;

and an order was actually issued to that effect. At other times he urged the King to forward a scheme, to which he had formerly opposed himself with all his influence, namely, the procuring a wife for Ferdinand from among the princesses of the imperial blood. Next, he threw out hints as to the propriety of abdicating the crown, as soon as the proposed marriage should be completed; whilst for himself, an asylum somewhere in the heart of France appeared to hold out the best hopes of protection against the violence of his enemies.

In the midst of these deliberations arrived two announcements, of which it would be difficult to determine whether the former or the latter struck this imbecile court with the greater degree of horror. A letter from Napoleon himself, accompanying certain presents of beautiful horses, informed the King of Spain that it was the Emperor's intention to visit Madrid, and there to settle with him, upon a solid foundation, the affairs both of Spain and Portugal. Such an arrival was by no means desired either by Charles or his favourite; but whilst they were yet hesitating how to act, Don Eugenio Izquierdo, who had long resided at Paris as the tool of Godoy, suddenly made his appearance in the Escorial, and communicated the following details. The Emperor, he said, had determined to seize Portugal for himself, and to

exchange it with the crown of Spain for the provinces north of the Ebro. New treaties of commerce and of alliance, offensive and defensive, such as the safety of his empire required, were about to be drawn up. The title of Emperor of the Indies would be assigned to the King of Spain, whose son, the Prince of Asturias, should receive the hand of the Emperor's niece; but the marriage must be the subject of an especial negociation, and might be deferred till other arrangements were complete. In addition to this official intelligence, Izquierdo took care to inform his master of the suspicions which he himself entertained touching the Emperor's real designs; and the statement threw all parties affected by it into the most serious alarm.

It was now that the wisdom of following the example set by the Regent of Portugal, and removing the court to its South American possessions, suggested itself to the mind of Godoy. His dreams of sovereignty were by this time wholly dispelled, and his highest ambition was to secure a place of retreat for himself, whatever might be the fate of Spain; nor did he find Charles in a mood at all different from his own. The plan was no sooner proposed than it was agreed to. The King and Queen both professed their willingness to fly; and preparations were instantly set on foot for securing a safe embarkation.

With this view the corps of General Solano was recalled from Alentejo, and ordered to occupy the mountains of Guadarrama. Detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were directed to cover the road from Madrid to Seville ; whilst the body-guard, nine squadrons of the royal carabinieri, the battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and the regiments of national infantry and cavalry which composed the ordinary garrison of Madrid, were marched from the capital to Aranjuez, where the court was then resident. All things, in short, were already in a state of forwardness, when an unexpected tumult frustrated at once the intentions both of Godoy and the King.

Though the greatest precautions had been adopted to keep secret the object of these preparations, it was not possible to hinder a rumour of the intended emigration from spreading abroad. The Spaniards were deeply afflicted at the prospect of being abandoned by their King ; and as it was understood that Ferdinand had expressed the strongest aversion to the measure, the whole was attributed to the selfish and wicked councils of the Prince of the Peace. The consequence was, that the hatred which had long been harboured towards Godoy, now increased with tenfold violence ; and in this general feeling the soldiers fully participated with the multitude. To such a height, indeed, was this universal discontent carried, that

Charles found himself under the necessity of abandoning his design ; and he issued a proclamation, in which he assured his beloved subjects that no consideration whatever should induce him to leave them. This appeared on the 16th, and on the 17th the preparations for departure were again renewed. But popular indignation was now excited to its highest pitch. A mob hastening to Aranjuez, found a cavalcade of carriages ready to proceed. They instantly cut the traces, and then turning their fury against Godoy, ran, in a tumultuous manner, to assault his house. Of the soldiers whom he called in to his assistance, all, except his own body-guard, deserted him ; and he with difficulty escaped to a place of concealment for the night.

Next day Ferdinand showed himself to the people, and the tumult was appeased. The houses, indeed, of Godoy, and of his nearest relatives and most abject dependents, were levelled to the ground ; whilst he himself, dragged from his hiding-place, was with difficulty conveyed to a public prison ; but this done, the mob immediately returned to their duty. Charles, however, had *learned a lesson, such as he had no desire to learn* again. The burden of sovereignty, he said, had become too heavy for him ; and it was, in the existing circumstances of the country, highly improper that an old and infirm man should endea-

vour to bear it any longer. He therefore, of his own free will, abdicated the throne, and named as his successor his eldest and beloved son, Ferdinand, prince of Asturias.

The joy of the people of Madrid, when this resolution was made known to them, is represented to have known no bounds. All ranks and degrees of men partook in it. The houses were decorated during the day with flowers and green boughs ; and at night, one vast illumination extended from square to square, and from street to street. Ferdinand was hailed, wherever he appeared, as the preserver of his country ; and for the moment, at least, both the advance of the French troops, and the fears which their approach had so lately occasioned, were forgotten. But this state of general satisfaction was not destined to be of long continuance.

It has been stated that Ferdinand, instigated perhaps by personal hatred towards Godoy as much as by any other motive, all along declared himself friendly to the wishes of France ; and the line of politics which he had pursued whilst a subject, he did not think it necessary to abandon after he became a sovereign. Though aware of the approach of Murat's army, the first use which he made of power, was to order Solano's corps back to its former quarters in Portugal ; to countermand the return of the divisions of Caraffa and Taranco ;

and to dismiss the whole body of troops which late events had drawn around the capital, to their original stations. Madrid was thus left almost without a garrison, and the very heart of the kingdom laid open to the will of the French Marshal.

In the mean while the Grand Duke of Berg was leading his numerous armies, by columns of brigades and divisions, towards Madrid. The columns marched as through an enemy's country, bivouacking every night, and taking all the precautions to secure themselves which are usually taken in a state of war, until they made themselves masters of the chain of mountains which separate Old from New Castile. The officers in command, likewise, having received instructions to that effect, delayed the posts at all the stations, and arrested such bodies of Spanish soldiers as they anywhere met by the way; whilst they industriously gave out, at every town or village through which they passed, that their final destination was the camp of Saint Roche, before Gibraltar.

Proceeding in this order, the advanced-guard reached Boytrajo, where intelligence of the late commotions in the Spanish capital met them. Murat instantly set forward. He took with him only a numerous and brilliant staff, besides one division of the imperial guard, and arrived just in

time to be an eye-witness of Ferdinand's triumphal entry into Madrid. The spectacle was not without its effect upon the mind of the French Marshal. He saw that the feelings of the people were all in favour of their new prince; and he probably anticipated, even then, the occurrence of some such events as in a few days afterwards came to pass.

Beauharnois filled, at this time, the office of ambassador to the court of Spain. It was but natural that Ferdinand should appeal both to him and to the Emperor's lieutenant for a recognition of his new title; but neither Beauharnois nor Murat had received any instructions on the subject. No sooner, however, was a sufficient body of French troops at hand, than both the one and the other began to give evidence that their master was by no means prepared to view with a friendly eye the revolution which had just occurred. Ferdinand was neither visited nor alluded to by them under any other title than that of Prince of Asturias. A correspondence in the country was opened with his father and mother, whose personal safety was provided for by the substitution of a French guard at Aranjuez, in lieu of the Spanish troops which had hitherto done duty there. These proceedings on the part of the French diplomatists could not but alarm Ferdinand; but his alarm was grievously augmented,

when day after day passed by, and no answer arrived to the letters which he had addressed to Napoleon, informing him of the changes which had placed him upon the throne of Spain. At last it was communicated to him that the Emperor in person was on his way to Madrid, for the purpose of acting as an arbiter in the divisions which unhappily reigned within the bosom of his family; and the communication was accompanied by suggestions, a too ready compliance with which brought matters to an issue.

The sword of Francis I, which had hung in the *armoria real* since the date of the battle of Pavia, was demanded by Murat, in the name of the Emperor his master. Ferdinand was not sorry to have found so good an opportunity of evincing his deference to the wishes of the man on whose protection he relied; and he gave up the weapon at once, with a suitable compliment, to its new owner. Then followed a recommendation that the Infant Don Carlos, his brother, should proceed a few days' journey towards the frontier, to meet the Emperor. To that hint, likewise, the most prompt attention was paid. But the next implied a measure, of which even Ferdinand doubted the wisdom; and it required more than an ordinary degree of persuasion to overcome his reluctance to its adoption. The ambassador Beauharnois represented that it would be particularly agreeable to

his master, if Ferdinand would consent to go as far as Burgos to receive him. Ferdinand wavered long, between the dictates of his hopes and his fears; and it was only when the arrival of a new actor on the stage turned the balance, that he gave a reluctant consent. Assured by General Savary, who professed to be little else than an avant courier to the Emperor, that Napoleon was actually on the road; that he had left him so near Bayonne as to render his arrival at Burgos by this time certain; and, that if Ferdinand entertained any hopes of being recognised as King of Spain, he must take care to give the most satisfactory proofs of his desire to obey the wishes of the man in whose hands his destiny lay;—assured of all this, he judged it imprudent any longer to hesitate; and in spite of the remonstrances and entreaties of his own most faithful counsellors, the memorable journey was determined upon. It began on the 10th of April, and it ended on the 20th; leaving this ill-fated prince a prisoner in Bayonne.

Previous to his departure, Ferdinand had appointed a supreme junta, to direct the affairs of the nation during his absence; at the head of which was his uncle, the Infant Don Antonio. He was hardly gone, when Murat addressed to this body a requisition, that the Prince of the Peace should be set at liberty. The junta, afraid either to refuse or grant the request, referred him to the

sovereign. Murat was indignant at the reply. He threatened to force the prison, and to put the troops who guarded it to the sword, in case they should presume to offer any opposition to his will; and the junta felt that they possessed no means of hindering that threat from being carried into execution. Godoy was given up to the French, and, like his rival Ferdinand, conveyed to Bayonne.

The next removals which took place were of the old sovereigns, whom it required no very urgent entreaties, nor any depth of policy, to expatriate. Charles had already protested against his abdication, as having been effected by compulsion; and thrown himself upon the justice and honour of Napoleon for redress. He was advised to seek the Emperor himself, and to plead his cause before him in person; and he readily adopted the suggestion. Charles and the Queen arrived at Bayonne exactly ten days later than their son.

Of the extraordinary and disgraceful scenes which followed these extraordinary movements, it is not necessary in this place to enter into a particular account. The world will not readily forget transactions which were marked by the most shameless violation of all laws, human and divine, in every individual who took a part in them. A mother demanding the death of her own son, and proclaiming her own infamy in hatred to her-child, is a spectacle which has not often been presented

before the eyes of the public ; nor has it frequently been called upon to witness duplicity carried to the length to which it was carried by Napoleon and his agents. Such things stand in no need of being detailed frequently.

In the mean while, affairs were every day assuming a more alarming aspect in Spain. Though there was not, as yet, open insurrection in any quarter, cases of individual quarrels were very frequent between the inhabitants and the French soldiery ; and no trifling quantity of blood was shed on the one side as well as on the other. The French, no longer caring to conceal that the claims of Ferdinand would never be recognised by their master, only provoked the Spaniards to indulge the more frequently in cries of "Ferdinand for ever !" till the adherents of that prince came to regard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as the personal enemies of the intruders. To so great lengths were these feelings carried at Toledo, that a general commotion seemed at hand, and nothing but the prompt arrival of Dupont, with a strong division of troops from Aranjuez, preserved the public tranquillity. But events were by this time in rapid progress, which brought in their train that universal opposition to French influence, which no efforts were ever afterwards able to overcome.

There remained at Madrid, towards the end of

April, no other members of the royal family, except the Queen of Etruria, her children, her brother the Infant Don Francisco de Paulo, and Don Antonio, the head of regency; and the Grand Duc of Berg received a letter from Charles IV, desiring that they likewise should be forwarded to Bayonne. When this letter arrived, the people of Madrid were in a state of the most violent excitement, brought on by certain rumours of the proceedings of the congress at Bayonne, which not all the vigilance of Napoleon or his servants could hinder from getting abroad. Men, women, and children, might daily be seen in crowds about the post-office, anxiously waiting for some fresh intelligence; and if the courier chanced, on any occasion, to be delayed, the symptoms of dissatisfaction exhibited on all sides were of the most appalling kind. The inhabitants of Madrid were in this frame of mind, when the determination of Murat with respect to the Regent and his relatives was communicated to them. The people protested that Don Antonio should not be taken from them; but in spite of these appearances the preparations for his departure continued to go on. It was now the 1st of May, and for the last two days no post had arrived. On the 2nd, a similar reply met those who again assembled at the post-office; whilst it was rumoured that the royal carriages were already harnessed, and that the princes were pre-

paring to set out. The people ran to the palace, cut the traces by which the horses were fastened, and forced back the carriages into the stable-yard; and an aide-de-camp of Murat happening to pass at the moment, they loaded him with insults and execrations. The aide-de-camp resented this treatment, and words were instantly followed by blows. And now began a tragedy which Spain will long retain in her recollection, not only because of the blood of her citizens which was shed, but because of the results which sprang out of it, and the arduous struggle of which it was the forerunner. But this, like the transactions at Bayonne, is too generally known to stand in need of minute relation. It is sufficient to observe that the firing continued for nearly three hours, with considerable slaughter on both sides; that it was not till after the most strenuous exertions of the authorities, both Spanish and French, that order was restored; and that it proved by no means the least distressing thing to the people of Madrid, that a combat which had already cost thus dear, should be followed by a multitude of indiscriminate military executions.

The immediate effect of the operations of this bloody day was to strike with a momentary terror the inmates of the capital; a sensation of which the French failed not to make the most, by circulating proclamations that spoke a language of

mingled threatening and conciliation. The Infant Don Francisco departed, as soon as order was restored, for Bayonne; and he was followed within four-and-twenty hours by Don Antonio. The latter, indeed, voluntarily expressed a wish to share *the fortunes of the King his nephew*; because he felt that, for the management of affairs so perilous as those which were around him, he was totally unfitted. His departure was followed by the admission of the Grand Duke of Berg as a member into the council of regency; and a few days afterwards the same Grand Duke was, by a decree of Charles IV, nominated to fill the office of president.

The news of the insurrection at Madrid reached Bayonne, at a moment when the Emperor appeared to be busily engaged in an attempt to reconcile Ferdinand to his parents, and his parents to him. He gladly availed himself of it, for the purpose of precipitating the designs which he had long ago formed. As might be expected, the amount of lives sacrificed was magnified greatly, as well by the terror of the Spaniards, as by the policy of the French; and to these exaggerated accounts Napoleon offered no contradiction. On the contrary, he made of them a handle for loading Ferdinand with maledictions. He accused him of being the cause of all this bloodshed, and insisted that he should instantly restore the crown to his

father, from whom he had impiously usurped it. Ferdinand, who at first had displayed some symptoms of courage, sank at last under the invectives of Napoleon. He not only obeyed the mandate, but, in his capacity of Prince of Asturias, affixed his signature to the deed by which Charles IV in his own name, and in the name of his family, resigned the sovereignty of Spain into the hands of the Emperor of the French. A similar proceeding was followed by the rest of the princes. They gave up their rights for ever, and declared, in a published document, that the Spanish nation could not evince its affection for their race in a manner more satisfactory, than by paying a ready obedience to the sovereign, whoever he might be, that should be appointed to succeed them.

Whether Ferdinand had foreseen the lengths to which matters would be carried, or whether he only expected to be detained for a time in captivity in France, does not appear; but immediately previous to the grand catastrophe, he wrote, and despatched by a trusty messenger, a letter of instructions to the council of regency. In it he declared that his actions were no longer free, and that it was impossible for him, situated as he was, to attend to the honour of the throne, or the welfare of the country. He therefore granted to the junta unlimited powers, permitting it to remove whithersoever it would, and in his

name to exercise all the authority of the sovereign. He recommended that a general cortes should assemble with as little delay as possible, for the purpose of adopting such measures as might appear most conducive to the public good; and he positively required that the removal of his person into the interior of France, should be the signal for the commencement of hostilities. That letter was conveyed by one who, for greater security, performed the bulk of his journey on foot. It was faithfully delivered to the junta; but as it reached its destination two days later than the official account of Ferdinand's resignation, the junta decreed that they were not authorised in paying to it any obedience. On the contrary, they showed themselves to be the ready and willing tools of the Emperor's lieutenant, who accordingly proceeded to order all things in the kingdom as he judged most conducive to his master's interests.

The first and great object to be attained in his view of affairs was, to scatter the Spanish army so as to render it ineffective, and to secure the fidelity of the great and important cities of Cadiz and Valencia. For this purpose, the two Swiss regiments cantoned near Madrid, were incorporated with the corps of General Dupont; the body-guards, with four battalions of Spanish and Wal-

loon guards, were placed under the orders of Marshal Moncey; directions were given to prepare an expedition of three thousand men, which might embark without delay for Buenos Ayres; and the Mediterranean fleet, at that time laid up in Port Mahon, was required to proceed at once to Toulon, for the purpose of joining the French squadron. Many changes were likewise ordered in the different garrisons scattered through Catalonia and elsewhere. General Solano, for example, was enjoined to proceed to Cadiz, there to execute his original functions as captain-general of Andalusia; whilst the most strenuous exertions were made to attach to the new order of things General Castanos, whose situation as commandant of the camp at San Roche, furnished him with powerful means either of advancing or thwarting the views of the French Emperor. Nor were other and hardly less important matters neglected. Every magazine of arms and stores throughout the country—every magazine at least which lay within their reach, was seized and appropriated by the French authorities. Preparations were made to fortify and victual the heights of the Retiro, that they might serve as a citadel, to keep the inhabitants of the capital in order; whilst a regular chain of posts between it and the frontier was established. Nothing, in short, was left undone, which ap-

peared in the most remote degree calculated to secure the absolute subjection of Spain; and it was even hinted that, as soon as that great end should have been attained, other and equally gigantic projects would be undertaken.

CHAPTER IV.

General insurrection of the Spanish provinces, and formation of juntas—The junta of Seville peculiarly vigorous and orderly—It assumes the title of Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies—Reduction of the French fleet in the harbour of Cadiz—Expeditions against Seville and Valencia under Dupont and Moncey—Actions at Alcolia and Baylen, and surrender of Dupont's corps—Moncey repulsed from before Valencia—Proceedings at Bayonne, and proclamation of King Joseph—He enters Spain—Battle of Medino del Rio Seco; and arrival of Joseph in Madrid—His flight in consequence of Dupont's capture—An expedition fitted out at Cork sails for the Peninsula—Sir Arthur Wellesley arrives at Corunna, and directs his course towards Portugal—Proceedings in that country—Mutiny of the Spanish garrison of Oporto—Seizure of General Quesnel, and the standard of independence raised—Junot's measures to suppress the revolt.

It has been stated that the details of the eventful 2nd of May reached Bayonne on the 10th; they were not more tardy in making their way through all parts of Spain; and the effect produced by them, from one end of the kingdom to

another, was the same. From the mountains of Arragon to the pillars of Hercules, and from Valencia to Cape Finisterre, there arose one loud and simultaneous shout, "Long live King Ferdinand—Death to the French!" The people thought not of the defenceless state of the country, its frontier towns in the occupation of the enemy, its soldiers dispersed, and its arsenals and treasures plundered. They saw only the degradation to which they were reduced; and they ran to arms with the alacrity of men determined to regain their freedom, or to perish.

Whilst in other provinces a general rising took place, distinguished more by the zeal of those who followed, than by the prudence of, its leaders, a regular form of government, such at least as the state of the times would admit of, was almost instantaneously organized at Seville. On the very day after the insurrection broke out, a junta consisting of twenty-three members, chosen from the principal men of the province, from the nobility, the higher clergy, the general officers and members of the municipal body, met together, and assumed the title of Junta, and Supreme Government of Spain and the Indies. Acting in this capacity, the Supreme Junta proceeded to give directions, that in every town or village which should contain two thousand householders, juntas of six persons should be formed, whose business

it should be to enlist under the national standard all males between the ages of sixteen and forty-five. Messengers were likewise despatched to the captain-general of Cadiz, to General Castanos, commandant of the camps at San Roche; to the cities of Cordova, Grenada, and Jaen; and to all the towns and villages near, to acquaint them with the resolution which had been formed of delivering Spain, and to entreat their best assistance in so just a cause. Light vessels were fitted out and sailed both for the Canaries and South America; commissioners hastened to Algarves and Alentejo, to request the co-operation of the Portuguese; and war, an interminable war, was solemnly declared against France and Napoleon. At the same time, proclamations were circulated, inviting all Italians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, and other foreigners, to abandon the French standard, and promising them the best treatment in the event of their taking service in the armies of Spain. In a word, every thing was done promptly, actively, and vigorously, whilst the most perfect order was preserved; and the new government showed itself not unworthy of the style which it employed, and which by the juntas it was permitted to employ.

Wherever the emissaries of the Supreme Junta appeared, they failed not to stir up among the people a spirit in every respect accordant to that which animated themselves. In Cadiz, the mul-

titude rose upon Solano, whose attachment to Godoy and the French continued unabated; and having dragged him from the house of Mr. Strange, an Irish banker, with whom he had taken shelter, they put him to death in a manner the most ignominious and cruel. Similar scenes were acted in different towns of Spain, whilst as yet the fervour of patriotism was too violent to be guided by reason; and not a few, both of Frenchmen and their adherents, fell a sacrifice to popular fury. But to the honour of Spain be it remembered, that she had suffered long and grievously under her oppressors; and that those who felt the effects of the first effervescence of her wrath, were fewer by far in number, than fell in one day under the regulated *fusilade* of the French garrison of Madrid.

It was, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for Spain, that the first great operations in which her patriot forces embarked, proved most of them successful. At Cadiz, a French fleet of five sail of the line and three frigates, was compelled, after a lengthened cannonade, to surrender at discretion. Two expeditions, simultaneously undertaken—one under General Dupont, for the purpose of securing the obedience of Andalusia; another under Marshal Moncey, designed to establish the new government in Valencia—were defeated; the latter with the loss of a large proportion, the former at the expense of the whole body of troops engaged in it.

As these were among the most brilliant services performed by the Spaniards during the whole of the war, and as they operated powerfully upon its results in other quarters, and in after campaigns, it may not be amiss to give a brief and connected sketch, both of the one and the other.

Nothing had as yet occurred to attract the attention of the conquerors, beyond the murmurs and complaints which resounded from one end of Spain to the other, when General Dupont, at the head of six thousand infantry of the line, five hundred marines of the imperial guard, two Swiss regiments in the service of Spain, about three thousand cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, all well appointed and equipped, set out from Toledo, where, for a month back, he had established his head-quarters. He was directed to rally under his standard as many Spanish troops as he should chance to meet by the way; and he was to be joined at Seville by a brigade of three thousand men detached from the army of Portugal. General Dupont knew of no reason why he should entertain a doubt of the final success of his enterprise: he was ignorant that he was about to enter a country everywhere hostile to him; he therefore moved on without much circumspection, and had no scruple about encumbering his columns with a long train of waggons and cars.

The road from Toledo to Cadiz, the extreme

point which Dupont had been commanded to reach, runs through the plains of La Mancha, over the ridges of the Sierra Morena. There is a bridge upon the Guadalquivir at Andujar, which the traveller passes, and then keeping close to the stream for a considerable distance, he recrosses the same stream at Venta de Alcolia. About a day's journey from this point lies the town of Cordova, on the same side of the river as Andujar; and at a similar distance from it, on the other side, is the town of Jaen. Cordova is built upon the direct road, as well as Cremona and Seville; but as the French army never succeeded in penetrating beyond the first of these places, it will not be necessary to describe, with great minuteness, the topography of the others.

Dupont traversed the plains, and reached the village of Carolina in the mountains, before any symptoms of the kind of reception which awaited him were exhibited. Carolina was almost entirely deserted; and from the reports of the few stragglers who still clung to their houses, it appeared that the men had withdrawn with arms in their hands. Dupont, however, continued his journey: he arrived at Andujar on the second day; and there his doubts, if indeed he entertained any, as to the accuracy of the report which had been made to him, were dispelled. The spirited resolutions of the junta of Seville were

here made known to him ; and he was given to understand that his entrance into Cordova would be disputed by the whole of the male population of the province.

Startled, but not intimidated by this intelligence, Dupont held his course ; causing the soldiers to march with greater circumspection, and covering his front and flanks with skirmishers. He crossed the Guadalquivir without opposition ; but as he approached Alcolia, the point where it behoved him to cross again, he found it occupied in considerable force by the Spaniards. A levy *en masse* had been formed, of which the command was intrusted to Don Pedro Agostino de Echeverria, lieutenant-colonel, and president of the military council of Cordova, for the suppression of smuggling and other crimes in the Sierra Morena ; and supported by three or four thousand soldiers of the line, it was now prepared to dispute with Dupont's army the passage of the river.

The main body of the Spaniards was drawn up along the right bank, so as to cover the bridge, which they had neglected to break down ; but a considerable division, of which some part was cavalry, remained on the left bank for the purpose of taking the enemy in reverse. It is hardly necessary to state that these dispositions, neither justifiable in themselves, nor at all such as the nature of the force employed might have sug-

gested, proved useless. The isolated corps twice attempted to charge, but it was each time repulsed with loss; whilst the bridge and village were both carried at a rush, and the undisciplined peasantry dispersed in every direction. Echeverria, however, rallied his regular troops as soon as they had cleared the village, and began his retreat in tolerable order; but the French cavalry speedily broke in upon them, and the rout became general.

Dupont lost no time in following up the success which he had obtained. He reached Cordova that night; and finding the gates shut, and preparations apparently making for defence, he gave orders that it should be carried by assault. These orders were promptly obeyed. One round from the artillery sufficed to burst the gates, and the troops rushing in pell-mell, swept the streets with a fire of musketry. This was, perhaps, one of the most wantonly cruel acts of violence committed during the war; for the people offered no resistance, only a few random shots having been fired from some of the windows. But it was deemed prudent, in the present condition of affairs, to excite, as far as might be, the terror of the Spaniards; and on this principle Cordova was given up to pillage.

Though he had so far succeeded in his undertaking, Dupont was by no means disposed to con-

sider his present situation as an enviable one. Bands of armed peasantry soon began to gather together, till they hemmed him in on every side; and such was their audacity, that it became impossible for individuals or even small parties to stray to a moderate distance from the camp, without running the risk of being killed or taken. On endeavouring likewise to open a correspondence with Madrid, he found that all means of communication between himself and that city were cut off. It is true that his patrols of cavalry, though pushed as far as Carlota on the road to Seville, encountered no enemy; but rumours of numerous masses in motion, of the advance of one corps from the camp of San Roche, of another from Grenada, and of a third already forming at Eciija, taught him that one such victory as that of Alcolia, was not sufficient to secure the submission of a large and populous province. Under these circumstances he determined, at least for the present, to give up all idea of further conquest, and to establish himself at some point which should at once enable him to re-open his communications with his rear, and place him in a situation to renew, at his own pleasure, offensive operations.

With this view he evacuated Cordova at an early hour on the morning of the 16th of June, and reached Andujar without molestation on the 19th. His next measure was to attempt the dispersion of

a band of armed peasants, who had assembled at Jaen; and who, more than any others, pressed upon his out-posts, and harassed his foraging parties. The troops employed upon that service found no great difficulty in accomplishing it; for the insurgents were poorly organised, and gave way as soon as attacked; but the conquerors went much further than their chief intended them to go, in punishing what they chose to designate as rebellion. General Dupont was desirous that the town of Jaen should pay dearly for its patriotism; but he was still more desirous that it should be left uninjured as a place of shelter, in case of need, to his own army. The victorious detachment committed in it the most horrible excesses, wantonly destroying every morsel of food and every cask of wine, which ought to have gone towards the sustenance of themselves and their comrades.

By these movements Dupont so far bettered his condition, that he was enabled to receive a strong reinforcement under Generals Videt and Gobert, and, to a certain extent, to re-open his communications with the capital; but he was still as far as ever from being safe. The rumours which had alarmed him whilst at Cordova were repeated, with even greater semblance of truth, till he reached Andujar. It was soon ascertained that levies were assembling in every direction around him; and that, unless the passes of the Sierra Mo-

rena were occupied in force, he would be entirely separated from every other corps of French troops in the Peninsula. To occupy these passes, however, by detachments from his own army, was a measure upon which he was afraid to venture; he considered himself barely strong enough to maintain his present position—to divide his strength would be ruinous; but he despatched message after message to Madrid, entreating that he might not be abandoned, and stating, in the plainest language, both the difficulties under which he then laboured, and his apprehensions respecting the future. Of these despatches a few only reached the place of their destination, the remainder being intercepted and carried to the Spanish generals; and as an opinion widely different from his own prevailed at head-quarters respecting the means already at his disposal, no efforts were made to comply with his wishes. It was, at the same time, broadly hinted to him, that to abandon the enterprise on which he had set out, would prove extremely mischievous to the cause, and, as a necessary consequence, bring down upon himself the displeasure of his master.

Dupont had acquired considerable reputation in the wars of Italy and Germany, as a general of division; but never acted before as commander-in-chief of an army. Though the junction of Vidal's division increased the strength of his corps to full

sixteen thousand men, he persisted in keeping it in a state of unaccountable inactivity. Had he moved at once either to the front or to the rear, it is probable he would have carried every thing before him; for it was not till towards the middle of July, that the junta of Seville succeeded in bringing together a force capable of opposing him; but he was unwilling to advance before a further reinforcement, for which he had applied to Marshal Junot, should have come in; whilst to retreat, would be to incur the censure of which he had been already forewarned, and of which he entertained at least an adequate degree of apprehension. He accordingly contented himself with the destruction of the bridges over the Guadalquivir, and the erection of a redoubt here and there along its banks; whilst by occupying Baylen in his rear, and keeping a garrison in the tete-du-pont at Mengibar, he persuaded himself that his position would be amply secured against any attempts which the insurgents could make against it.

Whilst he was thus wasting time, the Spanish government strained every nerve for the purpose of bringing into the field a force adequate, both by its numbers and its discipline, to act on the offensive. Early in July, about thirty thousand men, the greater part of whom were old soldiers, moved towards Andujar. They were commanded by Castanos, who had been recalled for the pur-

pose from the camp at San Roche ; and they numbered among their generals of division two of the most distinguished officers in the Spanish service, General Reding and the Marquis de la Coupigny. Part of this force encountered at Jaen a French brigade under General Cassagne, which had proceeded thither as a sort of advanced-guard from the main army, and after a sanguinary conflict, compelled it to retire. A position was next taken up within cannon-shot of Dupont's lines ; and there a plan was entered into, of which the success proved to be even more complete than the most sanguine could have possibly anticipated.

It was agreed that Castanos with one division should remain where he was, to keep the attention of Dupont, as far as might be practicable, fixed upon a single point. In the mean while General Reding, at the head of eight thousand men, was to force the *tete-du-pont* at Mengibar, to march upon Baylen, and attack the enemy there ; and he was to be supported by the Marquis de la Coupigny, who, from La Heguerita and Villaneuva, was to straighten the left of the French army ; whilst a corps of two thousand men, under Don Juan de la Cruz, was to push for the Sierra Morena, and block up every line of retreat in that direction.

The plan was carried into execution on the 16th of July. Reding assaulted and reduced the redoubt at Mengibar, crossed the Guadalquivir, and

drove in the French posts upon Baylen; but finding that Coupigny had not come up, he fell back again after dark, and repassed the river. As soon as Baylen was known to be in danger, General Videl, with six thousand men, hastened to cover it. He arrived there that night, but he found in it neither friend nor foe; because the Spaniards had already executed their retrograde movement, and General Dufour, who on the fall of Gobert succeeded to the command of the French, had evacuated the place as no longer tenable. Videl was naturally a good deal alarmed at this; and his alarm became greatly increased when it was reported to him that the sound of firing had been heard in the direction of the Sierra Morena. He made up his mind in a moment that Dufour had been driven back upon Carolina, and that, unless he hastened to support him, the retreat upon Madrid would be entirely cut off. Under this persuasion he lost no time in despatching a messenger to Dupont, informing him of what he meant to do, and then proceeded, without allowing his troops a moment to rest, in search of Dufour.

General Videl reached Carolina on the 17th; and on the same day Reding and Coupigny having formed their junction, returned to Baylen. They took peaceable possession of it, and instantly sending to make Castanos aware of their success, desired to be instructed as to their future move-

ments. They were ordered to march forthwith upon Andujar, against which the united efforts of the whole Spanish army were now about to be turned.

The troops had hardly taken their stations on the morning of the 19th, preparatory to this movement, when they found themselves in presence of the advanced-guard of Dupont's corps, which was now in full retreat towards the Sierra Morena. The arrival of Videl's despatch had at length opened the eyes of the French General to the real perils of his situation. He saw that the point from which he had hitherto apprehended an attack, was, comparatively speaking, one of slight importance, and that it was from the rear that danger, if it came at all, was to be apprehended; and he reluctantly determined to abandon Andujar, and to retreat as far at least as La Carolina, from whence other operations could at his leisure be undertaken, either offensively or defensively, as circumstances might point out.

With this design he moved from the town soon after night-fall on the 18th; but as he carried along with him vast multitudes of carriages and waggons, his march was necessarily rendered both slow and straggling. Though the head of his column quitted its ground about ten o'clock, dawn was beginning to appear before the last sections moved off; and when the moment of trial came,

the former were found to be at the distance of nearly three leagues from the latter. It was well for the Spaniards under Reding, that Dupont had deemed it expedient to bestow so much care upon the preservation of his plunder. Had the French moved in compact order, so as to bring the whole of their force into action at once, their enemies, however brave and resolute, could have hardly withstood the shock; for there was no great disparity in point of numbers between them, and the advantages of discipline and experience were all in favour of the French; but this they were not able to effect. On the contrary, regiment after regiment, and gun after gun, were hurried into fire as fast as they came up; the French fought as an army always fights which is taken in detail; and one part was utterly and irretrievably destroyed before another could render it the smallest assistance.

It might be about three o'clock on the morning of the 19th, when the scouts of the French army suddenly fell in with the advance of General Reding's corps. By neither party was the meeting anticipated; but both sides made every disposition which their relative situation and the exigencies of the moment seemed to require. Dupont felt that, unless he made good his passage at once through the force opposed to him, his rear would be assailed by Castanos; and he therefore directed

the leading division to charge the Spaniards, without waiting for the arrival of their comrades. The attack was bravely made, but it was no less bravely resisted; and the affair, after a warm and determined struggle, ended in the repulse of the assailants on all points. Very shortly, fresh troops arrived, including a battalion of the marines of the imperial guard, who renewed the contest with the utmost gallantry; but neither their numbers nor their physical strength, worn down by a night-march, and still further diminished by the rapidity of their advance to the front, were competent to carry them successfully through. The Spaniards were superior to them in every respect, in numbers, in position, and in the quantity and weight of their cannon; and though the French performed prodigies of valour, they were foiled in every effort. At last it was felt by all the officers present that their case was a hopeless one; and just as Castanos arrived upon their rear, and Don Juan de la Cruz took his ground upon their flank, it was determined to request a suspension of arms. The request was immediately complied with. In spite of the arrival of General Videl's corps, which, as soon as the firing was heard, had hastened from Carolina to the assistance of their comrades, the negociation continued; and it ended in the surrender of the whole French army, to the amount of fourteen thousand men, as prisoners of war.

The entire course of the Spanish campaigns produced no victory so decisive, or so influential in its consequences, as this. Not only was Andalusia freed from the presence of the enemy, but a degree of confidence was communicated to the patriots in other quarters, such as they had not previously experienced; and many an individual, who up to that moment had wavered between his duty and his interests, ceased to waver any longer. At Madrid, again, the news of the victory produced a very powerful effect, as well upon the French as upon the patriot party. The latter, who for some time back had dissembled their sentiments, began again to give them vent in national cries and acts of petty disturbance; whilst the former exhibited the liveliest symptoms of alarm, lest the conquerors should follow up their success by marching at once upon the capital. At this time Joseph Napoleon was resident in the city; he had entered it only two days previously, and had scarcely begun to exercise the functions of royalty, when the intelligence came upon him like a thunderbolt; and though conscious of the evils which must necessarily attend the step, he determined to retire for the present upon his resources. He quitted Madrid on the 31st, and issuing orders that all his scattered divisions should follow him, that the siege of Saragoza, then in progress, should be raised, and further

attempts upon Valencia abandoned, he fell back, with the utmost precipitation, beyond the Ebro.

In the mean while the expedition against Valencia was conducted by Marshal Moncey under circumstances not very dissimilar to those which attended the progress of Dupont's operations. When he quitted Madrid on the 4th of June, Moncey was indeed aware that his object was not likely to be accomplished without opposition; and he took his measures, as an able officer might be expected to do when setting out upon an undertaking of doubtful issue. The force which immediately followed his own, amounted to some eight or nine thousand men of all arms; there were in quarters, along his line of march, two battalions of Spanish and Walloon guards, and three companies of the king's body-guards, whom he ordered to join him; and he requested, and obtained a promise, that General Chabran's division, which consisted of five thousand men, and which was then stationed at Barcelona, should be ordered round to Tortosa, and placed at his disposal. With such a force he naturally concluded that any resistance which an armed peasantry could offer, would be easily overcome; and perhaps, had the whole of the force assembled under his standard, these expectations would not have proved groundless.

Moncey reached Cuenca on the 11th, where,

instead of a strong brigade of Spanish troops, he found only the skeletons of a few companies, the rest having deserted to join the cause of the insurgents. He was, as might be expected, both alarmed and disappointed at the event; and he wrote instantly to Madrid, to request that a column might move from that place upon Albacete, in order to cover his right. Not satisfied with this, he despatched an aide-de-camp to General Chabran, to request that he would instantly proceed to Castellar de la Plana, that he would there take under his orders the corps of General Requena, and hurry forward to reinforce his own corps. This done, he halted for eight days, not more to collect his own resources, than to enable his messengers to reach their several points of destination; and then he renewed his march, which was conducted throughout with the utmost caution and circumspection.

The insurrection at Valencia had been attended by circumstances of fearful cruelty, hundreds of innocent French inhabitants falling a sacrifice to the fury of the mob. But it was not in this case as in most others, that they who exhibit the greatest ferocity against people unable to defend themselves, are the first to turn their backs upon danger. The Valencians entered zealously into the national cause; insomuch that, not content to await the approach of the French, they marched

forward to meet them. The first encounter took place at the bridge of Pajazo over the Cabriel, and it ended, as might have been anticipated, in the defeat of the patriots. A second stand was made among the mountains, in the gorge of the principal defile between Siete Aguas and Venta de Bunōl. This position was occupied by two thousand regular infantry, six or seven thousand armed peasants, and twelve pieces of cannon; who did not give way without offering a resolute and lengthened resistance; nor was it till after he had a third time beaten his enemies in the field, that Marshal Moncey found himself in a situation to summon Valencia. But his summons was disregarded. The people were determined to bury themselves under the ruins of their city; and it consequently became necessary to carry the place by assault.

Valencia contained, at that time, a population little short of one hundred thousand souls. It was surrounded by a low stone wall, well flanked by towers and angles, and covered with a ditch, into which, from a canal hard by, water could at any moment be admitted. There was an arsenal in it filled with muskets, swords, and other weapons; and there were a considerable number of heavy cannon mounted upon the ramparts. The easy rate at which Moncey had advanced, enabled the authorities to turn these advantages to a good account; and when the French appeared, the

city was in an excellent condition to receive and repel an assault. Of all this the French were, of course, ignorant; and expecting that no serious opposition would be attempted, they advanced, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th, in columns of attack.

The Spaniards were now in that situation which they have invariably shown themselves best calculated to fill. Covered by their walls, and amply supplied with ammunition, they poured upon the assailants an incessant and heavy shower of musket and cannon balls, which swept down whole companies of men, and disabled the few light pieces which were opposed to it. The French dashed boldly up to the edge of the ditch; some of them even forced their way within the gates; but the fire was so tremendous, and the obstacles thrown in their way so insurmountable, that their disciplined valour availed them nothing. Having kept their ground, under shelter of the houses in the suburbs, till dark, they fell back to their camp, leaving behind them upwards of two thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing.

The result of this day's operations was sufficient to convince Marshal Moncey that any further attempts, with his present force, upon Valencia, would end only in his own destruction. He accordingly determined on a retreat; which, after having manœuvred during the 29th so as to keep

the Spaniards in doubt as to his intentions, he carried, on the 30th, into effect. It was high time for him to adopt this measure. Several corps, composed partly of regular troops, partly of armed peasantry, were forming in his rear; nor was it till he had overthrown some of these, first on the banks of the Xucar, and afterwards in the vicinity of Almanza, that he made good his entrance into Albacete.

Not less gratifying to the friends of freedom was the defence which, much about the same time, the city of Saragoza offered to the attempts of General Le Febvre; and had it not been for the fatal discomfiture at Medina del Rio Seco, the Spaniards would have had no cause to speak with regret of the issues of their first campaign. But that defeat was a severe blow upon the patriot cause; not only because it opened a way to Madrid to the sovereign whom Buonaparte had appointed, but because it contributed to prevent a British army from appearing in the field at a moment and under circumstances which would have rendered its appearance peculiarly fortunate. It will be necessary, however, before entering at all into the narrative of that battle, to give, in few words, an abstract of the transactions which, both in England and at Bayonne, were going on with reference to the mighty contest.

The Spaniards had no sooner raised the standard

of independence, than they felt the necessity of applying to England for aid. The first deputies who arrived for that purpose, were despatched by the principality of the Asturias; and they were followed by a succession of envoys from other provinces, including that of Seville, where the Supreme Junta had established itself. Their reception was such as the nature of the business on which they came, and the disposition of the people to whom they were suitors, might have authorised them to expect. All ranks and classes of men appeared eager to evince their respect for the representatives of a nation engaged in a struggle, sacred, in the eyes of Englishmen, as the object which it sought to attain; and not the government only, but corporate bodies and private individuals, made haste to mark the sense which they entertained of the gallantry and devotion already displayed in the contest.

Subscriptions were opened in most of the large towns in the kingdom, from which considerable sums were realised, and applied to the service of the patriots. All the Spanish prisoners taken during the late war were set at liberty; and being armed, clothed, and equipped, they were transported to their native shores, that they might assist in the great work of liberating their country. Nor did the efforts of Great Britain end there.

Large quantities of muskets, of cannon, balls, powder, and other military stores, were conveyed to different ports of the Peninsula, for the purpose of arming a population which professed to stand in need only of arms to insure success; whilst the admirals on the station, as well as the Governor of Gibraltar, received orders to communicate with the Spanish authorities as often as need be, and to lend every assistance which the latter might require, or the former might be able to afford.

The Spanish deputies, acting in accordance with their instructions, had taken care to assure the British government that Spain required no troops from this country, because every Spaniard capable of wielding a musket was anxious to take the field against the invaders. Notwithstanding these declarations, the British government was too much alive to the important results which hung upon the issues of the struggle, to leave the maintenance of it altogether to the undisciplined valor of the patriots; it determined to support them with an army of British soldiers, and it resolved that the force employed should be such as, without alarming the jealousy or wounding the pride of the patriots, might constitute an efficient nucleus round which larger armies might gather.

The first British force which showed itself upon the theatre of war, consisted of a small division of

infantry and artillery, detached, under the orders of Major-general Spencer, from the fortress of Gibraltar.

It has been stated that the authorities at home, as soon as they were made aware of the state of public feeling in the nations of the Peninsula, issued orders for the cordial co-operation of the governor of that place, as well as the British admirals on the station, in any movements against the French forces which might hold out a prospect of success. Neither Admiral Collingwood, however, nor Sir Hew Dalrymple, had judged it necessary to wait the arrival of these orders. From the first commencement of disturbances in the province of Seville, a constant intercourse had been kept up by both, with the chiefs and leaders of the Spanish insurgents; and as soon as the disposition manifested on the part of the people of Cadiz became known, an armament both of ships and troops was prepared to support it. Major-general Spencer, with several English and two Sicilian regiments, amounting in all to about five thousand men, embarked on board of a fleet of transports, and covered by the squadron of Lord Collingwood, set sail for Cadiz. The joint proposal of these officers to assist in the subjugation of the French fleet was indeed declined, the Spaniards being confident in their own resources, and perhaps entertaining some apprehension lest the

views of the allies might extend further than to the aid proposed; but General Morla gladly availed himself of the presence of the British corps to cover the rear of Castanos's army, and to secure it against any attack from the side of Alentejo, whilst prosecuting the plan of operations on which it had embarked. General Spencer accordingly landed his division at Ayamonte, on the Guadiana. By this movement he caused certain reinforcements, which Dupont had earnestly requested from Junot, and which had begun their march for the purpose of joining him, to fall back with precipitation upon Lisbon; and though he steadily refused to commit himself with the Spanish columns, which were gradually enclosing the French troops at Baylen, he nevertheless gave all the additional vigour to their councils, which arose from the knowledge that, in case of any reverse, there was a point behind them on which they could safely fall back.

Whilst the naval and military commanders in the Mediterranean were thus exerting themselves, an effort was made in the north, and made with the most complete success, to restore to the service of his country one of the ablest officers of which Spain could at that time boast. One of Buonaparte's first measures, when meditating the subjugation of the Peninsula, was to demand from Spain a corps of sixteen thousand veteran troops,

whom, under the Marquess de la Romana, he employed for a time upon the banks of the Vistula, and afterwards removed to the shores of the Great Belt. They were distributed at different points in that district, when the standard of independence was raised; and one of the earliest measures of the Supreme Junta was to issue a proclamation, calling upon them, in the name of their country, to return to its defence. This was necessarily consigned to the care of the British cruisers; and it was not given to them in vain. A scheme for its delivery, as well as for the removal of the soldiers, should they, as it was believed they would, desire to comply with its terms, was immediately devised in London; and the execution of it was committed to Vice-admiral Keats, an officer well worthy of the trust. It succeeded to admiration; and seven thousand men, with Romana at their head, were transferred from the ranks of the enemy, and added, at a moment of peculiar interest, to those of the patriot army.

It was not, however, by such assistance alone, that the cause of Spain and of Europe could be effectually forwarded; and to such assistance the British government was not disposed to limit itself. The wisdom, or rather the necessity under which England lay, of striking a great blow, now that the very field of action which she had so long desired was opened to her, could not escape the penetra-

tion of the most obtuse-minded ; and preparations began to be made for carrying on hostilities by land, on a scale which had never before been attempted since the commencement of the war.

In the early part of the summer, and before any expectation had arisen of the events which afterwards occurred, a corps of nine thousand men had assembled at Cork, under the orders of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley. Of General Wellesley's early services, and of the reputation which he had already earned for himself, it is not necessary in this place to take any notice. It is sufficient to observe that there was not an officer in the army, to whom both the profession and the nation at large would have more readily intrusted the command of a force which required courage of the highest order, and ability in the most extensive sense of the term, in its direction ; and that his past conduct, both in Europe and in India, fully justified all classes in the opinion which they had formed ; whilst his nomination and selection immortalised the judgment of that minister who laid his name before the King for the command. With what view the corps in question began to concentrate itself, was not, at the moment, accurately known. By some, an attack upon Cuba was spoken of as in meditation ; by others, a fresh attempt upon Buenos Ayres was represented as more probable ; but whatever the object might

be which the armament was originally intended to serve, of that object the recent events in Spain caused an immediate abandonment. General Wellesley was directed to proceed without delay to the assistance of England's new ally; and as the northern provinces held out, in many respects, the greatest facilities for a British force to act with effect, the port of Corunna was specified as a convenient point from which to commence his operations.

In the mean while, Napoleon was following up, with all the vigour of mind which so peculiarly distinguished him, the first steps which he had taken towards the establishment of a prince of his own blood upon the throne of Spain. The abdication of Charles IV, and the resignation of the rights of his family, were speedily proclaimed to Spain, and to the world; and it was further announced that the Emperor, anxious to insure the glory and integrity of the Spanish monarchy, had determined to waive his own pretensions in favour of Joseph, King of Naples. But Napoleon was desirous, not only that his brother should reign, but that he should have the appearance of reigning over a free and a contented people; and the cortes was, in consequence, invited to assemble, for the purpose of framing a constitution which might insure to the Spaniards the blessing of just laws.

and an equitable administration of them, among all ranks and classes of men.

The proceedings of the body which, under the appellation of an Assembly of Notables, met together in obedience to the summons of Buonaparte, have been so often laid before the public, that to repeat them here would be to waste time for very little purpose. Let it suffice to state that, towards the end of May, and during the first days of June, there arrived in Bayonne upwards of ninety persons, all that could be collected together out of one hundred and sixty who had been deputed; that they were, with few exceptions, men distinguished for their rank, their talents, or for the stake which they held in the country; and that, after many mock sittings and deliberations, they accepted Joseph as their sovereign, and drew up the charter which was to form the basis of his system of government. This done, Joseph was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies in due form. He nominated his ministers, appointing to office not only those upon whose fidelity he felt that he might depend, but many on whose acquiescence in the new arrangements he had no right to calculate, but whom he trusted, by this show of clemency and consideration to gain over to his party; and on the 10th of July, surrounded by the members of his council, he passed the Bidassoa.

At the moment when Joseph commenced his journey towards Madrid, the armies of Marshal Bessieres on the one hand, and of Cuesta and Blake on the other, were executing that series of movements and manœuvres which ended in the disastrous battle of Medina del Rio Seco. For some time previous, the northern provinces of Spain had been the scene of numerous skirmishes and encounters, to enter into a minute detail of which would be altogether foreign to the design of the present work. In the course of these, the usual quantity of enormities were committed on both sides. As often as a few stragglers from the French army, or the French inhabitants of a Spanish town, fell into the hands of an enraged peasantry, they were put to death with circumstances of peculiar cruelty; whilst the French failed not to avenge these excesses, by giving up to plunder, and levelling with the ground, every town or village which ventured to oppose their progress. On the latter principle, because a few hundred half-armed men presumed to defend it, Logrono was severely visited; Torquemada was destroyed; and Palencia escaped a similar fate, only by the haste of its dignitaries in giving in their submission. The focus of the insurrection, however, was known to be Valladolid, a city which contained upwards of twenty-five thousand inhabitants; and against it Bessieres, whose head-

quarters were established at Burgos, gave orders that an expedition should be formed.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, an old, brave, but headstrong officer, commanded, at this time, an assemblage of undisciplined peasantry, with whom he seemed determined to make a stand in defence of Valladolid. He was one of those who, at the commencement of the troubles, not only gave no encouragement to the feelings of the people, but exerted himself to allay them; either because he was satisfied that successful resistance would be impracticable, or that in the changes which a revolution could not fail to bring about, many substantial benefits would accrue to the nation at large. As soon, however, as he became satisfied that it was the nation which had risen in arms, he hastened to make amends for his former backwardness, and entered heartily into the cause, which he now regarded as that of his country. It was somewhat remarkable that Cuesta was among the number of those who held office both under Ferdinand and under Joseph. By the former he had been appointed captain-general of Castile and Leon, an authority which he actually exercised; whilst by the latter he was nominated to the viceroyalty of Mexico, at the very moment when his better judgment led him to draw the sword against the power which desired to promote him.

General Cuesta, with his half-armed rabble,

took up a position at Cabezon, about two leagues from Valladolid. He was attacked there on the 12th of June by two divisions of the French army, one under General Lassalle, the other under General Merle; and after a short but warm contest, was dislodged and overthrown, with the loss of all his cannon, and nearly one thousand men. The immediate consequences of this victory were, not only the submission of Valladolid to the conquerors, but the occupation of Santander; the latter being a place of which they were peculiarly jealous, because of its excellent harbour. But Cuesta, though defeated, was far from being discouraged. He withdrew with the remains of his force to Benevente; where he employed himself in raising new levies, and in giving some appearance of organisation to those which were already enrolled under his standard.

It was not long before intelligence reached Bessieres, not only that Cuesta's troops were re-assembling, but that a considerable army which had been formed under Blake, in the province of Galicia, was about to advance against him. Bessieres issued orders for the concentration of all his forces at Palencia, with the exception of three battalions, which were left to protect Santander, and a like number at Vittoria, to keep open the communication with France. He himself, likewise, prepared to take the field; and having

learned that Cuesta and Blake were actually in conjunction, and that they had taken up a position at Medina del Rio Seco, he set out, on the 13th of July, for the purpose of bringing them to action.

The battle of Medina del Rio Seco was fought on the 14th of July. It ended, as the reader knows, in the utter rout of the Spaniards; over whom, however, the victory was not won, till all the energies of the conquerors had been brought into play, and a heavy loss sustained, in killed and wounded, on both sides. The Spaniards appear, even by the confession of their enemies, to have fought well on that day; and their defeat may be attributed, rather to a want of judgment in their leaders, than to any absence of courage among the troops. Yet were the issues of the struggle of the most disastrous nature. Fifteen pieces of cannon, and upwards of six thousand men, were left upon the field; whilst the road was completely laid open to the invaders as far as the capital. But even these, though heavy calamities, were not all which may be traced back to the defeat at Rio Seco. It was at this unlucky moment that the British army, destined to support the patriot cause, set sail from the harbour of Cork; and its General reached Corunna only in time to be told that there was no longer a field for its operations in the north of Spain.

The army in question having completed its arrangements, put to sea on the 12th of July. After continuing with the fleet only a few hours, Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was embarked in a fast-sailing frigate, hastened on, and arrived at Corunna on the 20th. He lost no time in opening a correspondence with the junta of Galicia, from whom he received the distressing intelligence of the overthrow of their army; and by whom he was assured that, the enemy being now in possession of the course of the Douro, all communication between that province and those to the south and east, was cut off. There is reason to believe that in this dilemma, and because they still persisted in believing that Spain stood in no need of men, but of arms and money only, they recommended to him the propriety of effecting a debarkation somewhere in Portugal, and acting in conjunction with the insurgents there against the corps of Marshal Junot; and as the advice accorded perfectly with the tenor of his instructions, as well perhaps as with his own views, Sir Arthur prepared to adopt it. Having supplied the Gallicians with 200,000*l.* in money, and assured them of the speedy arrival of a large quantity of military stores, he once more put to sea; and directing his own fleet to follow him thither, made at once for the harbour of Oporto.

Of the political condition in which Portugal

then stood, a few words will suffice to convey to the mind of the reader a tolerably accurate idea. The discontent which has been represented in a former chapter, as prevailing among all ranks of men, increased in violence every day, till it became manifest to every observer that a general insurrection was at hand. It was not, however, till the whole of Spain was in arms, nor indeed till the Spanish troops which accompanied Junot's army had set them the example, that the Portuguese ventured to raise the standard of revolt; but when it was raised, the same spirit of perseverance—the same determination to live or die in freedom, which was already in the full exercise of its energies among their neighbours, appeared everywhere to animate them.

Notwithstanding the numerous private quarrels which arose in parts of the kingdom, and the occasional bursts of hatred against the intruders which from time to time showed themselves both in the capital and elsewhere, Junot persisted in representing—perhaps in believing—that the Portuguese were brought completely into subjection, till the delusion became suddenly dispelled in a manner which was far from being satisfactory. In the month of June two detachments, to consist of four thousand men each, were demanded from the army of Portugal; one for the purpose of supporting Bessieres by the occupation of Ciudad

Rodrigo; the other to co-operate with Dupont in taking possession of Andalusia. The first of these, under Loison, having advanced as far as Rodrigo, and finding the whole country in arms, and the gates of the place shut, suspended its operations, and fell back; the second under Avril, was not more fortunate in its undertakings. Badajoz had declared for King Ferdinand; the whole of the frontier was in arms; and the Spaniards and Portuguese, of whom a considerable number were attached to his division, deserted by whole companies. Besides, General Spencer, with his five thousand English, lay between him and the point which he had been ordered to reach, and General Avril abandoned his enterprise. But such misfortunes were trifling when compared to others which shortly followed.

No great while elapsed before the agents of the Supreme Junta found means to communicate both to the Spanish corps, which, under Quesnel, occupied Oporto, and to Caraffa's division in Lisbon, the course which events had taken both at Bayonne and Madrid. The intelligence was received by the troops with the utmost indignation. In Oporto, they rose at once upon the General; arrested him with his staff and his escort; and having given up the city into the hands of the municipal authorities, marched away to join their countrymen in Galicia. In Lisbon they were only

prevented from adopting a similar course by the promptitude and decision of Junot. Instantly on the news from Oporto being reported to him, he caused the whole of Caraffa's corps to be arrested and disarmed ; and putting them on board of certain hulks which lay at anchor in the Tagus, he kept them there as prisoners. But the impetus to a general revolt was given ; the match was already laid to the train, and no exertions on the part of the French functionaries could hinder it from exploding.

On the first impulse of the moment, the authorities at Oporto cast Quesnel into prison, tore down the French flag, and hoisted the national standard in its place. By degrees, however, they became alarmed at the boldness of their own proceedings ; and seeing themselves deserted by the Spaniards, they began to devise schemes for averting the vengeance of the French General. Don Luiz d'Oliveira, into whose hands the temporary power had been intrusted, betrayed that trust so far as to write, in terms unworthy of a Portuguese, to Junot, and to restore the tri-coloured flag to its former position ; whilst he endeavoured, by various acts of kindness towards the French, to make amends for the violence which they had suffered a few days before. But a spirit had gone abroad in other quarters, which soon renewed in the inhabitants of Oporto that hatred of their oppressors

of which they had already given some proof; and the cry of "Death to the French—Long live the Regent!" resounded through the streets. These cries were speedily followed by a second declaration of independence. Oliveira was put to death; and a junta having formed itself, in imitation of that of Seville, proceeded, with the venerable bishop at its head, to issue proclamations, and to call upon all good Portuguese to unite against the common enemy.

The appeal of the junta was heard throughout the whole kingdom; and it was everywhere obeyed. The students at the University of Coimbra were among the first to take up arms; the peasantry of *Tras os Montes* were not less on the alert; *Algarves* was in open revolt, and the *Alentejo* ripe for insurrection. That which he had long apprehended, Junot saw at length in progress, and proceeding with a violence and energy which threatened to set all endeavours to suppress it at defiance; but Junot was not a man to succumb under difficulties, however imminent. He set himself vigorously to the task of allaying the general ferment; and he applied to that object not force alone, but all the expedients of flattering harangues and conciliatory measures.

His first act was to remit what had not been paid of the contribution formerly imposed upon the people. He next affected to take the Portu-

guese troops under his especial care, augmenting their pay, discharging their arrears, and appearing to place the utmost reliance upon their fidelity and valour; and he did his best to amuse the inhabitants of Lisbon, by a renewal of the processions and religious festivals to which they had in former times been accustomed. But whilst he pursued this course in his more general measures, he was not unmindful of the policy of striking terror by particular examples; and he set on foot a multitude of separate expeditions, with the view of crushing the rebellion in each of the towns or districts where it might appear to rage with the greatest violence. On that errand Loison, who had returned to Lisbon, was despatched against Oporto, at the head of three battalions of infantry and several squadrons of horse; Thomieres was directed to reduce Fort Nazareth; whilst Kellerman was sent to insure the obedience of Villa Franca, Alcoentre, and Alcobaça. These are but a few of the expeditions which the Duke of Abrantes found it necessary to fit out, of which some were attended with momentary success, whilst others entirely failed. But even the successes of the French proved of little solid utility to them. As long as an armed force was at hand, to oppose which no means existed, a town, or village, or even a district, would remain quiet,—the very next instant after the troops were withdrawn, all

became again tumult and commotion. Junot saw and felt his embarrassments keenly; but the moment was now rapidly approaching which promised to bring these difficulties to a head. Rumours were in hourly circulation of the coming of a British army, and at last it was officially communicated that a British army had landed.

CHAPTER V.

Arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oporto—His conference with the junta—The transports assemble off Mondego, and the troops are landed—Strange conduct of General Freire and the Portuguese army—Junot takes measures to oppose the progress of the English, and calls in his detachments—Delaborde retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley—Battle of Loriça—Arrival of General Anstruther on the coast—March of the British army to Vimiero—Sir Harry Burrard arrives in the offing—Is visited by General Wellesley; but refuses to sanction an advance—The British attacked by Junot's army—Battle of Vimiero.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, as soon as he had closed his correspondence with the junta of Galicia, and directed the transports which conveyed his troops to rendezvous at the mouth of the Mondego, proceeded in person to Oporto, for the purpose of arranging some plan of campaign with the government of that place, or, as it then termed itself, the Supreme Junta of Portugal. He was received by the bishop, as head of the body, with every ap-

pearance of cordiality ; and all the supplies of different kinds of which he stood in need, including draft cattle of various descriptions, were readily promised to him ; but when he proposed to effect a landing there, and to co-operate with the garrison in a movement upon the capital, a variety of objections were started to the measure. It was suggested that, by landing on some part of the coast nearer to Lisbon, Junot might be attacked before all or even most of his detachments, at that moment scattered through the country, could be called in ; whilst the Portuguese in Oporto would be ready to intercept his retreat, in case he should endeavour to make any movement towards Galicia. How far Sir Arthur was swayed by this reasoning, it would be presuming to pronounce ; a communication from Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, it is believed, determined him to seek a point of landing elsewhere ; and he followed his transports to the appointed place of meeting in Mondego Bay.

On his arrival there, he found that important despatches from England were waiting for him. By these, he was informed that fresh troops *might be expected to join his army every moment* ; one division being already embarked at Ramsgate under Brigadier-general Anstruther, whilst another was assembling at Harwich ; but it was at the same time intimated to him that Sir Hew

Dalrymple had received orders to proceed from Gibraltar in the character of commander-in-chief; Sir Harry Burrard had been nominated as second; and Sir John Moore, who had just returned from the Baltic with a corps of ten thousand men, was likewise to serve in Portugal. In spite of these arrangements, however, Sir Arthur was enjoined to make good his landing, whenever a favourable opportunity should offer, and to enter at once upon any series of operations, for the successful accomplishment of which he might judge himself sufficiently strong.

In obedience to these instructions, and having conferred with Sir Charles Cotton, General Wellesley issued orders for the immediate disembarkation of his corps at the mouth of the Mondego. A fast-sailing vessel was at the same time despatched, to require the immediate junction of General Spencer and his division; and every arrangement having been made, the landing began. A strong west wind and a violent surf rendered this both a tedious and a perilous operation, several boats being swamped, and some men, both sailors and soldiers, perishing among the breakers; but after four days of severe fatigue, the force was disembarked, including the division of General Spencer, which arrived just as the last division began to leave their transports. The whole British army, amounting to rather more

than thirteen thousand men, bivouacked on the 8th of August on the beach.

Whilst the British force was thus employed, General Bernardin Freire arrived at Coimbra with about seven thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry of the Portuguese army, for the purpose of joining and co-operating with Sir Arthur Wellesley. These were, for the most part, wretchedly armed, and their discipline had attained to no higher degree of excellence, than usually attends raw levies suddenly called out, and as suddenly embodied; they were not therefore likely to add much to the real strength, whilst they would draw heavily upon the supplies of the invaders. Nevertheless, as it was advisable upon political grounds that the Portuguese should accompany the English in their present undertaking, it was arranged between the Generals, that both corps should move in the direction of the capital, and that they should form a junction on the 11th or 12th at the town of Leira.

In accordance with this arrangement, the advanced-guard of Sir Arthur's army began its march on the 9th of August. It consisted of some companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th regiments, supported by the brigades of Major-general Hill and Major-general Ferguson; and it was followed on the day after by the whole of the corps. The men marched with sixty rounds of

ammunition in their cartouch-boxes, and provisions of meat, biscuit, &c. in their haversacks, sufficient for the consumption of three days ; and the column was followed by a string of mules, bearing stores of every kind. No troops ever took the field in higher spirits, or in a state of more perfect discipline. Confident in their leader, likewise, and no less confident in themselves, they desired nothing more ardently than to behold their enemy : for even thus early in the war, it was the custom of a British soldier to admit of no apprehensions as to the issue of a battle. The entire strength of the corps made up barely thirteen thousand three hundred men ; there were attached to it two hundred cavalry of the 20th light dragoons ; and its artillery mustered in all eighteen pieces.

The troops arrived in Leira, without having met with any opposition, on the 11th and 12th, and they were received by the inhabitants with enthusiastic rapture, as by persons who had long groaned under oppression, and at last beheld their deliverers. On the same day, General Freire's corps made its appearance ; but the General himself had lost that zeal for sharing in the glorious enterprise before them, which seemed to animate him during his late conference with Sir Arthur Wellesley. He began by doubting whether it would be practicable to find supplies for both armies on the same

line of march ; and he ended by requiring, as the price of his adherence to the British standard, that Sir Arthur Wellesley should subsist him and his troops from the stores of the English commissary. This was a demand with which the English General could not, of course, comply. He represented that his army, fresh from a voyage, and liable to be separated at any moment from its ships, instead of being able to furnish provisions to the troops of the country, would, in all probability, be compelled to draw upon the country for its own supplies ; and he expressed his astonishment that any such unreasonable expectation should have been formed. The discussion was maintained for some time with much forbearance on the side of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and with a degree of obstinacy on that of Freire, for which it was not very easy to account ; and it ended at length in the latter declaring his determination to withdraw himself entirely from all share in the intended series of operations. With some difficulty he was prevailed upon to leave a brigade of infantry and two hundred and fifty horse with the British army ; but the remainder he positively prohibited from moving.

Notwithstanding this exhibition of the kind of aid which he might expect from his allies, Sir Arthur determined to lose no time in prosecuting the undertaking which he had begun. From all apprehensions on the side of Spain, the intelligence

of the victory of Baylen, and of the consequent flight of Joseph from Madrid, completely freed him; and he still hoped, notwithstanding the well-known activity of the French generals, that he might be enabled to engage Junot before Loison should have had time to join him. Under this persuasion, he renewed his march on the 13th, and on the 14th reached Alcobaça, the enemy having evacuated it during the preceding night; and on the 15th his head-quarters were established at Caldas.

It has been said that, at the moment when intelligence of the landing of the British army reached Marshal Junot, his troops were scattered over many districts of Portugal, with the view of extinguishing, as fast as they appeared, the first sparks of rebellion, and putting in a state of defence such fortified posts as remained in the hands of the French. Among other generals, Loison and Thomieres, each with his division, had departed from Lisbon—the former, for the purpose of quieting the Alentejo, and relieving Elvas, already blockaded by the Spaniards; the latter, to overawe Coimbra, and reduce Fort Nazareth. Of these, Thomieres was instantly recalled; and his brigade being added to that of General Delaborde, the latter officer was directed to advance towards Mondego, that he might watch the movements of the English, and, as far as he was able, retard

their progress. General Loison was likewise called in, Junot urging him by letter, when proposing to bombard Badajoz, "to abandon all his projects, and to hasten, without delay, to Abrantes." But though he made every possible exertion, leaving behind him multitudes of sick and weary whom he found it impossible to drag along, he failed in joining Delaborde in sufficient time to prove of any essential service; for Delaborde, in obedience to the orders of his chief, marched down at the head of five or six thousand men towards the coast. As the English advanced, he gradually fell back, manifesting, however, no disinclination to risk an action, whenever the nature of the ground should authorise the measure; and it was not long before a fitting opportunity presented itself. It was the rear-guard of his column which retired from Caldas on the evening preceding the day of Sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival; and on the following morning the two armies were in sight of one another.

A trifling skirmish had occurred at Obidos on the 15th, between four companies of British riflemen and the French outposts, in which some lives were lost on both sides, and no very decided advantage obtained on either. On the 16th, again, all was quiet; Sir Arthur devoting that day to the arrangement of his own plans, and to the institution of strict and accurate inquiries as to the

situation of General Loison. He likewise reconnoitred the position which General Delaborde had assumed, and found it to be one of extraordinary strength and difficulty; indeed, its selection reflected the highest credit upon the military talents of that officer, as the following tolerably accurate description of its locality may serve to prove.

The villages of Caldas and Roliça are built north and south from each other, at the opposite extremities of an immense valley, which opens out largely towards the west; and midway between them stands the little town of Obidos, with its splendid aqueduct and its Moorish castle. Roliça itself crowns an eminence, which again is flanked on the one hand by a range of hills, on the other by rugged mountains; by the very mountains, indeed, which bend round to girdle in the vale or basin, of which notice has just been taken. Immediately in front of it there is a sandy plain, not, perhaps, in the strictest meaning of the term, woody, but studded with low firs and other shrubs; and in its rear are four or five passes, which lead through the mountains. This was the situation in which Delaborde saw fit to await the approach of the English army. His outposts, driven in from Obidos, extended now along the plain to the hills on both sides of the valley; and his line was formed on the high ground in front of the village, so as that both its flanks might rest,

one upon the mountains, the other upon a steep eminence. Of his force it is not easy to speak with confidence, the writers of different nations having made different estimates of it; but by Sir Arthur Wellesley it was computed at six thousand men; and there is no reason to believe that his judgment was formed on mistaken grounds. Be this, however, as it may, there it stood presenting a bold front to its enemies; and covering the passes by which, in case of a reverse, its retreat might at any moment be made good, or a new position seized in the mountains.

Every necessary order having been issued, and every man made aware on the evening of the 16th of the business in which he was about to be employed, the troops on the following morning stood to their arms; and just as day began to dawn, marched from the bivouac in three columns of attack. The right column, which consisted of twelve hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Portuguese horse, was directed to make a considerable detour, and to penetrate into the mountains, for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; it was then to wheel up, and bear down with all its weight upon the rear of Delaborde's line. The left column again, consisting of two brigades of British infantry—those of Major-general Ferguson and Brigadier-general Bowes; three companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, twenty

British and twenty Portuguese horse, received orders to ascend the hills at Obidos, to drive in all the enemy's posts on that side of the valley, and to turn his right to Roliça. It was at the same time directed to watch the motions of General Loison, of whose arrival at Rio Major, on the preceding night, intelligence had been obtained; and in case he should come up, to engage him before he should have had an opportunity of communicating with Delaborde. The centre column again, which was composed of four brigades, namely, Major-general Hill's, Brigadier-general Crawford's, Brigadier-general Nightingale's, and Brigadier-general Fane's, together with four hundred Portuguese light infantry, the remainder of the British and Portuguese cavalry, a brigade of nine and a brigade of six-pounders, had it in charge to attack the enemy in front.

As the distance between Caldas and Roliça falls not short of three leagues, the morning was considerably advanced before the troops arrived within musket-shot of the French outposts. Nothing could exceed the orderly and gallant style in which they traversed the intervening space. The day chanced to be remarkably fine, and the scenery through which the columns passed was varied and striking; but they were themselves by far the most striking feature in the whole panorama. Wherever any broken piece of ground or other

natural obstacle came in the way, the head of the column having passed it, would pause till the rear had recovered its order, and resumed its station ; and then the whole would press forward with the same attention to distances, and the same orderly silence, which are usually preserved at a review. At last, however, the enemy's line became visible, and in a few minutes afterwards the skirmishers were engaged. The centre division now broke into different columns of battalions ; that on the left pressed on with a quick pace, whilst the riflemen on the right drove in, with great gallantry and in rapid style, the tirailleurs who were opposed to them. At this moment General Ferguson's column was seen descending the hills, and moving rapidly in a direction to cut off the enemy's retreat. But Delaborde was not so incautious as to permit that. The posts which covered his position on the plain being all carried, he lost no time in abandoning it, and withdrew his troops, in excellent order, and with great celerity, into the passes. It was evident, indeed, that to the gorges of these passes he had all along looked, as furnishing him with the most advantageous battle-ground ; for he instantly assumed a new position there, and presented a front more formidable than ever, because more than ever protected by the inequalities of the ground from the approach of the assailants.

Under these circumstances, it became neces-

sary, in some degree, to alter the plan of attack. Five separate columns were now formed, to each of which was committed the task of carrying a pass; but as the ground was peculiarly difficult, and the openings extremely narrow, no more than five British battalions, a few companies of British light infantry, and the brigade of Portuguese, could be brought into play. The following is the order in which this second assault was arranged:—

The Portuguese infantry were directed to move up a pass on the right of the whole line, through the pass next on the right to which the light companies of General Hill's brigade, supported by the 5th regiment, were commanded to penetrate. The office of forcing the third pass was committed to the 29th and 9th regiments; the fourth became the province of the 45th regiment; and the fifth fell to the lot of the 82nd. Than these passes, it is not easy to imagine any ground capable of presenting more serious obstacles to an assault, or more easy of a desperate defence. They were not only overhung on either hand by rocks and groves, among which skirmishers might lie secure, and do terrible execution with their fire; but as the troops advanced, they came upon spaces rough with myrtles and other shrubs; which unavoidably deranged their order, at the same time that they furnished admirable cover to the enemy. This was

particularly the case in that pass which the 29th and 9th regiments had been directed to carry ; and the enemy were not remiss in making the most of their advantages. Having permitted the column to go on, almost unmolested, till the leading companies were within a few yards of the myrtle grove, the French suddenly opened a fire, both from the front and flanks, which nothing but the most determined bravery on the part of the British troops could have resisted. As may be imagined, the advance of the column was for a moment checked ; but it was only for a moment. Colonel Lake, who led the attack, waving his hat in his hand, called on the men to follow ; they answered the call with a spirit-stirring cheer, and dashed on. But the enemy were full of confidence in themselves and in their position, and they disputed every inch of ground ; nor was it till after a considerable loss had been sustained, including the gallant officer who had so far conducted them to victory, that the 29th succeeded in crowning the plateau.

They were not yet formed in line, and the 9th was still entangled in the pass, when a French battalion advanced boldly to charge them. The enemy were met with the same spirit which they themselves exhibited, and the slaughter was very great on both sides ; but the charge was repulsed. It was renewed in a few minutes after by increased numbers ; for the columns which

were ascending the other passes being far in the rear, the French were enabled to bring the great mass of their force to bear upon this point; but the gallant 9th was now at hand to aid their comrades; and the enemy were again driven back with much slaughter. Nor was an opportunity afforded them of repeating their efforts; for the heads of different columns began to show themselves, and the position was carried at all points. The enemy accordingly drew off his troops, and began to retire, though in excellent order. Several efforts were made to harass him as he fell back, as well by the light infantry as by the cavalry; but his superiority in the latter arm, as well as the nature of the country, rendered these of little avail. He made good his retreat, leaving behind him three pieces of cannon, and about a thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing.

Sir Arthur Wellesley having followed the enemy as far as Villa Verde, on the road to Torres Vedras, halted for the night. On the following morning the pursuit was about to be renewed, and it seemed as if no check would be given to the ardour of the troops, till they should have won a second victory, and established themselves in Lisbon, when the arrival of a messenger at headquarters caused a suspension of the orders already issued. This person was the bearer of despatches from Brigadier-general Anstruther, who, with a

large fleet of store-ships, and a reinforcement of troops, was now at anchor off the town of Peniche. As it was no doubt a matter of the first importance to bring these reinforcements into the line without delay, Sir Arthur resolved to move in such a direction as would at once insure their landing, and facilitate their ready junction with his corps. With this view he directed the head of his column towards Lourinho, which place he reached that evening, and on the following day took up a position near the village of Vimiero.

The point at which General Anstruther's brigade was directed to land, was on a sandy beach at the mouth of the Maceira. There the disembarkation accordingly took place, but amidst difficulties of no ordinary nature; for the surf ran tremendously high; and flying bodies of the enemy's cavalry hovered about, as if with the design of cutting off each detachment as it stepped on shore. The skill and perseverance of the seamen, however, triumphed over the former of these dangers; one or two boats only being swamped, and about half a dozen men losing their lives; and against the latter, the vigilance and good order of the troops themselves offered defence enough. The whole were got on shore at an early hour on the 20th; and noon had barely passed when they took their station along with part of General Spencer's brigade, in the advance.

On the very day which saw this division join his army, it was announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley that General Aucland was in the offing; and before dark, Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur lost no time in opening a communication with that officer. He went on board of the frigate in which he was embarked the same night, laid before him a statement of affairs as they then stood, and entered into a minute detail of the plans which he had himself formed, and which he was already prepared to carry into effect. He represented to him the wisdom of resuming the offensive, whilst the British troops were yet flushed with their recent victory, and the enemy distracted and disheartened; and he proposed to move on the following morning to occupy Mafra, and to turn the position which he understood that the French had taken up along the heights of Torres Vedras. Whatever were really the objections to a plan so bold, and yet so judicious, Sir Harry Burrard saw many. He urged, in the first place, that since Sir John Moore's corps might be reasonably expected on the coast in the course of a few days at the furthest, it would be more prudent to remain quietly where they were till it should have actually arrived; in the next place, that the army was sadly in want of cavalry, and that the horses which dragged the guns were represented as being of the worst description. Then again there was a risk of losing

their supplies, in case they should diverge far from the shipping. It was in vain that Sir Arthur pointed out, in reply to all this, the impossibility of remaining quiet; because, if they did not advance to attack the enemy, the enemy would surely advance to attack them. It was in vain that he represented the great advantage which would arise, were Sir John Moore's corps to land in the Mondego, and march upon Santarem, thus cutting off the enemy's retreat both by Almeida and Elvas. Sir Harry Burrard's mind was made up. He would sanction no rash movement with a force as yet incomplete in every one of its branches; and as the senior officer, his will could not be disputed. Sir Arthur returned to the camp that night, and the very next day gave ample proofs that he had not erred in one, at least, of his anticipations.

Whilst Delaborde was executing the orders which he had received, and watching and retarding the progress of the English in a style worthy of his well-earned reputation, Junot was straining every nerve to bring into the field a force capable of sustaining, with some prospect of success, a general action with the British army. With this view, the garrisons of Lisbon, and of the forts in its neighbourhood, were drained of every man whom it was deemed prudent to withdraw; and the corps of Loison, Thomieres, and Kellerman, and

latterly of Delaborde himself, received orders to concentrate, without delay, in the position of Torres Vedras. The concentration took place during the 18th and 19th, and on the 20th the army was arranged into divisions and brigades. Of the former there were two; one of which was given to Delaborde, the other to Loison; whilst Kellerman took charge of the reserve, composed entirely of grenadiers.

These arrangements being complete, Junot immediately advanced towards Vimiero, where he had heard that the British army was encamped. The village of Vimiero stands in the midst of a beautiful valley, through which the Maceira flows, at the distance of about three miles, or something less, from the sea. On either side the hills rise to a considerable altitude, particularly towards the north, where a chain of detached heights rear themselves, with striking abruptness, out of the plain. Over the ridges of these runs the high-road, through the hamlets of Fontanel and Ventoza to Lourinho; and on the eastern side is a deep ravine, at the bottom of which stands the village of Toledo. On the north-east of Vimiero, again, there is a sort of table-land, covered in part with shrubs, and in part bare, which commands all the approaches from the side of Torres Vedras; and which is itself commanded in rear, and towards the west, by a mass of mountains that occupy the

whole space between the left bank of the Maceira and the sea. Such was the nature of the ground along which the British army now lay in bivouac ; its arrangements in detail were these :—

The greater part of the infantry, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, with eight pieces of artillery, were posted upon the mass of mountains just described ; on the south-eastern hill, again, or table-land, Brigadier-general Fane and Brigadier-general Anstruther took their stations ; the former with his riflemen and the 50th regiment, the latter with his whole brigade ; and they were supported by half a brigade of nine-pounders and half a brigade of sixes, which had been sent to them during the night. The high road to Lourinho, however, and the heights which it crosses, can hardly be said to have been occupied at all, only a single picket keeping guard there ; because no water being in the neighbourhood, and Sir Arthur not intending to continue on his ground longer than till daylight should enable him to quit it, he did not esteem it necessary to place any number of troops in a situation where so many inconveniences must attend them. But the village itself was fully occupied ; the reserve, both of artillery and cavalry, being stationed there.

Marshal Junot quitted his position at Torres Vedras soon after nightfall on the 20th ; and hav-

ing executed a tedious and difficult march, through narrow defiles, arrived, about seven o'clock in the morning, within a league and a half of the British outposts. The ground which he occupied was, however, completely hidden from the view of the English. He was accordingly enabled to form his columns of attack unseen; nor was it till a considerable mass of cavalry had deployed immediately in front of the picket which observed the Lourinho road, that on the part of Sir Arthur Wellesley an action was anticipated. But Sir Arthur, who was never taken by surprise, perceived in a moment that the principal attack would be directed where he had most cause to apprehend it, and where his line was most unquestionably the weakest: he ordered the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Aucland, and Bowes, successively to cross the ravine, and long before the first shot had been fired at the outposts, his left was secure.

The enemy came on in two powerful columns, supported and flanked by weaker bodies; the right, which consisted of about six thousand men, moving upon the Lourinho road; the left, of about five thousand, directing its efforts against the table land. The first onset of both was, as the first onset of French troops always is, extremely impetuous; insomuch that, on the left of the table land, the skirmishers were fairly driven in, and

the head of the advancing column presented itself, almost without a check, in front of the 50th regiment. The 50th, which was drawn up in line, permitted the enemy to approach till scarcely twenty yards divided them; and then pouring in a well-directed volley, made ready to charge. The enemy stood, for a moment, as if determined to await the shock; but the bayonets of the British corps were hardly crossed, when they began to waver; and before the rush was made, they broke and fled. Almost at the same instant, the 2nd battalion of the 43rd found itself vigorously attacked in the town of Vimiero by a lesser column, which flanked the greater. The 43rd had thrown part of its body into the church-yard, whilst part filled the houses, and covered the road which led to it; and it firmly met and bravely repelled every effort which was made to dislodge it. A similar result attended the attack which took place upon the extreme left of the British line, which was conducted with conspicuous gallantry by General Delaborde. It was repelled with immense slaughter, chiefly by the exertions of the 97th and 52nd regiments.

In the mean while a tremendous contest was going on among the hills, on the British right, and in the direction of the Lourinho road. The enemy forced their way in this quarter as they had done on the other flank, through the body of skirmishers

which covered the British line; nor did they make the slightest pause, till they beheld the 36th, the 40th, and 71st regiments in close array before them. Their line was likewise formed in a moment; and several terrible discharges of musketry were exchanged at a distance which hardly allowed of a single bullet passing wide of its mark. At length, the 82nd and 29th regiments came up to the support of their comrades, and the word was given to charge. One cheer, loud, regular, and appalling, warned the French of what they had to expect; but the French were men of tried valour, and they stood to the last. That was a tremendous onset. The entire front rank of the enemy perished; and the men who composed it were found, at the close of the action, lying on the very spots where each, during its continuance, had stood. Instantly the line gave way; and being pursued with great impetuosity, six pieces of cannon were captured on the field. An attempt was, indeed, made to recover these, at a moment when the 71st and 82nd, who had halted in the valley, were lying down to rest after their labours; but it was made to no purpose. These regiments only fell back to a little rising ground, from whence their fire could be given with greater effect; they gave it, and once more bringing the bayonet into play, carried every thing before them.

The French fought well in this action. They

fought like men who had been accustomed to conquer, and had not yet learned to suffer defeat. The grenadiers of their reserve, in particular, performed prodigies of valour, advancing under a cross fire of musketry and cannon, and never giving way till the bayonets of the British troops drove them down the descent. But they were routed at all points, and that with a slaughter far greater than usually occurs to armies of a similar magnitude. Out of twelve or thirteen thousand men whom they brought into the field, three or four thousand fell; besides a large proportion of prisoners, of whom several were officers of rank. On the side of the British, the total loss amounted to 783, in killed, wounded, and missing; among the former of whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, commanding the 20th light dragoons. He was shot through the heart whilst leading a brilliant charge which his detachment made; and in which, after committing terrible havoc among the enemy's infantry, it suddenly found itself beset by a whole brigade of French cavalry.

The battle had hardly begun, when Sir Harry Burrard, followed by his staff, arrived upon the field. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as a matter of course, proposed to resign to him all further responsibility; but Sir Harry possessed too much judgment not to perceive that the execution of plans could not be left in safer hands than in

those of the man who had formed them. He accordingly declined interfering in any way till the result of the struggle should be known, and took upon himself the direction of future operations only when the defeat of the enemy was ascertained. At that critical juncture, Sir Arthur Wellesley represented to him, in the strongest terms, that this was the moment for advancing; that whilst part of the army followed up the beaten enemy, part should push on by the nearest road to Torres Vedras. He pointed out that such a movement must inevitably cut off the French from Lisbon, and either place them between two fires, or compel them to begin a ruinous retreat, by the route of Alenquer and Villa Franca: he reminded him that there was no deficiency either of ammunition or provisions in the camp; that the British soldiers were in high spirits and admirable discipline; their enemies disheartened, wearied with their late marches, and almost disorganised. All this he urged upon the field with the warmth and earnestness of a successful officer, and the clearness and perspicuity for which he is remarkable. But Sir Harry was not to be moved from his determination. He had made up his mind already not to quit Vimiero till Sir John Moore should arrive; and he saw nothing in the events of the day to cause a change in his sentiments. The cavalry, he said, were certainly not strengthened, nor the

artillery horses improved, by the exertions which they had undergone. In a word, he was resolved not to act with precipitation ; and the British troops were accordingly commanded to rest upon their arms.

CHAPTER VI.

Inactivity of the British army under Sir Harry Burrard—Arrival of General Kellerman at Vimiero, with proposals—Sir Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters into a treaty with Kellerman—Difficulties as to the disposal of the Russian fleet, and preparations for a renewal of hostilities—Arrival of Sir John Moore's corps—Junot consents that the two Admirals shall arrange the point at issue between themselves—The convention of Cintra condemned by both Portuguese and Spaniards—Almeida and Elvas given up—The British troops enter Lisbon—Joy of the inhabitants—Carrara's corps restored to liberty, and re-armed—The French army sails for France, and the Russian fleet is conveyed to England.

It has been stated, in the preceding chapter, that among the variety of motives which induced Sir Harry Burrard, both before and after the victory of Vimiero, to check the advance of the British army upon Lisbon, one, and certainly not the least influential, was the expectation which he entertained, that every day would bring into his camp a re-inforcement of ten thousand men, under

the command of Lieutenant-general Sir John Moore. The corps in question (to which it was the writer's good fortune to be attached) had embarked at Portsmouth so early as the 31st of July; but owing to a continuance of baffling and adverse winds, it was the 19th of August before it arrived in Mondego Bay. It arrived, too, at a moment when the leaders of the divisions which had preceded it were too much occupied with other matters to pay to its movements any particular attention; and it became, in consequence, essential to open an immediate communication with them, and to ascertain how, and upon what service, it should prepare to employ itself.

Having learned from some of the coasting vessels that the right of the British army was in position at St. Martinho, Sir John Moore did me the honour to desire that I should proceed at once to that point, and communicate to Sir Arthur Wellesley, or Sir Harry Burrard, or the officer, whoever he might be, in command, the fact of his arrival. In obedience to these instructions I set sail in a light frigate, hoping, and indeed expecting, that I should be able to reach my destination on the following day; but at an early hour on the 20th the breeze died away, and what was still more distressing, the appearance of the sky and the state of the atmosphere, indicated a long continuance of calm weather. Under these circum-

stances I did not consider it prudent to remain any longer on board of ship ; a boat was therefore manned, which conveyed me twelve leagues by rowing, and landed me soon after sunset at the village of St. Nazareth.

It was not without great difficulty, and the loss of several precious hours, that I here succeeded in procuring either a guide to direct my steps, or the means of conveyance ; indeed, of my journey from thence to head-quarters no inconsiderable portion was performed on foot. On this account I failed, unfortunately for myself, in reaching Vimiero till the 24th, three days after the battle had been fought, and the campaign was, to all intents and purposes, at an end ; for the heads of departments were, I perceived, all busily occupied in conducting a negociation, of the origin and end of which the following is a brief account :—

Sir Harry Burrard, in pursuance of his system of procrastination, continued inactive in the position of Vimiero, when, at an early hour on the 22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar to take upon himself the chief command. Sir Hew was of course ignorant, as well of the condition of his own army, and the state of the country, as of the means and resources of the enemy ; and he could form no other judgment respecting the line of conduct which it behoved him to pursue, than that which his predecessors in command

might happen to suggest. But for the attainment of sufficient information some time was necessary; and before any definite course had been determined on, an event occurred which gave a new turn to the General's deliberations.

In the evening of the same day on which Sir Hew reached the camp, a body of cavalry was espied advancing by the road which the enemy had taken in their retreat. The pickets instantly stood to their arms; but the alarm, if such it deserves to be called, which had momentarily seized them, was at once allayed, when it was observed that the body in question were the bearers of a flag of truce. They were stopped, as is usual in such cases, at the out-posts, till a report of their coming should be made at head-quarters, and an officer sent down to ascertain their business. They proved to be the escort in attendance upon General Kellerman, who had been despatched by Marshal Junot, in consequence of the resolution to which he and his principal officers had that morning come, in a council of war; and who was the bearer of proposals for the conclusion of a suspension of arms, as the prelude to a more definitive treaty respecting the evacuation of Portugal.

Various rumours prevailed in the camp, as to the reception which General Kellerman's proposition received in different quarters. By some it was asserted that it gave singular satisfaction to

all ; and that even Sir Arthur Wellesley, feeling that the moment for action had passed away, offered no objection to the measure ; by others his opposition to it was represented as having been both strenuous and persevering. Be this, however, as it may, Kellerman was conducted, with every mark of respect, to the house where Sir Hew Dalrymple resided ; and after a conference of some duration, his first request was granted. An armistice, to continue during forty-eight hours, was entered into ; and then began the more important negotiation, to the conduct of which the armistice was but a fore-runner.

With admirable tact Kellerman opened his part in this transaction by magnifying, in every possible form, the strength of the French army, and the amount of its resources. He spoke of his General as determined to accept no terms which should not be to the most minute tittle honourable to the French arms ; and represented him as prepared, in case matters should be driven to an extremity, to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon. This done, he proceeded to lay before the British commanders a string of propositions, rather as if they had been suggestions from himself, than official communications ; for he earnestly desired it to be understood that he had no powers to conclude a treaty, and that his present business was simply to ascertain the fact, whether any desire to treat

existed on the part of the English. The conversation had not, however, proceeded far, when either his memory, or his regard to consistency, forsook him ; for he produced a written document, which authorised him to act at his own discretion, and pledged the honour of the Commander-in-chief to fulfil any agreement into which he might be induced to enter.

It is hardly necessary to repeat here that the evacuation of the whole of Portugal, including the forts of Elvas and Almeida, in which the French had garrisons, formed the basis of the present negotiation. To this the enemy would consent only on the following conditions :—first, that the French army should, on no account, be considered as prisoners of war ; secondly, that the troops should be transported with their arms, baggage, and private property to France, and be at liberty to serve again, either in the Peninsula or elsewhere, as soon as they should re-assemble ; thirdly, that no individual, whether Frenchman, Portuguese, or foreigner, in alliance with France, who chanced to remain in Portugal after the departure of the French, should be molested in any way, on account of the sentiments which he might have expressed, or the line of conduct which he might have pursued, during the late occupation ; and that all such persons, if they desired it, should be at liberty to withdraw from Portugal, with all

their effects, within a year ; fourthly, that the port of Lisbon should be recognised as a neutral port, and the Russian fleet which lay there treated as enemies' vessels are usually treated when in the harbours of a neutral power ; and lastly, that all the horses attached to the Frency army, as well those belonging to the cavalry and artillery as those of the staff, should be conveyed to France together with the men.

When the substance of these proposals began to be generally understood, and a rumour got afloat that they had been conditionally agreed to, the indignation of all ranks and classes in the army rose to a great height. There was not an individual who appeared to entertain a doubt that Junot felt his situation to be a desperate one ; and that nothing short of such a feeling would have tempted him to treat about an evacuation at all ; whilst the terms which he sought to obtain for himself were, as if by one consent, pronounced to be absolutely and totally inadmissible. But that which most powerfully stirred up the wrath at least of the junior departments, was the impudent endeavour, on the part of the French leader, to stipulate for the unmolested departure of the Russian fleet. It was seen at once that his object in introducing that article was of a twofold nature ;—that he wished both to reconcile his own master to the disgrace which his arms had suffered ; and to con-

ciliate the good will of the Russian autocrat, whose squadron he hoped to preserve; and it was earnestly trusted that the British Admiral, to whom reference must of course be made, would not give his consent to an arrangement so derogatory to the dignity of the British flag. Nor was the general discontent directed altogether against the details of the convention. Murmurs might here and there be heard, all of them condemnatory of that excess of caution which had checked a victorious army in the midst of its career; whilst a thousand wishes were expressed, that the new chief's arrival had been delayed till the campaign, so prosperously begun, had been brought to a conclusion.

Whilst one part of the army, and that by far the most numerous, thus expressed themselves, there were others, who, equally regretting that advantage had not been taken of the victory of the 21st, were nevertheless disposed to view the pending arrangement as, under existing circumstances, an extremely prudent one. In their eyes it was a matter of the first moment to deliver Portugal entirely from the presence of French troops, even though the troops thus expelled should be immediately brought into play at some other point on the theatre of war. These persons no more doubted, than their more sanguine comrades, as to the ultimate results of the campaign, were it renewed; but they saw, in the loss of

time which a recommencement of hostilities would occasion, evils which not the most absolute success would be sufficient to compensate. Besides, it was by no means impossible that the French, in possession of the commanding position of Torres Vedras, masters of Lisbon, and having garrisons in Elvas and Almeida, might protract the war till reinforcements should reach them from Spain; for though at the present moment their prospects in Spain appeared clouded, no one dreamed that the cloud would not sooner or later be dispelled. Then, again, winter was hard at hand; the resources of the country were exhausted; and to obtain supplies from home might not be at all times practicable. Under all these circumstances, they gave their ready assent to the terms of the convention, with this solitary exception, that they saw no wisdom in treating with the Russian Admiral through the medium of a French Marshal.

During the period which intervened between the conclusion of the armistice, and the return of the messenger who had carried a copy of the convention to Sir Charles Cotton, all things remained in a state of perfect quiet. Officers of every rank met together, indeed, in coteries, to indulge in an occupation to which soldiers upon active service are peculiarly prone, namely, speculation as to the future; and couriers came in from time to time with despatches of greater or

less moment from different parts of the country. But neither the speculations on the one hand, nor the despatches on the other, proved worthy of being recorded at length, though they were not without interest at the moment, and that too of the highest order. Among other topics of conversation which chanced to be occasionally introduced at head-quarters, it was but natural that the probable plans of the French, after they had cantoned their troops about Burgos, should prove not the least attractive. On this head the general opinion seemed to be, that they would attempt nothing further than to keep their own ground, till powerful reinforcements should have been sent to them from France. Then, again, there arose another question, namely, by the adoption of what line of operations the British army would be best able to render effectual aid in their expulsion. That we should not continue inactive in Portugal, after it was evacuated by the French, was well known; how then was it probable that we should proceed? It was answered to this, that whatever might be the plans actually carried into effect, Catalonia and the south of Spain held out numerous advantages to a British force, which it could not expect to enjoy in the Asturias or Galicia. The latter provinces, naturally barren and mountainous, had already endured the miseries of war for some time; their forage was therefore con-

sumed, and their resources exhausted. It was not so with Catalonia, where supplies of every kind were represented to be abundant, and where the people were spoken of as brave even to a proverb. To Catalonia, therefore, it was hoped that a separate corps might be despatched, even if it should be deemed unwise to choose it for the scene of our principal operations. Nor were the present and future condition of Portugal left unnoticed in these social discussions. The desire of the junta of Oporto, to transfer thither the seat of the executive, was well known; and it was equally well known that the Bishop had received some encouragement, even from British functionaries, to declare himself the head of the government; but to that arrangement Sir Hew Dalrymple appeared strongly opposed. He declared his determination to re-establish the regency as it had been appointed by the Prince previous to his departure for the Brazils; and he expressed himself dissatisfied with the conduct of those persons who had ventured, on their own responsibility, to excite a contrary expectation. Then, again, there came despatches from Castanos, stating his design of marching direct upon Madrid, and his great anxiety to be informed of the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal, and the advance of the British army to co-operate with him. But all these matters, as has been already hinted, though full of interest at

the moment, possess no claim upon the attention of the general reader now; they need not therefore be enlarged upon.

Men's minds were wound up to a pitch of very considerable anxiety, when on the 26th a letter from Sir Charles Cotton arrived, in which he declared his decided disapprobation of that article in the treaty, which had reference to the neutrality of the Tagus, and the treatment of the Russian fleet. No words can convey an adequate idea of the satisfaction which universally prevailed, as soon as this most acceptable piece of intelligence spread abroad. The French were understood, with reference to this point, to have assumed a tone so high, that no one entertained a doubt of the immediate renewal of hostilities; and the expectation was certainly not diminished, when the troops received orders to take their ground in marching order, at an early hour next morning. In forty-eight hours the armistice would expire; then would operations recommence; and so confident were all ranks that they would be resumed in real earnest, that the following plan was openly spoken of as on the eve of being carried into execution.

It so happened that the fleet which contained Sir John Moore and his division appeared at this critical juncture in the offing. Nothing could have occurred more opportunely; for though the

state of the weather was such as to render a disembarkation at the instant impracticable, there was little reason, in the month of August, to apprehend a very long continuance of the gale. As soon as the surf became moderate, the troops would of course land; when it was understood that they would press forward to Torres Vedras, and occupy that important post, from which the enemy had lately withdrawn to a fortified position at Cabeza. In unison with this movement, Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the head of his own corps, was to advance by his left from Ramalhal to Buccellas, for the purpose of turning the heights of Cabeza, and threatening Lisbon; whilst the Portuguese army would take the coast-road, and straiten the enemy there by the occupation of Mafra. By these arrangements, the French, it was anticipated, would either be compelled to fight on their strong ground, under the disadvantage of being assailed from three quarters at once; or, in the event of their retiring upon Lisbon, would probably be shut up there, and then driven at last to the necessity of surrendering at discretion. All, however, must depend upon the decision at which Junot might arrive, whenever he should be made aware of the Admiral's determinations; and that time might not be needlessly wasted, Colonel Murray, assistant quarter-master-general, and Captain Dalrymple, military secretary

to the Commander-in-chief, were instantly despatched to lay these determinations before him.

The hope which this sudden obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty had for a moment excited, was destined not to be of long continuance. Marshal Junot was too well acquainted both with his own weakness and the strength of his enemy, to break off a negociation so favourable to himself, because of the rejection of a single article; on the contrary, he soon consented that the two admirals should settle every question relative to the shipping between themselves, and the definitive treaty was signed with as little apparent reluctance as if no Russian fleet had lain in the Tagus. Thus, in the short space of seventeen days, was the campaign brought to a conclusion; and a kingdom, which previous to its commencement lay, as it were, at the feet of a conqueror, was restored most unexpectedly to independence, and to its former rank among the nations.

The excitement produced by these arrangements had hardly begun to subside, when new sources of uneasiness arose, and that too in quarters from which no causes of uneasiness had been anticipated. The Portuguese, though they took care to keep as much as possible aloof from their allies whilst perilous attempts were to be made, and great interests placed at issue, no sooner perceived the turn which affairs had taken, than they

chose to interfere in a manner as little agreeable as, to say the truth, it was unexpected. General Freire, who had refused to co-operate with Sir Arthur Wellesley, but who, as soon as victory declared for the English, had marched his troops towards Lisbon, visited Sir Hew Dalrymple on the day after the conclusion of the armistice, and declared his dissatisfaction with every article in the definitive treaty. He complained grievously of the disrespect shown to the Portuguese nation, as well in the stipulation, that persons should not be held amenable for their conduct during the recent usurpation, as because no reference whatever was made to the junta of Oporto, or to any other legislative body. To this Sir Hew replied, that the convention was in all its parts a military treaty, in which no mention was or could be made either of the Portuguese or of the British government; and he further reminded Freire, that in point of fact no government of Portugal existed. The junta of Oporto had, indeed, assumed to itself a superiority over other juntas, and it had been, to a certain extent, obeyed by the people of Portugal; but if any legitimate government existed anywhere, it must be sought for in the regency which the Prince had appointed; and he took it for granted that General Freire would not acknowledge it, adulterated as it was with Frenchmen and French agents. He nevertheless requested that General

Freire would commit to writing all the observations which he might desire to make on the treaty in question; and he pledged himself that the utmost attention would be paid to them, when the terms of the treaty were in process of execution.

This difficulty had scarcely been got over, when other and no less serious objections to the convention were started by the leaders of the two Spanish and Portuguese corps, which at this time blockaded the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida. Elvas had long been kept in a state of irregular investment by bands of armed peasants, whose utmost exertions never went further than to poison a well or two, where the cattle of the garrison were accustomed to drink, and to cut off straggling parties, as often as they issued from the town. Before Elvas, again, the Spanish General Galluza, provisional commandant of the army of Estremadura, had seen fit to sit down; in ignorance, perhaps, that a treaty was going on at the moment for its surrender; but in positive contempt of orders from his own superiors, which required him to begin his march, without delay, for Castile. The Portuguese, though, like their comrades nearer to the capital, far from being satisfied with the tone of the convention, were easily persuaded to subdue their own feelings; and Almeida being given up, the French garrison was quietly marched under a British escort, to Oporto. It was not

so at Elvas. When a British regiment which had been appointed to take charge of the works arrived in his camp, General Galluza positively refused to permit its passing further. He insisted that the Spanish corps under his command was entitled to all the privileges of a besieging army; and he protested that the French garrison should not pass the ditch on any other terms, than as prisoners of war prepared to lay down their arms. Neither Colonel Ross, the commissioner, nor the battalion which attended him, could, of course, compel an alteration in Galluza's sentiments; but advice was instantly despatched to Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was justly incensed; and at first declared his determination to withhold all succours from the Spaniards, and to cease all correspondence with them, if his wishes, in the present instance, were not promptly attended to; but being reasoned out of this resolution, Sir Hew consented that Colonel Graham should repair to Elvas, with full powers to conciliate the Spanish General. The Colonel, was, moreover, furnished with 10,000 dollars, as a means of enforcing his arguments, should they be violently opposed; and as a last resource, he was required to proceed to Madrid, and to lay before the Spanish government a statement of the case. All this was as it ought to have been; but Sir Hew's feelings were too violently excited to permit him to stop here. Sir

John Hope's division of infantry, with two squadrons of cavalry, were ordered to cross the Tagus. He was directed to move, in a menacing attitude, upon Elvas; and in case things came to the worst, to compel, by force of arms, an adherence to the terms of the treaty. Fortunately for all parties, this species of interference was not needed. The Spaniards, convinced by Colonel Graham's weighty arguments, that no good, but much evil, must arise, out of a breach of any compact, however rashly or improvidently entered into, at last consented to allow the departure of the garrison with its arms and baggage; and the garrison accordingly proceeded, as the garrison of Almeida had done, under a British escort, to its place of embarkation.

It may not be amiss if I record here the fate which ultimately befell these detachments. Wherever they passed, on their journey from the forts to the place of embarkation, they were met with the revilings and hootings of an enraged peasantry; nor was it without the utmost difficulty that they were preserved from the violence with which they were threatened. By great exertions, however, on the part of the escort, they were at length conducted to their vessels; but the troops from Almeida, ordered to take shipping at Oporto, had not yet weighed anchor, when an accident occurred, which had well nigh proved fatal to them. In

moving a military chest on board one of the transports, it fell to the ground, and bursting open, some church-plate rolled out. There was now no arresting the fury of the populace. The ships were instantly boarded, the French disarmed, their baggage taken on shore, examined, and plundered; and when it became apparent that, under the head of private property, the pillage of the most sacred edifices in the kingdom was about to be conveyed away, the lives of the whole detachment were placed in imminent danger. At last, however, the native authorities, aided by such British officers as happened to be at hand, prevailed upon the people to abstain from personal violence; but to talk any longer of the safe departure of these detachments, would have been useless. They were disarmed, to the number of fourteen hundred, and treated as prisoners of war.

In the mean while, one division of the British army, under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir John Hope, moved into Lisbon, and took possession of the different barracks, and of the castle. Shouts and blessings greeted them as they passed along; whilst persons of every rank, from the fidalgo down to the beggar, vied with one another in protestations of gratitude and affection. The windows were filled with females, who showered down flowers upon the soldiers' heads, and waved their handkerchiefs in token of amity; whilst the

men thronged the sides of the streets, and made the air ring with their cries, "Long live the English!" "Death to the French!" But the most gratifying spectacle of all, which met us on the present occasion, was exhibited on the following morning; when to the Spanish corps, which had hitherto been detained as prisoners in the hulks, not their liberty only, but their arms and accoutrements were restored.

To render the ceremony as imposing as possible, it was determined that it should take place in public, and announcements of what was about to be done were everywhere circulated. Great crowds were accordingly drawn together on the morning appointed, when the Spaniards, in number about four thousand, assembled in a large open space called the Campo d'Ourique, and forming a hollow square, with their generals and other officers in the centre, awaited the result. They were not kept long in suspense, ere General Beresford, to whom the arrangement of the ceremony had been intrusted, followed by a large concourse of British officers, made his appearance. Instantly General Beresford, having passed along the line, and saluted first the General and afterwards the whole corps, presented to the former, with great grace and dignity an elegant sword, and in an animated speech requested that the latter would again accept their arms from the

King of England, never to lay them down till the cause of Ferdinand VII., of Europe, and of humanity, had triumphed. This address, which was forcibly and well delivered, had not yet come to a close, when it was drowned in the reiterated vivas of soldiers and inhabitants; whilst the roar of cannon, and the braying of trumpets, echoed from one end of Lisbon to another. When the tumult had in part subsided, the Spanish General hastened to make his reply. He spoke evidently under the influence of strong feeling, and every sentence which fell from him gave testimony, that what he did speak, was spoken without premeditation; but his speech possessed all the fire which the circumstances under which it was delivered were calculated to excite. He then addressed his men in the language of genuine patriotism; exhorted them never to forget the events of this glorious day; and ended by declaring that, whenever the people of the Peninsula should cease to bear towards England the love and reverence which were due from the oppressed to their deliverers, they would prove themselves unworthy of a better fate than that which, but for English interference, would have befallen them. Finally, the troops marched past, and the business of the morning was concluded by a grand *déjeûné à la fourchette*, at which the Spanish officers became so intoxicated with wine and joy, as to dance waltzes,

bandangos, &c. in their boots, swords, and complete field-equipment.

The rejoicings having ended, it became a question of considerable moment how these troops were to be disposed of. Destitute as they were of money, and of almost every article necessary to their efficiency, it was quite evident that they could proceed nowhere in a body, nor act to any purpose, unless the means of moving and acting were advanced from the funds of the British army; and the Commander-in-chief seemed to entertain serious doubts, whether his instructions authorised him to make such advance. After a good deal of discussion, however, he was at length prevailed upon to supply them with 20,000 dollars, in addition to a certain number of days' pay, and complete supplies of arms, ammunition, and horses; and then the question as to their ultimate disposal was resumed. The first idea on that head was, that it would be advisable to march them off in the direction of Badajoz; because, being composed principally of detachments from different regiments, of which the main bodies were understood to be in the neighbourhood of that place, they might be enabled, when there, to join each its respective battalion. Preparations were accordingly begun with this view; but before they were completed, there arrived from Catalonia two deputies, whose representations

caused an immediate change in the plans. These strongly pressed upon Sir Hew the necessity of sending troops of all arms, but more particularly cavalry, into their province. They stated that the Catalonian army amounted to forty thousand men, which, though miserably supplied with equipments of every kind, were, nevertheless, able to cope with the enemy among the mountains; but that in the plains and level country, owing to the presence of five or six hundred French cavalry, they could not venture to show themselves. Under these circumstances, they besought the British General to send round by sea a corps of one thousand horse and ten thousand foot, the arrival of which would, they were assured, occasion an immediate rising throughout the whole province, particularly in Barcelona and other large towns, where nothing but the presence of an overwhelming force kept the people in subjection to the French yoke. There was a good deal of justice in the remarks of these deputies; nor, perhaps, would it have been an unwise thing, had Sir Hew Dalrymple obeyed their councils; but to do this he hardly felt himself authorised. The Spanish corps, however, being absolutely at his own disposal, he could employ it at any point, and on any service, which to himself might appear most desirable; and he instantly placed it in the hands of the Catalonian deputies. It was

embarked in a few hours afterwards, and set sail for Catalonia.

All this while arrangements were busily making for the transportation of the French troops to their own country. Whilst the few garrisons which they had scattered through the interior, received instructions to march upon Oporto, the main body, including the corps which had occupied the castle of Lisbon, and the forts at the mouth of the Tagus, assembled in one camp, and made ready to embark as soon as the ships were cleared out for them. Much discussion, however, and many difficulties arose, as to the construction which each party desired to put upon those articles in the convention of Cintra, which had reference to the private baggage of the army. The Portuguese were naturally anxious that the men who had plundered their churches, museums, and even their dwellings, should not be permitted to carry away that plunder under the head of private property; whilst the French protested violently against any search being made, or any inquiries instituted into the contents of their trunks or store-rooms. It was no easy matter for the British General to steer a proper course in such circumstances, keeping, as he desired, a strict regard to the sacredness of his own promises. On the one hand, he could not but feel, that whatever might be the words of the

treaty, its spirit was not such as to sanction the numerous acts of speculation and robbery of which the French might have been guilty; and he took care to state this with great distinctness to Marshal Junot. On the other hand, he saw that in many cases of alleged plunder it would be extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to identify the property said to have been stolen. Thus embarrassed, he took the only judicious step which it was in his power to take. A committee of inquiry was appointed, before which all claims might be brought; and the quantity of goods restored by its decisions to the rightful owners was immense.

Before dismissing the subject of Cintra altogether, I consider it right, without at all desiring to discuss the wisdom or impolicy of the arrangement in question, to lay before the reader an outline of the impression produced in England by the first intelligence of the convention, which was communicated to me in the following extract of a letter:—

“The tumult of our joy on Wellesley’s glorious conduct and successes has been cruelly disturbed by a communication of a supposed convention, the operations of which instrument would, if carried into effect, secure to the French advantages beyond their reach, under the most brilliant success;

whilst their ten thousand men are now pressed upon by not less than thirty to forty thousand men, British and Portuguese.

“ In the first place, it is a recognition, on the face of the instrument, of Buonaparte as emperor of the French.

“ 2ndly. It provides for the safe retreat of an enemy's corps, destitute of all other means of escape.

“ 3rdly. It gives France the entire grace of saving for Russia her fleet, whilst in truth she had not a remnant of power left to protect it.

“ 4thly. It makes a gratuitous sacrifice of the fleet of an enemy, and in the manner of doing it, recognises rights of neutrality on the part of Portugal towards Russia, which, if they could have ever subsisted for a moment in a port occupied by a French army, were destroyed, even in pretence, by the formal appointment of Junot as Buonaparte's Lieutenant of Portugal, and entails upon us all the encumbrance of watching, with a fleet, a port of our own, whilst we must give the enemy forty-eight hours' start of us, lest we should catch him.

“ 5thly. It gives France not only the immediate use of her army, which, without an active assistance, she could not have, but gives her also the plunder of Portugal, under the mask of private property.

“ 6thly. It gives France all the grace of having protected those Portuguese who have betrayed their sovereign, whilst it entails upon us the disgrace of exposing our allies to be attacked hereafter by a fleet which France has had the authority and means to protect. Will Spain or Europe believe that this was preceded by triumphs on our part? and will not France be convinced of the reverse?

“ 7thly. It lastly appears in its general result to be a happy contrivance, by which England shall have made a mighty effort, for no other purpose than making a dependent state the protector of one of its enemies, whilst it becomes itself the instrument by which the other shall remove an army from a position in which *it is lost* to one in which it may recommence its operations with advantage.”

At length the provisioning and storing of the transports being complete, the French army began its embarkation. It took place in three divisions; the first being protected by the two last, as they again were covered by the British troops; and before the middle of September the whole had cleared the Tagus. The Russian fleet, likewise, in accordance with the arrangement entered into between Sir Charles Cotton and Admiral Siniavin, was taken possession of by the British navy; and the seamen being sent back to their own shores, the ships were forthwith removed to England. They

were conveyed thither, however, not as prizes, in the strict sense of that term, but rather as a deposit, the British government engaging to restore them within six months after a general pacification. Still it was a matter of no little moment to render them for the time innocuous ; and as Russia already began to manifest symptoms of a desire to break off her connexion with France, it would not, perhaps, have been productive of any additional benefit, had they been absolutely and entirely transferred to the English service.

CHAPTER VII.

Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir Arthur Wellesley returns to England on leave—Sir Harry Burrard resigns the command to Sir John Moore—Preparations for an advance into Spain—March through Alentejo—Villa Vicosa—March to Elvas—Elvas, Badajoz—Difference of character between the Spaniards and Portuguese—Colonel Lopez receives despatches from Castanos—Merida—Its antiquities—State of agriculture in its vicinity.

THE events which I have endeavoured to record in the last chapter were still in progress, when a variety of changes in the arrangement of the British army took place, some of which were of the greatest moment. In the first place, Sir Hew Dalrymple was recalled, and under circumstances which sufficiently implied that the country was not satisfied with the result of the two late victories. Sir Arthur Wellesley, likewise, to the sincere regret of every Englishman in Portugal, departed upon leave of absence; and his example

was followed by many other officers of all ranks. The command accordingly devolved upon Sir Harry Burrard; but to what use it would be turned, no one appeared to know. All at once our preparations and warlike declarations ceased: there was no longer the faintest whisper of a movement; and we gave ourselves up entirely, or at least we appeared to give ourselves up, to the amusements and dissipation of Lisbon.

A state of things such as this could not, however, be of long continuance. Rumours began gradually to spread themselves, that Sir Harry's sojourn with the army would be brief, and that, as soon as he saw fit to return to England, an active campaign would be opened. These rumours were not raised upon false grounds. Sir Harry's constitution was incapable of bearing up against the fatigues and privations of active service; he therefore applied for leave of absence, and obtained it; and the command then devolved upon one, whom, next to Sir Arthur Wellesley, the troops most respected and loved—Lieutenant-general Sir John Moore. It would be no easy matter to describe, either the satisfaction which all appeared to experience when these arrangements became known, or the state of bustle and activity which every department at once assumed. An advance into Spain was now openly talked of;

and everything seemed to imply that it would commence immediately.

I have stated, in one of the introductory chapters, that as soon as intelligence of Dupont's capture reached Madrid, Joseph made ready for a hasty abandonment of his new capital. He had enacted the part of royalty only two short days, when he found it necessary to lay his power aside, and to fall back from the stage on which he had begun to perform it. The whole of the detachments scattered through the northern and eastern provinces were called in. Garrisons were, indeed, thrown into some of the strong-holds, sufficiently numerous to man the works, and a post was here and there established, merely for the purpose of watching the Spaniards, and giving notice of their movements; but the main body, amounting in all to about forty-five or fifty thousand men, concentrated in Navarre and Biscay. Here a position was taken up, with the right resting upon St. Sebastian, the centre at Vittoria, and the left thrown back as far as Pampluna; and here they seemed disposed to await the arrival of those reinforcements, which in great numbers were stated to be moving through France.

Whilst the above was pretty accurately known to be the disposition of the enemy, we were given to understand that there were in arms, in the As-

turias and in Galicia, sixty thousand Spaniards under Blake and Romana. Two large armies, independently of this, were stated to have formed; one, in the immediate front of the French, the other upon their left flank; at the head of the last of which was Castanos. The very best spirit was said to prevail in all quarters of Spain; every Spaniard was, or was disposed to be, a soldier; there was therefore nothing to be apprehended by us, let us enter the country when we might. It was even asserted that, unless we made good haste, there would be nothing left for us to effect; since it seemed in the highest degree probable, that before we should be able to arrive at the scene of action, the French would be everywhere driven across the Pyrenees. Such were the cheering communications which poured in upon us, not only from the Spaniards themselves, but from some of our own functionaries; and it was with hopes naturally elated to the highest pitch that we looked forward to the prospect before us.

We were not left long in a state of uncertainty. On the 6th of October, General Moore received an official despatch, informing him that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to intrust him with the chief command of an army, intended to cooperate with the forces of Spain in the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula. The army in question was to consist of not less than forty

thousand men, namely, of thirty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and artillery and engineers in proportion. Towards making up this force, the army in Portugal was to furnish twenty thousand men, including two regiments of cavalry, the 18th, and King's German regiment of hussars; whilst a corps of fifteen thousand men, under Lieutenant-general Sir David Baird, was to embark immediately at Falmouth for the harbour of Corunna. Sir John Moore was further informed that a scene of action had been already planned out for him in the north of Spain, though it was left to his own judgment to name a point of rendezvous on this side of it for the assembling of his troops. He was likewise expressly enjoined to move the cavalry by land; but his infantry and artillery he might either despatch by sea, or march across the country, as should to himself appear most expedient. Finally, he was instructed to pay to the feelings and prejudices of his allies every attention; to preserve the strictest discipline among his men; and to keep his divisions, as far as might be practicable, together, that they might act, at all times, in one body, and as a field army. It was added that, from the Spanish authorities and people, he might expect the most friendly reception, and the readiest compliance with his wishes; whilst, in case of any unlooked-for difficulties which it might be essen-

tial to remove, he was recommended to communicate directly both with the government at home, and with the English minister resident at the seat of the central junta.

Immediately on the receipt of this communication, Sir John Moore set himself actively and seriously to prepare for a full accomplishment of the wishes of his government. After mature deliberation, he determined that it would not be advisable to move any part of the army by sea, but that the whole, infantry and artillery as well as cavalry, should proceed by land. As, however, the roads through Portugal were represented to be extremely bad, and as no magazines or depots of provisions had been established, he resolved to advance, not by one route, but by three; and to unite his columns with that of Sir David Baird at Salamanca. But to move beyond the frontiers of Portugal, unprovided as we were with draft cattle, and having no depots of any kind, was impossible. Though, therefore, the troops were put in motion so early as the 13th, it was fully understood that the campaign would not be opened before November; and even then, from the aspect of things immediately about us, from the inexperience of our own commissariat, and the supineness of the Portuguese, it was extremely doubtful whether anything could be done to the purpose.

The hussar brigade, of which I was put in com-

mand, received instructions to assemble at Villa Vicoso, a town distant twenty-eight leagues from Lisbon, and consequently at no great distance from the frontier. We began our march for this purpose on the 18th of October, and taking it by easy stages, arrived at our mustering place on the 24th. Here the information was communicated to us, that whenever the moment of further advance should arrive, the whole army was to proceed in four columns; one under the command of General Paget, by Elvas and Alcantara; one under Beresford, by Coimbra and Almeida; one under Frazer, by Abrantes and Almeida; and a fourth under Hope, by Elvas, Badajoz, Merida, Medellin, Truxillo, Almanza, Oropesa, and Talavera de la Reyna, towards Madrid. To the latter column, which was to consist chiefly of artillery, with four regiments of infantry to escort it, we were attached.

In passing through the Alentejo, nothing occurred to ourselves particularly deserving of record. We found the country, indeed, in a state of miserable destitution; fields unsown, and hamlets ruined and deserted; whilst it was not without great exertion, and a serious waste of time, that with all the previous arrangements which had been entered into, we found it practicable to procure sufficient food either for men or horses; but we met with no adventures by the way, nor be-

held any objects which had a peculiar claim upon our attention. With such spectacles constantly before the eye, it was impossible not to indulge in a few idle surmises, as to what must have been the fate of the French army, had it attempted to make good its retreat in this direction. The French are, unquestionably, a hardy and enduring race of men; they excel, moreover, in the art of discovering and bringing to account every morsel of nutritious matter which may lie in the direction of their movements; but it appeared as if all their ingenuity, and all their patience, would have failed in carrying them safely through the Alentejo. There was literally nothing left for them to consume. But the difficulty of procuring subsistence would not have been the only obstacle against which they must have contended. The very name of a Frenchman was, in that part of the country, a thing to be abhorred; the peasantry were all ready to fall upon their stragglers; whilst the Spanish army before Elvas, formidable at least in numbers, would have stood seriously in the way of troops disheartened by defeat, and broken down with fatigue and hunger. How sincerely we all regretted that the convention should have interfered to prevent a consummation so devoutly to be wished!

Though our marches had been short, and neither men nor horses seemed at all distressed on

their arrival, we had not occupied Villa Vicosa two days, when symptoms of dysentery began to show themselves amongst us. The weather, too, soon began to break, and the rain came down with such violence, as to induce an apprehension that the wet season had actually set in. These would not have been very gratifying occurrences at any moment; but at a moment like the present they were peculiarly distressing. Nothing, however, remained, except to make the best of them. To the sick every possible attention was paid; and as the disease proved, by good fortune, not to be violent of its kind, the labours of the medical officers were rewarded by their speedy convalescence. Nor did the weather continue, as we had begun to apprehend that it would, obstinately unpropitious. On the contrary, after two days of incessant rain, the clouds dispersed; and by the 3rd of November every appearance in the sky promised a long continuance of sunshine and drought.

The whole of Sir John Hope's corps having by this time assembled, and every other arrangement being complete, on the 5th of November we began our march towards Spain. At first, neither the aspect of the country, nor the manners of the natives, differed very materially from those which had met us in our way hither; for we were still a couple of days' march from the frontier, and the

Portuguese, more than perhaps any other people, carry their own peculiar manners to the extreme line of their country. But the close of our journey presented us with much both to interest and amuse. We halted on the 5th at Elvas; and as we came in at an early hour of the day, such as felt disposed were enabled to take an accurate survey of that highly-striking place.

The first object which here attracts the notice of a stranger, is a magnificent aqueduct, measuring in altitude no less than one thousand feet. It rests upon three or four arches, raised one above the other, and is composed entirely of a remarkably fine and polished stone. In length it measures about three miles, and it conveys all the water which is used in the place, to a cistern of such dimensions, as to be capable of containing a sufficient supply for the inhabitants during six months. Of the town itself, it may be sufficient to state that the streets are generally handsome,—the houses being all built with stone, and extremely neat in their appearance; but though surrounded by a wall, it is not a place of any great strength. It lies, indeed, at the foot of Fort La Lippe, and consequently at its mercy; and it is commanded by other heights, which overlook it from various quarters.

Of Fort La Lippe, it would be no easy task to convey to the mind of the reader an accurate no-

tion, unless some exact plan or drawing were submitted to him. It stands upon the very summit of a steep and commanding eminence, and overhangs the left of the town; the military occupation of which is thus rendered totally impracticable, unless the fort shall have been previously reduced. It appeared to me to be a *chef-d'œuvre* in the science of fortification; and to consist of five principal angles, or rather bastions, each covered by batteries formed into smaller bastions, in tiers, one above another, which gradually recede towards the centre of the fort. From the highest of these you command a view of the whole country for many miles round, and they all communicate with one another,—all, at least, which possess the same degree of elevation by strongly casemated passages. The fort is abundantly supplied with reservoirs for water; and furnaces for heating shot are erected in all the most convenient places; in a word, nothing appears to have been omitted which the knowledge of its founder could suggest as calculated to place it beyond the reach of insult.

The only height, within a moderate distance of the place, upon which, in case of a siege, it would be possible to construct a breaching battery, stands in a line almost directly opposite to the angle which faces the north. It was upon this hill that the Spaniards threw up works during the late investment, when they were so unwilling to permit

the carrying into execution of our convention ; and from it they contrived to throw a few shells into the fort. But little or no damage was done ; nothing, at least, in any degree likely to affect the issues of the siege. Yet, trifling as the damage was, the Portuguese had not taken the trouble to repair it : indeed, it was melancholy to see how completely the national indolence prevailed here. Everything was, as far as it could be, out of order ; and it seemed as if the weather alone would shortly lay in ruins a work, which, if there were no other or more powerful motives to preserve it, deserved to be kept up as a mere specimen of the art.

Having halted at Elvas during the night, we marched next morning soon after dawn ; and passing through a plain of considerable extent, crossed the Guadiana at Badajoz, the capital of Estremadura. This movement introduced us at once into Spain ; and the contrast which was instantly presented to us, both in personal appearance and in manners, between the people of the two nations, I shall not readily forget. Generally speaking, the natives of frontier districts partake almost as much of the character of one nation as of another ; the distinctions between them become, as it were, gradually blended, till they totally disappear. It is not so on the borders of Spain and Portugal. The peasant who cultivates his little field, or tends his flock on the right bank of the

Guadiana, is, in all his habits and notions, a different being from the peasant who pursues similar occupations on its left bank ; the first is a genuine Portuguese, the last a genuine Spaniard. Nor are they more alike to each other in their amities than in their manners. They cordially detest one another ; insomuch, that their common wrongs, and their common enmity to the French, were not sufficient, even at this time, to eradicate the feeling.

It was not, however, by the striking diversity of private character alone which subsisted between them, that we were made sensible, as soon as we had passed the Guadiana, that a new nation was before us. The Spaniards received us with a degree of indifference to which we had not hitherto been accustomed. They were certainly not uncivil ; they poured no execrations upon us, nor did they hoot or rudely annoy us ; but they gave themselves no trouble to evince to us, in any way, their satisfaction at our arrival. Whatever we required they gave us, in return for our money ; but as to enthusiasm, or a desire to anticipate our wants, there was not the shadow of an appearance of anything of the kind about them. How different all this from the poor Portuguese, who never failed to rend the air with their vivas, and were at all times full of promises and protestations, no matter how incapable they might be of fulfilling the one, or

authenticating the other! The truth is, that the Spaniard is a proud, independent, and grave personage; possessing many excellent qualities, but quite conscious of their existence, and not unapt to overrate them. On the present occasion, too, they seemed to be more than ordinarily self-important, in consequence of their late achievements; they were quick to take offence, even where none was intended, and not indisposed to provoke, or engage in broils with our soldiers. Not that any serious disturbance occurred during our stay; the discipline preserved in our own ranks was too good to permit it; but numberless little incidents were continually taking place, which served sufficiently to make us aware of the spirit which actuated the natives. Yet with all this, there was much about the air and manner of the Spaniards to deserve and command our regard. The Portuguese are a people that require rousing; they are indolent, lazy, and generally helpless: we may value these our faithful allies, and render them useful; but it is impossible highly to respect them. In the Spanish character, on the contrary, there is mixed up with a great deal of haughtiness, a sort of manly independence of spirit, which you cannot but admire, even though aware that it will render them by many degrees less favorable to your wishes than their neighbours.

Badajoz is a fine old town, situated on a lofty

eminence, which overhangs the Guadiana on its southern bank. The fortifications were then in a state of tolerable repair; and a *tete-de-pont*, and a fort on the opposite side of the river, gave indication that, in the wars between Spain and Portugal, it had been regarded as a place of some importance. During my sojourn here, I met an old acquaintance, in the person of Colonel Lopez, an officer who had been sent forward by the Spanish government, to assist in clearing the way for our entrance into the country; and who had delayed his journey back, that he might with his own eyes see that proper accommodations were furnished to the troops in their passage. Colonel Lopez had just received despatches from the army of General Castanos, which bore date the 30th of October. He declined submitting them for my perusal; but he acquainted me that Castanos had narrowly escaped being made prisoner when executing a recognizance into the disposition of the French corps. His head-quarters being at Logrono, he had ridden into Lodosa, where a Spanish light battalion was stationed; when the French, by a sudden movement across the Ebro, contrived to surround both him and his escort. Castanos himself escaped; but the battalion, after a brave resistance of two days, during which their ammunition became wholly exhausted, were obliged to surrender. The same officer


described the position of the French army, in the terms in which I have detailed it at the beginning of this chapter. He stated that it was Castanos's intention to cross the Ebro at Tudela, to form a junction with Palafox, and to penetrate into the rear of the enemy; whilst Blake's corps should hang upon their left, and observe Vittoria. These were highly interesting and gratifying communications; unhappily a very few days sufficed to bring proof that they rested upon no solid foundation.

From Badajoz the column departed on the 7th, reaching Talavera la Real that night; and on the following day it came into Merida. Between these two extreme points the country is almost entirely one continued plain; clear and open, and admirable for the operations of cavalry. The accommodations which we met with by the way were moreover such as we had no cause to complain of. In the different towns, all persons who happened to possess stables, freely threw them open, and took in both men and horses in numbers proportioned to the extent of these and of their dwellings; whilst the alcaldes had invariably men in readiness to conduct the soldiers to their quarters, and to collect, at convenient points, forage, bread, meat, and wine, ready for delivery. Everything was done with the most perfect regard to order and precision; and though the marches

were generally severe, varying from twenty-eight to thirty English miles per day, still, as the horses were well fed upon barley and straw, there appeared no reason to apprehend that they would not be brought into the field in as good condition as could be wished. And at Merida it may with truth be asserted, that the hussars were in no respect less efficient than when they first landed at Cascais.

Merida is a handsome old town, full of relics, not a few of which it owes to the skill and industry of the Romans. There are the remains of what must have been a splendid triumphal arch, an amphitheatre, several statues, columns, and old walls, all well worth the attention of the antiquary; and there is a bridge across the Guadiana, which the inhabitants allege to have been built by direction of the emperor Trajan. Nor is it the antiquary only who would find much to interest and amuse him here. The agriculturist might see in the province, generally, much which he has never seen before—ploughs at work, each of them drawn by a single ass or mule, and guided by a single hand; and yet, in spite of the lightness of the soil, crops produced, such as neither Kent nor Norfolk will exceed. Then again there is the breed of sheep, so justly celebrated for its wool, to be found here in perfection, with pigs of the most beautiful and perfect breed. There are no milch

cows here, goat's milk being alone in use, and that extremely scarce and difficult to be had ; but the breed of draft cattle is remarkably fine. The beef, likewise, is excellent ; but that which an Englishman enjoys above all the other productions of the country, is the bread. The poorest peasants here eat bread of the purest and whitest flour, which they generally twist up into a sort of ring, and knead and bake with the utmost care. It is really delicious, and it appeared doubly so to us, who for so many weeks back had eaten nothing but the sour and unwholesome loaves of Portugal.



CHAPTER VIII.

Advance towards Madrid—Rumours of Blake's defeat—Arrival at Naval-carnero—Madrid; the state of public feeling there—Want of energy in the Spanish government, exhausted state of the treasury, and miserable plight of the armies—Movement of General Hope's corps upon Salamanca—Fears lest it should be cut off—Causes of them—Overthrow of the Spanish armies, commanded by Blake, Belvedere, and Castanos—A French corps at Valladolid—Skirmish at Amvola—Rumour of General Baird's retreat—Reflections on the conduct of the war.

HAVING passed the night in Merida, with very considerable comfort to ourselves, we prepared to renew our journey on the following morning. Previous to our setting out, however, two pieces of intelligence reached us, neither of which had any tendency to increase the feeling of satisfaction that attended us on our arrival. In the first place, we were given to understand that, as we proceeded onwards, though we should find at least as good, if not a better, disposition among the people, the

fare and general accommodations furnished, would greatly deteriorate. The country was represented as naturally more sterile, and its means, scanty at the best, were said to be quite exhausted during the recent struggle. In the next place, and this was a piece of news much more alarming, a report got into circulation, that Blake had sustained a serious defeat in Biscay, and had retreated, no one knew whither, with the loss of three thousand men. The reinforcements, likewise, to the French army, of which we had heard something previous to our advance from Portugal, were stated to have arrived; and their numbers were estimated at sixty thousand infantry, and from five to seven thousand cavalry. All this was startling enough, but as yet there were no authentic sources to which it could be traced back; and as evils are usually exaggerated, we willingly believed that much exaggeration might have been employed on the present occasion. At all events, our course was a very simple one; we had only to follow our instructions, and move in the direction of Madrid.

In the expectations which we had been led to form respecting the reception and entertainment that awaited us, we were not disappointed. The people, though supine, were remarkably civil; whilst the treatment which we received from them, if in some respects less agreeable than that which we had hitherto experienced, was still as generous

as we had any reason to look for at their hands. They gave us freely whatever they themselves possessed, and we had no right to demand more. We accordingly pushed on in good order and in excellent spirits, and passing through Medellin, Miajadas, Truxillo, Jaraicejo, Almaraz, Navalморal, Talavera del Reyno, and St. Ollalo, at each of which a night was spent, we reached, at last, a temporary halting place, in the town of Navalcarnero. As this place was distant from Madrid not more than twenty miles, I determined to quit the brigade for a couple of days, for the purpose of visiting that city; and it may not, perhaps, prove uninteresting to the reader if I lay before him a sketch of the condition, military and political, in which I found it.

The first person whom I made it my business to see was Lord William Bentinck, at that time officially resident in Madrid, and in attendance upon the supreme government. I found him disconcerted, in no ordinary degree, at the manner in which all things were conducted. The junta, it appeared, did nothing, or rather it was doing everything which Buonaparte could have desired. There was neither energy nor decision in the councils of the government—there was no money in the treasury—stores of every kind were wanting; and anarchy and misrule seemed to prevail in every department. Morla was at this time

secretary to the committee for the management of military affairs; and Morla was known to be an able, as he was then believed to be an honourable man; but the managing committee itself was made up of men, as ignorant as they were credulous. In their meetings there was abundance of cabal and party spirit, but neither talent nor information. Such were the accounts which Lord William gave of the Spaniards; whilst of our own situation he drew no more flattering picture. He was himself totally in the dark, and he believed that others were equally so, touching the amount and situation of the French army; he knew only that they were rapidly advancing, and in great force; but where they were now, or whither they might move hereafter, he was completely ignorant. So much, indeed, was he struck with the absence of all vigour in the conduct of the Spanish authorities, that he already appeared to regard the game as desperate. Our columns might, he conceived, effect their junction at Salamanca; it was even probable, from the accounts which had recently reached him, that they would; but it was by no means impossible that the enemy might succeed in throwing a strong corps in the way of that junction; for there were no Spaniards up in a state to oppose them.

These were certainly not the most acceptable communications which might have been made,

particularly to one who was already aware of the somewhat sombre temperament of his own leader. Sir John Moore was a most excellent but cautious man ; too much so perhaps to give his own abilities a free scope, or to do himself justice in the cause in which he had embarked : he had set out with the avowed determination of acting only in conjunction with the Spanish armies ; and he would not move at all till the whole of his force should be assembled. Now, if there could be one truth more self-evident than another in the existing state of affairs, it was this, that to look for any adequate support from the Spaniards till he should have more decidedly entered upon his great enterprise, was useless ; the question therefore was, would he, when at the head of thirty thousand British troops, including a brilliant, fresh, and most efficient cavalry, abstain from striking a blow ? There was too much reason to apprehend that he would ; though the army appeared to feel that now was the time to strike, or never. It is true that Buonaparte in person was stated to be either at Burgos or Vittoria, and that large masses, both of infantry and cavalry, were on their march to join him ; but the force immediately up was represented as not exceeding that under Sir John : why not endeavour to bring him to action ?

On the other hand, the junta appeared to be in

a state of the most pitiable alarm, lest Madrid should again fall into the hands of the enemy. They pestered General Moore with daily requests, that, in case of any reverse, he should fall back, not upon Portugal, or towards the north, but upon the capital; and they were particularly desirous that General Hope's corps might be detached altogether, and assist in the defence of the city. For they declared their determination to accept of no terms; and to make no submission to the invaders. Madrid, they affirmed, should be a second Saragoza; and if any judgment could be formed from the display of enthusiasm exhibited by the lower orders, it required but a moderate share of ability and good faith on the part of their chiefs to realise the boast.

I have said that the situation of affairs in general, as these at least were represented, demanded a decisive line of conduct from Sir John Moore; and that, upon every principle of warfare, a prompt commencement of offensive operations was required at his hands. Of the justice of this remark the reader will be the better able to judge, when I inform him, that upon our first line of operations, there were computed to be in arms, of Spanish and English troops, 116,000 infantry, and about 2700 cavalry. These were miserably scattered, it is true. There were the remains of Blake's corps at Reynosa, estimated at 20,000 men; General

Baird's corps of 12,000, including 1400 cavalry, was on its march from Astorga to Benevente; Moore himself had collected full 15,000 at Salamanca; and Hope's division, of five thousand men, was at the Escorial, already under orders to move upon Salamanca. There was also General St. Juan's corps, estimated at twenty thousand men, which occupied the passes of the Somosierra and Guadarama; whilst the armies of Arragon, commanded by Palafox, Omel, and Doyle, and that of Castanos united, could not amount to less than forty thousand. No doubt the latter force was far removed from any of the former, for its head-quarters were said to be at Saragoza, and its right towards the Pyrenees; it was likewise in the most imminent danger; for Blake being overthrown, the enemy seemed to be collecting all their strength, for the purpose of surrounding and overwhelming Castanos; yet the probabilities were, that a forward movement, executed with promptitude, might defeat that design; and there would be no very serious risk in advancing, at all events, to Valladolid. Nor was this the only circumstance which seemed to point out the propriety of adopting decisive measures. The French, though extremely formidable, were not as yet equal to the allies in point of numbers; their army, increased some time ago to eighty thousand men, had received an additional reinforcement of thirty

thousand only; the odds were therefore on our side. But it was not probable that we should long enjoy this superiority, as fresh troops were understood to be in progress from all parts of France towards the Spanish frontier.

But whilst thus arguing, let me not forget, in justice to the memory of a most excellent, intrepid, and able officer, to state one or two reasons why he should not rush, as it were headlong, into unseen dangers. His information, like that of the Supreme Junta itself, was most defective. Upon public and official reports, no confidence whatever could be placed; and from private sources of intelligence he seemed to be even carefully cut off. It was from his own officers alone, from Colonel Graham, Captain Whittingham, and others, whom he from time to time employed in collecting such facts as might fall in their way, that he received any communications on which he considered himself justified in relying; and these all united in representing the Spanish armies as not only half-armed, and otherwise wretchedly equipped, but inefficient also in respect of numbers. Corps put down by the juntas at twenty or thirty thousand men, proved, when inspected by these officers, to muster eight or ten; and of these eight or ten thousand, perhaps one-half, or nearly one-half, might be unprovided with muskets. Then, of the position of the enemy, no one knew anything. That they were

concentrating, seemed to be generally understood ; and that their object was to overwhelm Castanos, most men apprehended ; but no one could speak with confidence, because no one spoke on other grounds than those of common rumour. Nor was this all. Dissensions and quarrels were said to have arisen, both in the juntas and in the armies, at this most critical moment. Castanos was said to be harassed in his command by the presence of the commissioner Palafox ; and to be on bad terms with those under him. Romana was true and able, but he was at a distance, and had his hands full ; whilst Sir John Moore's own position, half-way between us and Baird, rendered any immediate movement extremely hazardous, either to the one flank or the other. That these circumstances carried great weight in the mind of our chief, his future proceedings proved ; but it is now high time to resume this detail.

I have said that the central junta was extremely anxious that some British troops should be detached from the main army, for the express purpose of covering Madrid ; and as General Hope's division chanced to be nearest at hand, the most urgent entreaties were pressed upon him, to come into this plan at his own discretion. It was strongly urged upon him, that were his corps to unite itself to that of General St. Juan, the passes of Somosierra and of the Guadarama would be

perfectly secured. General Hope, however, whose head-quarters were now at the Escorial, could not listen to any suggestion of the kind. The orders from his superior were abundantly explicit to join him, unless something extraordinary came in the way, at Salamanca; and General Hope saw nothing, either in the immediate situation or future prospects of the Spanish capital, to lead him into a neglect of these orders. Having, therefore, halted a few days, for the purpose of collecting his stragglers, and closing up the cavalry, which had marched at some distance from the rear of his column, he made preparations for pushing on, with as little delay as possible, upon Salamanca.

On the 27th, the whole division passed the Guadarama mountains; and the 18th hussars, with the 71st infantry, reached Villa Castrin, on the opposite side of the Sierra. Next day, the rest of the infantry, together with three brigades of guns and the whole park of ammunition-waggons, reached the same point; whilst the hussars pushed on to Adanero, where they took the duty of the outposts. But though our movements had been so far abundantly satisfactory, certain intelligence came in that day, which caused considerable uneasiness, as well to General Hope as to all who happened to be intrusted with it. It was in substance as follows:—

Lord Proby had been sent forward by Sir John Moore on the road to Valladolid, with the view, if possible, of ascertaining whereabouts the enemy were, and how they might appear disposed to act. Lord Proby had proceeded as far as Tordesillas, when a patrol of the French cavalry entered the town, and he with great difficulty escaped being made prisoner. In spite of this interruption, however, he so far effected his object as to be able to report that six hundred French cavalry, with two field-pieces and two howitzers, were actually in Tordesillas, and that they were supported by six hundred more who occupied Valladolid. The former force, he stated, had advanced their posts as far as Puerto del Douro and Arnajo, and detachments from both were scouring the country, levying contributions, and acting exactly as if no troops were in the field against them. But this was not all the intelligence which his despatch contained. It appeared that the magistrates of the towns and villages near, had received requisitions, accompanied by proclamations, from Marshal Bessieres, indicating that he was on his march from Palencia, at the head of ten thousand men; that he expected to be in Valladolid on the 24th; and that he should look to find rations prepared for his men, as well as forage for his horses, along the whole line of his march.

The reader will easily believe that such information, coming from such a quarter, produced no little stir among the principal functionaries of our little corps. Whoever will take the trouble to consult the map, may see that the distance from Valladolid to Salamanca is at least not greater than from Villa Castine to the latter place; and hence that, supposing the two corps to have arrived at their several destinations on the same day, there was every probability that Bessieres, unencumbered as he doubtless was with waggons, and even with artillery, would be able to throw himself between us and our point of rendezvous, should he feel so disposed. But if such were the case on the supposition of our arriving simultaneously at Valladolid and Villa Castine, the danger of being intercepted was doubled, provided the French Marshal should have acted up to the purport of his manifestos, and entered Valladolid on the 24th. Bad, however, as this was, it was not the worst news that met us here; for on the very same night a courier came in with accounts of the disastrous battle of Tudela. That the reader may the better understand how this misfortune threatened to affect us, it will be necessary for me to draw off his attention, for a few moments, from the details of our own proceedings, and to make him acquainted with the operations of the different

Spanish corps, upon whose efficiency we had been all along led to calculate.

Previous to our entrance into Spain, we had been given to understand that three large armies, one under Blake and Romana, another under Castanos, and a third, which kept up the communication between these two, under the Conde de Belvidere, were all manœuvring in the front and on the flanks of the French line, and would probably overwhelm it ere we should be able to join them. The manœuvring of the three corps proved to be nothing more than a mere retention of their separate positions, in which they watched the French, with extreme caution no doubt, but from which they never dreamed of attempting anything offensive. In this state things continued till the enemy's reinforcements arrived; and then it was left to them to form their own plan, and to choose their own field of operations. The first Spanish General who felt the weight of their prowess was Blake; he was attacked in his position in the debouches of Villarcayo, Orduna, and Munjuca; from which, after a very spirited and obstinate resistance, he retired upon Espinosa. No time, however, was granted him for breathing. On the very day after his arrival there, he was again assailed by an overwhelming force; and his army, worn out with fatigue, and destitute of pro-

visions and clothing, was utterly dispersed. It fled in all directions, and the magazines at Reynosa, as well as the harbour of St. Andero, were both taken possession of by the enemy.

Whilst the operations which led to this victory were going on, Buonaparte himself entered Spain, and fixed his head-quarters, on the 8th of November, at Vittoria. His first act was to send forward a corps, under the orders of Marshal Soult, against the Estremadura army, which, headed by the Conde Belvidere, lay in his front. Belvidere was a young man of great bravery, but said to be deficient in military talent; he took up a defensive position near Burgos, and awaited the approach of the enemy. The consequence was, that, attacked in an open country by veteran troops, of which a large proportion was cavalry, he suffered a complete defeat, upwards of three thousand dead being left upon the field, and the rest scattered, beyond the possibility of immediate reunion. Thus were two of the three armies, of which so much notice had been taken, summarily disposed of; it remained now only to dispose of the third in a like manner; nor did any great while elapse ere it also was made to succumb under superior discipline and numbers.

Castanos was at this time posted in the vicinity of Calahorra, and had under his orders the united armies of Andalusia and Arragon. Of the num-

bers which composed that army, it is impossible even now to speak with accuracy ; for the records of Spanish history are so overrun with exaggeration, that it would be extremely unsafe, in almost any case, to rely upon them ; but from every credible rumour, it could not exceed forty thousand men ; and of these, perhaps, one half only were adequately armed. As soon as Castanos heard of the fate of Blake's and Belvidere's armies, he declared his determination to retreat, and to avoid, as long as he possibly could, bringing matters to the issue of a battle. But Castanos was not left to the guidance of his own judgment. He was beset by spies from the central junta, which, on all occasions, appeared to distrust its generals, in exact proportion to their abilities ; and he was by them urged and importuned to take a step, of the folly of which his better reason had long convinced him. He fell back from Calahorra upon Tudela, and there risked an action. As he had anticipated, his raw army was beaten ; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the General could keep together, after the defeat, a force sufficient to form the nucleus of another. With this he fled, rather than retreated, to Calatayud, where his troops endured all the miseries of destitution, and even famine to the utmost.

It soon became known that the enemy were moving in force upon Segovia ; and though Segovia

was occupied by a division of St. Juan's army, amounting to six thousand men, under General Aradia, no great confidence could be cherished, that such an impediment would long delay him. The resistance to be offered by Segovia had already been measured, by the facility with which St. Juan might be able to defend himself in the Somosierra pass. In case he should succeed in holding that, then was General Aradia to keep his post to the last extremity; but if the Somosierra were carried, then was Aradia to fall back at once upon the Guadarama pass. Now the Guadarama pass was the only road left open for our retreat, in the event of our junction with Sir John Moore being cut off by troops from Valladolid; should it likewise be forced, our situation would become a desperate one. Nothing indeed remained, except to throw ourselves into Avila; where, as it was a fortified place, we must needs maintain ourselves, till Sir John Moore should be able to advance to our relief.

When General Hope began his march from the Escorial, he intended to proceed by Adanero to Arrivola, and from thence to Madrigal, Penaranda, Huerto, and so onwards to Salamanca. As soon, however, as the above intelligence reached him, he prudently determined to alter his route, and to move by a road considerably to the left, and of course further from the direct line of the enemy's

probable operations. The cavalry accordingly received orders to march on the 30th to Fontiveros, and to occupy posts for the protection of the column of artillery and infantry, which moved on the same day to Avila. On the following morning the march was resumed, and the road to Penaranda taken, where the column arrived without molestation on the 2nd of December; but the main body of the cavalry was still kept at Fontiveros, whilst its outposts were extended as far as Adanero, Arrivola, Villa Nova de Aroud, Madrigal, Royama, and even to Penaranda itself. Thus were the rear and the right flanks of the division perfectly secured; and it was rendered quite impracticable for the enemy to harass its movements, without at least sufficient time being gained to provide against any emergency.

It is hardly necessary to say, that my own position was with the cavalry. While thus employed, I instituted various inquiries as to the nature and strength of the French troops which had shown themselves in this quarter; and I heard that they consisted only of portions of a partisan corps, detached at a great distance from their main body, and intended to effect no other end, than merely to spread alarm over the country, and distract people's attention. In this they had certainly succeeded; whilst the chief part of their force was moving all the while towards their left, with the

design, after the defeat of Castanos, of overwhelming St. Juan, and taking possession of Madrid. How it came about, that they made no attempt to penetrate between our columns; whether the possibility of succeeding in the effort had not occurred to them, or that they considered the other an object of much greater importance, I had of course no means of ascertaining. But I did ascertain that they had not, from the first, made any movement, either partially or generally, which could lead to the supposition, that such an undertaking had ever entered into their contemplation.

We had traversed a large portion of Spain, and during the last few weeks had been almost constantly in the immediate presence of the enemy; yet, strange to say, we had never exchanged shots. On the 29th, at night, that event occurred for the first time. It might be about midnight, when the videttes, furnished by the picket at Arrivola, gave an alarm that the French were coming on. The troopers mounted and made ready, and in a few minutes found themselves attacked by a strong party of cavalry; concerning the nature of which, whether it were the advanced-guard of a corps, or a mere patrol, they were unavoidably ignorant. As nothing was to be gained by keeping possession of Arrivola, our people, after skirmishing for a few minutes, fell back; but they were not pursued,

and they halted for the night at a house upon the road-side, distant about half a mile from the village. At daylight they once more advanced upon Arrivola. The movement was, of course, made with extreme caution; though for caution, as the event proved, there was no necessity; for the enemy had abandoned the place several hours before, having taken time merely to plunder the post-office. This was the only event which befell us from the hour of our quitting Lisbon, up to the day of our junction with the main body of the army at Salamanca.

During the 3rd of December, no change took place in the position of the cavalry; its main body still continuing at Fontiveros, whilst its posts were extended, as before, along the flank of the column of infantry: little, therefore, occurred calculated to amuse or excite; for the enemy made no movements, and we were left entirely to ourselves. Whilst thus situated, every little piece of intelligence which happened to come in, attracted a degree of attention far deeper and more lasting than, in all probability, would have been the case had our minds and bodies been more actively employed. All the rumours which reached us were not, however, in themselves uninteresting; at least there was one, which, under any circumstances, would have driven us, in spite of ourselves, into a train of speculation and inquiry.

We were given to understand that Sir David Baird's column, which had landed at Corunna on the 13th of the preceding month, and had advanced on the road to Salamanca as far as Astorga, had suddenly received orders to fall back again upon Corunna. Such intelligence excited in us great surprise; nor could we see either the motive which should lead to such a measure, or the necessity which could compel it. Was it that a retreat had been determined upon, in order to save Portugal, by abandoning Spain altogether? or were we to take shipping, and proceeding southwards to Cadiz, to make the south instead of the north of Spain the theatre of our operations? These were questions which, at the outposts, it was impossible to answer; yet was it equally impossible not to perceive the unhappy results which would certainly follow out of the one as well as the other. This was not the moment for retracting, unless we should be fairly driven to it by a force overwhelmingly superior; and of such we certainly saw nothing, at least in our immediate front. Our business, on the contrary, was to advance; and the late disasters, so far from taking away from that necessity, only increased it.

In order to carry on operations with at least a fair prospect of success, several modes of acting were before us. In the first place, supposing the Somosierra and the Guadarama passes to be de-

fensible by St. Juan's army, and that the remains of Castanos's troops should have arrived, as they were said to have arrived, at Siguenza, on the 30th, all immediate apprehension as to the fate of Madrid might safely be laid aside. In this case, Moore's column might endeavour to unite itself with that of Blake, either at Leon or at any other convenient spot in that quarter, Sir David Baird's corps directing its march upon the same point; and as Blake was represented to have still twenty thousand men under his orders, the junction of the two would make up a formidable force, fit either for offensive or defensive undertakings. Upon this centre, the scattered battalions from the other armies might easily rally; and then, or even earlier, should it be deemed advisable, an advance upon Valladolid might be undertaken, and a campaign opened, upon a grand scale, with the combined strength of the whole.

In the next place, and still taking it for granted that the passes could be maintained for some time, the British army would run but little risk, were it, unconnected with any Spanish force whatever, to advance from Salamanca, by Abba de Tormes, upon Madrid. There was no force between these two points capable of resisting it; and the very knowledge that it was in motion to the front, would call off the attention of the enemy from their present plans, and give time to the broken

Spaniards to collect and recover their order. And lastly, should matters fall out in every respect contrary to our wishes and interests; should the Somosierra pass be carried, and all communication between St. Juan's army and the army at Sigüenza be cut off; should Blake's corps be so completely broken up, as to be rendered incapable of rallying or re-assembling; and Portugal be fallen into a state of helpless inactivity,—even in the event of all these misfortunes befalling us, we were not without a resource. There was nothing to prevent St. Juan's and Castanos's troops from retreating with all speed upon Cuenca or Valencia, and to unite themselves there with the Catalonians; or passing the Sierra Morena, to collect everything around them under the walls of Cadiz; whilst we also, with a good grace, might change our ground from the north to the south; whither our shipping could convey us from any ports between Corunna and Lisbon. At all events, a precipitate retreat, at a moment like the present, was unpopular. Our army had suffered no disasters; it had never come into contact with the enemy; it was now in the very centre of Spain, and the eyes not of Spain only, but of all Europe, were upon it;—what would be the consequence were it to abandon the capital without striking a blow, and quit the field before a single encounter had taken place? No doubt the game was a deep

one; but it was the last which England had to play, and it appeared desirable in the eyes of the army to play it boldly.

Such were the ideas which occurred at the moment, and which, in spite of very dispiriting intelligence from other quarters, continued to remain uppermost in our minds. The supineness and inactivity of the Portuguese, excessive as these were represented to be, in no respect led to a change of opinion. It is true that, from these, little efficient co-operation was to be expected; the energies of the people being applied wholly to the arrangement of religious processions; and the government, either from the absence of power or of ability, making no attempt whatever to support us; for even a line of dragoons, between Sir John Moore's army and that of the British commander in Lisbon, though requested in the joint names of these two functionaries, was refused. Yet in Spain the case was certainly different. There the common people, with some remarkable exceptions, were all enthusiastic in the cause; in Madrid this was particularly the case, as their expressions of joy, at beholding a British uniform, abundantly testified. Why should men thus actuated be abandoned? It was no good reason to urge, that the inhabitants of Estremadura and Toledo had exhibited symptoms of a self-confidence sadly misplaced, and of a hauteur and irritability of tem-

per highly disagreeable to their allies. Among them the French had not yet appeared; they knew nothing, therefore, either of the sufferings or of the defeats of their fellow-countrymen, except by report. With as little justice might it be urged, that the people of Old Castile deserved no support, because they were either unwilling or unable to defend themselves. The people of Old Castile present doubtless a poor specimen of the Spanish character; and resemble, in indolence and sloth, the natives of Portugal rather than those of Spain; but the people of Old Castile constituted but a small portion of the Spanish nation. Spain itself was not to be abandoned, because some Spaniards were spiritless or uncivil.

But Napoleon himself was in the field, his headquarters being already at Aranda. It was to be regretted that the case should be so, and that Alexander had not detained him somewhat longer at Erfurth; for he had, beyond question, appeared upon our stage too soon. Still, even Napoleon was not invincible. And, lastly, there was no unanimity, no vigour, no energy, in the proceedings either of the Spanish government or the Spanish generals. Instead of nominating some one person as commander-in-chief, to whom all the other generals might pay obedience, each leader of an army was left to act according to the suggestions of his own fancy; and all were, or claim-

ed to be, on a footing of the most perfect equality. Palafox, Blake, and Cuesta, were continually intriguing and caballing against one another; Castanos had been ruined by the presence of spies, and Blake sacrificed to a similar interference. As to Romana, his place of sojourn was quite unknown, though rumours were in circulation, both that he was about to be placed at the head of the Spanish armies, and that he might be daily expected at Salamanca, to consult with Moore. No doubt these were terrible evils; so terrible, as to bring upon Spain greater danger and greater calamities, than she ran the smallest risk of incurring from the efforts of the enemy. Yet were they not such as to authorise our withdrawal from the scene of action, at a time when upon our presence the very existence of the country might be said to depend. Besides, there was something so galling to the mind of a British soldier in the prospect of flight before he was beaten, that no one could think of it with patience. The very common troopers seemed indignant at the suggestion; and it certainly did appear strange, that whilst the women of Madrid were labouring night and day to put their city in a posture of defence, we should be preparing to abandon them.

CHAPTER IX.

Visit to head-quarters, and interview with Sir John Moore—
A retreat determined upon—General dissatisfaction of the
army—The idea of retreating abandoned, and orders issued
to advance—Movement upon Tordesillas—Skirmish at
Rueda—Sir John Moore resolves to attack Soult on the
Carrion—The army advances for that purpose—Brilliant
affair of cavalry at Sahagun—Preparations for a battle sud-
denly countermanded.

HAVING good reason to believe that the French
were all moving upon Madrid, and that there was
no probability of any attack being made upon our
posts for some time to come, I set off at an early
hour on the morning of the 4th, and reached Sala-
manca about noon on the day following. I was
induced to take this step, not from mere curiosity
alone, but in consequence of certain letters which
I had received from Sir John Moore, concerning
the contents of which I was desirous of personally
consulting him. I entered the place full of doubts

and apprehensions ; and I certainly did not quit it with apprehensions allayed, or doubts removed.

Having waited upon the General, and the compliments usual on such occasions having passed, our conversation naturally took the turn into which the present situation of affairs, and the position of the army, were calculated to guide it. It was then that Sir John explicitly stated to me, that he had come to a final determination to retreat. He had called the general officers together, he added, for the purpose of acquainting them with his decision, as well as with the reasons which led to it ; but he had neither requested their opinions, nor demanded their judgment. He next entered, at great length, into the motives which swayed him, reasoning, in conversation, as he reasoned in his letters, with a decided leaning to the gloomy side of the picture. He spoke warmly in condemnation of the Spanish government, and of the nation generally ; and enlarged upon the absence of all right understanding among the generals, as well as upon the absurdity of their military movements, which had subjected them all to be beaten in detail. He expressed his sincere regret that they had not marched, as they ought to have done, when he first began to enter the country, so as to unite themselves with him ; and declared that, with a force as yet uncollected, and having nothing but the remains of defeated corps on his flanks, a

choice of evils alone remained for him. The determination to which he had at last come, was not formed without extreme pain to himself; but the duty of preserving his army, situated as it now was, presented to his mind a consideration paramount to every other; he was, therefore, resolved to retreat.

Though I could not but feel deeply on hearing such a declaration, I deemed it my respectful duty to say little in reply, further than by expressing my regret that so strong a necessity for the measure should exist, and my apprehension of its consequences to the cause. The slightest indication of a retrograde movement, exhibited at such a moment as this, would, I feared, produce fatal effects; for Spain would fall, Portugal would fall, and the whole of Europe be once more at the feet of the enemy. Then what would become of Madrid, whose inhabitants were enduring the severest privations, chiefly with the hope of receiving aid from us; and of Castanos, and Palafox, and Blake, all of whom, on the same explicit understanding, were labouring to re-assemble their scattered troops. No doubt, I added, the General's information was more likely to be correct than mine; but I dreaded the heavy disappointment which his proposed step would occasion to the people of England, whose very hearts seemed set upon the success of his under-

taking; and whose mortification at his failure would be bitter, in proportion to the degree of hope with which they saw him embark upon it. I then retired, with the painful conviction on my mind, that the army would begin its backward journey in the course of a day or two at the furthest.

The feelings of regret under which I laboured were not, I soon found, confined to my own breast; they were shared by many in the army. Even the General's personal staff sought not to conceal their chagrin at the adoption of a system which seemed so unsatisfactory. General Hope having by this time joined, there were at Salamanca and in the neighbourhood full twenty thousand British troops, in a state, both from their equipment and discipline, to oppose any French force of almost double the number. General Baird, with a strong reinforcement, particularly in cavalry, was at Astorga; nor were there any impediments whatever in his way, which should hinder him from arriving within six days at the furthest. But if it should be deemed unsafe to wait so long here, why not move towards him, and concentrate the divisions behind the Douro, from whence offensive operations might be undertaken? Any thing, in short, was pronounced preferable to a retreat, which, independently of the disgrace which it would bring upon the Bri-

tish arms, must expose Madrid to destruction, and cause the certain annihilation of Castanos and Palafox's armies. Seldom did men, situated as we were, venture to speak out so boldly against the measures of their chief. But murmurings and remonstrances were useless; the die was cast, and it could not be recalled.

In the midst of these discussions, news came in from the capital, which served to produce an effect upon the mind of our General. The Spaniards were represented as prepared to bury themselves under the ruins of the city, and to perish to a man, before the French should enter. In the short space of forty-eight hours they had unpaved the streets, and loaded the balconies and flat roofs of their houses with the stones, in readiness to be hurled on the heads of the assailants. A huge trench was already drawn round the entire circumference of the city; numerous outworks were begun, and men and women of all ranks and classes were labouring incessantly for their completion. Morla had assumed the chief command of the place; and all were united in one enthusiastic resolution to conquer or perish. It is probably needless to add that the annunciation of these tidings served but to increase our discontent. Men were no longer contented to express generally their disapprobation of the retreat, but each

was ready with his own plan, from the adoption of which he was perfectly convinced that the most advantageous results might arise. Why not move to the right, cried one, and endeavour to unite with Castanos? Should matters come to the worst, there will always be a retreat across the Sierra Morena, upon Cadiz. Why not make a forward movement at once, exclaimed another, or else close up our own troops in the rear of the Douro? this will at least retard the enemy's operations, if it do not absolutely defeat them? Was it to be expected that Buonaparte, having gone so far, would relinquish Spain, till his whole strength should have been brought against it? or that the raw Spanish levies would not suffer defeats? Were there no provinces whither, in the event of being overpowered, the British army could withdraw, still warm in the cause, and still capable of exertion? Would not a British force in the north of Spain, even though driven to act on the defensive; or the same force retiring gradually towards the south, and gathering round it, as it went, the remnants of the different Spanish corps, cast prodigious difficulties in the way of the enemy, and give prodigious encouragement to our allies? All these questions were asked with the tone which men will assume, when matters are in progress of which they disapprove; and it was

answered, as if with one voice, that half the army had better be sacrificed, than the cause thus abandoned.

Notwithstanding these murmurs, of which he was not left in ignorance, General Moore exhibited no signs of any alteration in his previous resolutions. On the contrary, Lord Paget, who had been previously commanded to close up from Astorga with the whole of the cavalry, received orders not to march; and it was given out that the retrograde movement would commence on the day after the morrow; one cavalry regiment only was summoned, but it was called in for the avowed purpose of strengthening the hussar brigade, and enabling it to cover more effectually the retreat of the column. Thus, on the night of the 5th, the troops retired to rest, in the unshaken belief that the proud hopes with which they had entered this country, were all doomed to suffer overthrow.

Having remained during the night in Salamanca, I departed on the following morning to the outposts, which had been drawn in, and now occupied stations in the immediate front of this city. I had not resumed my ordinary routine of duty many hours, when, to my inexpressible satisfaction, intelligence was communicated to me that the General had altered his plans. Sir David Baird, who had actually begun his retrograde

movement from Astorga, was ordered to retrace his steps; and an advance, instead of a retreat, was understood to be in contemplation. Never has a condemned criminal rejoiced more heartily at the receipt of a reprieve, than did the British army when these tidings got abroad among them. But a few hours ago, and every face looked blank and woe-begone; men did their duty, indeed, attended to their horses and accoutrements, and performed all the other offices which their stations required; but they set about every thing with the air of people who took no manner of interest in what they were doing. Now all was life and activity, insomuch, that even occupations, which but a few hours ago would have cost many a complaint whilst in process of execution, were executed, not only without murmur, but with apparent satisfaction.

It was but natural that the curiosity of all should be powerfully excited respecting the causes which, in so short a space of time, had produced effects so remarkable. Whilst by some it was surmised that the disapprobation of the general officers to his proposed measures, had of itself induced Sir John Moore to take them into further and more serious consideration; others, with perhaps more reason, attributed the circumstance mainly to the receipt of fresh information from Madrid, and letters which were known to have

come in from Mr. Frere. From the former of these it was collected, that the inhabitants of the capital had abated nothing of their ardour; that the French had made one assault, in which they were repulsed with loss; and that, from the temper of the people and the zeal of their leaders, it was anticipated that no better success would attend them in others. Such were the news from Madrid; whilst Mr. Frere's letter was understood to contain little else than one tissue of cogent reasons against any movement to the rear. Mr. Frere was doubtless fully justified in writing in this strain; as minister from the court of England, he was perfectly authorised to give advice respecting the course to be pursued by the English General, even if that officer had abstained from requesting it; but Sir John Moore having repeatedly solicited his opinion, as to the prudence or imprudence of schemes in agitation, his right to speak or write strongly became increased four-fold. Mr. Frere, however, in my humble judgment, erred, in desiring that Colonel Charmilly should be examined before a council of war prior to any movement being made. Respecting Colonel Charmilly's trust-worthiness, I beg to be understood as offering no opinion; he might have been a very good and a very prudent man, or he might have been the reverse; but in either case it would have been not only insulting to the Commander of

the forces, to have the judgment of an unofficial emigrant set up in opposition to his own ; but the consequences might have been in every way ruinous. Sir John Moore dismissed that person with marks of dissatisfaction ; and I think I should have done the same.

In spite of all this, however, and in spite of the excessive timidity of the Supreme Junta, which on the first alarm of danger had fled to Badajoz, at the very extremity of the kingdom, only one opinion can, I conceive, be formed, as to the soundness of the views taken by Mr. Frere on the present occasion. No doubt we should have had serious difficulties to contend against, not the least serious of which was presented by the disorganised and disjointed state of the Spanish armies ; but of the evils arising from that system, even the imbecile government seemed to be aware ; and there was a prospect that the separate corps would be shortly brought together under some single chief. Romana, too, was generally spoken of as the man ; and in Romana we had all great confidence. Now should this plan be acted upon, as we had good reason to believe it would, the absence of the junta, so far from being a subject of regret, ought rather to be viewed as one of cordial congratulation ; inasmuch as the intrigues, cabals, and absurdities, which attended constantly upon its deliberations, were likely to produce less mischief when the body itself

was at a distance, than if it were near at hand. But to return to our own movements.

It was on the evening of the 5th,—on the evening of the very day on which I had my last interview with him, that Sir John Moore's sentiments began to waver. A courier was accordingly despatched that night, with directions to General Baird not to persist in his movement upon Corunna; and on the following morning a second courier set off, bearing orders for him to retrace his steps upon the Astorga road. At the same time Colonel Graham was despatched to Madrid, for the purpose of ascertaining the real condition of the city, and of bringing back such accounts as might be worthy of confidence. This officer, who throughout the war peculiarly distinguished himself by his activity and diligence, had come in, only a few days before, with tidings of the defeat of St. Juan's army, and the forcing of the Somosierra pass by a corps of French cavalry. It was then that men began to inquire why measures had not been adopted to secure that pass more effectually, than by leaving it to the care of a Spanish levy of half-armed peasants; and many were of opinion, that had General Hope's corps taken a position there, much time might have been gained; whilst Baird's column joining Sir John Moore's, the whole might have advanced together, or, in case of reverses, fallen back in a body upon Madrid. That advan-

tage, however, was lost ; and hence not only would any movement of troops upon the capital be made at a double risk, but even a single messenger—such as Colonel Graham—was compelled to make a long detour, in order to reach it in safety. By a circuitous route, however, Colonel Graham proceeded ; and upon the results of his mission, and the report which he might happen to bring back, the future operations of the army were understood to depend.

In these uncertain measures, and still more in the general tenor of his conversation, it was easy to perceive marks of the gloom which at this time overshadowed the mind of General Moore. That he was an officer of great distinction, every one acknowledged during his life, and posterity will never deny it ; but it was too manifest that a fear of responsibility, a dread of doing that which was wrong, of running himself and his troops into difficulties from which they might not be able to extricate themselves, were a great deal too active to permit either his talents or his judgment properly to exert their influence. Sir John Moore had earned the highest reputation as a general of division ; he was aware of this ; and perhaps he felt no inclination to risk it—at all events, he was clearly incapable of despising partial obstacles in the pursuit of some great ultimate advantage ; in one word, he was not a Wellington. Of this no

more convincing proof need be given, than the fact that, even at the moment when preparations for an advance were going on, his whole heart and soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese frontier. Did any one talk to him of the possibility of gaining Valladolid, and then, in case of the worst, of retiring into the northern provinces, and acting on the defensive, he would answer by a declaration that in the north there were no supplies; and that it was a country, in every point of view, most unfavourable for military evolutions. Perhaps this might be true. The northern provinces are certainly barren enough; and we should have doubtless been met by a variety of inconveniences, had we made them the theatre of our operations; but with the sea open to us, what had we to apprehend? Besides, even upon the supposition that our first and greatest object was to defend Portugal, it was by no means certain that we might not cover it as effectually by taking up positions in the north of Spain, as by falling back at once upon the frontier. Unless the French possessed a disposable force much greater than we had reason to believe they did, it was extremely improbable that they would venture to pass us by; whereas, were we to retire, they would of course pursue, and thus the whole of the Peninsula would be gradually overrun.

But though our leader seemed in no way dis-

posed to embark upon any hazardous undertaking, he showed himself well inclined, in the event of a favourable communication from Colonel Graham, to attempt something. Of the motions and strength of the enemy, no tidings had of late been received; but our own force was in the highest spirits, and in the best possible order. The hospitals were almost entirely tenantless, and the regiments of infantry were complete, not only in numbers, but in their equipments and clothing, and everything necessary for taking the field. The cavalry, again, were in admirable case; whilst of the artillery it is necessary to say no more, than that it never presented a more imposing appearance. How sincerely did all regret that the unhappy delay, occasioned by Baird's retrogression, should keep such an army idle, even for a single day!

From this period up to the return of Colonel Graham, only one event occurred of sufficient importance to be narrated. It was this: A courier, who was carrying despatches from Bayonne addressed to Napoleon at Aranda, having fallen into the hands of some armed peasantry, was by them sent in to the head-quarters of our army. Whether the mail contained any very interesting intelligence I cannot say, not having personally examined it; but I learned that some of its contents were at least amusing, if not instructive. They were of old date; for they spoke of the army

of Portugal as on its march through Bourdeaux, under the orders of Junot, whose letters were all written in a style of humility quite unprecedented. Their purport, however, accounted for their tone pretty effectually; for they were chiefly devoted to entreaties that some increase of pay might be granted; the writer being but badly provided for, now that his Portuguese resources had failed him. It will easily be believed that the perusal of these piteous petitions created no little merriment among the men, to whose exertions the Marshal was indebted for his present poverty.

On the 9th of December, Colonel Graham returned from his mission. He had taken the route by Talavera, at which place he arrived on the 7th, in time to be told of the surrender of Madrid, and of the murder of General St. Juan by his mutinous troops; and not judging it either prudent or necessary to proceed further, he instantly retraced his steps. According to his report, though many reverses had been sustained, still, from the attitude which the country continued to maintain, and the divided state of the French army, something might yet be done. The chiefs in the capital had indeed betrayed their trust; and the enemy were in possession of the Retiro; but the indignant populace had refused to lay down their arms, and there was little probability that they would soon be induced to change their

sentiments. There were about thirty thousand French troops thus kept in employment. Of the rest, some had proceeded against Saragoza, some against Toledo; some had taken the road to Valencia, and others had bent their steps towards Cadiz. All this appeared to Sir John Moore as inviting a forward movement on his part; and the army were too much gratified at the prospect of advancing at all, to question very minutely the grounds or motives upon which our General acted, or changed his opinions.

The movement began on the 12th from various points. On that day Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro, whither he had moved up in the course of the week, to Tordesillas; whilst the hussar brigade, under my own orders, proceeded from its ground at Arrivola. The divisions likewise defiled from Alba de Tormes, Salamanca, and Ludesma, and on the 14th a new position was taken up, the right resting on Tordesillas, the centre at Alayoz, and the left at Toro. In order to render it as secure as possible, the whole of the cavalry was placed upon the right of the stream, part occupying posts on one side of the river, and part upon the other. Lord Paget's corps crossed the stream; whilst that of which I was at the head, distributed itself through Patricios, Rubios, Madrigal, Nava del Rey, and Pollos, on the Douro. Thus we had

completely reversed the order in which, but a few days ago, we stood. Then our rear was to the Guadarama, that pass being in the hands of our friends, and opposed to the enemy; now we were facing the Guadarama, and expecting the enemy to debouch from the very places which we ourselves had formerly occupied.

It was the good fortune of a squadron of the 18th hussars to come, at this time, into contact with the enemy. There is a large village, or rather a small town, called Rueda, situated about half-way between Nava and Tordesillas; in which, we had been given to understand that detachments of the enemy's cavalry, with some infantry, were quartered. Having caused it to be reconnoitred, and finding that the French seemed quite ignorant of our proximity, I determined to surprise them, if possible; at all events to bring them to action. With this intention a squadron proceeded against them on the night of the 12th; and having happily made good our entrance unobserved, we soon threw them into confusion. The greater number were sabred on the spot, many were taken, and only a few escaped to inform General Franceschi, who occupied Valladolid with a body of two or three thousand horse, that the British army had not retreated.

When he began his movements, it was, I believe, General Moore's intention to advance by Valla-

dolid, to unite himself with Romana's army, and to threaten the communications between Madrid and France. With this view he had taken up his position at Tordesillas, and had despatched a messenger with a letter to Romana, making him acquainted with his plans. But on the 14th a French officer having been intercepted by the peasantry, the despatches of which he was the bearer were brought in to me; and seeing that they were of the first moment, I lost no time in forwarding them to head-quarters. An immediate change of plan was the consequence. The army, it was understood, would move to its left, for the purpose of effecting a junction at once with Sir David Baird's column; and then, either in connexion with Romana, if he could be found, or independently of him, should he keep out of the way, attack Marshal Soult, who, at the head of sixteen or eighteen thousand men, was in position about Valencia and Saldanha. The plan seemed to be both a wise and a spirited one; and it deserved success.

Whilst the columns of infantry were filing off in the direction of Toro and Benevente, the cavalry enjoyed several opportunities of again trying its strength with that of the enemy. In every instance the superiority of British soldiers was well asserted; and in a variety of skirmishes we succeeded in making prisoners of one lieutenant-colonel, one major, with upwards of a hundred

privates, and sixty horses. It was in truth a glorious spectacle to see with what perfect confidence of success the smallest patrol of British horse would charge bodies, often doubling themselves in number; and it was no less gratifying to find that a mere numerical superiority in no single instance availed the enemy anything.

In the mean time intelligence came in from Romana, that he had actually commenced his retreat from Leon, in consequence, as it was surmised, of the arrangements into which Sir John Moore had entered a few days ago, for retiring upon Portugal. Such information, at a moment like the present, could not fail of causing considerable vexation to our leader. He blamed Romana severely, and despatched another courier, with a letter couched in terms even more pressing than any which he had employed before, to request that the Spanish General would retrace his steps without a moment's delay. It was added that, should he find it impossible to act upon this suggestion at once, General Moore could not wait any longer for his convenience; because an opportunity of striking a blow was now before him, such as had never previously come in his way, and which the smallest loss of time might remove. In due course Romana's answer arrived; and it was to the effect, that he would co-operate, to the

utmost of his power, in any enterprise in which the British General might see fit to embark.

So far all was satisfactory enough; but the same thing could certainly not be said with reference to the information which we derived from our prisoners, touching the amount of French troops employed in the Peninsula. From one of these, Colonel Arvignac, we learned that there either were, or shortly would be, opposed to us ten corps d'armie, each consisting of two divisions, or nearly twenty thousand men; and the following is the list of generals in command, with their stations, as he enumerated them:—Ney and Moncey, in the neighbourhood of Saragoza; Le Fevre and Macelliny moving on Salamanca; Bessieres, at Madrid; Soult and Lassalle, near Placencia; Junot, advancing to Burgos; Gouvion St. Cyr, in the direction of Barcelona; Milhaud, in communication with Le Fevre; and Marmont, whose exact province I have forgotten. The cavalry attached to this mass he represented as embracing no fewer than thirty-six regiments; and he affirmed that there were full seven thousand of the imperial guards then quartered in Madrid. How far these statements were to be relied upon, it was of course impossible to say; but of one truth no man could be ignorant,—namely, that the enemy's force in the country was enor-

mous, and that our only chance of success lay in beating him in detail. But was it probable that we should succeed in this? The most sanguine amongst us could not but experience doubts, when it was recollected that, of all the Spanish armies which but a month ago had kept the field, Romana's alone remained; and that it could hardly be counted upon, inasmuch as it was as yet only in the act of forming. Then, again, the French generals were as prudent as they were brave. Should any one of them be made aware of our approach, he would doubtless fall back, with the view of drawing us after him, till we should be thrown into the midst of as many corps as the Emperor might deem it advisable to employ in our destruction. Still, much was to be effected by promptitude and boldness; and though we heard of nothing except immense masses of French moving in every direction; though the people undeniably began to exhibit symptoms of abated zeal and decaying patriotism; and though, above all, our own General was not a man to attempt anything, unless he saw before him a sort of moral certainty of success, such as others would scarcely look for; in spite of all these considerations, not a man in the army desponded, but all felt their spirits rise in proportion as the prospect of meeting the enemy became more decided.

With this feeling uppermost in our minds, every

march which brought us nearer to the position of Marshal Soult was performed, not only without a murmur, but with an excess of good-will. On the 16th, the head-quarters had been established at Toro; on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, it passed Villapondo and Valderosa, and on the 20th we were established at Majorga. Here Sir David Baird's column joined us; and here we could muster no fewer than 23,000 infantry, 2,300 cavalry, and nearly fifty pieces of cannon of different calibres.

Whilst head-quarters were established at Majorga, the cavalry and horse-artillery having advanced as far as Monastero Melgar Abaxo, succeeded, on more than one occasion, in measuring their strength with the enemy's outposts. Of the skirmishes which took place at this time, few were productive of any very serious effects; though all tended, in a greater or less degree, to increase the confidence of our people in themselves, and so far to prepare them for the grand struggle which was supposed to be pending. But there was one exploit which deserves lasting remembrance, not only because of the gallantry which the troops displayed in its performance, but because of the complete knowledge of his profession which was exhibited by Lord Paget in conducting it.

The Monastero Melgar Abaxo is distant about three leagues from Sahagun; in which place a

corps of seven hundred French cavalry were reported to be lodged. As they were at some distance from the main body of the French army, it was deemed practicable to cut them off, and Lord Paget determined, at all events, to make the attempt. He accordingly put himself at the head of the 10th and 15th hussars; and, in the middle of a cold wintry night, when the ground was covered with snow, set off for that purpose.

When they had ridden about two-thirds of the way, Lord Paget divided his force, and desiring General Slade, with the 10th, to pursue the course of the Cea, and to enter the town by that side, he himself, followed by the 15th, wheeled off to approach it by a different route. It was not long before his Lordship's party fell in with a picket of the enemy. The picket was instantly charged; and all, except one man, were either cut down or made prisoners. But the escape of one was as injurious, under existing circumstances, as the escape of the whole; for the alarm was given, and before the 15th could approach the place, the enemy were ready to receive them. It was now broad daylight; and as our troops drew near, the French were seen formed in what appeared to be an open plain, at no great distance from the town. The 15th were wheeled into line in a moment; and as there was no time to be lost, they followed their leader at a brisk trot, with the intention of charging; but

when they were yet fifty yards from the enemy, they found that a wide ditch divided them, and that the French had availed themselves of other inequalities in the ground, of which, when some way off, they had not been aware. A pause was now necessarily made, but one instant served to put the whole again in motion. The regiment, wheeling to its left, soon found out a convenient spot for crossing; and though the enemy manœuvred actively to hinder the formation, they were again in line and advancing to the charge, within five minutes from the commencement of the check. A few changes of ground now took place, as each corps strove to gain the flank of another; but they were only a few. The British cavalry effected its object; and then coming down at full speed upon their opponents, who stood to receive the shock, they overthrew them in an instant. Many were killed upon the spot, many more unhorsed, and one hundred and fifty-seven were made prisoners, including two lieutenant-colonels. On this occasion the English cavalry amounted only to four hundred men, whilst that of the French fell not short of seven hundred.

This brilliant rencontre took place on the 20th; and on the 21st the head-quarters of the army were advanced to the spot where it occurred. The weather was at this time remarkably inclement, a succession of frost and snow having been

followed by heavy rains ; and the troops, who had performed of late many severe forced marches, were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Under these circumstances, though fully conscious that every hour which passed was so much time lost to him and gained by the enemy, Sir John Moore determined to halt for a day ; and he devoted it to a careful supply of all the necessaries of which the men seemed to be in need, as well as in preparing against the events of the trial which he felt to be at hand.

Whilst resting here, the correspondence between General Moore and the Marquis de la Romana was renewed. The latter made no secret of the general inefficiency of his army, but he agreed to co-operate with us in our attack upon Soult, with all whom he could bring into the field in a fit state to meet the enemy. He sent moreover, from time to time, such pieces of information as he was enabled, by means of spies, or the vigilance of the peasantry, to collect. At first he represented the French force as amounting to no more than ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry, with eight or ten pieces of cannon, whom it would be perfectly practicable to surround and destroy before any reinforcements could reach them from other quarters ; but by and by he began to discover that these reinforcements had actually arrived, and that there were full eighteen

or nineteen thousand men in position along the Carrion. Sir John Moore had been all along aware that Soult's corps amounted to this force; he was not therefore disconcerted by the intelligence; but he neglected no means which presented itself, of obtaining fresh communications; and his channels were, at this time, both numerous and sure. Hour after hour however passed on, without the occurrence of anything calculated to produce an alteration in his plans; hour after hour, therefore, was believed by the troops to bring nearer and nearer to them the opportunity for which they had long panted, of forcing upon the enemy the issue of a battle.

So passed the whole of the 21st, and the greater part of the 22nd of December. Respecting the French it was understood that, out of the eighteen thousand men of which Soult's army was composed, seven thousand were stationed at Saldanha, and five thousand at the town of Carrion; whilst the remainder either lined the banks of the river in files of communication, or covered, in force, the different fords and bridges by which it could be passed. On our part, again, no definite position—none at least deserving of the name in a military point of view—had been taken up. We were on the eve of moving, and therefore our *regiments were kept as much together, as a regard to shelter would allow*; but we had selected no

points d'appui, nor were we particularly prepared to receive an attack, should such be made upon us, to advantage; yet were we ready to act in almost any manner which circumstances might require; *though our object was manifestly to act offensively rather than on the defensive; and to this end all our other and minor preparations were turned.* Hospitals were established in every convent near, and arrangements made for the safe and speedy removal of the wounded to the rear; whilst nothing was spoken of except the approaching contest, and the probable consequences of a victory, which all anticipated.

The evening of the 22nd was now approaching, and orders had actually been issued, for an immediate advance against the enemy. The army was commanded to march at eight o'clock at night, in two columns, for the purpose of forcing the bridge at Carrion, and so penetrating to Saldanha; and the right column, to which this charge had been peculiarly intrusted, was making ready to get under arms, when two couriers, one from the head-quarters of the Marquis de la Romana, and the other from Los Santos, arrived. They were bearers of intelligence, of which it is no figure of speech to affirm, that none could have been received more replete with sources of mortification to every member of the army. The enemy, it appeared, were moving in all directions upon us.

The corps which had begun its march towards the south, had halted at Talavera ; several strong divisions had moved from Palencia, and were already in the vicinity of Carrion ; the Badajoz army had wheeled round, and was in full march towards Salamanca ; whilst Napoleon himself had set out from Madrid, with the avowed intention of making Benevente his next halting place. Sir John Moore felt, or imagined, that this was not the moment, nor these the circumstances, under which to risk a battle. He believed that Soult would retire before him, for the express purpose of allowing time to these different divisions to get into his rear ; and he was persuaded that the passage of a few days would, in all probability, expose him to the risk of being surrounded by sixty or seventy thousand troops, of the flower of the French army. With this prospect before his eyes, he instantly countermanded the orders which had been issued in the earlier part of the evening. The regiments which had begun to muster, were dismissed to their quarters ; and it was understood, throughout the ranks, that all idea of attacking, at least for this night, was abandoned.



CHAPTER X.

Dissatisfaction of the army—Sir John Moore prepares to retreat—The infantry and artillery retire in two columns, covered by the cavalry—Movements of the French armies—Affair of cavalry at Majorga—Sufferings of the troops on their march—Alarm at Benevente, and brilliant cavalry action—Destruction of stores at Astorga—Wretched plight of Romana's troops—Disorganization of the English army—March from Astorga to Villa Franca—Serious skirmish at Villa Franca—Retreat to Liego, where battle is offered, but declined by the French—The armies in position three days—Retreat upon Corunna—The fleet arrives, and the embarkation is begun—Battle of Corunna, and death of Sir John Moore—The army is withdrawn.

It would be no easy matter to describe the effect which this unlooked-for event produced upon every man and officer in the army. The troops who had long panted to meet the enemy, and who but an hour ago were full of life and confidence, suddenly appeared like men whose brightest hopes were withered, and their favourite expectations

overthrown. Few gave vent to their feelings, either by complaint or murmur; but all retired to their quarters in a state of sullen silence, which indicated, more powerfully perhaps than any words could have done, the extent of the mortification under which they laboured.

We rose next morning perfectly ignorant, and to a certain degree quite indifferent, as to the fate which awaited us; nor were our spirits greatly heightened, when we saw hour after hour pass away without the occurrence of any movement either to the front or rear. There is good reason to believe that Sir John Moore himself had hardly determined on the course which it behoved him to follow. He was still imperfectly informed as to the amount of the different corps which were advancing against him; though the natural temperament of his disposition induced him to rate these at the highest; and he was extremely unwilling to commence a rapid retreat, till it should have become indispensable. Besides, despatches came in this day from Romana, announcing that he had advanced with all the disposable part of his army, amounting in the whole to seven thousand men, for the purpose of co-operating in the projected attack upon Soult. It was necessary to countermand this movement, as well as to make such arrangements with the Spanish General as should prevent the two armies from incommoding

or coming into collision with each other during the retreat. In settling this point, as well as in preparing the hospitals and stores for a speedy removal, the whole of the 23rd was spent; and the following is the order in which it was finally determined that the two corps should be withdrawn.

As the defence of the Gallicias was esteemed by no means impracticable, Sir John Moore was desirous of retiring in such a direction as would enable him, should circumstances authorise the measure, to take up positions in these provinces; whilst, at the same time, in case of the worst, a retreat should be open to him towards the coast. To effect this, it was necessary, in the first place, to cross the Eslar; which, from our present situation, might be done by three routes. We might proceed by Mansilla, at which point the river is crossed by a bridge; or by Valencia, where there was only a ferry; or we might take the route by Castro Gonsalo, where there is likewise a bridge, and from whence a road passes direct to Benevente. At Mansilla, however, the Spanish troops were already posted; they had exhausted the country of all its supplies; it was therefore vain to think of going thither; but the roads by Valencia and Castro Gonsalo were both open, and it was resolved to make use of them. This was the more necessary, as well because it would have

been extremely inconvenient to lead the whole column in the same direction ; as because, were such a measure attempted, the magazines which had been established both at Benevente and Zamora, must, one or other of them, be exposed to capture by the enemy. Astorga was named as the place of meeting for the two columns, where it was understood that a determined stand would be made ; whilst the Spaniards were requested to fall back upon Leon, from whence, in the event of our offering battle, they might harass the rear and flank of the French. In the mean while, however, Romana was to keep possession of the bridge of Mansilla as long as possible ; and the city of Leon was not to be surrendered, till it should be reduced to the last extremity. Every preliminary arrangement being complete, the army began, on the 24th, to retire in the order which had been assigned to it. General Hope, with his own division, and that of General Fraser, fell back upon Majorga, on the road to Castro Gonsalo ; whilst Sir David Baird, at the head of the other column, took the direction of Valencia. To cover these movements, the cavalry received directions to push strong patrols towards Carrion, as far as the enemy's pickets, and not to quit the position till night-fall on the 25th, some hours after the reserve and light infantry had been withdrawn. Everything was done with the most perfect regularity. The co-

lums made good their march, the one to Valencia, the other to Castro Gonsalo, without molestation, and the rear-guard withdrew, at the appointed hour, leaving the enemy in apparent ignorance that a retreat was in contemplation.

In the mean while, however, Buonaparte was advancing with rapid strides, from the Escorial. On the 24th, he had reached Tordesillas with the advance of his cavalry; sending strong detachments on as far as Villalpando and Majorga; and at the latter of these places our troops were again enabled to try the strength of their opponents. It was on the 26th that a considerable force of the enemy were seen drawn up upon the brow of some rising ground, and apparently making ready to cut off any stragglers which might lag behind, or wander far from the ranks. Lord Paget, who was present at Majorga, instantly directed Colonel Leigh, at the head of two squadrons of the 10th hussars, to dislodge them. Colonel Leigh, forming his little band into two lines, rode briskly forward, one squadron leading, and the other supporting, till he had gained the top of the hill. Here the men were commanded to rein up, for the purpose of refreshing the horses after the ascent; and they did so, under a heavy but not very destructive fire from the French. But the horses had no sooner recovered their wind, than the word was given to charge, and in five minutes the French were over-

thrown. Many were killed, many more wounded, and upwards of one hundred taken prisoners.

The 10th, however, was not the only cavalry corps which succeeded in distinguishing itself. It was remarked by all, that as often as the French and our people came into contact, the superiority of the British cavalry was shown to a degree far beyond anything which had been anticipated. They seemed to set all odds at defiance; and in no single instance was their temerity punished by defeat, or even by repulse. Matters went so far at last, that Captain Jones, of the 18th, ventured, with no more than thirty men of his regiment, to attack one hundred French cavalry; and he put them to the rout, killing fourteen, and making six prisoners.

Whilst the cavalry were thus coming into almost daily contact with the enemy, and kept in excellent spirits by their repeated successes, the infantry, covered by two or three light regiments, were marching over miserable roads, and through an exhausted country, exposed to hardships more terrible than it has frequently fallen to the lot of British soldiers to endure. The weather was now more severe than it had been since we entered Spain; cold winds blowing, and heavy showers of sleet and rain falling; and it was not always that the troops could find shelter, even at night, against their influence. The mules and other animals em-

ployed to carry the baggage, soon began to founder; or the muleteers, terrified at the prospect of being overtaken by the French, left them and fled. In such cases it was found quite impracticable to get the animals along, for they would obey no voice but that of their master, and they were consequently abandoned, and their loads given up to plunder. Nor were these the only evils to which our men saw themselves exposed. The Spaniards, whether they were men in authority or not, either abandoned their houses as the British army approached, locking their doors, and concealing, as far as they were able, the little stock of provisions of which they might chance to be possessed; or they met our requisitions for food and wine with murmurs and complaints, such as they would not have ventured to utter before French soldiers. These things not unnaturally increased the irritation under which the troops already laboured. They began to view the Spaniards as their worst enemies, and to treat them as people unworthy of any consideration whatever. This was severely retaliated upon them by an enraged peasantry; and scenes of violence and bloodshed, in which these allies were the actors, proved by no means uncommon.

On the 27th of December the column reached Benevente. Benevente is remarkable for an old baronial castle, which for many generations has

been the property of the dukes of Ossuna ; and to which, in point either of splendour or extent, it would be difficult to find in Europe a fellow. Near it runs the little river Eslar, across which, at some distance from the town, a bridge was thrown, but which was commanded by some hills, that rise rather abruptly from the opposite bank of the stream. Our people had scarcely entered the place, when an alarm was raised that the enemy were approaching ; and it proved to be so far not without foundation, that troops were seen, as if in the act of forming, on the heights beyond. Preparations were instantly made to receive them. The regiments assembled at their several points of muster, and the cavalry rushing through the gates, descended to the level country, where they could most conveniently act ; but neither the one nor the other were called into play. The enemy, satisfied with thus disturbing our repose, melted away, and we returned again to our former quarters and our original occupations. The best precautions were, however, taken, to provide against surprise ; the bridge over the Eslar was broken down ; and pickets of cavalry were extended all along the bank, so as to watch the fords, and give timely notice of any movement.

The night of the 27th passed by in quiet ; and as soon as day-light came in, the retreat was renewed. The cavalry, however, had not been

withdrawn, when certain movements on the part of the enemy appeared to indicate that we should not be permitted to escape thus easily. A body of five or six hundred horse were observed, about nine o'clock, to try a ford not far from the ruins of the bridge; and in a few moments afterwards they crossed, and began to form on our side of the river. Instantly the pickets, which had been appointed to do the duty of a rear-guard, made ready to oppose them. Though they mustered little more than two hundred men, they boldly advanced, under the command of Colonel Otway, against the mass, repeatedly charging its leading squadrons, and keeping it fairly in check, till Lord Paget and the writer of these pages arrived; when the former made haste to bring up the 10th hussars, whilst the latter put himself at the head of the detachments already in the field. Many charges were now made on both sides, and the squadrons were repeatedly intermingled; whilst the pickets still continued to give ground, as it was intended that they should. But the 10th were now ready: the pickets saw that they had support; and they required no entreaty to dash against the enemy. One cheer was given, and the horses being pressed to their speed, the enemy's line was broken in an instant. They fled in great disorder to the river, and repassed it much more actively than they had passed it before; leaving in our hands General Le

Fevre, their colonel, with upwards of seventy other officers and men. This was, however, the most serious affair in which we had yet been engaged. The cavalry opposed to us formed part of the imperial guard; they were all tried soldiers, and they fought in a manner not unworthy of the reputation which they had earned in the north of Europe. They lost in killed and wounded, independently of prisoners, about sixty men; our casualties fell somewhat short of fifty.

It has been said that Napoleon himself was an eye-witness of this rencontre, from the opposite heights on which he stood. Whether there be any truth in the rumour, I know not; but one thing is quite certain, that the enemy did not venture, for some days after, again to oppose themselves hand to hand to our cavalry. The column accordingly reached Astorga on the 30th, having been very little harassed by its pursuers. It arrived, however, in a state of great disorganisation; and it came to a place, where pictures of want and misery were already too frequent, in the persons of Romana's soldiers. For Romana, in spite of General Moore's entreaty to the contrary, had seen fit to fall back, not upon Leon, or the difficult country near, but in the same direction with ourselves. The consequence was, that all the houses were filled with his people, among whom a malignant typhus fever was raging; and the roads were lite-

rally covered and encumbered with men, horses, cars, and all the other accompaniments of an army, which had foundered or broken down on their march. It is hardly possible to conceive any set of men bearing less resemblance to soldiers, or having a stronger claim upon the compassion of those who beheld them, than these wretched creatures. They were almost all in a state bordering upon nudity. They had no provisions; their arms were, for the most part, useless; and of ammunition, either for musketry or cannon, they were wholly destitute. Nor, to say the truth, were our own people in a plight by many degrees superior. With us, as with them, provisions had long been scanty; and our shoes, that most essential article in a soldier's wardrobe, were, in most instances, worn out. Many officers had, indeed, brought with them from England considerable quantities of apparel; and depots of stores had been formed at various points, one of which chanced to be Astorga; but the mules which carried the baggage of individuals had almost all knocked up, and of the stores deposited in the town little use could be made. The Spaniards were, indeed, supplied with muskets—for of muskets, a large quantity had been collected here—and they received as much ammunition as they were able to carry; but as to clothing and provisions, these we possessed not in sufficient quantities to supply ourselves; we

could not, therefore, supply the wants of others. Romana's troops accordingly departed on the following morning, to follow the road by Fonubadon into Galicia, having derived from us none of the refreshment of which they stood so much in need, and in the hope of obtaining which they had, perhaps, deserted their post at Mansilla many days earlier than they needed to have done.

The army had hitherto fallen back under the persuasion that it would not be required to retreat beyond its present position at Astorga; but that here, or hereabouts, matters would be brought to the issue of a battle. Though their conduct, in many respects, cannot certainly be spoken of in high terms, it is probable that this prospect, and this alone, had hitherto kept the men in something like a state of subordination. They had committed various excesses, it is true; many had individually robbed and plundered, and got drunk by the way, and some had thus fallen into the hands of the enemy, or perished from the inclemency of the weather; yet the army, considered as a body, was still efficient, and required nothing more than a few hours of rest, and a moderate supply of provisions, to restore it to the state of high order in which it was at Salamanca. From the moment when preparations began to be made for a continued retreat from Astorga, all this may be said to have been at an end. In Astorga, the

blowing up of ammunition-waggon, the destruction of intrenching tools, and the committal to the flames of field-equipments for a whole division, gave the signal, as it were, for all the bad passions of those who witnessed them, to be let loose; and mortifying as it is to confess it, the fact cannot be denied, that from that hour we no longer resembled a British army. There was still the same bravery in our ranks; but it was only at moments when the enemy were expected to come on, that our order and regularity returned; and except in that single point, we resembled rather a crowd of insubordinate rebels, in full flight before the victorious soldiers of their sovereign, than a corps of British troops executing a series of military movements in the presence of their enemy.

When he began his retreat in real earnest, it was, I apprehend, Sir John Moore's intention to fall back upon Vigo, and there to embark his army in the transports which had been ordered round to receive them. With this view he had, when at Benevente, despatched General Crawford, at the head of three thousand men, along the nearer but steeper road by Orense, in order that any attempt on the part of the enemy to gain ground upon him with a light column might be prevented; whilst he himself took the more circuitous but better route, by Astorga and Villa Franca. At

the former place he was joined by Sir David Baird's division; and here everything, no matter whether it might be private or public property, for the removal of which means were wanting, was destroyed; and the army began its march on the following morning, in worse plight, and under more trying circumstances, than ever.

The road from Astorga to Villa Franca leads through the villages of Torre, Benivedre, Pinferrade, and over a country as much diversified, and as striking, as will be seen perhaps in any part of Europe. The first four or five leagues carry the traveller up one continued ascent, and along the face of a hill, steep, bare, and open; on gaining the summit of which, he arrives at the entrance of some tremendous passes, such as a thousand resolute men might easily maintain against ten times their number. These extend as far as the village of Torre, a distance of nearly three leagues; after which the landscape becomes as magnificent as the intermingling of hill and valley, rock and mountain, wood and pasture, can render it. We, of course, beheld it under all the disadvantages of a season remarkably inclement, when the ridges were covered with deep snow, and the fields and roads little better than mere heaps of mud; yet even thus it was impossible to pass it by without feelings of the liveliest admiration, and a strong regret that it had not been our

fortune to wander here when the forests were in full leaf, and the green hills in their glory. But it was not from its temporary bleakness alone, that a scene like that around us stirred up a strange commingling of pleasurable and painful sensations. The condition of the army was at this time a most melancholy one; the rain came down upon us in torrents; men and horses were foundering at every step; the former fairly worn out through fatigue and want of nutriment, the latter sinking under their loads, and dying upon the spot. Nor was it only among the baggage animals that an absolute inability to proceed further began to show itself; the shoes of the cavalry horses dropped off, and the horses themselves soon became useless. It was a sad spectacle to behold these fine creatures urged and goaded on till their strength utterly failed them, and then shot to death by their riders, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. Then, again, the few ammunition-waggons which had hitherto kept up, fell one by one to the rear; the ammunition was immediately destroyed, and the waggons abandoned. Thus were misfortunes accumulating upon us as we proceeded; and it appeared extremely improbable, should our present system of forced marches be persisted in, that one half of the army would ever reach the coast.

The reader is doubtless aware that the spirit of insubordination of which I have already spoken, as exhibiting itself in a variety of particular instances, became now almost general. There was no possibility of keeping the men in their ranks. Some under one pretext, and some under another, whole regiments strayed from their colours; and as often as a wine-house or store came in the way, scenes of the most shocking description ensued. The army moved, as is customary in such cases, by divisions, the main body keeping a day's march ahead of the reserve and the rear-guard. The former reached Benivedre on the 31st, and at an early hour on the 1st of January was ordered to leave it; but when the latter arrived, the place was full of stragglers, all, or almost all, in a state of desperate intoxication. At this time the enemy's cavalry, though they seldom sought an opportunity of coming to blows with us, pressed closely and incessantly upon our rear: we rode frequently many miles in sight of each other; and from time to time, our rearmost dragoons would exchange pistol shots with their leading files. Under such circumstances, no pause could, of course, be made, for the mere purpose of closing up such as lagged; and hence every one who proved unable, either from intoxication or weariness, to push on, was of necessity left behind. But the multitudes who lingered in Benivedre

were so great, that the utmost repugnance was experienced at the idea of abandoning them; and it was not till every effort to rouse them had been made in vain, that they were left to their fate. Even after the rear-guard had marched, a small detachment of horse still endeavoured to cover them; nor was it till the enemy, in great force, were seen approaching, that it retired. Then followed that scene which has been so frequently described already, but of the horrors of which none can form an adequate conception who were not eye-witnesses of it; when the French dragoons, pursuing our patrol, galloped through the midst of a crowd of men, women, and children, and wantonly slashed to the right and left, without regard to the age or sex of the object of their fury. Of the numbers who thus fell a sacrifice to their own intemperance, I cannot pretend to speak with certainty; but I know them to have been very considerable; and I am sure that British troops never looked upon a spectacle more appalling than those few presented, who, having come up with the column, bleeding and cut in numerous places, were, by order of the General, paraded through the ranks as a warning to their comrades.

We reached Villa Franca on the 2nd, having performed a distance of upwards of sixty miles in two days, where the greater part of the cavalry

took up its quarters, only a small detachment remaining with the reserve at Cacabelos. Like Benivedre, it was filled with drunken and disorderly men, belonging to the divisions which had preceded us; by whom the most violent outrages had been committed, not upon the natives only, but upon our own magazines. A store of wine had been broken open, and the wine either drunk or wantonly spilt; and a considerable quantity of forage, of which we stood sorely in need, destroyed. One man was executed here, being detected in the act of marauding; but the discipline of the army was by this time too much impaired to be very seriously affected even by such an example. Similar deeds were performed wherever opportunities occurred, and that with the openness of men, who saw, or fancied, that their case was desperate.

The enemy, who since the affair of the 28th had kept generally out of reach, showed a disposition on the 3rd to renew their system of attacking. A large force of cavalry was seen about one o'clock in the afternoon, advancing at a leisurely pace, and with much apparent caution, on Cacabelos. Through the middle of the town there runs a small stream, along the bank of which part of the reserve was drawn up; whilst the 95th rifle corps, supported by a picket of hussars, occupied a rising ground about half a league in advance. The rifle-

men were commanded to fall back, and retreat through the town over a bridge. The greater number had already effected this movement, when the French cavalry coming on in overwhelming numbers, our picket was forced to give way; and the French getting in among the two rear companies of the 95th, succeeded in making some prisoners. The riflemen had hardly recovered their surprise, and were barely able to spread in skirmishing order, when a cloud of dismounted chasseurs dashed forward, and crossing the stream in every part, commenced a sharp onset upon the village. They were met with great gallantry by the 95th, who retiring slowly up the hill in rear of the town, took post among some vineyards, and galled them terribly from behind that shelter. From these the cavalry attempted to dislodge them: they charged boldly up the road, and threatened to take the skirmishers in rear; but they were almost immediately driven back by the steady and well-directed fire of our troops; and they retreated, leaving General Colbert, with many other officers and men, dead upon the field.

The alarm had by this time spread to Villa Franca, and Sir John Moore appeared at the scene of action. He had scarcely done so, when a heavy column of infantry showed itself over the opposite hills, in full march upon our position. The artillery attached to the reserve instantly opened upon

it; and such was the excellence of the practice, that the enemy, having suffered severely in killed and wounded, was fain to withdraw his corps before it had been able to fire a musket. Nevertheless, Sir John Moore was not desirous of bringing on a general action here. He had heard of a position near Lugo, of which he proposed to take advantage by fighting there, should it be necessary to fight at all previous to his embarkation; he was not, therefore, willing to waste time, or sacrifice lives, in the obstinate maintenance of ground to which he attached no value. Whilst, therefore, the reserve was ordered to Villa Franca, the main body took the road to Herrieras; and it was followed, about ten o'clock, by the rear-guard, which reached its halting-place soon after midnight.

The country became, from this point, such as to render cavalry of no avail. It was universally steep, rocky, precipitous, and covered with wood, and, where in the few spots it was otherwise, too much enclosed with vineyards and mulberry plantations, to allow even a squadron of horse to form up or act. The cavalry were accordingly sent on at once to Lugo, whither the infantry and artillery followed, as fast as extreme exhaustion, and the nature of the road by which they travelled, would allow. But they followed both painfully and slowly; for though as many as forty miles were

performed in one march, that march comprehended, not the day only, but the night also. This was more than men, reduced to the low ebb to which our soldiers had fallen, could endure. They dropped down by whole sections, on the way-side, and died, some with curses, others with the voice of prayer, in their mouths. It was dreadful, likewise, to know that not men only, but women and children, were subject to this miserable fate. By some strange neglect, or by the indulgence of a mistaken humanity, Sir John Moore's army had carried along with it more than the too large proportion of women allotted by the rules of our service to armies in the field; and these poor wretches were now heightening the horror of passing events by a display of suffering, even more acute than that endured by their husbands. Some were taken in labour on the road; and in the open air, amidst showers of sleet and snow, gave birth to infants, which, with their mothers, perished as soon as they had seen the light. Others, carrying perhaps each of them two children on their backs, would toil on, and when they came to look to the condition of their precious burdens, they would find one or both frozen to death. Then the depth of moral degradation to which they sank, their oaths and cries, uttered under the influence of intoxication, were hardly less appalling than the groans which burst from

them, as all hope of aid abandoned them, and they sat down to die. I am well aware that the horrors of this retreat have been again and again described in terms calculated to freeze the blood of such as read them; but I have no hesitation in saying that the most harrowing accounts which have yet been laid before the public, fall short of the reality.

The journey from Villa Franca to Lugo occupied one night and two days, the army reaching the latter place on the 5th of January. It was one continued skirmish between the rear of the British and the advanced-guard of the French, in which the latter were invariably repulsed with considerable loss. But, in spite of these advantages, the British army became every hour more and more unfit for service. Its resources wasted away at every mile. First, whole waggon-loads of clothing, arms, shoes, and other necessaries, which had just arrived from England for the purpose of refitting Romana's army, were met, and after the men had helped themselves to those articles of which they stood most in need, the residue was destroyed. Next, two bullock-cars, loaded with dollars to the amount of 25,000*l.* were found to be immoveable. The casks which contained the money were stove in, and the treasure thrown from the road over a precipice. This was a most unwise as well as useless measure. Had it been

distributed among the soldiers, there is little doubt that they would have contrived to carry it along; whereas the knowledge that it lay among the cliffs, tempted many men to lag behind, who all fell into the hands of the enemy, or perished from cold. But every thing was now done as if our case was absolutely desperate, and as if the utmost that could be expected, or even desired, was to escape with our persons, at the expense of the whole of our materiel. Even guns were now abandoned, as fast as the horses which dragged them knocked up; and the very sick and wounded were left behind in the waggons, of which the bullocks or mules could proceed no further.

I have said that the march from Herrieras to Lugo produced one continued series of skirmishes between the rear of one army, and the head of the other. For the most part, these were productive of very trifling results, and seldom promised to produce more than actually arose out of them; but there was one occasion on which the spirits of the troops became powerfully excited, and when nothing but a degree of caution on the part of Marshal Soult, for which no one was prepared, kept off a severe, if not a general action. It was this:

The village of Constantino stands upon the edge of a small stream, which runs along a deep and rocky channel, forming the bottom of a ravine,

which, on either hand, is closed in by hills. The hill on the left of the village is ascended from the south by an exposed and winding road, tolerably steep and uneven ; whilst on the opposite side is a long gradual slope, till you arrive at the head of the bridge already spoken of. Sir John Moore was naturally apprehensive that, should he permit the enemy to take possession of the summit, whilst his own column was yet within gun-shot, the troops would be terribly annoyed during their open and gradual descent ; he therefore determined to dispute the further advance of his pursuers, and to give time to all the regiments which should be thus employed to make good the passage of the river, and gain the village.

With this view the rifle corps, supported by a brigade of horse artillery, halted on the brow of the hill. The enemy perceiving the disposition, and presuming that his troops, should they attempt to carry the ridge by assault, would be exposed to a murderous fire from the guns opposed to them, halted on the declivity of a range of hills opposite, and continued for more than half an hour to look at our people without attempting anything. By this time the column had gained the head of the bridge, and the principal danger was past ; the riflemen and artillery were accordingly directed to retreat also, in good order, but with all possible celerity. They obeyed these in-

junctions faithfully ; but they were soon followed by the French, who came pouring down the hill, just as the rearmost companies had effected the passage of the stream. Arrangements were instantly made to receive the attack which seemed now to be threatened. The 28th and rifle corps formed so as to defend the bridge ; whilst the 20th, 52nd, and 91st, under Sir John Moore in person, assumed a position on the summit of a hill in the rear. Here, likewise, the horse artillery took post ; and now all was expectation and anxiety. The enemy came on with great apparent boldness. His cavalry and tirailleurs attempted to pass the bridge ; they were met, not only by the fire of the riflemen, but by a heavy and well-directed cannonade from the high grounds, and they fell back. In a few moments they renewed their efforts on the same point, and with similar want of success ; and again, after a short pause, for the third time. But they were beaten back in every attempt ; till at last darkness put an end to the skirmish, and they withdrew. At eleven o'clock at night, however, our people abandoned their post. The troops were dreadfully harassed by their exertions, but not a man sank under them ; and before morning they reached Lugo, where they found the whole army concentrated.

At Lugo, as has been already stated, General Moore had resolved, should the enemy press hard

upon him, to halt and offer battle. With this design, orders were sent forward to Villa Franca, that General Crawford should retrace his steps, and that General Hope's column, which moved a days' march in advance, should rest at Lugo till the divisions in the rear had arrived. These orders were, I believe, transmitted by the hands of Sir John's aide-de-camp, Captain Napier, and were enclosed under cover to Sir David Baird, who was requested to forward them to their several places of destination. Captain Napier delivered his packet at Nagales, and Sir David Baird instantly despatched an orderly dragoon, with written instructions for General Hope and General Frazer. It unhappily fell out that the dragoon got drunk, and the packet miscarried. The misfortune was not discovered till the following morning, when fresh orders were instantly sent off; but the loss of time nothing could repair. General Hope, with his division, was already a full day's march beyond Lugo; and though he wheeled about immediately on the receipt of Sir David's communication, he did not arrive at Lugo till after the rear-guard had come in; and even then his troops were so fatigued, that their fitness for immediate service of any kind seemed to be extremely problematical. Many of the horses attached to this division dropped down dead in the streets; many more were destroyed as use-

less ; and even of the men, more than one were known to have perished of absolute exhaustion. Nevertheless, as the General had now determined to fall back, not upon Vigo, but upon Corunna, it was well that the detached columns had been called in. General Crawford, indeed, was too far on his way to be overtaken, and he reached Vigo without molestation, embarking there in good order, and at his leisure ; but had the rest of the army endeavoured to follow him, the probability is, that half its numbers must have fallen by the way.

The ground upon which Sir John Moore proposed to await the arrival of the enemy, was distant about a league, or a league and a half, from Lugo. It offered, upon the whole, a tolerably advantageous position, along the summit of a range of low hills, and covered on both flanks by rocks and precipices. Here the reserve, under General Paget, took its station ; whilst the rest of the army found quarters for the night in the town, and among such houses and cottages as were near.

About noon on the 6th, the French columns made their appearance, and deployed, as it had been anticipated that they would, upon the heights opposite. Immediately the army got under arms, and everything was in readiness, in case of an attack, to be moved to its proper station. But no offensive operations ensued. The lines looked at

one another for some hours, as if each expected the first movement to be made by its opponents ; till at last, as evening began to close in, all idea of a battle was laid aside. Those who had it in charge to keep possession of the position, piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac ; whilst the rest retired, each brigade and regiment, to its own quarters.

The morning of the 7th had scarcely dawned, when the enemy showed a disposition, either to attack us in real earnest, or to provoke us into a forward movement against themselves. They opened upon our line with four pieces of cannon ; which, though they did little serious damage, served to irritate and annoy the soldiers a good deal. The fire was, however, speedily returned by the British artillery, and with such effect, that in a few minutes one of the French guns was dismounted, and the remainder silenced. These were the only hostilities which passed between the two armies during the earlier part of the day ; but towards sunset, columns were observed to defile, in considerable force, towards our left, at the same time that a cloud of tirailleurs began an active skirmish with the pickets. Sir John Moore naturally conceived that he was about to sustain a serious attack, and that it would be principally made upon the point which was threatened. He flew to the spot, and arrived just as a heavy co-

lumn of French troops began to ascend the rising ground, and to press upon a wing of the 76th, which held it. The 76th gradually retired till it was joined by the 51st; a regiment in which Sir John had served as an ensign, and to which he addressed a few words calculated to remind them of the fact, and expressive of his confidence in their valour. The short address was not thrown away. After exchanging a few discharges of musketry, our people rushed forward with the bayonet; the enemy scarcely stood to receive the shock, but fled in much confusion down the hill, leaving a good many killed and wounded behind them. This was the last operation on either side; and the two armies again spent the night in anxious expectation of what the morrow might bring forth.

Sir John Moore no longer entertained a doubt that the hour of trial was at hand. He sincerely rejoiced in the conviction; for the prospect of a battle had restored to the army the whole of its confidence, and much of its discipline; and the General saw that it was only by beating his pursuers, and beating them effectually, that he could hope to free himself from their presence, or secure a safe and orderly embarkation. The greater part of the night was accordingly spent in bringing guns into the position, and making every arrangement which the circumstances of the case seemed

to require; and men's hopes were excited to the highest: but all our preparations had been made for no purpose. We were in position during the entire day, anxiously desiring that an attack would take place; but hour after hour passed away, and the enemy made no movement. On our part it was deemed unsafe to advance, because the French were understood to surpass us greatly in numbers; and they occupied ground extremely difficult of approach, though furnishing numerous facilities for a retreat; whilst another corps, under Victor, was known to have halted at Villa Franca, and therefore to be within reach. Under these circumstances, nothing remained for us, except to make the most of the impression which our demonstration might have produced upon the enemy's confidence. The troops remained at their arms till dark; and then large fires having been lighted along the heights, the retreat was recommenced.

We marched all night, both men and horses suffering dreadfully from cold, fatigue, and hunger; and passing through Lugo, we arrived at Valenuda about ten o'clock next morning. Here the positive inability of the troops to proceed further compelled a halt; and we lay upon the ground, and under a pelting rain, totally devoid of shelter, for several hours. But even this space of time was not granted to undisturbed repose. A

cry arose, from time to time, that the enemy were advancing; and at each alarm the regiments were ordered to fall in. It is needless to say, how severely this constant call to arms told upon men already worn down by a night-march; indeed, it is not going too far to affirm that many of the corps which had been most frequently roused from their sleep, made ready to renew their march in the evening, as little refreshed as if they had not halted at all.

From this time till it reached Corunna, the army saw little more of the French. We had gained by the late night-march twelve full hours upon Marshal Soult, and he was never able to overtake us; yet was our journey, at least for a time, little less harassing, and little less disorderly, than it had been before. When we came in to Betanzos, indeed, at a late hour in the night, so many were found to have fallen behind, not only from the leading divisions, but from the reserve itself, that to have pursued our progress on the following morning, would have been to sacrifice a large portion of the army; and the 10th was accordingly given up as a day of rest. By this means, multitudes of stragglers were permitted to overtake their corps; and though the enemy were certainly enabled to recover part of the ground which they had lost, that was a matter not to be put in competition with the preservation of so many British

soldiers. Besides, the only French force which succeeded in coming up with us, was a small patrol of cavalry, which our rear-guard had no difficulty in keeping in check. The advantages resulting from the day of rest were therefore very great.

At length the coast began to appear, and Corunna, with its citadel and towers, rose upon our view ; but the harbour, in which we had expected to find a large fleet at anchor, was occupied only by the few coasters and fishing-boats which usually find shelter there. Though intelligence of the alteration in our plans had been sent off some days previously, and the Admiral used every exertion to bring the shipping round, a continuance of adverse winds had rendered the effort abortive ; and it was only after an interval of some days that the fleet arrived. Most sincerely did every one now regret that a battle had not been fought long ago ; for it was quite manifest, that to embark without fighting was entirely out of the question. But where to fight, was a question which few felt disposed to answer. We had left behind us positions innumerable ; in any one of which an army such as ours might have maintained itself against twice its numbers ; at all events till reinforcements should reach us, or some diversion in other parts of Spain call off part of the enemy's attention from us. In the vicinity of Corunna, no such favourable ground existed. There were, indeed, positions here—

several of them very respectable, and one positively commanding; but to occupy these as they ought to be occupied, would require a force much greater than ours; whilst to occupy them imperfectly, would be to expose ourselves to prodigious risk. Still there was no help for it. That we had fallen into difficulties, every one seemed to be aware; but there was no disposition anywhere to magnify them; and our General instantly set about such arrangements as appeared to him best calculated to render them productive of no serious results.

The leading brigades arrived in Corunna on the afternoon of the 11th; and the night was passed by one division in the town, by another in the suburbs, and by the reserve, partly at the villages on the St. Jago road, and partly in El Burgo, near the bridge over the Mero. That bridge was of course destroyed, as well as another some little distance further up the river; and strong pickets were posted beside their ruins, in order to check any attempt on the part of the enemy to repair them. But the ground which, in case of a battle, the troops were to occupy, was not marked out till the morning of the 12th, when the following final arrangements were made:—

There is a range of heights, or rather of swelling knolls, which form a sort of amphitheatre round the village of Elvina, at the distance of perhaps a

mile, or rather more, from the town of Corunna. Upon these Sir John Moore resolved to draw up his army ; for though there was a much more formidable range a mile or two further in advance, his numbers were not adequate to its occupation. He accordingly stationed General Hope's division upon the left, posting it along a ridge which commanded the Betanzos road, and which sloped away gradually, with a rearward inclination, towards Elvina. At this place Sir David Baird's division took up the line, covering the hills which still continued to bend in, and extending to a valley which divided this range from another on the opposite side of the Vigo road. Across that valley the rifle corps threw itself in extended order ; and it was supported by General Frazer's division, which covered the road to Vigo, and protected a principal approach to Corunna ; whilst the reserve, under General Paget, took post at a village, about half a mile in rear of General Hope.

These arrangements were still incomplete, when the enemy made their appearance, moving in force along the opposite bank of the Mero ; but there was no exchange of shots, nor any design manifested on their parts to try the strength of our position. The same state of inaction continued during the 14th, except that on that day the artillery which was attached to General Hope's column, maintained a short but warm contest with

some of the enemy's pieces; and that a magazine, containing four thousand barrels of gunpowder, which had been lately brought from England, was blown up. It exploded with a force which shook the ground like an earthquake, and threw the inhabitants of Corunna into the utmost consternation. On the 15th, the fleet began to appear in the offing; whilst the enemy moved forward a body of troops, for the purpose of occupying the height on which the magazine had been constructed. A little skirmishing was the consequence; but as the height in question was in no degree valuable to us, the riflemen who had held it, and who seemed disposed not to yield it up at an easy price, were withdrawn. About the same time some companies of the 5th regiment made an attempt, under their commanding officer, Colonel Mackenzie, to possess themselves of a couple of field-pieces, which the enemy had advanced somewhat too far upon our left. The attempt, though boldly made, failed; and Colonel Mackenzie, who conducted it, was killed. Thus were the two armies in sight of one another, during three whole days, without any serious disposition being exhibited, to bring matters to the issue of a battle.

In the mean while, Sir John Moore was busily employed embarking the sick, the wounded, the women and children, and all such stores of am-

munition as yet remained, and could be spared from immediate use. This was effected with great regularity during the afternoon and night of the 14th; and on the following day, the bulk of the artillery, for which our ground was not adapted, was likewise withdrawn. The cavalry, after destroying the remainder of their horses, had gone on board some time before; so that nothing now remained except the most efficient of the infantry in position. On the 16th, therefore, as all appeared to be quiet in the French lines, orders were issued for the gradual retreat of the different divisions; and the boats of the fleet were collected in the harbour, and along the beach, to receive the regiments on board as fast as they should arrive at the water's edge. But about noon, just as the General had given his final directions, and had mounted his horse for the purpose of visiting the outposts, an alarm was spread that the enemy were in motion. Sir John flew to the front, expressing his high satisfaction at the intelligence; and arrived just as our pickets were beginning to skirmish with the tirailleurs, which, in great multitudes, covered the advance of the French army.

The enemy came on in four strong columns, two of which threatened the right of our position; whilst a third bore down upon the centre, and a fourth manœuvred so as to occupy the attention of the left. It soon became apparent that his main

object was to turn our right, which was decidedly the weakest point in our position. It was defended by Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42nd, and 50th regiments; having the brigade of guards in their rear, under Major-general Warde. In order to secure these against being turned, General Paget was ordered to advance instantly with the reserve, and throwing himself upon the right of Lord William, to take post in the foremost line; whilst General Baird made ready, after he should have checked the force which threatened his own position, to succour both by a flank movement of General Manningham's brigade against the enemy. The left column, again, needed only to keep its ground, and to resist any effort which might be made to force it.

The first attack of the French troops has long been noted for its impetuosity; nor was it less impetuous on the present day than on other occasions. Our advanced posts were all driven in; and the columns of attack moved forward with every demonstration of courage, covered by a cloud of skirmishers, and supported by a continued and well-directed fire from eleven pieces of artillery. As they drew near, these columns deployed partly into line; and it soon became apparent that they extended far beyond the extreme right of the British position. But our troops seemed

totally to despise this disadvantage; instead of waiting upon their own ground to receive the shock, they advanced to meet the enemy; the 4th regiment, with admirable celerity, wheeling back its right wing, and presenting a front in two directions. Nor was the slightest impression made upon them, either by the cannonade, which came fast and murderously, or by the appearance of whole corps of infantry, which seemed as if they must make their way between our people and Corunna. Sir John Moore was near the 4th when it executed this movement. He was highly delighted with it, and cried aloud, "This is exactly what I wished to be done!" And feeling that men who could act with so much coolness in the presence of a superior force were not likely to give way merely because the General quitted them, he rode off to see that in other parts of the field a similar spirit was in operation.

The French and English armies were separated from each other by a number of walls and hedges, and other enclosures; to pass which both parties seemed equally anxious. A few moments sufficed to bring them into contact; and though the onset was spirited in no ordinary degree, it failed in producing the slightest impression upon our line. The village of Elvina, which had been occupied by a few light troops, was indeed carried, and the enemy pressed on with high courage, and in great

force; but their advance was soon checked by the 50th regiment, which not only drove them down the slope, but pursued them through Elvina, and to a considerable distance beyond it. It was on this occasion that the generals, "two majors," Napier and Stanhope, were both lost to the service; the former being severely wounded and made prisoner, whilst the latter was killed on the spot.

The action became now extremely warm along the whole front of our line. The 42nd, after receiving and returning several volleys, crossed its bayonets, and, supported by a battalion of guards, repulsed a strong body of the enemy, which had endeavoured to possess itself of the heights on the left. The charge was an exceedingly brilliant one; and Sir John Moore was in the act of watching and applauding it, when a cannon-ball struck him on the left shoulder, and beat him to the ground. Some time previous to this, Sir David Baird had been compelled, by a severe wound in the arm, to quit the field: the regiments were therefore left, in a great measure, to the guidance of their own courage, and the management of their respective commanding officers. But, to use the words of the gallant soldier who succeeded to the command, "the troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not dismayed; but by the most determined bra-

very, not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged."

His efforts to force our right being thus foiled, Marshal Soult endeavoured to turn it, and to advance a column into the rear of our people unobserved. His design was discovered at once; and General Paget, moving forward with the reserve, met the column in the most gallant style, and drove it back with loss upon its original position. Not contented with this, General Paget pressed on; and instead of filling the situation of men who desired no more than merely to maintain themselves, and to repel assaults, the right of the British army became the assailants. The enemy were broken and dispersed; they not only desisted from all further attempts in this quarter, but were fain to alter, in some degree, their own dispositions, and to take ground considerably to their right. Nor were they more successful in the efforts which they made to penetrate our centre, and break through our left. At these points the ground was greatly in our favour; and as our troops showed the same firmness which distinguished their comrades to the right, the issue was never for a moment doubtful. For about half an hour, indeed, they were in possession of Betanzos, from which their fire came in heavily upon the

14th regiment; but from that point they were speedily dislodged; and when darkness put an end to the fighting, they had been repulsed, with terrible slaughter, in all their attacks. Our loss in this affair amounted to about eight hundred in killed and wounded: that of the enemy is uncertain; but it has been computed, and not, I should conceive, without reason, at double. Some prisoners were taken on both sides; but they were not numerous, nor were there any officers of rank among them.

I have said that Sir John Moore received a severe wound whilst animating the 42nd regiment to the charge, in an early stage of the action; it is hardly necessary to add, that the wound proved mortal; nor is it more necessary to enter into any minute detail of the last moments of that illustrious soldier's life, or of the melancholy solemnity with which his funeral obsequies were performed. The tale has been told already, with greater eloquence than I could employ; nor is it probable that it will soon cease to retain a place in the memory of the people of this country. It is sufficient for me to observe, that not all the consciousness of victory, cheering and gratifying as that is, was capable of alleviating, in the slightest degree, the grief of the army for the loss of its chief. Perhaps the British army has produced some abler men than Sir John Moore; it has certainly produced many who, in

point of military talent, were and are quite his equals ; but it cannot, and perhaps never could, boast of one more beloved, not by his own personal friends alone, but by every individual that served under him. It would be affectation to deny that Sir John Moore, during his disastrous retreat, issued many orders in the highest degree painful to the feelings of honourable men, who felt that their conduct had not merited them. His warmest admirers have acknowledged this, and his best friends have lamented it ; but, in all probability, no one would have lamented it more heartily than himself, had he lived to review, in a moment of calmness, the general conduct of this campaign ; because there never lived a man possessed of a better heart, nor, in ordinary cases, of a clearer judgment.

It would be superfluous in me to enter, at this place, into anything like a review of the merits of this our first military effort in the Peninsula. From the observations which I have taken the liberty to make here and there in the course of the narrative, the reader will have doubtless arrived at a knowledge of my opinion on the subject ; and to the justice of that opinion, given as it was on the spot, and amidst the progress of the events recorded, everything which has since occurred in Spain bears testimony. The truth is, that Sir John Moore, with many of the qualities requisite

to constitute a *general*, was deficient in that upon which, more perhaps than any other, success in war must ever depend. He wanted confidence in himself—he was afraid of responsibility—he underrated the qualities of his own troops, and greatly overrated those of his adversary. Yet let justice be done. He acted under circumstances at once difficult and trying. He was harassed by being made, in some degree, dependent upon the opinions of others; whilst he was from the first absolutely destitute of support from the authorities in the country, as well military as civil. Sir John Moore was, moreover, a brave and high-spirited soldier. Of this the most satisfactory proof was furnished, by his refusal to act upon a suggestion made to him by some of the oldest and most experienced-generals in his army, and his declining to enter into any convention for the quiet embarkation of his troops. He preferred the honour of his army to its safety; and by preserving the one, he provided for the other also.

On the fall of Sir John Moore, and the removal of Sir David Baird from the field, the command devolved upon General Hope; who conducted everything with that judgment and coolness which peculiarly distinguished him. Though successful in the battle, he did not consider himself authorised to depart from the plan upon which he knew that the late commander of the forces had intended

to act. The enemy no sooner retired than he renewed the preparations for embarking the troops, which their attack had interrupted ; and the boats being all in readiness at ten o'clock that night, brigade after brigade filed silently down to the beach. The embarkation was covered by Major-general Beresford, at the head of two thousand men, who occupied the land-front of Corunna ; and by Major-general Hill's brigade, which took post on the promontory, in rear of the town. It went on during the night with great celerity, and without any interruption from the French ; but on the following morning they pushed forward a corps of light troops towards the town, and seized the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. No attempt was, however, made to molest the covering brigades. The situation of General Beresford, under the walls of the place, was indeed such, as to place it in a great degree beyond the reach of danger ; and the Spaniards, to do them justice, seemed resolved to protect our movements to the utmost. General Hill's brigade was accordingly withdrawn at three o'clock on that afternoon ; and finally, as soon as darkness set in, the last division quitted its ground, and was received in perfect safety on board of ship.

Thus, without any other interruption than arose from a feeble cannonade, directed against our shipping, from the heights of St. Lucia, was the

whole of the British army, including its sick, its wounded, its artillery, its stores, and even its prisoners, conveyed from the coast; and the first regular campaign of our soldiers in the Peninsula came to a close.

In the course of the preceding details, I am aware much may be said and recorded of the particular exploits of different corps, and the conduct of officers. The just view of everything cannot be collected, nor individual merit marked out, by one in my humble position; my desire therefore has been limited to give fairly my own general impressions, without offence to any, and to apologise to all, whose corps, names, and actions, ought to be recorded in military history by an abler pen than mine.

CHAPTER XI.

Consequences of Sir John Moore's campaign—Departure of Napoleon for Germany—Military condition of Spain and Portugal previous to the arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley—Invasion of Portugal by Soult—He passes the Minho at Orense, defeats the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey, and enters Chaves—Oporto carried by assault—Lupisse fails to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo, and goes to join Victor—Battle of Medelin, and overthrow of Cuesta's army—Sir John Cra-dock and Marshal Beresford make preparations to oppose Soult—Sir Arthur Wellesley embarks at Portsmouth; reaches Lisbon; is received with enthusiasm—He makes arrangements to take the field.

IN spite of its disastrous and somewhat humiliating termination, the first campaign of the British troops in Spain cannot be said to have been wholly unproductive of benefit to the general cause. The attention of the enemy being turned mainly towards the north, an opportunity was given to the southern provinces of repairing, at least in part, the injuries sustained by the defeats

of Blake, Castanos, and Belvidere; and of that opportunity they were not altogether neglectful. The remains of the beaten armies were collected and re-organised, and fresh levies were industriously set on foot. Palafox, Cuesta, the Duke del Infantado, and the Marquis de Palacia, appeared each at the head of a corps; whilst Romana, retreating towards the Portuguese frontier, did his best to rouse the energies of Galicia; and Saragoza, though too fatally for its brave garrison, again made itself illustrious by the length and obstinacy of its defence. But the event to which, above all others, the Peninsula owed its escape from immediate conquest, was the unlooked-for arming of Austria, and the consequent departure of Buonaparte towards another scene of operations. He had scarcely returned to Madrid from his movement against Sir John Moore's army, when intelligence of the rising storm in the north reached him; and he found himself under the necessity of leaving to his marshals the completion of that triumph, of which he persuaded himself that he had laid the foundation. Having once more seated his brother on the throne, and amused himself and his adherents by the promulgation of a few decrees, he took the road to France; whither he was followed, on the 22nd of January, by the division of imperial guards, amounting in all to fifteen thousand men.

Of the proceedings which took place, both in Spain and Portugal, from this date up to the return of Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lisbon, it falls not within the plan of the present imperfect narrative to attempt any minute relation. Enough is done, when the reader is reminded that the Spanish armies, of whose re-organisation notice has been taken, suffered, one after another, signal defeats; and that before the month of March had expired, the principal matter of which the French generals had cause to complain, was their ignorance upon what point it behoved them to bear, for the purpose of completing their conquests. In Portugal, again, all was alarm and dismay. There remained in or about Lisbon, a corps of ten or twelve thousand British soldiers, under the command of Sir John Cradock, upon which alone the smallest confidence could be reposed; for though the Portuguese were still as far as ever from being reconciled to a foreign yoke, they were without officers, without discipline, and without confidence in themselves. General Beresford had indeed, with the activity and zeal for which he is remarkable, begun to exert himself for the removal of these evils. As soon as he received his appointment as commander-in-chief, he set steadily to the task of re-modelling the Portuguese army in all its parts, by introducing into each battalion a system both of drill and internal arrangement, similar to

that which exists in British regiments ; but a revolution so complete could not be effected in a moment, nor were its beneficial consequences fully felt till a later period in the war. The sole means of defence, independently of Sir John Cra-dock's division, therefore, which Portugal could hope to oppose to a fresh invasion, consisted of a corps under Silveira, mustering in all about six thousand men, of which one-half only were regu-lars ; of the Lusitanian legion, organised by Sir Robert Wilson ; of Beresford's levies, then in pro-cess of organization, of the garrison of Oporto, made up almost entirely of volunteers ; and of bands of ill-armed peasants, whose want of order would necessarily incapacitate them from acting with effect in the field, though their individual courage might render them truly formidable as guerillas and partisans.

Such was the state of Portugal, when three corps d'armée from the French army prepared to invade it. Having reduced Corunna and Ferrol, and otherwise secured the tranquillity of Galicia, Soult set forward in the direction of Tuy, with the design of penetrating through the province of Tras os Montes, seizing Oporto, and so advancing upon Lisbon. To aid him in this attempt, Victor was commanded to manœuvre on the side of Badajoz, and to send on a strong column, which should unite itself with Soult's army in the capital. As

these two points of attack were, however, at a great distance from one another, General Lapisse was directed to strengthen them by occupying the country between the Douro and Almeida, and by the reduction of the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. Here he was to remain till the fall of Oporto should be communicated to him; after which he was to unite himself to Victor; when both having covered Soult's movement to Lisbon, and seen the imperial eagles once more hoisted there, were to countermarch upon Andalusia, and complete its subjugation:—This was the general intelligence received, though for accuracy in all its parts it is impossible to vouch.

In accordance with these data Soult began his journey; his place in Galicia being supplied by Marshal Ney at the head of a fourth corps. He reached the Minho without encountering any other obstacles besides those which a wasted district necessarily threw in his way; and he made ready to pass the river in a flotilla of fishing-boats, which had been collected together for the purpose. But the river was wide and rapid; his sailors were unskilful; and the opposite banks being in possession of some armed peasants under General Freire, with a couple of six-pounders, his flotilla was either sunk or swept away. He gave up the attempt as impracticable, and turning to his left, marched at a quick pace upon Orense,

where there is a bridge. Here his passage was made good ; and here information reached him that Romana, with a body of Spaniards, and Silveira, at the head of his Portuguese, were drawn up near Monterrey, for the purpose of opposing his advance upon Chaves. He hastened to give them battle, defeated them with considerable slaughter, and removed to Chaves the hospital and magazines which he had previously established at Orense. His next movement was upon Oporto ; where the spirit of discord, and even mutiny, which prevailed among the garrison, not less than the absence of judgment exhibited by the authorities in putting the place in a position of defence, gave promise that no very obstinate or bloody contest awaited him.

The resistance offered by the garrison of Oporto was not more serious than Soult had anticipated. Having overthrown a tumultuary force, which ventured to oppose him at Braga, he arrived before Oporto on the 23rd of March, and on the same day sent in to demand its surrender. The summons was rejected, and dispositions were made for an assault. A long line of open outworks covered the place, so extensive as to be perfectly indefensible, except by a very numerous army. These were attacked at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th ; they were carried almost at a rush ; and before four the French soldiers

were in possession of the streets. Three or four thousand regulars and militia either escaped or surrendered ; the Bishop fled across the Douro, never pausing till he had reached Lisbon ; and the town was given up, during three whole days, to indiscriminate plunder. Several ships were in the harbour, laden with the property of individuals, which they had hoped to remove ; but the north winds happening to blow, they could not put to sea, and became, of course, a prey to the conquerors.

Established here, Soult proceeded to make the people of Portugal acquainted with the nature of the commission which he bore, and the extent of the powers with which he was intrusted. He issued proclamations, calling upon the peasantry to return everywhere to their homes, and threatening with the severest punishments all such persons as should be found with arms in their hands. He assured the inhabitants of Lisbon that the hour of their deliverance from the bondage of England had arrived, and invited them to place themselves and their city under the protection of an officer who had the honour to appear among them as the Emperor's representative ; and who, in his capacity of governor-in-chief, would pay the strictest attention to their prejudices, and secure to them the enjoyment of just laws and personal liberty. Finally, he denounced a terrible ven-

geance against all who should presume in any way to offer to his progress an opposition as perverse as it must be hopeless, and assumed generally the style of a monarch returning, at the head of a powerful party, to the throne of his ancestors.

In the mean while, Victor and Lapisse were each carrying on a series of operations, though not exactly in accordance with the supposed general plan which had been laid down for the conduct of the campaign. Lapisse, indeed, appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo with a corps of six thousand men, and endeavoured, by a coup-de-main, to make himself master of it; but he was repulsed, and being wholly unprovided with battering cannon, he did not renew the attempt. On the contrary, he marched to his left in search of Victor, leaving nothing behind for the purpose of keeping open the communication with Soult; who became, in consequence, completely isolated in his new position at Oporto. With respect to Victor, again, he found employment enough in pursuing, from place to place, the army of Cuesta; which led him first from Talavera upon Truxillo, and afterwards, by a variety of circuitous routes, upon Merida and Medellin. Here, at last, the Spanish General, apprehensive for the fate of Badajoz, determined to offer battle. An action was accordingly fought in an open plain, which surrounds the latter town, on the left bank of the Guadiana; and it ended in the

total rout of the patriot army. In this affair the Spanish infantry behaved well; they had even gained ground upon the enemy at several points, and were pressing forward with great gallantry, when a sudden panic seized the cavalry, and it fled from the field without striking a blow. Cuesta did his best to rally the fugitives; but to no purpose. The French broke in upon the Spanish left, exposed by the flight of the cavalry, and turned it, at the moment when Cuesta was thrown from his horse, and severely bruised. All now became confusion and dismay. The Duke of Albuquerque, who commanded on the right, endeavoured to form his division into columns, and to retire in good order; but the columns were not yet formed, when a heavy fire of artillery dispersed them, and the men could not again be recalled to their standards. The rout was complete; and the loss, in killed, wounded, and taken, was greater by far than a Spanish army had yet sustained from the commencement of the war.

It was not, however, a bloodless victory. The Spaniards, particularly in the commencement of the day, fought with determined gallantry, and to great advantage; and the French suffered more than their General had at all calculated upon. This was distinctly proved from the disinclination which he exhibited to follow up, with alacrity, the success which he had obtained. Though Cuesta

retired towards Llerena over plains of immense extent, with scarcely any cavalry to protect him, Victor, who was particularly strong in that arm, attempted no pursuit. On the contrary, he resumed his former position at Medelin and Merida, from whence he sent to call in Lapisse; and where he continued inactive, till the operations of the British army at last compelled him to move.

Things were in this state, the designs of the French having been temporarily frustrated, when the British government came to the wise determination of making another great effort for the deliverance of the Peninsula. For this purpose, large bodies of troops were collected, here and there, along the coast, consisting partly of the regiments which had returned from Corunna, and partly of others which had not yet seen service; and these, as they became severally complete, were sent off, under able officers, to Lisbon. Among the first who arrived at the scene of action, was Major-general Hill. He reached Lumias on the 6th of April, where Sir John Cradock had fixed his head-quarters; and found him making such dispositions as did not indicate offensive measures. General Hill, it was said, at this time suggested bolder measures, and he was aided by Beresford's council; and it was agreed that, instead of continuing preparations for a retreat, the combined British and Portuguese armies should move for-

ward. The enemy were, at this time, in a state of perfect inaction. The few demonstrations of a further advance, which, on first entering Oporto, they had made, were at an end; and they contented themselves now with pushing on their outposts as far as the banks of the Vouga, whilst the main body took post between that river and the Douro. It was resolved to threaten them there; and it was confidently hoped that Soult, already alarmed by transactions in his rear, would not only evacuate Oporto, but retire from the whole north of Portugal. The latter was an event for the attainment of which no exertions, it was believed, ought to be spared; because a conviction everywhere prevailed, that the occupation by a French army of the provinces of *Tras os Montes* and *Entre Douro e Minho*, was an injury to the cause second only to the fall of Lisbon itself.

These resolutions had been formed, and some movements were actually made towards their accomplishment, when Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom the chief command in Portugal had been intrusted, by an extraordinary effort of the war minister of the day, embarked with his staff for the seat of war. To that staff it was the writer's fortune to be attached, in the capacity of adjutant-general. We set sail from Portsmouth on Saturday, the 16th of April, with a stiff breeze blowing ahead, and had not proceeded beyond the Isle of

Wight, when an event occurred which had well nigh proved fatal to us. It might be about midnight, or rather later, when Captain Collier of H. M. ship — burst into the cabin, entreating us to rise without delay, for that we were on the eve of shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time in leaping from our cots, and mounting the deck ; when a very awful as well as alarming spectacle presented itself. In striving to pass a bank which runs out from St. Catherine's point into the sea, the ship missed stays ; this occurred again and again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer to danger ; and now when we looked abroad, the breakers were to be seen at about a stone's-throw from the bow. There was not an individual amongst us who anticipated any other result than that in a few minutes, at the furthest, the vessel would strike ; but we were deceived. The wind, which had hitherto been blowing on shore, suddenly changed, and we were at once relieved from a situation, than which the whole progress of our lives had not before brought us into any more uncomfortable. But it was the only adventure which befell us by the way. The fair wind which sprang up at a moment so critical, did not desert us during the remainder of our voyage ; and we anchored in the Tagus, after a passage of only six days, on the 22nd of April.

No words would be adequate to convey the faint-

est idea of the delight exhibited by all classes of persons, as soon as the arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Lisbon became known. All day long the streets were crowded with men and women, congratulating one another on the happy event; and at night the city was illuminated even in the most obscure and meanest of its lanes and alleys. In the theatres, pieces were hastily got up, somewhat after the fashion of the masks anciently exhibited among ourselves, in which Victory was made to crown the representative of the hero with laurels, and to address him in language as far removed from the terms of ordinary conversation, as might be expected from an allegorical personage. But it was not by such exhibitions alone that the Portuguese nation sought to evince its confidence in its former deliverer, and its satisfaction at his return. Sir Arthur Wellesley was immediately nominated Marshal-general of the armies of Portugal; by which means, whilst the care of training and managing the whole of the interior economy rested still with Beresford, the fullest authority to move the troops whithersoever he would, and to employ them in any series of operations in which he might desire to embark, devolved upon him.

It will easily be believed that no time was lost, either by the commander of the forces, or by those immediately attached to him, in endeavouring to

make themselves thoroughly acquainted, as well with the situation and amount of our own resources, as with the arrangements and designs of the enemy. With respect to our own resources, we found that the whole of the British corps had moved in three columns, and that it was to assemble, on the 24th, at Leiria. Of the Portuguese, again, two battalions only remained at Abrantes, whilst the remainder, with Marshal Beresford, were collected at Thomar; and so strenuous and unremitting had been his exertions, that they were already estimated at or about fifteen thousand men. But it was not from their numbers only that the Portuguese troops promised to prove formidable. Warmly attached to their English officers, and reposing unbounded confidence in them, they had applied of late with so much ardour to their military education, that some were already in fit state to take the field; and it required only a little experience, as well as a more extensive intermingling of Englishmen in their ranks, to put them on a level with the best troops of Europe. The battalions which gave way so easily at Oporto, entertained no respect for their leaders; there was not an officer of rank among them to whom they could at all look up. It was not so in Beresford's army. There the men were, what the lower orders of Portugal always are, perfectly brave; they were officered, at least in part, by persons for whom they entertained the highest

respect; and had a few more English generals taken rank among them, they would have been, even now, not unworthy to take their places by the side of British soldiers. There was one brigade in particular, commanded by Colonel Campbell, which struck me as being in the finest possible order. It consisted of two battalions, each mustering about six hundred bayonets; and it stood under arms, and went through a variety of evolutions with a precision and correctness which would have done no discredit to many of the brigades in our own army. Nor was it less satisfactory to find that the interior economy of these battalions had been brought to a state of perfection altogether in keeping with their external appearance. Both men and officers had learned to mess as the men and officers in the English service; the pay of the common soldiers was increased; and the mischievous system which heretofore had enabled the captains of companies to defraud their troops, was abolished. Everything went on, in short, as it ought to do; and the fairest prospect was given, that with a little additional help on the part of their allies, the Portuguese army would soon become not only efficient in the field, but orderly and well regulated in its cantonments.

With respect to the enemy, a variety of rumours were afloat, out of which it was not very easy to select one more plausible, or having a greater ap-

pearance of probability, than the rest. That their armies, on both sides of the country, remained stationary, was well known; but the causes of the halt were differently represented, according to the taste or fancy of our informants. By some, it was asserted that the war in Germany had compelled Napoleon not only to omit sending reinforcements into the Peninsula, but even to drain off part of the force which he had formerly kept there; and that the French generals found themselves, in consequence, checked in the midst of their career, and incapacitated from bringing to a conclusion the work which they had begun. By others, their inactivity was attributed solely to the effects of the battle of Medelin, on the one hand, and on the other, to the intelligence which had reached them of the arrival of our reinforcements; whilst, by a third party, the French marshals were represented as at variance among themselves, and not more unable than unwilling, to act up to the plans which they had formed. As the event proved, there was not one of all these surmises which did not possess some truth, though we of course could not at the moment ascertain this; but we did ascertain that their corps were far from being efficient, and that we might fairly calculate upon three or four months of absolute freedom from attack. In this case, little doubt could exist of our ultimate success, at all events, in delivering and keeping possession of

Portugal; whilst it was by no means improbable that we should take advantage of whatever success might attend us, and carry the war into Spain.

The reports in circulation as to the strength of Soult's and Victor's corps, were hardly less varied than those which spread abroad respecting other matters; but the opinion at head-quarters was, that the former could not have at his disposal above twelve thousand effectives, nor the latter more than double that amount. It became, therefore, rather a nice question to determine, whether an attempt upon Victor would not be preferable to an operation in the north. On the one hand, it was quite evident that, were we strong enough to destroy Victor, the great game would be played at once; for, in this case, Soult could not venture to remain at Oporto; and even Madrid would, in all probability, be evacuated. On the other hand, it might be attended with hazardous consequences, to leave the capital open, and Soult with his army in our rear. These were matters which required mature consideration; and though few men possess the faculty of arriving, with promptitude, at judicious determinations in the degree in which it was possessed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he could not pretend to make up his mind till he should have seen and advised with Beresford and Cradock. In the mean while, however, that

time might not be wasted, the most active preparations were set on foot, to render the troops moveable in any direction, and at the shortest notice. Our commissariat arrangements, which had fallen into miserable confusion, were once more placed in train; mules, bullocks, and such cars as seemed likely to be wanted, were put in requisition; and flying depots of hospital and other stores were disposed in order for immediate transportation. All these matters served to satisfy the troops that they would not be long kept inactive; and the promise which they held out, received, in due time, its fulfilment.

CHAPTER XII.

Dispositions of the allied troops—They assemble at Coimbra, and are reviewed—State of the French army becomes somewhat changed by the defeat of General Lefevre—Rumours of a mutiny among the enemy—Sir Arthur Wellesley arranges his plans, and the brigades are commanded to move.

SIR JOHN CRADOCK being at this time afflicted with a severe illness, failed in reaching Lisbon as early as he wished; but Marshal Beresford, on whose report of matters great reliance deserved to be placed, came in without the loss of an hour. He spoke in high terms of the Portuguese troops, and expressed himself sanguine as to the result of any operations which might be undertaken. Under these circumstances, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to take the field at once; and the following is a brief outline of the arrangements which were entered into in consequence of that determination.

The British troops, with the exception of one infantry and one cavalry brigade, under General Mackenzie, were directed to assemble, with as little delay as possible, at Coimbra, and to take up, in the mean time, the line of the Mondego. They amounted in all, including two brigades of Germans, to 17,000 effectives, the detached corps mustering 2,700 men, about one-half of which was cavalry; and they were to be joined there by a portion of the Portuguese army, which was so distributed, as that in each brigade one Portuguese might take its place between two British battalions. By this disposition, the fidelity, and to a certain extent, the gallantry of our allies, would, it was presumed, be secured; if they should exhibit the slightest disposition to desert their colours, or to turn their backs upon the French, they might at any moment be annihilated by the corps which hemmed them in. The army, thus arranged, would amount in all to about twenty thousand men, six thousand of which were allotted to act as a separate corps under Beresford; and it was understood that its undivided attention would, in the first place, be turned against Soult and the French force in Oporto.

In the mean while, a division of twelve thousand men, composed entirely of Portuguese, with the exception of the two British brigades already alluded to, was to take post, under General Mac-

kenzie, at Santarem and Abrantes. The object of this distribution was an exceedingly important one, for a due comprehension of which it may be necessary to advert to other matters, of which some notice has already been taken.

I have said that, according to the plan originally devised for the second invasion of Portugal by the French, Victor was on no account to move into Andalusia, till after he should have ascertained the fact of Soult's success, and been joined by the division of General Lapisse. Of this, certain intercepted letters from King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan informed us. But Victor had been already drawn into some deviation from these arrangements, in consequence of the movements of Cuesta; and it was not improbable that the course which events had lately taken, would draw him into still wider deviations. Though he knew nothing of Soult—nothing at least calculated to give him satisfaction—he had been already joined by Lapisse; it accordingly became a matter of doubt, whether he should proceed into Andalusia, or march upon Lisbon by way of Alentejo. It was to provide against the latter contingency, that General Mackenzie's corps took post as above described. In that position he completely commanded the fords over the Tagus; and he occupied ground, where twelve thousand men might, under any circumstances, offer a successful resistance to

at least twice their own numbers. It is true that a notion prevailed, that if the French endeavoured to cross the Tagus at all, they would make the attempt at Salvatierra; from whence, should they make good their passage, the strong ground could be turned; but that idea in no degree disturbed the equanimity of any one who bore in mind, that at the present season of the year the Tagus, so low at least as Salvatierra, could not be passed except in boats. Effectual care would, however, be taken, that with such means of passing the enemy should not be supplied; and hence the occupation of Abrantes, and Santarem, and the neighbouring villages of Golegam, &c. might be said to place Lisbon in perfect security from all insult in that quarter.

It was, however, extremely improbable that Victor would embark in an undertaking so hazardous as an advance upon Lisbon. He knew that Cuesta was again in force; he could not, therefore, turn his back upon him without leaving a strong corps behind for the purpose of watching his motions; and this would necessarily expose him to the risk of being attacked and destroyed in detail. It was more probable that, being strengthened by the junction of Lapisse, he would leave Soult to his fate, and move, with all his force, upon Andalusia. In this case, Sir Arthur Wellesley repeatedly urged upon Cuesta the wisdom of

retiring to the mountains, and keeping wholly upon the defensive; whilst the garrisons of Elvas and Badajoz should march upon the enemy's rear, and harass his convoys. This would give us an opportunity of completing our projects in the north; after which, by a rapid march to the eastern frontier, we might come up to his aid, and by a combined attack, overwhelm Victor's army.

Having put these matters as far in train as it was possible to do at this stage of the business, the head-quarters of the British army quitted Lisbon; and halting at Pombal on the 1st, arrived at Coimbra on the 2nd of May. Here, as in the capital, General Wellesley was received with a degree of enthusiasm which strongly marked the confidence of all classes in his abilities. But affairs were in too critical a posture to authorise the waste of time, even in the agreeable occupation of giving and receiving compliments; and Sir Arthur was not a man to gratify his own vanity at the expense of the public good. He accordingly cut short many of the dispositions which the Portuguese authorities had made, for the purpose of manifesting their good-will, and set himself, on the very day of his arrival, to the task of arranging and distributing his army for immediate operations.

It has been already stated that one brigade of infantry, and another of cavalry, were placed

under the orders of Major-general Mackenzie, and detached on a particular service. The regiments composing the latter, were the 3rd and 4th heavy dragoons brigaded together under General Fane, and the 2nd and 24th regiments of foot composed the former. The remainder were distributed into seven brigades of infantry of the line, two brigades of German infantry, one brigade of guards, and one brigade of light cavalry. Of the cavalry, which consisted of the 14th, 16th, and 20th British, and the 3rd light dragoons of the King's German Legion, the command was given to Major-general Cotton; whilst a brigade of guards, composed of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream, and 1st of the 3rd guards, and additionally strengthened by one company of riflemen from the 5th battalion of the 60th, was commanded by Brigadier-general H. Campbell. Major-general Hill was at the head of the first brigade, consisting of the Buffs, the 66th, the 48th, and one company 5th battalion 60th. Major-general Tilson had the third brigade, composed of five companies 5th battalion 60th, the 88th, and 1st battalion Portuguese grenadiers, and the 87th. The 5th brigade, made up of the 7th, 1st battalion 10th Portuguese, the 53rd and 1st company 5th battalion 60th, was headed by Brigadier-general A. Campbell. Brigadier-general Cameron commanded the 7th brigade, which consisted of the 9th, 2nd battalion

10th Portuguese, the 83rd, and one rifle company. The sixth brigade, composed of the 1st battalion detachments, 1st battalion 16th Portuguese, and the 29th, was under the orders of Brigadier-general R. Stewart. The 4th brigade, consisting of the 2nd battalion detachments, 2nd battalion, 16th Portuguese, the 97th, and a rifle company, was headed by Brigadier-general Sontag; whilst the 2nd brigade, made up of the 27th, 45th, and 31st, acted under the orders of Major-general Mackenzie. With respect to the Germans, again, they were divided into two brigades, under the respective orders of Brigadier-generals Longthwert and Driberg; the whole being commanded by Major-general Murray.

In addition to these arrangements, four major-generals,—namely, Sherbrooke, Payne, Lord William Bentinck, and Paget,—received local rank as lieutenant-generals during the continuance of the service, that they might severally take command of such divisions as the General-in-chief should from time to time see fit to consolidate. At the head of the adjutant-generals' department was the writer of these sheets, then Brigadier-general Stewart; and Colonel Murray, 3rd guards, acted as quarter-master-general.

His troops being thus distributed, and placed, each corps under its own leader, Sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to consider his plan of the cam-

paign which he was so soon about to open. That the reader may the better comprehend the nature of that plan, as well as the purposes of the different movements which subsequently took place, it will be necessary to remind him of the exact situation in which Marshal Soult stood, or, to speak more correctly, in which he was believed to stand, when the plan in question was formed.

It has been stated that Soult made his way with very little difficulty to Oporto, and that he remained there for some time, with his advanced posts on the bank of the Vouga, in a state of perfect inaction. In the mean while, the Spanish and Portuguese troops, which he had with so much ease dispersed, were again assembling, and gradually closing in upon his communications. Silveira, who had retired, first to the mountains of Oura and Reigaz, and afterwards to Villa Pouca, no sooner became aware that the enemy were moving upon the Braga road, than he quitted his new position, and advanced again upon Chaves. He entered that place without opposition, and after blockading the castle for four days, compelled it, with a garrison of 1300 men, to surrender. Encouraged by this success, he proposed to follow the steps of the French army, and, if possible, to cut off their detachment at Braga, as he had done at Chaves; but intelligence of the fall of Oporto caused him to relinquish that determination;

whilst a rumour of an intended movement through the province of *Tras os Montes*, by way either of *Canavezas* or *Entre Ambos Rios*, induced him to act upon another. He immediately occupied the villages above-named; repulsed the enemy in two attempts upon the former; and reaching *Amarante* just as a body of French troops were advancing upon it, compelled them to retire to *Peñafiel*, and himself took possession of the city.

Whilst *Silveira* was thus straitening the left of the enemy's position, and interposing himself in that direction between the corps of *Soult* and *Victor*, *Romana* was not idle in the rear. In spite of his defeat at *Monterrey*, the Spanish General, who had retreated upon *La Puebla de Sanabria*, soon found himself at the head of four or five thousand men, with whom he resolved to strike a blow upon the line of French posts between *Astorga* and *Villa Franca*. The former city was, indeed, too strong for him; it could not be won without artillery, and in artillery he was deficient; but the latter, after a trifling resistance, he contrived to reduce, making prisoners of a colonel and eight hundred men. This victory, trifling as it was, roused, once more, the dormant energies of *Galicia* into exertion. The French were attacked in every point where appeared the slightest prospect of success. *Vigo* was closely invested, on the land side, by General *Morillo*; from the sea, by

Captain Mackenley of the *Lively* frigate; and it capitulated just as a force from Tuy, destined for its relief, arrived under the walls. The retiring force was attacked and routed, and Tuy itself placed in a state of blockade; but in Tuy, Soult had established considerable magazines, and both the garrison and the sick in the hospital were numerous; he could not, therefore, permit it to fall as Vigo had fallen. Generals Gramdorges and Heudelet were sent, at the head of a light corps, to its relief; and their force was such as the half-armed and undisciplined levies employed in the siege could not successfully oppose. They entered Tuy, after having sustained some resistance, particularly at Ponte de Lima. But there was no design entertained of keeping permanent possession of Tuy, important as the place undeniably was. The orders of these generals instructed them only to withdraw the magazines and the garrison; and this, as well as the removal of the sick and wounded from Braga, they successfully accomplished. That done, they returned to Oporto, where Soult found himself fairly hemmed in;—in front by the British army, on the left by Silveira, in the rear by bands of armed Spaniards, and on the right by the sea.

Aware that such had lately been the enemy's situation, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to manœuvre, for the purpose of surrounding them in

Oporto, and compelling them to surrender. With this view, Beresford received instructions to proceed from Coimbra with his own corps, and some Portuguese troops, which, under Sir Robert Wilson, occupied Vizeu, as far as Lamego; to cross the Douro there, and to join General Silveira in Amarante. As soon as this movement should have been effected, and the detached column established in the province of Entre Douro e Minho, the force from Coimbra was to advance, and make, by the great roads of Vouga and Avouros, upon Oporto. In the mean while, Beresford's corps descending the Douro, was to seize every boat which lay along its shore, and so to arrange them, as that the means of crossing might be at our disposal, as soon as we should reach the banks of the river. The probabilities were, that Soult, finding himself beset on all hands, would not attempt a resistance which he must perceive to be in vain; but in case his obstinacy should get the better of his prudence, we were instantly to pass the stream; and nobody could for one moment doubt as to the results of the struggle.

Everything was in readiness for carrying these arrangements into force, when, on the evening of the 4th, a despatch from Silveira arrived, to inform us of a severe defeat which he had sustained at the town of Amarante. The enemy, it appeared, favoured by a dense fog, attacked him

there on the 2nd, forced the bridge over the Tamega, and took from him eight or nine pieces of cannon; and he was now falling back, with the remains of his corps, upon Lamego, in presence of several bodies of French troops which had crossed the Douro. In addition to this intelligence, a rumour reached us, that the enemy had evacuated Viana, Villa de Conde, and other places on the coast; it was reported, moreover, that he was busily employed in the destruction of stores and magazines in Oporto, and numerous preparations were said to be going on for the immediate abandonment of the city. All this information coming at once, could not but occasion some change in our plans. It was now manifest enough that Soult would not submit quietly to be surrounded; on the contrary, no one could doubt that he meditated either the removal of the seat of war, by circuitous marches to the Tagus, there to be supported by some movements on the side of Victor, or designed to attempt an escape out of Portugal by way of the *Tras os Montes*. The latter scheme was justly regarded as by many degrees more probable than the former; because, to bring his army across the Douro, and advance by Lamego, would be to leave us upon his flank; and it was resolved that no time should be lost in striving to defeat it.

The reader is probably aware, that at the

period concerning which I now write, the most serious discontent was understood to prevail in the ranks of the French army. There existed there a secret society, the members of which, under the title of Philadelphes, bound themselves by oath to attempt, whenever a favourable opportunity should occur, the abolition of the imperial dynasty, and the restoration of a democracy in France. Soult's corps was not free from men of this description, at the head of whom was an adjutant-major. This personage was in constant communication with Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom he proposed a scheme for seducing the soldiers from their duty, and arresting his general; and though he was received with all the caution, and treated with the reserve which prudence required, still there was that in his manner and mode of acting which commanded attention. From him we learned that a spirit, almost mutinous, was at work in Oporto; that the hospitals were crowded with sick; and that but one feeling prevailed among all ranks, that of unmitigated dislike of the particular service in which they were employed. It will readily be believed that such information only increased our anxiety to be beforehand with the enemy, of whose design to evacuate Portugal it was impossible any longer to entertain a doubt. Preparations were accordingly made to lead the army, in two divisions, directly upon the Douro,

—one proceeding by Aveira, and the other by Vouga; whilst Beresford, preceding it with his advanced-guard a single day, should move by Vizeu upon Lamego.

Some time was, however, required to bring up the various regiments and brigades from their detached stations; and this interval was spent, partly in putting the commissariat into a state of greater efficiency, and partly in smoothing down certain awkward feelings which had unhappily arisen among ourselves, on the score of rank. There was a considerable jealousy, on the part of some of our senior officers, with respect to the stations to which the Portuguese commission might advance their juniors, whilst acting with the combined armies. General Beresford furnished a case in point, who, though inferior in the date of his British appointment to several local lieutenant-generals, took rank as a field-marshal in Portugal, and commanded, as such, the advance of the allied forces. To obviate this, it was necessary to explain, that Portuguese rank could be permitted to have weight only as long as both British and Portuguese troops were under their present leader; but that, in case of any vacancy in the supreme command, he would of course succeed, whose British rank happened to be the most elevated. Nor was it ever intended that a senior British officer should act immediately under his junior, notwith-

standing the station which the latter might temporarily fill; and hence care was taken that no man should be appointed to a command in Beresford's corps, who was not, in point of fact, his junior in the British service. These were unpleasant discussions; and they were not the less so, on account of the necessity which all acknowledged for the employment of British officers in the Portuguese service. But they came not alone. Other difficulties arose as fast as these ceased to operate, touching the mode of paying the officers attached to Portuguese battalions; and it was only by an exercise of that clear judgment and firmness of mind which so peculiarly belong to him, that our chief was at last enabled to set them all at rest.

As the troops began to arrive in and around Coimbra, the difficulty of finding forage for the horses and mules attached to them, became very great. The markets were, however, good, the inhabitants freely supplying us with every article of provision at a moderate price; but the expense of supporting the army here was enormous. It was calculated that the British troops alone circulated through Coimbra a sum of not less than 10,000*l.* per day; and that the whole money spent by the allies exceeded 100,000*l.* per week. With respect to our own employments, again, they may be related in few words. Part of almost every day was spent in inspecting the several

corps as they came up, and in seeing that their arms, necessaries, and general equipments, were in a serviceable condition ; whilst the remainder was consumed, either in the office, or in riding over the country. When reviewing the different brigades, it was impossible not to be forcibly struck with the superiority of the English over the Portuguese soldiers in external appearance. The latter either were, or seemed to be, by far the worst description of men in the country, infinitely inferior in every respect to the peasantry. They were diminutive and narrow-chested in the extreme, yet were they extremely steady under arms ; and, as the event proved, fully equal to their allies in the endurance of fatigues and privations, and in several instances not greatly inferior to them even in the field.

On the 5th of May, the army being at length assembled, a grand review took place ; and a most imposing and magnificent spectacle it presented. To some of the troops which stood that day under arms, it is not going too far to affirm, that the whole world can produce none superior. Of this description were the brigade of guards, the 29th, the 83rd, and the four battalions of the King's German Legion ; and the rest, if in a few minor points they fell short, were such as any general might be proud to command. The whole were, indeed, in the highest state of discipline and

efficiency ; and all appeared animated by one spirit—an ardent desire to meet the enemy. Nor were they kept long in a state of suspense. On that very evening the definitive plans were arranged ; and on the following morning it was understood that the columns would begin to move.

As the intention of turning Soult's left by way of Lamego and Amarante still held good, Beresford, to whom that office was intrusted, received orders to march at day-break on the 6th. He was to be followed on the morning of the 7th, as previously arranged, by the brigades of General Tilson and Fane. On the same day, Cotton, at the head of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, supported by General Stewart's brigade of infantry, was to March upon Mullanda, and to arrive at Adigal on the 8th, followed by the King's German Legion. General Hill's brigade was likewise to march on the 6th, so as to reach Aveira on the 8th ; and the head-quarters were to move on the latter of these days towards Adego and the Vouga. Such were the orders issued on the evening of the 6th ; and these the several divisions specified made ready to obey.

CHAPTER XIII.

The army advances towards the Douro—A body of the enemy attacked and driven from Albergaria Nova—Affair of Grijon—Passage of the Douro, and defeat of Soult.

THE dawn of the 7th of May was beginning to appear, when the advanced-guard of the army, accompanied by General Cotton's brigade of cavalry, began its march in the direction of Oporto. It proceeded leisurely, and it was followed by the whole of the army, divided into two columns, of three divisions; two of which, under Generals Paget and Payne, moved by the Vouga road, whilst the third advanced upon Aveira, under the orders of General Hill. The latter movements did not, however, take place till the 9th, the main body halting during the 8th, in order that Beresford, who set out on the 6th for Vizeu and Lamego, might be enabled to reach his place of destination in good time, and take possession of

Amarante at the moment most desirable, when we should begin to show ourselves in front of Oporto. It was intended that, on the evening of the 9th, Hill should embark at Aveira, where boats were prepared for the purpose, and make good his landing at Ovar, at an early hour on the morning of the 10th. On the latter day, Cotton was directed to beat up all the enemy's posts between the Vouga and Oliveira, opening a communication, by this means, with General Hill; and he was to be supported in the undertaking by Generals Stewart and Murray, who, with their respective corps, received directions to pass the Vouga, and move upon Albergaria Nova. In the mean while, Sherbrooke and Cameron were to follow, so as that the latter, embarking at Oveiro on the evening of the 10th, might reach Ovar on the 11th. Then Cotton and Hill, whose junction, it was calculated, might by that time be effected, were to march rapidly upon Villa Nova; and it was confidently hoped that the celerity of the movements would be such as to secure the bridge, at all events, even if they should fail in cutting off the rear-guard of the enemy. This was the more necessary, as the bridge at Villa Nova formed the only visible means by which we should be enabled to pass the Douro; and were it to be broken down, a very serious obstacle to the ultimate success of the expedition would, it was apprehended, be raised.

Such were the general outlines of the plan as far as I could collect, which was of course liable to change according as circumstances might direct, but for which, were it to prove moderately successful in its main points, the following advantages might be expected to result. We had reason to believe that the enemy's force was pretty equally divided, one half being at Oporto, and the other at Amarante. Now by throwing Beresford across the Douro, full occupation would be given to the troops in Amarante; and hence our main attack, which was directed upon Oporto, would be materially forwarded. Again, by sending Hill and Cameron by water, we should seriously facilitate our line of march, and perhaps give an opportunity to Cotton, on the arrival of the former at Oveiro, to drive in part of the enemy's cavalry upon him. But the preceding arrangements were further confirmed by a report which had lately reached us, that Soult was collecting his whole disposable strength in front of Villa Nova, with the intention of sustaining an attack upon some high ground in the vicinity, which he had carefully fortified. We were extremely anxious that he should adhere to this determination, inasmuch as he could not possibly do us a greater favour; yet it was hardly to be expected that he would so far commit himself. On the contrary, it seemed more probable that he would move off with his whole army towards

Amarante, and endeavour to strike a blow at Beresford before we should be able to come up. In this case Beresford must needs keep the Douro between him and the enemy; and thus a road would be opened for the latter through Tras os Montes into Spain. These were, of course, the chances of war. Should the die turn up in one way, the enemy would escape us; should another cast be thrown, and his reported resolution of fighting between Tidrusa and Villa Nova hold good,—then was the game more likely to be our own. Hill's corps might, indeed, be for a moment in danger; but it would only be for a moment; because there was nothing to hinder the whole army from reaching the field of action by the 11th at the latest. In a word, the plan seemed the best which, under existing circumstances, could be formed; and it was vigorously carried into execution.

I have stated some reasons why Sir Arthur Wellesley was anxious to bring Soult to action at once, all of them originating in an apprehension, lest the enemy should make good his retreat unharmed. There was another motive at work besides these. It was confidently rumoured that ten thousand men from the armies of Spain, were ordered to reinforce the corps in Portugal; that they had quitted Arragon some time ago, and might be expected to reach Tudela on the 16th at the

latest. Now, though no account of their passage through Madrid or Burgos had come in, the rumour possessed too much of probability about it to be disregarded; and it mattered little to us, in the end, whether Soult or Victor was to receive the addition to his strength. Our business was to be beforehand with them, and to despatch one, if not both the French generals, before the reinforcements could reach them. Even if Soult alone should be destroyed, our prospects would become brilliant; for the accounts of the Spaniards, sent in by Colonel Doyle, were in the highest degree flattering; and nothing but the presence of the enemy in Portugal stood in the way of our co-operating with them. All these reasons had full weight in precipitating our measures against Soult; and as the army was well provided in every respect, and provisions and other necessaries were abundant, little doubt could be entertained, that a few days at the furthest would see the first part of our project fully realised.

It has been said that the advanced-guard, accompanied by General Cotton's division of cavalry, began its march on the morning of the 7th. The corps in question consisted of two brigades of infantry, one British and one German—the former commanded by Brigadier-general R. Stewart; with two brigades of artillery—one of sixes, the other of threes. It reached the village of Andeja

on the evening of the 8th; and finding that a body of the enemy, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, with some infantry and guns, were cantoned in Albergaria Nova and the villages near, a scheme was devised for surprising them. With this design, the troops passed the Vouga soon after it became dark, when General Cotton, diverging from the beaten track, set off with the cavalry, by a road which led round the villages to the right. Whilst he was executing this movement, the infantry and artillery, led on by General Paget, prepared to make their way over some very difficult ground, in what is called the pass of Vouga. Having halted for about two hours, in order that Cotton might have time to get well up, and to make his dispositions, they too began their march, Colonel Trant, with his Portuguese, undertaking to transport the guns through the most rugged parts of the pass. It unfortunately fell out, however, that the obstacles opposed to the progress of the artillery, were greater than had been anticipated; and the morning of the 9th broke long before the pass was cleared. This necessarily retarded both the infantry and the cavalry; in addition to which, the guides on whom Cotton had relied, mistook, in the darkness of the night, the proper road. The consequence was, that when our cavalry arrived, not in the rear, nor on the flank of Albergaria, but in its front, they

found the enemy drawn up to receive them, their horse being in line upon an open plain, covered by a body of riflemen; whilst a party of infantry occupied a pine-wood on their flank. Cotton had not anticipated such reception; he halted his people, and remained stationary; and was thus situated when Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived with the infantry. The latter were instantly directed to advance; the British, under Paget, passing through Albergaria; and the Portuguese, under Trant, through some hamlets on the left; whilst the cavalry, forming the centre, pressed upon the open space between the two villages. Both the British and Portuguese infantry pushed on without a halt, under an exceedingly brisk fire, which they as briskly returned; but the cavalry were not so fortunate. They found no convenient opportunity to act, and they were somewhat left behind by their dismounted comrades; but the position was carried with little loss on either side. The enemy retreated hastily, and our advanced-guard passed the night at Oliveira; the guards and the remainder of the column taking quarters in Albergaria.

At an early hour on the 11th, the march was renewed; but we had not proceeded far, when a strong body of the enemy, amounting to perhaps four or five thousand infantry, with four regiments of cavalry, appeared in our front. They occupied a commanding position upon some hills beyond the

village of Grijon, and seemed determined to defend it. Sir Arthur Wellesley saw, in a moment, that the height upon which the enemy rested his left could be turned, and he took his measures accordingly. Without once halting his column, he ordered General Murray, from the rear of the advanced-guard, to move round by the right, throwing, at the same time, the 16th Portuguese into a pine-wood on the left. The latter were intended rather to distract the enemy's attention, than themselves to attempt anything serious; whilst General Paget, supported by two battalions in reserve, manœuvred upon their front. A very heavy firing immediately began; but the enemy no sooner observed the judicious movement round their left, than they abandoned their strong ground, and fled. Upon this, our troops were again thrown into column, and the march resumed as if nothing had happened; every movement being made with the same coolness, and in as perfect order, as if at a field-day.

It would be difficult to conceive any little piece of manœuvring more beautiful than that which had just been executed; but the business of the day was by no means over. As soon as we mounted the heights from which the French had just been driven, the rear was observed retiring in great confusion; and it occurred to me that a good opportunity was furnished, of making a successful

charge with a few troops of cavalry. Sir Arthur Wellesley instantly acceded to my proposal, and two squadrons being intrusted to me, we galloped forward in sections along the road, and overthrew, by repeated attacks, everything which stood in our way. Our prisoners alone amounted to upwards of one hundred men. The enemy, upon this, halted, and formed their infantry on the heights of Carvalhos, which commanded the road to a great distance, and checked the pursuit of the two squadrons. A messenger was immediately despatched to the rear, to request that greater force might be sent up; and in the mean while, the squadrons wheeling off to the right, threatened, by a road which ran in that direction, the enemy's left. This movement, alone, had the desired effect. Before the additional troops could arrive, they were once more in full retreat, and the heights of Carvalhos were abandoned.

In this manner we continued our journey, marching and fighting without any intermission, from nine in the morning till five in the afternoon; for the march of the column was never for an instant delayed, because the advanced-guard happened to be engaged. At last, however, we halted for the night; the advance bivouacking on the ground where it stood, and the guards occupying Grijon and Carvalhos; and the head-quarters of the army establishing itself in the convent of Grijon, where

the French generals breakfasted that morning. Respecting these, we were given to understand, that Marmet, Thomieres, Delaborde, and Franceschi, were this day opposed to us; and some hopes were entertained, that even Soult himself might be on this side of the Douro. Nor was it less satisfactory to learn, that Hill's landing at Ovar succeeded to our utmost wishes. He was followed by Cameron; and both were already communicating with us.

Our casualties during the morning were considerable, a good many men having been killed, a still greater number wounded; but they were not more serious than might have been expected, for the enemy's force opposed to us greatly outnumbered the division of our army which was alone engaged. Their ground, too, was generally advantageous to them; and in opposition to all assurances previously received, they fought like men who were not willing to be beaten. The result of the affair, however, tended greatly to elevate the spirits of all who had taken part in it. Once more had English troops been brought into contact with French, and once more had they proved their superiority; they wanted but a wider and better field, to prove it still more satisfactorily.

We rose next morning with frames considerably refreshed, and began our march in the highest possible spirits. As we proceeded, cottages un-

roofed and in ruins ; gardens and enclosures laid waste ; and the most wanton destruction of everything destructible, marked the rout which the enemy had taken. But we fell in with none of his parties. Soult had withdrawn his whole force across the Douro in the night, and breaking down the bridge, was already congratulating himself on his escape from, at least, immediate molestation.

It might be about ten o'clock in the morning, when the advanced-guard, consisting of two brigades of infantry, those of General Stewart and General Murray, with two squadrons of the 14th dragoons, under Paget, arrived at the village, or rather suburb, of Villa Nova. It was joined here by General Hill's corps, which, marching from Ovar along the sea-shore, overtook us at the entrance of the place. We found, as we had expected to find, that the bridge was destroyed ; and we discovered, likewise, that Soult had taken the precaution to remove every boat and barge from this to the opposite side of the river. Under these circumstances, it became no easy matter to surmise how the passage was to be effected ; though every one felt that effected it must be, and that speedily. We were yet hesitating what course to pursue, when Colonel Waters of the Portuguese service, by whom the destruction of the bridge had been reported, was ordered to gallop forward, and to secure the means of transport at any risk. That

intelligent officer instantly proceeded to the river's bank, at a spot where it forms a curve, opposite to the Convento da Cerra, and where, at the distance of a mile and a half from Oporto, its course is concealed by a thick wood. He found here a small boat, hid among the bushes; and standing near it were the prior of the convent, and three or four peasants. The latter, partly at his entreaty, and partly by the exhortations of the prior, were persuaded to leap with him into the little skiff, and they made directly to the opposite bank, where there lay among the mud four large barges, of which they made themselves masters. The deed was a daring one, because patrols of the enemy passed to and fro continually; but it was productive of the very best results. They returned with their prizes unobserved, into which General Paget, with three companies of the Buffs, instantly threw themselves; and crossing the river without a moment's delay, took possession of some houses on the opposite bank, before the enemy were at all aware of their intentions. They had not, however, taken their ground many minutes, when the French, awaking as it were from a trance, advanced to dislodge them. A severe action now ensued, in which our troops resolutely maintained themselves, in spite of odds the most overwhelming; nor was the slightest impression made upon them, till fresh companies arrived to their

support, and all chance of a defeat had been averted.

In the mean while, our people on the opposite side were busily employed in planting guns upon the height of St. Convento, from which a plunging fire was speedily opened upon the enemy's columns. General Murray too, who had been detached with his division to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession of as many boats as enabled him to pass over two battalions of Germans, with two squadrons of the 14th; and these showing themselves upon the enemy's left, the latter immediately retreated from the bank of the river. In an instant the Douro was covered with boats, which the inhabitants hastened to convey across for our accommodation; and the 29th, the two remaining battalions of Germans, and the guards, were all passed over from Villa Nova. We were now in complete possession of the town, the enemy fleeing in all directions. Their principal retreat was, however, upon the road to Amarante, which they covered with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, all in the greatest confusion; and thither they were pursued by the dragoons from General Murray's corps, under my orders, with the gallant Colonel Hervey of the 14th, who unfortunately lost his arm in this skirmish. The slaughter was very great, for a panic had evidently fallen upon them; and as we followed them a

considerable way, repeated opportunities were furnished of charging to advantage. But at last we were recalled ; and the whole army assembled to recover from its fatigues, in the city.

The affair which I have thus, I fear imperfectly, attempted to describe, has been considered, and deserves to be considered by all military men, as not less brilliant than any action of its magnitude, either in the Peninsular or any other modern war. To pass a wide, deep, and rapid river, in the face of a formidable enemy, even with the assistance of an adequate supply of boats and pontoons, requires no trifling degree either of courage or management ; but on the present occasion the passage was made good in spite of difficulties, under which, perhaps, any other officer, except the man who effected it, would have sunk. So little, indeed, did Soult anticipate an attempt of the kind, that he directed his undivided attention to the sea ; and when reports were brought to him, that the British troops were crossing from Villa Nova, he refused at first to give them credit. But Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the very boldness of his plan went far towards securing its success ; he felt, moreover, that upon the promptitude of his movements, the safety of Marshal Beresford's corps in a great degree depended, and he made up his mind to hazard something, rather than permit such an opportunity of striking a blow to

escape him altogether. Had he adopted the resolution for which Soult gave him credit, of embarking his army, and so passing the mouth of the Douro with the boats of the fleet, the French must have escaped in good order; for a delay would have arisen of at least two days, and two days were all that Soult required to insure his safety. He therefore chose the more gallant course, of crossing his troops by detachments; and as he knew of what materials his troops were formed, he entertained no apprehension as to the results. His bravery and excellent arrangements were rewarded by a victory, which would alone immortalise any other individual, had another been so fortunate as to obtain it.

The evening was not far advanced, when the sound of firing ceased, and the most perfect order, consistent with a scene of universal rejoicing among the people, prevailed in Oporto. Our head-quarters being established in the house which Soult had occupied, we found every preparation for a comfortable dinner in progress; for the French Marshal quitted the place so lately as two in the afternoon, long after his sumptuous meal had been ordered. It will be readily imagined that we were not backward in doing ample justice to it. But ours was not a situation which sanctioned the loss of a single hour in relaxation. Orders were issued, and arrangements made, for

putting the army in a condition to resume the pursuit with as little delay as possible; and on the morrow the columns were again in motion. Of the night advantage had been taken to bring up and pass along the whole of the artillery, waggons, and commissariat stores; and when the dawn of the 13th came in, General Murray's brigade were in a condition to march. They set out accordingly on the road to Amarante; and the guards, with the rest of the infantry, prepared to follow in the evening.

Whilst we were thus carrying everything before us on the banks of the Douro, Marshal Beresford, with his detached corps, was not idle. Arriving at Villa Real on the 9th, and being there strengthened by the junction of Silveira's troops, he began his march on the following morning, in the direction of Amarante. On the 11th, his advance, under Silveira, reached that place, where a slight skirmish occurred with the division of General Loison; but the latter retreated almost immediately, taking, as it was believed, the road to Oporto. Of these events Beresford took care to inform us; whilst he himself marched rapidly in pursuit of Loison, fearful lest his junction with Soult should render the latter too strong for us. By this time, however, Soult was overthrown, and in full retreat: the consequence was, that his corps fell in with that of Loison, at Peñafiel, on

the evening of the 12th; and they both prepared to continue, in conjunction with one another, their confused and disastrous flight upon Spain.

There were two routes before Soult, by one or other of which he must necessarily move, if he desired to preserve any of the materiel of his army in its retreat. Either he would make for Galicia, by Ponte de Lima, Valencia, and Tuy; or, as was more probable, he would endeavour to reach Valladolid by Chaves. It was requisite, on our part, to provide against both emergencies. For this purpose, instructions were forwarded to Beresford, on the 13th, directing him, in case the enemy should abandon Amarante, to move upon Chaves, and to make himself master of that line of operations. In the mean while, our corps were to march in such order, as would at once press upon the rear of the fugitives, supposing them to hold still to the Amarante road, and seize the communications along the other route, towards Tuy. General Murray accordingly pressed forward in the direction of Peñafiel, followed by the Hanoverian Legion and a squadron of cavalry. This movement took place on the morning of the 13th. On the 14th again, the rest of the army, consisting of the guards, the cavalry, Generals Stewart's, Campbell's, and Hill's corps, followed the lower road towards Barcelos and Valencia. On the 15th, authentic intelligence reached us, that the

whole of the French force was retiring upon Chaves, after it had burned and destroyed the great bulk of its stores, and even its artillery, in Peñafiel. An immediate alteration of plan was the consequence. Whilst the cavalry, the guards, and General Cameron's brigade, advanced as far as Braga, the remainder stopped short at Villanova de Famelicao; and the lower road being entirely abandoned, all were instructed to move towards Chaves. Thither, therefore, the whole strength of the army directed itself; and it was confidently anticipated that great events must follow; for no one could doubt that the French army would suffer here complete defeat, provided Beresford's corps should have succeeded in occupying Chaves in their front.

In the mean while a variety of rumours respecting the present and future undertakings of the enemy in Spain, were hourly pouring in upon us. Of Ney it was reported that he had withdrawn from Lugo, and was verging gradually in the direction of the frontier; whilst Bessieres was stated to have detached from Valladolid a strong force, for the purpose of acting against us. Then came certain letters from Victor to Ney, which our flying parties had intercepted, bearing date at Merida, on the 29th of April. From these; it appeared that Victor had, by King Joseph's orders, opened a communication with the junta of Seville, from

which he expected the most favourable results; and he accordingly informed his correspondent that he had withdrawn his advance from Medellin; and should not, for the present, enter upon any forward operations. It is probably needless to add, that the latter piece of information afforded great satisfaction to us, inasmuch as it freed us from all immediate apprehensions on the side of the Tagus, and gave us assurance of being enabled to prosecute our designs against Soult without interruption. These completed, other and no less splendid undertakings were before us. We might march rapidly to Alcantara, by way of Ciudad Rodrigo, desiring Mackenzie to join us at the former place; when the whole concentrating at Truxillo, might threaten Victor's right, and, in connexion with Cuesta, force him to give battle, or retire from his present position. For all this, however, more troops were wanting. At present we could not muster, even with the addition of Mackenzie's corps, twenty thousand effective infantry and cavalry; and twenty thousand men were confessedly not adequate to the undertaking. In cavalry, especially, we were extremely weak; and it was unreasonable to expect that the successes already obtained could be followed up with any vigour, unless that arm in particular were rendered perfectly efficient.

CHAPTER XIV.

Sir Arthur Wellesley follows the French army—Skirmish at Salamonde—Sault makes for Orense, and the pursuit is abandoned—The allies countermarch upon Coimbra, where a reinforcement of five thousand men reaches them—Movement towards the south—Communications opened with Cuesta—His plans for the campaign opposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley—The army becomes sickly, and is distressed for money and stores.

THOUGH no man could feel more acutely than our gallant leader, that his energies were sadly cramped for want of means; and though the arrival of at least ten thousand fresh troops was an event for which he, in common with his followers, rather wished than hoped, he determined that nothing should be wanting on his part to make the most of the victorious little band already at his disposal.

Having ascertained, on the night of the 15th, by a report from General Murray, who, with the Ha-

noverians, had followed the enemy from Peñafiel to Guimaraens, and was now in communication with us from that place, that Soult was destroying his artillery and stores, and that the utmost distress prevailed in the French ranks, Sir Arthur Wellesley came to the conclusion, that to pursue any further with the whole of his force, would be to harass the men for very little purpose. It was evident, from these preparations, that Soult had made up his mind to retreat in a direction where no army could pretend to follow him, unless its leader were willing to disorganise his own means to the full as effectually as the enemy had disorganised his. Whilst, therefore, he directed Murray to fall from Guimaraens into our line of march, under the impression that men in a desperate situation might even yet make a desperate attempt, he commanded General Hill, with the four brigades of which he was at the head, to halt at Braga; and he did so, both because he still looked to a countermarch upon the Tagus, and because he entertained no intention of wasting his resources among the barren mountains of Galicia; for, that Soult would make for the mountains, no one could longer doubt. He had disencumbered *himself of everything calculated in the slightest degree to retard his progress, not excepting even the plunder of Oporto, or the caissons which contained the spare musket-ammunition for his sol-*

diers; and he was in full march towards the rugged pass of the Sierra de Montalegre.

In consequence of these arrangements, the advance of our army began its march at an early hour on the morning of the 16th, and came up towards evening with the enemy's rear-guard near the village of Salamonde, about four leagues from Braga, on the road to Chaves. The enemy were posted upon strong heights in front of the village, having the river Cavade in their rear, over which are thrown two small bridges. These conduct to two roads, one of which passes through Ruevaens, and along the tops of some lofty mountains beyond; whilst the other leads only to a sort of by-path, which, after penetrating by a shorter cut through the valley, ultimately winds into the main road, over the hills. Though the brigade of guards was the only portion of our force at hand, the General resolved to attack; and one moment spent in reconnoitring, served to satisfy him as to the best means of proceeding. There was an exceedingly high and steep hill upon the enemy's left, which they occupied in some force; their right being likewise upon a hill, but covered in front by a deep ravine. The latter point could not, of course, be assailed; but the former appearing to Sir Arthur Wellesley to be capable of being turned, he instantly despatched the riflemen, supported by three companies, to make the attempt.

The guards were then formed in column upon the road, covered by two three-pounders, conveniently placed for the purpose; and they were directed, as soon as the light troops should show themselves on the brow of the hill, to charge.

As the ground over which the light troops were compelled to pass, chanced to be peculiarly broken, a considerable detour was necessary, and some time elapsed before they reached their point of destination; but their arrival there was no sooner known than the guards advanced. The enemy made no attempt to offer them any serious resistance. They gave their fire, indeed, as soon as the head of the column came within range; but having done so, they immediately abandoned their ranks, and fled in the greatest confusion. We pursued them through the village with all the eagerness of men who had barely seen an object which they were eager to overtake; but the darkness came on so fast, that no one was able to determine exactly by which of the two roads they had retreated. At last, a large mass were descried upon the lower bridge, passing in a state of absolute disorganisation, and with much haste. Upon these we got the guns to bear; and before they could clear the defile, considerable execution was done among them. Our infantry, however, were soon obliged to abandon the pursuit; and we returned to the village, where, in a few miserable

hovels, stripped and plundered of everything portable, we passed the night.

At the first break of dawn, on the following morning, we again made ready to advance; and as day-light broke, we were able to discover that terrible havoc had been made at the lower bridge. The bodies of four or five hundred men and horses lay there; some killed by cannon-shot; others precipitated, in the confusion, headlong into the river; whilst baggage of every description, cars, waggons, and even knapsacks, all loaded with plunder, blocked up the bridges, and rendered them quite impassable. The same species of encumbrances filled the little streets. Articles of the greatest value, such as silver cups, rich tapestry, and cloth of gold, lay strewed about in the mud; indeed, it seemed as if the enemy had now, at length, lost heart, and were willing to relinquish every thing in order to preserve their own persons. One advantage they certainly obtained by this hasty abandonment of the last remnants of their property; for the roads were so completely encumbered, as to render our passage both disorderly and slow; and we were, in consequence, obliged to halt that night at Ruevaens.

During the three last days the rain had come down in torrents; and our men, who were continually exposed to it by night as well as by day, began to exhibit symptoms of suffering from their

hardships. On this account, as well as because it was now ascertained that Soult, instead of moving upon Chaves, had turned off from Montalegre to Orense, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to relinquish the pursuit. Beresford, it appeared, had anticipated the instructions sent to him, and was already in possession of Chaves; so that all which could be done to intercept the flying enemy, had been effected; but, as the General expressed himself, "if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body, and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress, it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifices;" and that such had been the case with Soult's army, the most convincing proofs were before our eyes. The whole extent of their route was strewed with the carcasses of mules, horses, and even men, who, unable to keep up, had been left behind; the horses and mules being either killed or hamstrung, and the men either dead, or in a state of the most pitiable exhaustion. Broken carriages, tumbrils, guns, and everything capable of rendering an army efficient, met us at every step. Nor was it by such marks alone that their

line of march could be pointed out. Every village, hamlet, or cottage, which they passed, was wantonly set on fire, till the sky became obscured during the day by volumes of smoke, and illuminated at night by the blaze of burning dwellings. On the inhabitants, likewise, they exercised the most wanton cruelty. But these outrages went not wholly unpunished. Such of the peasantry as escaped, collected together in groups, and hung upon the rear and flanks of the retreating army, and every straggler who fell into their hands was put to death under circumstances of the most terrible atrocity. It was no uncommon thing to come upon French soldiers lying by the roadside, not dead, but fearfully mutilated; whilst such corpses as bore marks of violence, seemed to have died under lingering torture. Our retreat from Sahagun was bad enough, — few retreats, perhaps, in modern times, have been more harassing; but the retreat of Soult through the mountains of Galicia must have been fully as disastrous. His loss in men alone could not fall short of four or five thousand, whilst his whole materiel was destroyed; and even of the troops who escaped, the probability was, that more than one-half would become denizens of the hospital. Yet is Soult deserving of the highest praise for the celerity and talent with which his flight was conducted. True, the army, after it should reach a place of safety, must,

like the Spanish armies, be entirely re-organised before it could pretend again to take the field; but even thus, it was no easy matter to escape; and the French Marshal was fully entitled to all the applause which we liberally bestowed upon him, for having, at the expense of any sacrifices, extricated himself from his difficulties.

I have said that Sir Arthur Wellesley, as soon as he had positively ascertained the route which the enemy were pursuing, determined not to follow them any further. He came to this resolution when the advance was already within a short distance of Montalegre, and he was confirmed in it by a report from General Mackenzie, which reached him on the night of the 17th, that a corps from Victor's army was moving on Alcantara. The four brigades, which had been left behind at Braga, were ordered instantly to return to Oporto; and those which accompanied the head-quarters, prepared to follow in the same direction. At the same time advice was forwarded to Marshal Beresford, desiring him to meet us in Braga, for the purpose of arranging a defensive plan for this part of the country; and Silveira with his Portuguese being left to pursue Soult, we all bent our steps once more towards the Tagus.

It will not be necessary to record with much minuteness, the progress of the army during its retrograde movement. Enough is done when I

state that, passing once more over the scene of its late triumphs, it arrived at Coimbra on the 28th, where head-quarters were established during a few days, and a short respite granted to the weary soldiers. The latter was an arrangement of which they stood much in need. Their sufferings in the mountains, though cheerfully borne at the moment, began, as soon as the immediate excitement abated, to take effect upon them ; and not a few, particularly of the younger and less seasoned among them, fell sick. Rest was therefore desirable. Nor was it a matter of indifference to us to learn that a reinforcement of five thousand men had landed, and that they might be expected to join us in the course of the week, so as to take part in the series of operations in which the army might next embark. We should, indeed, have felt greater satisfaction, had the numbers of our recruits been doubled ; but five thousand British soldiers were not to be spoken of lightly, and we were all extremely pleased at the prospect of their arrival.

Whilst this brief period of relaxation lasted, we found occupation enough, partly in considering the reports which were from time to time sent in respecting Cuesta, and partly in striving to compose those unhappy differences on the score of rank, of which I have already said something, and which now again began to show themselves. Much un-

brage was taken, because the officers attached to Portuguese corps received, not only an additional step in the British army, but a second advance, as soon as they took their places in the ranks of our allies. By this arrangement a British captain, who might happen to volunteer into the Portuguese army, was promoted to a British majority; and was still further pushed on, by receiving the Portuguese rank of lieutenant-colonel, immediately on his attaching himself to a Portuguese battalion. As such, he necessarily took precedence of the majors in the British army, no matter of what date their commissions might be. It was hardly to be expected that such an arrangement should not give serious offence to all who thus found themselves commanded by men whom they persisted in regarding as their juniors. Yet was the circumstance in a great measure unavoidable. To render British officers of real utility in the Portuguese service, it was necessary that they should enter it, not as subalterns, but as persons of rank; and they were generally the younger men who accepted commissions in that service at all. The difficulties respecting majors and lieutenant-colonels could, however, be overcome. It rarely happened, and it rarely could happen, that they would be brought into collision with one another; but the case was widely different with respect to the generals, Tilson, Murray, Hill, and Cotton, were all the se-

niers of Beresford ; though Beresford, in virtue of his commission as commander-in-chief of the Portuguese troops, necessarily took precedence of them, as often as the two armies acted together. There was, at least in one instance, no surmounting this ; and General Murray gave up his command in consequence, and returned to England.

With respect, again, to other matters, we learned that Victor, as soon as he discovered that his movement to save Soult was made too late, fell back again from Alcantara, and that he was now retiring to his former position. He had not, however, quitted it unobserved or disregarded by Cuesta : on the contrary, the Spanish General had followed him in his advance ; had directed a corps, under Zayas, to attack Merida, where four or five hundred sick were left ; and it was even rumoured, and apparently upon plausible grounds, that Merida had actually fallen. In the meanwhile, the main body of the Spaniards were understood to be at Caceres ; from which it was expected that they would march upon Truxillo and Almaraz, for the purpose of securing the bridge. It was stated, moreover, that the Portuguese, who defended the bridge at Alcantara, fought nobly ; and it seemed to be generally believed that, with a due proportion of British officers to direct them, the Portuguese troops would soon become exceedingly efficient.

Of our own future movements, no one, except the Commander-in-chief, knew anything ; nor had he, as far as I could learn, as yet determinately fixed upon them. Officers were, indeed, sent to Cuesta, with intelligence that Sir Arthur Wellesley was ready to co-operate with him in an attack upon any French corps which might be situated between Lisbon and Seville ; but, at the same time, to make the Spaniards aware that any promise beyond this could not be given. Portugal was our field ; and to move from it altogether would be to abandon the post which the British army was required peculiarly to protect. Still, our chief was willing to attempt as much as his numerical strength and the nature of his instructions would permit ; and if Victor would but remain where he was, a great blow might possibly be struck at him. In this case we should march to Thomar and Abrantes, throw a corps on the left bank of the Tagus, communicating on its right with Cuesta's left ; and detaching a division along the right bank, to destroy the bridge, it was not impossible that Victor might be surrounded.

It so happened that, at the moment when these dispositions were talked of, news reached us, not only from the north of Spain, but from the Danube. We read of the ruinous defeat of the Austrians in a paper printed at Madrid, and read it with the feelings of deep regret which it was calculated to

excite. Yet there was a good deal to cheer us in the rumours which came in from Galicia. It was said that, whilst Kellerman had united his corps to that of Ney, and both were marching against Romana into the Asturias, four thousand French troops out of the seven thousand which had been left to secure Galicia, had surrendered, at Lugo, to one of Romana's generals. St. Jago, likewise, was reported to have fallen ; and hence a sanguine expectation prevailed, that if these victorious Spaniards would but fall upon Soult whilst he was yet in disorder, and return again to support Romana before Kellerman and Ney should have been able to annihilate him, the affairs both of Galicia and the Asturias might do well. But these were little better than ordinary rumours, and, like the reports of the evacuation of Saragoza, and of the assembling of a strong force at Burgos, hardly deserved to be relied upon.

At length the troops having been well refreshed, and many of the sick restored to a serviceable condition, the army renewed its march on the 6th of June, and fixed its head-quarters at Thomar. Nothing occurred here, calculated in any lively degree to excite our interest. We were again amused, indeed, by rumours respecting the movements of Victor, most of which represented him as in full retreat upon Madrid ; and under the impression that these might be well founded, we

experienced something like a feeling of regret, that our advance towards him had not been conducted from the *Tras os Montes*, by way of *Ciudad Rodrigo*. Yet it was far from being too late to follow up, with vigour, that plan of operations which appeared to hold out prospects of ultimate success. It was the policy of the French marshals to unite their several corps, and to act in a body ; it was ours to prevent their junction, to cut off their communications, and to fight them in detail. To effect this, nothing appeared more advisable than that we should bring our army, in conjunction with that of *Cuesta*, to the north of the *Tagus*, and advance from thence upon *Plasencia*, *Salamanca*, and *Valladolid*. By taking that step, the probabilities were, that we should be able to overtake one or other of the French armies, and destroy it before it could be succoured by the rest ; whilst we should certainly reduce *Victor* to the necessity, either of abandoning the capital, or of being cut off from the great road to the *Pyrenees*, by our cavalry in *Castile*. Should we, however, fail in this, and should *Ney* and *Kellerman*, and *Soult* and *Victor*, succeed in uniting within their lines on the *Ebro*, then, indeed, with our present force, the chances of success would be materially diminished. On *Cuesta's* army we were not in the habit of greatly counting ; some service it might doubtless render us ; that is to say, it would

probably enable us to cope to advantage with any force which might be found between the Portuguese frontier and the Ebro; but it would not render an army of twenty thousand Englishmen,—and the sum total of our effectives at this time barely came up to twenty thousand,—competent to the overthrow of the united corps of four French marshals.

On the 7th, the army resumed its march, and took up its head-quarters on the same evening at Abrantes. Here other, and, as far as we could judge, more correct reports relative to the motions of Victor, reached us. He had not withdrawn, as had formerly been represented, to the north of the Tagus, but was busily concentrating in the neighbourhood of Merida, as if with the design of passing the Guadiana, and attacking Cuesta previous to our arrival; and this was considered the more likely, because the news of Ney's successes in the Asturias must, by this time, have reached him. But there were other and more interesting matters laid before us than even this, and of these a few words will suffice to give an account.

Lieutenant-colonel Bourke, of the Quarter-master-general's department, had been sent, some time before, to General Cuesta's head-quarters at Fuente del Maestro, for the purpose of concerting with him a joint plan of operations against the enemy in Estremadura. The day after our arrival

at Abrantes, letters came in from Colonel Bourke, bearing date the 4th and 6th of June, in which he informed us that Cuesta was afflicted with a severe ague, and hence that all his communications had been made through Major-general O'Donoghoe, chief of the staff. These, however, proved so far satisfactory, that the Spanish General was willing to negotiate with us on our own terms. For it had been his original wish that our army should divide; that part should keep possession of the bridge at Alcantara, whilst part executed a movement on the enemy's right; and it was chiefly to impress upon his mind the utter impossibility of acceding to that proposal, that Colonel Bourke's mission was undertaken. After a good deal of discussion, the point was conceded; and now three propositions were submitted for Sir Arthur Wellesley's consideration, concerning which it was at the same time stated that Cuesta gave a decided preference to the first.

In the first place, it was suggested that the whole British force might move from Abrantes upon Elvas and Badajoz, and uniting itself with the Spanish troops, make a joint attack upon Victor; whilst Cuesta should detach General Venegas, with a corps of seven thousand men, by Llerena, through the mountains towards Talavera, which, turning the enemy's left, and heading them in their retreat, would enable the combined armies

to annihilate them by falling on their rear. At the same time, Cuesta would detach a second corps from Badajoz towards Plasencia, so as to threaten their right; and he professed to be capable of sparing both detachments, and yet bringing eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, to the assistance of the British near Merida. In case this plan should not be adopted, it was proposed, in the second place, that the English army should move, en masse, to Alcantara, and press from thence upon the enemy; whilst the Spaniards following them closely, should take Merida by assault, and make themselves masters of all the artillery and stores which might yet be laid up in that place. Lastly, it was submitted that we should march upon the Teitar and Almaraz, and equally threaten the enemy's right and rear. All these proposals, it is necessary to observe, were made on the supposition that the enemy's head-quarters were at Caceres, and that their troops were cantoned partly there, and partly at Merida and the villages near. With respect to the movements towards the rear, no opinion could be formed, because they managed effectually to conceal these, by keeping strong patrols of cavalry continually in their front.

The force immediately under Victor was estimated at twenty-six thousand men. In addition to these, there was at Ciudad Rodrigo a corps of

thirteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, under Sebastiani; but the roads of communication between these were either extremely inconvenient or fatally circuitous. Should they attempt to unite, with artillery and baggage, Sebastiani must of necessity march round by Madrid; should they choose the mountain path, the junction might no doubt be effected, but it would be at the expense of all the materiel of one, if not of both corps. Besides these, a body of four thousand men in Madrid, and about one thousand in other garrisons between the capital and the frontier, there was represented to be no French force capable of being brought immediately against us, or interrupting the plan of operations, be it what it might, on which our Commander-in-chief should determine.

In pressing upon our consideration the first of his propositions, Cuesta strongly represented that we might expect ample supplies of every description at Badajoz; and that, should more be required than Badajoz was able to furnish, the deficiency could be promptly and sufficiently made up from Alentejo. The case would be very different, were we to proceed by Alcantara. The whole of that country was exhausted by the enemy, who ravaged it in all directions; and we should find it extremely difficult, as well as inconvenient, to carry along with us both provisions for the men, and forage for the horses. Besides, if it

were our design, as he was satisfied that it was our wisest course, to bring the enemy to action with as little delay as possible, we should certainly enjoy a better chance of attaining that end, by following the one route rather than the other. Were we to advance by Badajoz and Elvas, we should threaten the enemy's front, who would probably not abandon his position without a struggle; whereas by moving from Alcantara or Almaraz, we should instantly alarm him for his flank, and he would withdraw at once. For Victor, he continued, was particularly jealous of his right; and therefore the most prudent policy would be to turn his left by a corps pushed from Llerena.

To each and all of these plans Sir Arthur Wellesley, I believe, saw serious objections, and he immediately wrote to Cuesta, pointing out, in forcible terms, his own sentiments. With respect to the first proposition, an opinion generally prevailed, that by marching first to Badajoz, and afterwards towards Cuesta, we should effect no other end than merely to throw ourselves in the enemy's rear; whereas our object clearly was, to cut him off entirely from all sources of communication with any other corps in the country. Then again, as to the detached Spanish corps, it could not for a moment be doubted that it would either be defeated by Victor in his retreat, or, which was

not less likely to occur, find itself suddenly placed between the troops of Victor on the one hand, and of Sebastiani on the other. Besides, it was not on the left at all that an attempt ought to be made, because the right of the enemy offered to us the readiest point of attack. Of the three plans, I conceive that our commander considered the last less open to objection than either of the others, though even in it there were too many and too serious difficulties for him to sanction its adoption. The British army, therefore, it was considered, ought to direct itself upon Plasencia at once, so as to compel Victor to fall back, if not to receive battle; and whilst this was doing, Cuesta might move upon Sebastiani, so that both the French corps might be brought to action separately, and at the same moment.

It is probably needless to add, that the Spanish and British generals differed on the present occasion, not more in their views touching the subject immediately before them, than with reference to the series of operations which they expected to follow. Whilst Cuesta desired, above all things, that the armies of the two nations should be united, that they should fight side by side, and follow up to the utmost any advantages which they might obtain, Sir Arthur Wellesley was guided by other motives, and restricted his designs to a narrower, but a much safer and surer field. The Spaniard

was eager to see his allies fairly committed, and his native country made the theatre of their glories;—the Englishman felt that, by the tenor of his present instructions, so bold a policy was not authorised. The deliverance of Portugal, and the repulse of the enemy from Estremadura, were the two objects which he was required to keep in view; and he limited his present designs to the furtherance of these by the destruction of Victor's army. No doubt Sir Arthur Wellesley judged right; but it was said that, could we but succeed in getting between Victor and his supplies, and forcing him to give us battle before fresh troops should reach him, a wide door to future enterprise would be opened. Yet we had many disadvantages to overcome. In the first place, we were, single-handed at least, in numbers greatly inferior to the enemy; in the next place, on our allies we could not count, not only because of the want of discipline among the men, but because of the extreme obstinacy of their leader; and lastly, Victor was strongly posted. Under all these circumstances, it seemed doubtful whether anything could with prudence be attempted, till our own long-promised reinforcements should arrive.

In this state of uncertainty we remained during some days, no event occurring which at all merits repetition. Letters, indeed, and despatches arrived from England, the tone of which gave, in

some respects, general satisfaction to the army ; whilst in others it was as generally condemned. We were well pleased to find that, instead of exciting public expectation too highly, government was exerting itself to keep men's hopes within bounds ; because we felt that our game was not yet won ; and we were willing to receive credit in the end for having done more, rather than reproach for having done less, than had been anticipated. But we were not satisfied that some higher and more decided proofs of the sense entertained by his sovereign of our leader's merits, had not been given. On Sir Arthur Wellesley himself that circumstance produced no visible effect ; but his soldiers had looked for other results, and they were far from being reconciled to the overthrow of their expectations. They imagined that the passage of the Douro entitled him who had effected it, to some striking acknowledgment of gratitude from his country ; and they were surprised to find that none such had been bestowed. These, however, were transient feelings ; nor were others, which a somewhat unprecedented promotion of a few individuals excited, more lasting. But on one head all felt particularly anxious. The long-promised reinforcements were not yet arrived, and the despatches contained no information as to the period when they might be expected. This was the more vexatious, as almost

every day brought in some fresh rumour respecting Victor and the French army. At one time we heard that he had actually quitted his position, and that he was in full retreat towards the capital; at another, it was confidently asserted that he was preparing to pass the Guadiana, for the purpose of attacking Cuesta. That the latter apprehended such an event, all his communications made us aware; but for our own parts, we felt perfectly assured that he would not move till we commenced our operations, and that, as soon as we should approach Vera de Placencia, he would begin his retreat. In this case it was vain to expect that any serious stand would be made till after he should have been joined by Joseph's guards from Madrid; and then at Segovia, or somewhere in that vicinity, we anticipated that a mighty struggle awaited us, in which we should be opposed to all the force which it would be possible for Victor to bring together upon one field.

In the mean while, news came from the north, that Ney and Soult, having united their corps, were employed in the siege of Vigo; and that, as soon as it should fall, an event of which every one appeared to anticipate the speedy accomplishment, they were preparing once more to cross the Minho, and carry the war into the north of Portugal. Such an occurrence would naturally lead to changes in our arrangements. In the first place,

it would become absolutely necessary for Marshal Beresford, who had accompanied us so far with three Portuguese brigades, to return for the defence of the provinces, and to relinquish the intention, which at present he entertained, of penetrating along with us into Spain. The fact indeed is, that he was best placed at Oporto. There was no second under him capable of carrying on the organising system as he had begun it; and though his services with us were doubtless highly important, his presence among his own levies was infinitely more so. No doubt it would be extremely galling to him, to quit the scene of active operations for the sake of training recruits, and watching a distant enemy; but upon his vigilance our future successes in a great measure depended; and therefore he was prevailed upon, in case untoward events should occur in the north, to sacrifice his own wishes to the public good.

I have said that our effectives never exceeded, at this period of the war, twenty thousand men. Even now, with the addition of the five thousand lately joined, we barely came up to that number; for our men had become extremely sickly of late, and as the summer advanced, and the heat increased in intensity, sickness daily, and even hourly, accumulated upon us. It was not, however, the number of our sick alone which rendered us, in a great measure, inefficient: we were des-

titute of a variety of articles absolutely necessary, in order to fit us for a campaign. Our shoes were generally worn out, and no supply had reached us; and our military chest was quite exhausted. There was not a regiment in the army, to which many months' pay was not due; and, what was infinitely more distressing, there were no funds in the country from which to supply what was wanting. Yet, in spite of all this, not a murmur or complaint could be heard, from the highest to the lowest. Generally speaking, our immediate supplies were ample; that is to say, the men received, for the most part, their full allowance of provisions; and they were too thoroughly satisfied with the honour of the government which they served, to entertain any doubts as to the ultimate settlement of their balances. On the contrary, the very best spirit prevailed everywhere; nor is it going too far to affirm that, under their present leader, the troops would have borne any privations, and undertaken any services.

CHAPTER XV.

The British army moves nearer to Victor, and threatens his flanks—The latter withdraws across the Tagus—Sir Arthur Wellesley fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia—He visits Cuesta at Casa del Puerto, and is shown the Spanish army by torch-light—He returns to his own troops, which are put in motion, and Victor's posts driven from Talavera across the Alberche—Preparations for attacking him there, but he effects his escape—Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur Wellesley with the conduct of the Spaniards—He is compelled, by the negligence of Cuesta, to remain inactive.

IN the last chapter it has been stated that Cuesta sent in three proposals for the consideration of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and that an opinion generally prevailed that Sir Arthur had objected to the whole of them, laying before him at the same time some project of his own. No great while elapsed ere we were given to understand, by letters from Colonel Bourke, that the Spaniard remained bigotedly attached to his own opinions. On no

account whatever would he agree to act as Sir Arthur Wellesley suggested ; and the only alteration to which he would at all consent was, that after having joined him at Badajoz, we should direct our march upon Caceres, in order to threaten the enemy's right ; whilst he moved by Merida to Talavera. Whoever will take the trouble to consult the map, must see that by this scheme Cuesta proposed, first to form a junction between the two armies, and afterwards to divide them by a chain of almost impassable mountains. It is scarcely necessary to observe that neither Sir Arthur, nor any person of intelligence in his army, could approve of such an arrangement. We were all, indeed, well assured that the movement upon Badajoz, and the combination of the armies there, would compel Victor to cross the Tagus ; but we knew also that it would only drive him back upon his resources, prevent our striking a blow, and enable him to escape with his army entire. Under such circumstances nothing remained for us, except to continue quietly where we were, and watch the event. Care was, indeed, taken to secure every point which seemed at all in danger of an attack from the enemy ; and a few movements were made, calculated, in the event of any unlooked-for piece of good fortune occurring, to forward our enterprises on the offensive. Marshal Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the

north, was ordered to proceed, with one British and two Portuguese brigades, by Castello Branco to the Teitar, so as to menace Victor's flank, in case his retreat should be delayed; whilst the rest of the Portuguese troops were commanded to concentrate at Braga, for the defence of the northern provinces. But the strength of the army remained stationary; and as forage and provisions were sufficiently abundant, it suffered nothing in consequence. On the contrary, the cavalry horses improved every day in condition, and fresh regiments of infantry were continually brought up from the coast; so that, in the course of three weeks, we found ourselves, if not greatly more numerous, at all events more efficient in every respect, than we had yet been since our arrival in Portugal.

In the mean while, however, Victor had taken the alarm, and commenced his retreat towards the Spanish capital. His whole army was withdrawn across the Tagus; and Cuesta, as soon as he began to move in pursuit, saw the wisdom of Sir Arthur Wellesley's proposal, and agreed to it. Preparations were accordingly made for advancing upon Plasencia; but whilst these were in progress, advice came in that the French armies in the north had occupied Orense; and Beresford was, in consequence, compelled to resign his command here, and to hurry off where his presence was more

wanted, between the Douro and the Minho. Of course the departure of that officer produced no alteration in our plans, which, on the contrary, were brought at once to maturity; and it was determined to enter Spain, without a moment's delay, in two columns. Of these, one, consisting of three divisions of infantry, and the whole of the cavalry, was directed to move upon Plasencia, by way of Coria; the other was to proceed across the Gata, near Moraza, and to rendezvous at the same point. With respect, however, to any future undertakings, there seemed to be considerable misgivings. On Cuesta no reliance could be placed; his opinion of the English was not a generous one; and every body seemed to be aware that on the first favourable opportunity he would leave us to our fate, and follow up any design which to himself might appear most advisable. Now, from intercepted letters addressed by Joseph to his generals, which, one after another, fell into our hands, it was evident that the enemy designed to draw their corps gradually towards one point, and to act entirely upon the defensive. This would of course lead to an evacuation of Madrid, and a retreat to the north of the Ebro; and how far, and with what prospect of success, the campaign could be carried into these distant regions, were questions which no one could answer. But with matters so contingent we were not, in the present

instance, very deeply concerned. It was our business to follow up the enemy with all the energies of which we were masters; and we lost no time in bringing these effectually into play.

We had so far acted upon these plans, as to reach Castello Branco with the head-quarters of the army, when accounts came in, that Joseph had marched from Madrid at the head of five thousand men to join Victor, and that the latter had taken up a strong position at Talavera. Sebastiani, likewise, was reported to be in motion towards the same point; whilst Cuesta had suddenly checked his advance, and leaving a corps at Argaterem, had fallen back upon the Tagus at Almaraz. To counterbalance these rumours, it was stated that General Venegas was in close pursuit of Sebastiani, and that he might be confidently expected to form a junction with Cuesta from the opposite side of the river. Then again we were given to understand, that several corps from the north were marching towards Salamanca or Valladolid, and that their patrols had appeared at Lenares and San Estevan, places as near to Plasencia as Castello Branco. This was not a matter of surprise to us; for we saw that, if Victor should entertain serious notions of risking a battle on this side of Madrid, the latter movements were absolutely necessary to secure him against being turned. But the grand question was, whether he

would risk a battle at all ; and in case he were willing so to do, whether we would accept the challenge. It was surmised that, on the arrival in camp of all the battalions and detachments, of whose landing reports had within the last few days reached us, our force in the field could not fall greatly short of thirty thousand men. Cuesta, again, had under his orders full thirty-eight thousand ; but they were, for the most part, raw levies, and could not in any respect be counted upon. Of the French force, on the other hand, all reports agreed in stating that it amounted to at least forty-five or fifty thousand men ; would it be prudent, under such circumstances, to stake the issues of the campaign upon one battle ? The point was, to say the least of it, an extremely delicate one to determine ; but we all felt that our destinies were in the hands of one who was quite competent to guide them ; and hence we were all ready either to fight or to manœuvre, according as he should direct, with the fullest conviction on our minds, that we were doing that which our circumstances required us to do, and which, sooner or later, would bring about the most beneficial results.

I have said that our plans were no sooner matured, than they were so far carried into execution, that the army began its march, and, on the last day in June, fixed its head-quarters at

Castello Branco. No great space of time was wasted here; but entering Spain by way of Zarza la Major, we arrived at the town of Coria on the 5th of July. Intelligence reached us here, that General Crawford, with his brigade from England, had quitted Lisbon on the 28th, and hence, that their arrival in the camp might daily be expected. Some regiments, likewise, from Ireland, and the islands, were stated to have landed, respecting whom orders were sent back requiring them to encamp at Belem; from whence, as soon as they should have got into proper order for field service, they were to push forward. But it was not concerning our own people only that rumours crowded in upon us. A great deal was said both of the French and Spanish armies—of their strength and their position; and though we were not disposed to place in these rumours implicit confidence, it may not be amiss if I give here a brief outline of their general strain and character.

Victor's corps, amounting in the whole to about twenty-seven thousand effectives, had taken post, as was formerly stated, at Talavera, and occupied ground so formidable, that any attempt at turning could be made only by moving in force upon Avila. On the other hand, Cuesta, who at first had pursued at a quick pace, but who became alarmed when he found that we were not immediately in his rear, and that he was in danger of

getting entangled between the two rivers, returned to his old position on the left bank of the Tagus, from whence, keeping possession of Almaraz with his advance alone, he scoured the country in all directions with his cavalry. He was not, however, regardless either of us or of the means by which our communications might be rendered most direct and secure; for he had already established a bridge over the Teitar, and was busily engaged in the construction of two more across the Tagus; one in the vicinity of Almaraz, the other below the point where the waters of the Teitar and the Tagus meet. Whilst these movements were going on, Sebastiani had advanced from Toledo, with the design, as it was surmised, of attacking Venegas; but the latter fell back to Villanova de la Fuente, and drew Sebastiani after him as far as Consuegra. Thus were Victor and Sebastiani as completely separated from one another, as Venegas was separated from Cuesta, and Cuesta from Venegas.

With respect to other points, again, the corps of Ney and Soult were reported to have assembled at Zamora, to the number of twenty-three or twenty-four thousand men; whilst Marshal Mortier was represented to be with his force at Valladolid. The latter piece of intelligence we acquired from General Franceschi, the officer to whom our hussars had been so frequently opposed during Sir

John Moore's campaign, and who, till he fell into our hands, had been in command of the light cavalry and advance of the northern army. He was proceeding from his quarters at Toro, by way of Tordesillas, for the purpose of visiting his friend Marshal Mortier, when he was attacked near the ferry by a friar and ten Spaniards, and himself and his aide-de-camp made prisoners. The gallant friar was in the act of conveying him across the mountains, in order to present him to the Supreme Junta at Seville, when the head-quarters of our army chanced to be at Zarza la Major, by which means we were enabled to hold some conversation with him. He appeared dreadfully out of humour with his evil fortune, repeatedly ejaculating, "O ! comme c'est pitoyable pour un général d'hussars d'être pris par un capuchin !" Yet, Frenchman-like, he met all our advances with the greatest frankness and candour. Upon his person were found letters, which gave a very deplorable account of Soult's present situation and future prospects. His army was stated to be perfectly disorganised ; and the whole country round to be in a state of the most alarming revolt.

The news from the south-east, which arrived about the same time, were not, however, so favourable. There Blake, pushing forward with his accustomed rashness, had suffered a great defeat, and the French were said to be gaining ground, in

consequence, in every corner both of Catalonia and Arragon. But, in the present state of affairs, the south was infinitely less a source of anxiety to us than the central and northern provinces. Could we but contrive to destroy Victor, and afterwards press on through Gallicia and the Asturias, carrying with us Cuesta's and the Portuguese armies, and picking up, as we went along, the different corps which, under Romana and his compatriots, were in arms there, it was at least within the verge of possibility, that we might succeed in penetrating to Burgos and Vittoria, and so act upon the line of the enemy's communications. All, however, must depend upon circumstances, of the exact bearing of which no one could, as yet, form a judgment; for it was far from being a matter absolutely decided upon, that a battle ought to be risked at all. But to return to my narrative.

On the morning of the 6th, the head-quarters of the army moved from Coria to Galesto; and on the 8th they were established in Plasencia. From this point Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to open a personal communication with General Cuesta; and the 10th was selected as a convenient day for the purpose. As the events arising immediately out of this determination had in them a great deal of interest at the time, and as its more remote consequences bore powerfully upon the issues of the war, I shall take the liberty of re-

ording, at length, most of the particulars attending our remarkable journey.

As soon as the official business of the morning was discharged, and things put in a proper train, we set out from Plasencia, on the day above-named, for Cuesta's head-quarters, and were met at a flying bridge, of which I have already spoken as thrown across the Teitar, by a squadron of Spanish hussars. The hussars, who belonged to the regiment of Villa Viciosa, were, upon the whole, well mounted and equipped; indeed, we were not long in discovering that they had been selected to do the duty of an escort to us, simply because their appearance was superior to that of any other corps in the Spanish army. Unfortunately, however, in conducting us towards the bridge of boats upon the Tagus, our guides lost their way, and darkness had, in consequence, set in before we began to approach the camp. This was the more to be regretted, as Cuesta had drawn out his whole force for Sir Arthur Wellesley's inspection. The troops had been under arms during four hours, in momentary expectation of our arrival; whilst the poor old man himself, though still lame from the effects of his bruises at Medelin, sat on horseback at their head during the greater part of that time.

Our arrival at the camp was announced by a general discharge of artillery, upon which an im-

mense number of torches were made to blaze up, and we passed the entire Spanish line in review by their light. The effect produced by these arrangements was one of no ordinary character. As the torches were held aloft, at moderate intervals from one another, they threw a red and wavering light over the whole scene, permitting, at the same time, its minuter parts to be here and there cast into shade; whilst the grim and swarthy visages of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uniforms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as the flashes fell upon them. Then there was the frequent roar of cannon, the shouldering of firelocks, mingled with the brief word of command, and rattling of accoutrements and arms, as we passed from battalion to battalion; all these served to interest the sense of hearing to the full as much as the spectacle attracted the sense of sight. Nor was old Cuesta himself an object to be passed by without notice, even at such a moment and under such circumstances as these. The old man preceded us,—not so much sitting on his horse as held upon it by two pages,—at the imminent hazard of being overthrown whenever a cannon was discharged, or a torch flared out with peculiar brightness; indeed his physical debility was so observable, as clearly to mark his total unfitness for the situation which he then held. As to his mental powers, he gave us little oppor-

tunity of judging; inasmuch as he scarcely uttered five words during the continuance of our visit; but his corporal infirmities alone were at absolute variance with all a general's duties, and showed that he was now fit only for the retirement of private life.

In this manner we passed about six thousand cavalry, drawn up in rank entire, and not less than twenty battalions of infantry, each consisting of perhaps from seven to eight hundred men. These formed but one portion of the army, the rest being either at the bridge of Arzobispo, or in position along the Tagus; and they were all, with a few exceptions, remarkably fine men. Some, indeed, were extremely young—too young for service—particularly among the recruits which had lately joined; but take them for all in all, it would not be easy to point out a better made, stouter, or more hardy-looking body of soldiers in the service of any nation in Europe. Of their appointments, it is not possible to speak in the same terms of commendation. There were, indeed, some battalions whose arms, accoutrements, and even clothing, might be pronounced respectable; but in general they were very deficient, particularly in shoes. It was easy to perceive, likewise, from the attitude in which they stood, as well as from the manner in which they held their arms, that little or no discipline prevailed among them; and hence that in

general they could not be regarded in any other light than as raw levies. Some corps there doubtless were, such as the Irish brigades, a battalion or two of marines from Cadiz, and the remnants of their grenadier battalions, which deserved a higher military character; but speaking of them in the aggregate, they were little better than bold peasantry, armed partially like soldiers, but completely unacquainted with a soldier's duty. This remark applied fully as much to the cavalry as to the infantry. The horses were many of them good, but their riders manifestly knew nothing of movement or discipline; and they were, as well on this account as on the score of a miserable equipment, quite unfit for general service. The artillery, again, was numerous, but totally unlike, both in order and arrangement, to that of other armies; and the generals appeared to have been selected according to one rule alone, namely, that of seniority. They were almost all old men, and, except O'Donaghoe and Largas, evidently incapable of bearing the fatigues or surmounting the difficulties of one hard campaign. It was not so with the colonels and commanders of battalions, who appeared to be young and active, and of whom we had every reason to believe that many were rapidly learning to become skilful officers.

The place at which we paid this visit, and witnessed these events, was called Casa del Puerto;

where the head-quarters of the Spanish army were established in a wretched hovel. We alighted here after the review had ended, and as soon as we entered, Cuesta, who seemed quite overpowered by fatigue, retired to rest, but he returned again at eleven o'clock to supper, and sat with us till past midnight. He sat, however, as he always did under similar circumstances, in profound silence, neither seeking to take a share in the conversation, nor, apparently at least, paying the slightest attention to it. I was much struck by this singularity of manner, and inquired of those around me whether it were assumed; but they all represented it as being perfectly natural, and gave rather a curious account of the aged chief. Everything, it appeared, went on throughout the army, rather in his name than by his immediate orders; for he governed his followers wholly by a system of silence and terror, of which all stood wonderfully in awe. Cuesta was a person of no talent whatever; but he was a brave, upright, and honourable man, full of prejudices, and obstinate to a great degree, and abhorring the French with the hatred of personal rancour. On the latter account, and because they knew that he would never willingly betray them, the Spaniards reposed unbounded confidence in Cuesta; and they did so the more readily, as he never failed to hang, or otherwise put to death, every traitor that fell into his hands.

Cuesta never gained a victory, yet he was constantly eager to fight; and when the battle began, he was always to be found in the post of greatest danger. That, however, was a matter of very little moment; for he gave no orders except to push on; and as to arrangement, or the mode of executing manœuvres, they were things quite unknown in his army. It was said that Brigadier-general Quiske, Cuesta's military secretary, was a man of talent. Him, however, we did not see; but O'Donaghoe struck me as being clever and sensible, though, like other favourites who act for their principal, an intriguer and a politician. Respecting the rest of the generals, it was impossible to form any opinion, as Cuesta seemed particularly unwilling that they should hold any serious conversation with us. It is true that he presented them one by one to Sir Arthur Wellesley, the ceremony taking place after breakfast on the 11th; but no words were exchanged on the occasion, and each retired after he had made his bow.

This ceremony having been gone through, Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta withdrew, at the request of the former, to an inner apartment, where they held a conference which lasted four hours. What passed on the occasion I know not, as I did not happen to be present; but I heard that O'Donaghoe, who assisted his general, was

the chief speaker, and that Cuesta was, as usual, almost wholly silent. When it came to a close, dinner was announced ; and we sat down, about three o'clock, to about forty dishes, the principal ingredients in which were garlic and onions. Our meal did not occupy us long ; and on Cuesta retiring, as was his custom, to enjoy his siesta, we mounted our horses, and rode out into the camp. By this means we were enabled to see more of the regiments separately, than we had seen during the torch-light review. We saw, however, nothing which served, in any degree, to raise our opinion of the general efficiency of our allies ; and we returned to our host at a late hour, more than ever impressed with the persuasion, that if the deliverance of the Peninsula was to be effected at all, it must be done, not by the Spaniards, but by ourselves.

At an early hour next morning we took leave of Cuesta, and set out on our return to Plasencia. The old Spaniard brightened up as we bid him farewell, and embracing us after the manner of his country, repeated over and over again that he was fully satisfied with the result of the communication with which Sir Arthur had honoured him. How far the feeling of satisfaction was mutual, I take it not upon me to determine ; but that the journey had not been performed absolutely in vain, the orders which were issued immediately on our ar-

rival at head-quarters, for the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice, sufficiently attested.

The object for which we were now in a state of preparation, was nothing less than the advance towards Victor's army in its position at Talavera. To render this movement as decisive and as little doubtful as need be, it was resolved that, whilst Cuesta pushed him in front, both his flanks should be threatened at the same time, the right, or principal flank, by us, and the left by the Spanish corps under Venegas, from the southward of Madrid. The following dispositions were accordingly understood to be in forwardness, and the following marches definitely arranged.

The first corps appointed to move from its present encampment was that of Venegas ; and it was to march by way of Madrideojos, Tembleque, Oraca, Fuente-Duena, and Arganda. As soon as it had proceeded a day's journey on its route, a simultaneous movement was to be made by the corps at present at Arzobispo, and by Cuesta ; the former crossing the Tagus, and hastening by Colira to Salaveral, the latter breaking up from Almaraz, and marching by Naval Moral and Oropesa, to the same point. In the mean while, the British army from Plasencia was to pass the Teitar, near Fuente de Bargazagona, and moving by Toril, Naval Moral, Oropesa, and Gamonal, to arrive near Escalona, at

the moment when the other corps should reach their several places of destination. Whilst these things were going on, Sir Robert Wilson with the Lusitanian Legion, a corps mainly formed by his active exertions, some dragoons, and two Spanish battalions, was to follow the right bank of the Teitar as far as Arenas, and to secure the passes of the Puerto del Rio; and measures were at the same time taken that those of Avila and Guadarama should not be left open. Sir Robert Wilson's corps was not, however, to confine its services to a mere occupation of the passes above referred to. Masters of the fruitful vale of Plasencia, they would be able to furnish us, through the entire line of our march, with all the supplies of which we were likely to stand in need; whilst they would hinder so much as one foraging party of the enemy's army from committing havoc in that beautiful country.

So far everything was settled with the nicest attention to risks and advantages; but after all, it seemed something more than doubtful whether Victor would give us an opportunity of proving the excellency of our arrangements. He who refused battle at Merida and Truxillo, was not very likely to accept it in the position of Talavera. On the former ground he could not have been assailed, except by a flank movement on our parts, through Badajoz, which must of necessity have left the

Spaniards exposed to an attack from his entire force, whilst we were at a distance ; and we knew our allies too well to entertain any hope that the attack would have been successfully resisted. But even if it had, or supposing that we had found another opportunity of defeating him, his retreat was perfectly open ; and we could have only followed as far as the passage of the Tagus, in the face of numerous and very serious difficulties. Situated as he now was, matters bore a widely different aspect. The mountains of the Sierra de Gata on the one hand, and those of Arganda on the other, afforded to us numerous facilities for detaching corps, absolutely without risk, round his flanks ; whilst no necessity whatever existed, of supporting them by a direct attack upon his centre. I confess that, bearing these things in view, I, for one, entertained but slender hopes that he would wait to receive us in his present position ; nor could all my wishes to the contrary succeed in removing the impression, that no good would arise out of our judicious but somewhat tardy determination at Plasencia. We remained quietly in our camp till the 17th, giving the Spaniards time to put their several columns in motion ; but on that day we began our march, and passing the Teitar, occupied on the 18th Talagueta, and the rivulet of Talamora. On the 19th we arrived at Castinello and Casa de los

Somas, pushing on our advanced-guard as far as St. Julien ; and on the 20th we entered Oropesa, where one day's halt was determined on. On the 21st, Cuesta and his people passed through the town ; upon which occasion Sir Arthur Wellesley took an opportunity of exhibiting to the Spaniard twenty thousand British troops under arms. Cuesta expressed himself much gratified by the spectacle ; but the display was scarcely concluded, when he hurried forward, and arrived the same evening, with that portion of his army which marched from the bridge of Almaraz, by the great road through Naval Moral, at Villada. The several corps had now assumed their respective stations ; and it was determined on the 22nd to drive in those divisions of the enemy which occupied Talavera, to their position on the left bank of the Alberche. That we might be aware beforehand of the nature of the opposition about to be offered, reconnaissances in the direction of the town were made ; and it was found to be filled by a considerable force of French troops, particularly cavalry, of which there could not be less than fifteen hundred in and round the place. But to possess ourselves of that point was essential to all our future operations ; and therefore on the 22nd the columns moved forward with the design of seizing it.

On this occasion the Spaniards took the high-

road towards Talavera, whilst the British were directed to move upon the enemy's left by a parallel road through the mountains, in the direction of San Roman. As soon as the former began their advance, the French showed their cavalry in the plain in front of the town; which not only checked the Spaniards, but caused them very needlessly and very clumsily to deploy into line. This done, instead of endeavouring to drive them back, which, with their very superior cavalry force, they might have easily effected, our allies commenced a heavy cannonade, which lasted, without producing any visible effect, till our troops began to show themselves on the right. Then, indeed, the enemy retired with precipitation; and abandoning Talavera, and the ground immediately about it, they betook themselves to their principal position on the opposite side of the stream. They were followed in this movement by the cavalry and artillery of the Spanish army, and they lost a few men in the suburbs of Talavera; but of several admirable opportunities of making a charge, which presented themselves to the Spanish cavalry, these troops took no advantage. The truth is, that men could not more carefully avoid coming to close quarters with their adversaries, than the Spanish troops did this day. To us it was quite annoying to see with how much caution they hung back, when everything invited them to advance; and to

confess the truth, we acquired for them a feeling of distrust, of which, during some time—I might have said during the remainder of the war—we hardly succeeded in divesting ourselves.

On the 23rd, the enemy were seen in position behind the Alberche, and occupied ground which, had the Alberche been impassable, might have been considered extremely formidable. As, however, this was not the case, as there were several fords in the stream, by which both the right and the centre of their line could be threatened, it seemed extraordinary in Victor to remain where he was, with twenty thousand men only; for twenty thousand constituted the whole strength of the corps which now lay in our front. It is scarcely necessary to add, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was exceedingly anxious to take advantage of an occurrence on which he could have hardly calculated. Yet was he extremely unwilling to urge Cuesta to the adoption of any measure: on the contrary, he was desirous, from particular circumstances, that whatever was done should, if possible, be undertaken on the suggestion and at the entreaty of the Spanish General. For this it is not difficult to assign an adequate cause. From the day of our entrance into Spain, up to the present moment, no care whatever had been taken by the Spanish authorities, to supply us with any one of the many articles of which we stood in need. Sir Arthur had

repeatedly complained to Cuesta, and had, on every occasion, received the strongest assurances that his requests would be promptly attended to; but day after day passed by without bringing about the fulfilment of the promise; and we were now as far as ever from being satisfied. Thus circumstanced, Sir Arthur felt himself under the necessity of informing Cuesta that he would see him with his army across the Alberche; but that, in justice to his own troops, and to the king whom he served, he neither could nor would advance one step further into the country, till all the articles for which he had so repeatedly made requisition, should be supplied.

The discussions to which such a state of affairs frequently gave birth were again renewed, and with increased acrimony, on the evening of the 22nd; but it was, I believe, finally determined by Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 23rd, that a general attack should be made upon the enemy at dawn on the following morning. On this occasion, two divisions of British infantry, with one brigade of cavalry, were to pass the fords of the Alberche, so as to assault the heights on the enemy's right. Whilst this was going on, the Spanish cavalry, supported by a column of infantry, under the Duke of Albuquerque, was to pass a ford opposite to the centre of the position, leaving to Cuesta in person, assisted by Generals Zayas and Eguia, the

charge of carrying the bridge and battery on the left; and two divisions of British infantry, with two brigades of cavalry, were to remain on the plain, in rear of Albuquerque's column, as a support to the whole.

Cuesta received the suggestion with his accustomed dry civility, but desired time to consider of it and digest it. He spent the greater part of the night in deliberation, and at last gave his assent to the scheme. In the mean while, we had not been wholly idle. Soon after dark some guns were pushed across the bridge at Talavera, for the purpose of assisting in the dislodgement of the enemy from their batteries on the left, and in advance of their position. The different officers in command of divisions and brigades, were likewise instructed as to the duty which they would be expected to perform, and the general plans, liable to be changed upon the spot according as events might turn out, were matured. This done, we lay down to snatch a few hours of sleep. But as our troops had a circuitous march to execute, the space granted for repose was necessarily brief; and at two o'clock in the morning we were again under arms. We set off immediately in the direction agreed upon, and reached the Alberche without molestation; but it was only to ascertain a fact which seriously mortified and chagrined us—namely, that the enemy had escaped. Not a

vestige of their troops, nor a morsel of their baggage, remained ; and their huts, or standing camp, alone bore testimony that they had been there.

It was but natural, that feeling, as every one did, the full extent of our disappointment, a variety of motives should be assigned as those which actuated Victor on the present occasion. By some, it was alleged that the expected reinforcements not having come up, the enemy felt himself too weak to hazard a battle ; by others his retreat was attributed to fresh orders from Madrid, positively requiring him to withdraw and concentrate upon the capital. For my own part, it appeared to me that the French had never entertained the slightest idea of fighting, provided they could escape with any credit, and at the same time secure their plunder. They had kept their ground on the Alberche during the 23rd, partly because some time was necessary for the removal of their baggage, and partly because they probably conceived that our whole force could not be assembled ; and they retired on the very first opportunity which offered, after they had accomplished their own designs, and saw reason to believe that we were in a fit state to molest them. It was, therefore, very evident to me, that unless we followed them up closely, no possibility of bringing them to action would occur ; whereas by a rapid pursuit, there was every prospect before us of even yet com-

elling them to risk all upon the chances of a battle.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, determined not to deviate from the course which he had already threatened to pursue, should Cuesta persist in his system of procrastination and neglect. No one in the army questioned the soundness of the policy which dictated the measure—for of that there could be no question; but it was mortifying to reflect that a series of brilliant operations must be interrupted, and perhaps serious injury inflicted upon the cause, through the ill-timed obstinacy of a perverse old man. It seemed certain now, that we were not to pursue at all. But were the Spaniards to follow single-handed, as it was highly probable they might, it was an event quite within the compass of possibility, that the enemy would suddenly turn round upon them when they least expected it, and destroy them, when we should be near enough to know of their fate, and yet too distant to avert it. There was something more distressing in these considerations than an ordinary reader may be able to conceive. It was impossible for many not to put the question, why might we not go on at all events? and if provisions should be scarce, why not exist upon quarter allowance, rather than permit an opening so propitious to be closed up? A few days' march would drive the enemy beyond the capital, the

passes, and the mountains, and to effect more was not required of us. We should then be in a country where, in spite of Cuesta, we might support ourselves well,—it were better that we had attempted nothing, than to stop short just at a moment like the present. Our chief, however, had made up his mind upon mature deliberation, and doubtless formed his judgment upon grounds satisfactory to himself; nothing, therefore, remained to his followers, except to submit implicitly to his decisions. Besides, there was one great good of which no one could doubt, as likely to arise out of these decisions. Cuesta would see that we were in earnest, and he would then, perhaps, exert himself to supply our wants, rather than lose altogether the advantage of our co-operation.

On the morning of the 24th, it was my fortune to go on with two squadrons of cavalry, in front of Cuesta's army, as far at St. Olalla; we had there a smart skirmish with the rear-guard of the enemy, just as they were quitting the town; and I was enabled to ascertain that the main body had fallen back to Torrejos, on the Toledo road. From that point, it would be easily in their power either to double round towards Madrid, or to retire by Aranjuez upon Arganda, and so to the southward of Sigüenza; from whence, being joined by Sebastiani, and in communication with Souchet, they

might continue their march towards Tudela. In the latter case, Venegas' corps could hardly avoid a defeat from the united armies of Victor and Sebastiani; for he had moved in the direction formerly described, and was supposed to be by this time at Fuente-Duena, or Arganda. We learned, likewise, that Sir Robert Wilson's corps had reached Escalona, and that the enemy, alarmed for their right, had detached a division to occupy the Guadarama pass. Besides these heads of information, there were several others communicated to us here, on all of which we were not disposed to place implicit reliance. One went to state that Joseph had evacuated Madrid, and was concentrating all the force which he was able to collect upon Burgos; another, that the French nation was weary of the war, and that the French troops would shortly be withdrawn from Spain. The last rumour was more feasible than either of the preceding, and we saw good reason to credit it, namely—that Sebastiani's corps had never formed a junction with Victor at all; and the inference was not an unfair one, that he found ample occupation in La Mancha.

CHAPTER XVI.

Cuesta follows the French, who turn upon and drive him back in confusion--Battle of Talavera--Sufferings of the British army after the action, and its consequent retreat towards Portugal.

WHILST Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Talavera, sending two divisions under General Sherbrooke to Casa Leguas, across the river, Cuesta followed close upon the steps of the French army. The latter, however, were not, as the old man fondly believed them to be, in full retreat, but were merely falling back upon a point, where they knew that reinforcements would meet them; for all our information respecting Sebastiani and Joseph proved to be erroneous. Sebastiani was now in Toledo, from whence, leaving three thousand men to garrison the place, he set out to meet Victor; and Joseph and Jourdan, having formed a junction, were also hastening to support him.

The junction of these several corps d'armée took place at Torrejos ; and the total amount of the force thus brought together, fell little, if at all, short of fifty thousand men. Such, at least, were the statements of the prisoners who afterwards came into our hands. As soon as this was effected, Victor wheeled round, and attacking Cuesta's advance, which had proceeded as far as Olalla, drove it back upon the main body, and compelled the whole to retreat with precipitation to the plain, between the position which the French had formerly occupied, and the Alberche. The retreat was conducted with extreme disorder, and must have led to the total rout of the Spaniards, had not General Sherbrooke, with the division on the left, protected them. But this he did effectually, and then withdrew over the ford into the camp at Talavera, leaving General Mackenzie's division to keep possession of a convent and wood, on the right bank of the Alberche.

Such was the state of our affairs on the evening of the 26th, and it was certainly not of the most promising nature ; for Cuesta lay upon a river, into which, in case of defeat, he must be driven ; and he appeared to be making no arrangements whatever to meet the attack, with which he could not doubt that he was threatened. By one of those happy expedients, however, to which quick-sighted mortals can alone have recourse, both the

Spanish and British divisions were extricated from their difficulties, and placed, during the following day, in an extremely advantageous position. Sir Arthur Wellesley had, for some time, been examining, with an eagle's glance, the country about Talavera, and he suddenly selected ground, of which no one except himself had taken notice, but to the excellence of which future events bore ample testimony. Here he determined to draw up the armies; and he took his measures with such promptitude, and issued his orders with so much coolness and perspicuity, that every battalion, Spanish as well as English, stepped into the very spot which his admirable foresight had marked out for it. The following is a sketch of the dispositions which were thus effected:—

The town of Talavera is situated upon the northern bank of the Tagus, and extends so closely to the river's edge, that there is hardly any space left vacant between the buildings and the water. In front, and lying slightly to the left, there is a small but commanding height, upon which a heavy Spanish battery was constructed, and which constituted a point d'appui to the right of the Spanish army; for the two armies were drawn up in one continuous line, of which the English held the left, and the Spaniards the right. Our people extended from the town to the mountains of Talavera; which form part of the Sierra de Gata, and

running parallel to the Madrid road, enclose, on one side, the vale of Plasencia. The extreme left took post upon a bold height in the direction of Alataza de Segusella, protected in front by a ravine, and flanked by a deep valley, on the opposite side of which the mountains rose again in increased altitude, and swept away in one uniform line. The Spanish troops, on the other hand, were arranged among some olive groves, and along a road, the embankment of which supplied them with an excellent parapet, and rested their left upon a little hill distant about two miles from Talavera. A portion of their cavalry was stationed here, so as to support their left; and Zara's van kept possession of the rising ground.

Upon that height our right likewise leaned. A strong redoubt had been begun, for the purpose of increasing its defensibility; but it was not yet sufficiently advanced to add much to the security of the troops who happened to be in position there. These consisted of the fourth division under General Campbell, next to whom came the guards; which, again, were succeeded in the alignment by General Cameron's brigade and the Germans, as these were by General Mackenzie's and General Hill's. The last-named division held the extreme left of all. Posted on a sharp rising but commanding eminence, two brigades of British cavalry, one heavy and one light, were in the valley

on the left of this height: one brigade, under General Cotton, took post on the right, in rear of Campbell's division; and the Duke of Albuquerque, with a cloud of Spanish horse, supported our cavalry on the left. Such was the general arrangement for the occupation of the defensive position, which the allied armies were commanded to take up; and at an early hour on the morning of the 27th, they began to move into it.

The greater part of the movements had been made without annoyance, and all appeared to be going on as we could have wished, when about noon General Mackenzie's division was suddenly attacked at the convent and wood on the right bank of the Alberche, by two strong columns of the enemy. They came on so suddenly, and with such impetuosity, as to throw the 87th and 88th regiments into some confusion; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley reached the ground, they had succeeded, to a certain extent, in penetrating between the two brigades of which Mackenzie's division was composed. The consequence was, that, for some little time, we were unable to discover the position which one of these brigades had taken up, and it required great exertion, on the part of every officer present, to restore order. At last, however, the 31st and 45th, supported by the 60th regiment, were got in hand, and they covered the falling back of the other regiments in

fine style, from the wood into the plain. Here the cavalry were in readiness to support them; and from that moment a regular and well-conducted retreat began, which was continued, leisurely and orderly along the heights, towards the left of the position which the army had been directed to seize.

The enemy, nothing daunted by the steadiness of our people, continued to press on; and a partial action ensued along the whole front of the line. Towards evening it became more serious. The enemy appearing then to observe the great importance of the height upon which the left of our army rested, made a desperate effort to possess himself of it. He formed his infantry into close columns of battalions, and, covered by a tremendous cannonade, advanced at double quick pace to the assault. General Mackenzie's division having been withdrawn somewhat to the rear, and forming at this moment in the second line, the attack was met by part only of General Hill's division; but they proved themselves quite adequate to the task. The 48th, the 1st battalion of detachments, and the 29th pouring in a volley, rushed forward with the bayonet; and three companies of the latter gallant corps drove the enemy from the very ridge to which they had attained. It was a splendid charge; and it was one, upon the issues of which much might have

hung; for had the height in question been carried, the strength of our position became at once exposed. It was not, however, made without a heavy loss to the brave troops engaged; for the enemy fought nobly; and we had to lament, when darkness put an end to the contest, about eight hundred in killed and wounded, among whom were several very valuable officers.

We lay all night upon our arms in momentary expectation of an attack, the cavalry resting beside their horses, and the infantry on the ground which they had occupied during the day; but no attack was made. No great while elapsed, however, after the dawn appeared, ere the enemy once more put themselves in motion. The height upon our left was still the grand object of their desire; and that they prepared to storm with all the force which they found it practicable to bring against it.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 28th, two strong columns of chosen troops, the grenadiers of Lapisse's division, were formed in front of the height in question. The formation was marked by a furious cannonade, under cover of which the columns pressed forward; and desperate and numerous were the efforts which they made to render themselves masters of the summit. But nothing could exceed the gallantry and steadiness of the brave men who opposed them. The brigades of General Tilson and R. Stewart were here; they

permitted the enemy, again and again, to arrive within a few paces of the ridge, and they drove them back in admirable style with the bayonet, till, disheartened by so many repulses, they at last retreated altogether, leaving the ground covered with their dead. Had our cavalry been at this moment sufficiently forward in the plain and valley, they might have produced a terrible impression upon these fugitives; for the enemy retired in great confusion; and opportunities of making charges occurred, such as could not have been by any possibility overlooked; but, unfortunately, they were too far in the rear. The broken masses were thus enabled to reform themselves, and to withdraw, in something like order, within their lines.

The fighting had been maintained, without any intermission, from five in the morning till half-past eight, and the slaughter on both sides was terrible; but the enemy's loss in killed and wounded exceeded ours greatly; and, which was not less in our favour, his troops appeared dispirited and dismayed. They made no further movement during the next three hours, and the sound of firing ceased to be heard throughout the field. At this juncture it was a question with us whether we should advance, and in our turn become the assailants, or remain quietly where we were, and await the result of the enemy's deliberations. It was a fortu-

nate circumstance that Sir Arthur Wellesley determined on following the latter of these courses, for about half-past eleven several heavy clouds of dust were discerned, announcing the approach of the French army to a renewed attack upon different points in our line. They had now fully ascertained the exact station which the English army occupied, and rightly judging, that if it were shaken, the Spaniards would fall an easy prey, they made ready to bear down upon us with the whole weight of their force. Four distinct columns, each strongly supported by artillery and cavalry, came on; the first against that part of the line where the British and Spanish troops joined; the second against the guards and Cameron's brigade; the third against the Germans and Mackenzie's division; whilst the fourth, escorted by a mass of cavalry, moved up the valley on the left of General Hill's station. It may be necessary to observe here, that General Hill, having received a severe wound in the early part of the morning, quitted the field; and that the command of the troops which occupied the often-contested height, had devolved, in consequence, upon General Tilson.

The advance of French columns is invariably announced by a general fire of artillery throughout the whole extent of their position; and the ordinary custom was not omitted on the present occasion. A murderous cannonade spread havoc

among our ranks, whilst the attacking parties, covered as usual by clouds of tirailleurs, pressed forward with the greatest firmness and regularity. Our people had received instructions to reserve their fire till the enemy should have arrived within a few yards of them, and giving it with effect, to bring the bayonet immediately into play. They obeyed these orders to the letter. The heads of the enemy's columns were close upon our line before a musket was discharged, and then one volley was given with a degree of precision which must have astonished those against whom it was directed. A conflict now ensued, more desperate, because more completely hand to hand, than possibly the annals of modern warfare ever recorded. General Campbell's division, on the right, not only repelled the attacking column, but rushing on them when broken by its fire, drove them before it in gallant style; and charging a battery, from which it suffered severely, took, at the point of the bayonet, thirteen pieces of cannon. The enemy, however, were veteran troops, accustomed to be broken, and to recover their ranks again; and as our soldiers could not venture very far in pursuit, lest by so doing they should expose their comrades, the fugitives were enabled to rally, and to resume the offensive. What might have been the consequence of a renewed assault, it were a hard matter to say. The captured guns, at all

events, would have been probably recovered ; but just as the French were preparing to rush forward, they were taken in flank by a regiment of Spanish cavalry, and again overthrown.

In the mean while, the second and third of the French columns, reckoning from their left, bore their full weight upon our centre, and made a desperate effort to pierce it. They were met and beaten back with the same gallantry which marked the opposition of General Campbell's corps ; but the guards, eager to emulate the example of the 7th and 53rd regiments, pushed on, unfortunately somewhat too far, in pursuit. The enemy were not slow to take advantage of this. Observing a chasm in our line, they threw in a tremendous and most galling fire upon the Germans, who, for an instant, were in confusion. Here the battle was, for some minutes, most obstinate, and victory doubtful ; for the enemy's right column had withstood and repulsed a charge from Anson's light brigade of cavalry ; and had he promptly availed himself of the advantage thereby obtained, a different result might, perhaps, have occurred from that which crowned the operations of this glorious day. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was everywhere, saw how matters stood. He ordered up the 48th, which had been in reserve, to support the broken Germans, and to cover the retrograde movement of the guards ; and that regi-

ment, by its steadiness and good conduct, retrieved the disorder in this part of the line. The Germans were speedily brought back to their standards; General Sherbrooke succeeded in reforming the guards; and the French were beaten back, with terrible slaughter, from every point which they had assailed.

At this moment our troops were successful in all parts of the field, and it needed but a forward movement on the part of the Spaniards, to render the victory of Talavera as decisive as any upon record. Had it been possible to bring them up from the right of their line, so as to have gained, by a rapid march upon the Alberche, the enemy's flanks, one-half of the French army must have been sacrificed. But unfortunately this could not be done. The Spaniards, miserably disciplined, and totally unaccustomed to change their formation in the face of an enemy, were quite immovable; there they stood, as they had been originally drawn up; and to attempt any manœuvre, however simple, would have served only to throw them into confusion, without being productive of any good effect. The consequence was, that the enemy were enabled to commence and to continue their retreat in excellent order, carrying off with them much of their artillery, the whole of their wounded, and the greater part of their materiel. We could not venture to follow far, because even

yet they more than doubled us in numbers; and they escaped in better plight than usually attends an army which has suffered a repulse so decided and so bloody.

The loss of the British army in this action was very severe, and it was occasioned chiefly by the murderous and overwhelming fire of the French artillery. From that, several regiments, which can hardly be said to have been personally engaged at all, suffered nearly as much as others which bore the brunt of the contest. Out of nineteen thousand men, which formed the whole of our effective force when the battle began, upwards of four thousand were either killed or wounded; and among them were many officers, whose services, at a juncture like the present, could ill be spared. Generals Mackenzie, Hill, and R. Campbell, were wounded, and placed hors de combat. Brigade-major Beckett, an excellent officer, attached to the guards, together with Majors Fordyce and Gardiner, were among the killed. With respect to the enemy, it was not easy to form an accurate notion, but their loss must have exceeded ours by at least one third. Many rated it higher; but none below this amount. The Spaniards suffered but little, as few of their corps chanced to be engaged; but it is no more than justice to state, that the little which they had to perform here, they performed well. Some artillery, which they

had upon our left, was excellently served; and their cavalry regiment, called the King's, charged gallantly. It is likewise but fair to record, that they were in raptures with us and our behaviour; and that they declared, with all the clamorous eloquence of their country, that those who spoke of the British as less capable of fighting by land than at sea, lied in their throats!!!

We bivouacked that night upon the field of battle, having removed our wounded into Talavera, and established there an extensive hospital; and, on the following morning, we were joined by General Crawford's brigade from Lisbon, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. Had it arrived only a few hours earlier, more might perhaps have been done; but it came in at a moment when our successes were not sufficient to reconcile us to our position; for we were in a state bordering on want. Nothing had been done, and nothing seemed about to be done, by Cuesta or the Spanish government, to afford us supplies: our bread was all expended; and cattle, which hitherto had been found in abundance, were now become scarce. Add to this, that the enemy still showed troops upon the left of the Alberche; and that the Spaniards, afraid to approach them unless we were at their side, crowded still upon us, and drained the country of everything. Nor was this all. Whilst it was yet doubtful whether Venegas

had reached Aranjuez, a corps of French troops was reported to have advanced from Alba de Tormes as far as the pass of Banios, on the road to Plasencia, with the design of cutting us off from our communications with Portugal. Sir Robert Wilson, also, had fallen back from Escalona, and was close upon our left. In a word, though we had won a great victory, our situation was only so far improved, that we were for the moment free from an overwhelming force in our front ; but we were in the midst of difficulties, nevertheless, from which nothing but some prompt and vigorous movement would deliver us. The mind of our General was, however, as we well knew, full of resources ; and though most of us saw our embarrassments clearly enough, there was not an individual in the army who entertained a doubt, that his talent and decision would, in due time, overcome and disperse them.

During the 30th and 31st, all things remained as they had done, except that the enemy disappeared entirely from before us, and our wants became every day more and more urgent. The utmost exertions of our commissariat were unable to procure even a moderate supply of bread, and the meat was hardly in greater abundance. Rumours, likewise, of Soult's approach from the north, became every hour more and more frequent ; nor could all the hopes which we persisted in cherish-

ing, that Venegas must have got well round to the right of Madrid, suffice to allay entirely the apprehensions which that reported movement created. At last, on the 1st and 2nd of August, authentic intelligence reached us, that from Venegas we had nothing to expect; for that Soult, having carried the pass of Banios, which a corps of Spaniards under the Marquis del Reyno had been appointed to keep, but which they had deserted almost without striking a blow, was already in Plasencia. He entered that town, in fact, on the 1st; and having been reinforced from Salamanca, or during his march from the northward, and supplied with artillery and stores from Madrid, he appeared there at the head of fourteen thousand men, inferior, in point of equipment, to no portion of the French army. This was a startling piece of news, and required that some measure should, on our parts, be promptly devised; and Sir Arthur Wellesley lost no time in seeking a conference with Cuesta, for the purpose of determining of what nature that measure ought to be.

On the present occasion, Cuesta suggested that the British army should be divided; that one-half should proceed with a portion of his troops against Soult; and the other half, with the remainder of the Spaniards, go forward in pursuit of Victor. To this proposition Sir Arthur Wellesley would on no account agree, declaring that all idea of di-

viding the British force was preposterous ; but he proposed, in his turn, to march with the entire British army against Soult, provided Cuesta would remain at Talavera, and secure his rear. Cuesta consented to that arrangement ; and our troops, in consequence, marched back upon the 3rd from Talavera to Oropesa. But we had hardly taken our ground, when advices arrived from Cuesta, to state that he had intercepted a friar who was carrying despatches both from Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, addressed to Soult. In the former, an exceedingly accurate and precise detail was given, not only of our force, but of all our previous intentions up to the 28th ; a species of knowledge which could have been obtained only by treachery in some quarter or another ; whilst a narrative of the late battle was added, which, for the story of a Frenchman, exhibited wonderfully few deviations from the truth. The latter contained orders to Marshal Soult, to press forward with all diligence upon us, assuring him that his movement must cause a separation of the British from the Spanish forces ; that he would be supported by Marshal Ney, who had been directed to pursue his line of march from Castile ; and that, whilst they marched upon our flank, Joseph would again act on the offensive, and threaten our front. It was added that Joseph had, in the mean while, placed his force in a central situation about Barga, near

Torrejos, so as at once to keep Venegas in check, and to arrest any advance which we might endeavour to make immediately from Talavera.

From the tenor of these letters, it was easy to perceive that what had formerly been surmised respecting Venegas was correct, and that, instead of pushing briskly, as he had been directed to do, upon Fuente-Duena and Arganda, he had become alarmed for the safety of Seville, and had moved towards Toledo and Aranjuez. By this injudicious movement, he enabled the enemy, with their forces united, to keep both Spanish corps in check. Cuesta was dreadfully alarmed at the information. He gave orders for the immediate evacuation of Talavera, and made ready to follow our march to Oropesa without a moment's delay, though aware that he must thereby sacrifice the whole of our wounded, and that too when no enemy was in sight. This was a most galling arrangement to us, and it cut us the more deeply, that the old Spaniard, though literally encumbered with cars and waggons, refused to spare us more than seven for the transportation of the brave men who had fought and bled for his country. The abandonment of the town was, as may be imagined, a most heart-rending scene. Such of our poor soldiers as were in a condition to move at all, crawled after us, some still bleeding, and many more with their wounds open and undressed; whilst those whose

hurts were too severe to permit of this, lay upon their pallets, and implored their comrades not to desert them. By indefatigable exertions, and by sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, Sir Arthur Wellesley got together forty cars, which enabled us to bring forward in all about two thousand men; but there were still some hundreds left behind, all of whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity or honour, might have been preserved. The reader will easily believe that such a scene, added to the extreme distress which scarcity of provisions occasioned, cast a damp upon our spirits which we had not anticipated, and which certainly ought not to have been the consequence of a victory hardly won indeed, but singularly splendid.

As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley was made acquainted with Cuesta's determinations, he remonstrated in strong terms against the impolicy and cruelty of the measure; but his remonstrances were disregarded. During the night of the 3rd, the Spaniards came pouring in upon us like a flock of sheep; and a scene of noise and confusion ensued, of which no words could convey an adequate conception. At the same moment intelligence arrived, that Soult had passed the Teitar, and that his advanced-guard was already entering Naval Moral. The bridge of Almaraz must, therefore, be either destroyed by the Spanish peasants, or in the hands of the enemy; and hence

we were reduced to the alternative, either of fighting our way through Soult's corps, or of returning over the bridge of Arzobispo, and taking up the line of the Tagus. Sir Arthur Wellesley gave to each aspect of affairs a due portion of consideration. He felt, that should he determine to advance against Soult, he might, from the nature of the country, and the facilities which the line of the Teitar afforded to an army on the defensive, be kept, in spite of his utmost exertions, in play, till Ney had arrived with his corps, and Joseph and Victor were again able to come on. Nor was this the only risk which he ran. Should he not succeed in forcing his way to Plasencia, his circumstances would become desperate indeed; for the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, which was now fully ascertained to have taken place, deprived him of all means of crossing the Tagus; and a retreat, in case of disaster, became, in consequence, extremely precarious. These were contingencies of grave and serious aspect; but they were not the only considerations which served to guide him. By subsequent accounts, it appeared that the enemy were pushing by La Calzada upon the Arzobispo bridge; there was, therefore, no room left for hesitation, nor a moment to spare in maturing and acting upon some decision.

The greater part of the Spanish army arrived at

Oropesa during the night of the 3rd ; but it was the morning of the 4th before Cuesta himself came in. Sir Arthur Wellesley instantly waited upon him, for the purpose of stating his views as to the line of conduct which it behoved us to pursue. He represented to him, that situated as the allies now were, with a French force hurrying forward to surround them on every side, and destitute of all means of subsistence, except the little which, from day to day, might be collected in an exhausted country, the only step which they could venture, in common prudence, to take, was to assume the line of the Tagus, and to remain there in a defensive position, till stores could be collected, and some prospect of acting on the offensive, more attractive than was now before them, could be discovered. Cuesta, however, whose fears had driven him to evacuate Talavera, to sacrifice our wounded, and to leave the way open for Victor's army, was now stoutly opposed to every proposal which had a retreat for its object. He was satisfied that a second battle would end quite as advantageously for us as the first ; and he gave his voice decidedly for risking it. It was useless to remind him that the physical strength of men, to whom no provisions could be supplied, would not suffice to carry them through the toils of a long action ; and that, if we did fight, we should fight under all the disadvantages of a state

of utter and deplorable exhaustion. He would listen to no arguments of the kind, till at last, perceiving that argument was thrown away, Sir Arthur Wellesley assumed a higher tone. He told him plainly, that whatever the Spaniards might resolve upon doing, he would not sacrifice the army of which he was in command; and he left him, to issue orders for an immediate march towards Arzobispo. The orders were promptly obeyed; and we passed the bridge just as the enemy's patrols began to appear in sight.

The path which leads from Arzobispo, through the pass of Mesa d'Ibor, into the great road from Almaraz to Truxillo, Merida, and Badajoz, had been represented to us as wholly impassable for artillery. We found it extremely bad, no doubt; but we nevertheless contrived to drag our guns along, and by dint of extraordinary exertions, reached Toralida among the mountains, on the 5th. We remained there only during the night, and resting at Mesa d'Ibor on the 6th, we came in, on the 7th, to Deleitosa. Here a halt took place during two days, of which the troops stood greatly in need; for though our journeys had not been remarkable for their length, they had been accomplished in the face of numerous and severe difficulties. In the first place, no bread had been issued out from the commencement to the close of our march, and the men had tasted none for three

whole days. This, of itself, was sufficient to wear out their strength; but, besides suffering from hunger, they had a rough, and often precipitous track to follow; and they travelled through a district everywhere laid waste, and deficient in all the necessary articles, either for shelter or support. The season of the year was, indeed, in our favour, the weather happening to be remarkably temperate; and it was well that the case proved so; for had winter overtaken us, circumstanced as we then were, it would have been a hard task to foretell the probable consequences. As if fortune, too, had determined to try our patience in every possible way, we were scarcely settled in Deleitosa, when intelligence of the overthrow of Austria reached us. It was communicated from Seville, through our ambassador Lord Wellesley, and no doubts could be entertained as to its authenticity. The reader will readily believe that news so afflicting came with double weight upon men already beginning to lose heart in consequence of their own sufferings and reverses; and that not a few of the most desponding amongst us looked upon affairs as desperate, and all chance of successful resistance to French power as absolutely taken away.

No such sentiments, however, found a home in the breast of Sir Arthur Wellesley. He saw and felt the difficulties of his situation keenly enough;

perplexed as he was by being kept a good deal in the dark as to the steps which the enemy were preparing to take, and harassed and annoyed by the continued supineness of the Spanish authorities ; but he was far from regarding the game as lost. On the contrary, he spoke and acted on all public occasions as if events were taking the very course which he had expected them to take ; and he satisfied every one, either that he had provided, or that he was perfectly competent to provide, against any accident or contingency which might chance to occur. Our principal danger arose from the side of Plasencia. Were Soult, whose force was now ascertained to fall little short of twenty-five or thirty thousand men, and who was well known to hold the Spaniards in sovereign contempt, to push upon Portugal, by way of Coria, and the other towns which we had passed in our advance, then should we be thrown into circumstances of great embarrassment ; for his line of march would, in this case, be shorter than any which we could take, and he might reach Lisbon before us. But we entertained sanguine hopes that Marshal Beresford, of whose junction with the Duke de la Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo we were informed, must, by this time, be sufficiently advanced to intercept the movement ; and Sir Arthur invariably caused it to appear, that for such hopes there were ample grounds. Nevertheless, it

was generally felt, that if he intended to look exclusively to the defence of Portugal, the sooner he took up a line for that purpose the better. On Cuesta and the Spaniards, it was evident enough that no further reliance could be placed; there were around us, at present, no means of subsistence; our communications from every quarter were either entirely interrupted, or at best very uncertain; and, above all, sickness raged amongst us. Our effective strength, including General Crawford's division, was reduced at this period to seventeen thousand men. Where so many reasons existed for the adoption of a defensive system, there was little doubt that it would be adopted by him, who was so competent to judge of its fitness; and they who entertained this expectation were not disappointed.

I have alluded above to the supineness of the Spanish authorities, and the unsatisfactory relations in which our intercourse with the civil government at Seville stood, amply exemplified as it was by the arduous task which Lord Wellesley had to perform in the position in which he was placed, and fully borne out by the voluminous and constant correspondence that was kept up at this time between the two brothers. It is not my province, however, to enter further into those circumstances than to state that our chief was not only called upon to consider every military point

as connected with his army, but that every civil arrangement in the Peninsula was submitted to him ; and hence he commenced that early practice of universality of reflection and decision, to which, for reasons in the hands of Providence, he seems especially to have been designed.

CHAPTER XVII.

Defeat of Cuesta's army at the bridge of Arzobispo—Victor enters Talavera—Sir Robert Wilson's corps worsted at the Puerto de Banios—Sir Arthur Wellesley takes up the line of the Tagus—Cuesta is superseded, and General Eguia succeeds to the command of the Spanish army—Distresses of the British army, and extraordinary conduct of Eguia and the Spanish government—Sir Arthur Wellesley retires upon the Guadiana—General Arrezaga defeated at Ocana, and the Duke del Parque at Pamarue—Successes of the French in Andalusia—Fall of Gerona and Astorga—Massena assumes the command in the Peninsula—The British army moves towards Almeida, leaving General Hill's corps at Abrantes—Comparative strength of the opposing armies, and mutual preparations for the campaign.

WE resumed our march on the morning of the 11th, and arrived that day at Jaraicejo, a place distant about three leagues from the former position. Here we paused for some time, sending the cavalry as far to the rear as Truxillo, and occupying Almaraz and the Puerto de Miravete with

two divisions; but the head-quarters were established in Jaraicejo, and the main body of the army cantoned in the villages round. To ourselves nothing occurred, whilst we remained here, deserving of particular notice; but a variety of events, more or less important, were going on elsewhere; and of these, as they were reported to us, and, generally speaking, truly reported, it may not be amiss if I subjoin a brief outline.

The first rumour which reached us, was of a defeat which the Spanish army had sustained, on the 8th, at the bridge of Arzobispo. It appeared that Cuesta, having fortified the bridge, and leaving two divisions of infantry, with one of cavalry, under the Duke of Albuquerque, to defend it, returned, in the night of the 7th, to Paraleda de Garben, where better facilities for housing and covering his troops existed. He had scarcely departed, when the enemy appeared in force upon the opposite bank, and employed themselves, totally disregarded by the garrison of Arzobispo, in searching for a ford. This they succeeded in discovering, about two or three hundred yards above the barricade, and they sent over a column of cavalry, supported by infantry, which, falling upon the Spaniards during the heat of the day, took them wholly by surprise. They were put to the rout in a moment, with the loss of twelve pieces of cannon; and had the French followed

with the vigour which usually characterised them, the Spanish army must have been entirely dispersed. Cuesta, however, finding that he was not pursued, succeeded in rallying his men, and then retreated into the pass of the Mesa d'Ibor, where, upon ground partaking as much of the nature of impregnability as it is easy to conceive, he took up a position.

With respect to the enemy, again, it was understood that Victor had entered Talavera, where he behaved with the utmost humanity and kindness to our wounded; whilst the armies from the north were surmised, rather than accurately known, to have retrograded upon Plasencia. Of the exact posture of the latter we were, however, ignorant. We knew only that they had not appeared, at least in force, in the vicinity of Coria, though several plundering and foraging parties had arrived there; whilst a corps of five or six thousand men was fully ascertained to keep its station still in Plasencia. But we ascertained, at the same time, that a division had moved back as far as the Puerto de Banios, with a view to intercept Sir Robert Wilson. This officer, it may be necessary to state, had fallen in from Escalona, some time ago, upon our left. When we began our retreat towards Arzobispo, there were no opportunities of communicating with him, or drawing him off at the instant; and he had now penetrated in pursuit

of us, to the Puerto de Banios, whither the French corps hastened to attack him. Sir Robert Wilson could neither decline the battle, nor very successfully maintain it. In artillery he was quite deficient, the whole of his guns having accompanied our train, and his men were considerably harassed by repeated marches; but they offered a stout resistance, and when at length they were forced to yield, made good their retreat upon Ciudad Rodrigo. This they did, not as armies usually retreat, in compact bodies, and covered by their skirmishers, but by utterly dispersing, and again uniting at the particular point of rendezvous which, previous to their rout, had been determined upon.

In the mean while Marshal Beresford, with his Portuguese army, was in position at Zarza, whither General Crawford, at the head of four British regiments, hastened from Castello Branco to join him. The Marshal was confident that he was capable of arresting upon the frontier any French corps which might attempt to penetrate into Portugal; and that he could easily contrive to keep it in play till we should be able to arrive, by way of Abrantes, to his assistance. This assurance, together with the absence of all immediate manifestations on the part of the enemy of a design to advance beyond Plasencia, induced Sir Arthur Wellesley not to relinquish with precipitation his defensive line of the Tagus, but to remain quietly

in his present attitude, until the progress of things in other parts of the country should furnish him with better reasons, either to advance or retire. By acting thus, we still retained command of the great road to Seville; and by keeping the enemy in doubt touching our future intentions, we hindered him from directing his undivided attention to other points; whilst, at the same time, our retreat was secure, and an escape to the Spaniards as far as Monasterio, was by no means impracticable.

Matters were thus circumstanced, when the recall of Cuesta from the command of his army was announced. Notwithstanding the general confidence which appeared to be entertained in his honest integrity, and devotion to the cause of his country, he had exhibited, of late, too many proofs of incapacity to direct a campaign, to be permitted any longer to fill his high situation. He was superseded—though not with any marks of ignominy; and the guidance of the troops devolved, as a matter of course, on General Eguia, the next senior in rank. An idea had prevailed amongst us, sometimes, that the command would be conferred on Albuquerque; at other times, that it would be offered to Sir Arthur Wellesley; but the surprise of the former at Arzobispo was supposed to have stood in the way of one of these arrangements; and to the other, the national

pride of the Spaniards opposed insuperable obstacles. Had the case not been so, and had such an offer been actually made, Sir Arthur Wellesley must have experienced considerable embarrassment either in accepting or declining it: it was probably quite as advantageous to the general cause, as it was certainly much more agreeable to the private feelings of our leader, that no such difficulty of choice was submitted to him.

During the first few days of our sojourn at Jaraiçejo, we were tolerably well supplied with bread; and cattle being plenty, we had no cause to complain; but as no regular system of furnishing the army had been entered into with the Spaniards, this state of comparative abundance was not of long continuance. The country immediately round, from which all our necessaries were drawn, soon became exhausted, and we were again reduced to subsist upon a very scanty and uncertain allowance. The forage for the horses, likewise, became scarce, and many of them died in consequence. In the means of transport, too, for our sick, our wounded, and even for our ammunition, we were deficient. No horses, mules, or cars, were sent to us, notwithstanding repeated and earnest requisitions, till it became, at last, a question, whether, in the event of a compulsory movement, we should not be under the necessity of abandoning all to the enemy. Our sickness, moreover, was not di-

minated. The hospitals received fresh occupants as fast as those who had previously filled them returned to their duty; nor could we, by any exertion, muster on parade more than I have already specified as our effective force, namely—seventeen thousand men. With respect to Cuesta's or rather Eguia's army, again, all accounts agreed in representing it as reduced to twenty thousand firelocks, and these rather diminishing than increasing. But it was not in our own immediate neighbourhood alone, that affairs began to assume, every day, a more unpromising aspect. Intelligence reached us, upon authority which we could not dispute, that Venegas had suffered two great defeats from Sebastiani, strengthened by two divisions from Victor's army; that the first occurred at Aranjuez, on the 5th; the second on the 11th, at Almoríand. The truth is, that the enemy, as soon as he found that we had escaped him, countermarched, with accumulated force, upon Venegas; who, taken in some degree by surprise, was beaten with heavy loss, and compelled to retreat to Santa Cruz, in the mountains.

These circumstances, coupled with a persuasion, that in case Venegas should be closely followed, Eguia would be ordered by the junta to move to his support, created in the minds of all a thorough conviction that our stay in the position of the Tagus could not be very protracted. The con-

temptation of a retreat was not, however, a very enlivening one, accompanied as it was with fears for the safety of our hospitals; whilst the smallest mishap upon the occurrence of which it was possible to calculate, consisted in the abandonment of two or three brigades of artillery, and many stores. To Sir Arthur Wellesley, in particular, such a necessity could not but appear in colours the most distressing; for he had ventured upon great things by his forward movement; he had achieved a great victory; and it was mortifying in the extreme, to relinquish the hold which these gave him upon the confidence of Europe. Yet, with his means, how could he act? The handful of troops whom he now commanded, was composed of second battalions—of many youths, both officers and men, made certainly of different stuff, and inferior in stamina, to those whom Sir John Moore had led; indeed, the guards, the buffs, the 48th, and 61st, with the light division which had lately joined under Crawford, were the only portions of the army which, at other periods, would have been regarded as fit for active service. Of the cavalry, again, it is impossible to speak in higher terms. They were dropping off daily; and both men and horses suffered from sickness, to a degree even more appalling than that which befell the infantry. I consider it as no reproach upon any officer in the service, when I here record my con-

viction, that there was but one who did not absolutely despair at this juncture—and that one was Sir Arthur Wellesley. But Sir Arthur was far from despairing; he had already declared his conviction, that even in the event of Spain's subversion, Portugal could be defended. Into Portugal he accordingly prepared to remove, where, in comfortable cantonments, the health of his sick might be restored, and the strength of his weary and convalescents re-established.

That this resolution was not taken upon trivial grounds, the slightest survey of the occurrences, both political and military, which distinguished the latter months of 1809, will suffice to prove. With respect to political transactions, the supineness or treachery of the Supreme Junta became every day more and more conspicuous; and the duplicity of all the authorities with whom we were necessitated to confer, rose, at last, to a height which nothing could justify. General Eguia, full of professions, declared over and over again, that, let happen what might to his own soldiers, the wants of the English should be made good; and on the very day, perhaps, on which these assurances were penned, he would permit parties of his troops to seize and appropriate to their own use, stores of biscuit, or other articles of food, which had been collected for our use, and were on their way to our cantonments. In per-

fect keeping with these transactions, we were day after day urged, both by him and by the Supreme Junta, to resume the offensive, when all parties knew that we possessed no means whatever of transport, and when they refused to supply us with any portion of the mules or draft animals, of which they possessed so large a quantity, as to be able to employ many in dragging empty cars, merely that they might be ready in case of any unlooked-for emergency. From all these circumstances no ground remained for us to doubt that the Spanish government were either unable or unwilling to support us; and that they were perfectly indifferent as to what our fate might be, provided some paltry benefit might accrue individually to themselves.

In a military point of view, again, our little army was at this moment threatened on all sides by a force of full seventy thousand French troops; and there was not a Spanish or Portuguese corps, with the exception of that of Eguia, with which we were in communication. Upon Eguia, however, we could not count, even for a moment. In the first place, his troops were of the very worst description, undisciplined, unfriendly, and disheartened by repeated reverses; and in the next place we were aware that orders had even thus early reached him, to march for the support of Venegas, taking us along with him, could he prevail upon us to move, but, in the event of our re-

fusal, proceeding without us. The enemy, too, were reported to be making preparations for an incursion into Portugal, by way of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; and although Beresford had represented his own force as sufficient to delay, if not to obstruct, their progress, such a report, coming in at such a moment, was not to be neglected. All these causes combined to induce Lord Wellington (for he had by this time been raised to the peerage by that title) to fall back; and he did so with the less reluctance, that he felt himself better able to give support, even to the Spaniards, from a position which promised to furnish, at least, necessaries to his troops, than he could pretend to do whilst enduring all the miseries of sickness and want at Jaraicejo.

In pursuance of this determination, the army broke up from its position on the 20th, and not being harassed by any portion of the enemy's force, made good its retrogression, in five marches, by Truxillo, Meajadas, Medellin, and Merida, upon Badajoz. Here, for the present, Lord Wellington proposed to halt; and the troops were disposed in cantonments along the line of the Guadiana, in a position which at once secured their further retreat, should it become necessary, upon Lisbon; renewed their communications with Beresford, left open to them the means of advancing again, at will, into Spain, and furnished them abundantly with forage and provisions. But the

sickness which had raged so long, instead of abating, increased in violence, till before many weeks had passed away, there were computed to be not fewer than eight or nine thousand men in the hospital. Several causes, each of them, perhaps, sufficient of itself to produce the effect, were assigned for this increase of sickness. By some it was attributed, in no slight degree, to a sudden change from a state of violent exertion to a state of perfect repose; by others, to the unripe fruit, in which the troops too freely indulged; and by a third party, to the malaria, or unhealthy fogs, which, during the dry season, hang over the country in the vicinity of the Guadiana. Probably the last was more conducive than either of the others, to the results which we had so much cause to deplore; but there can be little doubt that all exerted their baneful influence over men, to whom such things were new, and who, in consequence, were more liable to suffer from them than either the natives of the country, or troops better seasoned against hardships and relaxation.

The army remained here, notwithstanding the inconveniences to which it was subjected, till towards the middle of December. Though both its own sufferings, and the condition of the Spanish provinces, precluded all hope that a forward movement could be attempted, Lord Wellington was extremely unwilling to withdraw entirely from the

vicinity of the seat of war; and he was desirous, at the same time, that the resources of the district, upon which he foresaw that in the end he must needs retire, should not be wasted and impaired by a premature arrival of his army. But though the troops continued without occupation all this while, the case was widely different with respect to their commander. The entire season of rest was devoted by him to continual exertions, both for the advancement of the discipline and efficiency of the Portuguese levies, and to infuse, if it were possible, something like wisdom and vigour into the councils of the Spanish government; whilst he was quietly preparing, in his own rear, measures for the construction of that stupendous line of works, which more than once baffled the efforts of the French armies, and proved the salvation of the Peninsula.

In the mean while the Spaniards, with their accustomed want of prudence and discretion, were rushing at all points into collision with the enemy, and were in all points suffering defeat. Eguia had not filled his new office many days, when, leaving Albuquerque with ten or twelve thousand men to watch the banks of the Tagus, and straiten the French foraging parties there, he hurried away to the support of Venegas, of whose reverses notice has already been taken. Venegas, however, was already superseded, and General Arre-

Arzaga commanded in his stead. He was an impetuous and rash officer; who finding himself, on the arrival of Eguia, at the head of fifty thousand men, weakly conceived that no French army would be able to make head against him. In the misplaced confidence which animated their leader, the Spanish troops largely partook; they required to be led immediately to battle, and they spoke of bringing back the junta, in a few days to hold its sittings in Madrid. Arrezaga hastened to comply with their wishes. He led his columns forward to the plains of Ocana, near Aranjuez, where he was attacked by Marshal Mortier, at the head of his own and Sebastiani's corps, and defeated with terrible loss. The enemy boasted of having taken twenty thousand prisoners, and represented the number of slain at four thousand: probably these were exaggerations; but that the Spanish army was annihilated, admitted of no doubt.

This disaster took place upon the 17th of November; it was succeeded by another hardly less ruinous, which occurred in a different part of the country, on the 28th of the same month. The Duke del Parque, at the head of a corps of some twenty thousand men, had for some time back kept his ground in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo; where, being joined by Sir Robert Wilson, he endeavoured, in a desultory war of posts, to harass and confound the projects of the enemy. His

immediate opponent had been Ney; but that officer, indignant at the appointment of Soult to the chief command of the French armies, which, on the recall of Jourdan, had taken place, requested and obtained permission to return to Paris. He was succeeded in his trust by Marshal Marchand, who, holding the Spaniards in utter contempt, hastened to bring the Duke to action. A battle was accordingly fought on the 18th of October, upon the heights of Tomames; which, owing to the improvident impetuosity of the French leader, ended in favour of the Spaniards. The enemy fled to Salamanca, whither the Duke instantly followed, and he entered the place on the very morning of that night, in which General Marchand found himself under the necessity of precipitately abandoning it.

It was the disposition of the Spaniards to experience so much elevation at the occurrence of every little instance of success, that they forgot not only how to improve it, but how to preserve the superiority which they had for the moment obtained. The Duke del Parque differed little in this respect from his fellow-patriots. Delighted with the applauses of the people of Salamanca, and regarding his victorious followers as invincible, he remained inactive in his advanced position, till the corps which he had beaten received reinforcements from Valladolid, when it, in its turn, be-

came the assailant, and moved towards him. A trifling affair took place at Carpio, where, upon some rising ground, he ventured to abide the assault—and it was not unfavourable to the Duke; but the enemy only retired upon their strength; and it soon became evident that a force was opposed to him, which he could not hope successfully to withstand. He accordingly retreated, with all haste, towards Alba de Tormes, where he took up a position, and where, on the morning of the 28th, he was attacked with great impetuosity. The Spaniards were worsted, and compelled to abandon their strong ground; and they retired for a while upon Tomames in tolerable order; but just as the scene of their former victory began to open upon them, a body of French cavalry charged their rear, and threw them into utter confusion. They thought no more of resistance, but casting away their arms, fled in all directions into the mountains.

By these two victories, the last remnants of the Spanish army were destroyed; and the French were left at liberty both to push their conquests into the southern parts of Spain, and to threaten Portugal through the province of Beira. Of the former of these opportunities they hastened immediately to avail themselves. Joseph put himself at the head of the army which was destined to overrun the kingdom of Andalusia; and having

under him Soult, as his major-general, with Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani, each in command of his own corps, he moved towards the passes of the Sierra Morena. Hither the fugitives from the battle of Ocana had fled. But neither they nor their leader had recovered from the dismay which that defeat occasioned, and neither offered, nor pretended to offer, any obstinate resistance to the invaders. The passes were carried, without the necessity once occurring of halting the columns, or forming in order of attack; and on the 21st of January, 1810, the intruders' head-quarters were established in the town of Baylen.

Though in following the progress of this army I shall necessarily anticipate events, which, in order of time, occurred later than others that yet remain to be narrated, it may not be amiss if, in the present stage of my narrative, I remind the reader of the fortune which befell both it, and that portion of the Spanish nation against which it carried on operations.

As soon as the junta became aware that Andalusia was on the point of being invaded, they began to think of securing, not the many steep and rugged defiles by which the approach to that province is guarded, but the safety of their own persons, and the preservation of their own property. They issued decrees and proclamations, it is true, by which they at once endeavoured to deceive the

people into a notion of their own security, and professed to rouse the little energy of which they seemed to be possessed, into action; but they neither exerted themselves to re-organise their routed armies, nor took any steps to bring to the post of danger Albuquerque's corps, though it was the only one upon which reliance could now be placed. On the contrary, they directed the latter to act upon such a plan, as promised most effectually to render its operations unprofitable; and they paid to the repeated and urgent entreaties for supplies, which poured in from the commanders of the former, no more regard than the worst enemies of the country would have desired them to pay. But whilst they were thus heedless of other matters, they passed a resolution, in which the Isle of Leon was declared to be the fittest and most convenient spot at which to hold their future sittings; and they decreed that, on the 1st of February, the members should assemble there for the despatch of business.

Though the junta had by this time lost, and deservedly lost, the general confidence of the nation, the idea that they were about to be abandoned by their rulers, not unnaturally excited among the people of Seville both indignation and despondency. This was not long in exhibiting itself, by numerous movements among the populace; and when the members of the junta pre-

pared to withdraw in accordance with this decree, they were arrested. A cry was raised, that Seville should be defended to the last, and that the chief command should be assumed by Don Francisco Saavedra, at that time minister of finance, and president of the junta. A scene of indescribable confusion ensued. Saavedra exerted himself to the utmost, in order to lessen it, and readily assumed the power which the people had thrust upon him; but it was only to secure his own escape, and the escape of his partners in the government. The junta fled; and Romana, whom the people sought to detain by violence, that he might assume once more the command of his own army, eluded their notice, and retired to Badajoz; and Seville was left, without magistrates or rulers of any class, to make its own terms with the conqueror. It opened its gates to Joseph as soon as he presented himself, and received him, not only without resistance, but with acclamations.

Whilst these things were going on, and whilst the different towns and cities of Andalusia were vieing with one another in their expressions of loyalty to King Joseph, and satisfaction at his arrival amongst them, Soult on the one hand, and Albuquerque on the other, were making the most strenuous efforts, the one to reach Cadiz before it could be put in a posture of defence, the other to throw himself and his army into that important

city, and to secure it. It has been observed that Albuquerque had received, from time to time, such orders from the junta as must have brought about, had he chosen to obey them, the destruction of the only Spanish corps to which Spain could now look for defence. He had been directed, in the first instance, to move from Truxillo, and the posts which he was left to defend along the Tagus, upon La Plata, for the purpose, as it was stated, of frustrating the enemy's intention of penetrating in that direction into Andalusia. He had hardly begun his preparations for obeying that order, when a second arrived, to require that he would merely hold himself in readiness to act on the offensive, should such a course be deemed advisable. Albuquerque, most fortunately for Spain, and highly to his own honour, was not a man to stand in fear of responsibility, and he paid to the last order no regard. He pushed forward as he had previously intended to do, and took post, with his infantry at Guadalcunhal, and his cavalry and artillery at St. Olalla and Ronquillo, in readiness to move in any direction where his presence might seem to be needed.

He was thus situated, when further instructions reached him, requiring that he should withdraw the greater part of the garrison from Badajoz, and, with all the force which he could collect, act vigorously against the enemy. Albuquerque

knew that, even if he were to obey this absurd order, and leave the important city of Badajoz unguarded, he would not be able to muster such a force as would authorise his entry upon any course of active operations, against an enemy whose strength, at the most moderate computation, tripled his own. He therefore not only set the order of the junta at defiance, but strengthened the very garrison which he had been required to weaken. This was hardly done, when fresh instructions reached him. One day he was commanded to march upon Cordova, because the enemy had made themselves masters of the pass of Puerto del Rey. On the next he was summoned to Seville, with all speed, for the purpose of covering it. The last order reached him in the morning; before night another arrived, by which the command of the preceding day, to hurry on towards Cordova, was renewed. Albuquerque was thoroughly disgusted, as he had good reason to be, with conduct so disgraceful and so extraordinary. All the while that the junta was thus misdirecting him, he was in the habit of receiving authentic information respecting the movements and designs of the French; and he knew perfectly, that neither Cordova nor Seville were with them objects of the slightest importance, but that their designs were upon Cadiz. He knew, moreover, that at the very moment when the junta were recom-

mending to him a rapid march upon Cordova, they were themselves preparing to make good their flight to the Isle of Leon ; and he was but too well aware, that if that island, and the important city which covered it, were left to their guidance, and to the protection of the weak garrison which at present held them, a very few weeks would suffice to put both into the possession of the French. Albuquerque loved his country and its independence ; and among all the Spanish generals, there were few whose talents and fine feelings better qualified them to direct the means which were to protect the one, and secure the other ; but he was an object of excessive jealousy to the paltry party which at this moment guided the destinies of Spain, and to that jealousy he at last fell a martyr. On the present occasion he determined to act for himself. As soon as he had accurately ascertained how matters stood, he broke up from his position, and marched with rapid strides, not upon Cordova or Seville, but upon Cadiz. By dint of the most praiseworthy exertions, he reached it just two days before Marshal Soult and his army appeared under the walls ; and he regulated its means of defence with so much judgment and energy, that not all the exertions of the French Marshal, unremitting as these were, proved adequate to its reduction.

Whilst these successes attended the French arms

in the south, their operations were hardly less propitious to them either in the east or in the north. In the east, Gerona, after enduring the miseries of a protracted siege, was reduced, and the army of Blake, defeated in more than one encounter, found itself in no condition to keep the field, and was fain to retire into the fastnesses with which Catalonia abounds, leaving all the towns and level country in possession of the French. In the north again, Astorga, after a gallant resistance, was compelled to capitulate; and the French were understood to be in full preparation for a fresh invasion of Portugal. To render this the more decisive, reinforcements were poured in from Bayonne in great numbers; and Marshal Massena was stated to be on his way from the Danube, for the purpose of taking upon himself the chief command of the troops by which the conquest of the Peninsula was to be effected. Towards the close of 1809, therefore, and in the beginning of 1810, Spain, regarded in a military point of view, was almost entirely reduced. Her fortresses were, with few exceptions, in the enemy's hands; her cities, open towns and villages, had almost all submitted; there was no army in existence to which the patriots could look; and Joseph was once more established, with perfect authority, in the capital. But that which, at the present juncture, gave to the general aspect of affairs its darkest

hue, was the submission of Austria, and the consequent deliverance of Napoleon from all apprehension in the north of Europe. The battle of Wagram, in deciding the fate of Germany, was supposed by most men to have decided the fate of the Peninsula likewise; for no one could doubt that all the strength of the empire would now be directed to the attainment of one object, namely, the expulsion of the English from the continent, and the consequent subjugation of Spain and Portugal.

Affairs were in this state, when Lord Wellington, alarmed for the safety of Lisbon, threatened as it was in the only quarter from whence danger might be seriously apprehended, determined upon abandoning his position on the Guadiana, and taking up another, which might enable him to watch the progress of any force that might sit down before Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. With this view, the troops were put in motion on the 15th of December, and after a march which, with occasional halts, occupied twenty-one days, established themselves on a new line, which, in a somewhat extended and not wholly connected manner, covered the frontier between the two rivers, the Tagus and the Douro. The advance, under General Crawford, consisting of the first battalions 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments, the 1st and 2nd regiments of Portuguese caçadores, detachments

from the 15th and 16th light dragoons, the 1st hussars King's German Legion, and one brigade of horse artillery, took post in front of Almeida, and sent patrols as far as Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst General Hill, with one division, remained on the south of the Tagus, to watch the motions of any French force which might be disposed to act against Badajoz, and threaten Lisbon through the Alentejo. Head-quarters were fixed first at Vizeu, from whence they were afterwards removed to Celerico; the cavalry, with the exception of those already specified, and a few squadrons necessary for relieving the outposts, found cantonments at Abrantes, Santarem, Thomar, &c.; and the park of artillery was established at Vizeu. With respect to the Portuguese troops, they had their head-quarters at Thomar; and they were stationed partly in that town, and partly in the villages near, as convenience or necessity pointed out.

The first good effect resulting from this change of situation showed itself in the rapid recovery of the sick, and the no less rapid restoration to full strength of such as were already convalescent. The country into which the troops were now moved, is as salubrious as any in the Peninsula; and as they contrived, for the most part, to obtain comfortable quarters, neither the cold of winter, nor the variable temperature of the spring, were felt by them. Provisions, likewise, proved abun-

dant ; and forage, if not so plentiful as could have been desired, was at least less scanty than it had been, either at Jaraicejo or Badajoz. On all these accounts, both Lord Wellington and his followers had ample reason to congratulate themselves on the movement which had been made ; whilst the condition both of the French and Spanish armies—the former too formidable to be attacked with any prospect of success—the latter dispersed and broken, if not absolutely annihilated—left no ground to regret the state of temporary inactivity to which they were compelled to submit.

I have said that, whilst Lord Wellington, with the main body of his army, took post between the Douro and the Tagus, General Hill was left on the southern side of the latter river, to keep open a communication with Badajoz, and to watch the movements of the enemy on the side of Alentejo. This latter arrangement was the more necessary, as Mortier and Regnier, at the head of nineteen or twenty thousand men, threatened the southern frontier from Merida ; and though Romana was in Badajoz, and Elvas was understood to be held by a respectable garrison, it would have been unreasonable to expect that either the one or the other could arrest the progress of the enemy, should they see fit to advance by this road upon Lisbon. General Hill's main position was at Abrantes, and it was of a nature to render him perfectly secure,

as long as the waters of the Tagus should continue full; but he stationed himself usually at Portalegre, and he even marched, from time to time, forward to Campo Major, as often as Romana saw, or fancied that he saw, reason to believe that he was about to be attacked in force. There was, in this manner, a good deal of inexplicable, and, as it appeared, profitless manœuvring between the French and English corps. Mortier, whenever the humour took him, would advance, as if with the design of investing Badajoz; certain, that by so doing, he would draw Hill from his quarters; whilst Hill no sooner showed himself, than Mortier would again retire, and take up his former positions.

In the mean while, though both Lord Wellington and the French generals might have appeared to an ordinary observer to be passing the first months of the year in a state of inaction, neither the one nor the other suffered a single day to escape without turning it to some account, and causing it to exert a greater or less degree of influence over the final issues of the campaign. Lord Wellington, contented to keep the enemy as long as possible in check, was devoting a large share of his attention to the fortification and proper armament of the lines at Torres Vedras; whilst the greatest exertions were made both by him and Beresford, to put the regular army and

the militia of Portugal into a state of efficiency. Reinforcements accordingly came in to him every hour, respectable, not from their numbers alone, but from their discipline, till he saw himself at last at the head of twenty-seven thousand British, and full thirty-one thousand Portuguese, troops of the line. The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much reliance was placed for baffling and retarding the advance of the French army, let it begin when it might, was put in a state of excellent defence. The old walls were repaired, and fresh outworks added to it; and a garrison of five thousand men being thrown in, with ample stores of every description, and a British officer, Brigadier-general Cox, at their head, no doubt was entertained that it would make a very obstinate resistance. That Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of time, no one in the present stage of affairs ventured to hope. The Spaniards were, indeed, full of protestations; they spoke of burying themselves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling the glory of Saragoza and Gerona; but as yet they were not invested; and to boast of what they would do, doing in the end nothing, was no uncommon practice among our allies. Still we might, in the present instance, be deceived; they might, by some accident or another, fulfil their promises; and if so, we had but little cause to

fear for our own safety, or that of the Portuguese capital, for some time to come.

The army remained in this situation till the summer of 1810 was far advanced, holding completely in command the main approaches through Beira, and carefully watching the others. It occupied all this while the position of Guarda, of which Lord Galway has spoken as presenting the only defensible line between Lisbon and the frontier; and though Lord Galway lived in an age when the military science had not arrived at the perfection which it has since attained, he cannot be said greatly to have overrated the excellence of that line. We were now distributed over the ridges, and along the descent of the Sierra de Estrella; a range of rugged mountains, which extend from Coimbra to Guarda, and end at last in the extensive plains of Castile. By this means we cut off all approach by the two great roads which run to the north and south of the Sierra, and which alone are passable to an army which moves with its materiel of stores and guns. Our advanced posts, as has already been stated, were pushed beyond Almeida, and covered by the rivers Aquida and Coa; both of which are in winter formidable from their depth of water and rapidity of current, and in summer, not easy of passage, in consequence of the acclivity and ruggedness of their banks. Our right, in the mean while, was protected by the Tagus,

watched and rendered impassable by the presence of Hill's corps at Abrantes ; whilst our left could be threatened only from the side of Oporto, where we had no reason to apprehend that the enemy meditated any inroad. Thus were we justified in considering ourselves secure, as long as the Tagus should continue unfordable ; and as this chanced to be the case up to a period quite unprecedented, we held our ground even beyond the season, when we might have fairly anticipated either a voluntary advance, or a compulsory retreat.

In the mean while there were collected, so early as the month of May, in our front, no fewer than three corps d'armée ; one, under Ney, composed of three divisions, one under Kellerman, of two divisions, and one, containing a like number of divisions, under Junot. Besides these, General Montiniere was understood to be in Valladolid with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of cavalry ; and last, though not least, Massena arrived, and took upon himself the command of the whole. If the several divisions be estimated at ten thousand each—and no accounts which we received rated them at less—then would the total of the force immediately opposed to us amount to full seventy-nine or eighty thousand men. To this we could oppose no more than twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand British, and about thirty thousand Portuguese troops ; and the latter being,

for the most part, as yet untried, an absolute confidence could not be reposed in them. Yet, in spite of odds so tremendous, the best spirits and the highest hopes pervaded all ranks. The number of our sick had diminished from nine to less than two thousand, and we were daily and hourly increasing in efficiency. A few skirmishes, moreover, at the outposts, in most of which our people were eminently successful, tended to keep alive that confidence in themselves and in their leaders, which is so essential to the welfare of an army; and it was no matter of trifling congratulation to find that our Portuguese allies, in all such affairs, behaved with a gallantry not inferior to that exhibited by our own troops. There were, indeed, many persons in the army, who saw something of risk in our advanced situation. It was not to be supposed that Lord Wellington, with a force so inferior, would attempt any offensive operations, or that he would even risk a battle, in case he should himself be attacked; why then, it was asked, remain in the immediate presence of an enemy, before whom, whenever he moved, we must of necessity fall back? It is needless to answer this or any other of the numerous questions which about that time began to make the round of the cantonments. Lord Wellington was not afraid to manœuvre even the Portuguese troops, though the enemy might hang upon their rear; he saw

no necessity for falling back upon Coimbra, till the measure should become indispensable ; he was *desirous of protracting the war as long as possible* upon the frontier, and therefore he remained where he was. That he had not judged erroneously, future events sufficiently proved ; it would therefore serve no good end to enter here into any elaborate defence of a policy which requires none.

During the early months of spring, though the enemy were in considerable force in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, they made no serious attempt to besiege the place. Occasionally, indeed, they did here what Mortier was in the habit of doing at Badajoz ; that is to say, they put themselves in motion, from time to time, as if with a view to commence operations ; but our advanced corps was no sooner reported to be in march, than they again retired. It was at such times, and under such circumstances, that parties found an occasional opportunity of exchanging a few shots with the enemy ; and that the caçadores were enabled to satisfy their comrades in the British ranks, that when the hour of the grand push came, they would not be deserted.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Low state of the finances of the British army, and apprehensions entertained by many respecting the issue of the war—Massena opens the campaign by investing Ciudad Rodrigo—Skirmishes at the outposts, and retreat of the light division on Almeida—Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which surrenders—Affair of cavalry in front of the British outposts—Rumours of the enemy's intended operations, and dispositions to meet him.

WHILST these things were going on, events daily occurred, some of them calculated to excite our spirits, and increase our hopes of ultimate success; others, as might be expected, having a tendency widely the reverse. Among the agreeable incidents just referred to, may be noticed the arrival at head-quarters of Lieutenant-general Sir Brent Spencer, an officer to whose merits every one bore testimony. In addition to this, assurances poured in upon us, that large reinforcements, both from Sicily and North America, were on their way; whilst numerous desertions from the French

army served to convince us that the enemy's troops, in spite of the proclamations and professions of the generals, were far from finding themselves comfortable in their present situation. From the month of January to the month of May, 1810, there came in nearly 500 men, all of them fully armed, and not a few bringing along with them their horses and appointments; and as they were principally Germans and Italians, the circumstance led to a persuasion, that the foreigners in the French service were beginning to grow tired, either of the particular war in which they were engaged, or of French supremacy in the abstract. It is true that we could not boast of the total absence of this military vice from among the mercenaries who took rank under our own standards. A German dragoon would, from time to time, pass over from us as well as from the enemy; but the loss which we sustained by desertion was trifling indeed, and came not up, by one hundredth part, to that endured by the enemy. Among the sources of uneasiness, again, to which we were subject, none affected us more seriously than the low state of our finances, and the difficulty which we felt in recruiting them. The army was universally in arrear for subsistence; many regiments had received nothing during several months; and at one period there were but a few thousand dollars in the military chest. Now,

in a country where nothing was, or could be taken, without being paid for, and where the people, accustomed to look with suspicion upon the paper-money issued by their own government, scrupled greatly in receiving our bills and promissory-notes, the absence of bullion was felt as an evil which hardly any ingenuity or attention could ameliorate. Our expenditure amounted on an average to 30,000*l.* monthly, and we drew daily rations for forty thousand men and twelve thousand animals; yet at no time were we able to collect in our own neighbourhood more than 150,000*l.*; and the remainder was consequently brought, at a heavy loss and with immense labour, from Cadiz and Gibraltar. But when the funds of these places were at length declared to be exhausted, as towards the middle of May proved to be the case, our prospects became melancholy. By great exertions, however, on the part of Lord Wellington, the credit of the army was so far preserved, that it never suffered from an absolute deficiency in articles essential to its existence; but individuals underwent numerous privations, and it was at one moment apprehended that, unless large supplies of gold and silver should speedily arrive from England, our movements might be cramped at a moment when, above all others since the commencement of hostilities, it was of consequence that they should be free and unfettered.

The reader, after this dénouement, will not be surprised to learn that, although the very best spirit prevailed, in general, throughout our ranks, speculations, not of the most cheering or consolatory nature, were at this period entered into here and there, as to the ultimate destiny which awaited us. It is part of the English character to look, under all circumstances, at events in the darkest colours of which they are susceptible; and the national disposition was not slow in being brought into play on the present occasion. By many it was esteemed a project utterly hopeless to attempt keeping possession of Portugal for any length of time after the enemy should have fairly entered upon his course of operations for its subjugation. Men accordingly began to inquire respecting the tonnage and capacity of the fleet, whether it were capable of removing, when the moment of retreat should arrive, the troops and stores now in the Peninsula; and a question was even raised, whether an effort would not be made to withdraw, not our own soldiers only, but the Portuguese army likewise. By such as started these questions, it was satisfactorily ascertained that, exclusively of four ships of the line and twenty-three frigates, there lay at anchor in the Tagus, transports possessed of ample stowage for forty thousand men. This, it was concluded, would suffice for the removal of the whole of the British army, with

its women and followers; and it was sagaciously enough surmised that the vessels of war would not be permitted to sail, occupied by their own crews only; but that they would be given up, as far as might be practicable, to the accommodation of our faithful allies.

Whilst some were thus amusing themselves, in speculating about events which were not destined ever to receive their accomplishment, the enemy was vigorously collecting their means, and preparing to open the campaign with a force which might bear down all opposition on the part of Lord Wellington and his army. Massena, who had paid a short visit to Salamanca, returned again to Valladolid, for the purpose of hurrying forward to the frontier every battalion and company which could be spared from the internal management of the country. Columns were accordingly reported to be on the advance, both from the Asturias and Galicia, whilst the Estremadura corps, strengthened by a fresh division of five thousand men from before Cadiz, was stated to be approaching Badajoz in force. As yet, however, the only direct indications of active operations being at hand, were found in the frequent movement of cavalry patrols along our front, and their daily attempts to discover some fords by which the rivers might be crossed. With these, when they became too daring in their approaches, our outposts would from

time to time skirmish ; but nothing was done upon a great scale, nor had we any good ground to surmise upon what plan, after his arrangements should be complete, Massena intended to act. That he would hazard all upon a direct attack in front, the nature of our own position, as well as the opinion which we entertained of his military skill and talents, forbade us to believe ; it was rather to be expected that he would support his movement in this direction, by corresponding movements upon our flanks ; but of any dispositions so to do which he might be making, we were ignorant. The truth is, that in spite of all secret intelligence, and the expense incurred in securing it, our information was still far from being accurate. This arose, not from any want of energy on our parts, but from the natural disposition of the Spaniards, who never dream of hazarding conjectures, or entering upon speculations, beyond the occurrences of the day. When a French force was actually in motion, or rather when it had already arrived within a short distance of its point of destination, we seldom failed to hear of it ; but the mere assembling of troops in the interior, they rarely took the trouble to report ; and hence we were not unfrequently left to guess at the enemy's probable intentions, from considering how we ourselves would act, in case their and our situations were reversed.

In the mean time, a few changes took place in

the disposition and management of portions of our troops; that is to say, Lieutenant-general Payne, to whom the cavalry had hitherto been intrusted, returned home, and Lieutenant-general Cotton succeeded to the command. The first division of infantry likewise, which had previously acted under the orders of General Cotton, was transferred to General Spencer; but the position of the army continued unaltered up to a late date in the summer; nor was it till the month of May had been considerably advanced, that the enemy showed any disposition to molest it.

His arrangements being at length complete, Massena prepared, at the head of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, to invest the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. For this purpose he pushed on several strong divisions, which, driving in our patrols and flying posts, established two bridges across the Agueda, and took possession of some commanding heights that lay between our position and the town. It was not without the deepest reluctance that Lord Wellington came to the conclusion, that any attempt on his part to interrupt the progress of the siege, could be productive of no good. In point of numbers alone, the enemy surpassed us by at least one-third; and their troops were all admirably disciplined, ably commanded, and inured to war. Of our force, on the other hand, the larger proportion were new

levies, which looked well, no doubt, upon parade, but which never having as yet come under fire, could not be expected to behave like veterans. Besides, were the enemy to suffer a defeat, though he would doubtless be compelled to abandon his designs for the present, his retreat was perfectly secure; and there were ample resources at hand from which to fill up the gaps which the fortune of a battle might have produced in his ranks. The case was widely different with respect to us. Were we defeated, our ruin was irretrievable; and were we even to succeed, the success could not be purchased except at an expense of life, which must cripple our means during the remainder of the season, and prove in the end more injurious to ourselves than to the enemy. Under these circumstances it was determined, to the great grief both of our General and his followers, that our attitude of watchfulness must still be preserved; and to render it the more imposing, head-quarters were transferred to the town of Almeida.

No great while elapsed, however, before the inconveniences attending this latter arrangement were found to overbalance any benefit which could arise out of it. By taking post at Almeida, Lord Wellington was doubtless at hand to direct every manœuvre which the advance might be required to make, and to observe with greater facility

the movements and operations of the enemy; but, on the other hand, he was in continual and imminent danger. Should our pickets, by accident, suffer a surprise, and their supports be overthrown, he might, before sufficient warning had been given, find himself shut up within the walls of Almeida, and exposed, along with the fortress itself, to the risk of capture. These were serious considerations; and they induced him, after having spent a few days only in his advanced situation, to withdraw as far as Alverca, six leagues in the rear.

I have said that a corps of French troops, having driven in our patrols and flying posts, threw two bridges over the Agueda, and established itself between Ciudad Rodrigo and the British army. The movement in question was effected early in June, and it completed the investment of the place, which had been begun as far back as the 26th of April. At first, indeed, the several divisions which closed around the city attempted nothing more than an occasional and irregular bombardment; whilst they intermitted from time to time in the strictness of their blockade, as often as the appearance of an advance on our parts led to the belief that we had determined upon raising the siege. Now, however, matters assumed a different aspect. The corps above alluded to consisted of thirty-one thousand men :

it was commanded by Marshal Ney, and taking post upon some high and advantageous ground, appeared determined to cover with effect operations which were conducted both with firmness and science; and as it was supported by full thirty-eight thousand, under the immediate orders of Junot, to whom the prosecution of the siege was more immediately intrusted, it could not but feel itself secure. Nothing, therefore, remained for either party to perform, except to watch, with equal earnestness, the progress of an undertaking in which both were equally interested.

That the reader may the more easily enter into the details which must by and by be laid before him, it may not be amiss if I here make him acquainted—even though, in so doing, I may be compelled to recapitulate a little—with the exact situation in which the allied and French armies at present found themselves.

There were, in the position of Guarda—that is to say, on the right of the Tagus, and on the left of the Douro—four divisions of British infantry, the greater part of the British cavalry, with the mass of the Portuguese troops, horse, and foot, under the immediate orders of Lord Wellington. Headquarters being established at Alverca, the outposts, which were principally supplied from the light division, extended along the Azava; a small stream which, rising among the hills near Alber-

garia, falls into the Agueda, at a little distance from Cesmiro. In rear of the light division, which lay chiefly in and about Gallegos, though considerably to its right and left, were the divisions of General Cole and General Picton, the former of which occupied Guarda, whilst the latter was in cantonments at Pinhel. There were detachments at Sabugal, on the right, and for a time, at St. Felices, on the left; though the latter was soon withdrawn, and the place occupied by a portion of Junot's corps. Guarda, however, and the stupendous heights around it, formed the key of the position from which the retreat lay, either towards the left, and so by Mondego, or to the right, and so by the Zezere, to Marcello, Thomar, Santarem, and ultimately to Torres Vedras.

Whilst the main body retained this situation, General Hill, at the head of the second division, some cavalry, and a corps of Portuguese, making up, in all, about thirteen thousand men, was on the left of the Tagus, employed, as has already been hinted, in guarding the approach to Lisbon by way of Alentejo. His position was more moveable, and necessarily so, than that of Lord Wellington; but the main point to be defended was Abrantes, in case the enemy should make any desperate attempt to pass the river, and threaten our communications. In like manner General Leith, with a corps of ten thousand men,

of whom not more than two thousand were British, was behind the Zezere, ready to support either Hill or Lord Wellington, according as circumstances might require; whilst Romana, with his division of infantry, strengthened by a few squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, kept post at Badajoz, and in the country round.

On the side of the enemy, again, the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, otherwise known by the appellation of the army of Portugal, were occupied, partly in conducting the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and partly in showing a front towards the four British divisions at Almeida, Pinhel, Alverca, and Guarda. On the other side of the Tagus, there were the corps of Regnier and Mortier, formerly estimated at nineteen thousand men, but since increased by a reinforcement of five thousand. The latter division, leaving seventeen thousand men to continue the blockade of Cadiz, had hastened to take part in the subjugation of Portugal; and the whole were now manœuvring, so as to threaten Badajoz, and ultimately to act against Hill. Besides these there was a division, estimated at eight thousand men, which, under General Bonnet, threatened the province of Entre Douro e Minho; whilst detachments were quartered here and there, between the frontier and Burgos, and from Burgos to the Pyrenees, for the purpose of keeping up the communication between Massena and France. On all

these heads our information was full, and as the event proved, tolerably accurate; whilst there were other rumours afloat, which, though some of them rested upon no sure ground, exerted considerable influence over the feelings of the troops, and on the plans of their leader.

We learned about this time, first, that the Matagorda fort before Cadiz had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and that the city itself, crowded with inhabitants, was not expected to hold out for any length of time. This was alarming enough; but it was hardly more alarming to us, situated as we then were, than a second report which came in, that the French, wearied with the resistance already offered, and harassed by sickness brought on by the exhalations from the Isle of Leon, had determined to raise the siege, and bring the whole of their force to bear against Portugal. Next we were assured, upon what appeared to be good authority, that the Emperor Napoleon was in full march towards Spain; that large divisions of his guard had already entered Madrid; and that he himself was expected to arrive there in a few days at the farthest. Then came an assurance, that Souchet's corps likewise, which had been directed upon Valencia, was stopped, and that it was hurrying on to join the army destined for the conquest of Portugal. All the communications at present made were, however, not of a nature so discoura-

ging. To counterbalance these recorded above, we were told that General Ballasteros was on the banks of the Guadalquivir at the head of ten thousand men, and that he was conducting himself with so much spirit and judgment, as seriously to impede the projects of Massena, by compelling him to detach Regnier for the purpose of keeping him in check. In like manner the mountains and forests of Spain were represented as full of guerillas, who cut off every small detachment of French troops that came in their way, plundered the convoys, interrupted the communications, and kept the whole of the enemy's post on the alert. These bands were made up chiefly of Spaniards, into whose hands Joseph saw fit to put arms, and who never failed, as often as a favourable opportunity came in the way, to desert. Then again Castile was said to be in a state of extreme commotion; insurrections breaking out in every quarter, and adventurous bodies of armed peasants destroying the garrisons of all the villages and open towns in the province. So bold, indeed, had the insurgents become, that an aide-de-camp of General Kellerman was fairly carried off from the gates of Valladolid; and no man could consider himself safe in the open country, unless attended by a powerful escort. In a word, Spain, though overrun, was represented as far from being subdued; and it appeared to us that the general who should attempt

to conquer Portugal, leaving a country so decidedly hostile in his rear, must either advance with a force so overwhelming as to carry everything before him, or he must be in danger of having his resources cut off, and of being himself placed in a situation as perilous as that experienced by the troops against whom he was preparing to act.

In the mean while, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was proceeding with a languor which gratified not less than it surprised us. The enemy broke ground before the place on the 11th of June, and on the 25th their batteries opened. Though the means of the assailants were known to be ample, and though little hope of being relieved existed, the resistance offered by the garrison was such, as to place them on a level with the brave defenders of Saragoza and Gerona. They obstinately disputed every inch of ground, making frequent sorties, and attacking the covering and working parties in the trenches; whilst they kept up from the ramparts an unceasing fire, which occasioned a heavy loss both of life and materiel to the besiegers. It was a galling thing to us, that we were compelled to be mere spectators of so much bravery. The sound of their very musketry could be heard within our lines, yet could we not venture to aid them; we could only admire their heroism, as we sincerely did, and lament that no ability rested with us to second it. And it is but fair to

acknowledge that the gallantry of General Her-
vasti and his brave garrison excited our admiration
the more decidedly, as we had looked for no such
exertions at their hands. Of the former we had
been led to think as of a weak old man, who
would rather anticipate the wishes of Massena,
than disregard his summons; whilst from the lat-
ter, more especially when under such a chief, we
expected nothing. Both the one and the other
showed by their conduct that we had done them
injustice; and they gained upon our respect and
esteem, in exact proportion to the unworthy no-
tions which we had been induced to form of
them.

That the reader may affix its true value to the
obstinacy of this defence, it is necessary to inform
him that Ciudad Rodrigo was far from being
either a very regular or a strong fortification. It
was surrounded by a wall, and the wall was made
up, in many parts, not of embankments or ma-
sonry, but of rubbish. An army of not less than
sixty thousand men lay around it, largely pro-
vided with ammunition, stores, battering train,
and intrenching tools; and the works were pushed
on by thousands of men in each relief, all of them
well skilled in the business in which they were
employed. The garrison, on the other hand, was
composed of less than four thousand soldiers; and
the inhabitants, including women and children,

barely amounted to five thousand. The odds were tremendous; but the Spaniards were true to the cause of their country; and even women and children took their turns in the labours of the siege. At last, however, in spite of the most strenuous exertions of the defenders, a practicable breach was made, and the enemy advanced to the assault, in the night between the 30th of June and the 1st of July. They were met on this occasion with the same devoted bravery which had so often foiled them in the trenches. Blue-lights, hand-grenades, and missiles of every description, were showered down upon them when covering the glacis, and crowding the ditch; and they were finally repulsed with a loss more heavy than many general actions might have occasioned. But the enemy were not to be foiled. They renewed their attack, causing science and skill to perform the work which bare bravery had failed in effecting; and it soon became apparent that not all the gallantry of Hervasti and his troops would be able to continue the defence of the place many days.

The British army, all this while, was resting in its position, and watching, with deep anxiety and bitter regret, the gradual but sure destruction of the city and its defenders. It happened, however, that in proportion as the siege drew towards a conclusion, the enemy became every day more and more pressing; and encounters at the out-

posts were events of constant recurrence. Of these the greater number produced no other effect, than merely to enable a few individuals on both sides to display their gallantry; but some were more important in their consequence; and it may not be amiss if I make the reader acquainted with the circumstances which attended one of them.

On the 3rd of July, General Crawford reviewed his division; and for the purpose, no doubt, of impressing the enemy with serious notions of its strength, he caused the regiments to be formed and drawn up in rank entire. The spectacle was not lost upon the French Marshal, who, with the view of ascertaining exactly the amount of our force between the Agueda and the Coa, and perhaps to convince the besieged that they had nothing to expect from us, ordered a recognisance to be made. It took place on the following day, and it brought on an affair which, under all circumstances, possibly, might have been as well avoided.

At an early hour on the morning of the 4th, the enemy were seen to be in motion, with five regiments of cavalry, some battalions of infantry, and several guns. They passed the Azava at sun-rise, and their cavalry, driving in our advanced videttes, came on with great rapidity, three regiments on the direct road from Gallegos to Almeida, and two by a path to the left, with the

view of turning our right flank. There were two pieces of cannon, of the horse-artillery, stationed at a small brook, about half a mile to the rear of Gallegos. These instantly opened upon the French column; but though the fire was well directed, and evidently galled them, it did not succeed in stopping them. Our cavalry, in the mean while, formed in rear of the guns, sending out three or four squadrons, with the hussars, to skirmish; and rather a sharp contest took place near a bridge which crossed the brook. The French made a dash to secure it, and passed some officers, with about thirty or forty men, to the other side; in accomplishing which, however, as the bridge was extremely narrow, they were compelled to defile from column. An opportunity was thus afforded of attacking them to advantage, which was not permitted to escape. Captain Crackenbourg, of the German hussars, an officer of gallantry and high character, saw in a moment the predicament into which they had thrust themselves. He instantly drew out two divisions of the hussars, and charging the body which had passed the bridge, cut down their officer, and drove the rest, with the loss of several killed and wounded, back upon the column. The affair was accomplished in an instant, but the promptitude and vigour which characterised its execution, both merited and received the approbation of all present. The brave men

were saluted by the cheers of their comrades as they returned, and the officer's name was justly and honourably mentioned at head-quarters.

Notwithstanding this momentary success, the enemy's force, especially in cavalry, was too great to be successfully resisted, and the light division retired. It was with some difficulty, indeed, that the troops contrived to carry off the guns; for the French, having discovered other parts by which the brook could be crossed, pressed upon them in overwhelming numbers; but both artillery and cavalry fell back in good order; and being supported by the infantry, whose fire from among the rocks and woods told heavily, they suffered but little. By this movement, however, Gallegos, Almeida, and the ground occupied on the preceding day, were given up; and a new position was assumed immediately in front of the town of Almeida, and in rear of Fort Conception.

From this date up to the 1st, no event occurred of any moment. The fire from the fortress having destroyed some of the enemy's magazines, they were compelled to intermit the siege till fresh supplies could be brought up; and the garrison were not slow in turning the breathing space to good account, by repairing, as fast as their means would allow, the injuries sustained by their walls. All this was prodigiously in our favour. Could the opening of the campaign be delayed till autumn

was drawing to a close, little doubt could exist that it would produce no results capable of seriously affecting our tenure of the country; for then the fields would all be bare, the roads would become impassable, and everything would be against the invader, as it would be advantageous to the invaded. It was to delay, indeed, that we mainly looked for our best prospects of success; and should Almeida hold out as Ciudad Rodrigo had done, our fondest wishes would be accomplished. Then might we retire with perfect confidence, either to Ponte de Marcella, or by a different route to the intrenched position at Torres Vedras; and from either of these strong-holds we might look down in perfect security upon the French troops perishing in our front. How different might have been the fate of the war, had Massena succeeded in commencing vigorous operations, whilst yet the entire summer was before him!

In that case, though we might have repelled, even with the lines as yet imperfect, any direct attempt to drive us back upon Lisbon, or into the sea, our means of holding the country would have been at least not greater than they afterwards became; whilst the subsistence to be procured by the enemy being abundant, the issue of the struggle must, to say the least of it, have been doubtful. But now there was not an individual in the army who appeared not to feel, that, let the

enemy be delayed only one month longer, and the chances were all in our favour ; for Lord Wellington had taken the wisest and most prompt precautions to render the sojourn of the French in Portugal more injurious to them than a sanguinary engagement. It is well known that the French armies moved unattended by convoys, and unprovided with stores of forage or provisions. They depended, in all cases, upon the resources of the country through which they passed ; and when these became exhausted, they could no longer keep the field. Lord Wellington had issued strict injunctions to the inhabitants to withdraw, with all their effects, as soon as his troops should begin to march upon their positions in the rear ; and could the peasantry but succeed in carrying along with them the corn now growing in the fields, the case of the enemy would be desperate.

Before matters came to this, however, many chances were yet to be run ; and these proved, in more than one instance, less favourable than we had cause to expect. Ciudad Rodrigo, indeed, did its duty nobly. It held out a full month against open trenches ; and its governor capitulated only when it would have been an act of insanity to resist any longer. But the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo came not unaccompanied by other evils, nor was it the most severe calamity which befell us at this time.

The enemy having supplied the ammunition, which had been expended, resumed their efforts against the place; and on the 10th of July, a second and more formidable breach was effected. The columns of attack were already formed—they had even taken their stations in the trenches, and were waiting for the word to advance, when General Hervasti, seeing that all hope of relief was at an end, hung out a white flag, and proposed a capitulation. It is said that Ney, by whom the force actually employed in the siege was commanded, refused to grant any other terms than those of unconditional surrender; but that Mas-sena, more generous, or more politic, consented that the troops should march out with the honours of war, and that the officers should retain their swords and baggage. Be this as it may, the place surrendered, and one obstacle to the advance of the French army into Portugal was removed.

On the morning after Ciudad Rodrigo fell, an affair took place between a portion of our light division and a party of the enemy, which gave rise, at the time, to a good deal of speculation. The enemy's patrols were in the daily habit of visiting the several villages and hamlets in our front, and of committing in them acts of barbarity and grievous plunder. General Crawford determined, if possible, to put a stop to this; and he made arrangements, on the night of the 10th, for cutting

off the next party which should show itself near his pickets. With this view he took with him six squadrons of cavalry, amounting to upwards of six hundred men ; and set off, soon after midnight, in the direction by which he expected that they would advance. General Crawford's object was to arrive before daylight with a portion of his cavalry in their rear, and to attack them in front with the main body, which should be drawn up for the purpose. Unfortunately for the success of his enterprise, he lost his way, and instead of pushing sufficiently to the left, fell in with the French patrol at a moment when he was least prepared to take advantage of the meeting. The enemy's force did not exceed thirty cavalry and two hundred infantry ; but they were advantageously posted in an open space, just beyond a narrow defile ; and to reach them it was necessary to thread that defile in a long line. The consequence was, that though the hussars, who led, formed up in succession as they got through, and charged their opponents with great gallantry, they effected nothing more than the dispersion of the handful of horse ; for the infantry had time to form a square, and not all the efforts of our people succeeded in breaking it. The hussars rode bravely up to the bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely thrown in, which killed or wounded upwards of a dozen men. The remainder wheeled off, and pur-

suings the French cavalry, made way for a squadron of the 16th. These galloped forward, but also took to the left, and leaving the infantry uninjured, joined in pursuit of the cavalry. When the last charge was made, the French square were without fire, every man having discharged his piece, and none having been able to load again; but when a third attempt was made, they were better prepared to receive it. It fell to the lot of Colonel Talbot of the 14th to lead this attack. It was made with daring intrepidity; but the enemy remained perfectly steady, and reserving their fire till the bridles of the horses touched their bayonets, gave it with such effect, that Colonel Talbot and several of his men were killed on the spot. The rest drew off, upon which General Crawford, despairing of success by the exertions of cavalry alone, despatched an orderly to bring up a detachment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no great distance.

Whilst this was doing, the enemy's little column began its retreat, which it conducted with singular steadiness and great order. The 14th dragoons seeing this, prepared to launch another squadron against it; and it was already in speed for the purpose, when Colonel Arenschild, of the hussars, observed cavalry advancing both in front and flank, and checked the movement. It was much to be regretted afterwards that he took this step, for the

horse which alarmed him, proved to be detachments from our own people, on their return from pursuing the enemy's dragoons, the whole of whom they had captured. The French infantry lost no time in availing themselves of the indecision of our cavalry. They marched on, and returned to their main body, without having lost a single prisoner, or suffered in killed or wounded.

It is probably needless to add, that when intelligence of this affair reached head-quarters, a feeling of extreme vexation pervaded the bosoms of all to whom it was communicated. That six hundred British dragoons should have been baffled by two hundred French infantry, was a circumstance for which no one appeared able to account. But the chagrin arising out of this little defeat, though abundantly palpable at the moment, soon ceased to exert an influence over us. Events of much greater moment were at hand; and rumours poured in, one after another, each calculated to engross our deepest attention, and to excite our liveliest interest.

The fate of Ciudad Rodrigo was hardly authenticated, when we heard that Regnier had been ordered to cross the Tagus, and that he was in full march to form a junction with Massena, by way of Almaraz and D'Alameta. General Hill immediately adopted a policy correspondent with that of the enemy, by moving upon Villa Velha. These

manœuvres, it is scarcely necessary to add, led to conjectures amongst us, as to the course which the enemy proposed to pursue, as soon as he should be freed from his remaining difficulties by the capture of Almeida. My humble opinion led me to believe that Massena would divide his army into three or four columns; and that with the first and strongest he would march direct upon Guarda, from whence he could push by Cavilhao and Sevola, for Pampelhoza. In the mean while, it was probable that the second column would penetrate by Belmonte to Turdao, and along the military road to Cardejes and Abrantes; for though orders had been issued to render it impassable, it was far from being certain that they had been properly obeyed. By the march of these two columns, the strong country about Castello Branco would be avoided, and the still stronger defences of the Zezere turned; whilst a communication would be immediately opened with Regnier, and a junction formed at Thomar. The third column, again, would, in all probability, push direct upon Castello Branco and Abrantes; whilst the fourth, if a fourth were employed, might be expected to follow us, in the event of our retiring by the Ponte de Marcella road, communicating all the while with the troops directed upon Pampelhoza, and uniting with the rest at Thomar. Were this plan adopted, it appeared to me that

we should be driven back as far as Villa Franca and Torres Vedras; for there were no impediments in the way to check the enemy, and as we had such a position in our rear, it would not be judicious to risk an action on any other ground, from which, even if we should be successful in it, no permanent advantage could be expected.


I have said that, in case the enemy should determine to advance in the order above specified, there was but slender probability of our being able to arrest their progress, or offer to them any steady front, till we should have taken up the fortified line at Torres Vedras. Of that line, and of the state of defensibility in which it now stood, it may be necessary to take a little notice.

The position of Torres Vedras forms the gorge, or neck of a peninsula, at the extremity of which the city of Lisbon is placed. It measures in extent, from the mouth of the Zezandra on the sea to Alhandra on the Tagus, about twenty-five English miles; and it embraces in its profile every species of ground calculated to assist the operations of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Along this line were erected, at convenient distances, no fewer than one hundred and eight redoubts, differing in dimensions according to the extent of the ground allotted for them, and the purposes which they were severally intended to serve; and the whole were armed with a train of four hundred and

twenty pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre. To protect these redoubts, and to give to their occupants ample space for offensive as well as defensive operations, mountains were perpendicularly scarp'd, rivers were dammed up, and inundations formed; whilst of the roads which once crossed the isthmus, many were cut up and destroyed; and many more, adapted to the movements of troops, were made. The truth is, that art, in the present instance, only filled up the outlines, which nature had already drawn, of a battle field, as formidable as ever was occupied by troops. But the strongest positions must always have their weak points; and even the lines of Torres Vedras, though approaching as nearly to the impregnable as it is possible for lines to do, were not without their assailable corners. In some places the redoubts were unavoidably placed at intervals from one another so considerable, that should there not be powerful reserves at hand, and moveable columns to block up the chasms, the enemy might, without loss or difficulty, penetrate between them. This was peculiarly the case on the flanks, in the space between Mafra and the sea on the one hand, and between Torres Vedras and the Tagus on the other; and as ill luck would have it, these very spaces were, above all others, the most favourable to the operations of an attacking force. The front of the centre was completely

covered by Monte Junto, which, extending its ramifications to the very works, would necessarily render the enemy's movements in that direction both tedious and difficult; but the two flanks were without such shelter, and must therefore depend much upon the valour of those who occupied them. Of that, however, no doubt could be entertained; and hence we felt that, in falling back thither, we were withdrawing to a stupendous fortification, which nothing but a regular siege, of which the duration was incalculable, could possibly reduce. The sole risk, indeed, which we ran, was from want of supplies. Were the French themselves amply provisioned, and were the Alentejo to be occupied, as it was probable that it would, by Mortier's corps from Valencia, then indeed an army of 60,000 men, thrown back upon a city containing at least 250,000 inhabitants, could not, it was to be apprehended, hold out many months; but on these heads we saw no reason to be apprehensive. The enemy, we were well aware, carried few supplies with him. We had either taken care already, or were busily exerting ourselves, to hinder any from being provided by the country into which he was about to enter; and above all, the sea was open to us. Though, therefore, there was something not flattering in the idea of retreating to the most remote corner of the Peninsula, we prepared to retire thither with the feeling that it

was “ reculer pour mieux sauter ;” and we already looked forward with confidence to the moment which should enable us once more to resume the offensive.



CHAPTER XIX.

Preparations proceed, and plans are formed—The light division attacked at Almeida, and falls back towards Alverca—General movement of the British army towards the rear—Indecision of Massena—Difficulties against which Lord Wellington is called upon to struggle—Almeida besieged and taken—The garrison enter the French service—The enemy advance, and the British army retires towards Busaco.

THE intervening period between the 11th and 18th of July, 1810, was spent chiefly in receiving reports touching the further movements of the army, and in making such dispositions as the turn which affairs were threatening to take appeared to demand. We learned at this time that the rumour already mentioned, as to the march of Regnier's corps, for the purpose of forming a junction with Massena, and acting in connexion with him, was correct. Regnier had arrived at Coria and Moraliga, and had unavoidably opened

a communication with the General-in-chief, by Abego and the pass of Perales. To render it the more secure, Massena turned to his left, whilst at the same time he threw a corps to his right, which, under Junot, established itself at San Felice. Regnier's movement naturally drew our attention chiefly to that quarter, and General Hill was, in consequence, ordered from Villa Velha to Castello Branco, where he arrived on the 20th. But this was not the only effect which it produced. It led us into further surmises respecting the enemy's future plans; and it induced us to make such arrangements, as promised most effectually to baffle him, should they be carried into effect.

From the system which he had lately adopted in distributing his force, it appeared that Massena was about to attempt one of two momentous undertakings. He would either strengthen Regnier so much as to render him superior to Hill, with the view of moving him immediately upon Castello Branco, and so forcing round our right; or he was manœuvring to join him, by the pass of Perales, to his own troops, and then, with very superior numbers, to attack us on the Coa. There was little ground for doubt as to which of these arrangements would prove most advantageous to us. In case he should adopt the former plan, there was a risk of Hill being disabled, in which case our situation in the position of Guarda would

become extremely precarious ; whilst in the event of any disaster befalling us here, Hill must retreat upon the Zezere, and we follow, with all the speed of which we were capable. Were he, on the other hand, to collect his whole force in our front, Hill might be brought up to our line in three or four marches, and other benefits might arise out of a battle on the Coa, such as would not probably attend a similar operation at a point nearer to the capital. In the first place, the enemy must approach to the attack across the rivers in our front, of which the banks were extremely rugged, and in some places quite inaccessible ; so that, if he failed, his annihilation was almost unavoidable. In the next place, it was probable that the Portuguese troops would fight with greater spirit on the frontier, than after they had retired a considerable way through the country. In their present situation, they felt that they were posted to protect their wives, their families, their homes, and their possessions ;—carry them further to the rear, and they would see that all these were already compromised. Whilst in the last place, it was not going too far to believe that an action fought upon the Coa would be entered upon, even by British soldiers, with greater spirit and livelier zeal, than one forced upon them when arrived within view of their shipping. All these considerations combined to produce a hope that Massena would

choose the bolder and more perilous course of assaulting us in our position above the Coa. But to counterbalance this, there was the knowledge which we possessed, of the great sagacity and experience of the officer opposed to us; who had been taught, moreover, in more instances than one, that it was not by open force that he could ever hope to overthrow a British army of not very inferior numbers. The probability, therefore, was, that he would not hazard the attack in question; but that moving round us, and accumulating forces upon us in all directions, he would endeavour to wear us out by constant watchfulness, and so make a prey of us at last, with little hazard to himself. Nor was it a thing impossible, that he would, by a false attack upon our front, endeavour to draw off Hill from the defence of Castello Branco, whilst he moved, at the same time, strong columns by his rear, and threw himself between us and our line of retreat. These several schemes were all, to a certain degree, feasible; and all, therefore, required attention. But we were headed by one who was not behind Massena either in clearness of foresight, or multiplicity of resources; and we well knew that he would direct no movement which the circumstances of the case might not demand.

I have said that the light division under General Crawford, to which the care of furnishing

the pickets was assigned, fell back, after the affair of the 4th, to a new position between Almeida and Fort Conception, where it fixed its headquarters, and established the mass of its infantry at a little village called Valdelamula. Our people remained here in quiet for some days, the enemy making no demonstrations of a move; but, on the morning of the 16th, the infantry were still further withdrawn, and took shelter under the guns of Almeida. It is worthy of remark that Lord Wellington had positively prohibited all fighting on points further in advance than the Coa. His orders to General Crawford, which, that they might not be misunderstood, had been twice distinctly repeated, were, that he should by every possible means avoid an action; and that as soon as he became aware of the approach of an enemy, he should retire, with ample space between, to the opposite bank of the river. Crawford, however, conceived that the French would respect the fortress of Almeida, that they would not push him very rapidly, and hence that he would be able to make a regular retreat at any moment. He accordingly made up his mind not to retire on the first intelligence of a movement, but to wait the arrival of the French columns, and then to fall back, slowly, orderly, and with some resistance, in their presence. No great while elapsed ere

the prudence of his determination was put to the test.

On the 21st, the enemy put themselves in motion, and entered, without opposition, Valdelamula, St. Pedro, and Villa Formosa; upon which the garrison was withdrawn from Fort Conception, and the fort itself blown up. Another pause of three days now ensued, after which a force composed of twenty-five squadrons of cavalry, ten thousand infantry, and a correspondent train of artillery, pushed forward in the direction of Almeida. General Crawford was advertised of this movement at an early hour on the morning of the 24th. The resolution which he had formed, however, of holding as long as it should be defensible, his present position, remained unshaken, and instead of retiring, he drew up his division in line, resting his left upon Almeida, and having his right, as well as his rear, covered by the Coa. Here he prepared to give battle; and here, before many hours elapsed, he was attacked in force.

There were three British pickets, two of infantry and one of cavalry, about half-way between Villamula and Almeida. The sun had not yet risen on the 24th, when they found themselves assailed by the enemy's skirmishers, which in whole swarms covered the advance of the columns of cavalry and infantry. Our people retired, but they retired

slowly and in good order, disputing every inch of ground ; and both suffering themselves, and causing their assailants to suffer, no inconsiderable loss. The skirmish was the more interesting, as it is impossible to conceive any piece of ground better adapted for a rencontre of the kind,—an extensive plain, intersected continually by hedges, stone walls, and enclosures, stretching all the way from Villamula to the Coa ; and it was through this that our soldiers fell back, retaining with obstinacy each successive fence, till the superior numbers of the enemy compelled them to abandon it. During the continuance of this skirmish, the French cavalry made more than one attempt to cut off portions of the British infantry, and they were not always unsuccessful. A division of hussars dashing forward into a part of the plain more open than the rest, threw themselves between the intervals in a company of the 52nd, and in spite of a heavy fire with which they were saluted, succeeded in making prisoners of an officer and about fourteen men.

The skirmishers being now driven in, the French prepared to follow up their successes, by vigorously assaulting Crawford's position. They bore down, with a dense column, upon his centre, where the 95th, with two Portuguese regiments, were posted ; and in spite of a desperate resistance, particularly from the 95th, and one of the foreign

battalions, pierced it. By this time our cavalry had withdrawn to the opposite side of the Coa, and our infantry being in some disorder, affairs assumed rather an unpromising aspect; Crawford, accordingly, determined upon a retreat; but it was undertaken under trying and ticklish circumstances; and it was not executed without a heavy loss, both in killed and prisoners. The only route open to General Crawford's division, was by a bridge across the stream; which, as it lay upon a level considerably beneath the ground now occupied by the enemy, was unavoidably exposed to a heavy fire from most of their guns. Thither, however, it was necessary to proceed, and thither regiment after regiment was moved, covered in succession by the corps in the rear, and last of all by a body of skirmishers. The French made several brave attempts to force the bridge; they charged towards it repeatedly, as our people were descending, and endeavoured to push a body of their cavalry across in our rear; but the opposite bank rising abruptly, and being covered both with artillery and infantry, they were on each occasion stopped. At length the firing ceased; and Crawford, having halted on his new ground till evening, retreated, under cover of the darkness, to a position within four leagues of Alverca.

There can be no doubt that in this skirmish the British troops fully supported their character

for gallantry and coolness; but it was to be regretted that the action had taken place at all. It was not our wisdom to waste our strength in partial encounters, particularly when these must be followed, as in the present instance, by a retrograde movement; and of this Lord Wellington was, I believe, fully satisfied, as he had cautioned any such to be wantonly incurred. Yet was Crawford an officer of singular ability and bravery, and certainly one of the best in the army, as all his proceedings showed; and even here he did as much, or perhaps more, than most men in a similar situation could have performed. But I doubt if he was strictly within his orders; and certainly considerable dissatisfaction was felt at head-quarters when the report of the affair came in.

The enemy having thus begun to move, our attention was powerfully called to the next steps which they should take; because it was concluded that from these a tolerably accurate judgment might be formed, as to the plan upon which they proposed to conduct the campaign. All eyes were consequently turned upon them; but though they showed themselves during both the 25th and 26th on our side of the Coa, it was not in force sufficient to authorise our coming to any conclusion as to their future proceedings. The question which interested us most deeply at present was, whether they would halt to besiege Almeida in force; or,

leaving a corps to mask it, would push on with the strength of their army into Portugal. In case they should adopt the former line of policy, then might we continue where we were, watching their progress, and striving perhaps, as opportunities offered, to impede it;—were they to pursue the latter course, then must we remove elsewhere. Lord Wellington, however, was desirous of obtaining full information on these heads before he moved his army, or took any other decided step; and the 25th and 26th were, in consequence, spent by us in a state of quiet.

On the 27th the French pushed forward several strong patrols as far as the river Pinhel. Though there was nothing in this absolutely decisive of the question at issue, still it gave rise to a belief that they might perhaps advance in force; in which case Lord Wellington appeared to feel that the army, situated as it now was, would fill rather a precarious situation. As it was not intended to risk a general action here, we should, of course, fall back to avoid it; but were we hurried in that movement, some loss and much confusion would be the consequence. It was accordingly resolved to march some leagues to the rear, and having opened free space for the British troops, by sending on the Portuguese brigades in front, to establish the head-quarters at Celerico. This place, situated at the head of the gorges of the Estrella, presented a

post of much greater strength and importance to an army threatened by superior numbers, than the extended line on which it had hitherto acted ; where it was liable to be forced at all points, should it attempt to defend itself throughout, or where, should it concentrate, it could only assume a position exposed to a thousand hazards by turning. Nor was this all. By falling back, in good order, upon Celerico, we had it in our power to despatch the whole of our divisions, which must necessarily retire by the same road at perfect leisure, and with proper intervals between them ; because having the start of the enemy by several marches, they would find it a hard matter to overtake or annoy us.

As soon as this determination was formed, no time was permitted to elapse before it was carried into effect. The cavalry, amounting in all to twenty-four squadrons, were moved up to Alverca, where they held themselves in readiness to cover the retreat. The light division marched to Celerico ; the first to Penhancas ; the third to Carapentra, Fares, and the villages near. With respect to the fourth division, it continued to occupy Guarda, because it was deemed essential to retain that place for some time longer, in order to keep open the communication with General Hill, whose corps was still in position at Alalay ; but General Cole received instructions, in the event of our re-

trograding beyond Celerico, to retire by a mountain road and rejoin us. Of the enemy's intentions, however, we were still ignorant. It was confidently asserted, indeed, that all design of acting upon our right had been abandoned, and that Regnier had attached himself to Massena, merely for the sake of adding to his weight, and enabling him to move with greater effect upon our front; but the arrangement appeared in itself so improbable, that we were scarcely disposed to believe it. We were, however, equally prepared for either emergency; and as our marches to the rear were conducted without any interference on the part of the enemy, we soon found ourselves in a position from which it was in our power to move, either forward or still further back, in comparative safety, and at our own convenience.

When we began our retrogression, it was with a full assurance on our minds, that a few days, at the furthest, would suffice to throw some certain light upon the enemy's plans and intentions. To our great surprise, however, day after day and week after week elapsed, and they still continued as inert and undecided as ever. Almeida, though invested, was not threatened with a siege, neither were corps in movement against us; though a full fortnight had passed since the affair with Crawford's division on the Coa, and a month since Ciudad Rodrigo submitted. There was, of course,

but one line of policy for us to pursue; we could only wait, with patience, till Massena should see fit to do something; whereas it appeared as if the French Marshal were either completely at a loss how to proceed, or that his means and resources were inadequate to the objects in contemplation. The reader will easily believe that so great an appearance of diffidence on the part of the French, tended not a little to inspire us with sentiments diametrically the reverse. Lord Wellington, in particular, augured the best results from a consideration of matters around him; and if there were any who still continued to harbour apprehensions touching the final issue of the campaign, these apprehensions had certainly lost much of their strength and plausibility. No doubt there were moments when a consideration of the existing state of Europe—everywhere in submission to the influence of France, and everywhere in arms against us—would renew those alarms which present events had a tendency to smooth down; but with such speculations we felt that we had nothing to do, and therefore we resolutely looked forward with a hope, which we were willing to believe rested on no insecure foundation.

Whilst our bodies were kept at rest, our minds were from time to time occupied by rumours which came in, in great numbers, from different parts of the country. We heard one day that

Regnier had advanced as far as Castello Branco, and that Hill had fallen back upon his strong position at Largedas. There had been a little skirmishing on this occasion ; and it gave us satisfaction to be told that the Portuguese cavalry had been brought into play, and had acquitted itself well. Next we were informed that the peasantry were forming themselves into bands of guerillas, and that they had already taken and killed several straggling parties of the enemy in the vicinity of Guarda. But the most pleasing intelligence of all which reached us at this time, reported the success which Silveira's followers had obtained over a body of French troops at Parba de Sanatrice. A Swiss battalion in the French service had, it appeared, attacked a Spanish post at the above place. The Spaniards gave way, and fled ; but a body of Portuguese militia belonging to Silveira's corps, advanced against the enemy, and shut them up in the town. Having sustained a blockade for some days, the enemy were glad to surrender upon terms ; and they were sent, to the number of four hundred, to their own country, on condition that they would not serve again in the Peninsula. Considered in itself, such a victory, followed by such consequences, was not, indeed, an event very highly to be spoken of ; but it promised to be productive of effects more important than the mere removal of a few hundred of the enemy from

the scene of operations. It gave the militia confidence in themselves and in their leaders ; and it would doubtless induce others to emulate the deeds of their fellow-countrymen, whenever fitting opportunities might come in the way.

All our rumours were not, however, of a description so cheering. It was stated, upon authority which appeared to be good, that Mortier had broken up from the neighbourhood of Seville, and that he was in full march to replace Regnier's corps on the left bank of the Tagus. That such a movement had been in contemplation, we were well aware, and the chief source of astonishment on our side was, that it had not long ago taken place ; but we understood now, that some differences between Joseph and Victor on the one hand, and Massena on the other, had hitherto prevented it. The former chiefs were unwilling to spare Mortier from the support of the force employed before Cadiz ; whilst the latter insisted upon his being despatched into Portugal, as essential to the great operations in progress. The dispute, it appeared, had been referred to Paris, and now the Emperor's decision having arrived, Massena's wishes were preferred to those of the King of Spain and his lieutenant. To us this was rather an alarming piece of news. We were already opposed by numbers so great, as to keep our utmost vigilance and skill in action, for the purpose of

effectually watching them ; there was no need of an addition to the sources of alarm by which we were surrounded ; nor was it a cause of inconsiderable annoyance to reflect, that a large portion of our nominal army was placed in a situation where it could prove of no real service. The reader is doubtless aware that under the common head of the Peninsular army were included, not only the divisions immediately commanded by Lord Wellington, with such detached corps as might be employed in operations along the coast of Alicant, but the garrison of British troops shut up in Cadiz, to the number of eight thousand men. Unquestionably it was a wise precaution to introduce some British regiments into that important place ; without them it is at least problematical whether Cadiz would have sustained, as it did, a tedious blockade of many months. But the question is, whether two thousand men would have sufficed for that service, whilst the remaining six thousand could have been employed to unspeakable advantage elsewhere. As yet, however, the tact of conducting a continental war with the spirit which was necessary, was new in England. Not only were we deprived of this large portion of our own force, and that, too, for a purpose which appeared nugatory,—but of the reinforcements which had been promised from Halifax and Sicily, one regiment alone arrived ; and even the vacancies oc-

casioned in the ranks of the different battalions in Portugal, by death, sickness, and other casualties of war, were either not filled up at all, or were filled up very imperfectly. This was doubly distressing, at the present moment, when the unhealthy season having returned, our sick began daily to increase in numbers, and when, I regret to say, instances of desertion, particularly from the German cavalry, became frequent. Lord Wellington, I apprehend, felt, though he carefully strove to conceal it, that he was not supported, as he ought to have been, from home; and there were few officers in his army, possessed of penetration, who did not likewise feel it.

Though it falls not in with the plan of the present narrative to enter minutely into the order of affairs purely political, I may be permitted to observe that Lord Wellington found himself, at this critical juncture, beset with many other difficulties besides those which originated in the insufficiency of his own force, and the tremendous superiority of the enemy. All responsibility was thrown upon him. The instructions which he received were generally so expressed, as to leave him ground for doubt respecting the course which would be most agreeable to his employers; whilst hints were thrown out, that he ought to look above all things to the preservation of the force intrusted to him. In few words, the ministers were alarmed at the crisis to which affairs had arrived, and their con-

duct partook of their fears. Nor was the government of Portugal to be depended upon. A variety of intrigues were going on there, augmented and renewed from time to time by arrivals from the Brazils; and a thousand impediments were thrown in the way of every useful suggestion, provided it happened to come from the English General or his friends. At last a new form of government was invented, in which both the British minister and Lord Wellesley were included; and by which Admiral Berkeley was advanced to the chief command of the fleet, as Lord Wellington had been to the chief command of the army. Yet even then,—even at a moment when Lord Wellington was enabled to mark out, as it were, a situation for himself, he was far from being emancipated from trouble. Continual references were made to him on the subject of civil arrangements, and he found himself almost unavoidably involved in the many petty cabals and jealousies, of which he had so much reason to complain. It is not going too far to affirm, that a British commander has seldom, if ever, stood in a predicament more harassing and more unsatisfactory than that occupied by the Duke of Wellington during the summer of 1810; and that probably not a single individual in the service of the crown could have carried himself through the difficulties arising out of it, except the man who struggled with and overcame them.

The indecision which had marked the enemy's movements, ceased at length to exert its influence; and on the 14th of August, 1810, they sat down in force before the fortress of Almeida. On the following day, ground was broken; but the works proceeded so slowly, that the 25th arrived before the first batteries were constructed. At one point, however, owing to the faulty nature of the fortification, the approaches had been pushed, without much interruption from the fire of the place, to the foot of the glacis; but the batteries just spoken of were erected at a prodigious distance, and came in only with the line of the first parallel, far beyond the proper range of battering cannon. Almeida, regarded by the Portuguese as one of the principal bulwarks of their country, was garrisoned at this time by two regiments of militia, and one of the line, which were placed under the orders of Brigadier-General Cox, an officer of merit and resolution; and it was confidently expected that the resistance made by it would not at least fall short, however much it might exceed the resistance offered by the feebler fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Lord Wellington, as soon as he learned that the enemy had begun the siege, once more moved his army to the position which it had occupied previous to the late retrogression. His object in this was not only to encourage the garrison to a desperate defence, by creating in it the hope of a

speedy relief, but to draw off the troops whenever the place should become untenable, avoiding, at the same time, a general action; and had the garrison acted with even moderate determination, there is every reason to believe that he would have effected the latter object, even though he should have failed in the former. But the garrison did not do its duty. It yielded on the first appearance of calamity, and accompanied its surrender with proceedings which left no room to doubt that the accident alluded to was not the sole cause of a submission so unlooked-for and so ill-timed.

The enemy's batteries opened at a long range on the 26th; and in the evening of that day a magazine, in which was deposited the chief part of the powder in the place, unfortunately blew up. It happened that some cars were in the act of conveying ammunition from the building, when a shell exploded at the door, and the loose powder having ignited, the fire was communicated to the whole depot, and it instantly exploded. This was indeed a heavy calamity; and Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, in their public despatches, attributed to it, and to it alone, all the events which followed; but the conduct of the garrison was such as to convince every unprejudiced observer, that in so doing they spoke, not from feeling, but from policy; and that, even had no such

misfortune befallen, little was to be expected at their hands. It was no sooner known in the town that the principal magazine had been destroyed, than the whole of the officers, with the Tenente Rey, or second in command, at their head, proceeded to Governor Cox in a body, and insisted upon his instantly surrendering. General Cox warmly remonstrated against the measure, and ordering them to repair to their several posts, informed them that he intended, as soon as affairs should become desperate, to cut his way through the enemy's lines, and join Lord Wellington. The officers withdrew in evident displeasure; but when the Governor came forth to instruct the soldiers in the duty expected from them, he found that all had laid down their arms, and that there was not a man willing to obey his commands, or follow his footsteps. Under such circumstances, but one measure remained for him to adopt. He accepted the terms offered by the French through the Marquis D'Alorna; and on the following day, being formally summoned, he most reluctantly surrendered.

This was bad enough: it was sufficiently mortifying to find that our allies, when left to themselves, could not be depended upon as friends; it was a thousand times more mortifying to be convinced that with unaccountable fickleness they were prepared, on suitable occasions, to become

our enemies. The French army entered Almeida on the 26th, and the garrison being paraded before him, Massena behaved towards them with a degree of good policy, not generally pursued either by him or his brother marshals. From the militia he exacted nothing more than a solemn assurance that they would not again take arms against the French, and then dismissed them to their homes; whilst to the soldiers of the line he offered various advantages, provided they would consent to take service under the banners of Napoleon. To the eternal disgrace of the persons thus tampered with, all, both officers and men, embraced the proposal, and all passed over, without the slightest apparent reluctance, to the ranks of the enemy. True, it was industriously given out that the measure in question had been adopted with one view only—namely, that they might be preserved from certain captivity in France, and find opportunities of again deserting to their countrymen; but it is hardly necessary to observe that no one dreamed of again placing reliance on men who could thus set all honourable and proper feeling at defiance. For my own part I looked upon the *ci-devant* garrison of Almeida as a band of contemptible cowards, or barefaced traitors; and I believe that the sentiments which I entertained towards them, were, without a single exception, entertained by every man and officer in the British army.

I have mentioned the Marquis D'Alorna as taking part in this negociation, so little creditable to the persons who were the subjects of it. D'Alorna was a Portuguese of talent, though a determined and uncompromising partisan of the French. When they entered the country before, under Junot, he declared warmly in their favour; and having been governor of the province of Beira, was enabled to render them some important services. It is but fair to state, however, that D'Alorna's treachery arose, not from any motives of personal ambition, but out of an hereditary abhorrence of the reigning family, from whom his ancestors, for many generations back, had suffered great oppression. Many of them, indeed, had been beheaded as traitors, when, according to his statement at least, they had committed no deeds deserving of the punishment; and the hatred stirred up by such cruelties descended, like an heir-loom, from father to son, till it broke out, at length, in the person of the present Marquis. D'Alorna was, as I have said, a man of ability; but he was something more than this. He knew intimately all the parties which existed in his native country, and all the secret springs by which they were severally guided; and he was more, perhaps, than any other individual, competent to direct the French in the operations which they might desire to undertake for its subjugation.

Such a man, actuated by such feelings, was not overlooked by the politic Napoleon, who gave him the rank of general of division in the French armies, and sent him, in this capacity, against the land of his fathers.

As soon as the fall of Almeida became known, Lord Wellington lost no time in retracing his steps, and again placing his divisions in the position which he had assumed previous to the late advance. They had not, however, long resumed their station, when they were called upon once more to abandon it; for the enemy advancing on the 1st, with a few squadrons of cavalry and some infantry, attacked our outposts at Alverca, and drove them in. Lord Wellington was not willing to risk a general action here, if it could be avoided. He was desirous, on the contrary, of stretching further to the rear, in order to bring his divisions into closer communication with General Hill, to be nearer to the position of the Ponte de Marcella, and, if the case should require it, to take it up; and all this he was anxious to effect for the purpose of hindering the enemy from pressing between our corps, or pushing hard upon our right, which, as I have already hinted, we looked upon as his probable course of operations. He accordingly issued orders for the whole army to fall back, and fixed his head-quarters on the following day at Gouvea. By this movement he kept in

check any troops which might endeavour to advance from Sabugal by way of Covilhos, and he threw an insurmountable obstacle in the way of all attempt to alarm both Hill's and our corps, by turning the fortified position of the Zezere.

It soon appeared, however, that in the plan of operations which some had drawn out for the enemy, they had fallen into many errors. Instead of manœuvring upon our right, Massena moved the whole of his force, not excepting the corps of General Regnier, towards our left, and drew us off, almost as soon as we had taken up our new position, to fresh ground, and more active undertakings. How this was effected, it will be necessary to state at length.

The reader has been already informed that Massena, instead of employing Regnier on the left of the Tagus, called him in, and united him to himself. The surrender of Almeida no sooner set him free from the last remaining encumbrance in his front, than he prepared to enter upon his grand undertaking—the invasion of Portugal; and contrary to all surmises, he resolved to commence his campaign as follows:—Whilst Regnier moved by the route which we had taken, with a view of threatening the position of Ponte de Marcella in front, two other corps, one under the command of Ney, another headed by Junot, marched in paral-

lel columns to the right, and directed their steps, the former by the upper road from San Felices, through Trancoso, the latter by Celerico, and across the Mondego, near that town, upon Vizeu. His object in these movements evidently was, to turn the position of the Ponte de Marcella, and to compel us to abandon a line, which, had we been followed by the main body instead of by a single corps, would have afforded an extremely desirable situation for a general action. How it came about that Massena determined upon this plan, I confess myself unable to form even a conjecture. Perhaps he entertained an idea that the passage of the Zezere would be difficult, that Abrantes would present to him a formidable obstacle, and that the country between Castello Branco and the Tagus would supply his troops with nothing requisite for their subsistence; or perhaps he apprehended serious obstructions from Romana's army, as well as from the garrisons of Badajoz and Elvas in his rear. Whether any or all of these motives had weight with him, I know not; but there can be little doubt that, in relinquishing the line of the Tagus, he gave up some advantages; such, for example, as a close communication with Mortier, and the army before Cadiz; for which, nothing to be obtained by his new plan of operations would seem to compensate. Be this however as it may,

we were soon informed that he had actually moved in the order above described; and we instantly prepared, by marching upon Cortico, near the Ponte de Marcella, to meet him upon the fresh arena which he had chosen to mark out.

In former parts of this narrative, I have taken occasion to particularise the amount both of our own force and of that of the enemy. Our estimates respecting the French were generally drawn from the reports of deserters, who are invariably disposed rather to overrate than underrate the strength of the party whom they have abandoned; but at this time we discovered, from certain intercepted returns, that the effective strength of the three columns above specified amounted, in the whole, to rather more than 70,000 men. Our numbers, again, were as follows: of British infantry there were in the field 23,868; of British cavalry 2870; of British artillery 2000; making a total of 28,738 British soldiers: of Portuguese there were infantry 21,712, cavalry 1696, and artillery 1000. The grand total of the allied army accordingly came up to 53,136. But of these full 25,000 were at a distance, some under Hill, others under Leith, so that we took up our ground at Ponte de Marcella with little more than 28,000 men. We took it up, however, in such time as to authorise a well-grounded expectation,

that before any serious attack could be made, they would be enabled to join; yet were we far from being at our ease, especially when intelligence arrived, that the whole of Massena's army had crossed the Mondego. The truth, indeed, is, that against odds so tremendous, more particularly when it was considered that one-half of our troops had never seen an enemy, no man could be very sanguine of success. Had all within our camp been Britons, then, indeed, though the victory would have doubtless cost us dear, we should have still counted upon it as certain; but with every disposition to think well of the Portuguese, we were unable to persuade ourselves, that when the moment of trial came, they would be found equal, I say not to their allies, but to their enemies. Our object therefore, was to avoid a rencontre, unless upon ground so favourable as almost to insure success; and for the attainment of that object, all Lord Wellington's movements were henceforth directed.


As soon as he had positively ascertained that the French were passing the Mondego with their third column, Lord Wellington threw two divisions, the light and the fourth, to the north bank of that river. In the mean while, the first division, consisting of six British and two Portuguese brigades, advanced from Coimbra, where it had latterly been stationed, as far as Mealhada, on the

great road to Oporto. The third division, General Picton's, with the cavalry under Cotton, were thus the only force left on the southern side of the Mondego; and they posted themselves, the one behind the Alva, the other in front of the Ponte de Marcella. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to add, that the latter corps were left in these situations, merely to keep open the communication with Generals Hill and Leith; and that they received orders, as soon as these officers should have formed their junction, to follow the rest of the army across the river. From these various arrangements, it became sufficiently manifest that Lord Wellington was even now looking out for a convenient field on which to offer his adversary battle; and we were not slow in arriving at the conclusion, that the first great struggle would take place at a point not very remote from the position now occupied by the left of the British army.

As it will be necessary for me, in giving a detail of future operations, to describe minutely the nature of the ground just referred to, I will not detain the reader by laying before him any premature or imperfect sketch of the position of Busaco. It will be better, perhaps, to close the present chapter with a recapitulation of certain unpropitious rumours, which, at this critical moment, came upon us with even more than their usual

exaggeration. We heard, to our extreme mortification, that Romana, having improvidently quitted his strong-hold, and advanced as far as Puente de Castro, half way between Seville and Badajoz, had risked an action with Mortier, and suffered a severe defeat. So complete, indeed, was the rout represented to have been, that nothing except the distinguished gallantry of a corps of Portuguese cavalry, which Lord Wellington had lent to Romana some time before, saved the Spanish army from utter annihilation; but all the bravery of these men was unable to restore the fortune of the day; and the whole had retreated in disorder to Badajoz. The battle was stated to have been fought on the 15th; and as Mortier was represented as following up the fugitives with great vigour, it became with us a question of some moment, whether he might not arrive in time materially to assist Massena, by threatening our right from Alcantara, or even from Abrantes. This was an idea pregnant with alarm to many, and productive, as all ideas in these times were, of a thousand idle conjectures and speculations. But our chief seemed entirely to disregard it. Whether he doubted the authenticity of the report, or calculated upon the ignorance of his adversary, or upon his want of ability to take proper advantage of the circumstance, should it be real, I know not. This, however, I

do know, that he continued to issue his commands, and to arrange his plans, with the same unbending firmness ; and that all things went on as coolly, as orderly, and with as much deliberation, as if no such rumour had reached us.



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NARRATIVE

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR,

FROM 1808 TO 1813.

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL CHARLES WILLIAM VANE,

MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.C.B. G.C.H.

COLONEL OF THE TENTH ROYAL HUSSARS.

THIRD EDITION,

WITH AN APPENDIX OF CORRESPONDENCE.



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
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NARRATIVE

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

CHAPTER I.

Battle of Busaco—The British army retires upon Torres Vedras, slowly followed by the French—Description of the lines—General review of the campaign, and condition of the two armies—Lord Wellington receives reinforcements.

It has been stated in the former volume, that the whole of the troops which composed the French army of Portugal, advanced, in pursuit of us, by columns of corps, between the Mondego and the Douro. Instead, however, of continuing their march, as we had anticipated, by these distinct routes, they soon struck into a single line, and proceeded, in one immense body, along the Vizeu road, on the right bank of the Mondego. It is worthy of remark, that the road thus selected is

one of the worst in Portugal, and that it presented at this time so many natural difficulties to the transport of guns and wheeled carriages, as to be by us esteemed quite impassable. Yet by that road were the French troops pushed forward, and though they were followed by an enormous train of carriages, of artillery, ammunition-waggons, and other materiel, they nevertheless contrived to make way with considerable rapidity and order.

As soon as the first intelligence of these movements reached us, we retired from Celerico, and took up fresh ground in the vicinity of Gouvea. This was done under a persuasion that the enemy would make his principal attack upon our right; but it was no sooner ascertained that the road by which we had fallen back remained unoccupied, than Lord Wellington directed his columns upon the point threatened, and in a very masterly style of manœuvre, threw the whole of his army across the Mondego, between the 25th and 26th. At the same time, the corps of Generals Hill and Leith were moved, the one from Largedas, the other from Thomar, by the Espinhel road; and they both arrived on the latter day at the river. Lord Wellington's corps crossed at the Bavia de Pina Cova, and at the fords in the neighbourhood of Ponte de Marcella. The light division, with the cavalry, were then pushed forward to meet the enemy's advance as far as Santa Comba Dao;

the first division was placed at Mealhada, on the great road which leads from Coimbra to Oporto; the fourth occupied the left of the position of Busaco, which it was now arranged to take up; whilst the third, leaving sufficient room for the first to form between, in case the attack should be made exclusively on the heights, unsupported by any attempt to turn our flank, took post in continuation of the line thus marked out. Such were the general arrangements entered into on the 25th; it remains now to describe the nature of the ground on which it was proposed to risk an action.

The position of Busaco consists of one huge mountain, which extends from the edge of the Mondego to the great Oporto road, and supports upon its summit the convent of Busaco, inhabited by monks of the order of La Trappe. It measures nearly sixteen miles in width from the right, where it eases itself off by gradual falls towards the Mondego to the left, where it ends in a variety of tongues of land, each as lofty, craggy, and rugged as itself. It is covered in front by gorges of indescribable depth, and defiles barely passable for sheep. The principal inconvenience attending it as fighting ground for our army, arose out of its extent; for it was manifestly too capacious to be occupied aright by sixty thousand men; whereas it is essential to the constitution of a military post,



that it be as easy of egress as it is difficult of access, and that its flanks as well as its centre be well secured. But where ground is too extensive for the troops destined to hold it, the latter object can never be perfectly attained; and in the present instance we could not but feel that any serious endeavour to turn our left by the Mealhada road, must in the end be attended with success. Strange to say, however, Marshal Massena,—an officer whose reputation came second to that of no marshal in the French service,—made no effort of the kind. On the contrary, he led his columns through the passes above described, and up the face of heights approximating very nearly to the perpendicular, and thus devoted them to destruction, from the hands of men, posted, as has been already mentioned, on their summits. Had he acted by the advice of Lord Wellington, I think he could not have adopted a course better calculated to insure a defeat, and that too with a loss to the conquerors trifling, even in proportion to what usually attends upon success.

On the 25th, the enemy's advanced-guard took possession of Santa Comba Dao, and pushed on to Martigao, were Crawford had strongly posted his corps. As it was Lord Wellington's wish that no affair of advanced-guards should take place, instructions had been issued for the light division to retire, on the first alarm, to the mountain of Busa-

co ; and the movement was executed in admirable order, and in the presence of the enemy. Our troops could not, however, fall back so rapidly as to avoid, entirely, coming into occasional contact with their pursuers, and a good deal of firing, with a tolerably smart cannonade, was the consequence. But the loss on either side was trifling ; although I had to regret the loss of a fine young man my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Hoey, who was killed by a cannon-shot at my side. The light division now threw itself upon some high and commanding ground just above the great road to Vizeu, so as to communicate with the fourth division on its left, and with the first upon its right. For the latter division had been moved up from its station at Mealhada, and now took post upon the heights, where room had been allotted to it ; and Hill and Leith being in full march over the Mondego, the line was in excellent progress towards formation. At length the arrangements were complete, and on the 27th, at day-break, the army was all drawn up in the following order.

On the right of the whole stood the second division, commanded by General Hill, guarding the declivities towards the Mondego, and flanked by the stream. Next to it came General Leith's corps, then General Picton's third division, then General Spencer's first division, then General Crawford's light division ; and last of all, upon

the extreme left, stood the fourth division, under the command of General Cole. The cavalry were sent to the plains in front of Mealhada, where there was room for them to act ; and the artillery was distributed at different points, according as convenience of ground, or the prospect of an advantageous range directed.

I have said that the light division drew up upon some high and broken ground above the great road to Vizeu. The road in question, which conducts from Coimbra to the town just named, winds round the right of a projecting tongue of land, and passing through the village of Mortea, skirts the convent wall ; from which, to the summit of the mountain, there is the space of barely half a mile. On the 26th the enemy showed a strong force in this direction, as well as in front of that part of our position which was occupied by General Picton. Though they did nothing more than show themselves, it became very evident that Massena was really making ready to attack our formidable position, and we heartily congratulated one another on a prospect so satisfactory ; for it is impossible to conceive a piece of ground more defensible from all attempts in its front. The glacis of a fortress is not more bare nor open to the fire of its defenders ; whilst the abruptness of the ascent was of itself sufficient to render powerless, at least for a time, the heavily-loaded troops which

might accomplish it. No great while elapsed ere our wishes received their full accomplishment ; for on the following morning, soon after our line had been formed, the enemy advanced to the attack.

At six o'clock in the morning two heavy columns were seen to approach, the one along the road, so as to fall in with the light division, the other through a defile, in the direction of General Picton's post. Both attacks were made with great spirit and determination ; but the latter was evidently that upon which Massena mainly relied, and to insure the success of which he had taken every imaginable precaution. It was intrusted to an élite corps, appointed expressly for the service ; and it was headed by three of the most distinguished regiments in the French army ; the 32nd, 36th, and 70th. These were placed under the command of General Merle, an officer who had acquired a high reputation from his behaviour at Austerlitz ; and they certainly gave proof that neither they nor their leader had won a name which they were not worthy to wear. They pressed forward with a gallantry which drew forth the hearty plaudits, not of their friends only, but of their enemies ; and in spite of as heavy a shower of grape, round shot, and musketry, as it is easy to imagine, they actually gained the summit. They gained it too in good order, that is to say, they were formed in an instant after the ascent

was won; and had they been supported, they would have doubtless stood their ground for some time; but there was no support in their rear; and the 45th British, with the 8th Portuguese, met them with a bravery not inferior to their own, or that of any other corps in either army. The contest was warm, but it was not of long continuance; for the 88th arriving to the assistance of their comrades, instantly charged, and the enemy were borne over the cliffs and crags with fearful rapidity, many of them being literally picked out of the holes in the rocks by the bayonets of our soldiers. The troops employed in this attack consisted of two divisions of the corps of Regnier, one of which, under Merle, suffered the fate just described, whilst the other remained in reserve at the defile.

Whilst these things were going on in front of Picton's post, two divisions of the corps of Marshal Ney, one commanded by Loison, and the other by Mermot, bore down in like manner upon General Crawford. Both of these divisions took part in the assault, a third being left in reserve; and they advanced with great intrepidity over half the ascent, exposed only to a trifling fire from a few pieces of cannon. The 43rd, 52nd, and 95th, were in line there, and they permitted the enemy to approach till less than one hundred yards divided them; and then one volley from

right to left, coolly and deliberately given, thinned the ranks of the assailants; after which our troops, giving a loud and simultaneous cheer, rushed forward with the bayonet. Never was rout more complete than that which followed the movement. The enemy, unable to retreat and afraid to resist, were rolled down the steep like a torrent of hailstones driven before a powerful wind; and not the bayonets only, but the very hands of some of our brave fellows, became in an instant red with the blood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more decisive charges than those executed this day by the two divisions which bore the brunt of the action, were never perhaps witnessed; nor could anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of our men throughout, except, perhaps, the hardihood which had ventured upon so desperate an attack.

The loss of the French in these encounters was estimated at somewhere between five and six thousand men; ours fell considerably short of one thousand; but as one of their corps, that of Junot, had not yet been engaged, we naturally expected a repetition of the battle on the following morning. In this, however, we were deceived. Massena had already erred sufficiently in risking one attempt to force our heights; and he had learned a lesson which it was not probable that he would speedily forget. Instead, therefore, of again di-

recting his troops against our impregnable rocks, he was observed, soon after daylight on the 28th, to be drawing off from the late points of attack, and it was found that he was moving, with his entire force, upon the Mealhada road, with the evident intention of turning us. It was a movement for which we were not only prepared, but for which we had all along looked, as a measure of common prudence on the part of the enemy; and as we never calculated upon being able to retain Busaco after it should be executed, we now made ready to abandon the high grounds, and continue our retreat. As soon, therefore, as the dusk of the evening set in, we defiled to our left, throwing Hill's division once more across the river; and the rest of the corps marching during the 29th, on Decentecio, Botao, Eiros, and Mealhada, the line of the Mondego was, on the 30th, assumed.

As it was not Lord Wellington's design to make any stand, or risk a second battle on the Mondego, the army was put in motion again on the 1st of October; and the head-quarters, having halted at Redenha that night, came in on the 2nd to Leira. During these marches, the divisions of the army were kept as near as possible to one another: the right retiring by the main road, pushed directly upon Leira; the left, passing the river somewhat lower in its course, came in, under the guidance

of General Spencer, to the same line of march near Pombal; by which arrangement one wing was throughout at hand to support the other, had circumstances occurred to require it. But the enemy showed no disposition to harass us. Though they entered Coimbra almost at the moment of our quitting it, they suffered our rear-guard to march on without molestation; and they even halted during the remainder of that day, and the whole of the next, in the place. On the 3rd, however, they pushed forward strong patrols into Condeixa, towards Leira. Here, part of our magazine, containing corn and provisions, fell into their hands; but the magazine was captured, not because we were unable, but because we were unwilling to defend it. The fact is, that Lord Wellington had strictly prohibited the rear-guard from engaging in any affair which could, without compromising its own safety, be avoided; and the stores in question were abandoned, rather than that a loss of life, however trifling, should be experienced in their defence.

The army rested in Leira till the morning of the 5th, when Lord Wellington, having ascertained that the enemy were coming on in force, gave orders that the retreat should be resumed. This was done along the two great roads which lead to Lisbon, by Rio Major and Alcobaça, and on the same evening head-quarters were established in

the last-mentioned place ; but though no skirmishing occurred, nor any serious hardships fell to our lot, it was altogether one of the most distressing journeys which any individual in the army was ever called upon to perform. The proclamations which had been issued, requiring the inhabitants to abandon their homes as we fell back, were very generally attended to, and spectacles more afflicting than this prompt obedience on the part of the Portuguese presented, it were a hard matter even to imagine. Crowds of men, women, and children ; of the sick, the aged, and the infirm, as well as of the robust and the young, covered the roads and the fields in every direction. Mothers might be seen with infants at their breasts, hurrying towards the capital, and weeping as they went ; old men, scarcely able to totter along, made way chiefly by the aid of their sons and daughters ; whilst the whole way-side soon became strewed with bedding, blankets, and other species of household furniture, which the weary fugitives were unable to carry further. During the retreat of Sir John Moore's army, numerous heart-rending scenes were brought before us ; for then, as now, the people—particularly in Galicia—fled at our approach ; but they all returned, sooner or later, to their homes, nor ever dreamed of accumulating upon our line of march, or following our fortunes. The case was different here.

Those who forsook their dwellings, forsook them under the persuasion that *they should never behold them again*; and the agony which such an apprehension appeared to excite among the majority, exceeds any attempt at description. Nor was it on account of the immediate suffering of the country people alone that we were disposed, on the present occasion, to view the measure with regret. It could not but occur to us, that, though the devastating system must inevitably bear hard upon the French, the most serious evils would, in all probability, arise out of it, both to ourselves and our allies, from the famine and general distress which it threatened to bring upon a crowd so dense, shut up within the walls of a single city. There can be no question now, that this very measure, more perhaps than any other, preserved Portugal from subjugation, and England from defeat; but, at the moment, there were few amongst us, who seemed not disposed to view it with reprobation; because, whilst they condemned its apparent violation of every feeling of humanity and justice, they doubted the soundness of the policy in which it originated.

Whilst we were thus conducting ourselves, marching with deliberation, and sweeping before us all the resources of the country, the enemy had advanced as far as Leira, and seemed disposed to follow us up with the full vigour of the school in

which their leader had learned his tactics. Their videttes entered Leira about a couple of hours after our rear-guard quitted it, and they had, in consequence, before them a choice of two roads to Lisbon, one by the Tagus, the other by the sea. But on both we were equally well prepared to receive them, as the following description of the new arrangement of our forces will show.

It has been stated above, that in continuation of the retreat from Leira upon the lines, the headquarters of our army were established, on the evening of the 5th, at Alcobaça. From Alcobaça a further falling back was made upon Torres Vedras and Rio Major; and from the latter of these places the troops began, on the 10th, to move into the position. On that day General Hill's corps, which had returned from the Ponte de Marcella upon Thomar, arrived at Villa Franca; and on the following morning every division occupied the ground marked out for it, and all were in readiness, at a moment's notice, to assume the posts which they might be required to defend.

Though I have already laid before the reader something of a rude outline of the position of Torres Vedras, I am tempted at the present stage of my narrative, that he may be the better able to understand the plan of operations upon which it was proposed to act, to go rather more at length into its localities and general disposition. I am

willing to believe, likewise, that the repetitions which may be necessary, will be perused, even by the unmilitary reader, without disgust ; because it is to the wise occupation of that position, and to the judicious method pursued in maintaining it, that the ultimate success of the Peninsular war is to be attributed ; and because it will long continue, even in its rude outlines, to present to future generations an enduring testimonial to the sagacity and unconquerable firmness of our leader. With this preface, I proceed now to describe, in as accurate terms as I am able to employ, both the arrangement of the troops, and the nature of the champ de bataille, upon which the fate, not of Lisbon only, but of Europe itself was to be decided.

Along the neck of the Peninsula at the extremity of which Lisbon is built, there extend several ranges of high and rugged hills, intersected here and there by narrow passes, and covered, for the most part, by deep ravines and defiles, in the usual acceptation of the term, impassable. Along these, at the distance of perhaps 25 English miles from the city, Lord Wellington had selected two lines, one considerably in advance of the other, but both of tremendous strength ; and he had bestowed upon their fortification so much of care, and diligence, and science, as to place them almost equally beyond the reach of insult from any assailing force, however numerous and well supplied. The sys-

tem pursued on this occasion was quite novel, and the works erected were altogether such as were not to be met with under similar circumstances in any part of the world. It will not be necessary to enter at much length into the merits of the second line, because its strength was never tried; but of the first or more advanced force, the following will be found to contain a tolerably correct sketch.

This line rested its right upon the acclivities of Alhandra, on the summit of which several formidable redoubts were erected, and was flanked by the fire of a dozen gun-boats, at anchor in the Tagus. The faces of these hills were all carefully scarp'd; the road which led through them was destroyed; and it was with perfect justice concluded, that here, at least, our position might be pronounced impregnable. On the left of these heights lay a ravine or gully, called the pass of Maltao, the gorge of which was effectually blocked up by two formidable redoubts; whilst it was completely commanded, on one hand by the hills of Alhandra, and on the other by those of Armedia. The latter, like the former, were scarp'd, and otherwise rendered inaccessible; and they communicated with the centre of the position, which was a huge mountain, crowned by a redoubt more extensive than any other in the line. As this mountain overhung the village of Sobral, its castle kept completely at command the great road which

conducts from thence to Lisbon, and rendered it utterly hopeless for any body of men so much as to attempt a passage in that direction. On the left of this redoubt, again, some high and broken ground looked down upon Zebreira, and stretched in formidable shape towards Pataneira. Just behind that village there is a deep glen, succeeded by other hills, which cover the roads from Ribaldeira to Exara de los Cavalleiros and Lisbon; whilst on the left of the whole was a lofty mountain, which crowded up all the space between these roads and Torres Vedras. Such is a brief detail of the leading features in this position; than which it will be seen that, independently of all that art had done for it, few can be imagined more formidable; but when it is further understood that the ascents were all steep, rugged, and rocky; that strong vineyards and deep ground everywhere covered the front; and that, wherever natural obstacles chanced to be fewer in number, or less insuperable in kind than could have been desired, labour had not failed to supply them; and when these things are taken into consideration, an army once brought thither must either be false to itself, or it might defy all the force of the French empire seriously to molest it. It remains now to state in what order, and with what design, the troops were arranged for its defence.

On the right of the whole was posted General

Hill's corps, the British troops occupying the village of Alhandra, where they were kept ready to be moved to any point which seemed most to be threatened ; whilst the Portuguese stood prepared to throw themselves into the redoubts, and to defend them to the last extremity. Next to Hill's came Crawford's division, having the heights of Arruda, and the works attached to them, peculiarly intrusted to its care. Then came General Pack's Portuguese brigade ; the whole of which were stationed in the great redoubt of which I have already spoken as crowning the hill above Sobral ; whilst Sir Brent Spencer's division garrisoned the high ground above Zebreira, as far as the village of Pataneira. General Picton's right joined itself to Spencer's left, in rear of the last-named place, at the ravine which there broke in ; and Cole's division, connecting itself with Picton's, carried on the line across the hills, as far as the road to Exara de Cavalleiros and Lisbon. Last of all came General Campbell's corps, which occupying the mountain between the road and Torres Vedras, formed the extreme left of our army.

I have spoken of redoubts and other works, as giving additional strength to this stupendous position ; it is right that I should refer to them in terms somewhat more explicit. The reader is not, perhaps, ignorant, that in fortifying a line, such as that of Torres Vedras, for the support of a


large army in the field, the ordinary practice is to construct batteries and other points d'appui, which shall present as imposing a front as may be to the attacking force, but shall be open and utterly defenceless from the rear. In the present instance, however, the redoubts thrown up were not so much field-works as regular castles, many of which were capable of containing several hundreds, whilst one required no fewer than three thousand men to form its garrison. These were built as if each had been intended to stand a siege of six weeks, at the most moderate computation; they were placed in situations which rendered them quite as defensible from one side as from another; and they were all, to a certain extent at least, independent of those near them, and well sheltered from their fire, should they fall into the hands of the enemy. It was Lord Wellington's design to garrison these posts chiefly with the militia and least disciplined regiments; whilst he kept the whole of the British troops, and the élite of the Portuguese, free and unencumbered, to be employed as circumstances might require. By this arrangement he secured to himself the double advantage of a moveable army and a fortified place. Supposing the position to be forced, the forts were still there to interrupt the enemy's communications, and cut off their supplies; whilst the columns need only to be marched a few miles to

the rear, in order to assume ground even more defensible than that which they abandoned. I am not willing to detain the reader by any remarks of my own, at a period of the narrative so replete with interesting occurrences: but I cannot proceed further, without desiring to draw the attention of my brother soldiers in a particular manner not only to the subject of which I am now speaking, but to the whole plan of this campaign; because I am sure that a British army never took part in one better adapted to instruct it in the art of manœuvring on a great scale, nor consequently so well calculated to make efficient officers of those who shared in it, or are disposed to take the trouble of studying it as it deserves.

In the course of this narrative I have, in general, confined myself so much to the movements of the troops placed immediately under the orders of Lord Wellington, that the reader, were he not instructed from different sources, might remain ignorant that there were other corps of greater or less efficiency employed at different points in our favour, during the entire summer. These were, a body of militia under Colonel Trant, which moved hither and thither as circumstances seemed to require; General Silveira's army, consisting of some eight thousand irregulars; a portion of the Lusitanian Legion, under Colonel Wilson; besides bands of guerillas in all directions. It is deserving

of record, that Lord Wellington kept the whole of these irregular troops among the mountains and fastnesses, in points of perfect security, till the opportunity arrived for bringing them into play. At what moment this occurred, and to what uses they were eventually turned, will best be understood by glancing back through the whole of the campaign, from its opening up to the present hour.

The fall of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, instead of disclosing at once the plan upon which Massena was preparing to act, left us for some time as much in the dark as ever; inasmuch as Regnier's corps remained on the left of the Tagus, and seemed still to threaten the division of General Hill. The consequence was, that an opinion generally prevailed in our army—and I have reason to believe that it was embraced by the Commander-in-chief—that he would make his main push upon our right flank, and amusing us in front, follow up our movements with one corps only. The defences of the Zezere were, under these circumstances, naturally looked to by us as of paramount importance; and it was chiefly to secure them, that General Leith's corps was formed at Thomar, and kept in reserve. Contrary to all expectation, however, and in direct defiance of every ordinary rule of military manœuvre, Massena left our right unmolested; and though he was



compelled to move upon a much larger portion of the circumference of the circle than we were, he threw his whole army, in masterly style, to the north bank of the Mondego. He was quite aware that, did we perceive this movement, Hill could be brought into junction with us within a shorter space of time than would be requisite to connect Regnier with himself; and he knew also that the movement could hardly be made without our knowledge. Massena, therefore, adopted his plans upon principles more deep and more subtle than usually guide men in their undertakings. By the less observing, it was affirmed that he had chosen the only road which was impassable for artillery; and that he moved his army in one line, merely that a reasonable excuse might be made for the delay on which he had already determined. There is not, however, justice in these notions. Massena took a road by which, and by which alone, he was enabled to avoid the whole of the defences of the Zezere, the strong positions of Sarsedas and Ponte de Marcella, and, I may add, the very rock upon which he chose to make temporary shipwreck of his prospects, the line of Busaco; for had he persisted in his prudent course, and followed at once the path by the Sierra de Caramala, he might have arrived at the point where he now stood, within a few leagues of Lisbon. Now let attention be

paid to the plan of operations, by which Lord Wellington contrived to render all the talent and prudence of his skilful adversary of no avail.

The first measure which our chief adopted was this: he caused an excellent road to be made on the south side of the Mondego, which extended all the way from Celerico to Ponte de Marcella, and beyond it to Coimbra. His next step was to provide against the delays and confusion to which the enemy, who moved in a single continuous column, were subject. For this purpose, as he had determined, on many accounts, not to risk an action on the frontier, he took the precaution to throw his divisions and brigades along the great gorge, extending from Celerico to the Alva; and he so arranged them, as that when the army began to move, the troops followed one another by stages, in the utmost regularity, and without any of that bustle which a march en masse unavoidably occasions. Possessed of these advantages, Lord Wellington saw, clearly enough, that it was in his power, in the event of Massena's advance by any single road, to cross the Mondego with his whole force, and to throw himself, whenever he chose, between the enemy and Coimbra. As soon, therefore, as Massena's designs were satisfactorily ascertained, he fixed, with a master's eye, upon the banks of the Dao and the Criz, as the proper spots at which to cast impediments in the way of the

French; whilst he should perform the arduous and enterprising operation, of throwing the entire of his infantry, artillery, and stores, by wretched fords, and still more wretched bridges, across a river of no ordinary dimensions or difficulties.

All was accomplished in the very order and manner which he had in his own mind chalked out. The bridges on the Dao, and the Criz were then destroyed with astonishing celerity. Crawford and Pack, with the advanced-guard, were thrown across at Santa Comba Dao, and the rest of the army accomplished a very brilliant manœuvre with the utmost accuracy and perfection; for not a gun got out of its place during the continuance of the march, and when the moment of inquiry arrived, everything was found in the exact spot which it had been intended to occupy. But the most extraordinary feature of all remains yet to be noticed. From the instant when he fixed upon the position of Busaco, Lord Wellington expressed his firm conviction that he would be attacked there; and he adhered to that opinion, in opposition to the sentiments of every functionary by whom he was surrounded. There was a degree of prescience in this for which it is impossible accurately to account; for there cannot be a question as to the course which the enemy ought to have adopted, and which it was their wisdom to adopt. Instead of dashing themselves madly

against us, they ought to have continued to take ground to their right, and so gone round a stupendous mountain, which the slightest exercise of military penetration might have shown that they need not hope to pass. It is true that at this time Colonel Trant, with his corps, ought to have taken post at Sardao: he had received orders to proceed thither, with a view of strengthening our left; and it may be that the enemy had been led to think of him as actually in that situation. But had the case been so, it requires no depth of discernment to discover that all the resistance which it was in his power to offer, would have availed nothing against three French corps; more especially when it is considered that there are numerous passes from Mortagao, by the Vouga, into the Oporto road, which Trant possessed neither force nor means adequate to watch. It were absurd, therefore, to speak of this notion, as at the time it was not unusual to speak of it, as in any degree influencing Massena in the course which he pursued; for it requires only a glance over the map to convince any one that all effort to stop the enemy in the flat country between the Busaco and the sea, must have been fruitless. Had they chosen to bring their united force into that arena, we could have done nothing to arrest their progress; and hence it is, that I speak of Lord Wellington's prescience as something quite

out of the ordinary course of events, inasmuch as Busaco was a position simply and solely because the enemy thought fit by attacking to give to it that character.

That the success which crowned our efforts at Busaco was productive of the most beneficial consequences, and that the manœuvres which preceded the battle were all admirable in their kind, admits not of a doubt. By means of these the enemy's arrival at Coimbra was delayed, and time given for the removal of the inhabitants; an advantage which became the more vital, as we had been disappointed in our expectation of an attack upon the position of Ponte de Marcella. Far be it from me, therefore, to throw out so much as an insinuation that everything was not conducted with consummate ability and admirable foresight. Yet is it as clear as the sun at noon-day, not only that Massena might have passed us by without fighting, but that, when we abandoned the ground of our victory at Busaco, we did so, not because Trant had failed in reaching his allotted station, but because the ground was in itself indefensible. The truth is, that Massena, in this campaign, by no means supported the reputation which his previous services had obtained for him, or came up to the opinion which we had formed of him, as a master of the military art. Throughout our retreat, he scarcely ever followed us up with the

vigour which generally attends the movements of a pursuing army, and all his operations were marked by a languor and supineness which surprised not less than they gratified us. It seemed as if the French soldiers had already learned to stand in fear of us, or that they had ceased to be the men before whom the nations of the north one after another gave way. Had we been at all pushed, hampered as we were with the whole population of the country, it would have been impracticable, at more than one place, to hinder stores and even stragglers from falling into the enemy's hands; but from the hour of our first movement, up to the moment of our arrival in the lines, not an effort was made so to harass us. It is time, however, that I should cease from this somewhat technical dissertation, and resume, where I permitted it to slip, the thread of my story.

During the last week of our retrogression the rain fell in uninterrupted torrents; flooding all the plains, cutting up the roads, and swelling every mountain-stream to a roaring cataract. In spite, however, of the difficulties thence arising, and nothing daunted by the numerous privations which threatened to befall his army in an exhausted country, Massena continued his march; driving us back upon our strength, our resources,

our magazines, and our provisions, whilst his own were suffering continual diminution, and his communications with the rear becoming daily more and more insecure. The truth is, that both parties were now committed to a desperate game. On our side the chances of success were, doubtless, infinitely greater than on the side of the enemy, inasmuch as our position was excellent, our troops were fresh and in high spirits, our supplies were abundant, and the capital in our rear was tranquil ; but we could not conceal from ourselves that the game was still desperate, as well with us as with them. Were we, by any fatality, to suffer a defeat ; were the French to force our lines, and make themselves masters of our intrenchments, through the imbecility or treachery of their defenders, or through any other of those accidents to which war is ever liable, the chances were, that neither army nor ships would ever escape from the Tagus. We were therefore in the situation of men about to make their last throw, and to stake upon it, not temporary prosperity, but actual existence. The French, on the other hand, whilst they advanced against us, plunged into a district where means of subsistence must soon be wanting to them, and left their rear to be acted upon by clouds of irregulars, whom Lord Wellington now summoned from their fastnesses for the purpose.

The bodies to which I allude were, five thousand men under Trant, which were hurrying along the road from Oporto to Coimbra; a similar force of militia under Wilson, which had already arrived at Busaco, and had taken some prisoners; two distinct corps, the one estimated at fifteen thousand men, under Silveira, the other at eight or ten thousand men, under Bacillar, which were advancing from the north; besides numerous straggling bands, all animated by the same feeling of deadly hatred towards the French. Now these corps, though very inferior to regular troops, were still capable of creating constant alarm; inasmuch as they were ever at hand to cut off convoys, to destroy stragglers, to surprise magazines, and to harass the rear-guard; whilst in front the prospect of a resistance was held out, which Massena could not contemplate without the most serious apprehension. That the enemy considered their situation one of extreme peril and hazard, was distinctly proved by the state of inactivity into which they soon fell; as if they felt their inability to perform that which their wishes prompted, and yet were unwilling to resign all hope without at least one effort to realise it.

In the mean while Lord Wellington, whose exertions were unintermitting, and whose activity of body and mind surpassed all that could have

been expected even from him, was receiving every hour fresh encouragements to persevere in the judicious system which he had adopted. For some time back he had been very urgent with his own government, to send such reinforcements as his circumstances required; and he was about this time gratified by the arrival in camp of six battalions from England, and four from Cadiz; amounting, in all, to between seven and eight thousand men. By this happy addition, the effective strength of the British army was increased to thirty-three thousand soldiers; whilst the sum total of its strength upon paper fell not short of forty-one thousand. Nor was this the only addition which he received to his force at a moment so critical. He prevailed upon Romana, whose continuance on the southern frontier was proved to be productive of no serious advantage, to join him with as large a portion of his corps as he could venture to remove; and there came in, in consequence, about three thousand Spaniards, the élite of the Spanish army, under that officer. The corps in question marched from Badajoz and Campo Major, and reaching the Tagus at Aldea Gallega, was brought over from thence, and took post at Exara de los Cavalleiros, as a support to our centre. Thus, with thirty-three thousand British, thirty thousand Portuguese, and three

thousand Spaniards, the allied army could muster nearly seventy thousand men ; of which the comparative inefficiency of some of its parts was more than compensated by the nature of the ground which it occupied.

CHAPTER II.

Massena halts before the lines, which are industriously strengthened by the British troops—Lord Wellington, alarmed for Abrantes, sends a corps across the Tagus to secure it—Fortifies a new position on the south side of the harbour—The enemy construct boats on the river—Retire to Santarem, and take up a position—The allies follow, and go into cantonments in front of them—Various movements of detached bodies, and many rumours touching the future.

LITTLE occurred in our immediate presence particularly deserving of notice, for some time after we finally took up the position of the Zebreira. At first, indeed, a few affairs of cavalry took place, most of which ended in our favour; but latterly this force was removed to the rear, as well because their services were not needed, as because they could there be better supplied with forage, than among the rugged defiles in front. There were also two partial rencontres of infantry; one in which some Portuguese regiments, attached to

General Cole's division, behaved well whilst retiring from Ribaldusa towards Guaxara; and another, which gave to the 71st regiment, assisted by a company of the 95th and a few Germans, a brilliant opportunity of distinguishing themselves. On the 14th, a strong body of French troops attacked a redoubt at Sobral, which the 71st were appointed to hold. That gallant regiment not only repulsed the assailants, but following them beyond the lines, drove them, in their turn, from a work which they had begun to construct on a height opposite, and kept possession of the ground which they had gained. These, however, were the only instances in which large bodies of men came into contact. The pickets, particularly on our right, would, from time to time, engage, and a good deal of desultory firing was the consequence; but such skirmishes produced no memorable results, and were, in general, productive of few casualties. The only person of note, indeed, that fell on either side, was the French General St. Croix, who was killed by a cannon-shot from one of our gun-boats, as he was reconnoitring. He was an officer of distinguished gallantry and high character—one of the best in the cavalry service of the Emperor; and I own that we sincerely lamented the sorry manner in which a brave soldier, who came with honour and safety through

the perils of Austerlitz, Esling, and Wagram, lost his life.

But though all remained quiet in our camp, and in that of the enemy, the latter were beginning every day to experience more and more severely the difficulties of the undertaking in which they had embarked. Their communications became hourly less and less open; sickness began to spread itself through their ranks; the stock of provisions which, in spite of our exertions to prevent it, they had, on their first arrival, contrived to discover, was rapidly wasting; and desertions were exceedingly frequent. Their regular troops in the rear, were, moreover, singularly active; and their enterprises proved to be, for the most part, not more spirited than successful. A corps of Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant and General Miller, entered Coimbra on the 7th, where they captured a considerable depot of stores, as well as four thousand sick and wounded, who had been lodged there in hospital. This done, they made ready the bridge over the Mondego for destruction; and then pushing their cavalry towards Condeixa, harassed Massena's rear with continual skirmishes. In entering upon the latter undertaking, they felt themselves perfectly secure; for it was in their power, at any moment, to retire, if attacked by superior force, across the river, and

breaking down the bridge in their rear, to set all the enemy's efforts to molest them at defiance. The consequence was, that their attacks were both bold and well managed ; and the enemy lost not a few, as well of those who met the assailants face to face, as from the stragglers and plundering parties, which, in spite of all risks, persisted in straying from their column.

A delay so continued, and so little expected from the French Marshal, not unnaturally led to a variety of conjectures, on our parts, as to its originating causes and probable results. The whole of Massena's operations, considered merely in a military point of view, appeared to be so inexplicable, that we found ourselves under the necessity of regarding them in a different light, and referring them to political considerations entirely. He had acted, from his first assumption of the command, as if he were embarked in an undertaking, of the ultimate success of which he was far from being sanguine ; and in which he hazarded his reputation on no other account, than because he knew it to be a business, in the prosecution of which the Emperor was deeply interested. There fell into our hands, during this interval, several letters ; some of instruction to Massena from Napoleon ; others, on private business between Massena and his brother marshals. Many of these were curious and interesting docu-

ments; and those of the former class showed that the sources of information open to the enemy were more ample and more correct than could have been supposed. The Emperor's directions to Massena, which had reference to the opening of the campaign, required him to enter Portugal without delay, and to bring the English to battle wherever he should find them. It was stated that there were but sixteen thousand British troops under Lord Wellington in person, and only four thousand under Hill; that the whole united, inclusive of the Portuguese, could not exceed thirty thousand men; that the Portuguese were little better than brigands; and that there could be nothing capable of arresting the progress of a French force, which counted sixty thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, between Ciudad Rodrigo and the capital. The probability that four thousand men would shortly be brought from Cadiz, was, moreover, urged as a reason why Massena should suffer no delays on his march; whilst it was added that the spies in London wrote strongly of the intentions of the English to embark as soon as they should be hard pressed, and abandon the country. Now it is worthy of notice, that the numbers specified above, corresponded exactly with the effective state of our army during the early summer; and there is no doubt that, at the moment when Buonaparte

wrote, serious thoughts were entertained, if not in Portugal, certainly in London, of relinquishing the contest as profitless, and beyond the means of England to support.

From the tenor of this communication we were led to believe that Massena had, as I have already hinted, embarked in a series of operations which his judgment condemned; and that he now found himself reduced to the mortifying alternative of either risking all upon the chances of a battle, or of remaining where he was, in spite of the numerous privations to which he was subject, till fresh instructions should reach him from Paris. Had he confined his views, if not previously to his defeat at Busaco, at all events after that event occurred, to the north of Portugal, taking up the line of the Mondego for the winter, and detaching a corps to occupy Oporto, he would have made himself master of a portion of the country; and making the most of his successes at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, would have obtained credit for having accomplished a tolerably brilliant campaign. But that opportunity was gone by. He had been repulsed at Busaco; he had passed the Mondego, with a perfect knowledge all the while, that his communications would become at every step more uncertain; he saw the whole militia of Portugal rising in his rear, and yet left his sick at Coimbra, without a sufficient garrison to protect them. He

had done all this, not that he might follow us with vigour, for the pursuit was so deliberate, that all our stragglers and almost all our baggage escaped uninjured; and now he lay perfectly inactive in our front. It was quite impossible to imagine that an officer of Massena's character could have acted thus, had he not acted under the influence of compulsion. To that, therefore, we unhesitatingly attributed the proceedings of our opponent. We had reason to believe that he had despatched messengers to demand, either that strong reinforcements should be sent to him, or that fresh instructions, suitable to the turn which affairs had taken, might be granted; and we accordingly looked forward to a continuance of the procrastinating system for some time to come; for reinforcements, supposing the plan of reinforcing to be adopted, could not arrive in a day. It is true that the French corps in Galicia, augmented by everything in Castile, would prove formidable; and that the space between Galicia and Massena's encampment, might be traversed with perfect ease in a fortnight. But the garrisons could not be withdrawn from Galicia and Castile till others arrived to replace them; and of the movement of any force adequate to that purpose we knew nothing. Our minister at Lisbon, Sir Charles Stuart, spoke indeed of full forty thousand men as on their way through Spain; but the only corps of which

our intelligence took notice, consisted of no more than nine battalions of infantry, and two thousand cavalry, on its march from Vittoria, towards the Portuguese frontier. There was, no doubt, a possibility that the blockade of Cadiz might be intermitted; in which case the army hitherto employed there, uniting itself to Mortier's corps, might enter Alentejo full twenty-five thousand strong; and if to this twenty thousand more could be added, on the route from Galicia to Oporto, then indeed we might expect some severe service before long. But however judicious all these measures might be in themselves, there was nothing before us calculated to excite an apprehension, that they were really in process of completion. On the contrary, we were led, from a variety of occurrences, to guess that Massena's views leaned more to a retreat than to an advance; and that he delayed the former movement only till the sanction of his master should be obtained, and his own credit should be thereby saved.

The advanced parties of the Portuguese being pushed on as far as Leira, and the garrison of Abrantes seriously incommoding the French, the latter moved in force upon Salvatierra, where they succeeded in establishing a bridge across the Tagus, and so laid open to themselves the province of Alentejo. This might be for the purpose of securing those supplies which were no longer to



be had from the north ; but taken in connexion with a rumour which prevailed of an intended attack upon Abrantes, it appeared to us that Massena was anxious to keep the Alentejo open as a line by which his escape would be secured. Abrantes, however, was so well supplied and garrisoned, as to leave us little ground to apprehend any misfortune there, unless, indeed, it were attacked by a force greater than the enemy could well spare from our front ; and hence we reflected, that if he should retreat by the Alentejo, he must march by a single road, and that the means were still in our hands of intercepting him, should we feel ourselves sufficiently strong ; or at least of harassing him dreadfully, should that course appear more advisable. To speak with candour, however, it must be confessed that Massena's designs were as mysterious to us as they were probably vague and undefined even to himself ; and we accordingly remained to watch the result, not in idleness, but in security, upon our line of impregnable hills and fortifications.

There arose, at this time, something like a question amongst us, whether a movement on the offensive, entered upon at this critical juncture, might not bring about the most favourable results. By such as argued in favour of the movement, it was urged that the French were diminished in numbers, broken in spirit, and devoid of confidence ; that the soldiers distrusted their leaders, and the

leaders distrusted the soldiers; and that a spirited attack made at such a moment, would not only not be resisted, but that it would probably end in a victory more complete than had been obtained during the war. Fortunately for the cause of which he was the main support, our chief saw matters in a very different light. We estimated the losses of the French army at the highest, when we put down the amount, by deaths, sickness, desertion, and the casualties of battle, at fifteen thousand men. Now, as they moved into the country with full sixty-two thousand, this would still leave them forty-seven thousand with which to meet us; and as we could not pretend to bring more than fifty thousand beyond the lines, our numerical superiority would be an advantage hardly worth calculating upon. To counterbalance it entirely, again, it was to be considered that the enemy were all veteran troops; whilst of ours, the larger proportion were raw levies of Portuguese and Spaniards, in many instances wretchedly officered, and in all, but little accustomed to field movements. **The Portuguese** had, indeed, behaved gallantly at *Busaco*; and we were disposed to place in them as much confidence as could be reposed in any soldiers as yet so imperfectly instructed in their duty; but we should have hardly looked to them for that regularity of manœuvre over a broken and varied tract of country, which we should be sure

to find in the well-trained troops to whom they would be opposed. Besides, our attack, if made at all, must be made without cannon ; for we had so completely destroyed the roads, and scarped the faces of the heights, that artillery could not be advanced, either by the one or the other, as long as an enemy lay before us to impede its progress. The enemy, therefore, if beaten at all—which was surely, under such circumstances, problematical—could not be beaten without a heavy loss on our side ; and that loss would, as a matter of course, fall upon the best men ; because such only would be found at their posts. Now if, again, the defeat were not perfect, if it amounted to anything less than a total rout and dissolution of the army, where would be the benefit arising from it ? Massena would retire upon some strong positions, disputing with us every inch of the country, and finally make his escape to the reinforcements in his rear ; whilst we should have exhausted ours, and crippled our whole resources, for the attainment of only a momentary advantage. Nay, it was far from being impossible, that whilst we were following up the corps opposed to us, others might advance upon the lines, of necessity feebly manned ; and should these be carried, not even the total destruction of Massena and his army would compensate for the misfortune. On all these accounts, and with the firm conviction on his mind, that

things were working as advantageously as he could desire, Lord Wellington determined to adhere to his defensive system ; and the event proved, that as his reasoning had not proceeded upon mistaken grounds, so the results to which it led were not fallacious.

Neither the time of our soldiers nor that of their chief was, however, wasted in idleness. The former were busily employed in the construction of new works, wherever their erection appeared at all desirable, and in giving additional solidity to those already thrown up ; till the lines became as perfect a specimen of a fortified position as it was possible for nature and art to produce. The latter was indefatigable in his exertions to bring his army into a condition of general efficiency, and his exertions were too judiciously applied not to be crowned with success. The Portuguese being now thoroughly amalgamated with the British troops, learned from them all those lessons which in after campaigns they turned to an excellent account ; and Beresford, to whom the entire merit of their first training is due, was in consequence relieved from all further responsibility in field operations. Every day brought in its improvements among them ; and the General was soon rewarded for all his trouble by the conviction that he might rely upon them almost as perfectly as upon his countrymen. Nor was Lord Wellington inattentive

to the comforts, and even luxuries of his followers. Provisions were abundant; there was no want of wine; and sports and amusements went on as if we had been, not at the seat of war, but in England. Officers of all ranks, and in every department, from the Commander-in-chief down to the regimental subaltern, occasionally enjoyed the field-sports of hunting, shooting, and fishing. The men, too, had their pastimes when not employed on duty; in a word, seldom has an army, occupying ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so many hours of relaxation, or contrived to unite so completely the pleasures of country life with the serious business of war. It is probably needless to add, that so great a show of security in their leader had the best possible effect upon the temper of the troops; or that the morale of the army was sustained, not more by a contemplation of things as they really were, than by a conviction that they must be going on prosperously, otherwise so much relaxation could not abound.

I have said that, in this interval of quiet, a variety of intercepted letters, as well private as official, fell into our hands. Among others, we were fortunate enough to become possessed of Massena's account of the battle of Busaco, given in a demi-official communication addressed to Berthier. It was rather a curious despatch, but contained, upon the whole, more of truth and can-

did admissions than were usually to be found in French reports of actions. He acknowledged that he had been repulsed in both attempts upon our position, with the loss of four thousand men, besides a large proportion of his best officers, whom he requested Berthier to replace without delay; and he stated the force with which he had attacked, almost exactly as it had been represented by Lord Wellington. Where alone he fell into error, was in representing Regnier's corps as having been opposed by a "colonne serrée" of twenty thousand men under Hill; whereas it is well known to every military man in our army, that the *colonne serrée* was a mode of formation of which Lord Wellington constantly disapproved. He had succeeded in overthrowing it at Vimiera, Talavera, and in this very affair of Busaco, and was not, therefore, likely to have adopted it on either occasion himself. But it was then so much in favour with the French generals, that they put no faith in any other method of fighting; and probably when Massena wrote his detail, he believed all that he was writing.

So passed the time, from the beginning of October, when we took up our ground at Torres Vedras, to the middle of November, when we were called upon to quit it. Rumours in abundance poured in upon us during this interval, some of them exhilarating enough, others sufficiently

gloomy; but as we seldom paid to such more attention than was their due, we rarely permitted them to exert any permanent influence over our feelings and expectations. The circumstance which served most decidedly to impress us with a belief that the enemy were far from being at their ease, was, that desertions from their army occurred daily; indeed, we received as many as 200 and 250 deserters in one week. Latterly, however, these became less frequent, and strange to say, several instances of the kind occurred amongst ourselves. We had, moreover, abundant sources of private gratification, in the many little fêtes and galas which from time to time occurred; more especially after the arrival of a king's messenger with crosses and medals for the army. But the gayest by far which took place at this time was held at Mafra, on the 7th of November, on which occasion Marshal Beresford was formally invested with the order of the Bath. The thing was conducted with great state and singular decorum, and gave universal satisfaction, both to the British officers and to the Portuguese inhabitants. At length, however, we were roused from this state of pleasurable inactivity, by a piece of intelligence which we were hardly prepared to receive, and which, in consequence, came upon us with a degree of surprise, of which I confess myself inadequate to convey any just idea.

On the 13th of November advices reached us, that a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand men was on its way to join the army of Massena ; that it had already passed the frontier ; and that the advance had arrived that day in Sabugal. At the same time we were perfectly aware that the enemy had for some time back been busily employed in the construction of a multitude of boats at Santarem ; and that these, with many already built, which had fallen into their hands, were mounted upon wheels, and put in a condition to be transported overland to any point where they might be needed. Whilst we were wavering between the belief that Massena meditated a retreat, and the notion that very possibly he might be disposed to make an attempt upon the fort of Lisbon from the opposite bank of the *Tagus*, intelligence came in, that not a man was to be seen, either at the outposts, or along the position which the French army had lately occupied. They broke up, it appeared, on the night of the 14th, and were departed ; but whether in full flight with a view to abandon Portugal, or merely for the purpose of taking up a winter's line, no one appeared to know. The movement was altogether as sudden and as unlooked-for as frequently occurs in war ; and it threw us, for a time, into a state of amazement, which instantly set all our speculating propensities into full play.

One idea, and not entirely a visionary one, was, that Massena despairing of success, at least during the present season, had determined to fall back upon Spain; that his wheeled boats were destined to supply the place of bridges over the Zezere, or, in case of need, over the Tagus; and that in the mean while he was retrograding by Thomar and Estrada-nova, for the purpose of meeting and carrying along with him the corps which had arrived at Sabugal. It was objected, however, to this, that nothing short of the most pressing necessity could justify a measure, which, besides the immediate abandonment of Portugal, must produce the very worst effects upon the French interests in Spain; and the objection, to say the least of it, was not more wanting in force, than the supposition which it was brought forward to combat. True, the army might have exhausted, and they probably had exhausted, the supplies which their confined situation furnished; and hence it became necessary to shift their ground, for the purpose of meeting the force now on its march, and the stores it was supposed to convey; but a flight into Spain was, upon more mature deliberation, pronounced improbable; and hence other and no less feasible theories were started to supply the place of that rejected as soon as proposed.

It was supposed, first, that Massena, guessing that we might be informed of his coming reinforce-

ment, had become apprehensive of a disposition, on our part, to attack him before it arrived; and that he deemed it a wise measure to fall back upon stronger ground, there to await its junction. Secondly, and this was the most general opinion of the whole, it was surmised that he intended to attempt the reduction of Abrantes by bombardment and assault, the fall of which would supply him with numerous means of every sort for the future prosecution of a scheme, upon which, at present, he was manifestly too weak to think of embarking. It was therefore believed that the French army designed to place itself in position behind the Zezere; from whence it might oppose a formidable barrier to any efforts on our part, for the relief of a fortress, the possession of which would be of incalculable advantage to them, whenever they should find themselves sufficiently strong to advance again upon the capital.

Abrantes had long been put in an excellent state of defence, and it was garrisoned by no fewer than two regiments of the line and three of militia; had it been left, therefore, entirely to its own resources, there was every prospect of its holding out vigorously. This, however, was not the first occasion on which we had been alarmed for its safety; and measures had in consequence been adopted, which placed it further beyond the risk, not only of capture, but of insult. General Fane,

with a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, accompanied by several guns and a howitzer, had been passed over the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march along the southern bank of the river, and to destroy, if possible, any boats which he might observe in progress of preparation at Santarem or elsewhere. He had obeyed these orders, and kept up a long and warm cannonade on the enemy's incipient flotilla; but his howitzer having been disabled, his round-shot proved of little utility; and as no attempt was made with the Congreve rockets, which now, for the first time, might have been brought into play, the enemy succeeded in completing the task which they had begun, and in furnishing themselves with ample means to cross the rivers at their pleasure. This was certainly unfortunate, seeing that all the bridges had been carefully destroyed in their rear; and they were, to a certain degree, hemmed in between unfordable streams on one hand, and our impassable lines on the other; but there was no help for it; and Fane, finding his exertions profitless, went into cantonments. He was thus circumstanced in quarters opposite to Santarem, when the retreat of the French began, and accordingly in a situation to render to the garrison of Abrantes, in case of an attack, the most powerful and opportune assistance.

The enemy's movement commenced from the right of the line from Ribaldeira, Sobral, and Villa

Franca; consequently the first alarm was given by General Campbell's division upon our left. Lord Wellington instantly wrote to Admiral Berkeley, to request that he would send up the launches and boats of his fleet, in order that means might be at hand to pass over General Hill's or any other corps which might be selected, to the left bank of the Tagus. At the same time, General Crawford's division was ordered to advance from the Arruda heights to Alenquer; and General Hill's, from Alhandra to Villa Franca, with directions to feel their way further to the front, but to act with caution. On the 15th, it was discovered that the enemy were moving the whole of their force on the great road by the Tagus, a small detachment only being left to protect the path which leads by Alcantara and Rio Major to Santarem. As soon as this was known, General Spencer's division pushed into Sobral and Alenquer; whilst Crawford, pressing forward from the latter place to Villa Nova and Azembaja, discovered the enemy's rear-guard in position between it and Cartaxo. These last-mentioned movements occurred on the 16th; on which day likewise the head-quarters were transferred to Alenquer; but as it was of essential importance that we should be fully informed respecting the enemy's probable designs, before we committed ourselves too far by any more rapid pursuit, a halt was ordered to take place on the

17th, in order that time might be granted for the arrival of a report from General Fane, whose situation gave him excellent opportunities of watching with effect the movement of Massena's columns.

The report in question arrived in due time, and it led us to believe that the enemy were continuing their retreat from Santarem, and that nothing more than a strong rear-guard remained behind for the purpose of covering the movement. It may be advisable to state here that the position of Santarem is exceedingly formidable, and that it cannot be turned except by a very large army, and at the expense of much time and fatigue in making a lengthened detour. We were, therefore, far from experiencing regret, that Massena had not deemed it advisable to offer us battle on that line, more especially as his abandonment of the strong ground left us at liberty to look to the protection of Abrantes, and to throw such a force there as might act with effect upon the enemy's flank, under cover of the p ace. Under these circumstances, Lord Wellington determined to establish his head-quarters at Santarem, to push on Crawford further in front, and to bring up the whole of his army in the same direction, except Hill's corps only, which, crossing the river at Vee-lada in boats, and returning again by the bridge below Abrantes, would be able to harass and im-

pede the enemy's communications, and render great assistance to us in our projected operations. This was the more to be reckoned upon, because Massena possessed but a single bridge across the Zezere ; and as he must move his entire army in one column, it was not probable that he could do so with such rapidity as to insure its passage unmolested from either quarter.

The troops being put in motion for these several purposes, it was soon discovered that General Fane's first report respecting the enemy's designs was not likely to be realised, and that they had assumed the position from which we thought they would have retired. The advance, under Crawford, found Santarem occupied by what appeared at first to be a strong rear-guard, but which proved in the end to be the second corps which had there taken up its cantonments. Upon this the head-quarters, attended by Spencer's division, were established at Cartaxo ; General Cotton's cavalry were sent forward to join the light division ; General Anson's brigade took the road to Aleventre and Rio Major ; and the fourth and fifth divisions fixed themselves at Alenquer and Sobral ; whilst the sixth remained stationary at Ribaldeira, and the third at Torres Vedras.

Our army had not long taken up its new alignment, when it was satisfactorily ascertained that the enemy were strengthening and disposing them-

selves in a very judicious manner, for the double purposes, as it appeared, of securing comfortable winter-quarters, and protecting, from the side of Abrantes, all such supplies and reinforcements as might be on the way to join them. Whilst the second corps garrisoned Santarem, the eighth took possession of a line of cantonments on the right, extending by Torres Novas all the way to Thomar. Here part of the sixth corps was established; and about four thousand infantry, with three hundred cavalry, passed the Zezere, for the purpose of establishing a tête-de-pont; for the bridge, it appeared, was already all but complete, though boats continued to be constructed in Santarem, and were hourly in movement towards the river. With respect, again, to the reinforcements, their advance was reported to be at Pinhel, whither they had arrived after sustaining a sharp action with the corps of General Silveira. The latter having come upon them at Valverde somewhat by surprise, succeeded in killing three hundred, and taking many prisoners; but as the enemy were reported to amount to fifteen thousand men, Silveira could not venture to follow up the success which he obtained. On the contrary, he very prudently retired behind the Douro, as soon as he had struck his blow; and the French, leaving a detachment to watch him, pushed on with the main body in the direction of Massena's

army. From all these particulars, we were led to the conclusion, that Massena entertained no design of evacuating Portugal ; but that he would remain where he was, till the junction of fresh troops, and the arrival of a more favourable season, should enable him once more to act upon the offensive.

Affairs continued in this state without the occurrence of any event calculated to interrupt our tranquillity, up to a late date in December. For some time the weather was so boisterous, and the rain fell in such constant torrents, as effectually to hinder any military operations from being undertaken ; and when these obstacles ceased to exist, the policy both of the English and French generals equally restrained them from entering upon a winter's campaign. Information, in the mean while, continued daily to accumulate upon us, and much of it was from a source which left no reason to doubt of its authenticity ; whilst the burden of the whole tended to strengthen our conviction, that another struggle for the preservation of Portugal must take place in the spring. Of the various rumours which reached us, it will be necessary to repeat only such as most deeply interested us at the moment ; and these I proceed to give in the order in which they came in.

We learned that the head of the enemy's reinforcement, which Silveira had encountered by the

way, was now in communication with Massena's line, and that it had closed in somewhere between the extreme right at Leira, and the extreme left at Santarem. Of the numbers which composed the entire force, a variety of accounts were in circulation, some rating it as high as fifteen or twenty thousand men, others taking it considerably below that estimate; but whatever its aggregate strength might be, no more than five thousand men had as yet arrived; nor were the remainder, as far as we could learn, ascertained to be near at hand. The reinforcement in question had, it appeared, been obtained by a forward movement of the ninth corps under Drouet; which, taking possession of the posts and cantonments on the frontier, hitherto occupied by detachments from Massena's army, enabled these detachments to proceed to their several corps. We had no reason to believe that any part of Drouet's corps was actually employed in Portugal; by many, indeed, it was imagined, that being under the orders of Joseph, it could not be moved out of Spain unless by express directions from Paris; but one of its divisions had certainly marched to the very extremity of its province; and thus the whole of Massena's three corps were rendered effective. At the same time other corps, which had been scattered through Castile, were represented as having fallen back upon Madrid; and the province, thus relieved from the presence

of the enemy, was again in a state of rebellion. Don Julian, the gallant partisan, whose services at Ciudad Rodrigo obtained for him so much well-merited renown, was once more in arms. He was preparing to attack Zamora, where a very feeble garrison had been left; and the probabilities were, that unless fresh forces speedily came up to take the stations which Drouet had abandoned, that part of Spain would become as hostile as ever.

With respect to Portugal, we heard that Silveira's affair had occurred with a detached corps, which had been thrown across the Coa to protect the march of the main body hither, by way of Sabugal, Castello Branco, and Cardijos. The Portuguese general, though deeming it prudent to retire, still held Francola with his outposts; and the enemy continued to maintain a small body of troops on the other side of the Coa, on purpose to watch him. In the mean while, Trant was at Coimbra, where all remained perfectly quiet; though his advance, under Wilson, had lately fallen back to Espinhel; whilst General Hill's movement on the left bank of the Tagus had been arrested at Chamuca. The necessity for his entrance into Abrantes no longer existing, Lord Wellington did not consider it prudent to push him on thither, as long as the enemy abstained from making some decided demonstration of their design to attack the place; and all their late ope-

rations seemed to imply that they meditated nothing more than defensive operations during the winter. It was very evident, likewise, that General Hill's march had seriously alarmed them for the safety of their expected reinforcements; and that they looked to Abrantes with apprehension, rather than with any hope of being able to make themselves masters of it; for they broke up the roads which lead from thence to Punhete, and otherwise strove to interrupt all communication between the Zezere and the town.

I have spoken hitherto of the dispositions of the French general in terms more vague perhaps than their nature, and the results to which they promised to lead, seem to demand. The line which Massena at present occupied was one of great extent—insomuch that it might, at almost any point, be pierced, and the position of Santarem, and the troops cantoned there, completely isolated; yet was it one, taking into consideration certain disadvantages under which we laboured, demonstrative of judgment in the individual who selected it. Were we disposed to try its strength, we must advance to the attack over a country low and flat, and at present everywhere under water, leaving, at the same time, numerous openings by which a spirited enemy might, in the mean while, penetrate into our lines in the rear. Now, in spirit and enterprise, no one can accuse French soldiers of

being deficient, and as they were aware of our difficulties, little doubt could be entertained that they would greedily take advantage of them. On the other hand, Massena had possessed himself of a district rich in corn; he possessed ample stores of cattle; and he enjoyed the prospect of living at least as well as he could do in any part of Spain. His communications with his rear were now more secured by means of the troops whom he had lately brought up; his flanks were equally safe, notwithstanding the proximity of Abrantes; and as most of the country people whom we had swept away with us had little by little returned to their homes, there appeared to be no difficulty whatever in his establishing himself where he was during the winter. But if such were really his design, why continue to crowd forward so many masses, which, were it intended to pass any length of time in a state of quiet, had much better be dispersed in cantonments more remote from one another? His present mode of proceeding must lead to a consumption of his means more rapid by far than was accordant with sound policy;—could it be that Massena entertained serious thoughts of resuming the offensive at once? This was a grave question at the moment; and it involved many other considerations, not less important and weighty than itself.

It was not to be expected that the enemy would

a second time make their attempt upon Lisbon by one side of the Tagus only, leaving to us the undisputed command of that river, and of both of its banks. They had already suffered so much from their neglect on this head, that nothing short of infatuation could lead them into it again. On the contrary, it required but a moderate degree of foresight to discover, that let the attempt be made when it would, a strong corps would be pushed along the left of the river, and the most strenuous exertions set on foot to molest the harbour, and all that came out and in, from the point of Almada. It accordingly became a matter of serious importance to us, that a position should be marked out and strongly fortified on the one bank as well as on the other. This was the more necessary, as, although Admiral Berkeley, when first consulted, had given it as his decided opinion, that the lines of Torres Vedras with the inner circle of works about Fort St. Julien would, at any moment and under any circumstances, secure, in case of need, the safe embarkation of the troops, the late alarm induced him to come to a different persuasion; and he now conceived, that unless something were done to fortify the left as well as the right side of the harbour, the shipping, in case of a reverse at our lines, would be exposed to danger. Guided in part by this consideration, and in part by the conviction, that such a chain of posts would enable him to

employ Hill's or any other corps with perfect security on the opposite bank, Lord Wellington determined to construct there an intrenched position, similar to that which he had constructed at Torres Vedras; and early in the winter the engineers, with as many troops and artificers as could be spared for the purpose, were employed in its formation.

The new line of redoubts extended across that neck of land which is formed by a bed of the river on one side, and by an inflexion of the sea on the other; and it was of a formidable nature. In addition to this, great care was bestowed in strengthening the inner circle of Fort St. Julien, and at both points the heaviest ordnance at our command, chiefly twenty-four pounders, were mounted. By this means our capabilities of defence were brought to a state of perfection, as high as was compatible with the end proposed, and the difficulties to be overcome. But after all, the great question was, whether, in case of an extremity, any works would suffice to cover the escape of an army so numerous as that now under Lord Wellington's command. There could be no doubt that both banks of the river were well guarded—that is to say, the new lines around Almada effectually covered the southern side; whilst the fortifications about St. Julien protected the bay and place of embarkation in all directions; but the question still remained to be



answered,—was it possible for a force of forty thousand men to escape in the face of such an army, as should be capable of driving it from the double line of Torres Vedras, back to the sea? It was quite evident that nothing short of an overwhelming superiority in numbers could ever force our first lines of defence. That superiority, however, were it such as to obtain this advantage, would likewise be competent to bear down all opposition which might afterwards be offered; and therefore our surest hope, I say not of ultimate triumph, but even of safety, lay in our success in the field. Of success, however, we must be doubtful, unless support should be given to us with the same unsparing liberality with which it was afforded to the enemy; and hence all felt, even now when the tide seemed to have turned slightly in our favour, that at no period since the commencement of the struggle did we stand in greater need of fresh troops of all arms and descriptions from England. There could be little doubt that Napoleon would, at length, be roused from the apparent apathy with which he had hitherto regarded the affairs of Portugal. The probability was, that the return of spring at the latest would bring to Massena such an addition of strength as we, with our present numbers, could not hope successfully to oppose in the field; and then we should be compelled to retire once more within our lines,

and the war would become one, not of personal contests, but of resources. Now, though we had heretofore sustained this species of warfare successfully, it was not to be expected that we could continue to do so for ever; and hence our most fervent wishes were, either that Massena might find himself under the necessity of abandoning Portugal before his supplies could reach him, or that we might receive such an addition to our means, as would enable us to bring matters to the issue of a battle, with something like a fair prospect of victory.

Whilst we were thus speculating, and whilst part of our people were employed in giving additional strength to the works in our rear, few events took place calculated to exert any degree of influence over the final issue of the war. I have mentioned the arrival of five thousand men at Massena's cantonments, and spoken of them as forming part of a considerable division, which the advance of Drouet's corps, and its occupation of the posts upon the frontier, set at liberty to move towards the front. The remainder followed their leading brigades, but after reaching the Zezere, retreated again, with the loss of many hundred men, through the operation of parties of guerillas upon their rear and flanks. For some days they were not heard of; but at length a report came in, that a corps had made its appearance on the Coa,

and that having crossed that stream, it was in full march towards the front. Whether this were the same body which, after reaching the Zezere, had fallen back without so much as opening a communication with Massena, we found it impossible accurately at this time to ascertain; indeed, our information went no further than to establish the fact, that it consisted of about sixteen thousand men, and that its march was conducted with great deliberation, as if to protect a convoy. But the impression made upon us was, that the corps in question either consisted solely of the same troops who had formerly made an attempt to join, or that they and part of Drouet's corps had united to make the number; and the information which we afterwards received went to satisfy us that the latter instructions had been correct. Though harassed as the rest had been, they succeeded in reaching their destination; and they made up the whole of the additional force which Massena received during the winter.

In the mean while, the French Marshal was waiting anxiously for advices from Paris, whither he had despatched General Foy, some weeks previously, with a statement of the situation and prospects of his army.¹

¹ I have noticed this mission, chiefly because it furnishes me with an opportunity of saying a few words touching statements

The position which he had taken up at Santarem, however, he carefully and industriously improved, by covering the face of the hill with three lines of abatis, or otherwise intrenching the corps to which its defence was intrusted. It ought to be observed here, that though Santarem lay considerably in advance of the rest of his line, and was, as I have already hinted, to a certain degree, isolated and detached, it was not on that account the less favourable to his general defence. On the contrary, though other points might be easily pierced, no advantage could be taken of the success obtained, whilst this projecting post remained in the hands of the enemy; whilst its natural and artificial strength were both such, as to render any attempt upon it, with our present means, in the highest degree hazardous and uncertain. Thus

which have appeared in a History of the Peninsular War by General Foy, and which has of late attracted some attention among his countrymen. The General, on his arrival at Paris, published in the *Moniteur* a variety of accounts, relative to the conduct of his fellow-soldiers, and the dispositions of the English army. In these I can by no means concur. For example: He assured the French public, that whilst multitudes daily came over from our camp, the crime of desertion was hardly known in the French army; whereas the returns in my possession distinctly prove that we took in no fewer than 733 deserters in the course of three months. But I feel delicacy in pressing, as an adverse military writer, our differences of opinion further.

were we kept at bay by a line, abundantly accessible in every direction save one ; because from that one our own flanks and rear were in danger, should we venture to try the fortune of an action in any other quarter.

There is but one other circumstance to which I consider it necessary to allude before closing this chapter, and with it the history of the campaign of 1810. December was far advanced, when an officer attached to the staff of Massena's army, who was proceeding towards Ciudad Rodrigo in the disguise of a peasant, fell into the hands of some of our flying parties, and was brought in to head-quarters. From him we learned that the Marshal had received no communications from France since he first entered Portugal, and that he was now labouring under the greatest anxiety for the arrival both of intelligence and instructions. Our prisoner had been sent, it appeared, to meet whatever corps or messengers might be upon the way for the purpose of hurrying them on with as few delays as possible ; and though he was evidently a man in whom no confidence had been reposed, he spoke with so great an appearance of candour and openness, that we felt little disposed to doubt the truth of his assertions. He informed us that Massena had resolved not to attack our lines, unless he should be reinforced by a corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men ; and that in

case these failed in arriving, he had determined to fall back, for the winter, by Castello Branco and Alcantara, into Spain. The advantages which he proposed to obtain by this movement were, a concentration with the armies operating in that portion of the Peninsula, and the reduction of the city of Badajoz, which would enable him, on the return of spring, to debouch once more into Portugal, with two large armies, one in the Alentejo, and the other on the right bank of the Tagus. Our informant further assured us, that instead of having corn and supplies in abundance at their command, the French were suffering grievously for everything. Their ammunition, their medicines, their shoes, their clothing, and provisions, were all at the lowest ebb; whilst their linen, an article upon which the welfare of an army depends in no ordinary degree, was almost entirely exhausted. Finally, he said that Massena was on bad terms with all his generals, Loison and Freire being the only individuals among them with whom he kept up any great intimacy; that there were full ten thousand sick in the hospitals; and that the entire force of infantry and cavalry which they were capable of bringing under arms, did not exceed forty thousand men.

The only fact in all this information which we felt disposed to question, was, the reported design of Massena to abandon Portugal. There ap-

peared to be no necessity for this measure, and many good reasons against it; and, therefore, we still inclined to the opinion, that whether he withdrew behind the Mondego or not, he would not withdraw further, but endeavour, keeping his communications open all the while with his rear, to obtain possession of as large a portion of the country as might be practicable. This, however, he would do, only provided he were left to the guidance of his own judgment; for, should a peremptory order to advance arrive from Paris, advance he must and would at all hazards. In the latter case, we were aware, from other sources, that he was prepared to sacrifice twenty thousand men in the attempt to possess himself of our lines; and that the attempt would be made both with judgment and vigour, we clearly foresaw. But of the result of any such endeavour, no one could for a moment doubt; and hence no one looked forward to the probability of its occurrence with the slightest alarm, or even anxiety.

Such was our state, and such our prospects and expectations, during the winter of 1810. On the side of Abrantes all was safe; the French having resolved, and wisely resolved, not to besiege it; whilst Silveira, who on the approach of the reinforcements had retired across the Coa, was again in readiness to act, as soon as an opening should be given on the rear of the enemy. In the mean

while, Trant and Bucellar were on the alert at Coimbra; and Wilson, retreating from Espinhel, threw himself with his corps on the other side of the Mondego. The latter movement, was, indeed, on one account, a subject of regret to us, inasmuch as it deprived us of our readiest and surest source of intelligence, which could henceforth be obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was made under the impression that a further continuance in Espinhel would be hazardous, and could not be risked. With respect to the French, again, they, like ourselves, rested quiet. Their position was, as I have already stated, a good one, and it was now greatly improved by their obtaining permanent possession of one bank of the Mondego; by which not only their flank, but all their marches from the rear were, to a certain degree, secured. But there were a variety of causes at work competent, in due time, to disturb this state of apparent tranquillity; and the spring can hardly be said to have set in, ere they came powerfully into operation.

Before closing this chapter, which terminates the campaign of 1810, it would be injustice not to record the extraordinary zeal, ability, and activity, which were displayed in two departments of our army; I mean, the commissariat under Sir R. Kennedy, and the medical department under Dr. Frank. It is not my province to eulogise; but as

the existence and life of the soldier depended upon the direction of the latter with his valuable assistants, and the comfort and sustenance upon the former, it is impossible that I should refrain, as adjutant-general of the army, from adding my mite of gratitude to these two very meritorious public officers. And I must say that, when Dr. Frank afterwards from illness left the army, it occasioned one general sentiment of deep public regret.

CHAPTER III.

State of affairs on the southern frontier—Advance of Soult against Badajoz—Capture of Olivença, and investment of Badajoz—General Mendizabal defeated, and Badajoz taken—Campo Mayor reduced—Massena breaks up from Santarem, and retreats into Spain—Marshal Beresford marches towards Badajoz—Attack of a French convoy at Campo Mayor—The British corps passes the Guadiana, reduces Olivença, and invests Badajoz—Lord Wellington visits this corps, and gives directions for the siege—Is recalled to the north, where the army remains in position round Fuentes de Honor.

BEFORE pursuing further the fortunes of Massena, and the movements of the divisions immediately opposed to him, it will be necessary, in as few words as possible, to make the reader acquainted with certain transactions which had been going on elsewhere.

Whilst the whole of the allied army was collected in the lines of Torres Vedras, and its attention turned almost exclusively to the defence of Lisbon, Soult, having assembled about thirteen or

fourteen thousand men in the south of Spain, advanced on Badajoz, for the purpose of effecting a diversion on the side of Alentejo, and opening a communication across the Tagus with Massena. Generals Ballasteros and Mendizabal, who, on the departure of Romana, commanded in that quarter, found themselves unable to oppose him. The former accordingly moved to his right upon Salvatierra and the lower parts of the Guadiana; whilst the latter, leaving seven battalions with a brigade of field artillery in Olivença, retreated across the river. Olivença was not a place of extraordinary strength; and had the reverse been the case, the neglect of Mendizabal to supply it with a competent store of provisions would have rendered the strength of its fortifications profitless: it was blockaded on the 11th of January, and on the 22nd famine compelled the garrison to surrender.

Having taken measures for rendering Olivença a place of arms in support of his future operations, Soult detached Mortier's corps on the 26th to invest Badajoz; and the investment was at once completed on the left of the Guadiana by the infantry; whilst the cavalry, under General Latour Maubourg, patrolled round the right. No great while elapsed ere the investment was converted into a siege. Ground was broken on the 28th, and an attack directed against the Pardaleras outwork, which was battered from the Sierra del Viento,

and enfiladed from a parallel at two hundred and fifty yards distant; and a breach being effected on the 11th of February, the Pardaleras was, on the same night, stormed, and carried with very little opposition.

As soon as the movement of Marshal Soult was known at Cartaxo, Lord Wellington despatched his Spanish corps into the Alentejo, that it might co-operate with Mendizabal for the protection of that frontier; and he pointed out a position to the north of Badajoz, having its right protected by Fort St. Christoval, and its front covered by the Gevora, as the best which the Spanish army could take up, for the purpose of keeping open a communication with the town in case it should be attacked. Unfortunately, the brave Romana, who, more than all the rest of the Spanish generals put together, had obtained and merited our confidence and respect, was unable to accompany his corps. He was now labouring under a severe malady, which, on the 27th of January, terminated his existence. But the division made good its position; the post recommended was assumed on the 9th of February; and it proved a constant source of anxiety to the besiegers, and of confidence to the besieged, by covering the introduction of numerous supplies into the place. The enemy saw its importance, and determined, at all hazards, to carry it; and the improvidence of the Spanish General

was not long in furnishing them with the opportunity which they so much desired.

It happened that a howitzer or two, from the opposite bank of the river, were enabled to throw a few shells into the ground of the Spanish encampment, which, without doing much real mischief, harassed and annoyed the men. Mendizabal, very unwisely, paid to the matter a degree of attention which it did not merit; and to get rid of the nuisance, moved the whole of his army to its left, completely out of the protection of Fort St. Christoval. The enemy perceived his error, and lost not a moment in availing themselves of it. Mortier established a flying bridge upon the Guadiana above the town, and crossed over in the night of the 18th; whilst six thousand men from the besieging army forded the Gevora, and attacked the Spaniards at daylight. The resistance made was as trifling as might have been expected from bad troops, deprived of all the advantages of position; and out of nine thousand infantry, and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, of which Mendizabal's corps had consisted, only three thousand five hundred made their escape. Three thousand fled to Badajoz, where they were shut up with the rest of the garrison; whilst five hundred retired upon Elvas, under the command of Don Carlos de España.

The siege was now carried on with renewed

vigour, and the Governor being killed, the command devolved upon General Imaz, an officer who felt no disposition to emulate the renown of Palafox and Alvarez. A breach, exceedingly imperfect in kind, was no sooner effected, than Imaz proposed a capitulation; and on the 11th of March, at a moment when he knew, from telegraphic despatches, that Massena was in full retreat, and that forces were on their way to relieve the place, he marched out nine thousand troops into the ditch, who layed down their arms to a similar number of French infantry, with some six or eight hundred cavalry, the total amount of the besieging army. Had the slightest resolution existed in the breast of that man, Badajoz might have been preserved; and all the blood which was afterwards spilled in retaking it, might, as a necessary consequence, have been saved.

Mortier's next business was to invest Campo Mayor, with a corps of five thousand infantry, and six hundred cavalry. Campo Mayor is a large frontier town, supplied originally with tolerable fortifications; but which had of late been sadly neglected, and were of course falling to decay. Five thousand men is the smallest number which would be required to garrison it; but at present it was held by no more than two hundred militia, under the command of Major Talliaia, of the Portuguese engineers. That officer's means in cannon

and stores were as feeble as his force in men ; there were but five pieces of artillery mounted on the ramparts ; yet he compelled the enemy to proceed against him with all the order of a siege ; nor was it till a practicable breach had been formed in the body of the place, that he would listen to any proposal of surrender. At last, however, seeing his defences ruined, and the enemy prepared to storm, he stipulated for a delay of twenty-four hours, in the hope that relief might arrive ; and none appearing, he very reluctantly gave up the town on the 23rd of March.

In the mean while affairs were drawing rapidly to a crisis on the north side of the Tagus. Though their change of situation conduced, for a short time, very considerably to the comforts of Massena and his army, it was quite impossible that a country already exhausted could long support the burden which the presence of some fifty or sixty thousand men, besides horses and other animals, laid upon it ; and this the French General began, by degrees, to feel very sensibly. His troops became every day more and more sickly ; provisions became every day scarcer, and forage was not to be procured by any exertions. The reinforcements, too, for which he had waited so long and so patiently, came not up, by any means, to his wants or his wishes ; indeed, the fresh regiments marched into his line were not sufficiently nume-

rous to fill up the gaps which the casualties of war had already occasioned there. Massena felt that the moment for offensive operations had passed away. Whether he regretted that he had not hazarded an attack upon our lines, at a moment when their yet imperfect state held out some chances of success, I know not ; but certain it is, that he soon began, after his assumption of the position at Santarem, to prepare for a retreat. Parties were continually employed upon the Zezere, constructing bridges, and throwing up works for their defence ; his sick and wounded were gradually, quietly, and cautiously, transferred to the rear ; and at the beginning of March 1811, there remained in his camp, besides some heavy artillery of little value, only the men and horses fit for duty, with as many stores, guns, ammunition-waggons, and tumbrils, as appeared necessary for their use. Everything, however, was done with so much address, that except of the fact that two bridges instead of one were now upon the Zezere, we were kept in profound ignorance as to his proceedings, and we continued to the last to cast anxious glances towards Abrantes, for the safety of which we conceived that there were still good grounds of apprehension.

I have stated that, on the breaking up of the French army from before the lines of Torres Vedras, General Hill's division was sent across the

Tagus, for the purpose of giving additional security to the garrison of Abrantes, and of embarrassing Massena's movements, should he either attempt to retire by the Alentejo, or take the route of Punhete. As soon as the operations of Soult's army became known, Marshal Beresford's corps was likewise thrown across the river, with a view of raising the siege of Badajoz, and giving relief to the Spanish corps, already hard-pressed upon the frontier. Beresford had not yet begun his march southward, when certain indications of a movement on the part of Massena, induced Lord Wellington to delay his progress. Instead of marching towards Badajoz, he was directed to advance upon Abrantes, and, repassing the Tagus there, to threaten the enemy's posts at Punhete; and a portion of his corps, under Major-general the Honourable William Stewart, had actually obeyed these instructions, when the enemy's designs became suddenly developed. On the night of the 5th of March, Massena decamped from his position at Santarem, and concentrating the whole of his army about Pombal, made demonstrations there, as if he were not only willing, but anxious, to rest the fate of the campaign upon the issue of a general action.

On the 6th of March the head-quarters of the allied army were established at Santarem, and dispositions were made for pursuing the enemy

along the road which his main body had taken, and dislodging him from the several posts which he retained in other quarters. General Stewart's brigade passed the Zezere, and advanced, together with the 4th, the 6th, and part of the 1st divisions, towards Thomar, where the French seemed at first disposed to collect in force; whilst the light division, supported by the 1st German huzzars and royal dragoons, proceeded at a quick pace towards Pombal. At Thomar no encounter took place, the enemy retreating, on the appearance of our people, towards the Mondego; but at Pombal there was some fighting, and hopes were at one moment entertained, that there would be a good deal more. Our leading brigade came up with the fugitives on the 9th, and succeeded, after a brief but smart skirmish, in capturing about two hundred prisoners; and on the 11th dispositions were made for bringing the enemy to action, by the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light divisions, assembled for the purpose. But Massena, instead of waiting to be assailed, broke up during the night, and fell back, covered by the whole of Montbrun's cavalry, by the 6th corps of infantry, and by part of the 8th, in the direction of Redenha. On the 12th, a strong rear-guard was seen posted at the end of a defile, in front of the village. It was immediately attacked by three divisions of infantry, by General Pack's Portu-

guese brigade, and the cavalry; and after an obstinate resistance, was driven through the defile to the plain beyond. It next retreated to some high and broken ground, where it again showed a front; but from this position also it was compelled to retire with some loss; and finally it withdrew to Condeixa, where the main body had established itself.

The enemy's force assembled here consisted of the 6th, 8th, and 9th corps; of the whole of Massena's army in short, except the 2nd corps, which continued still at Espinhel. The ground which they occupied was singularly commanding; and as it could not be attempted in front, without a sacrifice of lives much greater than either his feelings or policy induced Lord Wellington to risk, arrangements were made for turning it. The third division, under General Picton, made a long and tedious detour to the right; but it succeeded in throwing itself upon the left of the enemy's line, which instantly broke into column of march, and fell back. Similar movements were effected with similar results during several successive days; and the enemy, diverted from his original intention of passing part of his force over the Mondego at Coimbra, continued his retreat, in a single continuous column, along the road which winds between the river and the Sierra de Estrella. The consequence was, that he passed over little

else than a succession of admirable positions ; and as he took care to cover his marches with the best of his cavalry, with a force of infantry which never fell short of ten thousand men, and with only one brigade of guns admirably horsed, his retrogression was conducted in good order, and with as little loss as could well befall an army whilst executing a manœuvre of the kind. On one occasion only were the French in danger of being dragged into a general action, at manifest disadvantage to themselves. Whilst crossing the Coera, the allies pressed so closely upon them, that to save his main body, Massena was content to sacrifice a considerable portion of his rear-guard, which, halting to be attacked, was cut to pieces ; whilst the columns escaped, with the loss of some artillery and a great deal of baggage. It is, however, extremely probable that all Massena's precautions would have failed to preserve him, had it been possible to transport stores and provisions as rapidly as our troops were capable of marching ; but on the 19th, it was found that the columns had outstripped their supplies, and a halt of some days was necessary, to give the latter time to overtake them.

As it was not my good fortune to be an eyewitness of this memorable retreat, having been obliged to leave the army from severe illness for three months, I shall not pretend to enter mi-

nutely into details of which I could speak only upon the reports of others. It is sufficient to observe that Massena finally escaped to a position on the Spanish side of the Agueda, after having exhibited numerous proofs of capacity to direct the movements of a retreating force, and leaving behind him some sad memorials of the absence of all humane feelings from among his soldiery. The line of the enemy's march could, indeed, be everywhere traced by the smoke of cottages, hamlets, and towns, which they reduced to ashes; and even those which escaped the ravages of the flames, were left in a state of total dilapidation and absolute destitution. Of the acts of personal violence which they committed, I would rather not from hearsay give a relation; but this much may be said, that the Portuguese must cease to feel as men commonly feel, if they ever forget the conduct of an army, which entered their country with the warmest protestations of friendship, and in whose promises of protection too many were tempted to place reliance. Even the towns which had given shelter to the head-quarters of the French generals were not spared. Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, were all of them sacked on the evening previous to their evacuation; the convent of Alcobaca was burned to the ground; the Bishop's palace, and the whole town of Leiria, shared the same fate;—in a word, it seemed as if these men

had resolved to make a desert of the country which they had failed to conquer; and that the war, which they professed at first to wage only with the English and their armed partisans, had been turned against its peaceable inhabitants.

The last stand which the enemy made on the present occasion, took place near Sabugal, and proved highly honourable to the British arms. On the 3rd of April, the second corps was seen in position, with its right immediately above the bridge and town of Sabugal; and its left extended along the road to Alfayates, so as to command all the approaches from the fords of the Coa towards the upper part of the town. Lord Wellington made his dispositions to attack it in front, flank, and rear, at the same moment; and but for the unfortunate occurrence of a sudden shower of rain, it would have been, in all probability, annihilated. But though it escaped being surrounded, it made not good its retreat till after it had suffered a severe loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and an opportunity had been given to one brigade of the light division, which, single-handed, maintained the unequal contest for some time, of increasing the well-earned reputation which that peculiarly-distinguished division had already acquired. After this, Massena withdrew entirely into Spain; Almeida was blockaded; and Lord Wellington, leaving Sir Brent Spencer to conduct that service,

as well as to provide against emergencies in front, hurried away towards Badajoz, where his presence began about this time to be seriously needed.

It has been stated that Marshal Beresford was already moving to raise the siege of Badajoz, and arrest the progress of Soult in that quarter, when the unexpected concentration of Massena's forces at Pombal, induced Lord Wellington to recall him to his assistance. On the 17th, however, when all hope of fighting a general battle was laid aside, the Marshal prepared to resume his original undertaking; and putting himself at the head of the 2nd and 4th British, and General Hamilton's Portuguese division, with the 13th light dragoons, some heavy cavalry, and two brigades of artillery, he crossed the Tagus at Tancos. Marshal Beresford proceeded by way of Ponte de Lor, Oralo, and Portalegre, to Campo Mayor, where he arrived on the 25th. The enemy had just evacuated the town; and a considerable convoy of artillery, ammunition-waggons, and strings of loaded mules, was seen travelling under the escort of three battalions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, towards Badajoz. An immediate pursuit was ordered, and the allied cavalry was not long in overtaking the convoy, which made ready to receive them. General Latour Maubourg, who commanded on the occasion, formed his infantry into two solid squares, which he supported by placing his cavalry on the

right ; but a brilliant charge from two squadrons of the 13th, in which a similar force of Portuguese took part, overthrew the French cavalry, and gave to the allies momentary possession of the entire convoy. The ardour of pursuit, however, carried the conquerors too far. They followed the flying cavalry under the guns of Badajoz, and suffered, in consequence, some loss ; whilst they gave to the squares an opportunity of retiring in good order, against which they could not, in their scattered state, make any impression. The consequence was, that before any portion of the British infantry was enabled to come up, the whole of the convoy escaped within the gates, leaving only a single howitzer, with one or two ammunition-waggons, in the hands of our dragoons.

The enemy having thus withdrawn entirely from the right bank of the Guadiana, it became an object of consideration how that river was to be passed, in order that Badajoz might be put in a state of blockade before it should be provisioned, or the damage caused in the late siege repaired. There were but two bridges, one at Merida, the other at Badajoz ; and both were in possession of the French ; whilst the only practicable ford,—and that too, during the present season of the year, practicable for cavalry alone,—lay under the guns of Fort Juramenha. Upon it, however, no reliance could be placed, as the sole channel of

communication between different portions of our army; for the first flood would close up the passage entirely, by rendering the ford for a time quite impervious. A bridge upon tressels was accordingly directed to be formed, and put down at a convenient point; whilst five Spanish boats, with four pontoons, then in store at Elvas, were converted into rafts, to be used, when circumstances should require, as flying bridges.

It is not necessary to enter at much length into the various obstacles which the army was compelled to surmount, before it succeeded in effecting its passage across the Guadiana. Having carried in its train no pontoons or other materials for bridge-making, it was reduced to the necessity of depending upon such supplies as the country round, and the inefficient magazine at Elvas, were enabled to furnish; and these proved so inadequate, that several heavy showers causing the waters to rise on the very morning after the tressel-bridge had been completed, the whole was swept away, and the labour of several anxious days annihilated. It was at length determined not to wait any longer, but to pass the troops at once upon the rafts; and after they should have taken up their ground of investment, to erect another bridge at their leisure. The resolution was promptly carried into effect. During the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, the troops were ferried

across in detachments as numerous as were at all consistent with their personal safety ; and on the latter day, Marshal Beresford established his head-quarters at a small village on the left bank of the river. He had hardly done so, when an attack was made upon the village, which so far succeeded, that the cavalry picket stationed there was surprised and destroyed ; but a company of infantry, which were in reserve to support them, came up, and the enemy were finally driven out with some loss.

Before these arrangements could be accomplished, the enemy were enabled to fill in their trenches, to rebuild the breaches, and to throw considerable stores of provisions and ammunition into Badajoz. This done, Mortier returned towards Seville ; but he endeavoured to cast an additional impediment in the way of our projected siege, by placing a garrison of four hundred men in Olivença. The numbers thus shut up, though neither adequate to make a proper defence, nor very formidable when considered as a post upon our flank, were not altogether to be neglected ; and Marshal Beresford accordingly resolved to commence his operations, by making himself master of Olivença.

The care of conducting this attack was intrusted to General Cole, who sat down before the place on the 11th. On the 15th, the batteries

being in readiness to open, the Governor was summoned, and honourable terms offered, in case he should be disposed to capitulate; but as these were rejected, the firing began, and before noon a practicable breach was effected. The Governor now, in his turn, proposed terms of capitulation, but was refused. The firing was resumed, and in half an hour the place surrendered at discretion. General Cole then hastened to join Marshal Beresford, who, having established a bridge of casks over the ford at Juramenha, and secured it by a tête-de-pont, capable of containing fifteen hundred men, was now in position at St. Martha. Here the corps established itself; and from this point the different objects were attended to, of our completing the investment of Badajoz; of alarming General Latour Maubourg into a further retrogression; and of watching the motions of Soult, who was using his best endeavours to open a communication with the city.

Things were in this state, when, on the 20th of April, Lord Wellington arrived from the north, and gave directions for the immediate commencement of active operations against Badajoz. The great difficulty, however, was to fall upon some such plan of attack, as might hold out a promise of speedy success, and at the same time should not require the employment of great means in its execution. It was a matter of the first consequence to

reduce Badajoz quickly; because, if a greater space of time were allowed than sixteen days of open trenches, besides the period requisite in preparing materials, our information assured us that Soult would be able to collect a sufficient force to relieve it. On the other hand, seldom has a siege been undertaken, in modern times, with resources less adequate to the design, either in intrenching tools, ammunition, or guns. Lord Wellington had, it is true, ordered an ample supply of everything requisite to be forwarded from Lisbon; and an ample supply of everything requisite was actually prepared; but when the stores began to be put in motion, it was found that means of transport were wanting; and hence not one-tenth part of the materiel promised ever reached the camp of the besieging army. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, our engineers set steadily to the operation of reducing the place; and the preliminary steps to the breaking of ground before the Pardaleras, the Castle, and Fort Christoval, were taken so early as the 22nd of April.

Before, however, any use could be made of these preparatory arrangements, a despatch from Sir Brent Spencer summoned Lord Wellington to his original station on the northern frontier. Having drawn out directions for the future conduct of the besieging force, and recommended to Marshal Beresford, in case of any attempt on the part of

Marshal Soult, to risk an action, Lord Wellington departed from the Guadiana, and arrived at the position in the vicinity of Almeida, just in time to meet the danger with which his troops were there menaced. It will be necessary here to describe somewhat at large the situation in which our army at this time stood, on the banks of the Agueda ; and as I happen to be enabled, from personal observation, to enter upon my task, I do so with greater readiness than if, as in the earlier pages of the present chapter, I were obliged to write from the statements and observations of others.

Between the Duas Casas and Touron rivers, there extends a range of heights, which formed, on the present occasion, the main feature in our position. Our right, though placed directly upon Nava d'avel, might be said, in strictness, to rest upon the Coa ; for the country between the Coa and the village being extremely impracticable, little danger was to be apprehended from any attempt made in that quarter. Our centre extended along the heights just alluded to, between the villages of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa ; whilst our left, which embraced Fort Conception and Valdelamula, circled round by Almeida, so as to complete the blockade of that important place, at the same time that it appuyed upon ground extremely favourable. With respect to the arrangement of the troops, a few words will suffice.

On the extreme right of the line, General Houstoun, with the seventh division, took post; the cavalry being formed next to him, though somewhat in advance. After the seventh came the first division, thrown considerably forward, and upon very advantageous ground, and communicating on its left with the third, which again held connexion with the light, as it did with the sixth and fifth. The fifth division, under Sir William Erskine, formed the extreme left of the line; whilst the blockade of Almeida was, in an especial manner, committed to the sixth division, under General Campbell. Every division and brigade was, however, in a situation to move at a moment's warning, and by short and direct paths, to any post in the entire line which might be threatened; and hence, though to external appearance our flanks were far removed from one another, the space of three hours would have brought the most distant battalions in position to the same ground, at any given point. Such was the local state of our army, from the day when Massena retreated across the frontier, up to the end of April; and such it continued to be, when Lord Wellington, after having examined the condition of affairs in the south, returned to direct the series of operations which were impending.

When Massena finally withdrew from the Portuguese territory, it was confidently anticipated

that he would scarcely be in a condition to resume offensive operations for several months to come. Rumours of his excessive unpopularity began also to make their way within our camp. We were told a variety of tales touching a quarrel which had occurred between the Prince of Esling and Marshal Ney, into which, it was added, that the whole army had entered, with a decided leaning towards the latter officer; and it was repeatedly rumoured that Massena was on the eve of his recall, and that some new chief would shortly appear upon the stage to supply his place. Whether these reports were well or ill founded, we hardly cared to inquire; but we continued to preserve an attitude of extreme watchfulness towards the front, at the same time that the blockade of Almeida was kept up with all the diligence and vigour of which we were capable. With respect, again, to the enemy's position, we were not so well informed. We were aware that they occupied Ciudad Rodrigo and the country round in force, whilst their outposts extended along the Agueda, and their patrols occasionally passed it; but whether they had sent any of their divisions to the towns in the rear, as some of our communications asserted, we possessed no means of accurately ascertaining. The first days of May, however, brought in a tolerably explicit declaration of the enemy's designs; and we found that any notions which we might

have been led to form, as to the disorganisation and consequent inefficiency of Massena's army, were quite as groundless as many other reports which daily poured in upon us.

I have said that the centre of our line extended at this time along the heights between the villages of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa; a few words more respecting the localities of the former of these villages may not be amiss.

Fuentes de Honor was not, strictly speaking, embraced in our position, and though occupied by the light troops of the 1st and 3rd divisions supported by the 7th regiment, it was held merely as an advanced post. Yet, in spite of its advanced situation, it possessed so many defensible features, as to form, in point of fact, one of the main bulwarks of our ground; and its strength came fairly into trial on two separate occasions, at the period to which I now refer. On both was the judgment which directed its selection distinctly shown; and therefore I will endeavour to detail its particular features and bearings.

Fuentes de Honor stands at the bottom of a valley, and on the bank of a small rivulet or brook. On either side are rising grounds; and through it passes the main road to Caseja, Gallegos, and from thence to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the Ciudad Rodrigo side, an extensive morass is bounded at some distance by a thick wood; and though the ground

certainly rises there, as it does in rear of the village, still the troops which advance in a hostile attitude from that quarter, must pass over a considerable tract, where they will be exposed to a heavy and destructive fire from almost every point. The village itself is crossed in various directions by walls, which afforded excellent cover for infantry, and were not altogether profitless against artillery; whilst in its rear arise some rocky heights, which at once covered the troops whilst in possession of the place, and afforded them a safe place of retreat, in case they should be driven out. Above these rocky heights was our main line arrayed; from whence, in case of need, reinforcements could be continually sent to the troops in the village; whilst, in the event of the village itself being carried, the conquerors would find that their labours, so far from being completed, were only beginning. To sum up all in few words;—it would be extremely difficult to conceive a post so well adapted to give to its defenders a superiority quite unusual over any force which might attack them; so easy of defence from its local situation; so secure, in point of retreat; and withal so extremely important to the line which it was designed to cover; as furnishing an arena of contest quite distinct from the main position, and totally independent of it. This post, as I have already stated, was held by the light troops of the third and first divi-

sions; and it became, as soon as Massena found himself in a condition to renew hostilities, the theatre of operations, hardly less sanguinary, or less glorious, than the hills of Busaco, or the plains of Talavera.

Before I proceed, however, to give any account of the operations which may be said to have marked the opening of another campaign, it may not perhaps be amiss if I offer a few remarks, in addition to those already recorded, touching the present prospects of Lord Wellington's army, as compared with those which were before it at the corresponding period in 1810.

In the month of February, 1810, Lord Wellington formed himself in position, on almost the same ground which he occupied now. His was then the only thing in the shape of an army throughout the Peninsula; for the Spanish corps had been all, one after another, overthrown; and there remained no force capable of keeping the field, except about twenty-seven thousand British, and an equal number of Portuguese troops. It unfortunately happened, also, that both the British and Portuguese were suffering dreadfully from sickness; whilst the latter, as is well known, never having as yet found an opportunity of proving themselves, could not, even if efficient in other respects, be perfectly relied upon. The enemy had just made themselves masters of Andalu-

sia, without being under the necessity of striking a blow ;—Cadiz was in a state of blockade ;—and Regnier and Mortier, threatening Portugal through the Alentejo, were but feebly opposed by a miserable levy under Romana. Massena, likewise, was around Ciudad Rodrigo with upwards of seventy thousand veterans ; and from the fortress, garrisoned only by Spaniards, and superintended by a Spanish governor, no very obstinate resistance was expected.

It is not, perhaps, going too far to affirm that few men, situated as Lord Wellington then was, would have regarded his case as other than desperate. He was opposed, with less than fifty thousand effectives, to the undivided strength of the French empire ; for there was no diversion going on in the north of Europe, nor any prospect of such diversion being speedily effected. It is true that the lines were in his rear, fortified as carefully and skilfully as time and circumstances would allow, and that his retreat thither could never be prevented ; but formidable as the lines were, no one ventured to pronounce them impregnable, especially if assailed by the whole of the French corps then in the Peninsula. The truth, indeed, is, that among the heads of departments, and throughout the army at large, there were at this time few, who did not look forward with something like anxiety to a speedy re-embarkation.

Portugal has no gates, it was said, by closing which thirty thousand British soldiers can pretend to shut out the French army; and to talk of defending it, now that Spain has been subdued, is as idle as it could be, to talk of defending the solitary province of Galicia, Andalusia, or Arragon. Embark we must, before long;—and happy shall we be, if our embarkation be not impeded or prevented. Such, however, were not the sentiments of our chief; and it must be so interesting to posterity to record what passed in his mind at the period I allude to, that I hesitate not to give his opinions, in nearly his own words, as communicated to myself:


“There is no doubt that the task which I have undertaken is Herculean, particularly now, that the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that there is nothing in the shape of an army in the field but ourselves. I think I am, however, in such a situation, that I can retire and embark whenever I please; and if that be the case, the longer I stay, the better for the cause, and the more honourable to the country. Whether I shall be able to hold my ground at last, must of course depend upon the numbers and the means by which I shall be attacked; and adverting to the difficulties of subsistence even for small numbers in this country, I hope that I shall not be attacked by more than I shall be able to manage.

The necessity of keeping my rear open to the Tagus is a difficulty; and I should be able to effect my object with greater ease, if I was not under the necessity of effecting everything, not only without loss, but without risk or even the appearance of risk, in order to please the good people of *England*."

These are memorable sentiments, contrasted with those which, it must be admitted, were generally felt by the army. How well and how accurately all our commander's calculations had been formed, the turn which events took speedily demonstrated. The enemy advanced—they overcame the obstacles opposed to them—and we retired, as it had been previously arranged, to Torres Vedras. Here then, at the very extremity of the Peninsula, Lord Wellington took his stand; and here he remained till the results of his own profound combinations compelled the enemy to fall back into Spain.

How different was our situation now! Instead of acting solely on the defensive, we were engaged in two offensive operations at once, both of them of the very first importance. We had even ventured to divide our strength in the faces of those very corps which but a year ago threatened us with annihilation; and we were carrying on two sieges, and covering the divisions which conducted them, at the mouths of the two great roads which

touch upon the Portuguese frontier. Thus by the unbending firmness of one man, aided by the admirable discipline and courage of his troops, had the course of a war, of late so alarming, been arrested ; and the French, instead of overrunning Portugal, and bringing under their yoke the last portion of the continent of Europe, were held in check in a country where their superiority extended no further than over the spots of ground covered by their several bivouacs.



CHAPTER IV.

Battle of Fuentes de Honor—Re-investment of Almeida—The French garrison blow up the place, and escape—Massena's army retires into Spain, and Lord Wellington's into cantonments—Siege of Badajoz by Marshal Beresford—Is raised in consequence of the advance of Soult—Lord Wellington sends off reinforcements to Marshal Beresford, and sets out to join him—The Marshal's corps assemble in position at Valverde.

ON the 1st and 2nd of May, several large bodies of French troops were observed to pass the Agueda and the Azava, and to make a movement, as if with the design of threatening our communications, and, if possible, effecting the relief of the fortress of Almeida. Towards the evening of the 3rd, the sixth corps showed itself in three lines on the ridge which overhangs Fuentes de Honor, in a direction parallel to that occupied by us; and they shortly afterwards opened a heavy cannonade, which they followed up by a desperate

assault upon the village. Lieutenant-colonel Williams, who commanded a battalion of light companies, gallantly sustained the attack for some time; but it was found necessary, at last, to support him with the 71st, under Colonel Cadogan, as it again was supported in succession by the 79th and 24th regiments. The battle had not lasted long, when Colonel Williams received a wound, which compelled him to quit the field, and things were in some disorder; but at this moment Colonel Cadogan pressed forward with the 71st, and driving the enemy with the bayonet from all the ground which they had won, restored the fortune of the day. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the 71st were ably supported by the 79th and 24th; upon the senior officer among whom, Colonel Cameron of the former corps, the command of the whole devolved.

Though checked in their first advance, the enemy repeatedly renewed their attack, bringing up, on each occasion, fresh troops; and on every occasion were they driven back with a heroism which has never been surpassed, and but rarely equalled. They fought, however, with great gallantry, and more than once stood to be bayoneted by our soldiers in the main street of the village; but their success, whenever obtained, lasted but a moment, and they were instantly swept away by a desperate charge from the men whom they be-

lieved that they had overcome. The 71st, which had repeatedly attacked and overthrown columns of French troops on the road, were tempted, towards dusk, by the appearance of what they conceived to be a gun on the opposite acclivity, to rush across the rivulet, and become the assailants in their turn. Nothing could be more impetuous, and yet more orderly, than this charge. They literally bore down everything before them, till they reached the object of their search; when, to their mortification, they discovered that it was not a gun, but only a tumbril of ammunition. Of that, however, they made themselves masters; and though severely galled on their return by a murderous fire of musketry and grape, they regained Fuentes de Honor with their trophy, and spent the night there in quiet.

As may readily be imagined, the dawn of the 4th had not yet appeared, when the whole of our line got under arms, and waited in anxious expectation for a renewal of the combat. Day broke, however, without disclosing any disposition, on the part of the enemy, to resume the offensive; and as hour after hour stole on, a belief naturally arose, that nothing would be attempted, at least for the present. In this persuasion we were strongly confirmed by the report of several deserters, who this day came in to us, and from whom we learned that Massena, overawed by the

obstinaey of yesterday's resistance, had resolved to attempt nothing further, till he should be reinforced by a body of the imperial guard, which was understood to be on its march to join him. That the statements of the deserters were not to be disregarded, a variety of circumstances led us to believe. In the first place, clouds of mounted and staff officers might be seen, riding, from time to time, along the opposite ridge, and examining, with apparent care and minuteness, into our dispositions. In the next place, as evening approached, we observed no inconsiderable addition to the enemy's cavalry, particularly to their hussars and lancers, arrive. The reader need scarcely be reminded that our force was greatly weakened, more especially in cavalry, in consequence of the formation of the separate corps, which was now acting under Marshal Beresford. Of the latter description of troops we could not muster, at present, more than fifteen or sixteen hundred in the field; and the total amount of our effectives, including Portuguese of all arms, fell short of twenty-nine thousand. On the side of the enemy, again, the cavalry were computed to exceed four thousand; whilst the sum of the effectives fell not short of forty-five thousand. These were fearful odds, especially when it is considered that we were fighting for the attainment of one specific object, and that we were not only called upon to

resist with effect this tremendous superiority, but to continue, at the same time, the blockade of Almeida. Yet had the men confidence in their leader, as their leader had confidence in them; and that feeling, aided by the judicious choice of ground, and the able manœuvres which our divisions severally executed, carried us safely and gloriously through all our difficulties.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 5th, our advanced parties sent in to state that the enemy's columns were in motion; and before six they had commenced a desperate attack, as well upon the village of Fuentes de Honor as upon the 7th division, which occupied a wood and some broken ground on the right of our line. In Fuentes the assailants were met with the same spirit of determined resistance which had frustrated all their efforts on the 3rd; and if for a moment they seemed to have made an impression, they were almost immediately afterwards driven with loss from the ground which they had won. On the right, affairs went on with rather more of apparent peril; though even there the danger was never very imminent. It was here that they deemed it expedient to employ the mass of their cavalry, which came on, strongly supported both by infantry and guns; and a severe loss was on our part experienced, before a final check was given to the progress of men who fought like troops

habituated to victory, and as yet unaccustomed to reverses.

The first attack fell upon General Sontag's brigade, which had been especially directed to defend the wood, but which, overwhelmed by numbers, retired, after a gallant and obstinate resistance. Our cavalry seeing this, and anxious to cover the retreat of their comrades, quitted a very commanding and yet open position on which they had been drawn up, and descended, with two or three pieces of horse-artillery, into the low ground. It was an unfortunate movement, and opened to the enemy the only prospect of permanent success which they enjoyed during the whole of the day ; for they immediately occupied in force the heights which had been abandoned, and pressed our people so vigorously, that it was found necessary to give to this part of our line a new direction. The light division, which had advanced to support the cavalry, finding the post already evacuated, wheeled to the right, and made arrangements to protect a fresh movement of General Houston's division, which they executed in masterly style. They drew up in squares of battalions, received and repulsed repeated charges of the French cavalry, and then marching through our own squadrons, sustained a cannonade as galling as has frequently fallen to the share of troops in that dense order. In the mean while, no formidable force of British

dragoons could be brought together, for our inferiority in that arm was too decisive to warrant any grand display; but a few squadrons charged from time to time through the intervals of the squares with greater or less benefit, according as opportunities offered. In the end, however, this species of manœuvre threatened to be productive of more harm than good. Our troopers, in retiring, got among our own squares, and threw them into confusion, from which, but for the judicious conduct of the chasseurs Britanniques, much mischief might have accrued. These, however, by a well-directed flanking fire, hindered the enemy from taking advantage of the opening made, and hence our retrogression was effected with but little loss on our part, and a heavy slaughter among the French.

The right was now appuyed by a strong hill, on the summit of which stood an old tower; and the enemy finding that the new alignment had been taken up without the slightest disorder, paused before they ventured to assail it. Their successes here amounted to nothing more than the occupation of some ground, which, at the commencement of the action, had been held by us; they had in no respect broken our ranks, and they were as far from turning them as ever; whilst in the direction of Fuentes de Honor, upon which a variety of attempts had been made, they were beaten back

at all points. They had attacked it in front, and on both flanks, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry; but the steady valour of the 71st and 79th regiments, supported by the 24th, set all their efforts at defiance; and now, after several hours of severe fighting, not the slightest impression was made. Massena seemed to feel that our troops were made of more obstinate stuff than even he had anticipated, and towards evening he relaxed in his exertions. His columns on our right halted; those which had been employed in the assault of Fuentes drew off; and the whole army prepared to bivouac, in the order in which it stood at the close of the action. Similar arrangements were entered into on our side. The pickets were stationed along the front of the position; and large fires were lighted across the ridge; and both parties lay down to rest with a confident assurance on their minds that the battle was intermitted only till the return of daylight.

We were, as usual, under arms long before dawn appeared; but it brought about no such results as we had anticipated. The enemy were before us, indeed, in the same force as ever, and in the same attitude which they had assumed on the preceding evening; but they exhibited no disposition to renew the struggle; whilst we were content to retain our attitude of watchfulness, and to act as we had hitherto done, entirely on the de-

fensive. In this manner the whole of the 6th passed away, no movement of any importance being made on either side ; and night again closed in, bringing with it an increased persuasion, that the morrow must, at all events, lead to some more decisive issues. But those amongst us who anticipated another battle, found, on the return of day, that they had miscalculated the enemy's courage or resources. The dawn of the 8th showed their columns in full retreat ; and towards noon it was satisfactorily ascertained that they had taken the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Massena, with his whole army, reinforced by every battalion and squadron which he had been enabled to bring up from Castile and Galicia, was thus foiled by three divisions of our divided force ; he was compelled to retreat before men over whom he had calculated on obtaining an easy and brilliant victory ; and Almeida, for the relief of which he had shown himself deeply interested, was left to its fate. It may be worth while to inquire into some of those circumstances which tended to produce a failure so remarkable, and to place fresh laurels on the brows of one, to whose renown all Europe was already beginning to bear witness.

There can be no doubt that the general arrangement and disposition of the allied troops was marked by all that judgment and military sagacity, which so eminently characterise the tactics

of the Duke of Wellington. Every species of force, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, was posted where it could act to the best purpose and with greatest effect; whilst due advantage was taken of all the natural inequalities which presented themselves, to shelter our people, as far as might be, from the enemy's fire. Yet our line was in many places unavoidably exposed, and open to the attacks both of cavalry and artillery; whilst the thick woods in our front afforded to Massena the most convenient plateau which he could have desired, for the distribution of his columns unseen, and therefore disregarded. Had he rightly availed himself of this advantage, he might have poured the mass of his force upon any single point, and perhaps made an impression before we could have had time to support it. There were, besides this, other and equally obvious modes of proceeding, to which he had no recourse. Massena's superiority to us, both in cavalry and artillery, was very great. Had he commenced his attack with a violent cannonade, it must have produced some havoc, and probably considerable confusion in our line. He might then have moved forward his cavalry en masse, supporting it by strong columns of infantry; and had either the one or the other succeeded in piercing through, our situation would have been by no means an enviable one. It is, indeed, highly probable that his charges would have been

repulsed ; but in this case, a third resource was left to him, of which he might also have availed himself. Had he thrown his cavalry round our right flank,—a movement which we should have found it no easy matter to prevent,—crossed the Coa, advanced upon our lines of communication, and stopped our supplies, at the moment when, with his infantry, he threatened to turn us ; then pushed upon Sabugal and the places near, he might have compelled us to pass the Coa with all our artillery at the most disadvantageous places, and cut us off from our best and safest retreat. There was, indeed, a time during the continuance of the affair of the 5th, when his design of acting in this manner was [seriously apprehended ; and Lord Wellington was, in consequence, reduced to the necessity of deciding whether he should relinquish the Sabugal road, or raise the blockade of Almeida. But Lord Wellington's presence of mind never for a moment forsook him. He felt no distrust in his troops ; to retain his hold over a secure and accessible line of retreat was, [therefore, to him, a consideration of less moment than to continue an operation of which the ultimate success could be now neither doubtful nor remote ; and he at once determined to expose Sabugal, rather than throw open a communication with Almeida. It was a bold measure, but it was not adopted without due consideration ; and it received

an ample reward in the successful termination of this hard-fought battle.

The loss experienced by our army during the operations of these two days was very considerable; for the actions, although partial, were maintained with signal obstinacy on both sides. It fell chiefly upon the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions of infantry, and upon the cavalry, and amounted in all to nearly sixteen hundred men. That of the enemy was much greater, and came not short, on the most moderate computation, of three thousand. They left four hundred dead in the village of Fuentes de Honor alone, and a large proportion of prisoners fell into our hands. Notwithstanding all this, however, they retrograded so slowly, that on the 9th it was still doubtful whether some fresh efforts might not be made. They had taken, as I have stated, the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and appeared about noon on the preceding day to be in full retreat; but their retreat was conducted with the utmost leisure, which the peculiarity of our circumstances would not permit us to interrupt. On the contrary, we applied ourselves sedulously to the double task of strengthening our own ground by means of intrenchments, and resuming the strict blockade of Almeida, in which late events had compelled us to relax; and on the 10th we were relieved from all further uneasiness respecting Massena, by the discovery that he had left no

more than a few cavalry pickets on the banks of the Azava. Thus was an end put to a variety of conjectures, which some had begun to hazard, touching the probabilities of another action in this quarter; and Lord Wellington was left at liberty to pursue such plans as he should consider best adapted to the situation of the country, and most suitable to his own means and resources.

In addition to giving security to his position above Fuentes de Honor, by directing certain field-works to be thrown up here and there for its defence, Lord Wellington issued orders that the blockade of Almeida should be resumed. On first arriving in this province, the British general caused Almeida to be reconnoitred, with the view, if possible, of carrying it by a coup-de-main. As, however, it was found too formidable for any such attempt, and as the army was not possessed of a battering train, or other materials necessary for the conduct of a regular siege, he was, per force, obliged to content himself with its investment; and confident hopes were entertained, that famine would, before long, do the work of war. It had now been blockaded some time, and its stock of provisions, originally scanty, was drawing, we were well aware, rapidly to an end; it was therefore of the utmost importance, not only to prevent fresh supplies from being thrown in, but to hinder the garrison from effecting its escape; a measure

which the governor was known to have in contemplation. On this account, Massena's columns had no sooner abandoned their ground, than the sixth division, on whom the duties of the blockade devolved, were commanded to resume their labours; and they marched for the purpose, under the orders of General Campbell, back upon their cantonments.

General Campbell, a zealous and enterprising officer, was exceedingly desirous that the arrangement of the blockade should be intrusted entirely to himself; and being ambitious, as it was but natural that he should, of the honour of reducing this important place through his own skill, he requested and obtained permission to conduct all details without any interference. Whether it was, that General Campbell felt too confident, or, whether any other circumstances had weight with him, I know not; but the event proved that, in making his dispositions, he adopted a system of incaution, which led to results mortifying to himself, and annoying to the whole army. Instead of covering with troops the left face of Almeida, the banks of the Agueda, and the bridge at Barba del Puerco, these points remained unguarded; and he posted a brigade at Junça and Malparteda, threw back General Pack to Cinco Velhas, and watched, with a degree of attention, the right face of the town, from which no movement was likely to be made.

with a probability of success. Of Barba del Puerco in particular, it behoved him, in the opinion of all, to be excessively jealous, because, through it ran the most direct and shortest road towards the enemy's outposts; indeed, so conscious were all parties of this, that on the 11th the 4th regiment, from Sir William Erskine's division, was, in spite of the late agreement, ordered up to take possession of the heights above that place. But the arrangement came too late, for matters were already in a train for an attempt, the success of which, whilst it speaks nothing in favour of our prudence, must ever redound to the honour of General Brennier, the brave man who conducted it.

A little before midnight on the 11th, an immense explosion was heard in the vicinity of the fortress; though our head-quarters were too far removed to be aware of the circumstance. Soon afterwards General Pack, who chanced to be at Malparteda with the pickets of his brigade, spread an alarm that the place was blown up, and that the French garrison was marching in good order towards Barba del Puerco. General Pack's pickets offered as much resistance as they were capable of offering; but the enemy soon broke through, and passing along the flank of the reserve, our people were unable to arrest their progress, even for a moment. General Pack sent immediately to summon General Campbell, who, on the first noise,


had hurried from his quarters ; but the latter hastened to the front, not leaving, as it was said, positive orders behind him, and came up whilst his own troops were yet dispersed and in disorder. Great delay occurred in consequence, in bringing them to the point threatened ; whilst the 4th regiment failed in its attempts to head the flying garrison ; by which means Brennier was enabled to lead his troops in a close and compact column from Almeida as far as the Agueda, without having experienced any serious molestation by the way. General Pack, indeed, by great exertions, contrived to hang with a few of his men upon the enemy's rear, and pointed out, by the flashes of his musketry, the exact path which they had taken ; but Brennier conducted all things in a manner so cool and soldier-like, that not the slightest symptom of confusion was manifested throughout the night. He had given positive directions to his soldiers, from the instant of their quitting the town, to continue their march in profound silence ; however heavy might be the fire of the besiegers, they were not to return a shot ; and when daylight arrived, in case they should find themselves surrounded, they were to make an opening wherever they best could, with the bayonet. No commands could have been more punctually obeyed. The sound of a voice was not heard among them ; and they never once returned the desultory tirailade

with which General Pack's men endeavoured to gall them.

Having reached the Agueda, they made a halt, in order that some stragglers who had lagged behind, might regain the column. This measure afforded an opportunity to the 36th, 2nd, and 4th regiments, to close upon them; and as the French, when they resumed their march, mistook their way by diverging a little too much to the left, these regiments were enabled to reach the bank of the river just as the fugitives were crossing the bridge at Barba del Puerco. A destructive fire was immediately thrown in, by which between one and two hundred men were mowed down; whilst two squadrons of the royals having flanked them, succeeded, in conjunction with Pack's Portuguese, in securing ten officers and two hundred men as prisoners. Thus about one-third of the garrison of Almeida was cut off. But the remaining two-thirds effected their escape, not less, in all probability, to the astonishment of Marshal Massena, than to the regret of Lord Wellington and his followers. It seemed as if, by this untoward event, all the advantages obtained by the battle of Fuentes de Honor were thrown away. Not that we very deeply regretted the escape of the individuals: they were brave men, had made a bold venture, and deserved that it should be crowned with success; but it was mortifying to

reflect that now Massena might, with some show of reason, speak of his late operations as a victory, and not as a defeat. He might, in a specious manner, inform Europe that he had manœuvred merely for the purpose of bringing off the garrison of Almeida; and as the garrison had actually escaped, how could we contradict him? It is not worth while to dwell longer on this affair; but I will venture to affirm that no one who witnessed the effect this disappointment produced upon our army, will ever be able to forget it.

General Brennier left Almeida in a state of sad dilapidation. On examining it next day, we found that three out of the five bastions of which it was composed, had been blown to atoms; the crests were thrown down into the ditch; and the stones of which they had principally been composed, were hurled, by the violence of the explosion, in all directions, and to great distances. Whether the foundations were materially shaken, we had not the means of immediately ascertaining; but the revetments and ravelines were equally untouched, and the main outline of the rampart and ditch remained entire. The other two bastions had not been injured, the mines having by mere accident failed to explode. Yet was the whole a complete ruin; and though we judged that it might be so far restored, for a moderate expense, as to be rendered secure against a coup-de-main, we saw



plainly enough, that to put it again in a state of defence, and render it capable of withstanding a siege, would require much time, much labour, and much money. In this country the expenses of mason work are very heavy, and Almeida was entirely constructed of masonry ; whilst the lapse of six or eight months—the smallest space of time that its re-erection would require—would, in all probability, produce events calculated, either in one way or another, to render its existence or non-existence a question of very little importance. On these accounts, Lord Wellington determined not to interfere respecting it, but to leave it to the Portuguese government to determine whether it should be rebuilt or not ; and if it were, in what form, and after what plan, the repairs should be applied.

The sensation produced by the escape of the garrison, and the destruction of Almeida, having subsided, we began again to give our undivided attention to the reports which arrived from various quarters, relative to the French, as well as to speculations and surmises touching ourselves. Of the French, it was confidently asserted that they had retired upon Salamanca, Zamora, and Toro ; that Massena had received his recall from Paris ; and that Marmont, of whose junction we had previously received accounts, was now in the chief command. Their generals, moreover, were said

to agree in opinion that nothing could be undertaken against Portugal or the English, till the army should be completely reorganised, and strengthened by large supplies both of men and means. All likewise combined, it was said, in an outcry against Massena, whose conduct towards Ney had been warmly condemned, not only by the corps of Ney himself, but by the officers of the army in general, and whose measures were characterised as having been, from the first, without object, and destitute of judgment. A strong sense of discontent was thus said to be general throughout their ranks, and discipline was stated to have become, in consequence, grievously relaxed. As to ourselves, though our credit might not, perhaps, stand on ground quite so elevated as that which it occupied previous to the late failure at Almeida, yet it must be admitted by all that the British army had established for itself a reputation such as it had not, at any other period of the war, obtained; and there were few who looked forward without a sanguine and well-grounded expectation, that future events would only add to the glories of the troops and their illustrious leader. We had now been fairly pitted against the warriors and chiefs before whom the powers of Europe gave way; and we had come forth from the struggle in a manner which could hardly fail to satisfy all that we were at least not

inferior to them in any qualification befitting soldiers. Every individual in the army felt this, and every one felt to whom the praise was due. The consequence was, that Lord Wellington was looked up to with a degree of enthusiastic devotion, which it may not, perhaps, be easy for a common reader to understand; whilst all his proceedings showed that in his army, in its valour and patience, discipline and coolness, he reposed a confidence of which the soldiers knew themselves to be worthy, and which it was their principal boast, that they had in no instance abused or betrayed.

As soon as Almeida fell, and it became satisfactorily ascertained that nothing of any importance would be attempted on this side of Portugal, Lord Wellington began to direct a large share of his attention to the campaign in the south, and made ready to assist Marshal Beresford, not only with strong reinforcements, but with his own counsel and presence. For this purpose, he put two divisions, the 3rd and the 7th, under Generals Picton and Houston, in march towards the Guadiana, directing them to move by Campo Mayor. The rest of the army was then ordered into cantonments; the sixth division at Mealhada, Jueda, and Frenada; the fifth at Fuentes de Honor, Ponte Vilhe, and Nave d'Avel; the first at Aldea de Ponte and Albergaria; the light at Gallegos, and along the banks of the Agueda; and the ca-

valry at Cesmeo and the villages near. Along this line, by the extraordinary exertions of Mr. Kennedy and the commissariat department, the troops were, upon the whole, well supplied; and though forage was rather scarce, still the cavalry contrived not only to keep up the condition in which they previously stood, but even to improve upon it. Sir Brent Spencer, likewise, on whom, in the event of Lord Wellington's absence, the command of the whole devolved, was unremitting in his exertions to provide for the wants of the soldiers, and to guard them against surprise. But on the latter head no great risk was apprehended; and therefore Lord Wellington, as soon as he had seen his arrangements in a train towards their completion, set off, accompanied by the heads of departments, for Badajoz.

It may be necessary here to advert to circumstances which, during the last fortnight, had befallen Marshal Beresford and his corps.

On the 22nd of April, in consequence of directions given by Lord Wellington himself, measures were taken for completing the investment of Badajoz, and for preparing fascines, gabions, and other implements necessary for the conduct of the siege. These were somewhat interrupted by the sudden rise of the river on the 24th; which sweeping away the bridge of casks, which had been thrown across, cut off all communication between

the investing army and Portugal. On the 29th, however, the communications were restored by means of flying bridges; and on the 1st of May, the bridge of casks was replaced more firmly and more conveniently than ever.

On the 4th, General William Stewart invested Badajoz on the left bank of the river; having marched from Talavera la Real with five thousand men at midnight, and taken up his ground without any loss at nine in the morning. By some mistake, however, and the occurrence of several disasters, the investment on the southern side was not effected till the 8th, and then only after a good deal of skirmishing, and with considerable difficulty. But a flying bridge was, in the interim, established on the Guadiana, immediately below the mouth of the Caya; roads of communication were formed round the place; and the guns and stores were moved from Olivença according to orders; and as those intended to act against Fort St. Christoval were brought up on the same day which saw the investment completed, preparations were made to break ground, and commence the siege with vigour, that evening.

Without going into a regular journal of this siege, it may be proper to advert here to the amount of the means with which a handful of British troops endeavoured to reduce one of the strongest and most regularly fortified places in

the south of Spain. For the attack upon Fort Christoval—to the results of which they looked for success in the undertaking at large—there were provided five hundred intrenching tools, two thousand sand-bags, a few planks, and about two hundred gabions. The artillery consisted of three brass twenty-four pounders, provided with three hundred rounds per gun, and two eight-inch howitzers, supplied each with two hundred rounds. The besieging corps was made up of one British brigade, two battalions of Portuguese of the line, and a battalion of militia, mustering in all about four thousand men; one hundred men of the line were appointed to act as overseers; forty-eight carpenters, and thirty-six miners, were attached to the engineers; and there were present twenty-seven rank and file of the corps of royal military artificers.†

The soil upon which the working parties began their operations proved so rocky and unyielding, that though ground was broken on the night of the 8th, and four hundred men were employed in breaking it, ten men only were enabled to work under cover, when daylight appeared; and the progress made was in consequence both slow and

† See an extremely interesting work by Colonel Jones, of the Engineers, called “A Journal of the Sieges in the Peninsula.”

unsatisfactory. On the 10th the garrison made a sortie, which was at first attended with success—the troops employed making their way, in spite of the covering parties, into one of our advanced works; but the guard of the trenches soon recovered the ground which was lost, and drove the enemy back with considerable slaughter within the walls. On this occasion the indiscreet valour of some of our officers tempted them to lead their men up to the very glacis of the fort; and they sustained, for no purpose, a loss, which might have been well avoided, of nearly four hundred in killed and wounded. On the 11th the breaching battery being completed, and the guns and howitzers prepared for service, our artillery opened the attack, attempting, with the howitzers, to keep under the fire of the place; whilst with the three twenty-four pounders, they strove to batter in breach the smaller flank of Fort St. Christoval. But our gunners were Portuguese recruits, who knew little of their duty, and exhibited a bad specimen of practice; whereas the fire from the fort was both well directed and warmly kept up. The consequence was, that long before evening our batteries were silenced; and the three guns, and one of the howitzers, were rendered unserviceable.

Nothing intimidated by these reverses, Marshal

Beresford prepared to renew his efforts with all the means which he was able to bring together. Other guns were moved round to Fort Christoval, and a new battery constructed and armed; but before a fair trial could be made of its efficiency, reports reached the General, which caused him to suspend, for the present, the whole of his undertaking. He learned that Soult, having collected an army of fifteen or sixteen thousand men, in communication with General Latour Maubourg at the head of six thousand more, was in full march for the relief of the place; and as the corps with which he covered the siege was by no means competent to oppose that force, it became indispensable to relinquish every other object, for the sake of effectually meeting the danger which threatened. On the night between the 12th and 13th, therefore, when a fresh parallel had just been opened, and upwards of fourteen hundred men were paraded, for the purpose of briskly carrying on the work, an order arrived that the undertaking should be relinquished, and that the troops should march, without delay, to the position at Valverde. The orders were promptly obeyed. On the night of the 13th, all the batteries were dismounted; and on the 14th, such materials as it was found impossible to remove, were burned, or otherwise destroyed. On the night of the 15th, the last corps which had halted to complete these

operations, took their departure; and the first siege of Badajoz was formally raised.

Such was the substance of the information which reached us; part of it whilst we were yet at Villa Formosa, and part whilst we were prosecuting our journey towards the Guadiana. That Marshal Beresford's situation was one of extreme difficulty and delicacy, any one who reflects must perceive. There was submitted to him no other alternative than either to fight with the Guadiana in his rear, over which his communications were precarious and indifferent, or by a retreat, to abandon Badajoz entirely, and permit the enemy, by taking possession of the course of the river, to strengthen and consolidate himself in Estremadura and the south of Spain. He knew, indeed, that Lord Wellington was hurrying to his assistance, and he was aware that two divisions had begun their march for the purpose of supporting him: had it been practicable, therefore, to protract matters, and to avoid an action till the reinforcements should arrive, it would have been his policy to do so. But the enemy pressed forward with so much rapidity, and manifested so decided an intention of overwhelming him at once, that in point of fact he can hardly be said to have possessed a choice. He accordingly concentrated his troops, as has been above related, at Valverde, whither likewise the Spanish generals, Blake and Castaños, with

twelve thousand men, hastened to join him; and the three chiefs having concerted their plans, and made every disposition to receive the enemy, awaited that battle which appeared to be inevitable.

CHAPTER V.

Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz—Battle of Albuera—Retreat of Soult, and renewal of the siege—It is pressed with vigour, and a breach in Fort St. Christoval pronounced practicable—Movements of the enemy to relieve the place—Brilliant cavalry affair at Usagre.

IN consequence of the advices which he received from the south, Lord Wellington, as soon as he saw matters in a proper train upon the Agueda, set off to join Marshal Beresford, and to superintend in person the operations which that officer was conducting. We quitted Villa Formosa on the 15th, and travelling at the rate of sixty miles a day, without baggage or impediments of any description, arrived in Elvas before dark on the 19th. Whilst performing this arduous journey, a variety of rumours relative to late transactions met us at every stage. At one place it was stated that the enemy were coming on in force, and that

a battle might hourly be expected ; at another, that Marshal Beresford had resolved upon a retreat, not feeling himself equal to oppose the French ; and, at a third, that a great action had been fought, and that it had ended in favour of the allies. It will readily be imagined that the last rumour, though it entered in no respect into particulars, tended, in no slight degree, to elevate our spirits, and quicken our pace. On reaching Elvas, however, more accurate details were given ; for Colonel Arbuthnot, from the Marshal's headquarters, met us here, and from him we received an official account of one of the most obstinate, as well as sanguinary actions, in which British troops were ever engaged.

The most advantageous position which it is possible for an army to assume, which desires to check the advance of a hostile force from Seville to Badajoz, is beside the village of Albuera, among some undulating heights which stretch towards the rear, and are covered by two small streams running in parallel directions upon the flanks of the plateau. On this ground Marshal Beresford determined to take post, and for that purpose advanced his troops towards Albuera on the 14th and 15th ; but Soult, having hurried from Seville by forced marches of not less than six leagues a day, was beforehand with him ; and the cavalry, which had been sent on as far as Almendralejo to

reconnoitre, was driven back in disorder. It was accordingly found, on arriving at the village, that an extensive wood, of which it had been Marshal Beresford's intention to avail himself, was in possession of the French; and hence, that whatever dispositions he might deem it advisable to make, must be entirely restricted to the country on the western bank of the Albuera.

The position selected for the army was accordingly behind the little river Albuera, where the road from Seville to Badajoz and Olivença, after passing the stream by a bridge close to the village, separates into two branches. Here the ground rises from the river in gentle undulations, which, extending to the right, afford no single point d'appui more favourable than another, but tempt him, who has already arranged his line along their summits, to draw it out from hill to hill, and eminence to eminence. It was here that the allied armies were posted on the evening of the 15th; their left resting upon Albuera, and covered by the stream, the steep banks of which, together with some walls and buildings, afforded to it a good deal of shelter; whilst their right, extending to a considerable distance, found no commanding feature on which to lean.

Marshal Beresford had on this occasion under his orders a corps of Spaniards, whom he stationed in a double line upon his extreme right, between

two hillocks, one somewhat in advance of the other; next to them came the second British division, which, under General Stewart, composed the centre; and on the left of all were the Portuguese of General Hamilton's division, supported by General Alten's brigade of light Germans. The fourth division, under General Cole, which did not reach its ground till after the battle began, formed, as a reserve, in rear of the second; whilst the main body of the cavalry took post upon the right, so as to cover the Spaniards, and hinder them from being turned. With respect to the exact numbers of this army, it is not very easy to form a correct judgment, because the Spaniards are proverbial for the great inaccuracy of their returns; but taking these at 12,000, the Portuguese at 8000, and the British at 7500, the total amount will reach about 27,000. That it could not exceed this is certain, however much it might fall short of it. In cavalry, Marshal Beresford's corps was extremely weak, and his artillery amounted to no more than thirty pieces.

The force with which Soult prepared to raise the siege of Badajoz was, in point of number, inferior to that of the allies; but in cavalry, artillery, and the general character of the troops, it was greatly superior. Twenty thousand French infantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon, bivouacked, on the night of the 15th, in

the wood ; and the whole advanced next day in the finest order to the attack.

It might be about nine o'clock in the morning of the 16th, when a heavy force of cavalry, supported by two large columns of infantry, were seen moving towards the bridge, with a view, as it was supposed, of piercing the allied line in that quarter, and making themselves masters of Albuera. All eyes were instantly turned to the point threatened, and the most effective preparations were made to meet and repel the attack ; but before the excellence of these could in any degree be put to the test, a new source of alarm disclosed itself in another direction. The enemy, instead of coming on as had been expected, rapidly changed their plan, and under cover of their cavalry, and favoured by a thick fog, filed off towards our right. Here they pressed forward with an impetuosity which the Spaniards, who were stationed there, could not withstand ; and in a few minutes they were in possession of the most commanding heights, upon which our right flank depended for support. The Spaniards behaved, on this occasion, with considerable gallantry. They gave way, it is true, and fell back ; but their retreat was conducted without confusion, and though repulsed, they were far from being defeated. But their retrogression threw open to the enemy, not only the key of Marshal

Beresford's position, but the only good road by which, in case of a disaster, he could retire ; for it laid bare his line of communication with Valverde, and exposed him to the risk of being hemmed in between the river and the enemy's columns. It became, therefore, an object of the first importance to recover the heights which had been lost ; and it was in striving to attain that end, that the chief portion of the loss occurred.

Marshal Beresford endeavoured at first to bring back the Spanish troops to the charge ; but finding them extremely unwieldy, and little capable of executing a nice manœuvre, he passed the whole of General Stewart's division through them, towards the right. This done, General Stewart immediately deployed his first brigade, consisting of the buffs, the 66th, the 2nd battalion 48th, and the 31st, into line, and pushed them, under Colonel Colbourn, up the hill, against the enemy's columns. Their advance was spirited, and their fire admirably directed ; but before they could approach within charging distance, the enemy's cavalry broke in upon their right. One wing of the buffs was now directed to be thrown back ; but the regiment, confused, in part by the approach of the cavalry, and not rightly understanding the orders given, fell in upon the second brigade, which, under General Houghton, was advancing in column to support its comrades. The

movement unavoidably threw that brigade likewise into confusion, as it happened at the moment to be in the act of deploying into line; and hence it could afford no adequate assistance, for some time, to the leading regiments, which were now engaged under the most fearful disadvantages. The consequence was, that the first brigade suffered terribly, as well by a tremendous fire of grape which was poured upon them from the height, as from the cavalry which rode through and cut them up at their leisure. The buffs, 66th, and 48th, were, indeed, annihilated, and the 31st escaped a similar fate, only because, being on the left, it had time to form, and was thus enabled to show a regular front to the enemy.

In the mean while General Houghton's brigade had completed its formation, and advanced gallantly to the charge, the General himself animating his troops forward, and setting them an example of the most devoted bravery. He was thus employed, cheering them on, and waving his hat in front of the line, when three balls pierced his body, and he fell. The brigade, however, was not daunted by his fall; it still pressed forward, and the regiments of which it was composed, namely the 57th, 1st battalion 48th, and 29th, vied with one another in deeds of heroism. The 57th and 29th in particular, the former under Colonel Inglis, the latter under Major Way, performed pro-

digies of valour ; but notwithstanding their utmost exertions, nobly seconded by those of the 28th, 34th, and 39th, under Colonel Abercrombie, the enemy succeeded in maintaining their post. At this moment we had lost a whole brigade of artillery, a large number of prisoners, and eight stand of colours, belonging to the buffs, the 66th, the 48th, and 57th regiments ; and affairs began to wear an unpromising appearance. But Marshal Beresford determined to make one effort more for victory, and happily it was not made in vain.

General Cole's division had not yet been engaged ; it reached the ground after the battle began ; and having rested for a space in rear of the centre, was moved towards the right, where it formed en potence. It was now ordered down into the valley, for the purpose of carrying this formidable height. Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the fusileer brigade, to which the arduous task was mainly intrusted. Though deprived, at an early stage of the action, of their leader, Sir William Myers, the fusileers pressed on without a moment's pause, or even hesitation, and, amidst terrible slaughter, drove the enemy from the ridge which he had so long and so obstinately defended. They were, however, ably seconded by Colonel Abercrombie's brigade, as well as by a brigade of Portuguese under Colonel Hervey, which repeatedly resisted and repelled attacks

from the enemy's cavalry; and they retook the whole of the captured guns, with the exception of a single howitzer, and three out of the eight stand of colours which had been lost. In this grand assault General Cole, with almost every individual attached to his staff, was wounded; General Stewart received two contusions; and few of the senior officers, either of regiments or brigades, escaped unhurt; but its success was decisive of the fortune of the day, which now declared in our favour. The enemy made no fresh efforts to regain his post, but retiring in good order across the rivulet, took up for the night the ground from which he had advanced in the morning.

Whilst this tremendous conflict was going on upon the right, several attempts were made to penetrate into the village, and to break through our left in the direction of the bridge. The latter were bravely met by the Portuguese troops, who constantly drove back the columns as fast as they came on; whilst General Alten's light Germans, lining the walls about the village, hindered the assailants from making any impression there. Some cavalry, which showed themselves here, were watched by the 13th light dragoons, and by a Portuguese brigade, under Colonel Otway; but the mass of the enemy's horse, independently of those squadrons which committed so much havoc among the infantry, was extended beyond our right, and

threatened to take us in rear. It was judiciously opposed by General Lumley's heavy brigade, which, moving as the enemy moved, and continually presenting to them a front of resistance, hindered them from effecting a design which must have been productive to us of the most serious consequences. Our artillery, likewise, was admirably served: its fire was very destructive, and the men stood to their guns till many of them were sabred; indeed, there was not an officer or soldier in any department of the army who failed this day in doing more than his duty. I have already spoken of the daring intrepidity of the fusileers and it deserves to be held up to remembrance; but the bravery of the 57th and 31st fell in no degree short of that of their comrades. These regiments having ascended the height, stood their ground nobly against all the efforts of a column of French grenadiers. The enemy's fire thinned their ranks, but never once broke them; for at the close of the action, the dead and wounded were found in two distinct lines, upon the very spots which they had occupied whilst alive and fighting. They fought, too, in every imaginable order which infantry can be called upon to assume. They resisted cavalry in square, deployed again into line, received and returned repeated volleys, whilst a few yards only divided them from their opponents; and at last carried everything before them,

by a charge with the bayonet. All this could not, of course, be done without a prodigious slaughter on both sides; indeed, the killed and wounded lay in masses so compact, that full seven thousand bodies occupied the space of a few hundred feet; and our artillery, when advancing towards the close of the day, were compelled to pass over them, deaf to their cries, and averting their gaze from the brave fellows thus laid prostrate in the dust.

The victory was a highly important one, but it was purchased at a rate dearer than had been required to secure any other victory in the Peninsula. Out of 7500 British troops engaged, 4158 were placed hors de combat, the Portuguese lost 389, and the Spaniards nearly 2000; so that there fell of the allies this day no fewer than 6577. Of the enemy's loss we were necessarily unable to form a calculation equally exact, but it was estimated to amount to full 8000, among whom were three generals killed, and many superior officers wounded. The latter fact we learned from our prisoners, who asserted that the casualties among their leaders had been such as to leave the troops in many instances at a loss from whom to receive orders, and that this circumstance, more than any other, led to the retreat from the height, and the abandonment of further operations.

During the battle of Albuera, a number of little

events occurred, some of them honourable in the highest degree to individuals, and others, not disgraceful, but somewhat ludicrous. It is not necessary for me to add my tribute of respect to the memory of the brave youth, Ensign Thomas, of the Buffs, who refused to resign the standard of his regiment except with life, and whose life paid the forfeit of his devoted gallantry. Though young in years, and holding but an inferior rank in his profession, his name will be recorded in the list of those of whom England has just cause to be proud; and his example will doubtless be followed by others, as often as the chances of war may leave them only a choice between death and dishonour. But there were one or two circumstances besides this, of which little notice has elsewhere been taken, and which appear to me to be deserving of some passing record.

During the hottest of the action, Marshal Beresford exposed himself with a degree of intrepidity, which could hardly fail of spreading an example of heroism around. He repeatedly dragged the Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them to lead their men forward, and show them the way; and when individually charged by a Polish lancer, he grappled his adversary by the throat, and threw him from his saddle. A very different fate attended the personal exertions of the Portuguese staff. They too were charged by a single

lancer, who knocked down one with the butt of his pike, overset another man and horse, and gave ample employment to the entire head-quarters before he was finally despatched. These heroes declared that the man seemed possessed by an evil spirit; and that when he fell at last, he literally bit the ground. The lancers, as is well known, were peculiarly daring in their attacks, and merciless in their operations. They seldom paused to offer quarter, but speared our men without mercy, whether offering resistance, or giving proofs of submission.

Such is the substance of an official report, which was communicated to us at Elvas on the 19th; and it must be confessed that a disclosure of the loss sustained took away, in some degree, from the satisfaction which would have otherwise accompanied the announcement of a fresh victory. When the amount of casualties suffered at Albuera came to be added to those experienced before Badajoz, and in the affair of Fuentes de Honor, it appeared that, unless powerful reinforcements should arrive speedily from England, the plans for the rest of the campaign must receive serious interruption from the absence of adequate means to carry them into effect. We had it in contemplation, be it remembered, at this time to reduce the two fortresses of Badajoz and Rodrigo, and to keep the army of Portugal occupied in the north; whilst

Soult should be threatened in the south, and an effort made to raise the blockade of Cadiz; and to effect these different ends, we possessed only the force which had followed Massena from Torres Vedras, diminished by full nine thousand men, who were hors de combat in the late encounters. It was impossible to think of this without experiencing the liveliest anxiety, or to cast our regards homewards without an ardent hope that a proper spirit might animate the councils of those in whom the power of rightly carrying on the war was vested. That we were committed in the eyes, not of the Peninsular nations only, but of Europe at large, could no longer be questioned; all now looked to us and to our fortunes as the criterion by which to try the wisdom of their own resistance or continued submission to the French yoke; and hence, if we should either relinquish the contest, or conduct it with languor and indifference, the prospect of a secure peace was felt to be as remote, as when arms were first assumed against the aggressions of Buonaparte. It was our business, however, not to speculate upon probabilities, or to waste time in idly wishing for an increase of means, but to turn those already at our disposal to the best account; and Lord Wellington was not a man to permit present opportunities to be neglected, merely because the future happened to be not quite so bright as he either desired,

or had reason to believe that it ought to have been.

On the retreat of the enemy after the battle of Albuera, Marshal Beresford sent back General Hamilton's Portuguese division, with orders to observe Badajoz upon its southern side, whilst he himself advanced with the rest of his corps, and took post at Almendralejo. The troops were thus distributed when Lord Wellington arrived; and as it was essential that Soult's columns, which were understood to have concentrated at Fuente del Maestre, should be narrowly watched, he did not interfere with the material parts of this arrangement. But the reduction of Badajoz being the object in which he felt most deeply interested, he applied to it all the resources and numerical force at his disposal, and earnestly urged forward every measure which promised in any way to accelerate the undertaking. No great while elapsed before the siege was regularly renewed; and if the means applied were still very inferior to what they ought to have been, they were at least more respectable than any which it had been practicable to apply during the late investment; and not less respectable than the circumstances of the army, and the general resources of the country, were adequate to procure.

As soon as the two divisions came up, of whose march from the position of the Agueda notice has

already been taken, Lord Wellington proceeded to invest the place anew, upon both banks of the river. For this purpose, the seventh division, under General Houston, drove in on the 25th all the enemy's posts upon the right bank, and established its pickets within a short distance of Fort Christoval, at the same time that a flying bridge was thrown across the Guadiana as at the last attack, and the stores and materials forwarded from Elvas to the depots before the place. On the left bank, again, the Portuguese corps was already at its post; but it was strengthened, on the 27th, by the arrival of the third division, which, marching from Campo Mayor, crossed the Guadiana at the ford above the town. The garrison was thus shut completely within its works, and the business of the siege began.

I have said that the total amount of men and means employed in this service, though certainly greater than had been employed before, was not such as to raise any very lively expectations, in the breast of an ordinary observer, of a speedy and successful termination to our labours. There sat down before the place a besieging army of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, including three thousand Spaniards, and two thousand Portuguese militia; and the artillery to be employed amounted to forty pieces, among which are to be numbered four ten-inch and six eight-inch howitzers. Of mortars we

possessed none; eight, therefore, out of the ten howitzers, were directed to be used as such; and our guns, of which two were twenty-four pounders, and four sixteen pounders, were all brass, and of Portuguese manufacture. The engineers' stores collected on the occasion comprised 3500 intrenching tools, 60,000 sand-bags, 600 gabions, a very few fascines, and an extremely inadequate quantity of splinter-proof timber and planks; whilst, independently of the officers, there were attached to the department, 169 men of the line, to act as overseers, 48 carpenters, 48 miners, and 25 rank and file, of the corps of royal artificers. The chief engineer and principal director of the operations was Lieutenant-colonel Fletcher. Major Dixon, of the Portuguese artillery, was at the head of that department; and Captains Ross and M'Leod were put in charge of two depots, which were established on each side of the river.

To oppose this force, there was understood to be in Badajoz and in its outworks, a garrison of three thousand men, amply provided with food and other stores for two months' consumption. Their artillery, too, was of a very excellent description. It numbered full 150 pieces; from which a fire might, at almost any point, be thrown out, infinitely superior to that which we could bring against it; and though, at first, we were led to believe that the stock of ammunition was scanty in the place,

a short experience of its uses served to convince us that in that rumour there was no foundation. In spite, however, of these disadvantages, our engineers appeared sanguine as to the results. They determined to make two attacks upon two sides at the same time, directing one against Fort Christoval, and the other against the old castle. That the reader may the better understand the object of these, it will be necessary to inform him, somewhat more minutely than has yet been done, how Badajoz, Fort Christoval, and the Castle, were respectively situated.

The large and fortified town of Badajoz stands upon the left bank of the Guadiana, having one-fourth of its enceinte washed by the river, which varies from about three hundred to five hundred yards in width, and secures all the space which it embraces from insult. Towards the land side its defences consist of eight regularly constructed fronts, connected by a good covered way and glacis. The ravelines are, however, unfinished; but the fronts possess whole revetments, and the escarpe of the bastions is thirty feet in height, though that of the curtains is considerably lower. In advance of these fronts are two detached works, namely, the Pardaleras, a crown work, about two hundred yards distant, and the Pecurina, a strong redoubt, four hundred yards removed from the glacis. On the north-east side, again, where an

angle is formed by the junction of the river Revelas with the Guadiana, there is a hill, measuring, perhaps, 120 feet in height, the summit of which is crowned by an old castle ; and the walls of that castle, naked, weak, and only partially flanked, form part of the enceinte of the place. The castle itself embraces an area of very considerable extent, and might, if proper care were bestowed upon it, be rendered exceedingly formidable ; but its defences have, by some accident, been most unaccountably neglected, and, at the period of which I am now speaking, it was deficient even in an ordinary parapet to shelter its guns. It was against this point that our engineers determined to conduct one of their attacks, and it was here that they seemed to possess the best, if not the only chance, of ultimately succeeding.

On the opposite bank of the Guadiana, and in a direct line with this ancient building, stand the heights of St. Christoval, which measure in altitude little less than the hill of the castle itself, and may, from the peculiar shape and bearing of the latter eminence, be said completely to command it. The castle hill, it will be observed, forms a sort of inclined plain, which eases itself off towards the edge of the water ; and hence a spectator from the summit of the heights of St. Christoval is enabled to see, with perfect accuracy, anything which may happen to be going on within the walls of the

castle. To hinder an enemy from availing himself of this advantage, a square fort, of above three hundred feet per face, has been constructed. It is strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp twenty feet in height ; and it is capable, from the rocky nature of the ground on which it stands, to offer a stout resistance, even when methodically besieged. Between it and the town, however, the communication is far from being good ; inasmuch as it is carried on entirely by means of a long bridge, subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more precarious and insecure instrumentality of boats. Against this fort was the second attack directed ; and the obstacles to be encountered soon proved to be as serious as from the general appearance of the place might have been expected.

Every preliminary measure having been duly adopted, large working parties were ordered out on the night of the 31st, and ground was broken both before the Castle and Fort St. Christoval. The former operation went on wholly unobserved by the enemy, till daylight disclosed our people, already well covered by their embankment ; but in the latter we were immediately detected, and an incessant fire of grape and round shot kept up in the direction of the noise. In spite, however, of this interruption, the men toiled on ; and four distinct batteries, at different distances from the place,

were marked out, and in part completed. From that moment reliefs regularly succeeded one another by day as well as by night; and though the enemy, by shifting two or three of their guns, contrived to throw shot into our very trenches, still all the batteries, including one against the angle of the castle, were completed and armed by the 2nd of June. On the 3rd they opened; and a heavy fire was kept up on both sides, during several days and nights, without the smallest intermission.

It was now that the inefficient nature of Portuguese artillery, as well as the inferiority of Portuguese ammunition, became conspicuous. Our guns, one after another, became disabled by their own fire; whilst our breaching batteries, though they caused the masonry both of Fort Christoval and the Castle to peel off, were far from producing that effect which had been anticipated from them. On the side of the castle all that could be said was, that at the end of several days of open batteries, the wall and rampart appeared to be a little shaken; but of a practicable breach the commencement had not yet been made; nor could it be surmised how far it was ever likely to be effected. On the side of Fort Christoval, however, our progress, though not what it was expected to have been, seemed more certain. Two bastions at length fell, apparently filling up the ditch with

their ruins, and on the 6th, the breach being reconnoitred, it was conceived that an assault might safely be hazarded.

There were a variety of reasons which combined to produce an inclination in Lord Wellington, rather to risk an attack before the place should have been laid perfectly bare, than lose even another day in distant cannonading. We heard from all quarters that the enemy were moving, in great force, for the relief of the place. So early, indeed, as the 25th, the very day on which the re-investment took place, circumstances occurred to produce a suspicion of the kind, and every hour gave to it greater force, and an increased degree of credibility. On that day an affair took place in front of our covering corps, which, though creditable in the highest degree to the troops engaged, could not be regarded by us, at head-quarters, without uneasiness, since it clearly indicated a disposition, on the part of Marshal Soult, to resume the offensive, and led to the conclusion, either that reinforcements had already arrived, or that they were close at hand, and therefore to be securely counted on.

The advanced station of our cavalry was, at this time, in Usagre, a small town, distant about two leagues from Almendralejo. Here General Lumley, who commanded the allied squadrons, took up his quarters; and here an opportunity was af-

forded him of distinguishing himself. On the 25th, about five hundred of the enemy's cavalry crossed a little stream which runs before the village, and filing through the street, which our people, on their approach, had evacuated, debouched at its extremity, and formed with a wall in their rear. General Lumley seized this favourable opportunity, by ordering out the 3rd dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons, to charge. They executed the movement in good style, and overthrowing the French in a moment, cut down about one hundred, and made many prisoners. The rest fled in every direction ; whilst their comrades, in large numbers, stood upon the opposite bank of the rivulet, to witness a defeat which they could not interfere to prevent. The affair naturally produced the best effect upon the spirits of our troopers, who had almost begun to consider themselves inferior to the French ; and it had an effect diametrically the reverse upon the enemy. The latter came not on again whilst our squadrons retained their attitude of defiance ; but as it was not intended that we should keep this place by dint of hard fighting, that attitude was gradually laid aside. Our men fell back upon Los Santos, Villa Franca, and Puebla ; and the enemy took quiet possession of Usagre.

Had the report of this rencontre come alone, it would have been treated by us as an indication of

nothing more than a desire on the part of the French Marshal to feel how we were disposed, and whether it might not be practicable to alarm us into an abandonment of our present undertaking ; but it did not come alone. We soon learned that Drouet had actually set out from Salamanca for the south, with seventeen battalions and several squadrons ; and that a large proportion, if not the whole of Marmont's army, was expected to follow. Lord Wellington instantly despatched orders for General Howard's brigade of the first division, as well as for a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to hasten from the Agueda, in order to reinforce us at Badajoz ; and instructions were, at the same time, conveyed to other divisions, that they should hold themselves in readiness to undertake a similar journey. By and by a rumour came in that Drouet was near at hand, and that his arrival at Cordova was confidently expected on the 9th of June at furthest. Now as Soult was at this time at Llerena, Villa Garcia, and the villages near, there could be little doubt as to his being able to collect a force upon the Albuera by the 12th ; and then the question arose, whether it would be possible for us to continue our operations against Badajoz beyond the 10th. It was quite evident that the covering army, even after it should have been strengthened by the troops called in from the north, would not be competent to oppose Soult,

thus increased to full thirty thousand men ; whereas, should Marmont himself appear upon the stage in this quarter, to risk a battle with the covering and even besieging corps combined, would have been most injudicious. On all these accounts Lord Wellington determined to try the effect of an assault on the very first opportunity which should hold out the slightest prospect of success ; and hence the breach in Fort St. Christoval was no sooner pronounced practicable, than preparations were made to storm it.

In the mean while a few changes occurred in the distribution both of the men and officers employed in this part of the country. The Portuguese government had become, of late, so little attentive to the condition of its army, that the troops, destitute of pay, and miserably supplied with necessaries, were sinking fast into the state of inefficiency from which they had been so lately delivered. The men, after enduring privations more severe than could have been borne by the natives of almost any other country, began at last, some of them to desert their colours, and the rest to lay aside all that esprit de corps, with which Marshal Beresford had taken so much pains to inspire them ; and the officers, as many at least as were not Englishmen, or thoroughly imbued with the English system, hardly endeavoured to restrain them in their proceedings. Under these circum-

stances, it became indispensable to relieve Marshal Beresford from his command of the covering corps; because it was felt that, if he could not restore something like alacrity and discipline to the Portuguese legions, no other officer in either service need attempt it. Marshal Beresford was accordingly called in, and General Hill proceeded to take upon himself the charge thus rendered vacant. At the same time, General Howard's brigade was incorporated into the second division; whilst the remains of the brigade lately commanded by General Houghton, as well as of the buffs, the 31st, and the 66th, being formed into a single battalion of detachments, and placed in the brigade of General Lumley, were attached to the same division. The brigade of Portuguese, likewise, which marched from the Agueda at the same time with General Howard's regiments, took its station in the second division. Thus, whilst the third and seventh divisions, with one corps of Portuguese, and another of Spaniards, under the immediate orders of Lord Wellington, pressed the blockade, and carried on the siege of Badajoz, the second and fourth divisions, with the light brigade of the King's German Legion, supported by General Cotton with the cavalry from the north, as well as by the cavalry of the south under General Erskine, covered their operations; the infantry holding the

position of Albuera, as being the most advantageous in this neighbourhood, and the cavalry keeping watch at Almendralejo, Los Santos, Villa Franca, and the country round.

CHAPTER VI.

Siege of Badajoz—Fort St. Christoval twice stormed without effect—Movements of the enemy to relieve the town—Lord Wellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Portugal—Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversion, and retires to Cadiz—The British army takes post behind the Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas—Intercepted letter from Marmont to Berthier—The allies go into cantonments.

THE breach in St. Christoval having been examined by Lieutenant Foster of the engineers, and pronounced practicable, orders were issued that an assault should take place on the night between the 6th and 7th of June; and the forlorn hope, consisting of twenty-five men, advanced about midnight under the guidance of that officer, and directed their operations against the part which appeared most assailable, namely, the right salient angle of the fort. By the fire of our batteries the palisades had all been destroyed; and as the counterscarp was here little more than four feet in depth, it proved no obstacle to the assailants: they

sprang into the ditch, and marched straight to the foot of the breach. But here a sad reverse awaited them. The enemy, labouring incessantly between dusk and the hour of attack, had removed the rubbish, and the escarpe was found to stand clear nearly seven feet from the bottom of the ditch. Our men, though totally unprepared for such an occurrence, made repeated efforts to surmount the obstacle; but all were unavailing. They accordingly determined to relinquish the attempt, and they might have retired with a very trifling loss, had they not been met by the main body of the storming party, amounting to 155 men. These having brought with them a few ladders, insisted upon trying the effect of an escalade; and they unhappily planted their instruments against a point, the summit of which overtopped the longest of them by full five feet. The consequence was, that the enemy, roused to a sense of their danger, hurled down into the ditch a shower of shells, grenades, stones, and other missiles, which taking effect among men unavoidably crowded together, produced considerable slaughter and great confusion. The party at length retired, leaving behind them twelve dead, and carrying away upwards of ninety wounded.

From this period up to the 9th, our people sedulously employed themselves in constructing new batteries, and making better preparations for

a fresh assault. There arrived upon the 8th seven iron guns, which having been transported from Lisbon to Elvas, were from the latter place forwarded to our camp; and these, with the whole of our serviceable artillery, amounting to no more than seven cannons and two howitzers, played incessantly upon the breach, and the batteries which commanded and defended it. But the practice was far from being accurate, and the walls seemed to be made of materials more than ordinarily durable; for after expending a considerable portion of ammunition, it was found that the breach could not be made by many degrees more promising than it was before. Still, as a good deal of rubbish lay under its gorge, so as to form, in our view, a sort of rude path up the face, it was again determined to try the fortune of an assault, and the determination was formed on grounds not very dissimilar from those which guided our resolutions on the previous occasion.

We heard, upon authority which left us no room to doubt the truth of the report, that Drouet had actually reached Cordova on the 7th and 8th, and that his division of eight thousand men was in communication with the corps of Marshal Soult. The latter, too, had, as it appeared, refused his left, and was manœuvring that he might come, by Medellin, into connexion, either with a part, or with the whole of Marmont's army; for of the

movement of the latter towards this quarter of Spain we were now credibly informed, and we saw at once that the main effort of the enemy would be directed to the preservation of Badajoz. Nor, in truth, was this at all to be wondered at. Situated as their forces now were, Badajoz was to the French a point of paramount importance, inasmuch as it formed the key of all their intended operations in the Alentejo, and a connecting link with Seville and their divisions before Cadiz. It was but natural, therefore, that they should use every effort to preserve it; and that such was their intention, a despatch received on the 8th from General Spencer, together with other information collected elsewhere, sufficiently assured us. The following is an outline of the details contained in that despatch, in which, as the reader will easily believe, we felt ourselves deeply interested.

The enemy, it appeared, entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th, with 2,500 cavalry, 14 pieces of artillery, and 16,000 infantry: and our light division retiring, on the 6th, as far as Nave d'Avel, the French pursued their march in two columns, composed chiefly of cavalry, along the roads which lead to Gallegos and Carpeo. The mass which moved by the latter road seemed to be the stronger of the two, and it was accompanied by six pieces of cannon. Our cavalry, observing them all the while, fell back to the high

grounds, and formed a line between Espeja and Gallegos ; upon which the enemy pushed through the wood, in two bodies, with great impetuosity, and made a daring attempt to cut off a large proportion, if not the whole, of the force opposed to them. The cavalry, however, saw through the manœuvre, and skilfully defeated it. By inclining to their right, they avoided the left and front attacks directed against them, and coming down with great gallantry upon the column on the Espeja road, overthrew and repulsed it with loss. On this occasion the royals particularly distinguished themselves. Our people then retrograded to Sabugal, whilst the French having merely entered Fuentes de Honor, and patrolled as far as Almeida and the Coa, withdrew their troops, and ended their recognisance.

Whilst the preceding operation was going forward, another and more important movement, which this was intended to cover, received its accomplishment, though not unnoticed by us. Despatches from Colonel Grant, who occupied posts about the Puerto de Banos, informed us that two divisions of Marmont's infantry with 500 cavalry had passed along the rear of the reconnoitring columns, and arrived on the 6th—the very day on which the recognisance was made—at Los Santos and Fuentes. They were commanded by Regnier, and continued their march upon Banos, at which

place their leader slept on the night of the 9th. But it was not from the reports of our own officers alone, that we obtained, at this time, a pretty accurate insight into the enemy's designs and operations. From intercepted letters which fell into our hands, we learned that Marmont fully intended to co-operate in raising the siege of Badajoz—though whether with the whole or only a part of his force, we had no opportunity of accurately determining. All our speculations, however, tended to excite a belief that, if he moved at all, he would move with his army entire; and we were the further confirmed in this opinion by various hints, which, though in their more direct allusions inexplicable, were yet sufficiently clear to put us generally upon our guard. It was stated in these letters that as soon as Badajoz should be relieved, the two Marshals would proceed to act upon the plan originally formed; and hence, though of the object of that plan we necessarily remained in the dark, we were not slow in discovering that it required for its accomplishment a perfect union of force. Upon these grounds we came to the conclusion that Badajoz must either be reduced at once, or not at all; because we could hardly pretend to continue the siege in presence of Marmont's and Soult's armies combined; and as little could we hope to fight them to advantage on the south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city in a

state of blockade. That we might not, however, be exposed to greater hazard than was necessary, General Spencer received directions to move by Penamacor to Castello Branco; which place he was commanded to reach on the 12th, and to hold himself in readiness to form a junction with our corps at the shortest notice.

Such was the general state of our affairs, when the breach in Fort St. Christoval was pronounced, for the second time, practicable; and it may not be amiss, before proceeding to narrate the particulars of the assault, if I give a brief review of the relative strength and prospects of the contending armies.

There were now, on the south and north frontiers of Portugal, two large and effective French armies,—that of Marshal Soult in the province of Estremadura, that of Marshal Marmont in La Mancha. The former, by dint of extraordinary exertions, was enabled, when reinforced by Drouet's and Sebastiani's divisions, and by two or three battalions, which he did not scruple to withdraw from before Cadiz, to muster full thirty thousand men; of which not fewer than four thousand were cavalry; the latter having reorganised the army of Portugal, and arranged it into six divisions, possessed thirty thousand infantry, besides cavalry and artillery. Allowing, therefore, for casualties on the march, and for those little mis-statements which

are unavoidable in making up all returns, the gross amount of the two corps, when united, would not fall short of sixty thousand men. Now, on our parts, although our force upon paper showed nearly fifty thousand British troops, we were quite unable, from sickness (and there were at this time 12,500 upon the list) and other necessary deductions, to bring more than thirty thousand men into the field. The Portuguese, again, having become, in every respect, far less efficient than they were wont to be, could not be calculated at more than twenty-five thousand; whilst the Spaniards, who spoke of themselves as twelve thousand strong, might muster perhaps eight or nine thousand. Thus, in point of gross numbers, the opposing generals were almost on a footing of equality. But it ought to be remembered that, whilst the French possessed ample means of recruiting their losses, and were enabled, after every reverse, to make head again with almost undiminished strength, our reinforcements came in slowly, and by small detachments at a time. To pursue the siege of Badajoz, therefore, leisurely, and with a strict attention to rule, would be to lay ourselves out for a general and decisive action, in which we must fight in an open country, with our flanks exposed, and the Guadiana closing us in upon the rear. It is true that, at the present season, the waters of the river were low; that it might be forded in various points,

and could not, therefore, cut off our retreat, supposing us to be worsted; but the question was, whether it were worth while to cast all upon the hazard of one throw; more especially when the stake on the side of the enemy was not, and could not be made, equally desperate with our own. To act thus had never yet been Lord Wellington's policy; and he saw nothing in present circumstances to bring about a change in his plans. On the contrary, he resolved to make one effort more to possess himself of the beleaguered city; and in case that should fail, either to prosecute the undertaking, provided he were left to do so at his leisure, or to retire from before the place, and take up a convenient position somewhere on the north side of the Guadiana.

Actuated by these motives, and anxious to avail himself of the opportunity still within his reach, Lord Wellington gave orders that Fort St. Christoval should again be stormed, on the night of the 9th of June. On this occasion, the storming party consisted of two hundred men, twenty-five of whom, as formerly, formed an advanced-guard, or forlorn hope, under Lieutenant Hunt, of the royal engineers. They marched from the trenches at the signal given, and pushed for the ditch; but the enemy were far better prepared to receive them now than they had been before, and opened a heavy fire upon them as soon as they arrived

within range of musketry. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Hunt was killed upon the glacis; and though the troops leaped into the ditch with their accustomed gallantry, and pressed forward as they imagined towards the breach, they had no longer a leader capable of guiding them, and in consequence lost their way. They went forward, provided with two ladders from twenty-five to thirty feet in length; but they applied them, not to the breach, but to the face of a bastion which was not in ruins, though considerably injured by stray shot. The consequences were such as might be anticipated. After persisting in their efforts to escalate with the most daring bravery during a full hour, they were finally compelled to retreat, with the loss of forty men killed, and no fewer than one hundred wounded. Thus ended the second attempt on Badajoz; for on our parts nothing further was tried at this time. During the 10th, a truce was agreed upon, for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, and burying the dead; and in the evening our guns and stores began to be removed. On the 11th, all that could be done, without attracting notice, towards the attainment of the same end, was effected; and on the 12th, the siege was finally raised, after it had cost the allies 9 officers and 109 men killed, with 25 officers and 342 men wounded and taken prisoners.

But though the stores and materiel were thus

removed from before Badajoz, it was not esteemed prudent to withdraw the covering army from its position on the Albuera, till the enemy, by some movement more decisive than they had yet made, should throw further light upon their future intentions. In spite of the extreme probability of the rumours which had reached us, it would have been something more than prudent, had we changed our whole line of operations upon their authority alone; and hence the corps of which Marshal Beresford had originally been in command, but which was now under the orders of General Hill, kept its ground, and retained its attitude of watchfulness, up to the 16th. Upon that day, however, we received official information that Regnier, with the advance of Marmont's corps, was at Truxillo; and that the main body was in the act of passing the Tagus at Alcantara; whilst Soult's army was observed to be feeling its way, with the cavalry and light troops, from Llerena towards Medellin and Merida. It was therefore impossible any longer to doubt that the object of the enemy was a combined operation for the relief of Badajoz; and as they refused their left, and marched strongly towards their right, our left became of course the probable point of attack. Under these circumstances, the position of the Albuera was pronounced wholly untenable; nor was there any other on the left of the Guadiana

which offered the slightest advantages, or held out to us the smallest inducement to take it up.

It would have been quite unnatural, had Lord Wellington, thus situated, felt otherwise than mortified and grieved to a great degree. In spite of all the exertions which he had made, and the numerous successes which he had obtained, he saw himself, at the present juncture, in a situation at least not more enviable than that which he filled on the opening of the campaign; for the resources of the enemy, instead of diminishing, appeared to increase, whilst his own were becoming daily more and more enfeebled. I have said that the Portuguese army was not now in the state of efficiency in which it appeared to be twelve months before. On the contrary, without pay, without provisions, without sufficient means of transport, the troops seemed to be rapidly falling back into their original disorganisation; whilst the commanders were involved in continual disputes and quarrels, as well with one another, as with the Regency and the court of Brazil. With respect, again, to the Spaniards, nothing could be more disgusting than the apathy with which they regarded passing events, unless, indeed, it was their excessive and mistaken jealousy of English interference. Though we had drawn upon ourselves last year all the French armies of the north, neither Castile, nor Galicia, nor Biscay, nor Na-

varre, nor the Asturias, nor Leon, made the faintest effort to take advantage of the diversion ; and now, when the armies of the south and of the centre were collected in our front, both the interior and northern provinces of Spain remained perfectly quiet. Madrid, which was at this time freed from the presence of French soldiers, was actually guarded by the citizens in the name of Joseph, and with arms and ammunition given to them by the French ; whilst the Cortes and the Regency had become objects of contempt, as general and as complete as ever was heaped upon the government of this or any other country. In every department cabal and party spirit were at work. Each commander of an army had his own plans and his own adherents, both in the Regency and in the Cortes ; whilst among themselves there existed but one point of union, and that was to be found in a universal distrust of their allies. From Spain, therefore, little was now to be expected ; indeed, it was confidently given out that Joseph had retired from the Peninsula, and that Ferdinand was about to return with Marshal Berthier, for the purpose of allaying all misgivings, and reconciling the nation at large to the wishes of Napoleon. Nor were our prospects by many degrees more bright, when we looked only to the defence of Portugal. By the capture of Badajoz in the south, and the destruction of Almeida in the

north, the two great roads into the heart of the country were laid open ; for the government having refused to advance money for its repair, Almeida was blown up ; and hence it was in the power of Buonaparte, whenever he should think fit strongly to reinforce his armies here, to march upon Lisbon by the route which to himself should appear most advantageous. It is true that our works about the capital were capable of a long and obstinate defence, and that if England chose to turn her undivided strength to that point, she might unquestionably preserve it ; but it admitted of serious doubt whether the preservation of Lisbon would repay the cost of defending it, especially when it must be defended by subjecting the richest provinces in the kingdom to devastation. These were gloomy and somewhat dispiriting considerations. Whether they occurred to Lord Wellington or not, I take it not upon me to determine ; but before the rest of the army they rose in full force ; there were few who looked far into the future without serious misgivings.

Lord Wellington having maturely weighed all the reasons for and against his proposed proceeding, at last sent for Castaños and Blake at Albuera, and opened to them the views which he entertained, and the determination to which he had come. He did so, prefacing his declaration by a statement, that nothing which they could do

or say would induce him to depart from his own plans ; leaving it, at the same time, to themselves to choose whether they would follow us in our movements, or act independently ; and when they adopted the latter alternative, he explained to them his own sentiments as to the best course which they had it in their power to pursue. This done, he dismissed them, and immediately issued orders for the breaking up of the army from Albuera and Badajoz. The movement took place on the 18th ; and all the stores and baggage being safely conveyed to the rear, the columns moved without impediment or confusion upon their new ground. On the 20th of June the following was the disposition of the allied British and Portuguese armies.

At Torre del Mouro, on the line of the river Caya, an extensive encampment was formed, which rested its right flank upon Elvas, and had its left covered by Campo Mayor. It was occupied, 1st, by the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton ; 2ndly, by the second and fourth divisions, by Major-general Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry, by Major-general Alten's light brigade, and by two brigades of nine pounders. These troops were all under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-general Hill, and held the right wing or Elvas moiety of the encampment. The third and seventh divisions again, which moved from the trenches, di-

rected their steps towards Campo Mayor ; where on the left of the camp they reported to General Picton, as the senior officer. In the mean while General Spencer's corps, which, in obedience to directions previously given, had advanced to Portalegre, formed a separate encampment for itself. It was kept there, because Portalegre constituted a convenient centre from whence it might either be brought, in case of need, into the camp at Torre del Mouro, or thrown back across the Tagus, should Marmont demonstrate in that quarter ; whilst the communication between the two, which happened to be neither remote nor intricate, was sufficiently preserved by patrols and flying parties.

It is to be observed that the object of this new alignment was purely one of defence. It was assumed under the persuasion that the enemy, who had collected in strength, would not content themselves with the relief of Badajoz, but press forward with a view to besiege Elvas, and probably make an irruption into Alentejo. Now, as the loss of Elvas would have been productive to us of consequences the most disastrous, inasmuch as it would have supplied the French with an additional pivot on which to turn, and completed the exposure of the richest and most fertile districts in Portugal, Lord Wellington made up his mind to risk everything for its preservation ; and with this view he disposed his army in such order, as that it might

seize the first favourable opportunity of striking a blow. Should Marmont, previously to sitting down before the place, choose to risk a great battle by attacking us in our position, the nature of the ground which we occupied would give to us advantages the most decided; should he, on the other hand, commence his operations before the town, leaving us to observe or molest him as best suited our own convenience, we might wait with patience till the fitting moment had arrived, and then become ourselves the assailants. Thus were we provided against either extremities, supposing the notion formed touching the enemy's designs to be well-founded; whereas, if no forward movement were made on their parts, then might we either remain quietly where we were, till general events should take a turn more favourable, or resume the offensive as soon as our own circumstances, and the distribution of the enemy's force, might appear to authorise the measure. That Lord Wellington himself anticipated a general action is, I believe, true; he spoke of its probable occurrence, and took all the precautions to insure a victory, which his genius pointed out; and as he possessed sources of information to which no other individual had access, there can be little doubt that he came to that conclusion on grounds perfectly reasonable. As to myself, I own that I considered the enemy had gained a great deal by

the successful resistance of Badajoz; more, perhaps, than in the present state of the campaign they had any right to expect; and as their troops stood at least as much in need of repose and re-organisation as ours, it appeared somewhat improbable that they would, for the sake of harassing us, deny to themselves that of which they strongly experienced the want.

But whilst Lord Wellington thus distributed his own forces, he was neither unmindful of the advantages to be derived from a diversion, nor careless of the condition of the strong-holds which he had fallen back to protect.

To effect the former of these objects, General Blake was directed to put his corps in motion, and, marching down the right bank of the Guadiana upon the Conde de Unebla, to cross at Mertola, so as to threaten, at once, Seville, the camp before Cadiz, and the rear of the French army. For the purpose of prosecuting the latter, numerous working parties were employed every day, not only at Elvas—where, in truth, their exertions were much needed—but likewise at Campo Mayor, and the fortress of Juramenha. I have said that the exertions of our artificers were in a peculiar manner needed at Elvas, and I said truly. By the negligence of the Portuguese government, that city—the most important by far upon the southern frontier—had fallen into a state of mise-

nable dilapidation. The walls were in many places broken down; the ditches filled up; and the few pieces of artillery mounted upon the ramparts were all of the worst description; whilst, to add to its general disabilities, it was held at this time by a garrison composed entirely of Portuguese troops; and the Governor, though one of the best of his class, was still only a Portuguese officer. On these several accounts it became sufficiently manifest, that if the place were intended to offer a moderate resistance, great care must be taken to remedy some, at least, of its defects; and since it suited not the policy of the times to change the garrison, or displace the Governor, Lord Wellington determined that the excuse of ruined defences should not be at hand to sanction a too ready submission. Its works were carefully and scientifically repaired, and rendered capable, under proper management, of holding out for a very considerable length of time. Besides these operations, however, which, though doubtless very useful, were certainly not very interesting, nothing was attempted on our part; and as the enemy, with a few trifling exceptions, continued as peaceably disposed as ourselves, we were left, somewhat to our surprise, and not a little to our mortification, to spend the best of the summer months in idleness.

From the 20th of June to the 21st of July, our army remained in its double encampment, at Por-

talegre and Torre del Mouro. Few incidents occurred, during the whole of that time, calculated, in a military point of view, to arrest our attention, or rouse us from our lethargy; and of these few, it unhappily occurred that almost all proved of an unsatisfactory nature. The enemy, instead of following us up, as had been anticipated, confined their operations entirely to the southern side of the Guadiana, never venturing upon anything on our bank of the river, except an occasional recognisance; and these recognisances, being conducted generally by cavalry, were generally successful, as far as success was desired. On one occasion, in particular, they contrived to make prisoners of nearly one hundred and twenty men, belonging to the 11th light dragoons, and twenty hussars of the German legion; and as this was the most serious affair which took place during an entire month, it may not be amiss if I give a particular account of it.

It has been stated that, in forming our present encampment, the line of the Caya was taken up: it may be necessary to remind the reader, that in making use of this expression, no more is meant than that our troops were posted in the rear of that river, and in a direction parallel with its general course. The Caya is a shallow and winding stream, which runs in one of its branches, nearly north and south from the mountains near

Campo Mayor, to the Guadiana. Its banks are in general low and open, though on our side there was a range of commanding heights, not very far removed from the stream. It so happened that our cavalry pickets, instead of being posted upon this rising ground, were ranged along the margin of the river, some of them in the very angles formed by its detours, and in spots where no vigilance could enable the videttes to observe an enemy till he was close at hand. In one of these most inappropriate spots was a considerable party of the 11th stationed, on a morning, when the French thought fit to push a large force across the river, for the purpose of ascertaining how we were employed. Our cavalry behaved with their accustomed gallantry, charging the leading squadron of the force immediately opposed to them, and driving it back with precipitation upon its support; but they were ignorant all the while that other squadrons had turned them, and that overwhelming numbers were already formed in their rear. The consequence was, that the whole party was surrounded, and with the exception of a few individuals, who contrived to cut their way through, all were taken. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the disaster gave rise to a variety of reports, and to much condemnation; but I consider it not worth while to repeat it.

In addition to such occurrences as this, the only

sources of public interest which we possessed, arose from the various reports which, from time to time, came in, of the movements both of the French armies and of the Spanish corps. We learned, for example, that Soult had returned to Seville with the whole of his force, and that he had detached a division to oppose Blake, who had crossed the Guadiana, according to the preconcerted plan, at Mertola. Instead, however, of pushing for Seville, Blake contented himself with making a night attack upon the castles of Puebla and Unebla, in which, as a matter of course, he failed; and now, on receiving intelligence of the march of Soult's detachment against him, he withdrew to Ayamonte, and embarked for Cadiz. Marmont, in the mean while, was stated to remain stationary at Merida and its vicinity; from whence his cavalry were sent to the front for the purpose of foraging, as often as necessity required. Large reinforcements of stores and artillery were, at the same time, thrown into Badajoz; its works were thoroughly repaired, and its garrison was increased to the amount of five thousand men. But the most satisfactory piece of intelligence which came to us, was conveyed in a letter from Marmont himself; which, though addressed to Marshal Berthier, fell, by great good fortune, into our hands. The General had intrusted it to one of his aides-camp, whom he despatched, as a most confi-

dential person, to Paris ; and who, being intercepted, as well as his communication, by a wandering band of Spaniards, was sent in person to our camp. As the letter was really a curious one, and as it served to convey a very correct idea of the state of the French army, as well as an extremely favourable notion of the judgment and good sense of its commander, it may not be amiss to repeat here a brief outline of its contents.

The letter in question was dated from Merida, at a period posterior to the relief of Badajoz, and the consequent retrogression of our divisions. It began by informing his Excellency the Prince of Neufchatel, that having succeeded, in conjunction with the Duke of Dalmatia, in raising the siege of Badajoz, the writer had since directed his undivided attention to the re-organisation and re-establishment of discipline in the army of Portugal. The system of requisitions, and the irregularity of supply, had been carried, it was continued, to so great a height, that the army was become little better than a rabble of banditti ; nor could any thing be attempted with the slightest prospect of success, till the method should be entirely changed, and the troops provided and paid in such a manner, as to render them both contented and manageable. To accomplish this, the Marshal was then devising plans ; and he earnestly pressed for instructions and assistance from the Emperor,

in carrying them into execution. In the mean time, however, he meditated a removal to the right bank of the Tagus ; whilst Soult, who had heard of succours being sent from Cadiz to Tarragona, and considered his presence in the south as indispensable, was preparing to march thither without delay. With him the Marshal would leave the fifth corps of infantry as well as several battalions of cavalry, these being more immediately destined for the defence of Estremadura ; but he added an earnest request, that they might thenceforth be attached to the army of Portugal, as an arrangement not only natural, but necessary.

The letter went on to state, that with his own corps, amounting to thirty-two thousand infantry, and from three to four thousand cavalry, the writer intended to place himself in some convenient camp between the Teitar and the Tagus, where he should be able more narrowly to watch the conduct of his troops, and improve their discipline. The only obstacle to this arrangement arose from the difficulty of providing adequate supplies of food and forage ; but though doubtless very great, Marmont expressed sanguine hopes that he should be able to surmount it. In this case, and supposing that two or three months' repose were obtained, and that the remounts of horses, and re-equipments of various kinds promised should arrive, he entertained no doubt that the fine army of Portugal would

again become *très redoutable*, and capable of executing any service in which the Emperor might be pleased to employ it. He next proceeded to specify the position and supposed strength of our army. He reported the departure of Blake's corps, and its embarkation for Cadiz, subsequent to the failure of its attack upon the castle of Puebla, and entered into a variety of other particulars, which abundantly testified that the channels of information possessed by the French, were at least as perfect and as open as those possessed by ourselves. But of his own plans, Marmont said nothing more, inasmuch as it was his design to remain wholly upon the defensive, till specific orders should reach him from Paris. In addition to this despatch from Marmont, a letter from General Tresion, chief of the staff, was likewise intercepted; but it contained little calculated to interest, except an explicit declaration that the French troops were unable to cope with the English, and that their best chance of success lay in manœuvring.

I have reason to believe that the communications made in Marshal Marmont's despatch, combined with other circumstances of less moment, determined Lord Wellington to forego, for the present, all offensive operations against the enemy in Spain. It was clear that against odds so tremendous he could not, with his present strength,

hope to accomplish any object of importance, since Marmont's corps alone was capable of offering to him a stout resistance; and should it fall back upon that of Soult, its superiority would become at once overwhelming. He accordingly made up his mind to place his troops in temporary cantonments; and the divisions began, on the 21st, to break up from their respective stations for that purpose. Two of these, the third and the sixth, were ordered to cross the Tagus, and to occupy Castello Branco, and the villages near; the seventh was directed to move upon Niza; the light to Campo Mayor; the first and fifth to Portalegre, whither the head-quarters likewise removed; and the second and fourth to Evora and its adjacents. Thus was a very strong corps of infantry, supported by the whole of the cavalry, kept in Alentejo; whilst the remainder of the army taking post in the vicinity of the Tagus, became disposable towards any point which might chance to be threatened.

CHAPTER VII.

Amusements of the officers in quarters—Lord Wellington suddenly moves towards Rodrigo, and invests the place—Disposition of the army in its new alignment—Description of the country round Ciudad Rodrigo—Reports of the preparations made by the enemy to raise the siege of that city, and arrangements entered into in consequence.


IN the preceding pages, my narrative has been so completely confined to a detail of the great operations of the army, and of the results arising out of them, that I have as yet found no opportunity of making the reader acquainted with the general mode and style of living adopted at this time among the staff and other officers. It may be sufficient to state here, that no set of persons could more industriously strive to unite mirth with hardships, and relaxation with severe duty. For some time, we contented ourselves with keeping pointers and greyhounds, and indulging, as often as oppor-

tunities offered, in the sports of shooting, coursing, and fishing; but now a taste for hunting began to prevail amongst us, and fox-hounds and harriers, more or less numerous and good, were established in the different divisions of the army. At headquarters we were fortunate enough to become possessed of an excellent pack, which afforded us much amusement, and occupied time which would have otherwise hung heavily on our hands; and it is worthy of remark, that in such minor undertakings, no man entered more heartily than our leader. It was during this summer that he first instituted the custom, which he never afterwards laid aside, of throwing off at settled points on established days in every week, whilst the army was not in the field, and the incidents, replete with mirth, to which these meetings gave rise, are far too numerous to be recorded, though they will be long remembered. Then, in our quarters, we lived gaily and well. A spirit of good-fellowship and hospitality everywhere prevailed; and in the midst of war,—balls, private theatricals, and agreeable parties, were things of continual occurrence. It is unnecessary to add that this system, whilst it detracted in no degree from the discipline and efficiency of the troops, spread abroad among those who came under its influence the very best disposition and temper; and all men really learned to love their occupation, even at its most trying mo-

ments, from a recollection of the many enjoyments of which it became the source.

It has been stated that on the 21st of July the army broke up from its camps, for the purpose of taking possession of a line of temporary cantonments on each side of the Tagus. All was duly executed by the 23rd ; and on that day the whole of the divisions, with the exception of the fifth alone, which still kept the field at about a league's distance from Portalegre, were comfortably housed at their respective destinations. The movement was hardly made, when we were joined by four regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, from England—namely, by the 26th, 32nd, 68th, and 77th infantry, and the 12th light dragoons ; all of them strong in numbers, and extremely effective ; whilst the arrival of General Graham at Lisbon, who came as second in command from Cadiz, was officially announced to us. The latter piece of intelligence was received with much satisfaction ; for General Graham had seen a great deal of service, and wherever employed, had proved himself always to be an officer of enterprise and talent ; and his late success at Barossa, however much it may be supposed to have depended upon the valour of the troops engaged, certainly took not away from the reputation which their leader had previously acquired.

We were scarcely settled in our new quarters



when a variety of rumours began to circulate, most of them calculated to inspire apprehension, and very few of a contrary tendency. In the first place, a report was conveyed to us through certain Spanish officers at head-quarters, that two separate columns, consisting of thirty thousand men each, were on their march to reinforce the French armies in Spain; one from the side of Dalmatia, and the other from an opposite direction. Nor could the numerous details with which we were favoured, of the formation of bands of guerillas, and of their daring enterprises, in any effectual degree lessen the impression which it had produced. Much has been said of these guerillas, as well by the Spaniards themselves as by the historians of other countries, who have derived their information chiefly from Spanish sources; but all who served in the Peninsula can attest that a less efficient and more mischievous body of marauders never infested any country. It is not denied that they cut off, from time to time, a small convoy, or an isolated detachment; but unfortunately they did not confine their operations to attacks upon the enemy. Whoever fell in their way, be he friend or foe, rarely escaped unplundered; and the inhabitants of the smaller villages everywhere dreaded their appearance as much as that of the French. Yet were these the only portions of the population of Spain which could be said to be in

arms. In the country places, it is true that the people were generally disposed to favour the cause of independence ; and that from the little hamlets and solitary cottages, by far the larger proportion of recruits for the Spanish army was procured ; but in the towns, one wish, and one alone, seemed to prevail—namely, that the repose of the inhabitants might not be interrupted by the approach of any troops, whether French or British. Tranquillity at all hazards, and at any cost, was the boon for which the mass of the population of Spain now pined, till it became too apparent, that were we to withdraw from the Peninsula, the war would come to an end before the close of a single summer. Nor, in truth, was the existence of that feeling very greatly to be wondered at. The Spaniards possessed no force competent, at any point, to make head against the invaders ; almost all their strong places were in the hands of the French ; whilst discord the most atrocious and the most palpable reigned in those very assemblies which ought to have guided the energies of the people, and directed their exertions. We heard, indeed, about this time, of the re-capture of Figueras, and it was one of the few rumours which served to keep alive anything like a hope that Spain might yet do something worthy of her ancient renown, and of the cause in which she was embarked ; but neither this, nor a few trifling

successes near Astorga, nor even the triumphs of Don Julian, who was intercepting convoys, and making prisoners about Salamanca, was sufficient to inspire us with any great degree of confidence in the exertions of our allies. On the contrary, we felt that the British army was, and must continue to be, the principal in this war of Peninsular independence; and hence it was not very easy even for the most sanguine amongst us to believe that, should Russia and the northern states persist in their pacific policy, Great Britain could possibly retire from a contest so unequal, in triumph, and with honour.

When the army first took up its line of cantonments, an opinion generally prevailed, that nothing further would be attempted, on our parts, till the sultry season should have passed away. With respect to the enemy, every thing appeared to indicate that, whatever might be done in other parts of the Peninsula, Portugal would be left undisturbed, till the arrival of the promised reinforcements from France, and other favourable circumstances, should authorise a fresh invasion. Marmont, it was ascertained, having withdrawn his troops into the vale of Plasencia, with the exception of one division only under General Foy, which was appointed to watch the left bank of the Tagus, had established his own head-quarters at Talavera de la Reyna. Soult was gone to the

south, with the intention, as was believed, of laying siege to Carthagená; and Suchet, to whom Tarragona had lately submitted, was preparing to push his conquests in Alicant and Catalonia. In the mean time, Bessieres was assembling one considerable corps at Valladolid, and Bonnet another at Leon and Benavente; whilst Joseph, who had lately returned to Madrid, was amusing himself and his subjects with proclamations, as absurd in their language as they were nugatory in their effects. He was assuring them at once, of the increased love of the Emperor towards the Spaniards, and of the march of sixty thousand fresh troops from France into Spain; and whilst he threatened the severest vengeance against the bands of plunderers by whom the roads and passes were everywhere infested, he held out the brightest hopes to all such guerilla chiefs as chose to accept rank in the imperial service. Not a word, however, was said, either by him or his generals, of further attempts against Portugal or the English; and hence there were few amongst us who anticipated any other result, than that the line which we had now assumed would be maintained, at all events, throughout the dog-days, if not till the return of spring.

Whilst the rest of the army were thus indulging in dreams of quiet and repose, the ever-active mind of their leader was meditating an enterprise,

hazardous, no doubt, and at the best beset with difficulties, but in the highest degree influential upon the general issue of the war. The possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz on one side of Spain, and of three out of the four principal fortresses on the other, gave to the enemy a facility of movement, of which it was of the utmost consequence to deprive them; and Lord Wellington's principal views had, in consequence, been, for some time back, directed to the recovery of places of the importance of which every day brought proofs more and more decided. How he failed in his attempt upon one of these, the reader has already been informed, as well as of the circumstances which would have rendered a fresh effort, in the same quarter, even more hopeless than the effort already made. But with respect to Ciudad Rodrigo, the case was somewhat different. Should Soult really embark in the siege of Carthagená, or in any other expedition calculated to give to his army full occupation, Ciudad Rodrigo must necessarily be left, in a great degree, to the protection of its own garrison; and with the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, even though it should be supported by the single corps of Marmont, Lord Wellington believed himself fully adequate to cope. With the hope, therefore, that some such occurrence might fall out, stores and guns were quietly, but industriously, transported from Lisbon to Oporto, and

from Oporto to Lamego; and at the moment when, to all external appearance, his undivided attention was bestowed upon recruiting the health of his troops, he was looking to their employment in a species of operations, for which, to confess the truth, the British army was, at this period, less prepared than any other army in Europe.

I have said that, at the period to which my present narrative refers, the British army was, among all the armies of Europe, the least prepared to undertake the duties of a siege,—and for this obvious reason, that it was, and long continued to be, deficient in those establishments, without which it is utterly impossible either to defend or attack fortified places to advantage. In expressing myself thus, it is very far from my intention to cast the slightest stigma upon the corps of engineers. Our engineer officers were then, as they are now, equally able and scientific; but besides that, in the Peninsula at least, they were few in number, the absence of all adequate support in the other departments of the army, rendered them quite incapable of applying the science to its legitimate ends, or causing it to produce its legitimate effects. Ours was, perhaps, the only army in Europe which possessed no corps of sappers and miners, nor any body of men peculiarly trained to carry on the more intricate details of a siege. We had, it is true, what was termed the regiment of royal military artificers;

that is to say, a battalion of carpenters, blacksmiths, stonemasons, and other handicraftsmen; but not one of these had ever seen a mine; and as to a sap, they were probably incapable of understanding the very meaning of the word. In the regiments of the line again, there were but few, even among the officers, who had ever bestowed much attention upon these important matters; whilst the men may be pronounced, without reservation, to have been universally ignorant of them. Now, when with such materials our engineers began the labours of a siege, how was it possible that they could carry them on either with rapidity or success? These officers could not be present in a variety of places at the same moment; and wherever they were not present, the probability was, that nothing was done as it ought to have been done. Then, again, in all the materials requisite for sieges, we were greatly deficient. We had no pontoons nor pontooneers; our breaching artillery, chiefly of Portuguese manufacture, was both meagre and badly supplied; and our intrenching tools consisted simply of the most common description of spades, bill-hooks, and pick-axes. The truth is, that the British government, never having contemplated the possibility of its armies being engaged in a serious continental war, and feeling secure against invasion from the decided superiority of its fleets, had never bestowed

attention upon the organisation of means, without which the bravest troops in the world will be liable to disaster, as often as they find themselves opposed by ramparts and ditches; and hence the British army, in no single instance from the commencement to the close of the Peninsular struggle, sat down before a fortified place but under disadvantages. Both the General and his followers were conscious that they possessed neither the physical nor moral elements for such enterprises, and they never entered upon them except when an irresistible necessity compelled.

But though the case was so, and though now, more perhaps than at subsequent periods, we felt our own inferiority in these respects, Lord Wellington was not, on that account, disposed to permit what appeared to be a favourable opportunity for the re-capture of Ciudad Rodrigo to pass unheeded. The divisions had taken up their cantonments but a few days, when an intercepted return of the provisions in that place fell into our hands, from which it appeared that the existing stock was scanty, and that the prospects of securing a fresh supply were both remote and contingent. It instantly occurred to him, that were it practicable to invest Rodrigo previous to the arrival of a convoy, famine might be made to do the work of a siege, whilst, at all events, a knowledge that the fortress was in danger, could not but dishearten

Marmont, even if it should fail in alarming Sout in the midst of his southern operations. The plan was no sooner conceived than carried into execution. Whilst the second British, and General Hamilton's Portuguese division of infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, received orders to remain at Estremos and Portalegre, under General Hill, for the protection of Alentejo, the remainder of the army, consisting of the dragoons, the light, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, was suddenly called into the field, and on the sixth day after it had taken up its cantonments, found itself in full march towards the north.

On the 1st of August head-quarters reached Castello Branco, where a halt of a single day occurred. On the 8th they were transferred to Sabugal; and on the 10th, Lord Wellington fixed his residence in the town of Fuente Guinaldo. A loose and extensive line was then taken up, from Villa Vicoso on the right, to Gallegos on the left, along which the several divisions and brigades were distributed, the 1st occupying Penamacor, the 4th Pedrogao, the 5th Payo, near the pass of Perales, the 6th Gallegos, the 7th Alfayates and Villa Mayor, and the light Mortegao, on the opposite side of the Agueda. With respect to the 3rd division, it remained, with the bulk of the artillery, at Fuente Guinaldo; whilst the cavalry was scattered here and there in squadrons and

small parties, according as the nature of the ground rendered their presence desirable, or facility of accommodation invited.

Before I proceed to give any account of the operations to which these arrangements proved a prelude, it will be necessary to make the reader somewhat better acquainted with the real state and local situation of the fortress, towards which our attention was now turned.

Ciudad Rodrigo is situated upon one of three hills, or rather eminences, which stand upon the right bank of the Agueda, and rise abruptly out of an extensive plain, in a state of high cultivation, and at this time covered with an abundant crop of corn. The plain in question is bordered on the north and west by a range of rugged mountains; and on the south-east, by a similar range, still more rugged and impervious. The former of these ranges consists of cliffs and crags, separated from one another here and there by wide passes, through which several excellent roads conduct to Salamanca and into Castile; the latter can boast only of the pass of Perales, a defile so precipitous, as to be perfectly useless in a military point of view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at the distance of many miles from the walls, and hence both are equally unavailing for the purposes of a blockading force; whilst neither offers a posi-

tion at all favourable or commodious to an army intended to cover the progress of a siege.

It is rather singular, in a country like Spain, that the whole flat should be deficient in springs and pools, and that the only source from which water can be procured by the inhabitants, is the Agueda. I need scarcely add that this circumstance alone, independently of all other considerations, gave to the projected siege no very favourable aspect, since it was manifest that, should it be undertaken, the mass of our troops must establish themselves at a distance from the river, and suffer serious inconvenience in a matter, not less important than any by which they were liable to be effected. But the difficulty which would thus be experienced in supplying the men with one of the most essential necessities of life, was not the only, nor, perhaps, the greatest obstacle, which stood in the way of our design on the present occasion. Should we fairly embark in the siege, we must do so with the full determination either of abandoning our whole train, or staking everything upon the fate of a battle, in case the enemy should approach in force to the relief of the garrison; because the condition of the country in our rear was such, as to preclude all hope that heavy guns and stores, once brought up, could ever be removed hastily, and in the presence of a superior

force. In the first place, the roads in this part of the country are rarely such as deserve to be termed good; during the dry season, they may, indeed, be traversed by carriages of any description; but after rain they are impervious to all except the lightest and best constructed. In the next place, the rivers which separate Rodrigo from Portugal, particularly the Agueda and the Coa, are not only difficult on account of the steep and rugged nature of their banks, but they are liable to sudden rises of many feet, which will, in the course of a few hours, sweep away bridges, and render fords impassable. Supposing, therefore, that we should bring up our guns and stores unmolested, open our trenches, and establish our magazines, it would be vain to speculate upon any other issue than success; for retreat we could not, even if defeated, without abandoning all these to the enemy. There was not, either, as I have already hinted, any ground upon which a covering army could draw up to advantage. Were we to take possession of the north-western ridges, our troops would be separated into numberless little bands, no two of which could co-operate well together, inasmuch as the heights are all a great deal too rugged in their faces to permit of easy communication from the one to the other; whilst we should be exposed to the risk of being forced at some one point, and having the enemy in our rear, before we were

properly aware of their approach. To post ourselves in the plain, again, could be done only at the expense of prodigious labour and much time, since the plain ought to be fortified before it could offer a position; and even then it would be exposed to the hazard of turning, or being drawn out till it became feeble from its very extent. In the outward appearances of nature, therefore, we saw nothing calculated to inspire us with confidence as to the issue of the intended operation; and no man can say our chief examined the ground superficially. He spent an entire week, from three o'clock in the morning till six in the evening of every day, on horseback.

If the nature of the country was not such as very strongly to encourage us in our designs, the information which we received from a variety of quarters, both as to the state of the fortress, and the probabilities of its being relieved, were equally at variance with our wishes and expectations. It was soon discovered that the scarcity of provisions under which the garrison was reported to labour, had long ago been removed. A convoy of stores of every description had entered the place just before our arrival, and it was now victualled and provided for at least two months to come. Evidence, likewise, was not wanting, that the French marshals were determined to hazard all, rather than permit a post of so much importance to be

wrested from them ; and hence, that our siege must be commenced, under the moral certainty of being attacked by all the disposable force in the country long before it could be brought to a conclusion. The following is a brief summary of the rumours which now prevailed, relative to the disposition and numbers of the enemy's troops ; and by which, in the event of our embarking in the affair, we should, in all probability, be assailed.

The corps of Marshal Marmont, distributed through the vale of Plasencia, mustered in all thirty-five thousand men ; there were at Benavente, Toro, Valladolid, &c. about fifteen thousand more ; whilst ten thousand fresh troops, from the reinforcements lately introduced into the country, were understood to be within a few marches of Salamanca. It was not difficult to foresee that, whenever Marmont should deem it expedient to take the field, he would do so at the head of these corps combined ; or, in other words, with a force of not less than sixty thousand men. Now, it unfortunately happened that the allied army was suffering at this moment more severely from sickness than it had done at almost any previous period. There were in hospital, or unfit for duty, no fewer than thirteen thousand British, and five thousand Portuguese—a full thousand of whom had broken down during the late march ; and hence the utmost amount upon which it was possible for us to

calculate, exceeded not forty-two or forty-three thousand men. The matter to be decided accordingly was, whether, with such means, we should be justified in laying siege to a strong place, well supplied, well garrisoned, and covered by an army which, in point of numbers, surpassed our own by nearly one-third ; more especially after our late failure at Badajoz, the impression of which had not yet departed from men's minds. There could be but one opinion as to the prudence or imprudence of the undertaking, and that opinion Lord Wellington immediately embraced. He found himself mistaken in the estimate which had been formed of the defensibility of the place, and he now wisely abstained from a vain attempt to accomplish that for which his means were manifestly incompetent. Having placed Rodrigo in a state of blockade by drawing around it a chain of posts, he determined to await the result in the position which he had assumed ; and he found comfort under a temporary derangement of his plans, from the conviction that his movement would at least operate as a powerful diversion in favour of other provinces and cities of Spain.

Matters continued in this state, from day to day, and from week to week, without giving birth to any events worthy of record. The blockade was maintained with so much diligence, that the garrison began at last to experience something like

distress, and the preparations for converting it into a siege, though not absolutely laid aside, went on slowly and with languor. Occasionally, too, an affair of posts would occur, in which, I regret to say, the enemy were not always unsuccessful; whilst rumours, as usual, came in to supply with subjects of speculation those who had little in their own immediate occupations or prospects to excite interest. One day brought intelligence of the formidable attitude assumed by the Spaniards in Galicia; the next furnished a detail of their overthrow and dispersion. Now we heard of Blake's arrival in Cadiz, and of the great deeds which he expected to perform in Andalusia; again, of the rapidity with which Suchet and Sebastiani were completing the subjugation of the southern provinces; and the probability that Grenada and Carthagená would shortly be reduced. But it was not till towards the end of August, that certain indications of a movement on the part of Marmont, gave to our own situation its ordinary character of interest; and September was far advanced before we learned to believe that important operations were really at hand.

The first expectation of hostilities about to recommence, was excited by a report that Marmont had broken up from his cantonments, and that his columns were in march towards Castile. This came in about the 24th of August, and as it was

supposed to rest upon tolerably good evidence, Lord Wellington made instant preparations to meet the threatened danger. The divisions which had hitherto occupied cantonments between Fuente Guinaldo and the Tagus, closed up; the first and fourth passing the Coa, and stationing themselves at Nave d'Avel, Fuentes de Honor, Villa Formosa, and Valdelamula; whilst the remainder took post on the heights of Pastores, at El Boden, at Montiago, Albergaria, and the places near. By this arrangement, the several brigades of the allied army were so distributed, as that they could, at a moment's notice, concentrate between the Agueda and the Coa; whilst all the principal defiles of the mountains beyond being watched, the possibility of throwing a corps unobserved either into Rodrigo, or upon any link in our communications, was prevented. A point d'appui, likewise, for those in front, was constituted at Fuente Guinaldo, where a position was marked out, and strengthened by respectable intrenchments; in a word, every precaution was taken which the circumstances of the case appeared to demand, and which would enable Lord Wellington either to fight to advantage, should it be his policy to risk a battle, or, having kept out his advanced corps to the last moment, to fall back upon his resources.

We were thus situated, the expectations of all

being excited to a high degree, when there fell into our hands letters and other documents, which threw a good deal of light, as well upon the amount of the enemy's means, as upon the plans which he had been lately devising, and the manner in which he proposed to carry them into execution. Of the letters, one, and not the least interesting, was addressed by General Foy, from his head-quarters at Almaraz, to General Gerard, commandant of the 5th corps at Zafra. It bore date so long ago as the period of our first arrival in our present line, and informed the writer's correspondent of the march of the British army towards Ciudad Rodrigo; of Lord Wellington's designs upon that place; and of the measures which the French were about to adopt, for the purpose of defeating them. General Foy, it appeared, was under orders to join Marmont at Plasencia, whilst Gerard was to move upon Almaraz and Truxillo; eight thousand men were on their march from the army of the centre; and their arrival at the Tagus might daily be expected. As soon as these should come up, Marmont was to push, with the whole of his army, through the pass of Baños, and to advance upon Ciudad Rodrigo from the side of Alba; whilst General D'Orsenne, with as many troops as he might be able to collect, was to threaten the blockading force from Salamanca. Such was a general outline of the

enemy's plan, as far at least as it could be collected from the statements of General Foy; with respect to the amount of resources at his disposal, we possessed other and not less accurate means of information. Of the strength of Marmont's corps, after it should have been reinforced by the promised divisions, little doubt could exist; we set it down, allowing for casualties and sickness, at forty-five thousand effectives; D'Orsenne's we were disposed to calculate at twenty-five or thirty thousand; and there were included in it fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry of the imperial guard. The latter fact we learned from a perusal of certain official returns, which, together with the intercepted letters above alluded to, came into our possession; and we were the more inclined to place reliance on their accuracy, from private accounts representing the division of guards as little short of thirty thousand. One of D'Orsenne's generals, for example, in a private communication full of the most extravagant bombast, informed the Governor of Rodrigo, that they were coming with twenty-five thousand guards; and then, added he, "*Nous verrons si ces illustres Anglois nous attendront, ou si, comme à l'ordinaire, ils se retireront.*" This statement was, of course, treated as a gross exaggeration; yet the amount of force known to be at Marmont's disposal was such as we could scarcely hope to fight to advantage;

and as Lord Wellington saw nothing in the existing state of affairs, which demanded that his prudent counsels should be abandoned, he resolved not to hazard a general action at all. On the contrary, it was his intention to retire leisurely across the Agueda, or even further, in case he should be hard pressed; and, from some other and better ground, to act offensively or otherwise, according as circumstances might direct.

I should try the patience of the reader beyond endurance, were I to repeat, in regular order, all the demonstrations and trifling movements on the part both of the enemy and ourselves, which, up to the middle of September, served to keep alive the interest under which we now began again to labour. At one time, a corps of French cavalry was known to have threaded the pass of Baños, and all were, in consequence, on the alert, as at the commencement of great undertakings. At another, the cavalry were stated to have withdrawn; and a rumour prevailed, that Marmont was once more falling back upon Plasencia; and that the design of relieving Rodrigo was abandoned. For this, a variety of causes were assigned. Soult had fought a severe action with Blake, and had suffered a defeat: he had returned to Llerena, and part of Marmont's troops were on their way to reinforce him. The Spaniards in the north, too, were acquiring fresh resolution, and

great things might yet be expected from them. Thus were we amused, day after day, by statements which at the best could be very imperfectly relied upon, and which were not unfrequently devoid of all foundation ; till men ceased in the end to turn their eyes, with the smallest interest, to any other part of the stage besides that immediately before them. But matters were drawing gradually to a crisis ; and proofs began by degrees to develope themselves, touching the real predicament in which the belligerent parties stood ; and the fate which, as a matter of course, might be expected to attend ourselves.

CHAPTER VIII.

Delay on the part of the enemy to commence operations—They advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; throw in a convoy, and pass the Agueda—Skirmishes along the front of the British line, which falls back upon Fuente Guinaldo—Display of French troops there—Lord Wellington retires to Alfayates—Partial actions during the movement—The enemy withdraw, and the British troops retire into cantonments behind the Coa—Ciudad Rodrigo observed by flying parties—Exploits of Don Julian.

It was now the middle of September, and the enemy's grand movement for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was still deferred, though each successive day brought additional proofs that no great while would elapse ere it would receive its accomplishment. We heard from various quarters that Marmont's columns were in march towards Tomames and Val de Fuentes, and that the imperial guards, with other troops to the number of twenty or twenty-five thousand men, were collected in and

about Salamanca. Next came intercepted communications, which stated that a convoy would arrive near the place on the 20th or 21st at the latest; and that the force with which it was proposed to cover its introduction, would render all idea on our part of an attempt at molesting it, inadmissible. Upwards of sixty thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery, it was said, were prepared to raise the blockade; it was even hinted that a fresh irruption into Portugal was at hand, and that a campaign as active as had yet been performed, and pregnant with results the most important, might be expected. Such reports and surmises, from whatsoever quarter conveyed, or by whomsoever stated, were received with the liveliest interest by the army at large. The sun never rose without an expectation that great deeds would be accomplished, or at least begun, before his setting; and never set without producing a conviction, that when he rose again, it would be upon a scene of carnage and strife. All, however, were prepared to bid that morning welcome, let it come when it might. The best dispositions which his circumstances would allow had already been made by Lord Wellington, and the best spirit prevailed among the men; so that, if one feeling appeared more conspicuous than another, it was of impatience that the game, so long anticipated, should be so tardy in its commencement.

In the former chapter a general outline has been given of the order in which the allied troops, from time to time, arranged themselves; it may not be amiss to give here in detail, the nature of the ground which they occupied at this critical juncture. There were two divisions, the fifth and the light, on the right bank of the Agueda; the one occupying Payo, the other Martiago. The latter communicated by its left, through Pastores, with the third division of El Boden; which, again, extending along the river Azava as far as Gallegos, united with the sixth, and thus leaned the left of the whole line upon the Agueda at Cesmiro. At the same time, Fuente Guinaldo, Nave d'Avel, and the posts in that direction, were held by the fourth and first divisions; whilst the cavalry were at Ituero, Espeja, Carpio, and along the plain which skirts the left of the high ground that runs parallel with the Agueda from Fuente Guinaldo to El Boden and Pastores, where it terminates in an abrupt fall towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The two lines of operations, again, which it was probable that the enemy would select, were either by Gallegos and Almeida, passing the Azava and Duos Casas rivers; or along the great road which leads to Fuente Guinaldo, turning the Azava, and making direct for Sabugal. Now, as the country on the latter of these was in every point of view more defensible than that upon the former, Lord

Wellington early determined on making it the line of his retreat; and the divisions upon the more advanced chain accordingly received orders, in case of an attack, to retire, after having well disputed their ground, towards Fuente Guinaldo. Here it was expected that a more resolute stand would be made, under cover of the redoubts and other works which had of late been thrown up; whilst, in the event of further falling back, everything was so settled, that the movement could be executed at any moment, and with comparative security.

Such was the order of the allied army, when, on the 24th of September, a considerable body of the enemy showed themselves in the plain before Ciudad Rodrigo. They came from the Salamanca and Tomames roads, and were accompanied by a countless number of waggons, cars, and loaded mules. Their progress was slow, and apparently cautious; but towards evening the convoy began to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen squadrons of cavalry, which passed the Agueda, and a large column of infantry, which halted upon the plain. Still no symptoms were manifested of a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt anything further than the object which was thus attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at dusk, and all bivouacked that night near the town. In the morning, however, as soon as objects became

discernible, one corps of cavalry, amounting to at least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a whole division of infantry, appeared in motion along the great road, which, leading from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Boden on the left ; whilst another, less numerous perhaps, but, like the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched direct upon Espeja. They both moved with admirable steadiness and great regularity ; and as the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear and beautiful, their appearance was altogether very warlike, and extremely imposing.

As it was not for some time ascertained whether strong reconnoissances only, or the advance of the whole French army, were intended ; and as Lord Wellington felt great reluctance to abandon the heights of El Boden and Pastores, unless threatened by numbers which it would have been useless to oppose, our troops neither shifted their ground, nor made at first any general disposition to cover the points threatened by concentration. The enemy's columns, on the contrary, pushed on—not disregarded certainly, but as certainly without drawing us into any premature disclosure of our intentions ; till the larger mass, which was moving towards Guinaldo, reached the base of some rising ground, which was held by a portion of the third division. These troops instantly formed ; and though they consisted of no more

than one British brigade under General Colville, and one Portuguese regiment of infantry—the ninth—some pieces of Portuguese artillery, and four squadrons of General Alten's cavalry, they contrived to arrest, for a considerable space of time, the further advance of the assailants. It was my good fortune to be particularly mixed with this affair, and as one more brilliant has not often been accomplished by a handful of British troops, I shall take the liberty of giving here a somewhat detailed account of it.

I have said that the enemy's column was permitted to approach almost to the base of the heights, before any disposition was made, on our part, to harass or impede its progress. The guns, indeed, opened upon his leading squadrons as soon as they arrived within range, and it was consolatory to observe that their fire was well directed; but the infantry continued in close columns of battalions behind the ridge, and the cavalry stood in similar order, each man with the bridle of his horse slung across his arm. As soon, however, as it became distinctly manifest that an attack was in serious contemplation, our troops prepared to meet it with their accustomed gallantry and coolness. The infantry wheeled into line; the cavalry mounted, and made ready to move wherever their presence might be required; whilst the artillery, redoubling their exertions, poured forth a

shower of grape and case shot, which exceedingly galled and irritated the enemy. These arrangements were not lost upon the French; they too gave to their front a greater extent, as speedily as the nature of the ground would permit, and advanced forward.

The attack was begun by a column of cavalry, which charged up the heights in gallant style, cheering in the usual manner of the French, and making directly for the guns. Our artillery men stood their ground resolutely, giving their fire to the last; but there being nothing immediately at hand to support them, they were at length compelled to retire, and the guns fell, for a moment, into the hands of the assailants. But it was only for a moment; for the 5th regiment was ordered instantly to recover them. They marched up in line, and firing with great coolness; when at the distance of only a few paces from their adversaries, they brought their bayonets to the charging position, and rushed forward. I believe this is the first instance on record of a charge with the bayonet being made upon cavalry by an infantry battalion in line; nor, perhaps, would it be prudent to introduce the practice into general use; but never was charge more successful. Possessing the advantage of ground, and keeping in close and compact array, the 5th literally pushed their adversaries down the hill; they then retook the

guns, and limbering them to the horses which had followed their advance, drew them off in safety. Whilst this was going on in one part of the field, repeated and impetuous attacks were made in another upon the handful of cavalry, which, under General Alten's orders, manfully stood its ground. Columns of the enemy's squadrons pushed again and again upon the heights at different points, and under different leaders; but they were overthrown as regularly as they came on, by short charges from our resolute troopers, who drove them down the descent with great slaughter, and still greater confusion. It is worthy of remark that, on all such occasions, the assailants outnumbered the defenders by at least four to one; and that, emboldened perhaps by their recent successes at the outposts, they came on with the reckless bravery which is exhibited only by men accustomed to conquer; but nothing could exceed the steadiness of our cavalry; and their excellence became only the more apparent, on account of the great odds to which they were opposed. There were present in this rencontre two squadrons of the 1st hussars of the King's German Legion, with a similar number of the 11th light dragoons; between whom it was impossible to determine which performed feats of the greater gallantry; indeed I can personally attest that the single source of anxiety experienced by the officers in command, arose

from an apprehension lest these brave fellows should follow the broken multitudes down the cliffs *and precipices into which they drove them.* To hinder this were the efforts of others and myself mainly directed ; and it was not without considerable exertions that we succeeded.

The action had continued in this state for some time, the enemy continually assaulting our front and left, and we as continually repulsing them, when Captain Dashwood, an active officer of the Adjutant-general's department, suddenly discovered a heavy column moving towards the rear of our right, round which it had penetrated unobserved, and therefore unresisted. Not a minute was to be lost, for even a moment's indecision would have enabled the French to accomplish their object of surrounding us. A retreat was accordingly ordered, and the heights were abandoned. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the peculiarity of our situation compelled us to look rather to the celerity with which this manœuvre could be executed, than to anything besides, and that the retreat of the cavalry was, in consequence, more precipitate than orderly ; but the brigade of infantry, which consisted of the 77th, 83rd, and 5th, covered it, and found fresh opportunities of exhibiting their steadiness and high state of discipline. They formed into squares in the plain in rear of the hussars, and when the French cavalry came on in

overwhelming numbers, and at full speed, opened upon them a fire so destructive, that it completely checked them. This was the last effort on either side. The enemy, overawed by the commanding attitude assumed by our infantry, drew back ; and our troops continued their march upon Fuente Guinaldo, where they arrived, in due time, without further molestation.

Whilst the right of our line was thus employed, large masses of the enemy's cavalry and infantry bore likewise upon our left, and drove back the advanced posts from Carpio, and the stations near. They were opposed chiefly by the 14th and 16th dragoons, which charged with great gallantry as often as opportunities offered ; but as it was highly improbable that demonstrations thus made in force upon both flanks would not, sooner or later, end in an endeavour to bring on a general action, Lord Wellington early began to make his dispositions for the event. For this purpose, the light division was commanded to cross the river, and hold the right of the line at Fuente Guinaldo ; the third and fourth divisions, with General Pack's brigade, took their ground so as to be flanked by the redoubts ; the seventh, which had hitherto been in reserve at Albergaria, closed up ; whilst the fifth remained still on the right bank of the Agueda, with a view of giving additional security to that flank of the position. The cavalry, again, were all moved into

the centre, and took post in front of the town. At the same time the sixth division defiled from Gallegos and Espeja towards its right; whilst General Graham, who commanded the force on the left of Ituero, and was, with the first division, at Nave d'Avel, received instructions, in case the right should be sorely pressed, to march at the shortest notice to its support. Every movement was made, and every object accomplished, on the night of the 25th, without the slightest confusion or risk; indeed the only circumstances which befell during the progress of operations, at all deserving of record, occurred at Pastores, where the 74th and a battalion of the 60th regiments were posted. By some mistake or another, the orders for the retreat of these regiments did not arrive till all support had been withdrawn, and the enemy were seen in their rear; upon which Colonel Trench of the 74th, the senior and a very distinguished officer, with great judgment passed the Agueda, and made good his retreat by the right bank. He fell in, during his perilous journey, with a party of French cavalry, most of whom he succeeded in making prisoners; and having re-crossed the river, overtook his division about midnight, with the two battalions unbroken and uninjured.

The night of the 25th was spent by us as it is customary for soldiers to spend a night upon which they have reason to expect that a day of

battle will rise ; that is to say, the superior officers lay down in their cloaks upon the floors of the houses, whilst the men slept on their arms, round large fires, which blazed along the range of the position.

Long before dawn, however, all were astir and in their places ; and the different regiments looked anxiously for the moment which should behold the commencement of a game as desperate as any which they had been yet called upon to play. But, instead of indulging our troops as they expected, Marmont contented himself with making an exhibition of his force, and causing it to execute a variety of manœuvres in our presence ; and it must be confessed that a spectacle more striking has rarely been seen. The large body of cavalry which followed us to our position, and had bivouacked during the night in the woods adjoining, were first drawn up in compact array, as if waiting for the signal to push on. By and by, nine battalions of infantry, attended by a proportionate quantity of artillery, made their appearance, and formed into columns, lines, echelons, and squares. Towards noon, twelve battalions of the imperial guard came upon the ground in one solid mass ; and as each soldier was decked out with feathers and shoulder-knots of a bloody hue, their appearance was certainly imposing in no ordinary degree. The solid column, however, soon deployed into

columns of battalions—a movement which was executed with a degree of quickness and accuracy quite admirable; and then, after having performed several other evolutions with equal precision, the guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac. Next came another division of infantry in rear of the guards, and then a fresh column of cavalry, till it was computed that the enemy had collected on this single point a force of not less than 25,000 men. Nor did the muster cease to go on, as long as daylight lasted. To the very latest moment, we could observe men, horses, guns, carriages, tumbrils, and ammunition-waggons, flocking into the encampment; as if it were the design of the French general to bring his whole disposable force to bear against the position of Fuente Guinaldo.

The position of Fuente Guinaldo was held at this time by three divisions only of the allied army, not one of which could bring into the field so many as 5000 bayonets. Our numerical inferiority was, therefore, very great; and as there was nothing in the nature of the ground calculated to make up for a superiority in numbers so decided, Lord Wellington at once determined to abandon his works, and retire. In accordance with this resolution, we began our retreat immediately after dark on the 26th; the right wing taking the two roads which lead, one by Castelhas dos Flores

and Furcalhos, the other by Albergaria and Aldea de Ponte to Nave d'Avel, whilst the left fell back upon Bismula, and behind the Villa-major river; and the troops went off in such perfect order, that not only were there no stragglers, but not an article of baggage, however valueless, was left behind. Our movements had, however, been closely watched by the enemy; for on the morning of the 27th they appeared in two columns, each consisting of twelve squadrons of cavalry, and a division of infantry, upon the two roads by which our right wing was retiring. These columns mutually supported one another; and their great object appeared to be, not so much to overtake and force us to give battle, as to hurry us in our march; but they were in no single instance successful. On the contrary, their obstinacy on two different occasions enabled portions of our corps to beat them back with some loss, and with a great deal more of confusion.

The enemy's force which marched by Furcalhos, was stopped at that place by the infantry of the light division. They had fallen in with the cavalry early in the day, which, retiring before them, drew them to some broken ground, where the infantry was formed; and a few discharges from the skirmishers served to convince them that here at least our line of march was not to be pressed. They therefore abstained from making

the attempt; but the corps which followed the Aldea de Ponte road seemed animated by a more daring spirit, and pushed vigorously to obtain possession of a range of heights which lead from that village to Nave d'Avel; and had they succeeded, the communication between the right and left wings of our army would have been destroyed. But Lord Wellington no sooner observed their design than he took effectual measures to defeat it, by commanding the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, with a considerable force of cavalry, to halt and concentrate upon the point threatened. The disposition was hardly effected, when our people were assailed by clouds of tirailleurs, which, as usual, covered the front of the French columns, and a very brisk skirmish ensued. It fell chiefly upon the 4th division, supported by General Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry; indeed, the brunt of it was borne by the fusileer brigade under Colonel Pakenham; but though warm for the moment, it was not of long continuance. The enemy were chased at once from the high grounds which they had gained. They fled, rather than retired, beyond Aldea de Ponte, and they were pursued with the impetuosity which English soldiers generally exhibit, considerably further than it had been intended to follow them. The consequence was, that our light troops were, in their turn, driven back by the

enemy's supporting column, which, roused by the sound of firing, had crossed over from the Furcalhos road, and were compelled to retire upon the divisions in position, which had not, since the commencement of the affair, once changed their order.

An opinion now began to prevail, that it was Marmont's intention to push us across the Coa, with the rapidity of one who had already conquered, or was, at all events, secure of conquest. Lord Wellington himself adopted the idea, and indignant at the presumption which all his adversary's movements displayed, he resolved to render the proposed task somewhat more difficult of performance than it appeared to be regarded by the French Marshal. There were some heights, or rather acclivities, about Rendoa and Soito, which offered an extremely favourable position, the Coa covering both flanks, and a retiring angle of the river forming their point d'appui. Thither the army moved on the night of the 27th, and there it was proposed to fight a battle on the morrow, in case the French should persist in the design for which we gave them credit. With this view the fifth division received orders to pass the Agueda at Navas Freas, and to form the right of the line above Quadraseias. The fourth division was to draw up upon the left of the fifth; the light above Soito; the third in front of Pouca Tarenha; the

first and sixth at Rendoa, where the ground was peculiarly strong; and the seventh, with the cavalry, in a second line in the rear. There cannot be a doubt that we should have fought here with much greater security to ourselves than at Fuente Guinaldo; because the natural defences would have shielded our troops far more effectively, whilst the approaches for the enemy were both difficult and exposed; yet there were objections even to this position, which the most sanguine found it difficult to overlook. There was no secure retreat. With a river like the Coa in our rear, it would have been absolutely necessary, either to repel, at all points, the enemy's attacks, however formidable, or to perish; for the line, once broken, could not be withdrawn without suffering a loss, which, in our case, must have proved fatal. As it happened, however, the excellence of the position was not destined to be tried, for the enemy never approached it. Whether it was that Marmont's provisions failed him, or that he deemed it unwise to attack us upon ground so formidable, I know not; but on the morning of the 28th, the strength of his columns had disappeared, and only a rear-guard of cavalry remained to keep possession of Aldea de Ponte.

Notwithstanding the apparent retreat of the enemy's columns, Lord Wellington did not consider himself justified in abandoning the line

which he had taken up, till some more decisive proof should be afforded that immediate danger was at an end. About noon on the 28th, however, all doubts on the subject were removed by the return of Major Gordon, brother to the Earl of Aberdeen, to head-quarters; who, so long ago as the 25th, had been sent to the French army as the bearer of a flag of truce, and whom Marmont had very prudently detained during the progress of his late operations. Major Gordon was, as might be expected, well stored with interesting anecdotes relative to the situation and feelings of the French army. He had received the most marked attention from Marmont and others of the generals, with whom he lived on terms of familiarity, and who scrupled not to carry him along with them in their rides, and to give him the fullest insight into all their dispositions and arrangements. He spoke of the enemy's troops as being generally well appointed and equipped, especially the cavalry and imperial guards; and he estimated their numbers at full 60,000, with 120 pieces of cannon. The French, it appeared, expressed themselves in terms of the highest respect touching the military talents of Lord Wellington, of which they considered his retreat from Fuente Guinaldo as furnishing another brilliant specimen; for they had fully anticipated an action at that place, and all their plans were laid to secure a decisive victory.

The great bulk of their army, it appeared, was to have been directed against our right, partly forcing and partly turning it; and whilst the cavalry, of which they brought full six thousand into the field, amused and occupied the centre, our left also was to have been assailed. They were therefore not a little disappointed, when the dawn of the 27th displayed our works and position abandoned; and whilst they lamented the mischance which had thus wrested the laurel from their brows, they gave our chief full credit for the prudence which dictated his determination to fall back. Major Gordon further stated that the French, when they first passed the Agueda, entertained no other design than merely to reconnoitre our position, and to retire again; but that, irritated by their cavalry loss, they pushed on, and were afterwards tempted, from a contemplation of our extended alignment, to bring up, as they did on the 26th, the whole of their army.

Now, however, the campaign was at an end. They were all in full march towards Spain, for the purpose of separating into corps, and retiring to different quarters; that of General D'Orsenne into Galicia, where, after it should have received large reinforcements, and passed under the command of Oudinot, it was to become the army of the north; whilst that of Marmont, with its an-

cient title of the Army of Portugal, was to return to its original station about Plasencia.

The single circumstance of Major Gordon's return sufficed to convince us, that in the opinion which he had formed relative to the future proceedings of the French army, he was not mistaken; since Marmont, had he intended to prosecute the invasion of Portugal any further, would have scarcely permitted him—first, to acquire so much accurate information—and then, to carry it over to the English General; and it ought here to be recorded that the army possessed few more able, intelligent, and active officers, and perhaps none who more largely possessed the confidence of Lord Wellington, than Major Gordon. It became, therefore, evident enough, that, for the present at least, the campaign was at an end. Under these circumstances, a question naturally arose, how was it probable that the allied troops would be disposed of?—in other words, would the close investment of Ciudad Rodrigo be resumed, or should we follow the example of the enemy, by withdrawing into temporary cantonments? Against the scheme of a renewed investment, there were many and powerful reasons to be urged. In the first place, every chance of reducing the place by famine was removed, the late convoys having amply supplied it with all manner of stores; whilst to

the vigorous prosecution of a siege, the approaching rainy season threatened to oppose obstacles, such as we could scarcely hope, even with means more ample than those actually at our disposal, to surmount. But these, though sufficiently weighty, were not the only objections to which the undertaking was liable. The enemy had already given proof that they were disposed to make any sacrifices in other quarters, rather than permit a place so important to fall into our hands; and having once drawn their force to a head, it was very little probable that they would hesitate about doing so again, should similar reasons for the movement be held out to them. To sit down, however, before fortresses, only that he might be compelled to retire again, suited not the policy of Lord Wellington; he therefore determined, at least for the present, to suspend any attempt upon the place, and to give to his soldiers that rest of which their general exhaustion and increasing sickness stood so much in need.

On the 29th of September the allied army broke up from its position in front of Alfayates, and leaving the light and fourth divisions to observe Rodrigo, and discharge the duty of the outposts, passed the Coa, and withdrew into cantonments. By this arrangement, a line was taken up, which extended from Penamacor, on the right, to Celerrico on the left; and head-quarters being estab-

lished at Frenada, every disposition was made to pay attention to the sick, of which the numbers became every day more and more alarming. When we first established ourselves in Fuente Guinaldo, there were, besides Portuguese, thirteen thousand British soldiers in hospital,—when we retired behind the Coa, that number had considerably increased; and we had not inhabited our new quarters a week, before it swelled to the enormous amount of sixteen thousand men. The unhealthy season came on, too; fevers and agues made rapid progress amongst us, till scarcely a regiment could muster upon parade two-thirds of its numerical strength; and the medical attendants almost sank beneath the fatigues which they were condemned to endure. To add to our present discomfort, the billets were, for the most part, extremely small and incommodious. The rain, which fell in torrents, soon penetrated the thin roofs of the cottages among which the troops were distributed; and even the larger mansions, or chateaux, of which the general and staff officers were put in possession, ceased, at last, to resist a deluge so incessant. Then, our out-of-doors occupation was destroyed. We could neither hunt nor shoot, nor follow the different employments which, in dry weather, contributed equally to our health and amusement; whilst a total absence of books, with fare somewhat scanty and coarse, enabled us to struggle

with difficulty against ennui. On the whole, I have no hesitation in pointing to the period of our sojourn among the villages on the left bank of the Coa, as one of the least interesting throughout the Peninsular war, during which there occurred absolutely nothing to individuals, calculated either to excite or amuse; and in which public events were, with a few memorable exceptions, such as to depress, rather than elevate, the spirits of those who gave to them any grave or serious attention.

Having premised thus much, I shall cease to drag the reader through a detail of the petty actions which distinguished one day from another in this tedious time of rest, but merely state the least unimportant; and as these happened to be neither numerous nor very unusual in their nature, a few words will suffice for the purpose. It is first, however, worthy of remark, that though driven by circumstances into this state of temporary inaction, Lord Wellington ceased not for a moment to devise plans for the future, or to prepare the means of carrying them into execution. Before the weather broke, serious thoughts were entertained of making an attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo by escalade; but the rising of the waters caused it to be abandoned, perhaps not unhappily for the credit of our arms. Next, a scheme was devised for the commencement and prosecution of a siege, as soon as the aspect of affairs in La

Mancha and Galicia might authorise the measure ; and working parties were in consequence employed at Almeida, with the view of converting it into a place d'armes against the projected undertaking. Without absolutely investing it, flying parties passed continually round Rodrigo, so as to interrupt the communications between the garrison, and the army in its rear ; and these performed, on several occasions, services of considerable importance : the following may be taken as a specimen.

Don Julian de Sanchez was one of the most enterprising and able of all the guerilla chiefs whom the progress of the war had called into active life. He commanded a small body of irregular horse, with which he repeatedly executed exploits such as few men besides himself would have attempted ; till his name became as famous in the rude songs of his countrymen, as it was dreaded and abhorred by his country's invaders. Don Julian had thrown himself into Ciudad Rodrigo, when Massena laid siege to it ; and contributed not a little both by his example and personal exertions to the gallant defence which it offered ; and when at last a surrender became indispensable, he cut his way, at the head of his troops, through the enemy's lines, and escaped. Since that period, he had harassed and destroyed numerous convoys in Asturias, Galicia, and others of the northern provinces ; and now, having attached himself at length to our

army, he rendered himself exceedingly useful, by taking an active part in those patrolling expeditions of which I have just spoken.

It was the custom of the French garrison to send out their cattle every morning beyond the walls for the purpose of grazing, under the protection of a guard, which at once tended them, and watched the movements of our parties. Don Julian determined, if possible, to surprise the herd; for which purpose he concealed his people, day after day, among the broken ground on the bank of the river, not far from the town; but the guard proved, for a time, so vigilant, that no opportunity occurred of effecting his design. At last, however, an accident occurred, which enabled him to accomplish, not only his original purpose, but one which he did not dream of accomplishing. It so happened, that on a certain day—on the 15th of October—General Regnaud, the governor of the place, rode out, attended by his staff and a slender escort, and ventured, somewhat incautiously, to pass the Agueda at the very spot where Don Julian's ambuscade lay concealed. He was instantly surrounded by the Spanish cavalry, and made prisoner; and as if fortune had determined to reward the latter for their patience, the cattle appeared at the same moment at a sufficient distance from the walls to authorise an attack. The attack was made with the most perfect success,

and both Governor and cattle were conveyed in triumph to our head-quarters. In a native of any country except France, such an unlucky coincidence would have produced a degree of gloom not to be shaken off; but by General Regnaud, his misfortunes were borne with the utmost philosophy and good-humour. He became a frequent guest at Lord Wellington's table, and we found him an extremely entertaining as well as intelligent companion. He talked very freely of the designs of his own superiors, and laid open to us much of the internal economy of the French armies, among the leaders of which it appeared, from his statements, that no great cordiality prevailed; and his reasonings on the general aspect of the war, though not always sound, were invariably specious, and always interesting.

CHAPTER IX.

Increasing jealousies among the Spaniards, and numerous disasters in the south, produce gloom in the British army—It continues in its quarters, and makes preparations to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo—The French armies suddenly withdraw towards the south and east of Spain—Lord Wellington moves to the front, and invests Rodrigo—Progress of the siege—Storming and capture of the place.

WHILST we were thus conducting ourselves on the banks of the Coa, affairs gradually assumed, in other quarters of the Peninsula, an appearance less and less cheering. At Cadiz, discord the most ill-timed prevailed, both among the inhabitants and the government; whilst the troops in general, instead of improving in discipline and military skill, became more and more inefficient every day. All classes, too, manifested towards their allies a degree of jealousy, for which no adequate cause could be assigned; they suspected

every proposal, however disinterested in its nature, and threw impediments in the way of every design, provided only the one chanced to originate with an English officer, and the other were to be carried into execution by English soldiers. Nor were matters in a condition many degrees superior to this elsewhere. Madrid submitted quietly to the domination of the usurper, and the whole country from thence to the Bidassoa was overrun. In Galicia, General Abadia was at the head of only 7,000 recruits, miserably clothed and fed, though sufficiently armed; whilst Castanos's army of Estremadura might muster perhaps 750 officers, and 2 or 300 men!! It is true that in Catalonia the Spaniards were reported to have obtained some successes under Lacy; and that the Empeinado and Mina were both actively employed as guerillas; but Suchet had already achieved so successful a campaign, that, with the exception of a few strong places, the southern provinces might be considered as subdued. All this was discouraging enough; yet was it less discouraging than the palpable proofs which every day presented themselves of the exhausted patriotism of the Spanish people. Men of all ranks spoke openly of the folly of continuing a struggle so hopeless; and most of the higher orders began seriously to provide for their own safety, by giving in their submission to the new dynasty. In a

word, the nation at large seemed weary of the war, and desirous of being relieved from its miseries at any cost and upon any terms; whilst the government appeared more anxious to recover the revolted colonies of South America, than to deliver the mother country from the presence of its invaders. At the very moment when every exertion ought to have been made to increase the numbers of the army, and improve its discipline, the regency was sending its best regiments across the Atlantic for the purpose of keeping Mexico in obedience, and re-conquering the Caraccas, till the troops themselves refused at last to proceed, and mutiny threatened to fill up the measure of the calamities under which Spain laboured.

With such prospects in the political horizon, and an absence of comfort amongst ourselves, a spirit of dissatisfaction began to arise in the bosoms of many, as well as a powerful feeling that the cause had at length become desperate. The Portuguese, no doubt, were still true to themselves; that is to say, the dissensions in the local government were rendered comparatively harmless by a decree from Rio Janeiro, which placed the resources of the country at the disposal of Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, and left them at liberty to act, in military matters, according to the dictates of their own judgment. But there were few individuals attached to the army so

short-sighted as not to be aware that, should Spain finally submit to the power of France, any effort to maintain Portugal must be futile. Multitudes accordingly now began to turn their eyes elsewhere, and to desire employment either in England or the colonies; and the numbers of those who actually requested and obtained leave to quit the country, were by no means inconsiderable. Our chief alone appeared to retain his usual sanguine expectations; for he continued his preparations for a fresh campaign with the same diligence and with the same composure, as if the state of the Peninsula had been as favourable, as from the proclamations of the Cortes, and the statements in the English newspapers, it was represented to be.

We were thus situated, when the report of a brilliant enterprise, admirably conducted by General Hill, in Spanish Estremadura, came in to enliven us. When Marmont withdrew to his cantonments around Plasencia, he left a corps of his army, under General Gerard, at Merida, which subsequently returned to the vicinity of Zafra, where it took post. Gerard remained quietly here for some time; but being ordered to levy contributions on the inhabitants of Caceres, he moved, about the middle of October, towards that place; thus endangering the depot of Castanos's corps, which had there its head-quarters. To counteract

this movement, and defeat its object, General Hill was directed to take the field. He advanced from Portalegre on the 22nd, and causing the enemy to evacuate Aleseda, of which they had recently possessed themselves, he pursued them as far as Alcuerca, where he contrived, in a masterly and scientific manner, to surprise and disperse them. The following is a brief account of this splendid affair:—

General Hill passed the night of the 21st at Malpartida, where he obtained such information of the enemy's incaution, as induced him to entertain a hope that they might, by dint of extraordinary exertion on his part, be overtaken, and brought to action. With this view, he put his columns in march at an early hour on the morning of the 27th, and following certain by-paths, arrived that evening, unobserved by Gerard, at Alcuerca. He was now within one short league of Arroyo del Molino, the village where Gerard's corps was to pass the night; so he prohibited all fires from being lighted, and took other necessary precautions to conceal his approach. He was perfectly successful; for the enemy remained in utter ignorance of his proximity, till they found themselves attacked on the morning of the 28th, just as they were preparing to commence their march. Thus taken by surprise, they offered, as might be expected, no very resolute resistance;

and the victory was such, that out of 2,500 infantry, and 600 cavalry, of which the French corps originally consisted, scarcely 500 made their escape; General Gerard himself being wounded, and his artillery taken. General Hill received, as he deserved, the highest encomiums for the ability with which his enterprise was conducted; and the enterprise itself continued, for some time, to furnish the chief topic of conversation at headquarters.

In the mean while, however, Lord Wellington, with that unwearied diligence which so peculiarly distinguishes him, was applying all the powers of his mind to the removal of certain inconveniences, under which, both now and at former periods, his army had painfully laboured. The two great evils of which we found principal cause to complain, were, the impoverished state of our military chest, and a very inadequate as well as uncertain supply of the means of military transport. To obviate the former, our chief devised a scheme for the passing current through Spain and Portugal of exchequer bills; and to try how far the theory could be reduced to practice, he requested that a supply should be remitted from England to the amount of 150,000*l.* For the diminishing the latter, he caused a number of cars to be fabricated after a particular model, so that boys might be capable of managing them; and arranging them into brigades,

composed each of thirty-five carriages, he placed them, after the fashion of the commissariat mules, under their several capitaos or leaders. How far the first of these devices was found to answer its end, I take it not upon me to determine ; but the last proved productive of the greatest advantages, and at once rendered us independent of the caprice and jealousy which too frequently stood in the way of our most important undertakings. Unhappily, however, our efforts to straiten the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo were not attended with the same beneficial results. In spite of our utmost diligence, the enemy contrived to throw convoy after convoy into the place, till in the end the investing force became infinitely more straitened for provisions, forage, and other necessaries, than the force which it sought to inconvenience. The truth is, that our troops were, at the present juncture, at too great a distance from the fort, to watch it to any good purpose ; whilst they were too far in front to find subsistence for themselves in a country which had so long and so frequently been the seat of active operations. It was in vain that one or more divisions moved up, from time to time, towards the Agueda, as often as a report came in, that some fresh supplies were collecting, and some fresh convoys about to move upon Rodrigo. They arrived either to learn that the stores had already passed, or that the whole had

been a false alarm; till both men and officers began to grow heartily tired of a species of warfare which harassed and fatigued themselves, without bringing the slightest inconvenience upon the enemy. At last the General determined upon withdrawing a portion of his army further to the rear; where the horses, which had wasted away to mere skeletons on account of the scarcity of provender, might be enabled to recover their strength, and to scatter the rest over a wider surface, wherever more convenient accommodations could be found for it.

In accordance with this arrangement, the fifth and sixth divisions, with the whole of the cavalry except a single brigade, retired towards the Douro and the Mondego, where they occupied a range of villages infinitely more commodious than any which had of late been assigned to them. Headquarters, however, continued, as before, at Frenada; whilst the first division, under General Graham, took post at Pinhel on the left, the third and fourth in the centre, between the Agueda and the Coa, the seventh on the left, extending as far as Penamacor, and the light, under Crawford, considerably in advance, at Guinaldo, on the right bank of the Agueda. The good effects of these changes were almost immediately felt. Our sick daily diminished, our horses gradually returned to condition, and the spirits of all rose, as they felt

themselves becoming more and more efficient; whilst a blessed change in the weather, by enabling us to resume our ancient out-of-door occupations, tended, in no slight degree, to restore our primitive good-humour.

In this channel affairs continued to flow, till the year 1811 came to a close. Our parties labouring assiduously at Almeida, brought it, by degrees, to assume something like the appearance of a fortified place; whilst preparations were busily made for throwing across the Agueda a bridge upon tressels, sufficiently durable to resist the influence of the stream. Stores and ammunition, with a considerable train of heavy artillery, were likewise moved towards the front; and the divisions of infantry stationed there, busied themselves in the construction of gabions and fascines. Everything, in short, appeared to indicate that sooner or latter Ciudad Rodrigo would be regularly besieged; and the first opportunity which offered for the purpose, was not permitted to pass unnoticed.

During the last three months, the enemy's troops in the north and centre of Spain had remained tolerably quiet, there being no force, with the exception of General Abadia's corps, to occupy their attention; whilst in the south, hostilities were carried on with increasing vigour. Master of Tarragona, and victorious over everything in the

field, Suchet sat down before Valencia, whilst Victor drove back Ballasteros under the walls of Gibraltar, and directed a considerable division of his corps against Tariffa. In the mean while, General Drouet, at the head of twelve thousand men, insured the submission of Spanish Estremadura; and Soult, whose head-quarters were understood to be at Seville, kept that kingdom also in subjection. Thus were the Spaniards pressed on every side by corps against which they could make no head; and it appeared as if the subjuration of all those important places, which up to the present moment had offered the most steady resistance, were at hand.

I have in former parts of this narrative taken occasion to observe, that whatever might have been their conduct in the field, the Spanish troops seldom failed to do their duty when employed in the defence of fortified places. The fortress of Murviedro, which Suchet found it necessary to subdue, as a preparatory step to the reduction of Valencia, cost him dear; and the same spirit which had animated the garrison of the one place, appeared to prevail among that which held the other. Tariffa, too, being happily occupied by a thousand English soldiers under Colonel Skerret, withstood and repelled all the efforts of the enemy to carry it; whilst bands of guerillas gathered round the rear of the French armies, and seriously

retarded their progress. It became necessary, under these circumstances, to reinforce their strength from other provinces. The whole of the disposable regiments in the vicinity of Madrid were, in consequence, moved to Toledo; and towards the end of the year, Marmont himself broke up from his cantonments at Plasencia and Talavera, and fell into the same line. It so happened that D'Orsenne, with the army of the centre, took the road, about the same time, to Burgos; and we were left without any thing in our front, as well upon the side of Beira as in the direction of the Alentejo.

Lord Wellington was no sooner made acquainted with these several movements, than he hastened to avail himself of the opportunity which they presented, of effecting that end towards which his most anxious attention had been so long and so steadily turned. Directing General Hill to advance upon Merida, as well with the view of alarming Drouet as to effect a diversion in favour of the beleaguered places, and to draw off part of the enemy's force from Ballasteros, he himself made ready to invest Ciudad Rodrigo in form, and to wrest it, if possible, out of the hands of a garrison, now unavoidably left to its own resources. There were not wanting amongst us some who criticised this design, and would have greatly preferred a general inroad into Spain, bare as it was of



French armies up to the very walls of the capital; but Lord Wellington was too well aware of the difficulties to which his troops must be exposed, were they, in the month of January, 1812, to penetrate into an exhausted country, to give to that suggestion one moment's consideration. Besides, his own honour, and the honour of his army, were in some degree staked upon the recovery of the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst the safety of the province of Beira might be said mainly to depend upon it. Orders were accordingly issued for the immediate advance of as many stores as it was possible to collect; whilst the divisions in front closed one upon another, and made ready to move upon the Agueda.

Seldom has an army embarked on a business so arduous, under circumstances more unfavourable than those which attended us at present. In the first place, the situation of the place to be attacked, standing, as I have already said, upon the brink of a rapid river, and surrounded by a vast plain destitute of positions, water, or even cover for the troops, rendered it impossible to establish ourselves permanently about it, without exposing the men to hardships which must soon prove fatal to their health. It would therefore be necessary, after driving the garrison within their lines, to carry on the siege by relays of divisions; in other words, to keep the main body in cantonments on

the left bank of the Agueda, whilst a certain number of brigades should push on the works on the right bank, the rest relieving them in that duty at the expiration of a certain space of time. Now, though the Agueda be fordable in several places during dry weather, it requires but a few hours of heavy rain to render the fords impassable; whilst the rain, which might chance to last for a few days, would inevitably sweep away the only bridge which we had found it practicable to lay down. At the present season of the year, however, such rains were not only of probable occurrence, but confidently to be apprehended; and therefore we set out with a prospect before us, of continual interruptions, from causes which no exertions on our part would suffice to obviate. In the next place, the means at our disposal, whether of transport or attack, fell infinitely short of the very lowest calculation which the superintending engineer had been able to form. Instead of 1400 cars, the amount demanded, we could muster no more than 450; and our whole materiel consisted of 38 twenty-four pounders, with 12 howitzers. We possessed not a single mortar, and our stock, both of powder and shells, was exceedingly scanty. There was, moreover, every reason to apprehend that, as soon as the enemy should be made aware of our design, they would hasten to defeat it, and a question naturally arose, whether, under all cir-

cumstances, it would be possible for us to bring the undertaking to a fortunate termination. Now a repulse, in any case, would have been abundantly distressing; had this been our first attempt of the kind, not to succeed in it would be infinitely more injurious than not to embark in it at all; but were we again thwarted, after all that had occurred already, it was hard to calculate upon the mischief which might be expected to ensue. Yet was it absolutely necessary that something should be done, as well for the gratification of the people of England, as to satisfy our allies that we were not indifferent to their calamities; and as the only choice submitted to him lay between the siege of Rodrigo, and an advance into the interior of Spain, Lord Wellington wisely determined on the former. On the 5th of January, the divisions in the rear began to close up; on the 6th and 7th, the army assembled, and on the 8th we crossed the Agueda in force, and completed the investment.

Of the general features of the country by which Ciudad Rodrigo is surrounded, a sufficiently elaborate account has been given already. I will not, therefore, repeat it here; but as little or no notice has yet been taken of the defences by which it was covered, it may not be amiss if I endeavour to make the reader acquainted with their nature, before I proceed to detail to him any circumstances attending the siege. The following de-

scription is extracted from Colonel Jones's *Journal of Sieges*; a work which every soldier would do well to study, and which every civilian may peruse with satisfaction:—

“ Ciudad Rodrigo is built on a rising ground, on the right bank of the Agueda; it has a double enceinte all round it; the interior wall is of an old construction, of the height of thirty-two feet, and is generally of bad masonry, without flanks, and with weak parapets and narrow ramparts; the exterior enclosure is a modern *fausse-braie*, of a low profile, and is constructed so far down the slope of the hill, as to afford but little cover to the interior wall; and from the same cause of the rapid descent of the hill, the *fausse-braie* itself is very imperfectly covered by its *glacis*. On the east and south sides, there are *ravelines* to the *fausse-braie*; but in no part is there a covered way, nor are there any counter-mines: without the town, at the distance of three hundred yards, are the suburbs; they are enclosed by a bad earthen retrenchment, hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during the investment of the place in 1810; and the French, since they had been in possession of Rodrigo, had made strong posts of three convents—one on either flank of the suburbs, and one in the centre; and they had also converted into an infantry post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated just beyond the *glacis* on the north-west angle of

the place. The works of the suburbs, therefore, though contemptible in themselves, yet as supported by these convents, were considered as fully competent to resist a coup-de-main.

“The ground without the place is generally flat, and the soil rocky, except on the north side, where there are two hills, called the lesser and the greater Teson; the one, at 180 yards from the works, rises nearly to the level of the ramparts, and the other, at 600 yards’ distance, to the height of 13 feet above them. The soil on these hills is very stony, and during winter, water (usually) rises at the depth of six inches below the surface: the French had erected a small redoubt on the highest hill, which, from its situation, prevented any attack on that side till it should be taken: this redoubt was supported by two guns, and a howitzer in battery, on the top of the fortified convent of St. Francisco, at 400 yards from it, and a large proportion of the artillery of the place, (particularly mortars and howitzers placed behind the rampart of the *fausse-braie*,) was in battery to fire upon the approach from the hill.”

There were two points at which this place might be readily assailed; one on the eastern and southern sides, where the ground was more flat, but the suburbs extensive; the other on the north, where the hill and redoubt just alluded to protected it from insult. Lord Wellington seemed

at first disposed to make his approaches from the former of these quarters ; but, on mature deliberation, it was found that the superior fire from the northern face would not present obstacles so serious as those which the rocky nature of the soil, and the resistance to be expected from the fortified convents and suburbs, would offer on the other. It was known too, from the system of attack adopted by Massena, that the walls on the northern front might be breached at a distance ; whereas, on the southern and eastern fronts, it appeared doubtful, from the natural fall of the ground, whether any impression could be made, except from batteries erected on the crest of the glacis ; and as the saving of time was to us a matter of the first consideration, that which promised most speedily to lay open the body of the place, was pronounced to be the best. For these, among other reasons, our chief readily laid aside his first intentions, and having closely reconnoitred the city in all its faces, he determined to act upon the second with as much promptitude as vigour.

With this view he resolved that ground should be broken on the night of the day in which the investment was effected ; and as it was essential, as a preparatory measure, to obtain possession of the redoubt which crowned the greater Tesson, orders were issued that it should be attacked by a party of the light division, and carried by escalade.

Our troops, to whom no ladders had been issued out, and who probably did not dream of requiring such implements thus early, immediately sat down to construct them, and the sides of a few Spanish cars which had conveyed intrenching tools from Almeida, supplied them with materials. They tore them to pieces, and long before the appointed hour a sufficient quantity for the service in contemplation was completed. Three hundred men of the 52nd and 95th regiments then prepared, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Colbourne, to assault the outwork. They were to be supported by two firing parties, which received instructions to keep up a warm discharge of musketry upon the opposite flanks, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the garrison; whilst the storming party, descending into the ditch, should cut away the palisades, and mount, with the assistance of their rude ladders, into the redoubt. Everything was done with the most admirable order and daring courage. At nine o'clock at night, the several detachments moved to the posts assigned them, and our brave fellows, finding that the palisades were close to the outward side of the ditch, sprang over them, without pausing to break them down. They then rushed pell-mell into the redoubt, and taking the enemy completely by surprise, made themselves masters, not only of it, but of the entire garrison which had

been appointed to defend it. Two officers, forty men, and three pieces of cannon captured, were the fruits of their success; and it was purchased by the loss of only six men killed, three officers and sixteen men wounded.

The way being thus cleared to ulterior operations, 700 men immediately advanced towards the hill, 300 of whom were to effect a lodgment close to the redoubt, whilst 400 should open the communication to it from the rear. They succeeded in both objects with wonderfully little loss; for the enemy, irritated by the fall of the outwork, directed all their fire upon it, and our people were in consequence enabled to pursue their tasks unmolested. When morning dawned, therefore, the cover was found to be such, that reliefs might, with perfect safety, be employed to complete by day what had been so well begun at night; and hence, within little more than twenty-four hours from the investment of the place, our engineers found themselves in a situation to mark out the first parallel. That, again, was begun, and so far brought to perfection, between sunset on the 9th and sunrise on the 10th, as to afford excellent shelter to the workmen; indeed, so unremitting were the zeal of the superintendents and the activity of the troops, that before noon on the 13th, not only was the first parallel completed, but three batteries, capable of containing thirty-

two pieces of artillery, were erected. The guns were likewise brought up, the platforms laid, and an ample supply of ammunition lodged in the magazines; and we began already to talk of the opening of the batteries as an occurrence which might be hourly expected.

We were thus situated when intelligence arrived at head-quarters, which, without alarming either Lord Wellington or his followers, increased the anxiety of all to bring the undertaking before them as speedily as possible to an end. We learned that Marmont, after proceeding in the direction of Valencia as far as Oçana, had suddenly given out that his presence in the east was not required, and returning with four of his divisions, had taken the route of the Guadarama pass towards Valladolid and Salamanca. His object was represented to be, a desire to throw supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, of our operations against which, however, both he and D'Orsenne were said still to be in ignorance; indeed we ascertained, upon what appeared to be good authority, that even at Salamanca, a distance of only sixteen leagues from our trenches, not a rumour of the siege had, so lately as the 12th, got abroad. A good deal of time had thus been gained by us, upon which, at the commencement of the business, it would have been idle to calculate; but it would have been worse than idle to suppose that a

secrecy, under any circumstances so remarkable, would long continue to screen our operations. On the contrary, it was but just to believe that the French generals might, even whilst we were discussing their plans, be made acquainted with the perilous predicament in which Rodrigo stood ; and it was beyond a question, that whenever they did ascertain that fact, they would make the utmost exertions to relieve it. The matters, therefore, upon which alone we considered it necessary to speculate, were, the probable period at which they would be enabled to arrive, and the amount of force with which, within a given space of time, they could be in a condition to threaten our besieging army.

With respect to the former of these considerations, it was the opinion of Lord Wellington, that were they to exert themselves as they might, sufficient time would not be granted for a regular and scientific prosecution of the siege to a close. He therefore directed that the batteries in the first parallel should be armed, and that they should open at once upon the body of the place, without pausing to silence the enemy's fire, or ruin his defences. By this means he hoped to effect a breach in the course of a few days at the furthest ; when he would either storm with the counterscarp entire, or approach by the more secure but tedious process of sap, according as Marmont should, or should

not, show a disposition to molest him. With respect to the latter question at issue, it was not so easy a matter to come to any certain conclusion. Some time ago a rumour had prevailed that D'Orsenne, with the division of guards, was recalled to France; but that was now ascertained to be destitute of foundation. On the contrary, that general was stated to be himself at Valladolid, with a portion of his corps; whilst the remainder were at Burgos, and in the country to the north of it. Now, were Marmont and D'Orsenne again to unite, their force would doubtless outnumber us in the same proportion in which it outnumbered us before; indeed the odds against us would be greater, inasmuch as we could not now, with any honour, abandon our works, and must therefore separate our army into covering and besieging corps. For the enemy to effect this junction, however, a larger space of time would be required than would be necessary on our part to accomplish the reduction of the place, even by the most tedious process contemplated; and hence we felt no great apprehension that our labours would be interrupted by the united armies of Portugal and the centre. Still a very considerable force, perhaps forty thousand men, could, it was believed, be brought against us so early as the 27th or 28th; and even forty thousand men would occasion no trifling inconvenience to troops entangled, as we

were, round a strong place, and destitute of any favourable position from which to act against them.

With this prospect before him, Lord Wellington at once urged forward the siege by every means in his power, and took such steps as promised most effectually to secure those employed in it from interruption. Some of the divisions which had hitherto occupied cantonments considerably in the rear, were moved up, and placed themselves in quarters, ~~the~~ fifth at Albergaria, at Janca, and on the Coa; and the seventh at Payo. The cavalry, consisting of the brigades of Generals Slade and Anson, of the 1st hussars, of Alten's, of the 3rd dragoons and 4th dragoon guards under Le Marchand, with four troops of horse artillery, were at Ituero; and General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry at Barba del Puerco. General Hill, likewise, received instructions to throw a couple of brigades across the Tagus at Villa Velha, for the purpose of giving additional support to our right; whilst he himself, in case of need, should fall back upon Portalegre and Niza. Thus it was calculated that an army of 38,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry could, within a few hours, be assembled at any given point; and with 38,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, it was felt that there existed but small ground of apprehension, let Marmont take the field when he might.

In the mean while, our works before the town

were proceeding with the same diligence and vigour which had hitherto characterised them. There was a fortified convent on the right of the captured redoubt, which commanded the very spot upon which it was proposed to form a second parallel. This it was considered necessary to reduce; and the service was performed on the night of the 13th, in the handsomest manner, by the light companies of guards, supported by Lord Blantyre's brigade. Our men approached the post wholly unobserved, and making their way within the barricade, found the garrison of fifty men collected round a large fire, and sound asleep. The enemy, roused thus awkwardly from their slumbers, fled in all directions, without making the faintest effort to defend themselves; and as they left arms, knapsacks, and every thing behind, they easily leaped from the windows, and effected their escape; but the convent remained in our possession, and it proved of the utmost utility in covering the progress of the sap, which was immediately begun, and carried on to the line of the projected parallel.

The enemy had hitherto confined their resistance to a heavy cannonade from the walls; on the 14th, they tried the fortune of a sortie, and for a moment or two their success was such as to threaten the most serious consequences. An exceedingly culpable custom prevailed among the

troops stationed for the defence of the trenches, by which the old guard, as soon as the relief came in sight, began to move off; thus leaving the advanced line wholly undefended from any effort which the garrison might make to take possession of it. From the tops of the towers, on which officers were constantly stationed, this extreme negligence on our part was repeatedly observed; and the Governor having ascertained that it was a matter of daily occurrence, resolved to take advantage of it. At eleven o'clock, therefore, in the forenoon of the 14th, about five companies sallied from the town, just as one of our guards had quitted the trenches, and the other was as yet at some distance from them; and they pushed on with so much haste, that they arrived at the very wall of the convent before they were stopped. The workmen, unarmed and surprised, could only retire before them; but an alarm being immediately given, Lord Blantyre's brigade, with a detachment of Germans, hastened to the spot, and with difficulty threw themselves between the French troops and the point of attack. The latter were then driven back, and they fled within the town, having effected no other object besides upsetting most of the gabions which had been placed on the preceding night; neither they nor we suffering any serious loss in killed or wounded.

There had been mounted, during the earlier

part of this morning, twenty-five heavy twenty-four pounders in the batteries already constructed in the first parallel. With these a fire was directed to be opened, partly upon the point intended to be breached, and partly upon the convent of St. Francisco, another fortified post which, from the left of the redoubt, enfiladed our projected communication between the first and second parallels. At four o'clock in the afternoon it began; and of a spectacle more strikingly magnificent, it has rarely been the good fortune even of a British soldier to be a witness. The evening chanced to be remarkably beautiful and still; there was not a cloud in the sky, nor a breath of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artillery broke in upon its calmness, and volumes of smoke rose slowly from our batteries. These floating gently towards the town, soon enveloped the lower parts of the hill, and even the ramparts and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the towers and summits lifting their heads over the haze, showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on a summer's day. The flashes from our guns, answered as they promptly were from the artillery in the place, the roar of their thunder reverberating among the remote mountains of the Sierra de Francisca; these, with the rattle of the balls against the masonry, and the occasional crash as portions of

the wall gave way, proved, altogether, a scene which, to be rightly understood, must be experienced. I confess that I have seldom been more powerfully and yet singularly affected, than I was by this magnificent combination of sights and sounds ; and the chances are, that I shall never again enjoy another opportunity of experiencing similar sensations.

The point against which our present efforts were directed, was that which the French, during the siege of 1810, had breached, and which, according to the opinion of our ablest engineers, had not yet obtained that solidity which time, and time only, bestows on masonry. It was, however, so well covered by the *fausse-braie*, that serious doubts were entertained, whether it would be practicable to reach it with effect till after that should have been blown in ; whilst the distance at which our batteries were erected, full 650 yards from the crest of the *glacis*, rendered the practice less accurate, as well as less destructive, than it would have otherwise been. Both of these circumstances told against us ; but our guns, of English manufacture, were excellent of their kind, and our gunners skilful ; and hence it was easy to perceive that the top, at least, of the rampart, crumbled rapidly before them, and that it required only a better position to enable our object to be attained to its fullest extent. Preparations were

accordingly made to advance our works further; and a sap, destined to crown the summit of the lesser Teson, was begun.

The guns, which were directed exclusively upon the convent of St. Francisco, made of that post, after some hours of heavy firing, a heap of ruins; and it, as well as the suburbs, were taken possession of by the 40th regiment soon after dusk on the 14th. Parties were then sedulously employed, as well in extending the second parallel, as in throwing up fresh batteries; and on the 17th, our trenches were advanced to the summit of the nearest hill, within 180 yards of the body of the place. From the new batteries, likewise, so commanding a fire was brought to bear, both upon the main breach and upon an old tower, somewhat to the right of it, that the latter at length fell with a tremendous crash, and the former was pronounced practicable. Pits were next dug, here and there, along the glacis, into which riflemen were introduced, with orders to fire unintermittingly upon the embrasures; whilst a continued shower of grape and canister, thrown in both by night and day, kept the faces of the breaches clear, and hindered any attempts at repairing them.

Such was the condition of Ciudad Rodrigo—the *fausse-braié* shaken to atoms, and two formidable breaches in its main wall; when Lord Wellington, willing to spare the lives both of his

own troops and of the garrison, sent in to demand a surrender. The reply, though not such as could have been desired, was nevertheless one which all brave men must admire; and I give it in the words of the Governor, because these alone can do it full justice: "Sa Majesté l'Empereur," said he, "m'a confié le commandement de Ciudad Rodrigo. Je ne puis pas le rendre. Au contraire, moi et la brave garnison que je commande s'enseveliront dans ses ruines."

Nothing therefore remained but to carry the place by assault; and to this end all our future exertions were turned. On the 18th the town was closely reconnoitred by Major Sturgeon, of the staff corps, whose exertions and ability from the commencement of the siege had been very conspicuous. He reported that on the enemy's left of the main breach there was a favourable point of entrance for a body of troops, which might assist in flanking the approach of the column of attack in that quarter, whilst the lesser breach on the right was perfectly accessible; and Lord Wellington, satisfied by the declaration, determined to defer the final struggle no longer. The night of the 19th was accordingly fixed upon as the proper period for commencing the assault; and in the mean while, all the details of the plan upon which it was deemed advisable to conduct it, were drawn up, and maturely considered.

All who know Lord Wellington are aware that, to the kind of influence by which other men are liable to be effected, he is and ever has been an entire stranger. In all his undertakings, be they great or small, the single circumstance which had weight with him was, that everything should be done correctly; and that the least possible inconvenience should be experienced, not only by the persons immediately employed, but by the army in general. Acting upon this principle, he issued orders that the attack should be made by the divisions, whatever they might chance to be, which should happen to be on duty that day in the trenches; and as the light and third divisions enjoyed that good fortune, upon them the honourable task devolved of carrying Ciudad Rodrigo by assault. The third division, consisting of the brigades of Major-general M'Kinnon and Lieutenant-colonel Campbell—that is to say, of the 45th, 74th, 88th, and five companies of the 60th regiments on the one hand, and of the 5th, 77th, 83rd, and 94th on the other—were to attack the main breach. They were to be preceded by the light companies, under Major Manners, as a storming party; as these, again, were to be headed by parties carrying wool-packs and ladders; the former for the purpose of filling up the ditch, the latter to enable the assailants to mount the wall. They were to form, General M'Kin-

non's leading and Colonel Campbell's supporting, in the second parallel; and they had as their reserve a Portuguese brigade, drawn up in order in the trenches. To aid this principal attack, a demonstration was to be made on our right by Major O'Toole of the 95th rifle corps, at the head of five companies of that regiment, and of the light companies of the 83rd and 94th; and the particular care of guiding this little column was assigned to Major Sturgeon, at whose suggestion it prepared to act. In the mean while the smaller breach on our left was to be stormed by the light division, consisting of Major-general Vandeleur and Colonel Barnard's brigades—in other words, of two battalions of the 52nd, one of the 43rd, two of the 95th, and two of Caçadores. The attack was to be led by General Vandeleur's brigade, which issuing from the left of the convent St. Francisco, was to descend into the ditch, and advance, first upon the breach in the *fausse-braie*, and then upon that in the body of the place. As soon as they should succeed in gaining the summit of the *fausse-braie*, they were to detach to their right, for the purpose of communicating with General M'Kinnon's brigade, and flanking the assault of the principal wall; and whenever they had crowned the breach in that wall against which they were directed, they were in like manner to

turn to the right, and join the main attack. This done, and a communication between the two columns being established, an effort was to be made to burst open the Salamanca gate, opposite to the convent of St. Francisco; upon which the rest of the division, which up to that moment were to remain in reserve, would enter and secure the conquest of the place. Here, as at the greater breach, a select party of men were appointed to head their comrades; they consisted of 300 volunteers under the command of Major Napier; and they, like the storming party elsewhere, were preceded by the bearers of bags, ladders, and the other engines of assault. Finally, the parties appointed to carry these necessary implements were prohibited from taking with them their arms; and the storming parties received positive instructions on no account whatever to fire a shot.

Partly with a view to draw a portion of the enemy's attention from the breaches, and partly under the idea that, during the confusion, an entrance might be obtained by escalade, General Pack's Portuguese brigade received instructions, as soon as the firing should become general, to demonstrate against the outwork of St. Jago, and the convent of La Caridad. They were to plant their ladders at the moment when their comrades issued from the trenches; and they were to ren-

der the attack either a real or a false one, according as circumstances should direct. The last clause in these instructions was not, perhaps, the least interesting to those affected by it; it was this:—“Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by assault this evening at seven o’clock.”

As the preceding orders appeared at an early hour in the day, ample time was afforded for making every preparation which the circumstances of the case required, and both men and officers were fully and correctly apprised of the duties which they were expected severally to perform. They were not inattentive to these instructions, and exactly at the moment specified, each column took its station, in readiness to obey the signal of advance. It would be no easy matter to describe the state of a soldier’s feelings during the pause which ensued. The evening was calm and tranquil, and the moon, in her first quarter, shed over the scene a feeble light, which, without disclosing the shape or form of particular objects, rendered their rude outline distinctly visible. There stood the fortress, a confused mass of masonry, with its breaches like shadows cast upon the wall; whilst not a gun was fired from it, and all within was as still and motionless as if it were already a ruin, or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On our side, again, the trenches crowded with armed men, among whom not so much as a whisper might

be heard, presented no unapt resemblance to a dark thunder-cloud, or to a volcano in that state of tremendous quiet which usually precedes its most violent eruptions. But the delay was not of long continuance; at a few minutes past seven o'clock, the word was quietly passed that all things were ready, and the troops poured forward with the coolness and impetuosity of which British soldiers alone are capable, and which nothing could successfully oppose.

No piece of clock-work, however nicely arranged, could obey the will of its maker more accurately than the different columns obeyed that night the wishes of their chief; and his orders were, in consequence, executed at every point with the same precision and regularity as if he had been manœuvring so many battalions upon a revue plateau. General M'Kinnon's brigade, amidst showers of grape and musketry, rushed, without a check, to the foot of the great breach, and in spite of numerous obstacles, and the most determined resistance, succeeded in gaining the summit.

But a serious opposition awaited them there. The enemy, driven from the main wall, took shelter behind a retrenchment, in front of which they had dug a ditch of considerable width; and whilst our men were vainly endeavouring to pass it, a mine was suddenly sprung. The havoc oc-

caused by that terrible explosion was prodigious, numbers of the bravest and most forward of the men being blown up and destroyed. Unfortunately for the army at large, the gallant M'Kinnon was among them; but the rest, nothing daunted by the fate of their comrades, only redoubled their exertions, with a courage which seemed to rise in proportion to the difficulties opposed to it. They were thus situated, when Major O'Toole's little column, which had acted under the guidance of Major Sturgeon upon the right, joined them; when finding that all their efforts were fruitless, and that it was impracticable to press further till the results of other attacks should be known, they established themselves among the ruins.

In the mean while, both the light division under Crawford, and the Portuguese brigade under Pack, were following up with equal resolution the measures pointed out to them. The former issuing from the convent, made for the lesser breach, their brave chief leading as few like himself could have led, when a musket-ball struck him in the arm, and penetrating the side, lodged in his lungs. He fell to the ground, and was borne from the field in a dying state. Almost at the same moment, Major Napier commanding the storming party, Colonel Colbourne of the 52nd, and General Vandeleur, all most distinguished and brave officers, received severe wounds, and the troops were left

to the guidance of accidental leaders, and their own bravery; but neither the one nor the other were wanting. The pause of a moment, and only of a moment, occurred, when, with a shout which was distinctly heard over the roar of musketry and cannon, they renewed the charge, and in five minutes had won the ascent. Then arose the cry of victory from every quarter; for General Pack's Portuguese had succeeded in their escalade, and the troops rushing along the ramparts, speedily opened the way to the third division, and the town was our own. The enemy fled in the utmost disorder. They were pursued from street to street, and from house to house, with the fury which is irrepressible among men flushed with conquest, and exasperated by the memory of comrades slain; and all who continued to offer the slightest resistance were immediately put to the sword. To the honour of British soldiers, however, be it recorded, that not a single life was taken in wantonness. He who threw down his arms was spared by the very hand which had been uplifted to destroy him, and hence out of a garrison which consisted originally of 1800 combatants, full 1500 were made prisoners.

It were vain for me to attempt any description of the scenes of plunder and confusion which now presented themselves in every quarter of the town. The firing, which had ceased for a moment, be-

cause the contest was at an end, was renewed, here and there, in the extravagance of triumph; whilst shouts and screams mingled fearfully with the groans of the wounded, and the outcries of men in a state of intoxication. Many houses likewise, in different districts, burst forth into flames, whether wantonly or accidentally excited it was impossible to determine; whilst the churches were ransacked, the wine and spirit cellars emptied, and for several hours every species of enormity was perpetrated. All these things occurring during the night, the darkness of which being but imperfectly dispelled by the light from the burning edifices, produced an effect which none can desire to experience again. At length the drunken dropped gradually asleep; the wounded were removed to temporary hospitals; and though of the houses already on fire the greater proportion were burned to the ground, the further progress of the flames was arrested; and by dawn on the following morning a degree of order was restored, such as few who beheld the condition of things immediately posterior to the assault could have anticipated.

The casualties among the allied forces, during the progress of this important siege, were, as might be expected, numerous; 9 officers and 217 men being killed, and 84 officers and 1000 men wounded; and of these 6 officers and 140 men were killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded,

on the night of the assault alone. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the loss of so many valuable lives was keenly felt, not only by private friends, but by the army in general; but among them all, there fell not one more universally nor more justly lamented than Major-general Crawford. He was an officer of whom the highest expectations had been formed, and who, on every occasion, found an opportunity to prove, that had his life been spared, the fondest hopes of his country would not have been disappointed; and he was a man, to know whom in his profession without admiring was impossible. To me his death occasioned that void which the removal of a sincere friend alone produces. From the moment of receiving his wound, he knew that all hope of recovery was idle; he lingered on for several hours, and at last submitted to his fate with the magnanimity of a hero, and the resignation of a Christian. Poor Crawford!—whilst the memory of the brave and the skilful shall continue to be cherished by British soldiers, thou wilt not be forgotten; and the hand which scrawls this humble tribute to thy worth must be cold as thine own, ere the mind which dictates it shall cease to think of thee with affection and regret.

The task does not devolve on me, as I have already more than once expressed, to enumerate those who, on the present occasion, peculiarly dis-

tinguished themselves. All did their duty, and beyond this a British soldier knows not how to proceed; because, when in the presence of an enemy, a British soldier considers his utmost exertions as called for, and therefore gives them. To the talents of Colonel Fletcher, chief engineer; of Major Dixon, director of the artillery; and of Major Sturgeon, of the staff corps, the highest praises were given by our illustrious chief; whilst to the bravery of Lieutenant Gurwood of the 52nd regiment, who, after leading the forlorn hope, escaped unhurt, he bore the most decided testimony, by presenting him with the sword of the captured governor. The fruits of the victory were, as I have already stated, 1500 prisoners, a very large quantity of ammunition and military stores, and no fewer than 321 pieces of cannon, of different calibres, but almost all serviceable.

Thus fell the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. Its conqueror lost no time in putting the works once more in a state of defence; and long before Marmont, who was exerting himself to relieve it, could bring his troops into the field, the British army was in full march towards other and no less memorable triumphs.

I have now arrived at that period of the war in the Peninsula, when I am necessarily compelled to take leave of my readers.

A severe fever, caught on the banks of the

Guadiana, increased by fatigue and anxiety of mind, compelled me to solicit, when our army removed to the south, Lord Wellington's leave of absence to return to England for the recovery of my health.

To abler and more competent pens will the task be hereafter assigned, of giving to posterity the full and perfect details of the great events of this war, and especially of its glorious conclusion, of which these sheets are only, and that up to a certain period, a very weak outline. If, however, my humble undertaking should call into play the greater talents and abilities of others, it will not have been made in vain; and if I should be so fortunate as to carry the interest of my brother officers along with me in the précis of events, of which my description must now close, I will, next year, venture to submit to them, in a similar shape, my military recollections of the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 with the allied armies on the continent, where it was my fortune to proceed, under the gracious commands of my Sovereign, after I left the Peninsular army in 1812; first as Minister to the court of Berlin, and afterwards as Ambassador at the court of Austria.

APPENDIX
OF
CORRESPONDENCE.



SINCE the publication of the first edition of this Narrative, the Author has received communications from some of his brother officers ; and he deems it but justice to them to give these letters, with his answers, to the public, in this Appendix. For himself, the Author must again repeat what he stated in his Advertisement, "That the deficiency of the work is at once acknowledged ; and he hopes, under the circumstances in which it was written, it will meet with indulgence."

V. L.

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APPENDIX OF CORRESPONDENCE.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-general Inglis to the
Marquis of Londonderry.*

Brighton, 2nd of May, 1828.

My Lord,

It is with great regret I observe in your History of the Peninsular War, that your Lordship mentions that the 57th regiment lost their colours at the battle of Albuera, and, in the same paragraph, that many prisoners were made by the enemy.

My being in command of the 57th regiment on that day will be sufficient apology for my addressing you on this subject, which your Lordship will admit my feelings as a soldier are naturally most deeply interested in.

I take the liberty to annex a copy of the paragraph alluded to, with one or two remarks.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. INGLIS,

Lieutenant-general.

Lieutenant-general,

The Marquis of Londonderry,

&c. &c. &c.

COPY.—Page 535. Quarto Edition.

“ At this moment we had lost a whole brigade of artillery, a large number of prisoners, and eight stand of

“colours belonging to the buffs, the 66th, the 48th, and
“ the 57th regiments.”

REMARKS.

The 57th regiment brought into the field on the 16th of May, 1811, at the battle of Albuera, 579 rank and file, out of which number 415 were killed and wounded; the remaining 164 were marched off the field by Lieutenant-adjutant Mann, who was only the fourteenth officer in rank at the commencement of the action. The colours are in my possession, and not one man was missing.

WM. INGLIS,

Lieutenant-general.

*Copy of a Letter from the Marquis of Londonderry to
Lieutenant-general Inglis.*

Holderness House, May 9th, 1828.

Sir,

On my arrival from Paris yesterday, I received your letter of the 2nd instant. I much regret that there should have been any inaccuracy on my part in my allusion to the 57th regiment. My information as to the events of the battle of Albuera was collected hastily at the moment, and I was not a personal observer in the field.

The passage you allude to mentions, “ at one moment
“ we had lost a whole brigade of artillery, a large number
“ of prisoners belonging to several different corps;” but there is no specification of any number of prisoners particularly to the 57th regiment; and out of 415 killed and wounded, it is not surprising if, amongst these, prisoners were stated to exist. With regard to the colours, some

were at one moment taken, as I was informed; but your own knowledge clearly proves the standards of the 57th were not taken; and if there is a second edition, I shall be very glad to rectify an error by construction, which, however, permit me to say, I consider as reflecting not in the smallest degree upon the corps who so gallantly and gloriously triumphed at the conclusion of that memorable battle; and I hope you will permit me to add, from the various opportunities which I had of remarking the 57th, they do not possess many more sincere admirers than myself.

I have the honor to be,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

V. L.

Lieutenant-General

Sir Wm. Inglis, K. C. B.

Second Letter from General Inglis, to Lord Londonderry.

Brighton, 18th July, 1828.

My Lord,

I am extremely sorry to observe in the 2nd edition of your Lordship's Narrative of the Peninsular War, it still appears that the 57th regiment lost their colours at the battle of Albuera on the 16th May, 1811; and that it likewise appears in the Naval and Military Magazine as an extract from your Lordship's history.

I beg to refer your Lordship to my former letter on this subject, with your Lordship's reply, dated 9th May, 1828.

Considering the high authority of your Lordship, holding the first official situation in that army at the period, I trust you will allow me to express myself, feeling it an impe-

rious duty to defend the honour of my old friends, as their commander, besides my very long service with them, having entered the service as ensign in the 57th regiment in the year 1779.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

Humble servant,

WM. INGLIS.

Lieutenant-general,

The Most Noble The Marquis of Londonderry,

&c. &c. &c.

Answer to 2nd Letter from General Inglis.

July 21st, 1828.

Sir,

I am honoured with your second letter, in date the 18th July, relative to the error in my book as to the 57th regiment. In the next edition your letters to me, and my answers, will appear in the Appendix, and I am entirely ready to admit your more accurate knowledge and information relative to the corps commanded by yourself.

I have the honour to be,

Your obedient

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*Copy of a Letter from General Lord Howden to the
Marquis of Londonderry.*

May 14th, 1828.

My Dear Lord,

There are spots in the sun without impairing its splendour—so is a very small error in the beautiful composition of your book.

In my humble case, page 245, (Quarto Edition), there is a paragraph that will mislead the ordinary reader, and in it there is not the justice I feel due to me. It could only proceed from mis-information, and therefore I will venture to correct it. I will transcribe the passage:—

“ He reached Lumiar on the 6th April; where Sir
“ John Cradock had fixed his head-quarters, and found
“ him making such dispositions as did not indicate offen-
“ sive measures. General Hill, it was said, at this time
“ suggested bolder measures, and he was aided by Beres-
“ ford’s council; and it was agreed that, instead of con-
“ tinuing preparations for a retreat, the combined British
“ and Portuguese armies should move forward. The ene-
“ my were at this time in a state of perfect inaction.”

Lumiar is but two or three miles from Lisbon, and therefore no preparations for retreat could be made there, as, undoubtedly, if the idea of retreat, or rather say embarkation, was the least in contemplation, it would have taken place in Lisbon itself. I suppose *Leiria* must have been meant, which is above eighty miles from Lisbon on the road to Oporto, to which place the army, such as it was, had moved under my command; and it may at once

be asked, why proceed so far? For no other purpose, than to retreat? For the enemy had not made any forward movement, from Oporto, of consequence.

General Hill never suggested to me "bolder" measures, and I do not recollect that Marshal Beresford urged any movement of a more positive nature than those already adopted.

I believe it must be allowed that the security of Lisbon, the object upon which every thing turned both then and thereafter, could never, for a moment, be out of the thoughts of the officer who commanded in chief; and until some light appeared as to the intentions of Soult, who commanded in the north, and Victor in the south, a rapid and thoughtless march from Lisbon would have been deemed unjustifiable rashness, not to be redeemed by attractive "boldness." Had those French generals joined in common union, and made a simultaneous movement, nothing could have given a chance of saving Lisbon, but a determined resistance in and about the town of Lisbon itself. Why they did not act in concert must remain an impenetrable mystery, or be ascribed to the worst of passions, and most destructive jealousy on their part.

I will, some time or other, lay before you intercepted letters, to prove that the united march to Lisbon was the original intention between these two generals, as also a copy of my orders—that, notwithstanding the very weak and defective state of the army I had (one regiment of cavalry, the 14th, only) until the arrival of all your gallant and glorious band from England, it never was my intention to retreat or embark; and my letters to government will evince that we should have made a stand to the last moment at Lisbon, in a more contracted line than Torres Vedras, with such powers and defences as we

could array. This resolution may be viewed as one of temerity, but still it was so determined.

Now, my dear lord, forgive the shadow of a reproach to you, and from my pen too, which, save this little explanation, with my voice is always employed in unbounded admiration of your eloquent and lucid work.

Ever most truly yours,

HOWDEN.

Copy of a Letter from Lord Londonderry to General Lord Howden.

Holderness House, May 16th, 1828.

My Dear Lord,

I lose no time in replying to your letter of the 14th instant; and allow me to assure you, if I endeavoured to avoid one thing more than another in my imperfect book, it was the giving offence to any one. Above all I must deplore having, 'however inadvertently,' expressed myself in a manner of your position and services which might mislead; because, my dear Lord, there are few men whom I respect publicly, and value privately, more than your Lordship.

An extreme desire to avoid delicate questions, the whole bearings of which I was not officially and properly in possession of, added to the caution that was imposed upon me by knowing the secret thoughts of my brother, induced me to confine myself in my Narrative as near to simple facts as the several cases would admit. But as you call upon me for a more accurate explanation, I can have no difficulty in transcribing from my manuscript the part I omitted in reference to your situation and intentions.

Under date of the 23rd April, 1809. I write as follows,

from Lisbon. Previous to General Hill's arrival, which happened on the 6th, Cradock, from the inadequacy of his force, had determined most properly not to advance from Lumiar, *and had every thing prepared for the worst*. But when Hill came, and he heard other corps were following, (and being also pressed by Beresford,) he took the resolution of advancing, and it was settled that a combined movement both of the British and Portuguese army towards the north, should be made, &c. This day, 'THE 23RD' the British troops are to assemble at Leiria.

The former certainly with prudence, previous to Hill's arrival, resisted an advance, while the latter, perhaps with too little precaution in the judgment of some, was urging it. From *Mr. Villiers'* general tone about Cradock up to the present moment, he has acted most judiciously in every respect. As to his feelings, it is in vain to deny he was deeply wounded, the orders coming the very moment he had determined to advance the army. His first wish and impression was to return home, but afterwards gallantly resisted this impulse, and decided to go to Gibraltar, exerting himself to the utmost to stop any murmurs that might be amongst the individuals most attached to him, so that, upon the whole, this difficult and delicate arrangement has been carried into effect as well as the circumstances of the case would allow. Mr. Villiers has acted with much judgment in all the business here, beloved by the army, whom he takes great notice of, keeping the generals together, respected highly by the people of Lisbon, and enjoying the confidence of the government. Wellesley has written to Cradock and Beresford, announcing his arrival and intentions, and begged them to come here; so we look out for them tomorrow, when some general determination will be taken.

Under date of the 27th April, I write as follows, from Lisbon.

I have just seen Cradock, with whom I have had a long conversation. It is impossible not to admire the good sense which seems to actuate his conduct. The letter he wrote to you sufficiently marks his feelings; but he assured me, upon his honor, while he, personally, must suffer, that he thought the government were right to do what they thought most judicious. At the same time, a right measure often brought on individuals unmerited misfortunes. He seemed quite sure to receive from the government those marks of approbation for his conduct, which under critical circumstances he trusted he had merited. In deciding on going to England ultimately, and resigning Gibraltar, when another person can be appointed, he says he has been led by what is the feeling of the army, as many general officers may look upon Wellesley's employment in the active army of the country as their being laid aside; and he might incur all their disapprobation, if he silently sat down under the arrangement proposed. I replied that no man was to sacrifice himself on a supposed public feeling. He asked me then, upon my honour, what I should do in a similar predicament, as to the offer of Gibraltar; and I said that, if I would have accepted Gibraltar when in England as a command that was agreeable to me, I should go there now, more especially if I thought, in so doing, I was additionally promoting the king's service. I think Cradock is satisfied of your friendly feelings towards him; and one cannot contemplate his situation without pain.

Under date of the 1st May, I write as follows from Lisbon.

I stated that Cradock had determined not to advance

previous to Hill's arrival ; and Villiers showed me a letter from Cradock, in which there was no fixed intention of moving mentioned, which were the grounds of the opinion I gave in my letter of the 23rd April. It appears, however, since, that on the Saturday before Cradock could know we were landed, he met Beresford half-way between Leiria and Thomar, and settled an advance upon Coimbra, but no operation was actually commenced.

I have now, my dear lord, copied my original manuscript letters, where they relate to you, your conduct, and your determinations, nearly *verbatim*. But rather than give this long detail in my book, which in some parts embraced delicate points, I simply said as follows :—
“ General Hill reached Lumiar on the 6th April, where Sir J. Cradock had fixed his head-quarters ; and found him making such dispositions as did not indicate offensive measures.”

Allow me just to observe, that you must know if your head-quarters were on the 6th at Lumiar, which my letters assert ; and if so, and if, previous to General Hill's arrival, no fixed plan of advance had been ordered, I hope you will agree, this part of the paragraph is not incorrect.

Permit me, however, to observe, I only state a general “ *on dit*,” for the truth of which I cannot nor do not vouch, but which was probably excited by Hill's arrival with a corps eager for battle ; and that *preparations for the worst* (viz. embarkation,) which might have been necessary, if you had been attacked by a joint operation of the enemy from north and south, before your reinforcements arrived, were no longer so necessary.

This, my dear lord, is the *Resumé* of my impressions at the time, connected with my letters ; and allow me to hope

that all your reasoning justifies the line that seems to have been taken so properly at the time, upon which, however, I have not presumed to express my individual opinion.

In conclusion, I have only to add, that it will afford me the greatest pleasure to give publicity to *any or every part* of this explanation you think fit ; or to afford further information, as far as my documents or memory serve, on every part of the subject.

Ever yours, my dear Lord,

Most sincerely and affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*Second Letter from General Lord Howden to
Lord Londonderry.*

18th May, 1828.

My Dear Lord,

I only write a word to return my warmest thanks for the letter of yesterday, and the other communications, that must have given you so much trouble to annex.

Could any thing make me more attached to you, it would be the generous feeling, so strongly displayed in your letters to Lord Castlereagh, towards me, at the period I endured the most distressing circumstance that ever fell to the lot of a Commander-in-chief—his supersession in command, almost in view of the enemy, and at the same time receiving the united praise and approbation of all his measures from his king and government.

The painful remembrances can never be obliterated from my mind ; but the lapse of nearly twenty years afforded the usual lenitive of time ; they therefore slumbered, but still are awakened by the luminous records of your work.

I am looking over some papers, and among them I find letters to you, in office, of the 3d and 5th of April, 1809, from *Lumiar*, which bear strongly upon the situation of affairs in Portugal at that period, and show the well-grounded apprehension of an united attack from Soult and Victor in the south, who had advanced within a few leagues of Badajoz.

Lumiar, which gives rise to the little point between us, being but two miles from Lisbon, creates all the mistake. "Head-quarters there" is, in fact, Lisbon itself, and the idea of any retreat from *thence*, would only be immediate embarkation.

Ever most truly yours,

HOWDEN.

Lord Londonderry merely acknowledged the receipt of the above letter, and expressed his readiness to act upon this correspondence in any manner Lord Howden pointed out.

May 28, 1828.

Third Letter from General Lord Howden to the Marquis of Londonderry.

Hereford Street, 21st May, 1828.

My Dear Lord,

I received your note this morning, and shall say little more, than that you are very good, and it is like yourself, to think further of me.

Without troubling you with more particulars, I believe I have laid before you sufficient materials to do away the little paragraph in your excellent work, that has given me pain, and did not, as I conceived, do me justice—how it

is to be repaired, I shall leave to your kindness; for I cannot enter into any controversy with you.

It was my unhappy lot to be debarred from any participation in all the glories of Portugal and Spain that followed my supercession; but I may be allowed to maintain that all that was possible, under very critical circumstances, was done before the arrival of the reinforcements from England, and that no one false step took place; for, if any one error had been committed, the transcendent triumphs that succeeded, and the brightest annals in English history, might and would have been lost to the world; to this alone I lay claim.

The warmest and repeated thanks of his Majesty, and the British government through Lord Castlereagh, to the very close of my command, were the gratifying but sole reward.

Ever yours,
Most truly,
HOWDEN.

The Marquis of Londonderry.
&c. &c. &c.

(Copy) Before the arrival of General Hill with the reinforcements from England, the 6th April, 1809.

General Order by SIR JOHN CRADOCK.

Lumiar, 29th March, 1809.

The several arrangements for the troops to enter upon the campaign will take place immediately.

The Deputy Commissary-general will distribute, with the least possible delay, to the several corps, and the heads of departments, the allotted means of transport; and a re-

turn will be made to the Adjutant-general of the actual equipment, or of the deficiency, if any arises.

Lieutenant-colonel Robe will execute all the arrangements and orders he may have already received about the artillery, and report the conclusion to the Commander of the Forces. Especial care is to be taken by the commanding officers of the cavalry and artillery, and the Deputy Commissary-general, that a sufficient quantity of spare shoes be secured for the length of march they may be engaged. The Commander of the Forces desires, in the most urgent manner, that the greatest care and attention be paid to the preservation of the mules, &c. as no deficiency can be supplied.

Letter from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock.

Downing Street, 16th February, 1809.

Sir,

Your dispatches of the 19th, 21st, and 31st ult. and of the 2d inst., have been received and laid before the King.

His Majesty has commanded me to express his high approbation of the line of conduct you have pursued, and entertains a conviction that the same good sense, temper, and steadiness, which seem to guide your decisions, will be persevered in, and will finally overcome any unpleasant difficulties that may arise. I have nothing to add to my despatches of yesterday.

I have the honour,

&c. &c. &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lieutenant-General

Sir John Cradock, K. B.

*Extract from Lord Castlereagh's letter to
Sir John Cradock.*

Downing Street, March the 30th, 1809.

“ You must believe me sincere when I assure you that, with respect to yourself, in addition to much personal confidence, the government feel very strongly, indeed, with respect to the whole of your conduct in Portugal, which, in times and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has, in every instance, met with their unqualified approbation, and, I can truly say, fulfilled every wish and expectation I had, or could have formed, when you were selected for the command.”

*Copy of a Letter from Sir John Cradock to
Viscount Castlereagh.*

Lumiar, 1st April, 1809.

My Lord,

I lose not a moment, as the vessel is under weigh, to state that the account has arrived that Oporto has surrendered to the enemy. I lament that I cannot send to your Lordship the particulars. I learn, however, that the Bishop is on his way to Lisbon.

From the very imperfect information that is current, it appears that no resistance was made. It would be too sanguine to expect much any where, constituted as the Portuguese troops are, and from the general insubordination that prevails.

I am not in possession of any further accounts from the

French and Spanish armies in Estremadura, nor of the proceedings of the Salamanca corps, since they invested Ciudad Rodrigo.

Our movements will be either to advance to Leyria, as the best mode of forming a junction with the Portuguese troops in the neighbourhood of Thomar, or it may be necessary to retire thence still nearer to Lisbon, to protect, as well as our means will permit, the capital, which comprehends, in all probability, all that is really an object to the enemy.

I have the honour,

&c. &c.

J. CRADOCK.

Viscount Castlereagh.

*Copies of Letters from Sir John Cradock to
B. General Stewart.*

(By the Isis, Captain Towers.)

(Private.)

N.B. These letters passed B. General Stewart on his way out from England.

Head-Quarters, Lumiar, 3rd April, 1809.

My Dear General,

Though an opportunity offers, I do not write to Lord Castlereagh, as I really have nothing to submit to his Lordship in an official shape. All my ideas and reasonings are before him, and we now seem just approaching to the crisis to put them in execution. The total defeat of Cuesta will allow the enemy to do what he pleases upon our most vulnerable quarter; and General Beresford told me last

night, that a division was within a league of Badajoz, the inhabitants of which were imploring our assistance.

I cannot yet send you the particulars of the miserable resistance made at Oporto, but it teaches us to expect the same in every place where the British army is not. The enemy, I learn, has pushed on a small advanced guard beyond the Douro. The Salamanca division, after showing themselves before Ciudad Rodrigo, has moved to San Felice to execute their ultimate designs. We have no reason to alter the former estimates of the numbers of the enemy: the Oporto division from 20 to 15,000; San Felice from 12 to 9,000; and the Estremadura, deducting what they may have lost in the late action with General Cuesta, from 35 to 33,000.

You may guess how unpleasant are my feelings, not to move the British forces, small as they are, against General Soult, or the enemy in possession of any part of Portugal; but I do not believe there is any person in the army who would encourage such an idea.

Prepared as we are on all sides, we have no choice but to remain in the best position that can be found, (and all are bad,) to cover Lisbon and the Tagus, and wait the reinforcements *that must be sent*, if we are to maintain Portugal. It is unnecessary to repeat that no dependence whatever can be placed, in their present state, upon the Portuguese troops; if I said that the whole were ready to mutiny and revolt, I believe I speak General Beresford's real sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers, and they do just as they please. I have given all the British officers that General Beresford has asked for. To quit the defence of Lisbon, and march the British troops to join such people as these, was impos-

sible. The best of them will come to join us, and they are to have our flank at Sacavem under General Beresford. You know how unequal our force is, to extend to the left—properly to Belem. We have no intelligence of the approach of General Hill with his troops.

Had we sufficient force, even under the pressure that surrounds us, we might strike a blow at Soult, or the Salamanca corps; but, as we are, nothing can be done.

Your's most truly,

J. F. CRADOCK.

The Honourable B. General Stewart.

Per Sarah.

Head-quarters, Lumiar, 5th April, 1809.

My Lord,

I have the honor to inform you of the arrival of the force under the orders of General Hill, with the exception of one transport, containing about 300 men, which parted company during the voyage. The packet is under weigh, which prevents my giving your Lordship any further particulars. The position of the enemy, I may say, remains almost the same as when I wrote on the 3rd instant to General Stewart. The closer approach to Badajoz, however, must more mark the intention to invade Portugal with the powerful force from that quarter.

Unless upon sure grounds, I will not move the British force so far from Lisbon as to expose this valuable station (in any point of view) to more than the common danger; but, since the present accession of strength, it may be

advisable to make a movement to Leiria, there awaiting and acting upon the events of the day.

I have the honor,

&c. &c. &c.

J. CRADOCK.

The Viscount Castlereagh,

&c. &c. &c.

P. S. I have the honor to annex the report of Captain Rose, just come in from Elvas.

(Private.)

Lumiar, April 6th, 1809.

My Dear General,

Nothing material has occurred since my letter of yesterday to Lord Castlereagh. We shall move on Saturday and Sunday to Leiria; but I shall not venture from the protection of Lisbon and the Tagus, without being somewhat ascertained of the movements and intention of General Victor, now apparently threatening Badajoz; and prepared, if it be his design, to enter the Alentejo, in the line of the Tagus.

I send you our order of battle. I hear the enemy is particularly strong in cavalry at Oporto; in this we are very deficient.

Your's most truly,

J. CRADOCK.

The Honourable B. General Stewart.

&c. &c. &c.

(Copy)

*Copy of a Letter from Sir John Cradock to
Marshal Beresford.*

Caldao, 20th April, 1809, twelve o'clock.

My dear Beresford,

I have this instant received your letter of the 19th. I was upon the point of writing to you, to state I had made some alterations in the disposition of the British force, from the arrangement I lately sent to you. I shall now concentrate the whole at Leiria and Batalha for the sake of accommodation, with an advance corps in front. The army will march to-morrow and reach Leiria, as soon as it is predicable. Mr. Commissary Rawlings must be severely checked for his totally unfounded representations of supplies, which were only calculated to mislead every one concerned, in the most dangerous manner. All the recommendations you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the coasts, have been ever since acted upon to the utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have any dependence upon immediate aid.

My dear general, I have only to repeat that it is the first wish of my mind to reach General Soult, or any part of his force; but nothing can persuade me to commit the British army, either from the want of supplies or ammunition. I will never allow them to be in any state but a formidable one; and I will not depart from the established principle and instructions of government. I alone am responsible. If false and ill-judged steps are taken, the

weight of blame will fall upon me. It will give me the greatest pleasure to see you. I shall be at Leiria on Saturday about noon. I will either go to Overna on Sunday, or meet you at any other place. Let me know by your next communication.

Yours most sincerely,
J. F. CRADOCK.

Marshal Beresford.

*Copy of a Letter from Lord Castlereagh to
Sir John Cradock.*

Downing Street, June 2d, 1809.

My Dear Cradock,

I have delayed my answer to your letter written to me on your departure from Lisbon, till I could be assured it would find you at Gibraltar. Your wish to return has been so strongly conveyed to me by your friends here, that I can have no desire than to fulfil your request. You have done everything that honour and duty could require from you towards the service and government in the most exemplary manner. What is most satisfactory to your own feelings, it can only be necessary for me to be assured of, to feel it incumbent on me to promote; and, in this sense I most cheerfully advised the King to leave your return in your own hands. If I have not entered into the extent to which some of your friends (whose judgement upon such a point may be more correct than mine) have felt upon the nature of your command at Gibraltar, I am sure you will believe it has not proceeded from any indifference to your military character or reputation. For both I must always feel the utmost solicitude, and shall be happy to avail

myself of any occasion of *marking it*. As we shall probably soon meet, I shall only assure you of the same regard and esteem with which I am,

Dear Cradock,

Yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lieutenant-general,

Sir John Cradock, K. B.

Gibraltar.

Copy of a Letter from Sir J. Cradock to General Robe.

Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.

My Dear Sir,

I very sensibly feel the want of horses and mules you represent for the service of the artillery; and the more so, as all the efforts to make up the deficiency, since my arrival in Lisbon, have not had any effect with the Regency.

As it is my intention to take up a position at some distance without delay, I am to request that you will this day see the commissary-general on the subject, and report to me what can be done upon this most important point. Every exertion must be made.

I have the honour,

&c. &c. &c.

J. CRADOCK.

General Robe,

Commanding artillery,

Lisbon.

From Sir J. Cradock to P. Rawlings, Esq.

Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.

Dear Sir,

I lose no time in communicating to you my intention to take up a position at Sacavem for most of the British force left in Portugal, exclusive of the garrisons at Almeida and Elvas. I cannot as yet point out the numbers, nor for what exact time the provision should be made; but it may assist your arrangements to tell you that you may, in a great measure, draw back the supplies at Santarem, Abrantes, and Castel Branco, only leaving sufficient for those corps in Colovera.

&c. &c. &c.

J. CRADOCK.

P. Rawlings, Esq.

Commissary-general.

After Orders.

Lisbon, December 30th, 1808.

The several corps in Lisbon and the vicinity will hold themselves in readiness to march out of the town. The details will be arranged in the course of to-morrow.

The quarter-master-general will immediately take the necessary measures for the embarkation of the sick. Upon returns being sent to Commodore Halket, the proper number of transports will be provided.

Major-general Mackenzie will take upon himself the command of the troops to be placed in advance, and will

give such general directions as he shall think necessary. The Commander of the Forces directs that the troops about to take the field, should regulate themselves upon the equipment presented by General Moore; with the addition, that each man should take his blanket.

J. CRADOCK.

Letter from General Robe to Sir John Cradock.

Lisbon, December 31st, 1808.

Sir,

In obedience to your orders, I have seen the commissary-general, who is using every exertion; but from the want of co-operation by the Regency, he can do little or nothing. He can only procure ten mules to-night, and he is promised twenty to-morrow. He says he will be able to let your Excellency know, by to-morrow, the utmost of his ability in that way.

I have the honour,

&c. &c. &c.

WM. ROBE,

Commanding Artillery.

His Excellency,
Sir John Cradock.

Extract of a Letter from Sir John Cradock to
Mr. Hookham Frere.*

February 17th, 1809.

“I fear your Excellency is led to entertain a more favourable notion of the efficiency of the Portuguese army, than in any shape they are entitled to; in short, in my opinion, they want every thing that constitutes a respectable force. Except about 10,000 English arms, they have no other. Many of the regiments of cavalry are without horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are not half clothed; and as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To take the field with effect, or assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the first moment of my arrival in Portugal, I wished to produce the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible.

It is a matter of serious lamentation, that such misrepresentations of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your Excellency; for it appears absolutely necessary that, at the present crisis of the war, the foreign assistance that we have to depend upon, should be duly estimated, and brought into close calculation.”

* This letter was founded upon the report of Brigadier-general Cotton, who inspected the Portuguese cavalry. The verbatim report is mislaid, or probably sent to England.—H.

Before the arrival of General Hill with the re-inforcements from England, the state of the British forces in Portugal were as follows :—

10,225, including every man in Portugal; occupying Lisbon, Almeida, Elvas, the forts on the Tagus, &c. &c.

5221 being every disposable man, capable of marching, including convalescents.

From the adjutant-general's report.

*Copy of a Letter from Major-general Sir N. Trant
to Lord Londonderry.*

No. 7, Hertford Sreet, May Fair,
19th July, 1828.

My Lord,

Having been absent upon the continent when your Lordship's Narrative of the Peninsular War made its appearance, I have had no opportunity until this day of noticing one or two passages which you have introduced into it, wherein my name is mentioned in reference to the movements of a corps of militia which had served under my orders during Massena's invasion of Portugal in 1810; and as those passages appear to have been written under an erroneous impression, I consider it to be my duty to replace the facts with which they are connected in a more accurate point of view than your Lordship has represented them; but I would assure you, that in resolving to address this letter to you for that purpose, I have been influenced by no other feeling than that which would attribute what you have stated to the imperfect information which had reached you; and which you had no reason to discredit when you accepted it as your authority.

In page 443 of your book, (first edition of it,) after commenting upon the want of penetration which had been manifested by Massena in having attacked the position of Busaco on the 27th of September, instead of resorting at once to the measure which he subsequently adopted, of turning it by its left, your Lordship remarks as follows:—
“It is true that at this time Colonel Trant, with his corps, ought to have taken post at Sardaõ : he had been ordered to proceed thither with a view to strengthen our left; and it may be that the enemy had been led to think of him as already in that position; but had the case been so, it requires no depth of discernment to discover that all the resistance which it was in his power to offer would have availed him nothing against three French corps; and more especially when it is considered that there are numerous passes into the Oporto road by the Vouga, which Trant had neither means nor force adequate to watch.” And again, in the following page, your Lordship observes, that
“when Lord Wellington’s army abandoned the ground of Busaco, he did so, not because Trant had failed in reaching his allotted station, but because the ground in itself was indefensible.”

Now, my Lord, abstracted from the error which your Lordship was under, in supposing me, throughout the above observations, to have been absent from Sardaõ at the period to which the last quoted paragraph in particular has alluded, I should only have to acknowledge myself indebted to you for the public expression of an opinion which would so effectually contradict the very absurd assertions of one or two other writers upon the same event, and who would pretend that my absence from Sardaõ, (as presumed also by them,) had been the principal cause of Lord Wellington’s retreat from Busaco; as if it was to be expected

that the undisciplined corps of Portuguese militia which I then commanded, who were embodied and armed only within the preceding nine or ten months, reduced in number to barely 1,500 men, through causes which I shall hereafter explain, and who, in fact, should only have been considered as little else than a collection of armed peasantry, could possibly, and however well disposed in other respects, have arrested the progress of an army of veterans, consisting of 65 or 70,000 men, headed by their numerous cavalry, and marching in a single column upon the given point which these writers would have allotted to me to defend; the idea is altogether too ridiculous, and I have therefore never thought it worth my attention to refute it.

But as what your Lordship has written upon this subject, and for which I would again avow myself under obligation to you, has been grounded upon the mistaken notion that I did not reach the post which I had been instructed to occupy, *before* the enemy had effected his operation, and consequently before Lord Wellington had commenced his retrograde movement, I believe that the following explanation will leave no doubt upon your mind, that upon this point your Lordship had been misinformed.

Sardaõ was in fact the only place mentioned as my destination in the order which directed my removal to the Lower Vouga; and as my corps did absolutely arrive there before Massena crossed the Serra de Caramula, that order, it must be allowed, was to all intents and purposes put into execution, as far as it was possible for me to understand the intention of it, where no more specific object had been annexed to it.

It had reached me on the 23rd September, when we were in the vicinity of Moimento da Beira, moving upon

Lamego; and as we had marched in the three or four preceding days about seventy miles, your Lordship would perceive, on consulting a map of the country, that we had marched a distance of two hundred miles in nine or ten successive days, as calculated by the route through Oporto, that by which I was directed to move, and to which I had not myself given a preference; and it cannot be doubted for one moment, that where the roads are so generally in a bad state, as they are throughout Portugal, we must have made extraordinary efforts to arrive at Sardao on the 28th September, the day on which my militia entered it, and as early in that day as from twelve to two o'clock, P. M. The first French troops that arrived at Boyalva, where the passage of the Caramula was effected, and which is four miles distant from Sardao, only entered that village at five in the afternoon of the same day, according to an official intimation which was transmitted to me by Sir Stapleton Cotton, who commanded the British cavalry upon my right, and with whom I was then in free communication.

But, my Lord, if you were, as I presume was the case, present at this crisis at head-quarters, possibly you may recollect that I had an interview with Lord Wellington in the forenoon of the 28th, upon the heights of Busaco, having pushed forward in advance of my troops, in order to receive his Lordship's commands; and I now request your particular attention to what passed upon that occasion, as it forms the most essential circumstance conveyed in this explanation, as far as my own proceedings are concerned in it.

His Lordship, after enquiring in what position I had left my militia, and on being informed that I hourly expected it at Sardao, then, (and for the first time that I



had heard the village mentioned in any form) pointed out Boyalva as the ground upon which he was desirous to see me posted. I instantly proposed to his Lordship to follow up his suggestion, and I was still in time to act upon it, as two hours would have sufficed to have carried me back to my corps, and another would have removed it to its new position; but this offer was declined; and as his Lordship then expressed himself, because he considered my militia, under all its disadvantages, as incompetent to offer resistance. I would here observe that I found, through my observations at a later period, that in reality (but which Lord Wellington was not aware of) the village of Boyalva was altogether useless as a point of defence—1st, because it is situated upon the *western* slope of the Caramula, and does not protect the summit of it, or the approaches from the eastward; 2dly, because it is in itself entirely open; and 3rdly, because there are to my own knowledge, passes practicable for cavalry on either flank of it.

From what I have just now mentioned, it would naturally appear that Lord Wellington at this moment, having ascertained what were Massena's intentions, had already made up his mind to retire upon his lines: he could only have defended the passes of the Caramula by detaching several thousands of his more efficient troops in that direction, and his front would, in this case, have been too extended not to have rendered it vulnerable in some one point, if attacked, according to Buonaparte's tactics, by an overpowering mass of the enemy's best troops. He would thus, perhaps, have sacrificed all the advantages which he had just then acquired by his recent victory, as the Portuguese troops, who were only in the infancy of their experience, might have lost their confidence in their allies as well as in themselves; and, in short, the fate of

Portugal, as well as of Europe, might have been unfavorably decided by any other measure than that which he adopted at this critical moment. It is in this reasoning alone that the real motive of his Lordship's retreat from Busaco is to be found, and certainly not in attaching any degree of credit to the very unfounded imputation which has been attempted to be thrown upon the corps of militia men which was under my orders.

In the course of your narrative, your Lordship has estimated the strength of my corps at five thousand ; but at no time did it exceed three thousand five hundred in effectives during this campaign: the mean may have been two thousand five hundred. Two of my regiments were employed upon the lines of Torres Vedras, and the others were never completed to their complement, in consequence of the rigorous system of recruiting which had been exercised in order to supply the deficiencies of the regular battalions.

When on our march to Sardaõ, we had traversed the districts in which the militia had been levied, and as very many of the men had, notwithstanding my precautions, availed themselves of the opportunity of revisiting their families, this circumstance, joined to extreme fatigue, had reduced our numbers, as I have above described it.

Had not my communication with the army been intercepted by the enemy's movement upon the night of the 28th, no possible doubt could have arisen in regard to my arrival at Sardaõ; as Lord Wellington would have been more thoroughly acquainted with my precise situation, since I not only held possession of that post on the 28th, but during the entire of the 29th; on the evening of which day, the French, after cutting off one of my patrols, posted a piquet at one extremity of the village, whilst mine oc-

cupied the other, and our respective videttes were in presence in the centre of it. It was, indeed, only at day-break on the 30th, that, when I became assured of the complete evacuation of Busaco, I determined to shelter my corps behind the Vouga, about six miles in my rear. But as this measure could not pass unnoticed by the enemy, my rear-guard was penetrated by a charge of his cavalry, and it lost an officer and twenty-five men.

This affair in itself was in other respects of no importance; and if I have brought it under your Lordship's notice, it is only to explain what must have been hitherto mysterious even to Lord Wellington himself,—the extraordinary allusion which Massena made to it in one of his reports of that epoch: here are nearly his words:

“General La Croix, when scouring the country with his cavalry, fell in with a British division, which he compelled to retire across the Douro, after destroying several hundreds of its number, and capturing six hundred.” The fact is, that after the charge I mentioned, La Croix reconnoitred the defensive position which I took up at the Vouga Bridge, and not having any infantry to support him, made no attempt to force it, but quietly fell back upon his army.

In one of the passages which I have already quoted, your Lordship seems to imagine, that if Massena did not turn the Busaco position on the 27th, it was probably because he conceived me to have arrived at Sardaõ. But besides that circumstances had already made him acquainted with my small number, he had been enabled also to trace my motions up to the 23d of September, when his army was between me and the village you mention, and that I was then moving in an opposite direction.

I had made an attack upon the escort of his heavy artillery on the 20th, at a place called Raanz or Rantz, on the

road from Trancoso to Viseu, and I subsequently moved upon Moimento da Beira, and towards Lamego.

Upon the occasion I allude to, we captured two officers and one hundred men; but, although I was disappointed in my principal object, that of seizing upon the park of artillery, which I am persuaded might have been effected had I been accompanied by a detachment of British dragoons, the affair was in so far fortunate, that according to the account given of it by General Pampalona, who was then in Massena's army, and has since published a memoir of this campaign, it essentially contributed to the defeat of the enemy on the 27th. The escort was obliged to fall back a day's march upon Trancoso; Massena's advance was by this means delayed during two days; and it was precisely in this interval that Lord Wellington was enabled to pass his army from the left to the right of the Mondego, and without molestation to occupy the position of Busaco.

It was after this affair that I was ordered by General Barcelar, who commanded in the north of Portugal, to march to Sardaõ by Oporto, rather than by the more direct but more difficult route of Pedro do Sul—an error which Lord Wellington publicly animadverted upon, but in which he was aware that I had not in any degree participated. Barcelar, in fact, conceived the intention of the order he received to be for the protection of Oporto; and for the first time of his life perhaps, for he was conscientiously obedient, he took upon his responsibility to act upon his own private opinion.

As a matter secondary to that which had induced me to

trouble your Lordship with this very protracted communication, I beg leave to observe to you, that in your mention of the recapture of Coimbra, you made the following mistakes :

1st, That event took place on the 7th, not the 9th of October. 2dly, General Miller's corps was not present in the attack—it only arrived on the following day, and mine alone had been engaged upon the occasion. And, 3rdly, There were very nearly five thousand prisoners taken, including one hundred and fifty-seven officers—not four thousand as you have stated.

I would here conclude this long letter, by requesting your Lordship to make every allowance for the anxiety which had induced me to address it to you ; but on reading it over, I find it incumbent upon me to devote a few lines, at its termination, as a tribute due from me in recollection of the intrinsic good qualities of the militia soldiers who were under my command during the war in the Peninsula. It has happened that the mention I have already made of them, has represented them, as a body, in unfavorable colours ; and such only was the picture I could draw of them at the period then before me ; but from my general experience of the individual characters of the men who composed my corps during the several campaigns that I commanded it, I do not hesitate in my opinion, that no better materials could be found to form excellent soldiers : they were patient when under great privations ; temperate in their habits ;—obedient to their superiors ;—and they possessed at once a constitutional bravery, which only required adequate discipline to be usefully called into action ; and as much, if not more, perhaps, of genuine

patriotism than the natives of any other country in Europe, with the exception only of our own.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord, your Lordship's
most obedient humble servant,

N. TRANT,
Major-general in the Portuguese service,
and late Lieut.-Colonel British.

*Letter from Lord Londonderry to Major-General
Sir N. Trant.*

Holderness House, July 21st, 1828.

Sir,

I am honoured with your letter of this day's date, and I am entirely ready to acknowledge that your statements of the facts you describe may be more authentic than the information I have detailed in the part of my book to which you have alluded, as regards the conduct and services of yourself and corps under your command.

In great military operations, various views will be taken, and different opinions formed; and it is difficult to combine the sentiments of officers on abstract details.

My object has been, without wishing to give offence to any of my brother officers, to collect a general *precis* for future historians of those campaigns which I witnessed; and I conceive I can in no better way answer the object your communication has in view, as bearing upon my History of the Peninsular War, than by publishing the same, together with this answer, in the Appendix to the next edition of my work.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*From Lieutenant-General Sir H. Fane to the Marquis
of Londonderry.*

Avon-Ringwood, 14th August, 1828.

My dear Lord Londonderry,

I have only recently found leisure for reading your
“Narrative of the Peninsular War.”

Taking for granted that, where the proceedings of *named* individuals are detailed, you will be desirous of having any material errors pointed out, I take the liberty of addressing you; and of calling your attention to the following quoted passage in the said work, relative to me.

At page 465, 456, Quarto Edition, you write as follows: “General Fane, with a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, accompanied by several guns and a howitzer, had been passed over the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march along the southern bank of the river, and to destroy, if possible, any boats which he might observe in progress of preparation at Santarem, or elsewhere. He had obeyed these orders, and kept up a long and warm cannonade on the enemy’s incipient flotilla; but his howitzer having been disabled, his round-shot proved of little utility; and, *as no attempt was made with the Congreve rockets, which now for the first time might have been brought into play*, the enemy succeeded in completing the task which they had begun, and in furnishing themselves with ample means to cross the river at pleasure.”

I beg leave to trouble your Lordship with copies of parts of three dispatches of mine, dated the 8th, 12th, and 16th of November, 1810.

Almeirim, 8th November.

My Lord,

I am just returned to this place after having reconnoitred the whole river as high as the mouth of the Zezere.

The number of boats we have been able to discover is as follows :

1st, Below Santarem, in a creek	2
At Santarem	3
&c. &c. &c.	

To Lord Wellington, &c. &c.

Almeirim, 12th November, 1810.

My Lord,

From a spy sent over the river, by my desire, by Colonel Mestre, and from a peasant who escaped from Santarem last night by swimming the river, I learn that there certainly is a large quantity of *materials* collected in the Praça. He states himself to have been made to work daily, and that he was employed in the Praça three days ago; that he saw as many as twelve boats at least, and a great quantity of plank, poles, &c. which, he says, are piled as high as the roofs of the houses.

As the attempt to destroy these will be attended with the destruction of the lower town, I shall take no step until I receive your Lordship's further instructions. The materials cannot be made use of in the present state of the river; therefore no ill consequence can arise from my delaying, &c. &c. &c.

To Lord Wellington, &c. &c.

The reply to this last dispatch, was a desire that I should try what could be done ; and on the 16th of November I wrote as follows :

Almeirim, 16th November, 1810.

My Lord,

I have to make known to you that I, this morning, according to your wishes, endeavoured to set fire to the materials collected by the enemy in Santarem.

We fired *forty-two* 32-pounder carcass rockets ; four or five of which only, (*I think*) fell into the town ; and which did not appear to me to do any damage. At any rate, they entirely failed in effecting my object.

Four of them burst almost immediately after leaving the frame, but fortunately did no injury to any one.

The range of these weapons appears to me to be too wild to be of service, employed as we employed them ; for a town no larger than the lower town of Santarem, is too small an object to be hit with any certainty, as our experience of this morning proved. Fired into a large city full of combustible materials, or amongst crowded shipping, they certainly must have a most terrific effect ; particularly if fired in flights of 30 or 40 together. Going, however, into a town in the state Portuguese towns now are, with little but the walls and roof of any house remaining, I think they will do no good." &c. &c. &c.

To Lord Wellington.

From these extracts, your Lordship will perceive,

1st, That only 5 boats could be *seen* at Santarem ; and that what others might have been there, were in the midst of the town.

2ndly, That the reason why the rockets were not tried *immediately* upon my having the power of trying them, was, an apprehension that I might not meet the approbation of the Commander of the Forces, if I burned the town of Santarem.

And, 3rdly, that as soon as I received his sanction for the attempt, I *did* make it ; and *did* “bring into play the Congreve rockets ;” and made a very full report to the Commander of the Forces of my having so done, and of my opinion relative to these missiles.

The rockets were under the control of Lieutenant Lindsey, of the Royal Artillery ; who was the officer specially appointed for their management.

Under these circumstances, I am at a loss to imagine how your Lordship’s statement, that “*no* attempt was made with the Congreve rockets, when they *might* have been brought into play,” can have been inserted in your Narrative ; and I cannot but think that you will desire to correct this statement, should another edition of your work be called for.

I am, my dear Lord Londonderry,
Very faithfully yours,
H. FANE.

To the Marquess of Londonderry,

&c. &c. &c.

*Answer from Lord Londonderry to Lieutenant-General
Sir H. Fane.*

Wynyard Park, August 17, 1828.

My Dear Sir Henry,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant.

In my advertisement you will observe that the deficiency of my narrative is at once admitted; and under these circumstances, I had hoped it would meet with indulgence, especially from my friends and brother officers.

I am anxious, you may be assured, to correct every error that is pointed out, especially where the proceedings of named individuals are detailed; and I shall send your communications together with this answer, to be inserted in the Appendix to the 3rd edition, 8vo. which is just coming out.

Without entering into discussion, I shall only say, I wrote from the best information I could procure at the time, entirely unauthorised or unassisted by any body in the army. I seldom or ever saw communications addressed by general officers direct to the Commander of the Forces; and the impression at the moment at head-quarters was, that the enemy did avail themselves of the means of crossing the river; and it was in general report, that the Congreve rockets had not been brought into play. However, from your statement, this must be erroneous, and I shall have much pleasure in placing your letter in my humble record before the public.

Believe me, my dear Sir Henry,

Your's very faithfully,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Letter from Mrs. E. Matthews to the Marquis of Londonderry.

7, Cecil Street, Margate, September 14th, 1828.

My Lord,

Under the most proud though painful feelings, I take the liberty of addressing you, and I am sure your Lordship will pardon the intrusion when I explain the motive. Having been informed that your Lordship had lately published an admirable work on the War in the Peninsula, I felt very desirous to peruse it, but could not procure a copy from any of the libraries of this place; but on taking up the *Kent Herald* of the 28th of August last, the first article that met my notice was an extract from that part of your Lordship's publication which treated of the Battle of Albuera, the impressive description of which renewed again in my breast painful feelings, which time had in some measure softened, though not healed. The subject to which I allude, is the notice your Lordship has been pleased to particularly take of the gallant conduct of my nephew, Ensign Thomas of the Buffs, who fell in that battle, bravely defending a colour of his regiment. The little hero was born in Jamaica, and being an orphan, was committed to my care at the age of four years, and was educated and provided for by my husband Doctor Matthews, who was then surgeon of the same regiment. The extract, as I read it, with respect to his endeavouring to preserve the colour by the forfeiture of his life, was not the only act of heroism performed by him on that memorable day, and which your Lordship probably not being aware of, I will take the liberty of mentioning. He had, previously to his regiment's being broken by the French cavalry, taken the command of

Captain Stevens' company, there being no other subaltern but himself attached to the company, and the Captain being wounded at the commencement of the battle. The circumstances are detailed by Captain Stevens in a letter he wrote Doctor Matthews from Olivenza four days after the action, which letter I have now before me, and beg leave to transcribe an extract from it for your Lordship's information, under the impression that it might not be displeasing to you, as the Author of the History of a War which terminated so gloriously to the British name, to be made acquainted with any additional minutia which your Lordship might in some future edition think of sufficient value to be recorded.

The extract runs thus: "I cannot refrain from tears, while I relate the determined bravery of your gallant little subaltern, who fell on the 16th instant, covered with glory; and it must in some measure alleviate the grief I know you will feel at his loss, to know that he fell like a hero. He rallied my company after I was wounded and taken prisoner, crying out, 'Rally on me, men, I will be your pivot. Such glorious conduct must surely meet its reward in that world where all troubles cease, and all grief is at an end. He was buried with all the care possible, by a serjeant and private, the only two survivors out of my company, which consisted of sixty-three when taken into action.'" The colours he died in protecting, it appears he took possession of at the moment the officer who held them was killed, his company being dispersed. This gallant little fellow was not sixteen years of age, when he so bravely sacrificed his life for the honour of his King and country. His loss was, and is still most painfully felt by me, for he was as truly amiable in his private life, as he was gallant and brave in performing his duty to his King and country as a soldier. With many apologies for the

liberty I have taken, which I am sure your Lordship will excuse as the effusion of grateful feelings for the kind manner in which you was pleased to call to notice the remembrance of one so near and dear to me,

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Most obedient,

Humble servant,

ELIZ. A. MATTHEWS.

To the Right Honourable

The Marquis of Londonderry,

&c. &c. &c.

Letter from Mrs. Craufurd, widow of General Robert Craufurd, to Lord Londonderry; and Answer.

My Lord,

I have lately read, with strongly awakened feelings, your Lordship's account of the Peninsular War. It has brought before me the observations and opinions upon it I was used to hear, in a remarkable degree, and placed me where I was when listening to them.

The tribute to the memory of him from whom I heard them has called forth the deepest emotion.—At the close of the book, I am led to address a few words to your Lordship, not that I would presume to trespass on you with a detail of the feelings of an individual almost unknown to you, and after the lapse of a number of years, since the only link between us was broken, but because I am anxious to beg as a favour of your Lordship, that you will have the goodness to direct the publisher in any

future editions of the work to correct the spelling of the name ; which, being peculiar to the Craufurds, to whom my husband belonged, is often mistaken, and is so in your Lordship's work. It is a point of no great moment on most occasions, but very important to myself and to my family on this.

With every grateful and gratified sentiment,

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Obliged Servant,

M. F. CRAUFURD.

Dawlish, 16th October, 1828.

Dear Madam,

I am honoured with your letter. I feel much flattered that my humble testimony to your husband's glorious career should have met your approbation. Those who knew him only as an officer, appreciated, as they deserved, his science, skill, and matchless bravery ; those who regarded him also as a friend, (as I did,) never can forget him. I shall send your note and this answer to my publisher, as the best way of having your wishes complied with.

I have the honour to be, &c.

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*Major-General Sir J. Wilson to the
Marquis of Londonderry.*

2, Somerset Street, Portman Square, 3rd Dec. 1828.

My Lord,

Having only very recently had an opportunity of perusing your Lordship's work entitled "Narrative of the War in Spain and Portugal," I have noticed an error or two respecting myself which I feel extremely anxious to have corrected; and as I now find that the third edition is on the eve of publication, I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship with this view ere the new edition meet the public eye. I am quite confident from your Lordship's high military feeling and sense of justice, that you will readily concur in the correction of a paragraph, which I cannot doubt upon your Lordship's perusal of the following explanation will appear to require it. The paragraph in question, p. 481, is as follows: "In the meanwhile, Trant and Baçellar were on the alert at Coimbra; and Wilson, retreating from Espinhel, threw himself with his corps on the other side of the Mondego. The latter movement was indeed, on one account, a subject of regret to us, inasmuch as it deprived us of our readiest and surest source of intelligence, which could henceforth be obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was made under the impression that a further continuance in Espinhel would be hazardous, and could not be risked." The facts were plainly these: In December, 1810, I occupied Espinhel and other small villages on the Thomar road, with about 1500 militia and a detachment of Portuguese cavalry, the enemy being strongly posted in my front at Cabaços, from which point he had lately compelled me to fall back after two sharp attacks upon my isolated corps,

being then full thirty miles or more from Coimbra, the nearest support. At this time Drouet's reinforcement to Massena's army entered Portugal, taking the Ponte de Marcella road; and as the enemy progressively closed in upon my rear, those in my front moved to give their hands to him. It now became imperative upon me, in order either to avoid being hemmed in by an overwhelming force approaching in my front and rear, or being cut off from General Baçellar's army, of which my division formed the advanced guard, to throw myself across the Mondego; but as soon as the enemy presented his flank, I re-crossed the river, and at Corvo, not far from Espinhel, had an affair with his rear guard, making near a hundred prisoners, and posting myself as near as I could to the latter village, where Drouet's corps halted some days, thus recovering the former line of communication with the grand army by the Zezere and Abrantes; (for these movements I refer to Lord Wellington's dispatches of January 1811;) but my subsequent removal from this line of country a few days afterwards, was wholly independent of what was occurring near me, to the south of the Mondego; it was the result of other causes, which were these: In the mean time Silveira's movements had brought Claparede's division upon him, and the enemy meeting with no serious resistance in his advance, entered Lamego without opposition, Silveira retiring to the right bank of the Douro. The enemy's rapid advance upon Lamego necessarily gave General Baçellar considerable alarm for the safety of Oporto and the line of the Douro, the defence of which was one of the principal objects committed to his charge. He, therefore, ordered Miller's division and mine to hasten to Silveira's support, expecting that some stand would be made in a country full of positions, in order to cover

Lamego, and enable us to co-operate with him ; but before we could arrive, he had crossed the Douro at Pezo de Regoa with precipitation.

From this simple statement of facts it will appear evident—

1st, That when I threw myself across the Mondego, it was to avoid being crushed by a superior force closing upon me in front and rear, and that it was not then, the inconvenience alluded to by your Lordship could have been felt; for having immediately afterwards re-crossed the river, the former communication with head-quarters was presently restored.

2ndly, That when some days after this, my distant removal from the south of the Mondego to the Douro took place, thereby suspending the more direct communication with head-quarters, it was the consequence of positive orders I received to move in an opposite direction against the enemy, who was then seriously menacing the line of the Lower Douro, and to whom the glove had hastily been thrown down in that quarter, without any adequate exertion having been made to redeem it. In neither the one case nor the other did I then act from any impression of my own ; but from an unavoidable necessity caused by the movements of the enemy, as well as in conformity with the orders I received ; and if in this there was any thing that formed a subject of regret to the army, it is to the causes I have just endeavoured to explain, and to these alone they ought to be attributed.

I have the honor to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

Humble Servant,

JOHN WILSON,

Major-General.

*The Marquis of Londonderry to Major-General
Sir J. Wilson.*

Wynyard Park, Dec. 15th, 1828.

Sir,

I am honored with your letter, and shall have much satisfaction in inserting it in the Appendix of the 3rd edition of my work which is now coming out.

I had much rather give your full explanation, than proceed to any partial correction of my own. My wish has been only to record events *as far as* I was acquainted with them, and I feel much pleasure in any explanation or elucidation being afforded by the parties concerned.

I have the honor to be,

Your obedient Servant,

VANE LONDONDERRY.


END OF THE CORRESPONDENCE.

(PLAN OF
the Action near
(CORUNA)

Jan^y 16th 1809.

LIEUT GEN^l SIR JOHN MOORE,

Commander in Chief



REFERENCE

L. Gen. Sir D. Baird	1 M. Gen. L. W. Bessincks B ^d	14 th 42 nd 50 th	
	2 M. Gen. Manningham's B ^d	1 st (Royal), 3 rd B. 26 28 2 ^d B ⁿ	
	3 M. Gen. Ward's	1 st B ⁿ 1 st C ^o 3 rd B ⁿ	
L. Gen. Hope	4 M. Gen. Leith's	31 st 50 th 76 th	
	5 M. Gen. Hill's	2 Queens 5 th 14 th B ⁿ	
	6 Col. Crauford's	32 36 71 92	
		L. Gen. Fraser	7 M. Gen. Beresford's
8 B ^r Gen. Fane's			36 79 82
Reserve			
M. G. Paget	9	20 52 95	
	10 B. Gen. Disney	28 91	

- A 20th, 62nd, 95th
- B 28, 91
- C M. Gen. L. W. Bessincks B^d
- D M. G. Manningham's
- E E. M. Gen. Ward's
- F M. Gen. Leith's
- G M. Gen. Hill's
- H Places of Embarkation on the Night of 16
- I Places of D^o 17th
- K Battery open to the Enemy against the Shipping on the Afternoon of the 17th

Memorandum

The 50th Reg^t was relieved during the Action by the Guards and the 81st was in the like manner relieved by the 59th.
Original Position of the British Troops
Position of the French
Forward movement of the Troops repelling the attack of the Enemy.

PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO;

under the command of

By the British Army, under the

Command of LORD GOWER, and the

inferior of the French Army, under the

Command of

General D'ARTIGAS.

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From Aveiro

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
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
From Coimbra

From Coimbra



REFERENCE.

- A. Arrival of the Right Column of the Army from Oporto.
- B. Arrival of the Left Column from the side of Aveiro.
- C. Passage of the Douro by a point of the Hill under the Barricade of the Ferry of Avintes.
- D. Passage of the Douro by the first foot bridge which was the first Corps that crossed near the Ferry of Avintes under the Barricade.
- E. Buildings occupied by the British to cover the Passage of the other Troops.
- F. Ferry where the remains of the Hills were crossed by the Douro under the Barricade.
- G. Attack of the Enemy upon the Troops which first crossed the River.
- H. Position of the French Artillery.
- K. Battery opened against the right Bank of the Enemy, attacked.
- L. Advance of the Troops under the Barricade.
- M. Passage of the Troops under the Barricade in boats brought from the opposite shore the bridge having been burnt by the Enemy the night before.
- N. Advance of the Troops under the Barricade.
- O. Retreat of the French.
- P. Pursuit of British Cavalry and Light Infantry.




Plan
 of the
BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

REFERENCE

- A Shows the first position of the two Armies on the Night of the 27th before the Hill was attacked that Night.
- B The position of the two Armies when the Hill was attacked at 5 O'Clock in the Morning of the 28th
- C The Situation of the two Armies when the Enemy made an attack on our Right and Left Flanks.
- D (The furthest Advance of the Guards in pursuit of the defeated Enemy after his Attack as shewn by C Also the Charge of B. Genl Ansons Brigade of Cavalry against two Solid columns of the Enemy which were advancing against the Hill as shown by C.
- E B. Genl Fines Cavalry ready to Charge the Enemy should he advance to attack the Hill as shown by C.
- F The 1 Batt^o 45th Advancing to cover the retreat of the Guards.
- G The Light Bodies of Cavalry advancing to support the 45th


Sketch of
Part of the Ground about
FUENTES, AND VILLA FORMOSA,
Occupied by the Allied Army
 On the 5th and 6th of May, 1811.



REFERENCE

- A British Infantry
- B D^o Cavalry
- C Portuguese Infantry
- D D^o Cacadores
- E British Rifles
- F Breastworks and Epaulements against the Enemy's Cavalry
- G Portuguese Watch Tower
- H Enemy's Cavalry
- I D^o Light Infantry
- K D^o Main Body





PLAN of BADAJOZ and its ENVIRONS,
Invested March 17th 1812, and Carried by Storm on the night of April 6th
By the Allied Army, Commanded by
GENERAL THE EARL OF WELLINGTON, &c. &c.

EXPLANATION.

- | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1 Bastion S ^t Vincent | 6 Bastion S ^t Roch | 11 Gate of Merida | 16 Ravelin of S ^t Roch |
| 2 D ^o S ^t Joseph | 7 D ^o of the Trinity | 12 D ^o of the Trinity | 17 Tête de Pont |
| 3 D ^o S ^t Jacob | 8 D ^o S ^t Peter | 13 D ^o of the Pillar | 18 Fort S ^t Cristoval |
| 4 D ^o S ^t John | 9 Castle | 14 Fort Pardaleras | 19 Remains of the Old Lines of Weyvik |
| 5 D ^o S ^{ta} Maria | 10 Palm Gate | 15 Fort Picurina | 20 Tower of S ^{ta} Engracia |

AAA. Works thrown up by the Allied Army for carrying on the Siege

- | | |
|--|---|
| a Battery of 12 Twenty four P ^o to breach the Right Face of the Bastion N ^o 7. | d Enfilading Battery of the Right Face of the Bastion attacked. |
| b Co-operating Breaching Battery to silence the Flank of N ^o 6. | e D ^o Flank of N ^o 8. |
| c Enfilading Battery of the Ditch of the Bastion attacked. | f D ^o Right Face of the Redoubt N ^o 16. |

Plan
of
CIDAD RODRIGO,
describing its Siege by the Allies Aug. 1812.
GENERAL THE EARL OF WELLINGTON,
Commander in Chief.



REMARKS. 1812.

January 7th Lord Wellington Reconquered Ciudad de Rodrigo
 8th The Place Invested & at night the Redoubt Bonaud & carried by Storm & a halcyon made in it.
 9th at night The Batteries (C) & (D) to contain 23 Guns and the first parallel commenced.
 10th at night The Convent of St. Domingos (E) carried by Storm & a halcyon made in it.
 The second parallel commenced by the approach.
 11th day The enemy made a sortie & destroyed part of the works but night at 1 PM the batteries opened.
 at night The Convent of St. Francisco (G) and the Salubre carried by Storm.
 12th at night The advanced battery on the left (H) for seven Guns began.
 13th at night The batteries for seven guns on the left opened.
 14th at night The batteries for seven guns on the left opened.
 15th at night The batteries for seven guns on the left opened.

REFERENCES.

- 1 Salamanca Gate
 - 2 Church of St. Domingos
 - 3 Church of St. Domingos
 - 4 Gate
 - 5 Retrenchment made light
 - 6 Garrison during the Siege
 - 7 Convent of St. Domingos
 - 8 Cathedral
 - 9 Convent of St. Domingos
 - 10 Church of St. Domingos
 - 11 Church of St. Domingos
 - 12 House of Instruction for Boys, Children.
 - 13 Works constructed by the English.
 - 14 Works constructed by the English.
 - 15 Works constructed by the English.
- On the Height of a Redoubt intended*
- NOTE.**
 In the three batteries originally intended for the guns only 25 24 pounders were mounted, and the seven guns for the advanced battery were supplied from those 25.
 The Works of the English for the reduction of the place are washed away.
 Those which the French used for the same purpose are washed away.
 The works ground on the 15th June and the Spanish Garrison capitulated on the 12th July 1812.

No. II.

State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, and Royal Engineers,
Head Quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1809.

	Officers.						Serjeants.			Drumrs.			Rank and File.				Alterations since last.		Civil Branch.								
	Lt. Colonels.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Asst. Surgeons.	Staff Serjeants.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Total.	Horses.	Mules.	Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred.	Commissary and Paymaster.	Clerks of Stores.	Conductors of Stores.	Artificers.
British	Artillery	3	..	10	11	5	..	8	1	5	1	..	9	283	59	286	628	2	6	12	22
	Drivers	1	6	..	4	7	..	6	3	1	1	244	21	192	457	529	146
German	Artillery	..	1	5	12	1	..	7	..	5	3	1	2	179	27	102	308	1
	Drivers	1	..	1	141	6	24	171	182	51
Engineers	1	..	3	8	2	25	1	..	26
Wn. Th. attached to Artillery	1	2	..	1	5	4	5	1	56	14	77	247
Waggon Train	2	3	1	5	62	20	12	94	10
Total..	4	1	20	41	6	5	33	6	27	7	2	13	990	148	693	1931	711	197	10	1	2	6	12	22

No. VI.

State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, Royal Engineers, &c.
Head Quarters Placencia, 15th July, 1809.

	Officers.				Serjts.			Drmrs.		Rank and File.						Alterations.						Civil Branch.							
	Lieut. Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Staff.	Staff Serjeants.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Total.	Horses.	Mules.	Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred.	Promoted.	Reduced.	Com. and P. Mr.	Clerks of Stores.	Conductors.	Artificers.
British { Artillery	3	..	10	12	5	..	12	1	1	4	1	5	338	69	220	627	3	8	17	49
British { Drivers	2	6	1	4	10	..	2	5	349	38	65	452	494	81
German { Artillery	..	1	5	12	1	..	9	2	1	3	1	2	182	25	101	308
German { Drivers	1	1	157	3	10	170	196	36
Engineers	1	..	4	12	2	24	3	..	27
Wn. Tn. attached to the Artillery
Waggon Train	..	1	3	7	3	2	23	2	237	13	41	291	139
Total..	4	2	24	49	10	6	57	4	4	14	2	7	1287	151	437	1875	829	117	3	8	17	49

VIII.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Talavera de la Reyna, 27th July, 1809.

Killed.		Wounded.			Missing.	
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.
Capt. Fordyce, D. A. A. G.	81st Regiment.	Lieut. Hembruck	1st Lt. Dns. K. G. L.	Severely	Capt. Poole	} 1st Bn. Detachts. 52d Regiment 91st Regiment 79th Do.
Lieut. Col. Ross	Coldstream Guards	Capt. Boothby	Royal Engineers.	Do.	Walsh	
Capt. Lodge	31st Regt. 2d Bn.	Capt. and Adj. Bryan	1st Bn. Coldstr. Gds.	Do.	Lieut. Cameron	
Lieut. Graydon	88th Do. 1st Do.	Lieut. Popham	29th Reg.	Do.		
M'Carthy	Do. Do.	Capt. Coleman	31st Do. 2d Bn.	Do.		
M'Dougall	91st Regt.	Lieut. George Beamish	Do.	Do.		
Ensign La Serre	87th Do. 2d Do.	Ensign Gamble	Do.	Slightly		
		Soden	Do.	Do.		
		Lieut. Col. Guard	45th Do. 1st Bn.	Severely		
		Capt. Woolf	60th Do. 5th Do.	Do.		
		Major Coghlan	61st Do. 1st Do.	Do.		
		Capt. M'Crea	87th Do. 2d Do.	Do.		
		Somersall	Do.	Slightly		
		Lieut. Kavenagh	Do.	Do.		
		Barnall	Do.	Severely		
		Kingston	Do.	Do.		
		Johnson	Do.	Do.		
		Carrol	Do.	Do.		
		Ensign Moore	Do.	Slightly		
		Knox	Do.	Severely		
		Butler	Do.	Do.		
		Capt. Daring	Rifle Corps, K. G. L.	Slightly		
		Lieut. Holle	Do.	Severely		
		Adj. Deliris	7th Line Bn. K. G. L.	Do.		

No. XI.

CONTINUATION.

Wounded.			Wounded.		
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Captain Goodman	61st Regiment 1st Bn.	Slightly	Major Bodecker	1st Line Bn. K. G. L.	Severely
Hartley	Do.	Do.	Captain Marshall	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant M ^c Lean	Do.	Do.	Captain Saffe	1st Line Bn. K. G. L.	Slightly
Trench	Do.	Do.	Petersdorf	Do.	Do.
Collins	Do.	Severely	Lieutenant Goeben Senior	Do.	Severely
Givin	Do.	Slightly	Ern. Hodenberg	Do.	Do.
Ensign Brackenbury	Do.	Do.	Fk. Hodenberg	Do.	Do.
Adjutant Drew	Do.	Severely	Saffe	Do.	Slightly
Captain Kelly	66th Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly	Schlutter Senior	Do.	Do.
Stewart	Do.	Severely	Ensign Allen	Do.	Do.
Adams Bt. Lt. Col.	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Colonel Brauns	2nd Line Bn. K. G. L.	Severely
Lieutenant Morris	Do.	Do.	Major Belleville	Do.	Slightly
Dudgeon	Do.	Do.	Captain Breyman	Do.	Severely
Humbly	Do.	Do.	Heldrill	Do.	Slightly
Steele	Do.	Do.	Sharnboust	Do.	Severely
Shewbridge	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Buerman	Do.	Do.
Morgan	Do.	Do.	Wenckstern	Do.	Do.
Ensign Cotter	Do.	Do.	Wessell	Do.	Do.
M ^c Carthy	Do.	Slightly	Wick	Do.	Do.
Captain Summerfield	83rd Do. 2nd Do.	Do.	Holle	Do.	Do.
Reynolds	Do.	Leg amputated	Ensign Tinch	Do.	Slightly
Lieutenant Nicholson	Do.	Severely	Schniat	Do.	Severely
Baldwyn	Do.	Slightly	Billeb	Do.	Do.
Johnson	Do.	Do.	Blumenhagen	Do.	Do.
Abell	Do.	Severely	Captain Hamelberg	5th Line Bn. K. G. L.	Do.
Pyne	Do.	Slightly	Gerber	Do.	Slightly
Ensign Boggie	Do.	Severely	Lieutenant Linsingen	Do.	Severely
Carey	Do.	Do.	During	Do.	Do.
Lettoller	Do.	Slightly	Ensign Brandes	Do.	Slightly
Adjutant Brahan	Do.	Do.	Kobler	Do.	Do.
Major Gough	87th Do. 2nd Do.	Severely	Major Berger	7th Line Bn. K. G. L.	Slightly
Lieutenant Rogers	Do.	Slightly	Lieutenant Volger	Do.	Do.
Ensign Pepper	Do.	Do.	Freytag	Do.	Severely
Captain Brown	88th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Ensign Offen	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Whittle	Do.	Do.	Captain Allen	23rd Lt. Dragoons	} Wounded and Missing
Ensign Whiteiaw	Do.	Do.	Drake	Do.	
Major Ross	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Anderson	Do.	
Captain M ^c Pherson	38th Regiment	Do.	Captain Leckey B. Major	45th Foot 1st Bn.	} Missing
Bradby	35th Do.	Do.	Ensign Reeves	48th Do. 2nd Do.	
Chancellor	28th Do.	Slightly	Lieutenant Shipley	97th Do. Do.	
Lieutenant Gilbert	38th Do.	Do.			
M ^c Beth	28th Do.	Severely			
Fullerton	42nd Do.	Do.			
Munroe	38th Do.	Slightly			
Brown	42nd Do.	Do.			
	43rd Do.	Do.			

No. X.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Talavera de la Reyna, 28th July, 1809.

Killed.		Wounded.			Wounded.		
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Major Gen. M. Kenzie		Major General Hill		Slightly	Lieutenant Kirwan	7th Foot 2nd Bn.	Severely
Br. Gen. Langworth		Brigr. Gen. A. Campbell		Do.	Muter	Do.	Do.
Captain Beckett (Bde. Ms.)	Coldstream Guards	H. Campbell		Severely not dangerous	Adjutant Page	Do.	Slightly
Gardner Do.	43rd Foot	Capt. Whittingham	13th Lt. Dns. D. A. Q. N. G.	Slightly	Lieut. Col. Drummond	24th Do. 2nd Do.	Severely
Lieut. King	23rd Lt. Dragoons	Blair 91st Regiment	Brigade Major	Severely	Major Popham	Do.	Do.
Power	Do.	Bouverie Cold. Gds.	A. D. Camps to Lieut. Gen. }	Slightly	Captain Collis	Do.	Do.
Wyatt	British Artillery	Burgh 92nd Regt. }	Sir A. Wellesley }	Slightly	Evans	Do.	Do.
Ensign Parker	Coldstream Guards	Zerisen 1st Le. Bn.	A. D. C. to B. G. Langworth	Severely	Lieutenant Vardy	Do.	Slightly
Captain Walker	1st Bn. 3rd Guards	Craig (Sicilian Rt.)	Do. to Lt. Gl. Sherbrooke	Slightly	Ensign Grant	Do.	Severely
Buchanan	Do.	Captain Brice	3rd Dn. Guards.	Severely	Skeene	Do.	Do.
Dalrymple	Do.	Colonel Hawker	14th Lt. Dragoons	Slightly	Johnson	Do.	Do.
Ensign Ram	Do.	Captain Chapman	Do.	Severely	Jessamin	Do.	Do.
Adjutant Irby	Do.	Hawker	Do.	Do.	Adjutant Topp	Do.	Slightly
Lieutenant Beaufoy	2nd Do. 7th Foot	Lieutenant Ellis	Do.	Do.	Captain Gauntlett	29th Regiment	Severely
Major F. Orpen	61st Do. 1st Bn.	Wainman	Do.	Slightly	Newbold	Do.	Slightly
Captain H. James	Do.	Smith	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Stannus	Do.	Severely
Lieutenant Hemus	Do.	Bence	16th Do. Do.	Do.	Leslie	Do.	Do.
Lieut. Col. Gordon	83rd Do. 2nd Bn.	Capt. Howard	23rd Do. Do.	Severely	Stanhope	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Dahman	Do.	Frankland	Do.	Do.	Nicholson	Do.	Slightly
Montgomery	Do.	Lord W. Russell	Do.	Slightly	Captain Nichools	31st Do. 2nd Do.	Do.
Hood	Do.	Cornet Dodwell	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Girdlestone	Do.	Do.
Captain Blake	88th Do. 1st. Do.	Lieutenant Poten	1st Do. K. G. L.	Severely	A. Beamish	Do.	Severely
Wersabe	1st Line Bn. K. G. L.	Cornet Tueto	Do.	Slightly	Captain Colquhoun	10th Do. 1st Do.	Slightly
Lieut. Hy. Hodenburg	Do.	Lieut. Colonel Framingham	Royal British Artillery	Do.	Major Gwynn	45th Do. Do.	Severely
Evert	5th Line Bn. K. G. L.	Captain Taylor	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Cole	Do.	Do.
Dachenhausen	Do.	Baynes	Do.	Do.	Lieut. Col. Donelan	18th Do. Do.	Do.
Hemelman	Do.	Lieutenant Stanway	Royal Engineers	Do.	Major Marston	Do.	Slightly
		Captain Todd	Royal Staff Corps	Do.	Captain Wood	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Shanahan	Do.	Do.	French	Do.	Do.
		Lieut. Col. Stibbert		Severely	Lieutenant Drought	Do.	Severely
		Sir W. Sheridan		Do.	Page	Do.	Do.
		Captain Millman		Do.	Cheslyn	Do.	Do.
		Christie		Do.	Gill	Do.	Slightly
		Collier		Slightly	Cuthbertson	Do.	Do.
		Wood		Do.	Ensign Vandermeulen	Do.	Severely
		Jenkinson		Severely	Lieutenant Johnson	48th Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly
		Ensign Sandilands		Do. not dangerous	Ensign Renny	Do.	Severely
		Lieut. Col. Gordon	1st Bn. 3rd Guards	Slightly	Major Kingscote	53rd Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly
		Major Fotheringham	Do.	Do.	Captain Stowell	Do.	Do.
		Captain Giels	Do.	Do.	Garliffe B. Major	60th Do. 5th Do.	Do.
		Ensign Aitchison	Do.	Do.	Andrew	Do.	Do.
		Towers	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant Zuhlke	Do.	Severely
		Scott	Do.	Do.	Ritter	Do.	Do.
		Lieut. Col. Muter	3rd Foot or Buffs	Severely	Mitchell	Do.	Do.
		Major Drummond (Bt. Lt. Col.)	Do.	Slightly	Ensign Altenstein	Do.	Do.
					Captain Furnace	61st Do. 1st Do.	Slightly
					Laing	Do.	Do.

No. XV.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. on the Advance of the French Army towards the Position of Busaco, on the 25th and 26th September, 1810.

Regiments.	Killed.						Wounded.						Missing.						Total.							
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cav.	Horses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cav.	Horses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cav.	Horses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cav.	Horses.		
General Staff						1													1							
14th Light Dragoons						1				1	2	4							3	7				1	5	12
16th Do. Do.						2		1				4							4	3		1			4	9
1st Hussars, K. G. L.						2				1	3	4											1		3	6
Total British Loss						5	1	1		2	5	12							7	10	1	1		2	12	27
Portuguese Army											3														3	
General Total						5	1	1		2	8	12							7	10	1	1		2	15	27

Captain Hoey, 99th Regiment, D. A. A. G. severely } wounded.
 Cornet Keating, 16th Light Dragoons, slightly }

No. XVII.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810.

Killed.		Wounded.			Wounded.		
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Major Smith	45th Foot 1st Bn.	Lieutenant Colonel Barclay	52nd Foot	Slightly	Major Prior	1st Regt. Ports.	Slightly
Captain Urquhart	Do.	C. Campbell	70th Do. A. A. G.	Do.	Ensign J. M. de Pantos	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Ouseley	Do.	Captain Ld. Fitz Somerset	43rd Do.	A.D.C. to Ld. Wellington, Do.	B. de Senio	Do.	Do.
Ensign Williams	74th Do.	G. Preston	40th Do.	Do. to Sir B. Spencer Do.	Captain F. Auzabis	8th Do. Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Henry Johnson	88th Do. 1st Bn.	Lieutenant Mair	7th Do. 1st Bn.	Do.	Lieutenant V. Matthias	Do.	Do.
		Lindesay	9th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Ensign Jno. A. Rodrigo	Do.	Do.
		Captain Meacham	24th Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly	Manuel Pedro	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Miller	38th Do. 2nd Do.	Do.	J. Manuel	Do.	Do.
		Major Gwynn	45th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Felix Antonio	9th Do. Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Harris	Do.	Do.	Captain P. Jose	16th Do. Do.	Do.
		Tyler	Do.	Do.	Ensign J. Maria	Do.	Do.
		Anderson	Do.	Slightly	Lieutenant J. Galderio	19th Do.	Do.
		Major Napier	50th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Colonel Champion	21st Do.	Do.
		Captain G. Napier	52nd Do. 1st Do.	Slightly	Captain S. Burgess	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant C. Wood	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant J. Machell	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Col. Williams	60th Do.	Do.	Ensign J. Montero	Do.	Do.
		Captain Andrews	Do.	Do.	J. Alberto	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Joice	Do.	Severely	Botello Cas	3rd Cassidores	Do.
		Eberstein	Do.	Do.	Segurada	Do.	Do.
		Franhein	Do.	Slightly	J. Chrostimo	Do.	Do.
		Cargill	74th Do.	Severely	Captain J. Bernardo	4th Do.	Do.
		Captain Douglas	79th Do. 1st Do.	Do.	Lieutenant A. Queros	Do.	Do.
British		Lieutenant Colthurst	83rd Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly	J. D. Vasconcella	Do.	Do.
4th Foot	Captain W. M'Intosh	Major Silver	88th Do. 1st Do.	Severely (since dead)	Ensign Feliziamo	Do.	Do.
Do.	Do. De Souza	M'Gregor	Do.	Do.	Captain L. Homm	6th Do. Do.	Do.
66th Foot	Do. Charles Fox	Captain M'Dermott	Do.	Do.			
62nd Do.	Do. Salisbury	Dansey	Do.	Slightly			
	Ensign Castes	Bury	Do.	Do.			
	Das Novas Franci	Lieutenant Fitzpatrick	Do.	Severely			
		Nickle	Do.	Do.			
		Ensign Leonard	Do.	Severely			
		Lieutenant During	1st Line Bn. K. G. L.	Slightly			
		Major Wurmb	Do.	Do.			
		Lieutenant Stolte	Det. 2nd Lt. Do.	Severely			
		Captain J. Cameron	79th Regiment 1st Bn.	Missing			

No. XVII.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810.

Killed.		Wounded.			Wounded.		
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Major Smith	45th Foot 1st Bn.	Lieutenant Colonel Barclay	52nd Foot	Slightly	Major Prior	1st Regt. Ports.	Slightly
Captain Urquhart	Do.	C. Campbell	70th Do. A. A. G.	Do.	Ensign J. M. de Pantos	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Ouseley	Do.	Captain Ld. Fitz Somerset	13rd Do.	A.D.C. to Ld. Wellington, Do.	B. de Senio	Do.	Do.
Ensign Williams	74th Do.	G. Preston	40th Do.	Do. to Sir B. Spencer Do.	Captain F. Auzabis	8th Do. Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Henry Johnson	88th Do. 1st Bn.	Lieutenant Mair	7th Do. 1st Bn.	Do.	Lieutenant V. Matthias	Do.	Do.
		Lindesay	9th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Ensign Jno. A. Rodrigo	Do.	Do.
		Captain Meacham	24th Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly	Manuel Pedro	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Miller	38th Do. 2nd Do.	Do.	J. Manuel	Do.	Do.
		Major Gwynn	45th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Felix Antonio	9th Do. Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Harris	Do.	Do.	Captain P. Jose	16th Do. Do.	Do.
		Tyler	Do.	Do.	Ensign J. Maria	Do.	Do.
		Anderson	Do.	Slightly	Lieutenant J. Galderio	19th Do.	Do.
		Major Napier	50th Do. 1st Do.	Severely	Colonel Champion	21st Do.	Do.
		Captain G. Napier	52nd Do. 1st Do.	Slightly	Captain S. Burgess	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant C. Wood	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant J. Machell	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Col. Williams	60th Do.	Do.	Ensign J. Montero	Do.	Do.
		Captain Andrews	Do.	Do.	J. Alberto	Do.	Do.
		Lieutenant Joice	Do.	Severely	Botello Cas	3rd Cassidores	Do.
		Eberstein	Do.	Do.	Segurada	Do.	Do.
		Franhein	Do.	Slightly	J. Chrostimo	Do.	Do.
		Cargill	74th Do.	Severely	Captain J. Bernardo	4th Do.	Do.
British		Captain Douglas	79th Do. 1st Do.	Do.	Lieutenant A. Queros	Do.	Do.
4th Foot	1st Regt. Portuguese	Lieutenant Colthurst	83rd Do. 2nd Do.	Slightly	J. D. Vasconcella	Do.	Do.
Do.	Do.	Major Silver	88th Do. 1st Do.	Severely (since dead)	Ensign Feliziamo	Do.	Do.
66th Foot	16th Do. Do.	M'Gregor	Do.	Do.	Captain L. Homm	5th Do. Do.	Do.
Do.	Do.	Captain M'Dermott	Do.	Do.			
62nd Do.	21st Do. Do.	Dansey	Do.	Slightly			
Ensign		Bury	Do.	Do.			
Das Novas Franci	4th Cassidores	Lieutenant Fitzpatrick	Do.	Severely			
		Nickle	Do.	Do.			
		Ensign Leonard	Do.	Severely			
		Lieutenant Daring	1st Line Bn. K. G. L.	Slightly			
		Major Wurnb	Do.	Do.			
		Lieutenant Stolte	Det. 2nd Lt. Do.	Severely			
		Captain J. Cameron	79th Regiment 1st Bn.	Missing			

No. XVIII.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in skirmishing with the Enemy's Advance on the 4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th October, 1810.

Regiments.	Killed.						Wounded.						Missing.						Total.																		
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Horses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Horses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Horses.										
3rd Dragoon Guards																			1										1								
1st or Royal Dragoons								1										1	1	1								1	2								
14th Light Dragoons															1	1										2	2	2		3	3	2					
16th Do. Do.						1	1	3	2							11	13	15		4	4	6	2						16	18	24						
1st Hussars K. G. L.								1							5	5	1										1		5	5	3						
1st or Royal Dragoons								4						1		1	2			4	4	4						1	4	5	10						
16th Light Dragoons						1	1	5							3	3	1			4	4	4							8	8	10						
1st Hussars K. G. L.						1	1	12						1		8	9	7								1	16	17	4	2	25	29	23				
Total.						3	3	26	2					2		28	32	26			1						1	30	32	23	4	1		3	61	69	75

16th Light Dragoons, Captain Murray, slightly.
Do. Sweetenham, severely.
1st Hussars, K. G. L. Aly, slightly.
Linsingen, Do.
1st or Royal Dragoons, Lieutenant Carden (missing.)

No. XIX.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in an affair with the Enemy near Sobral, 14th October, 1810.

Regiments.	Killed.						Wounded.						Missing.						Total.													
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cavalry.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cavalry.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cavalry.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Qr. Mrs. of Cavalry.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.
General Staff	1
21th Foot 2nd Bn.	1	1
50th Do. 1st Do.	2	2	
60th Do. 5th Do.	1	6	4	1	..	10
71st Do. 1st Do.	7	4	23	4	..	30	
Dets. 95th Do. 3rd Do.	2	..	1	7	1	9		
1st Line Bn. K. G. L.	1	1		
2nd Do. Do.	4	4		
5th Do. Do.	1	1		
7th Do. Do.	2	2		
Total..	1	9	1	2	4	46	4	1	2	5	59		

General Staff, Captain Douglass Mercer, 3rd Foot Guards, acting A. D. C. to Lt. Gl. Sir B. Spencer, slightly.
 95th Foot, 3rd Battalion, Lieutenant Feles, severely.
 5th Line Battalion, K.G.L. Muller, Do.

No. XXI.

Return of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, on the 24th July, 1810.

Killed.		Wounded.			Missing.		
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Lieut. Col. Edward Hull	43rd Foot 1st Bn.	Lieut. Shaw 43rd Rt. A. D. C. }		Slightly	Lt. J. M'Culloch	95th Regt. 1st Bn.	taken prisoner
Captain E. Cameron	Do.	to B. General Crawford }		Severely			
Lieutenant John Nason	Do.	Lieutenant Blatchford	14th Light Dragoons	Slightly			
D. M'Leod	95th Do. 1st Do.	Captain P. Deshon	43rd Regnt. 1st Bn.	Do.			
		Thomas Lloyd	Do.	Do.			
		W. F. P. Napier	Do.	Severely			
		J. W. Hull	Do.	Slightly			
		Lieutenant George Johnstone	Do.	Severely			
		J. P. Hopkins	Do.	Slightly			
		H. Harvest	Do.	Severely			
		James M'Dearmid	Do.	Slightly			
		John Stephenson	Do.	Severely			
		Roger Frederick	Do.	Do.			
		Major Henry Ridewood	52nd Do. 1st Do.	Slightly			
		Captain R. Campbell	Do.	Do.			
		James Creagh	95th Do. 1st Do.	Severely (since dead)			
		Samuel Mitchell	Do.	Do.			
		1st Lieut. H. G. Smith	Do.	Slightly			
		Mathias Pratt	Do.	Severely			
		Reilly	Do.	Do.			
		Coane	Do.	Do.			
		T. Smith	Do.	Do.			
		2nd Lieut. George Simmons	Do.	Do.			
			3rd Cassidores	{ One Officer, rank and name unknown			

No. XXVI.

Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded
from the 6th to 15th March, 1811.

Date.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
14th March, 1811	Lieutenant Thomas Gifford	52nd Foot 1st Bn.	
15th March	Sawatzky	60th Do. 5th Do.	
	Hepenstall	88th Do. 1st Do.	
		Wounded.	
11th March, 1811	Lieutenant Hopwood	95th Regt. 1st Bn.	Severely
	Ensign Jose Joaquim Figeo	3rd Cacadores	Do.
	Lieutenant Clark	5th Foot, 2nd Bn.	Slightly
	March	45th Do. 1st Do.	
	Cross	52nd Do. 1st Do.	
	Ensign Lifford	Do. Do.	
12th Do.	Adjutant Winterbottom	Do. Do.	
	Lieutenant Hippenstall	88th Do. Do.	Slightly
	Captain Bogue	94th Do.	Severely
	Lieutenant Beckwith	95th Do. 1st Do.	
	Captain Chapman	95th Do. 1st Do.	
	Waldron	11th of the Line	
	Ensign Jose Felicissimo	4th Cacadores	
	Jose P. de Carto	6th Do.	
	Captain Napier	43rd Foot 1st Bn.	Severely
	Dalyell	Do.	Slightly
	Ensign Carroll	Do.	Severely
	Captain George Napier	52nd Do. 1st Do.	Do.
	William Mien	Do.	Slightly
14th Do.	William Jones	Do.	Severely
	Lieutenant Wynne	60th Do. 5th Do.	Slightly
	Crabb	74th Do.	Do.
	Major Stewart	95th Do. 1st Bn.	Severely
	Lieutenant Strode	Do.	Do.
	Joaquim Manuel	1st Cacadores	
15th Do.	1st Lieutenant M'Culloch	95th Do. 1st Bn.	Severely
	2nd Do. Kincaid	Do.	Slightly

No. XXVIII.

Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded on the 3rd of May, 1811.

Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
	Killed.	Wounded.		
Lieutenant Cowsell	71st Regt. 1st Bn.	Captain Krauchenberg	1st Hussars, K. G. L.	Slightly
Captain Imlach	79th Do. 1st Do.	M'Donald	42nd Regt. 2nd Bn.	Severely
		Lieutenant Rudkin	50th Do. 1st Do.	Slightly
		Ensign Grant	Do.	Do.
		Lt. Col. Williams	60th Do. 5th Do.	Severely
		Duchestalette	Do.	Slightly
		Captain M'Intyre	71st Do. 1st Do.	Severely
		Lieutenant Fox	Do.	Do.
		M'Crea	Do.	Slightly
		Ensign Kearns	Do.	Dangerously
		Adjutant Law	Do.	Slightly
		Lieutenant Calder	79th Do. 1st Do.	Do.
		Ensign Brown	Do.	Severely
		Lieutenant Hill	92nd Do. 1st Do.	Do.
		Uniacke	95th Do. 3rd Do.	
		Captain de Barros	6th Cacadores	
		Lieutenant de Moratto	Do.	
		Manuel Joaquim	Do.	
		J. de St. Anna	Do.	
		Ensign F. de Roxa	Do.	
		Antonio Pinto	Do.	
		Adjutant B. de Magelhomes	Do.	

No. XXIX.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of His Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. on the 5th May, 1811.

Regiments.	Killed.										Wounded.										Missing.										Total.																					
	Gen. Staff.	Colonels.	Lt. Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drumrs.	Rk. & File.	Total.	Horses.	Gen. Staff.	Colonels.	Lt. Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drumrs.	Rk. & File.	Total.	Horses.	Gen. Staff.	Colonels.	Lt. Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drumrs.	Rk. & File.	Total.	Horses.													
General Staff											1	1	3												2														2													
Horse Artillery											1	1	3												1	3													2	6												
Foot Do.										1	4	5	9												18	21	21												22	26	30											
1st Royal Dragoons											4	4	18												36	37	24												40	41	42											
14th Light Do.											3	3	5												21	32	22												27	38	30											
16th Do. Do.											7	7	4												16	18	5											33	27	11												
1st Hussars K. G. L.										1	1		6												37	43	20											37	45	26												
Coldstream Gds. 1st Bn.											4	4													47	50												58	62													
3rd Foot Guards, 1st Do.										1	5	6												49	53												66	72														
1st Foot, 3rd Do.																									8	9												8	9													
5th Do. 2nd Do.																									3	3												3	3													
9th Do. 1st Do.																									4	4												4	4													
24th Do. 2nd Do.											4	5													17	19												25	29													
30th Do. 2nd Do.																									3	4												3	4													
42nd Do. 2nd Do.											1	2													22	23												23	25													
44th Do. 2nd Do.																									4	4												4	4													
45th Do. 1st Do.											3	3													1	1												4	4													
50th Do. 1st Do.											3	3													19	21												26	29													
51st Do.																									5	5												5	5													
60th Do. 5th Bn.																									11	14												12	15													
71st Do. 1st Do.											2	3													6	64	74											74	108	126												
74th Do.											1	1													1	56	56											54	59													
79th Do. 1st Do.											26	27													121	135												239	256													
83rd Do. 2nd Do.											1	1													2	26	29											26	29													
85th Do.											12	13													3	39	39											43	84	92												
88th Do. 1st Bn.											1	2													1	45	49											47	52													
92nd Do. 1st Do.											7	7													2	32	36											39	43													
94th Do.																									4	4												4	4													
95th Do. 1st Bn.																									6	7												6	7													
95th 2nd Do.																									1	1												1	1													
95th 3rd Do.											1														2	2												2	5													
Chasseurs Brittanique											28	30													15	21												21	30	58												
1st Light Bn. K. G. L.																									2	2												2	3	3												
2nd Do. Do. Do.																									1	1												1	2													
1st Line Do. Do.																									3	14	18											15	19													
2nd Do. Do. Do.											2	2													2	13	13											15	17													
5th Do. Do. Do.																									8	8												8	11	19												
7th Do. Do. Do.											1	1													1	4	6											7	9													
Brunswick Oels											1	1													2	4	7											10	18													
Total British..											1	7	1	8	2	129	148	45	2	1	4	15	21	7	2	50	4	766	872	95	1	2	3	1	8	2	226	243	5	2	2	4	18	31	9	2	66	8	1121	1263	145	
Do. Portuguese..														5	1	44	50				2	4					140	158						1	7	43	51					2	4	17	8	227	259					
Grand Total.											1	7	1	13	3	173	198	45	2	1	4	15	23	11	2	61	4	906	1030	95	1	2	3	1	9	2	269	294	5	2	2	3	4	18	33	13	2	63	16	1348	1522	145

No. XXX.

Casualties which have occurred in the Trenches and Batteries before Badajoz,
between the 15th and 18th May, 1811.

Regiments.	Killed.							Wounded.							Missing.							Total.																		
	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.										
Royal Engineers	1	1	2	2	2	4									
27th Regt. 3rd Bn.	1	4	5	1	..	2	..	8	1	52	64	1	2	9	1	56	69						
34th Do. 2nd Do.	1	1	1	1							
40th Do. 1st Do.	10	10	2	1	18	21	2	1	..	28	31						
60th Do. 5th Do.	1	1	1	1							
97th Regiment	7	7	19	19	26	26							
2nd Lt. Bn. K. G. L.	1	1	1	1							
Total British Loss..	1	1	1	21	24	1	..	4	3	..	8	1	92	109	1	5	4	..	9	1	113	133				
Portuguese Loss..	1	1	..	2	40	44	1	1	..	4	1	88	95	1	22	23	..	3	2	..	6	1	150	162	
General Loss..	1	2	1	..	3	61	68	1	..	4	4	1	..	12	2	180	204	1	22	23	1	5	7	2	..	15	2	263	295

No. XXXII.

Continuation of the Siege of Badajoz.

Dates.		Killed.							Wounded.							Missing.							Total.																				
		Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.												
3rd June	39th Foot, 2nd Bn.																																										
	51st Do.																																										
	57th Do. 1st Do.																																										
	85th Do.																																										
	Total British..																																										
Do. Portuguese..																																											
General Total..																																											
4th June	Royal Artillery																																										
	48th Foot, 1st Bn.																																										
	74th Do.																																										
	83rd Do. 2nd Bn.																																										
	85th Do.																																										
94th Do.																																											
Total British..																																											
Do. Portuguese..																																											
General Total..																																											
5th June	Royal Artillery			1																																							
	5th Regt. 2nd Bn.																																										
	7th Fusileers, 1st Bn.																																										
	45th Regt. 1st Do.																																										
	51st Do.																																										
	66th Do. 2nd Do.																																										
	74th Do.																																										
	88th Do. 1st Bn.																																										
	94th Do.																																										
Total British..			1																																								
Do. Portuguese..																																											
General Total..			1																																								

XXXV.

Names of the Officers at Badajoz, from the 30th May to 11th June.

	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.		
	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
30th May	Lt. R. de Mello	2nd Portuguese Line		Lieut. Col. Oliver	30th May.	Severely	Ensign Leslie	9th June	
2nd June	Lieut. Sedgwick	5th Regt. 2nd Bn.		Major Gomes	14th Portuguese		Captain Nixon	57th Foot 1st Bn.	
5th Do.	E. Hawker	R. B. F. Artillery		Ensign Jose Vicente	21st Do.		Budd	85th Do.	
	Hunt	Royal Engineers			Do.			19th of the Line	
	Westropp	51st Regiment		Ensign Leslie	3rd June				
	Hogg	85th Do.			57th Foot 1st Bn.				
	J. Pereira	7th of the Line		Lieut. J. B. de Lopez	4th June				
	Major McGeachy	17th Do.			Portuguese Artillery				
	Lieut. J. de Meneara	19th Do.			5th June				
				Lieut. Forster	Royal Engineers	Severely (since dead)			
				Westmacott	Royal Staff Corps	Do.			
				Beardsley	51st Regt.	Do.			
				Gammell	85th Do.	Slightly			
				Grant	Do.	Do.			
				Captain Maxwell	17th Regt. of the Line	Severely			
				Ensign J. E. Bogueuse	Do.	Do.			
					9th June				
				Captain Patton	Royal Engineers	Severely			
				Smellie	51st Foot	Do.			
				Lieut. Hicks	Do.	Do.			
				Morton	85th Do.	Slightly			
				Dufief	Chasseurs Britannique	Severely			
				Lewzenewsky	L. B. Lt. Infantry	Slightly			
				Jose Fortis	17th of the Line				
					11th June				
				Captain V. Barrieros	3rd Portuguese	Slightly			
				Lieut. Bap. Lopez	Do.	Severely			

No. XL.

Names of the Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at Albuera, 16th May.

Killed.				Wounded.		
British.	Regiments.	Portuguese.	Regiments.	British.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Maj. Gen. D. Hoghton		Staff-surgeon Boolman		Maj. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole		Slightly
Lieutenant Fox	3rd Dn. Guards	J. P. J. Jose Montro		Hon. W. Stewart		Do.
Captain Burke	3rd Foot, 1st Bn.			Capt. Egerton	34th Regt.	Do.
Lieutenant Herbert	Do.			Waller	103rd Do.	Severely
Ensign Chadwick	Do.			Rouveria, A. D. C. to Major Gen. } the Hon. G. L. Cole }	Sicilian Regt.	Do.
Thomas	Do.			Wade	42nd Do.	Do.
Captain Erck	7th Do. 1st Bn.			Baring, A. D. C. to Maj. Gen. Alten	1st Lt. Bn. K. G. L.	Slightly
Lieutenant Archie	Do.			Capt. Hawker	Royal Artillery	Do.
Captain Montague	23rd Do. 1st Do.			Lieut. Thiele	Do. Ger. Do.	Severely
2nd Lieutenant Hall	Do.			Capt. Holmes	4th Dragoons	Slightly
Captain Humphrey	29th Do.			Lieut. Wildman	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Duguid	Do.			Adj. Chantry	Do.	Do.
Ensign King	Do.			Capt. Marley	3rd Foot, 1st Bn.	Do.
Furnace	Do.			Gordon	Do.	Severely
Vance	Do.			Stevens	Do.	Do.
Captain Gibbons	34th Do. 2nd Bn.			Cameron	Do.	Do. and taken prisoner
Lieutenant C. Castle	Do.			Lieut. Juxon	Do.	
Ensign Sarsfield	Do.			Shepherd	Do.	Slightly
Lieutenant Beard	39th Do. 1st Do.			Hooper	Do.	Do.
Lieut. Col. Duckworth	48th Do. 1st Do.			Latham	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Page	Do.			Wright	Do.	Do.
Ansaldo	Do.			Woods	Do.	
Lieutenant Liddon	48th Do. 2nd Bn.			Houghton	Do.	Severely
Loft	Do.			Titlow	Do.	Do.
Drew	Do.			O'Donnell	Do.	Do.
Ensign Rothwell	Do.			Ensign Walsh	Do.	Slightly
Major Scott	57th Do. 1st Bn.			Lieutenant-colonel Sir W. Myers Bn.	7th Do. 1st Do.	Severely (since dead.)
Captain Fawcett	Do.			Capt. Cholwick	Do.	Slightly
Benning	66th Do. 2nd Bn.			Singer	Do.	Do.
Lieutenant Shewbridge	Do.			Crowder	Do.	Do.
Ensign Coulter	Do.			Lieut. Provost	Do.	Severely
Lieutenant Whitney				Maultry	Do.	Do.
				Ellis	Do.	Do.
				S. B. Johnstone	Do.	Do. (since dead.)
				Mullens	Do.	Severely
				Henry	Do.	Slightly
				Jones	Do.	Severely
				Morgan	Do.	Do.

No. XLI.

Continuation of the Names of Killed and Wounded at Albuera.

Wounded.					
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Lieut. R. Johnson	7th Fusileers, 1st Bn.	Slightly	Lieut. Popham	29th Fusileers	
Gibbons	Do.	Do.	Briggs	Do.	Severely
Moses	Do.	Severely (since dead)	Ensign Lovelock	Do.	Slightly
Br. Lt. Col. Blakeney	7th Do. 2nd Bn.	Severely	Kearney	Do.	Severely
Capt. M'Ginnes	Do.	Left arm amputated	Lovelock	Do.	
Orr	Do.	Severely	Adj. Wild	Do.	Severely
Tarleton	Do.	Slightly	Capt. Flemming	31st Do. 2nd	Do.
Lieut. Erwin	Do.	Severely	Knox	Do.	Slightly
Healy	Do.		Lieut. Butler	Do.	Do.
Wray	Do.	Severely	Gethin	Do.	Do.
Orr	Do.		Cashell	Do.	Do.
Seaton	Do.	Severely	Ensign Wilson	Do.	
Penrice	Do.		Nicholson	Do.	
Lorentz	Do.	Slightly	Capt. Weddrington	34th Do. 2nd	
Holden	Do.	Do.	Wyatt	Do.	
Fraser	Do.	Do.	Lieut. Hay	Do.	
Acting Adj. Meagher	Do.	Do.	Walsh	Do.	
Lieut. Col. Ellis	23rd Do. 1st Bn.	Do.	Capt. Brine	39th Do. 1st	Severely
Capt. Hurford	Do.		Lieut. Hart	Do.	Do.
M'Donald	Do.		Pollard	Do.	Do.
Stainforth	Do.	Slightly	Ensign Cox	Do.	Do.
1st Lieut. Harrison	Do.	Do.	Capt. Wilson	48th Do. 1st	Slightly
Booker	Do.	Severely	French	Do.	Do.
Treave	Do.		Bell	Do.	
Thorpe	Do.		Morrisot	Do.	Slightly
2nd Lieut. Castles	Do.	Slightly	Parsons	Do.	Severely
Harris	Do.		Lieut. Crawley	Do.	Slightly
Ledwith	Do.		Sterring	Do.	
Adj. M'Lean	Do.		Wright	Do.	Slightly
Capt. Gale	28th Do. 1st Bn.	Severely	O'Donoghue	Do.	Do.
Carroll	Do.	Slightly	Duke	Do.	Do.
Lieut. Crummer	Do.	Do.	M'Intosh	Do.	Do.
Cottingham	Do.	Do.	Vincent	Do.	Do.
Shelton	Do.		Ensign Collins	Do.	Do.
Ensign Ingram	Do.	Slightly	Adj. Steele	Do.	Do.
Lieut. Col. White	29th Do.	Severely	Capt. Watkins	48th Do. 2nd	Do.
Major Way	Do.		Waugh	Do.	Do.
Capt. Hodge	Do.	Slightly	Drought	Do.	
Todd	Do.		Wood	Do.	
Nestor	Do.	Slightly	Lieut. Johnson	Do.	Slightly
Lieut. Stannus	Do.	Severely	Vandermeulin	Do.	Do.
Broeke	Do.		Shea	Do.	

No. XLII.

Names of Officers Continued. Killed and Wounded at Albuera.

Wounded.			Wounded.		
Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.	Rank and Names.	Regiments.	Remarks.
Lieutenant Sharp	48th Foot 2nd Bn.		Portuguese.		
Ensign Norman	Do.		Colonel Collins		
M'Dougall	Do.		Adjutant Jose de Mello	2nd Regiment	
Lieutenant Col. Inglis	57th Do. 1st Do.		Ensign P. Broquet	4th Do.	
Major Spring	Do.	Slightly	Captain Jose de Mattos	5th Do.	
Captain Shadforth	Do.		James Johnson	Do.	
M'Gibbon	Do.		Lieutenant Jose Miranda	Do.	
Jermyn	Do.		Ensign J. S. Vasconcellas	Do.	
Stainforth	Do.		Lieutenant J. P. de Carvalhos	11th Do.	
Hely	Do.		B. de Napoles	Do.	
Kirby	Do.	Severely	Captain A. P. D. Aragaz	23rd Do.	
Lieutenant Evatt	Do.	Do.	Lieutenant-colonel Hawkshaw	1st Bn. L. L. L.	
Baxter	Do.	Slightly	Major J. Paes	Do.	
M'Lachlane	Do.	Do.	Captain F. Jacob	Do.	
M'Farlane	Do.		J. P. Rosado	Do.	
Dix	Do.	Slightly	Lieut. Ant. Carlos	Do.	
Patterson	Do.	Severely	Andrew Camacho	Do.	
Hughes	Do.	Slightly			
Sheridan					
Vietch					
Myers					
M'Dougall					
Ensign Torrens					
Jackson		Slightly			
Lieutenant Ingerleben	50th Do. 5th Do.	Do.			
Captain Ferns	56th Do. 2nd Do.				
Lieutenant Hicken					
Harvey		Slightly			
L'Estrange					
Chambers					
M'Carthy		Slightly			
Codd					
Hard		Severely			
Crompton					
Ensign Walker					
Hay		Severely			
Mack		Slightly			
Major Hartwig	1st Lt. Bn. K. G. L.				
Ensign Smalkenson					
Adjutant Taple					
Captain J. Herse	2nd Do. Do.				

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